Private provision of trans-boundary public information: innovations in Western and Central Pacific tuna fisheries

Simon R. Bush, Megan Bailey and Paul A.M. van Zwieten

Wageningen University, The Netherlands

Email: simon.bush@wur.nl

Paper presented at the ECPR General Conference 2013, 4 - 7 September 2013, Sciences Po Bordeaux, Domaine Universitaire.

Abstract

Tuna in the Western and Central pacific constitute one of the most contested fisheries in the world, with competing interests over catch allocation, trade and sustainability. One of the underlying drivers of conflict and poor cooperation is incomplete or unavailable information, creating both substantive and strategic uncertainties over management. Governments and industry alike limit the capacity of the many existing tuna information systems because catch, effort and trade statistics are considered politically sensitive and/or proprietary, despite efforts by intergovernmental bodies and donor agencies. This paper maps the existing information systems striving to create more transparency in Pacific tuna and argues that state-based information systems may be unable to overcome political and commercial interests. Our work suggests that innovations in informational networks, often led by private actors, can improve state-based management. These improvements are often local, however, and the flow of information across stakeholders can be limited, even when innovation exists. We argue that a new architecture for transparency and accountability is needed for the conservation of WCPO tuna that links existing information platforms, connects investors with local businesses and communities, and increases the availability of private data to public entities.

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Introduction

The role of information in environmental governance is changing dramatically with the advent of information technology, the rise of civil society as a legitimate actor in decision making, and the expectation of society at large to ‘know’ more about how resources are being produced and consumed. Our understanding of environmental problems can therefore no longer only be limited to ‘additions and withdrawals’ at specific sites based on a narrow set of extractive actions, but instead needs to take into account a wide range of material and informational flows that shape how resources are consumed and produced across global space (Mol and Spaargaren, 2005; Mol and Spaargaren, 2006). Global environmental policy and management therefore places new demands on informational infrastructure to facilitate the collection, collation and communication of informational flows to an ever larger group of users, all with different knowledge, expectations and, drawing on a North-South divide, differing degrees of access to information technology.

Understanding information as an ‘environmental flow’ draws attention to the agency of those supplying and demanding information, as well as the design of infrastructures that facilitate the accumulation, movement and communication of information. The design of these infrastructures determine the speed and spatial configuration of informational flows, as well as the access of both producers and users of information. How decisions are made for the design of these infrastructures, how they are implemented, and what consequences they have for environmental decision making, falls under what Mol (2006) and others have labelled informational governance. Building on a wider analysis of the shifting boundaries between the role of the state and private actors in environmental governance, informational governance focuses on how conventional modes of state-centred environmental decision making are being transformed by informational processes, technologies and institutions leading to multi-actor, and often transnational forms of environmental governance (Mol, 2008). Informational demands are therefore shaped by the state in networked collaboration with a wide range of public and private actors, in addition to the informational infrastructures that facilitate informational flows.

Effective management of fisheries resources depends, in part, on the availability of data and information. Information uncertainties in parts of the Western and Central Pacific Ocean exist, leaving scientists, managers, industry and the public in the dark about the present and future sustainability of tuna fisheries in the region (WEPA OFM, 2009). Some of the key questions being raised at present relate to the ecology of the system (limits of tuna population production, bycatch of non-target species), to the likely future market conditions for tuna products (import requirements for the European Union, EU) and other countries, trade flows, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing requirements, IUU), and to the social impacts of the fisheries sector (employment in the fishery and value added sectors) (see for example EC, 2009; Langley et al., 2009; Barclay, 2010).

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Additionally, the effectiveness of different institutional and governance regimes is also being questioned (Mora et al., 2009; Kalfagianni and Pattberg, 2013). Both private and public decision making can be improved by providing information streams that help answer these larger ecological, economic and social questions.

