Private Security in Guatemala: Pathway to Its Proliferation

Bulletin of Latin American Research, Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 320–335, 2012

Private Security in Guatemala:Pathway to Its ProliferationOTTO ARGUETAGIGA Institut fur Lateinamerika-Studien, Hamburg

It has become common to explain the proliferation of private securityservices as causally determined by crime rates and institutional weak-ness. This article on the contrary argues that other explanatory factorsneed to be emphasised, especially for post-war societies: institutionaltrajectories and political processes. The article first presents the presentsituation of commercial and non-commercial private security services inGuatemala (private security companies as well as security neighbour-hood committees). Against this background it reconstructs mechanismsand critical junctures through which the Guatemalan state had sourcedout policing functions to the private sector during the war and tracesthe reinforcement of these mechanisms in post-war society. It argues thatthe proliferation of private security services is an outcome of the rein-forcing of an institutional pattern of public security displacement to theprivate sphere. The continuity of self-defence and vigilante organisationsthereby emerges as a stronger explanatory factor of the proliferation ofprivate security services in post-war societies than their self-explainedauthorisation through high crime rates.

Keywords: private security companies, security neighbourhoods com-mittees, public security, path dependency, post-war, Guatemala.

The signing of the Peace Agreements in Guatemala in 1996 ended the longest internalwar in Central America and addressed the reform of the main security institutions.The Security Sector Reform (SSR) was implemented to overcome a militarised andcounterinsurgent conception of security and to strengthen civil institutions designedto control and prevent crime in a democratic society. However, these institutionaland political processes failed in different aspects: (a) in addressing the increase anddiversification of crime; (b) in preventing the subsequent uncontrolled private responsesto it, such as lynching, vigilantism, social cleansing, and neighbourhood organisations;and (c) in controlling the proliferation of private security companies.

There are 289 private security companies operating in Guatemala (Ministry ofInterior, 2010). From those, 148 are authorised by the Ministry of Interior andapproximately 140 function without permission. The number of authorised agents in2004 was 60,000. However, taking into account the 100 remaining companies pendingauthorisation, the estimated number of agents could have been 106,700 (UNDP, 2010)or five times higher than the total number of police officers.

Private security companies proliferated in parallel to the transition to democracy andsecurity sector reform without accountability mechanisms and significant impact oncrime reduction. Which factors explain this proliferation? Conventional wisdom argues

© 2012 The Author. Bulletin of Latin American Research © 2012 Society for Latin American Studies.Published by Blackwell Publishing, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street,

320 Malden, MA 02148, USA.

Private Security in Guatemala

that the weakness of state security institutions and the increase in crime are to blame(Johnston, 1999; Kempa et al., 1999). Likewise, most private security studies are madefrom an inside-sector perspective while political context and the historical institutionaltrajectories remain marginalised (Fundacion Arias para la Paz y el Progreso Humano,2003; Arias, 2009).

Taking the case of Guatemala as an example, I argue that private security isan outcome of the historical reinforcing of an institutional patter of public securitydisplacement to the private sphere. This is a political process in which two main mecha-nisms were in motion. First, commercial private security was reinforced as a result of theexcessive concentration of public security institutions on counter-insurgent operations.Since 1955, the police created commercial private security services using state resourcesin order to fill the vacuum of public security. Second, non-commercial private securitywas reinforced through the creation of self-defence organisations such as civil patrolsand military commissioners and also through the creation of vigilante groups (deathsquads) against communists, insurgents and alleged criminals. These organisations werepart of an extended programme of civic action and covert operations implemented bystate armed forces and supported by the US Government during the internal war.

The key point of these historical argumentations is the continuity of the reinforcingprocess of the institutional pattern of public security displacement. Thus, the transitionto democracy produced a formal institutional reform of the security sector, which,in turn, reproduced private security in the post-war society. This article traces thisinstitutional pattern and seeks to identify the reproducing mechanisms responsible forthe proliferation of private security in Guatemala. It analyses private security companiesas commercial private security and juntas locales de seguridad (local security boards) asnon-commercial private security.

Thus, private security is considered here as a socio-political function in whichnon-state security actors implement actions to protect themselves or the community.From a sociological perspective, private security is a segment of private policing thatinvolves both commercial and non-commercial organisations (Shearing and Stenning,1987; Johnston, 1992).

