Problems, Functions and Semantic Roles Volume 137 (A Pragmatist's Analysis of Montague's Theory of...

VIII Existence, negation and roles: Prolegomena to a pragmatic theory of denotation and existential import in "negative sentences"

1. Introdudion. A new problem, its solution (in outline) and an auxiliary.

Having linked our discussion of linguistic interpretation to the Interpreter's mental representations, rather than to "objective things" and "objective facts", we are faced with the problem of (re)formulating all further semantic questions, and answers to them, in an appropriate terminology. This we shall not try to do in a general way. Our problem below is a particular problem, though an important one — that of analysing the connections between denotation and assumptions of actual existence, particularly in connection with negative sentences. In Montague's theory those connections are far from clear. W e believe that such problems should preferably be dealt with in terms of a framework like ours, of the Producer's locutions and the Interpreter's representations, rather than in terms of an objective Language with direct relations to an Objective Outer World.

It all started with Russell's sentence

(1) The King of France is not bald

As the reader probably knows, Russell treated (1) as an ambiguous sentence with two equally reasonable interpretations. According to one of these the sentence is used to assert that a unique individual exists who is king of France and who is not bald; according to the other interpretation it is used to deny that there exists a unique individual who is both King of France and bald. The ambiguity of (1) is due to the Interpreter's uncertainty as to the scope of the negation-operator not in (1). On the latter interpretation this operator is given a wide scope, on the former it is given a narrow scope.

However, not only negative sentences with definite descriptions can be considered as ambiguous. Take the following much simpler sentence:

(2) John is not bald

For those who accept Russell's theory concerning (1) it is not unreasonable to say that there are two possible interpretations of (2), too. Referring now to IE, the distinction concerning (2) becomes: 1. The Interpreter in representing the sentence ascribes existence to (the value of) a possible individual (j'j, in addition to non-baldness; 2. The Interpreter negates an ascription of baldness to the possible individual in question. Here a "possible individual" corresponds

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168 Existence, negation and roles:

to (but is not!) a constant Carnapian ( s , e) -function like Xw.jw, rendered in IE as )'. Below we shall sometimes say, more briefly, just "individual".1

Since 1950, P. F. Strawson has always opposed this theory of Russell's. In Strawson's opinion (1) has as a presupposition that there is (exists) a unique individual who is king of France; and (2) is analysed in a similar manner. If this presupposition does not hold in reality, then (1) is neither (objectively) true nor (objectively) false. Strawson defines a presupposition of a sentence as a necessary condition for its being either true or false. W e express this as follows, as concerning IE:

(3) A sentence φ has a sentence ψ as a presupposition in a language IE (to which both sentences belong) := φ η ψ and (~<pj η ψ

The symbol between "φ" and "ψ" here means that ψ follows logically from φ in IE according to the special features of IE (its lexicon, its syntax, and its logical rules).

Now as the reader will know, on the basis of classical two-valued logic it follows from (3) that ψ is a tautology. Therefore, if one accepts Strawson's definition of linguistic presupposition — which we shall call the semantical definition of presupposition1 — then the Theoretician will have to assume a three-valued logic or another non-classical logic which does not make every presupposition, of whichever sentence, a tautological sentence.

We shall not pursue this possibility here, for a third position is possible, which we shall call the pragmatical outlook on presupposition. Well known names in this respect are Karttunen, Peters3 and Gazdar.4 Like Strawson, all these writers deny that sentences as (1) and (2) are communicationally ambiguous, but they do not accept Strawson's semantical theory of presupposition either. The pragmatical theories of presupposition, which are sometimes called "formal pragmatics", do not need a recourse to three-valued logic. The notion of pragmatical presupposition can be defined as follows:5

φ has ψ as a presupposition in a language IE := if φ is a correct assertion in IE, then there are good reasons for the assumption that ψ is correct

Adapted to the terminology of the present book:

:= when the Interpreter judges φ to be true, then the Interpreter has good reasons for assuming ψ to be true

' Montague's use of the expression "possible individual" makes it correspond to "value of constant <s,e)-function". This difference as to preferred terminology is related to the difference between our REC-rule and his; cf. Section VI. 6.

! Cf. Gazdar (1979), pp. 90-103. 3 Cf. Karttunen and Peters (1979). 4 Cf. Gazdar (1979). s This definition is nearly the same as that of Blau. Cf. Blau (1978), p. 55.