Transnational fisheries need transnational management, and that requires the sharing of information across borders and stakeholders (Langley et al., 2009; Bailey et al., 2012; Fanning et al., 2013). While there is are effective information systems at the regional scale through the Western and Central Fisheries Commission (WCFPC) - coordinated by South Pacific Commission (SPC) and the Fisheries Forum Agency (FFA) - Indonesia and the Philippines remain largely a ‘black box’; they are recognised as having some of the most important fishing grounds in the WCPO, but are criticised as having weak and ineffective information systems feeding into regional management (Lewis, 2004; Satria and Matsuda, 2004; Langley et al., 2009). The informational uncertainty within these countries means that regional transboundary management of tuna fisheries is undermined and balancing decisions around global market access, social well-being and conservation measures difficult at best. At the same time export markets for tuna are calling for more transparent fishery practices and traceable fish, placing pressure on both states and the private sector to establish effective informational systems to meet these demands (Miller et al., 2012). While investment has been made, better coordination of the information flows and a more sustainable model for meeting both state and private objectives is needed. The rationale is that greater transparency of data and information in Indonesia and the Philippines will enable these countries to make informed management decisions, comply with international regulations, such as the Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported regulation, and perform more effectively in regional management discussions.

In this paper we argue that these new public and private demands require a new informational architecture that facilitate informational flows, while meeting demands for transparency and accountability placed on tuna fisheries in Indonesia and the Philippines. In particular we explore how informational flows once coordinated by the state are now being structured through trade and traceability, demonstrating a clear inter-linkage between both state and private rules, norms and technologies. We explore an apparent friction in overcoming the limitations of the state by comparing the ways in which the permanency of information regimes and the dynamism of networks influence the architecture of informational flows around tuna in the WCPO. Finally we suggest that information innovation, often led by private actors, may improve state-based management. In short, is a new architecture for transparency and accountability needed for the conservation of WCPO tuna that links existing information platforms, connects investors with local businesses and communities, and increases the availability of private data to public entities?

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The paper is based on interviews, site visits and content analysis of grey literature in the Indonesia, the Philippines and the WCPO. A total of 34 key respondents were interviewed, including inter-government organisations, government departments, fishing and processing companies, fishing associations and NGOs. Questions were exploratory in nature, focusing in on the current structure, linkages of existing databases and the wider legal and institutional demands placed on all actors by the emerging informational demands of sustainability, food safety and IUU.

We now turn to a review of the informational governance and transparency before mapping out the information flows associated with tuna in Indonesia and the Philippines. The paper then concludes with a discussion on the opportunities and challenges for a new informational architecture based on private provision of trans-boundary public information.

Informational architectures

Informational regimes vs. dynamic networks?

The intersection of public and private actors in informational governance is located between the permanency of informational regimes and the dynamic and transformative power of networks (Mol, Forthcoming). They are permanent in the sense that they draw on the legitimacy and authority of the state to place demands over what information is collected, stored and communicated, for decision making over long time periods. Their ‘permanence’ is characterised by the high cost of changing the infrastructures involved in these informational systems, either in terms of losing the infrastructure in place or the information accumulated. Transnational informational regimes are also based on multi-lateral arrangements that base a degree of their power on the accumulation of information through and coordination across a spatially nested hierarchy of governance levels (Hooghe and Marks, 2003). In the case of fisheries this may be from port to province, to national government and finally the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) databases. Although widely perceived as inaccurate, quickly out of data and unable to adapt to the fast changing nature of environmental problems (Pahl-Wostl, 2009), these intergovernmental databases maintain an important function based on state legitimacy and authority. They are also interdependent with international treaties that underlie international fisheries management, including the United Nations Law of the Sea, which sets out requirements for transparent information flows to be put in place by member countries.