The case of Guatemala shows that the historical reinforcement of private securityweakened the effectiveness of public institutions because they were used as part ofthe counterinsurgent strategy and as a labour reserve for Private Security Companies(PSCs). Public security institutions have had to compete with a strong private securitysector operating outside the democratic rule of law. Informal social control mechanismsadopt policing functions involving state and non-state practices rooted in daily socialactivities that preserve a particular social order. This governmental process involvesthe enlistment of others, the shaping of incentives, and the creation of new forms ofoperative action as part of a ‘responsibilisation’ strategy that extends the scope ofpublic institutions by linking them with the practices of private actors and communities(Garland, 2005: 213).

In general, it appears that historical trajectories (authoritarian regimes, internalwars, political instability) can explain the origins and evolution of private security. Iadopt a path-dependent analysis to identify the mechanisms through which the statehas displaced its functions to the private, reinforcing it as an institutional pattern. Aninterplay of mechanisms of reproduction and critical junctures define this pathway.From a historical institutionalism approach, these mechanisms reinforce a previousinstitutional selection, raise the cost of shifting it, and reduce the possibility of other

© 2012 The Author. Bulletin of Latin American Research © 2012 Society for Latin American StudiesBulletin of Latin American Research Vol. 31, No. 3 321

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institutional arrangements being selected at a certain critical juncture (Mahoney, 2001;Tilly, 2001; Pierson, 2004: 20).

The article is based on an extended examination of documents from the GuatemalanHistorical Archive of the National Police and the Digital National Security Archive. Asa result of the lack of official information about the current private security situation inGuatemala, this article uses a set of interviews conducted with PSCs owners and relatedkey actors.

The first section describes the current situation of commercial private security inGuatemala and the second section presents its historical explanation. Likewise, thethird section presents the current situation of non-commercial private security and thefourth section contains its historical explanation. Although both historical explanationsare presented separately, it is important to see them as one historical process of publicsecurity displacement.

Private Security Companies in Guatemala

Guatemala’s spending on private security in 2005 was US$574.3 million (1.8 per centof the gross domestic product (GDP)). Of this, private homes spent 29.4 per cent, andcompanies the rest (UNDP, 2006). In contrast, a reduction in the public sector resultedin a low investment on internal security. The available data shows that in 2005 privatesecurity spending exceeded the budgets of the Ministry of Interior (US$234.6 million)and the Ministry of Defence (US$131.2 million) (De Leon-Escribano and Sagone, 2004).

Most of the security companies were founded in Guatemala. The small numberof transnational companies (for example G4S) can be differentiated only by theirparticular brand; they relinquished international quality standards, and reproduced thelogic and mechanisms of the local private security market. ‘Without this rejection, theinternational companies could not have the ability to compete in a market with its ownrules’ (interview with Jorge Sierra, Grupo Almo, 2009).

The Guatemalan government has few possibilities for effectively controlling theprivate sector. Guatemalan laws regulating the private sector do not include personalprivate security services (generally delivered by one person in coordination with others,but not integrated into a formal company) in their legal definition of private security.For this reason, the number of private security organisations can only be estimated.Laws regulating the activities of PSCs were passed in 1970 when PSCs concentratedmostly on the provision of guards (MINUGUA, 2002: 74; Tager and Merida, 2002:105). The diversification of services became characteristic of PSCs in the 1990s, whichis an aspect that existing laws do not regulate adequately, along with hiring criteria,professional qualifications and training.

PSCs are legally authorised to operate when they have a ministerial agreement.The process for obtaining this document requires a substantial investment of time andmoney to meet the long list of legal requirements. The process can take up to threeyears, but it can be reduced to a few months, depending on the owner’s former militaryrank and on the size of the bribe (interview with Alvaro Hernandez, Security AdvisoryMinistry of Interior, 2009). Hernandez also expressed that a common practice foroperating without authorisation is to rent a ministerial agreement from companies thathave two or more of them. This mechanism is called ‘coverage’ and generates extraincome for these companies. Aside from renting an authorisation, these companies alsorent uniforms, guns and agents from other companies.

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The Division de Supervision y Control de Empresas, Entidades y Personas Indi-viduales de Seguridad Privada (Division for Supervision and Control of Companies,Entities and Private Security Persons; hereafter ‘Supervision Division’) is the only agencywithin the National Civil Police with responsibility for controlling PSCs. This unit isunderstaffed and is only able to control authorised companies (the Supervision Divisiondoes not have a record of the number of agents, arms, services, and so on, for unau-thorised companies). As a result of high levels of corruption in the police force, PSCsconsider the Supervision Division as a mechanism for avoiding state controls: ‘The unitof control is necessary, but, more important, when it is neutralized’ (Interview withAlvaro Hernandez, Security Advisory of the Ministry of Interior, 2009). This meansthat the existence of the Supervision Division as a public institution is important aslong as its work does not interfere with the activities of private security companies. Itrequires the existence of a set of informal rules that allow avoiding state controls and astrong private security sector with political capabilities to control public institutions.