1. Introduction. A new problem, its solution (in outline) and an auxiliary 169

For tiie moment let us grant that negative sentences, at least, (can) have such pragmatical presuppositions. W e think that one can know quite accurately what these presuppositions are only if one knows what the function of the negative sentence is in the given context of utterances (discourse). So we shall first have to deal will· the question of what functions negative sentences fulfill in human discourse.

In the OE sentence

Ex. 9 John walks

the proper name John directly denotes (to the Interpreter) its extension, 7 P. ~P(j'), and indirectly denotes a "phenomenon" — corresponding to the constant value of;". Nevertheless he or she cannot yet conclude that there exists, in the actual world of the discourse (wQ), an individual, walking or not, that "corresponds" to this proper name. The value of ; " in w c is the same (for this interpreter) as the value of ; " in any other possible world of the discourse in question. The function;" is not (or, only exceptionally) a function from possible worlds which is everywhere undefined, or which everywhere has the same artificial value "zero". The Interpreter's /'-function has some value in wQ, which is the "phenomenal meaning" of John in w0 ; it is quite another thing to say that something corresponding to such a phenomenal meaning exists.

So until now we have to assume that Ex. 9 has the same effect in the Interpreter's mind as a presentation of the following sentence in our metalanguage would have:

(5) The possible individual John walks

However, this interpretation of Ex. 9 leads to questions as: Can all possible individuals walk? Is this not a privilege of actually existing possible individuals? And that is not all. (5) does not correspond to what a producer of Ex. 9 normally wants to express. The Producer usually wants to express something about an actual object, and the Interpreter will usually understand the sentence in that way. W e therefore wish to say either (i) that in Ex. 9 the word John itself denotes an existing individual or (ii) that it logically follows from Ex. 9 that such an individual exists.

It is easy to see that the first alternative is not a good solution. For let us suppose that in Ex. 9 John indirectly denotes — to the Interpreter — an actually existing object. Now the question is whether John also denotes such an actually existing object in the following negation of Ex. 9, viz.:

(6) John does not walk

It is not necessary to say that it does. W e think that if the possible individual that John indirectly denotes does not actually exist (i.e., does not exist in wQ), the Interpreter may still regard (6) as true.

So the hypothesis that John denotes an actual individual in any sentence




provided the Interpreter takes that sentence to be "true", seems to hold good for affirmative sentences but not for negations.6

We do not like this conclusion very much. We think that as far as denotations are concerned, affirmations and negations — sentences without and sentences with negation elements — should be treated theoretically in the same way.7 In our view the truth seems to be that neither in Ex. 9 nor in (6) does"John" DENOTE an actually existing individual.

We assume that quantification ranges over representations of possible individuals, which is to assume that the Interpreter's basic individual-notion is: a constant function corresponding to a possible topic of conversation; with no admixture of a notion of actual existence.

However, something then has to be done about the fact that it seems to follow logically from Ex. 9 but not from (6) that the "corresponding" possible individual really exists (in w0). Our theory of representation ought somehow to reflect this fact.

Furthermore, it is known that even when confronted with a negation like (6) the Interpreter is inclined to think that John is used to refer to an actually existing individual, although it may not be possible to maintain that this logically follows from (6). In other words, even negations like (6) do generally pragmatically presuppose the actual existence of an object. Our hypothesis is that interpreters usually try to regard (6) as a sentence in which the predicate is denied of an actually existing object (indirect reference of subject term).

In the next sections we shall introduce and discuss Interpreter's postulates that will enable the Interpreter to infer from Ex. 9 that the possible individual Aw.jw exists actually. We also try to do justice to the opinions of interpreters concerning the "existential import" of negative sentences. For this purpose we need to know what the communicative function of the negative sentence is, in the "context of utterance" in question. Section 2 contains a discussion of the communicative functions of negative sentences. Our solution will be built upon the assumption of a special predicate for existence, £, in the Interpreter's representational apparatus IE. Summing up:

Problem VIII: How, on the basis of our assumption that quanti-fication ranges over (representations of) possible individuals, to ascertain a theoretically homogene-ous treatment of (Interpreter's) denotations of terms in affirmative and in negative OE sentences with extensional verbs?

