8/19/2019 Pro Reversed Majority Voting

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Pro Reversed Majority Voting

The Stability and Growth Pact, and the member state's compliance with the fiscal rules which state

that the excessive government deficit should not be higher than 3% of G P and the debt rate no more

than !"% of G P, have a main tool# the reversed $ualified ma ority voting& The preventive arm and the corrective arm are the tools used by SGP , in which the preventive arm

sets the goals ember States have to achieve, while the corrective arm is implementing financial

sanctions for ember States which are violating the rules&

The necessity of immediate action for changing the Pact was shown by the recent financial crisis&

echanisms of (rt& )*! needed a long time to be applied therefore the implementation of sanctions

was not ta+en too serious& efore the reform, the -ommission.s proposal was adopted by a $ualified

ma ority decision in the -ouncil& ut many countries encountered troubles meeting the criteria and

member states were hesitating to implement strict sanctions on others, especially when the financialcrisis hit& -onse$uently, the experiences throughout the crisis showed that /the SGP was nowhere near

of being efficient and the only reliable guardian was the -ommission&0

1Palmstorfer, *")2, ) )4&

5n ecember *")), in order to strengthen enforcement of the SGP, the reform brought new rules for

economic and fiscal surveillance& Some reform proposals suggested an automatism in case of a

member state's violation of the criteria but the fundamental element is 67 8, under which the

9uropean -ommission.s decisions for ember States enter into force automatically& 5t is said that

67 8 will /considerably strengthen the -ommission.s position and improve the effectiveness of the

SGP0 1ebd& ) ):) *4& The mechanism is an effective tool when it comes to forcing member states to

comply with the criteria of the SGP& The -ouncil 1only the $ualified ma ority4 can re ect the proposal

though, because the sanctions are very drastic when it comes to sensitive political decisions such as

the monitoring phase, a decision stating that no effective action was ta+en against the deficit, or the

imposition of sanctions or fines&

5n spite of the drastic sanctions, 67 8 is allowing the member states to intervene in necessary cases

and to have the last word, therefore deciding whether or not the sanctions should be implemented&