An interviewee described Ebano’s hiring process as follows. The company sets upa stand in poor rural communities. Applicants must be between 18 and 25 years old.Selected applicants are then taken to the company’s central offices in the city. Thecompany first reviews an applicant’s documentation and performs a short backgroundcheck, then administers medical and psychological tests, as well as a polygraph test. Theapplicant must know how to read, write and speak Spanish, and be at least 1.65 m tall.Often, the applicant completes an employment application with the help of administra-tive staff, because of educational limitations. Once the above requirements have beenmet, the applicant receives a two-day training course on security procedures, laws andweapons (interview with Jorge Sierra, Grupo Almo, 2009). This hiring process producesa shift in labour away from the agricultural sector, to private security (Dickins, 2001).

There are two different types of guard. The first is a typical guard with a shotgunwho has no experience in security issues and weapons and earns Quetzals 1000 monthly(approximately US$130) for 10 hours of work per day. This sort of guard costs less andis used widely. Legal and professional restrictions limit these guards from carrying outpreventive security actions. The second type is the VIP guard, generally an ex-militaryofficer with full training in security and weapons usage. This sort of guard is expensive.Since the abolition of obligatory military service and the downsizing of the army,company owners claim that it is increasingly difficult to find young people with militaryexperience and ‘the mystique and discipline of the army’. During the 1970s and 1980s,the army was the ‘training school of PSCs’ (Prensa Libre, 2004).

Lack of state capabilities to regulate and control commercial private security havebeen attributed to weak post-war security institutions (MINUGUA, 2002; Tager andMerida, 2002; CDDHHCEC, 2004). However, a historical analysis has shown thatrather than being the result of an institutional failing in Guatemala, this situationcan be explained through the existence of an institutional pattern of public securitydisplacement in which commercial private security sector controlled public institutionsand avoided formal controls over its own private business. The existence of a weakpublic security sector has benefited private security sector profitability, and has grantedit de facto legal impunity.

The State Roots of Private Security Companies

There are strong and complex historical links between private security and state securityinstitutions that are often overlooked, but are nevertheless very important because


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they explain the proliferation of private security as an outcome of political processes(as opposed to a response to crime rates). As I will show in the sections that follow,the main reinforcement mechanisms for the PSC proliferation have their origins inpublic institutions via the army, the police, and international advisors. This historicalexplanation is structured as follows: after the critical juncture that in 1954 changedthe political trajectory of the country, the armed forces were placed in an institutionalpattern centred on fighting against communism and insurgency while public securitywas displaced to the private sphere. In 1955 the Special Service of Surveillance of theNational Police was created to deliver commercial private security. Police officers andcivilian entrepreneurs created PSCs using personnel of the National Police. Parallel,the existence of a large US Public Safety Program reinforced the political role of thepolice and opened the possibility for international advisors to create PSCs as well.The intensification of the internal war reinforced this process and the consequentdisplacement of public security.

The Special Service of Surveillance and Private Security Companies

The Servicio Especial de Vigilancia (Special Surveillance Service) is the most importantunit in the National Police for understanding the proliferation of commercial privatesecurity services. It was created as part of the National Police in 1955 in the contextof the reorganisation of the institution after the reformist period of 1944–1955. Thisreorganisation was undertaken in the context of the start of the US Public Safety Programand the anti-Communist functions of the National Police. This progamme started in1956 and was formally terminated in 1974. It was part of the Office of Public Security,a worldwide police training programme established by the International CooperationAdministration (the precursor of the Agency for International Development (AID)(DNSA, 1956).

Among other functions, the Special Service of Surveillance was responsible forcontrolling the allocation of police officers in surveillance activities at the request ofparticular individuals, industries, banks, commercial enterprises, embassies and publicinstitutions. They used the uniform, weapons and other identifications of the policeand were under the control of the General Director of the National Police. This unitalso posted agents in strategic locations for collecting information on political leaders,students and alleged insurgents, among others.

A contract was signed in which the person or institution hiring the services wasobliged to pay the same salary to the officer as paid by the National Police (AHPN,1957/doc1770813). This unit worked under similar arrangements when it was hiredby other public institutions (AHPN, 1958/doc1747670). It was not until 1969 thatsmall businesses started to hire agents from the Special Service of Surveillance (AHPN,1969/doc665327).