Solution Assume Interpreter's Existential Meaning Postulates

' We use "negations" and "negative sentences* as equivalent expressions. Furthermore we treat the expressions "affirmative sentences", "affirmations* and "positive sentences" as synonyms (for our purposes).

' It is not easy to give a good general definition of what a "negative sentence" is. Since we shall consider only sentences with one negation element, we shall allow ourselves to restrict the meaning of "negative sentence" to: sentence with exactly one negation element.



2. Preliminary observations concerning the communicative functions of negations 171

(EMP's) for affirmative sentences with extensional verbs and also for negative sentences that relate existential assumptions to the communicative function that a given OE negative sentence has in a given context.

Auxiliary The Interpreter's existence predicate E, to be ascrib-ed to values of (representations of) possible individ-uals.

2. Preliminary observations concerning the communicative functions of negations in ordinary language

2.1 Contradidion of statements and hypotheses: Exclusion negation. A widely recognized communicative function of a negative sentence is that of contradicting an utterance of another sentence, often the sentence that results when the meant negation element is deleted. According to Garcia negative sentences have only this one function: "A negative sentence merely denies what is affirmed in the positive sentence".8

Here we have to distinguish two possibilities. The first is that at least one person has actually produced and uttered that affirmative (positive) sentence. The other is that the introduction of the affirmative sentence as a hypothesis leads to results that at least one person considers undesirable or absurd or contradictory (that person may be the Producer or the Interpreter or someone else).

There is a rattier close resemblance between this communicative function of negative sentences and the concept of exclusion negation that was develope by Gerrit Mannoury (1867-1956), Dutch philosopher and the intellectual leader of the Signifies movement in the Netherlands.'

The clearest description of exclusion negation that we happen to know comes from E. W. Beth. An exclusion negation rejects something without putting an alternative in its place. The attention is concentrated entirely upon the possibility which is excluded.10

There is, however, one important difference between our notion of this function of negation and Mannoury's exclusion negation. Mannoury emphasised that exclusion negation is characterised by, as he formulated it, "emotionelle Bedeutungselemente". The function of these emotional meaning-elements is an emotive one: that of hindrance of rejection.11

In our opinion Mannoury emphasized the emotive element too strongly. Take for instance the sentence.

' Garcia (1975), p. 5. 9 Cf. for instance Van Nieuwstadt (1978). 10 Beth (1946), p. 119. " Mannoury (1934), p. 333.




(7) The King of France does not go to Berlin

It may be considered as an example of exclusion negation. It states that die hypothesis of the King of France going to Berlin has to be excluded (from further consideration). The present readers fail to recognize any emotional impression deriving from this sentence.

Nevertheless we like Mannoury's expression "exclusion negation". So we shall from now on use this term when a negative sentence has (mainly) the function either of contradicting another sentence or of excluding a hypothesis from further consideration.

Another example of exclusion negation is the following sentence pair:

(8) Mary will not visit John (a). He makes her nervous (b).

The hypothesis that Mary does visit John now leads an interpreter to a conclusion about a result of her visit that she, at least, would consider undesirable. So we see that the introduction of an exclusion negation is not restricted to hypotheses that lead to absurdities or contradictions, as is assumed in formal logic; an exclusion negation is also often introduced in hypotheses that entail something that is undesirable.

Next, consider the following sentence pair:

(9) That coat is not gray (a); that coat is beige (b).

Sentence pairs of this kind are fairly usual in ordinary language. We do not think that the only function of (9a) is to bring about that the Interpreter regards

(10) That coat is gray

as not true. For as the reader will agree, (9b) allows one to infer that (10) is false. So if the only function of (9a) were to inform the Interpreter of the falsity of (the representation of) the corresponding affirmative, (10), then an utterance of (9a) would be entirely superfluous. And then Garcia would be right where she remarks that "in terms of actual communication, for practical purposes, a negative sentence is, a priori, worth far less than an affirmative one".12

2.2 Signalling extra-logical discrepancies in the outer world: Discrepancy negation. Wason and Johnson-Laird write that the communicative function of negation is mostly, though not always, to correct a preconception (which Hie Interpreter has presumably formed).13 Their example is:

(11) The train wasn't late this morning

Suppose, they say, that someone arrives punctually at his work and utters this sentence. A remark like this is probably only made when it is known to the hearer(s) that the train is often late. In that case the preconception which is denied is "that the train is notoriously unpunctual".14

11 Garcia (1975), p. 5. I ! Wason and Johnson-Laird (1972), p. 30. 14 Wason and Johnson-Laird, I.e.



2. Preliminary observations concerning the communicative functions of negations 173

(Although Johnson-Laird and Wason here make an interesting point about negation, we cannot entirely agree with what they literally say. For suppose (11) is a true sentence (according to the Interpreter). Does uttering it once bring about a "correction" of the preconception that the train is unpunctual? In our opinion only a series of utterances of (11) will bring about a change of Interpreter's presupposition. But perhaps this is what they mean to say).

We think that Johnson-Laird's and Wason's corrective function of negation can be subsumed under what we may call the signalling of extra-logical discrepancies in the outer world (or, in what the Interpreter takes to be the outer world). In their example the discrepancy is that between die punctual arrival of the train in question and the "normal" unpunctual behaviour of that train.

A discrepancy of another kind is signalled by (an utterance of) the following sentence:

(12) Mary is not a man (a); so she doesn't have a chance of becoming Pope of the Roman Catholic church (b).

By means of (12) the Producer states that Mary does not meet the gender requirement—being a man—for becoming Pope of the Catholic church. So we can say: There is a discrepancy between Mary's sex (female) and the sex she would have to in order to become a pope (male).

A discrepancy is never a discrepancy in an absolute sense but can always only be formulated in relation to some situation or state of affairs — physical, cultural or other.

In situations in which the linguistic or cognitive context makes it perfectly clear which discrepancy is alluded to, the (b)-part of the sentence pair can be omitted. In actual discussions and other conversations of some length it is often obvious what "hidden" discrepancy has caught the Producer's attention and determined his or her locution.

Not only sentence pairs are used to signal discrepancies — sometimes a single sentence with a negation element is sufficient:

(13) John did not behave very well yesterday

Due to the words very well in this sentence it is clear that a discrepancy is observed, and which one; a (b)-sentence would be quite superfluous. There is, so the Producer must have thought, a discrepancy between John's behaviour yesterday and the way people are expected to behave under the same circumstances (referred to here by means of the words very well).

A related example is

(14) John is not a good

which signals a discrepancy between an actual situation and an ideal situation.




The ideal situation need not be ideal in an absolute, metaphysical sense but is either

(a) a situation (hat some person or group of persons prefer above alternative situations; or

(b) a situation that a person or group of persons regard as the normal situation.

The ideal situation that is "presupposed" by the Producer in case of sentences like (14) is one that satisfies the deontic requirement or norm:

(15) One ought to do ones job well

In case of (13):

(16) One ought to behave well

Summing up: (13) and (14) share an important characteristic. Each is a negative sentence with a kind of emotive force, at least for many potential heares. This emotive force derives from norms like (15) and (16). So we can say: (13) and (14) are negative in a double sense — both logically and emotionally.

Our concept of discrepancy is very wide. Note, however, that a description of a discrepancy, were one to give one, will never be an overt contradiction (φ and not φ).

When a negation element is used to form a sentence that has the function of signalling a discrepancy in the outer world we shall speak of a discrepancy negation.

2.3 Choice negation. Mannoury distinguished two forms of negation, exclusion negation (cf. Subsection 2.1) and choice negation. Beth describes the latter notion as follows:

A choice negation presupposes the distinction of two alternatives. (In our terms: The Producer of a choice negation distinguishes two alternatives.) By rejecting one of these alternative one simultaneously affirms the other. The attention of speaker and hearer is divided over both alternatives. A choice negation therefore mainly has an indicative meaning.15

We believe that Mannoury needlessly restricts himself to only two alternatives. We see negation as a syntactic operation whose communicative choice function works equally well in cases with 3, 4 or any other number of alternatives, provided the number is not too high to be handled in practice. This third function of negation is therefore simply to bring about a choice among a number of alternatives — to choose another alternative, that is, than the one mentioned in the sentence with the negation element. An example:

(17) Rudolf or Otto or Bertrand committed that aime (18) Rudolf did not commit that crime

Given an utterance of (17), (18) functions to choose the disjunction of the other alternatives:

ls Beth (1946), p. 119.



2. Preliminary observations concerning the communicative functions of negations 1 7 5

(19) (Hence) Otto or Bertrand commited that crime

This is a use of negation elements that is covered by the science called formal logic, which tells us that (19) logically follows from (17) and (18) taken together, "by* — on account of — the rule one calls Disjunctive Syllogism.

We have now distinguished the following three functions (here: purposes, uses) of negation:

1. exclusion negation 2. discrepancy negation 3. choice negation The third of these functions of negative sentences and the "formal" part of

the first function are easily described in a formal logical theory — a theory of inference. They are the "overt" functions of negation, one might say. To describe the inferential logic of second, "hidden" function of negation, that of signalling discrepancies of any kind, is much more difficult. At least, nothing in modern theoretical logic can as yet be called a theory of the inferential niceties of this function of negation.

We mentioned that according to Garcia the only function of negative sentences is that of denying what is affirmed in the (or, in a) corresponding positive sentence. Garcia would be right here only if the Interpreter's sole task were to interpret completely isolated sentences, so that neither the Interpreter's background information nor the context in which the sentence is uttered, nor die hidden preconceptions and discrepancies could influence the process of interpretation.

2.4 Functional comparison of negative sentences and positive sentences. A negative sentence, being the result of the application of a negation element, can be said to have the same communicative function(s) as that negation element itself (or the other way around).

First of all, it is important to realize that nothing sensible can be said about the function that a negative sentence has in abstracto, i.e., when its linguistic or cognitive context is disregarded.

We have seen that negative sentences have three functions, though usually not at the same time. What about positive sentences? Can they fulfill these three functions, too? Certainly not all of them. For instance, there is hardly an element of choice in an argument of the form: ~<p or ψ; φ; therefore, ψ. The communicative function of choice negation can hardly be fulfilled by a positive sentence.

On the other hand, the function of signalling discrepancies in the outer world can be fulfilled by positive sentences, too; though this is certainly not an important function of these sentences." The same holds of the exclusion function.17

" An example is: The train was late this morning. The discrepancy is maybe that between the unpunctual arrival of the train and the way trains are expected to "behave".

'1 An example is: William does have enough money to buy a goldfish. This sentence can have the function of excluding from further consideration the idea that William should be given some money.




O f course affirmatives have important functions of their own. Thus an affirmative sentence may be produced for no particular reason other than to convey new information, even if that information is not relevant in the discourse in question."

Negations, however, are never produced merely as a consequence of their capacity to convey information; at least not by a socially mature producer. Negations have to be relevant to the Interpreter's problem situation.

Why do negations "have to" be discourse-relevant? Clearly this is because otherwise there is no limit to the number of negative sentences that someone may produce in a conversation." An infinite number of true but pointless sentences could be made about any possible obj ect of the discourse were it not that conventional relevance requirements prevent each party from dominating the discourse to no avail.

A sentence that, in a certain context, has at least one of the three functions we discussed in Subsections 2.1-2.3 will be called a communicative negation. W e can then formulate our opinions and hypotheses concerning Interpreter's sentence representations ~<p* that are of the form ~ Γδ*](ι*) as follows:

(20) Reg (~<p) 3 {Communeg (~<p) - [Excluneg (~<p) V Discrepneg (~φ) V Choiceneg (~<p)]}

The second-order predicates: Reg, Communeg, Excluneg, Discrepneg and Choiceneg are the Theoretician's abbreviations of: registered sentence, com-municative negation, contradiction negation, discrepancy negation, and choice negation.

3. Affirmation, negation and existence

3.1. An existential-meaning postulate concerning representations of extensional intran-sitive OE verb phrases. O n our theory the name John is represented as "λΡ.Ύβ'), where j' is a function that has the same value in every possible world.

If we now assume the presence of a special predicate for existence, £, in the representational language IE, then the assumption that John exists in the actual world can be formed in IE:

(21) ECP

which abbreviates

(22) EiffwJ)

In our meta-language: The possible individual John exists in w c . W e want the Interpreter to be able to infer (21) from Ex. 9 but not from (6). Perhaps the

" This means that we do not subscribe to Grice's maxim: 'Be relevant" as far as positive sentences are concerned.