The existence of this service lead to the creation of PSCs by police officers andcivilian entrepreneurs which used personnel of the police. The first companies weremostly directed by police officers such as Manuel de Jesus Valiente Tellez, ownerof the PSC Policía Privada de Investigaciones Valiente ‘Los Vigilantes’. The legalauthorisation for this company was issued on 3 August 1971, and stated clearly thatthe owner was obliged to reorganise the company in accordance with the new law butcould continue to offer its services (Tipografía Nacional, 1971). Like this company,there were approximately 30 companies which functioned through the Special Serviceof Surveillance between 1960 and 1996 (AHPN, 1985/doc2765346).



International security advisors created PSCs using the benefits provided by thepolice. For example, On 16 March 1982, authorisation was extended to Consultores deSeguridad Internacionales (Consesa), owned by US citizen Carl William West (AHPN,1985/doc2765346, 1985/doc2767792). Carl West was an officer of the US Army whoserved in Central America. During the 1960s, he founded private investigation offices inPuerto Rico and in Houston, Texas. He came to Guatemala in 1977 under an agreementwith the Government of Guatemala to offer specialised training to the National Police.

Likewise, after 1974, relations between Guatemala and Israel were characterised bythe sale of firearms and military training (DNSA, 1976). It has been reported that in 1983there were 300 Israeli military officers working as advisers in Guatemalan security andmilitary intelligence structures (Beit-Hallahmi, 1985; Bahbah, 1986; Hunter, 1987: 36).Israeli security advisers created security systems in inland farms located in armed-conflict areas. Business groups also hired Israeli security advisers. As it proved to be agood business opportunity, the Israelis started PSCs offering security systems based ontheir war experience. Nowadays, Golan Group is the largest and oldest Israeli privatesecurity consortium in Guatemala with approximately 3,000 guards and an incalculablenumber of investigators and security advisers (interview with Edgar Herrera, securityadvisor of EMISA, 2009).

Parallel to the existence of commercial private security services in the National Police,the military created also its own private security service. The Mobile Military Police(MMP) offered a private security service similar to the Special Surveillance Service.It was created also to provide information about any activities that might exacerbatetensions among the peasant population and when to repress them (AHPN, 1955).

The MMP was hired by industries and farms that risked being targeted by insurgentsor labour union movements. This unit had an important role in the counterinsurgencystrategy with the consequent perpetration of different human rights violations (CEH,1999). In 1980 members of the MMP hired by the Pantaleon sugar mill killed a memberof the company’s labour union (CEH, 1999: 321). The Embotelladora Guatemalteca(EGSA-Coca Cola) hired the services of the MMP to organise the internal securitycorps after a labour union was formed within the company (CEH, 1999: 113). In 1997the MMP had 2421 agents and, after its formal dissolution, some MMP agents werereinstated within the National Civil Police and the prison system. Most of the restwere hired by private security companies (MINUGUA, 1997: 26). The demobilisationof the MMP after the Peace Agreements left some state interests and private clientsunprotected and security businessmen hired MMP’s former agents. The economic eliteshad little trust in the government’s new civil security institutions as a result of thepotential for infiltration of former insurgents in security matters, among other reasons.They preferred to continue commercial relationships with the same military officers thathad previously provided them with security (interview with Carlos Quintanilla, ownerof SERPROP, 2009).

The National Police’s Centro de Operaciones Conjuntas (COPC) was in charge ofPSC operative and administrative efforts. The unit was created in 1972, and it was thefocal point of the army’s operative and intelligence units (PGDH, 2009: 124). It hadthe support of all units of the National Police, the army and PSCs. Their agents wereespecially trained by members of the army who were members of PSCs as well. (PGDH,2009: 167).

The link between PSCs and police personnel is undisputable, as many PSCs werefounded by police officers who hired police personnel. In addition, many police units,especially those tasked with intelligence work, used PSCs as information sources. The


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military counterinsurgency strategy necessitated the flow of information between allparamilitary groups in the country, with the police often acting as an intermediarybetween the military and PSCs. Finally, training course contracts were signed betweenthe police and PSCs that allowed the incorporation of international military specialistsinto the PSC sector. Some of these international specialists offered their services asprivate security companies.

Both mechanisms – private security services from state security institutions andinternational security advisors hired by state military forces – were reinforced duringparticular political processes. The military power struggles, the dissolution of statesecurity institutions and the military downsizing following the peace agreements allowedthe incorporation of former militaries into the private security business. This processcan be analysed at two different points in time: the first during the internal war, and thesecond in the context of a post-war society.

First, in the aftermath of the coups d’etat in 1982 and 1983, the army expelled manypersonnel who went to work for PSCs. For example, former-Captain Rodolfo MunozPilona founded the Unidad de Servicios Integrales de Seguridad (USI) in 1989. This PSCis known as ‘el cuartelito’ (the little garrison) because it is headed with strong militarydiscipline. It became a safe working place for former officers who participated in the1982 coup. Security companies like USI brought together a large number of formermilitary officers, who continued to control the army networks and security structuresthey had helped establish (interview with Rodolfo Munoz Pilona, owner of USI, 2009).

The second point in time occurred after the post-war downsizing of military per-sonnel. The army reform process was implemented in two stages. The first was thedownsizing of personnel implemented in 1997, 2003 and 2004. A total of 31,400military personnel were demobilised (MINUGUA, 2004). The second involved the rein-tegration of former officers into democratic civilian life. As the second phase was neverimplemented, it allowed for the uncontrolled incorporation of military officers into civillife, with a large number of unemployed officers and soldiers being reintegrated bythe private sector, PSCs, organised crime, and drug trafficking, among other activities(interview with Edgar Herrera, Security advisor of EMISA, 2009).

Figure 1 shows that from 1962 to 1996 there was a relatively stable number of PSCauthorisations per year, the growth was very low in comparison with the years from

Figure 1. Annual Authorisations for PSCs in Guatemala.

Source: Author’s own compilation with data from Ministry of Interior of Guatemala.



1994 onwards. By 1996, there were 37 PSCs authorised in Guatemala, most of themowned by police officers. It was from 1996 onwards that the number of authorisationsaccelerated. In fifteen years, from 1996 to the present, 113 PSCs were authorised.

The origins of private security within the state show how the proliferation of theseservices occurred on the basis of a pre-existing displacement process of state securityfunctions. The existence of mechanisms that reinforce a particular institutional arrange-ment in politically critical junctures confirms the argument that the characteristics ofprivate security in contexts of post-war societies could be better explained by placingthe phenomenon within a timeframe.

Non-Commercial Private Security

The local security boards are neighbourhood and communal groups organised to protecttheir living area. Their activities vary – hiring PSCs, or guarding themselves while inpossession of illegal weapons and with their faces covered. They were created in orderto accomplish the reform of the police and to incorporate international models ofcommunity policing. Rapidly they became vigilante groups and proliferated withoutcontrol. Different factors explain this process: the continuity of self-defence functionscreated during the internal war and the marginalisation of non-state security actorsduring the security sector reform.

Before presenting the historical explanation of the non-commercial private policingproliferation, the post-war situation of the JLSs and its relation with crime rates will bedescribed.

Juntas Locales de Seguridad in Post-War Society

The formal creation of local security boards started in July 1999 after the National CivilPolice issued a general order to address community policing. In 2001, 231 JLSs wereregistered and in 2009, the PNC reported 1029 JLSs (PNC, 2008, 2010). The politicalcontext limited the outcomes of the police reform which produced that the model ofcommunity policing was only formally implemented. Consequently, the JLSs becameautonomous and uncontrolled and even more serious, legitimised by the state and localauthorities. Complementarily, the strong citizen security discourse empowered localcommunities to take local security and crime prevention by their own hands.

One state intelligence officer argued that JLSs degenerated with regard to their origi-nal objectives since their formal creation in 1999, because they were used as an informa-tion resource for the police (interview with an intelligence analyst of the State IntelligenceAgency, anonymous, 2009). The interviewee argues that because the police historicallyplanted informants in communities and neighbourhoods, the population quickly rejectedthe work of the JLSs, and a desired collaboration with the police was impossible. Nev-ertheless, the JLSs were organised and are still working without relation to the police.

The activities of the JLSs are linked to violent phenomena such as lynching, kidnap-pings and extortions. For example, the San Juan Sacatepequez JLSs have approximately200 members, many of them former military officers, former insurgents and membersof criminal groups. Thus, the JLSs are not a product of the call for community organ-isation made by the police in 1999; they are a product of their own community andneighbourhood history, particularly in those areas with strong violent activity during


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the internal conflict (interview with intelligence analyst of the State Intelligence Agency,anonymous, 2009).