" This rule is reminiscent of the "dynamic" rule (or rules) of dialogue logic, that the other rules of the game - the rights and duties of the participants - should be such that discussions can come to an end after a finite number of steps: as discussed in Barth and Krabbe (1982).



3. Affirmation, negation and existence 177

easiest way in which to accomplish this consists in the introduction of a meaning postulate of existence. W e start with one that concerns the arguments of representations of extensional intransitive verbs δ ^ :

EMP1 (Υχ)α(['δ ^ f i j D E('x))

("EMP" is short for "existential-meaning postulate"). The assumption that the Interpreter applies such a meaning postulate to IE atomic sentences with representations of such verbs explains why most interpreters seem to infer (21) from Ex. 9 without suggesting that they also infer (21) from (6). Suppose, conversely, that a possible object (of a certain discourse) which is called John, does not — according to the Interpreter — exist in wQ. Then the following is interpretationally true:

(23) ~E('j')

From EMP 1 and (23) the Interpreter now concludes:

(24) ~rs^](j')

So we see that when the Interpreter judges that the possible individual /" does not exist in w c , all sentence representations of the form (24) — which are representations of negative sentences "about John" — are interpretationally true.

This means that one important difference between positive and negative sentences is that the Interpreter who registers an affirmative OE sentence can sometimes (though not always) conclude with certainty on die strength of this sentence alone to the actual existence of a certain possible individual, whereas this is not possible when the registered sentence is a negative one.

This concept of existence is very broad indeed, in as much as it is a relative concept that always involves a possible world.

Take for example the sentence — in an enlarged OE —

(25) Nero Wolfe lives in New York City

People who know Rex Stout's detective stories take this sentence — about Nero Wolfe — to be true. Let us imagine that the Interpreter has listed lives in New York City as an extensional intransitive verb phrase. From (25), some background information and EMP 1 the Interpreter can now draw the conclusion:

(26) Nero Wolfe exists in the fictional world created by Rex Stout

or, in an enlarged OE,

(27) E(nw(wRS))

where nw abbreviates Nero Wolfe, and where the fictional world created by Rex Stout is indicated by "WRS". Now let the actual world of interpretation, w0 , be the physical world in which the Interpreter lives, as a human organism. Then




the IE sentence (22) is the Interpreter's assumption that the possible individual j' exists in the same physical world, and

(28) ~E(nw(wal)

is the Interpreter's assumption that Nero Wolfe does not inhabit this world.

3.2 Existential-meaning postulates concerning ext-ext transitive OE verbs. What about affirmative sentences of other kinds than those to whose representations the Interpreter can apply EMP1? An existential-meaning postulate for represen-tations of two-side extensional transitive verbs would be:

EMP 2 (VxMVy) • y) [ECx) & ECy)]

It seems reasonable to assume that the Interpreter also entertains a third postulate.

EMP 3 (¥x)(Vy)D y!Jx,<j>) D ECx)

Here the series of existential meaning postulates referring to types of verbs seems to end.

4. Does the introdudion of an interpretational predicate of existence help us solve our problems?

In the last section we saw that even when equipped with EMP 1, or EMP 2 or EMP 3, the Interpreter will not infer (21) from (6). So one of our problems concerning existence assumptions is indeed solved. There is an important difference between affirmative and negative sentences in connection with the actual existence of the possible individuals referred to in them — thanks to E M P l , EMP 2 and EMP 3, the Interpreter can derive the existence of a individual from some, though not from all affirmative sentences, but not from any negative sentences.

4.1. Exclusion negation and existence. It is true that the Interpreter never infers (21) with cerntainty from (6) alone. But we also know that most interpreters of (6) do generally assume that such an individual exists. In the following sections we shall solve the problem of how to explain this empirical fact (as we think it is).

We believe that it is reasonable to assume that the Interpreter makes use of his knowledge of the linguistic context in which a sentence is produced. Furthermore, that the Interpreter usually has some relevant background knowledge at his disposal, which makes the task of interpreting the registered negative sentence easier. We shall assume that from all this knowledge the Interpreter is able to grasp what the communicative function of this negation is.

We return to our initial example

(1) The King of France is not bald



4. Introduction of an interpretational predicate of existence? 179

Suppose the Interpreter knows that, in the given context, the function of (1) is that of exclusion negation. Can the Interpreter use that knowledge to infer that the King of France exists in w0, the actual world of the discourse? No, not always; the Interpreter knows that one of die reasons for excluding the possibility of a unique bald King of France from further consideration is that France has no King.