There are some specific differences between civil security organisations in rural andurban areas. The JLSs are mostly organised in rural areas, their actions depend on theorganisational history of the region, and do not have a direct correlation with criminalrates; they are mostly organised in low-income regions where hiring PSCs is not possible.

In Guatemala City, on the contrary, the JLSs are organised through the ComitesUnicos de Barrio (Unique Neighbourhood Committees), which are directed by themunicipality. They are organised in areas that have a median income and a mostly non-indigenous population (interview with Priscila de Narciso, Auxiliary Mayor of District9, 2009). Metropolitan districts 1 and 9 comprise approximately 1 million inhabitants,and have 200 neighbourhood committees. These organisations prefer military ratherthan police support and expect the army to solve the criminality problem with an ‘ironfist’ (interview with Ruben Darío Martínez, Auxiliary Mayor of District 1, 2009).

There are cases where a neighbourhood security organisation is promoted by aPSC. The Hotel Security Council of Guatemala promotes the informal organisationof neighbourhoods around tourist areas, and has representatives in every securitycommittee that collect information about criminal activities (interview with ByronHeredia, COSEHOGUA, 2009).

The political structures created during the internal conflict were the mechanismsfor the accelerated proliferation of JLSs. International models of community policingexpected collaborative relations between the police and the community (Savenije, 2010;Huhn, 2011). However, in a context in which self-defence and vigilante policing wereintegrated and adapted to the community’s collective life and there was no functionalpost-war demobilisation, the community policing approach stimulated the reproductionof self-defence policing. The homogeneous design of JLSs does not take into accounteach community’s cultural traditions and historical conflicts because it is a model oforganisation created by the central administration of the security institutions (interviewwith intelligence analyst of the State Intelligence Agency, anonymous, 2009). In mostcases, the population was already organised before its contact with state institutions.This situation produces negative effects for the rule of law, and reduces confidence inthe judicial system. However, the positive or negative actions of the JLSs depend largelyon the historical organisational culture of the region.

Homicide Rates and Juntas Locales de Seguridad

The proliferation of non-commercial private security is commonly associated with anincrease in crime and weak public institutions. However, this article shows that in thecase of Guatemala, an historical approach involving the continuity of social controlmechanisms (self-defence and vigilante organisations) is a more accurate explanationfor the proliferation of such organisations.

However, the analysis of homicide rates and JLSs illustrates two important points:the low homicide rates in indigenous communities, and the lack of a clear correlationbetween poverty and homicide rates. In fact, the greater the poverty rate, the lower therate of homicides. This is especially true in areas with a majority indigenous popula-tion (Totonicapan, Quiche, Solola, Alta Verapaz, Huehuetenango, Chimaltenango, SanMarcos). There are also departments with high poverty rates, low indigenous popula-tion and high homicide rates (Jalapa, Santa Rosa and Chiquimula). The extreme caseis Guatemala City, which has lower poverty rates but higher homicide rates (ENCOVI,2006; PNC, 2008).



While homicide is not related to poverty, extreme social inequality generally producesa serious social tension. Lack of security is perceived to be Guatemala City’s principalsocial malaise, although it is not related to the actual situation of criminality (UNDP,2007). Numerous studies have attempted to explain that this perception of insecurityand the reactions it provokes are based on differing social discourses that are related topolitical and social phenomena not directly linked with the causes of violence (Huhnet al., 2006).

The question now is whether the homicide rates, as well as poverty rates and ethniccharacteristics, explain the presence of JLSs in certain areas. Figure 2 shows that thereare areas with high homicide rates and a majority non-indigenous population that havefew JLSs (Peten, Izabal, and Chiquimula). On the other hand, departments such asSan Marcos, Alta Verapaz, and Quiche have low homicide rates, majority indigenouspopulations and a high number of JLSs. The remaining departments with majority ofindigenous populations and high poverty rates (Totonicapan, Solola, Huehuetenango,Baja Verapaz and Chimaltenango) have a typical number of JLSs.

The extent of the nation’s police coverage is not a strong indicator of a JLS presence.Although there is no acknowledged standard for judging what constitutes adequatepolice coverage, the number of police officers in Guatemala is nonetheless low inrelation to the population (UNDP, 2010). In 2006, Guatemala had approximately20,000 police officers, or about 1.56 police officers for 100,000 inhabitants, which isequivalent to 0.19 police officers per square kilometre (OCAVI, 2008). Most of them areconcentrated in the metropolitan area of Guatemala City, where there is a large numberof JLSs, as well as a high homicide rate. In regions such as Quiche and Alta Verapaz,there is lower police coverage, a lower homicide rate and a strong JLS presence.

As it was shown, crime rates do not explain satisfactorily the presence of JLSs inGuatemala. An alternative perspective is the relation between political violence duringthe internal war and the areas where there are active JLSs.

Most of the political violence committed during the internal war was concentratedin areas with majority indigenous populations that had a strong tradition of communalorganisation. Approximately 83.3 per cent of the victims of human rights violationscommitted during the internal conflict were of Mayan ethnicity (CEH, 1999). With the

Figure 2. Homicide Rates and JLSs in Guatemala 2008.

Source: PNC (2008).


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exception of Peten and Guatemala City, five of the eight departments with the mosthuman rights violations during the internal war were areas with majority indigenouspopulations and structural poverty.

Likewise, 54 per cent of the population that was organised into civil patrols, Patrullasde Autodefensa Civil (PACs; Civil Auto-Defence Patrols), was concentrated in the sevendepartments with majority indigenous populations (Huehuetenango, Quiche, Alta Ver-paz, Baja Verapaz, San Marcos, Chimaltenango and Solola) (Saenz de Tejada, 2004).The percentage of human rights violations committed by Military Commissioners wasespecially high in areas with majority-indigenous populations. With the exception ofZapaca, the remaining departments match those departments with a high rate of humanrights violations and presence of PACs, and are nowadays departments with highnumber of JLSs.

Based on the foregoing analysis, the proliferation of non-commercial private securityis not directly caused by an increase in crime, ethnic characteristics, poverty rates orinstitutional security coverage. Non-commercial private security reinforces historicalmechanisms of self-defence against perceived or potential threats. The tendency totransfer public security functions to the population can result in violent and authoritarianpractices, as well as increased popular distrust, and deterioration of the rule of law.It is important to remark that rather than the continuity of actors (which occurredduring the first post-war years) the historical explanation identifies the reproduction offunctional mechanisms of self-defence and vigilante policing.

From Self-Defence and Vigilantism to Community Policing

This article identifies two main paths to the increase in non-commercial private policing.First, the existence of self-defence organisations such as military commissioners, civilpatrols and self-defence organisations created by insurgent groups. They reinforcedself-defence policing as a local security function in order to protect a specific social order.

Second, state security forces with the support of the US Public Safety Program createda set of cover operations units to fight against communism and insurgent groups. Theseunits were integrated by police and military officers and also by civilian populationsand became vigilante groups also fighting alleged criminals.

The central point of the process is the reproduction of these functions during thetransition to democracy in which institutional reforms promoted by the security sectorreform introduced community policing models that opened up the possibility of thereimplementation of self-defence policing. Civil security organisations can be analysedfrom the perspective of the function that caudillos and their supporters had in thebuilding of the state in Central America (Holden, 1996). The use of institutions forpolitical control has historical authoritarian origins. During the dictatorship of JorgeUbico (1931–1944), the public administration was designed to facilitate social control,from the central state administration to the communal level. Social conflicts wereresolved through the administrative hierarchy and with the help of corresponding civilorganisations, such as the Auxilios Civiles (Civil Auxiliary) and Military Commissioners.They served different functions, such as surveillance, enforcing the legitimacy of stateauthorities, and the organisation of patrols. Their main function was to be an extensionof state security and social control (CEH, 1999: 424; Argueta, 2004).

During the internal war (1960–1996), the counterinsurgency reactivated histori-cal mechanisms of social and security control as part of an extended programme ofcivic action supported by the US Government (DNSA, 1963). The military had a



complex network of institutions, actors and organisations under their formal and infor-mal control, extending from the national centre of power to communal organisations(Schirmer, 2001).

One part of the counterinsurgency strategy was the reactivation of a Military Com-missioners network. In 1966, there were approximately 5,000 Military Commissionersinvolved in military operations against insurgent groups (CEH, 1999: 427). By the endof the 1980s, there were approximately 35,000 Military Commissioners throughoutthe country and they were part of the network of human intelligence of the army(DNSA, 1994). Their functions ranged from controlling social and political activitiesin communities and neighbourhoods, to denouncing criminals and organising securityoperations (AHPN, 1980/doc2774071, 1980/doc2774089, 1980/doc2774098).