However, if a true negative sentence like (1) or (2) has the function of exclusion negation, the Interpreter will regard the possibility that the possible individual exists as highly probable. Why? Because in the Interpreter's communicative experience this has been the case in a majority of cases. This is to say that the Interpreter works according to the following postulate:

EMP4 When δ ^ is the IE representation of an extensional OE intran-sitive verb phrase and his or her information implies nothing about the existence of v* (a constant or a description), then the following IE postulate — where we now have to assume the presence of a probability notion π (to be read: it is highly probable that) — becomes operative:

{Exclunegi-röLtia*)) & - Γ δ ^ Κ Ο Ι 3 π(Ε(Υ))

Suppose next the Interpreter's background knowledge comprises the information given in a sentence like the following:

(29) The King of France uses hair btion

From that knowledge, but not from (1) itself, the Interpreter in that situation infers with certainty that the subject term of (1) was used to refer to someone in the actual world of the discourse.

Strawson and others hold that (1) logically (semantically) presupposes the actual existence of the King of France. We now see that such an assumption is superfluous, and why that is so. As soon as the Theoretician disregards the contextual information and the background information, and their functions in the communicative process, it begins to look as if the isolated negative sentence "has" such a "presupposition".

4.2 Discrepancy negation and existence. Next, suppose the Interpreter concludes that (1) has the function of discrepancy negation. That means that the Interpreter interprets (1) as if it were one of a pair of registered sentenced, e.g.,

(30) The King of France is not bald (a). So he will be rejeded as a member of the club of bald people (b).

As before, the existence of the king of France in the actual world of the discourse does not follow from (1), or (30a), but it does follow from (30a) and (30b) together. We believe that the following postulate concerning negative sentences with the function of discrepancy negation is a reasonable assumption about the Interpreter's representational apparatus:




EMP5 When is the IE representation of an extensional OE intransitive verb phrase, then the following IE implication is (epistemo)logically true in IE:

{Discrepneg(~ [νδ^](ι*)) & ~ [νδ^](ι*)} 3 ECO

It is easy to see that this postulate has explanatory power with respect to our problem. The discrepancy concerns i*. That possible individual has to exist in the actual world of the discourse; for otherwise we would be committed to an unintelligible assumption of "discrepancies" among (the properties of) merely possible objects of discourse. It would be hard to make sense of such a notion.

4.3 Choice negation and existence. Should we assume an Interpreter's existential meaning postulate for this kind of negation, too? We return to the disjunction (17). This disjunction is a useful premiss only if both Rudolf and Otto and Bertrand could possibly have committed that crime; and a necessary condition for being in a position to commit this crime is to exist. So each of these individuals had to exist actually at the time of that crime, — even Rudolf, who in fact did not commit the crime. The Interpreter's existential-meaning postu-late for choice negation is completely analogous to that for discrepancy nega-tion:

E M P 6 (As E M P 5, with choice negation instead of discrepancy negation)

4.4 Conclusions. We have assumed throughout in this chapter that the Inter-preter is able to form an opinion (not necessarily conscious and recognized) as to what the function of the negation element in the registered sentence is, in the given context. It seems reasonable to assume that this is often the case but that there are situations in which the Interpreter does not see what the function of the registered sentence is. It seems likely that even in such cases many interpreters will use their knowledge of the linguistic context or else their background information to infer that the possible individual referred to exists actually.

Our overall conclusion is that in practically all situations in which a negation sentence is used communicatively, i. e. as Exclusion negation, as Discrepancy negation, or as Choice negation, it follows by pragmatical existential-meaning postulates (EMP 4, EMP 5, or EMP 6) that the possible individual in question does exist actually, i.e., in the actual (fictional or real) world of the communication. That the possible individual in question actually exists never follows with certainty from the registered negative sentence alone.

The assumption that any isolated negative sentence whose IE representation is ~ Γ δ ^ Κ Ο has the existence of a possible individual as a logical or semantical presupposition is a superfluous and misleading assumption.



Problems, Functions and Semantic Roles Volume 137 (A Pragmatist's Analysis of Montague's Theory of...

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