While military commissioners were an extended network of civilian informants andrepresentatives of the military authority who implemented private policing in theircommunities, vigilante groups – which appeared after 1960 – have implemented ‘socialcleansing’ both of persons linked to political organisations and activities as well asalleged common criminals (McClintock, 1985: 83; Jonas, 1991: 60). These groups wereknown as death squads and were made up of both civilians, and police and militarytypes. The groups were the result of covert anti-communist operations conducted bymilitary and police personnel with the support of US advisors (DNSA, 1965a, 1965b).After decades of activity, different death squads fought against different alleged threats.During the 1960s they were used against communism, during the 1970s and 1980s theytargeted political leaders linked to insurgent groups, and, finally, during the post-warperiod death squads were organised to fight against criminality.

Another part of the counterinsurgent strategy was the reactivation of PACs, whichorganised approximately 1 million civilians in 1986 (Remijnse, 2002). The organisa-tional structure and activities of the PACs during the internal war were different ineach region. One of the main functions assigned to the PACs during the internal warwas monitoring and denouncing people and situations that caused suspicion (Saenz deTejada, 2004: 50). PACs contributed to the structuring of an authoritarian communalorganisation, and in 1999 it was estimated that they committed 18 per cent of allhuman rights violations during the internal conflict (CEH, 1999: 109). The PACs werealso organised by the National Police in urban areas and even in private and publicschools reproducing the same social control functions as the rural patrols (AHPN,1982/doc2774144, 1982/doc2774135; 1983/doc2774145).

Self-defence as motivation to organise policing actions was not only reinforced bystate security forces. To a lesser extent, insurgent groups created a civilian organisationalmechanism to ensure logistic support, such as food and sleeping quarters as well asinformation about the actions of the army. There were two main civilian organisationspromoted by insurgent groups: the Local Clandestine Committees (CCL) and theIrregular Local Forces (FIL) (CEH, 1999: 293; Brett, 2007: 51). These groups were alsoorganised as civil self-defence against the actions of the army in those communities thatsupported the insurgents.

Despite their formal dissolution in 1996, most PACs and military commissionershave been reincorporated over the past twenty years into a new local power structureand have remained linked with intelligence units or the army (DNSA, 1995a, 1995b,1995c; AVANCSO, 2002: 360).

The army and the National Police has historically been the institutional tool for amechanism of power sharing between state and non-state actors in a political arenawhere the line between the public and private spheres has been diffused. After revising


Otto Argueta

the historical context of civil security organisations it is possible to argue that theJLSs are only one part of a larger and more complex system of informal society–statecollaborations in security and control matters that have been reproduced on the basisof its self-defence policing functions that became a reproducing mechanism of theinstitutional pattern of public security displacement to the private sphere, in this case,as non-commercial private policing.

The Reinforcement Mechanisms of Private Security Proliferation

In this section, previously discussed arguments are integrated into an explanatoryframework with regard to the proliferation of private security services in Guatemala,and the corresponding displacement of public security institutions.

Based on a path-dependent approach, the emergence and proliferation of privatesecurity can be viewed as the reinforcing of a particular institutional pattern ofpublic security displacement. There is an overlapping of sequences at the time of theincorporation of different actors in the process. This dynamic reinforces the functionof private security in the general social system and places private security, bothcommercial and non-commercial, as a strong reproducing mechanism against publicsecurity institutions in the post-war society.

The historical explanation showed that private security was reinforced before thepost-war increase in crime and the alleged weak capabilities of public institutions. Onthe contrary, private security is the outcome of an institutional pattern of public securitydisplacement triggered after the critical juncture of 1954. On the one side, the policecreated the institutional mechanism to offer commercial private security that stimulatesthe creation of PSCs owned by police officers, civilian entrepreneurs, internationaladvisors and militaries. In other words, commercial private security has its roots in stateinstitutional trajectories and key political processes.

On the other hand, non-commercial private security emerged also from the historicaldisplacement of public security. As part of an extended programme of civil participationin counterinsurgent operations, state security forces reactivated a set of self-defence andvigilante organisations to fight against communism, insurgents and alleged criminals.

However, the historical perspective gains value if it explains the reproduction ofthis institutional pattern beyond political change processes such as the end of theinternal war and the transition to democracy. In this perspective, this article showedthat incomplete demobilisation processes and the marginalisation of non-state securityactors in the security sector reform allow the reproduction of private security as a socialfunction of self-defence.

Crime rates and state capabilities do not explain satisfactorily the presence of privatesecurity during the post-war period. The historical explanation presented here proposesan alternative approach to explain private security proliferation based on its relationwith historical trajectories of public institutions. This perspective can help to explainthat rather than an effect of the weakness of state institutions, in particular contextsprivate security can be one of its causes.

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Private Security in Guatemala: Pathway to Its Proliferation

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