Operating both in and beyond the state, networked information systems led by combinations of private and public actors are playing an ever important role in developing and controlling the global informational infrastructure around fisheries resources. Non-government organisations (NGOs) and companies are increasingly

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involved in the provision and critique of a range of fisheries statistics, either operating independently or in collaboration with states. NGOs also play a central role the advocacy and interpretation of information in environmental decision making in international regimes – indeed in many regimes, including the Convention of the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (Article 21), their role is mandated. In addition to their legislated obligations for providing information, companies are also being pushed to disclose more information about their activities through a range of third party initiatives, which for fisheries includes the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) (see Auld and Gulbrandsen, 2010), as well as taking their own initiatives to provide information on production processes and sourcing to manage their own reputational risk with consumers and NGOs (Iles, 2007). Less constrained by the statutory limitations of states, both NGOs and companies are able to innovate in terms of what information they collect, how and for what purpose, as well as how they design the informational infrastructures that facilitate informational flows.

Trans-boundary fisheries governance is a case in point when it comes to the interaction of informational regimes and networks. In addition to being party to environmental regimes, and their informational requirements, states with the support of private and civil society actors are creating new ‘hybrid’ informational governance arrangements, many of which draw on the neo-liberal logics of linking regulatory control through market mechanisms, where greater transparency is set as a condition for market access (Gupta, 2008). In fisheries this includes the requirements set out by the IUU regulation of which the EU is a leading player, which represents not only a networked form of informational governance, but also the interaction of state and non-state actors in facilitating the governance of informational flows. These information flows are also layered onto trade, meaning that provenance, sustainability and food safety are increasingly brought together through traceability (e.g. Trienekens et al., 2012). These informational flows, structured through trade and traceability, demonstrate clear inter-linkages between both state and private rules, norms and technologies, which ultimately leads to questions around how the permanency of information regimes and the dynamism of networks influence the architecture of informational flows.

Modes of transparency

If we accept that disclosure itself is a governing act (see Gupta, 2008), then understanding how different flows of information come together also requires attention to who facilitates these flows and whether and how they lead to greater transparency. General typologies of transparency capture some of this diversity. As Auld and Gulbrandsen (2010) argue, procedural transparency has been used to describe the openness of decision making or adjudication procedures to improve the legitimacy of the governance arrangement, while outcome transparency concerns the openness of regulated or unregulated behaviour in order to identify whether and how regulation is effective in

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meeting its goals (Mitchell, 1998; Meunier, 2003; Fung et al., 2007; Vermeulen, 2007). Other forms, such as ‘targeted’ transparency are related to this typology by focusing on whether and how specific regulatory aims are reached (Fung et al., 2007). These different insights into transparency are useful in understanding transparency in general categories of governance, especially as they are linked to legitimacy and authority (Cashore, 2002; Boström, 2006; Auld and Gulbrandsen, 2010). But they are less useful when trying to identify how different demands for information by different actors in hybrid arrangements of regimes and networks, especially through trade and value chains, lead to different expectations of transparency.

Addressing these differentiate modes of transparencies Mol (Forthcoming) offers a typology for value chains – but holds wider relevance to transparency beyond these chains (Table 1). First, management transparency is related to the provision of information for supply chain management to increase logistical efficiencies and does not involve wider societal actors. This involves upstream actors disclosing information within the chain on where, how and how much production occurs. Second, regulatory transparency, related closely to outcome and targeted transparency outlined above, involves demand for information by public and authorities about changes in behaviour for compliance to regulatory goals. It involves private actors self-reporting on their activities to public regulatory bodies. Third, consumer transparency refers to demands for information made on production and products related to claims of sustainable production made through environmental certification schemes. This then refers to private actors reporting to NGOs who assess their performance against public regulation and standards agreed upon in multi-stakeholder settings. Finally, public transparency, where more general demands are placed by societal actors, including NGOs, as part of broader claims to a right-to-know about the nature of production practices; open self-reporting and disclosure by private actors to a broad audience, but involving levels of data aggregation.

Mol’s typology helps to describe the direction of these flows, but does not address what drives self-reporting of private information. From a regulatory perspective related to informational regimes, Mitchell (1998) argues for the importance of considering enhancing self-reporting through a set of five incentives: (1) faith that the information they provide will be processed, analysed and disseminated in ways that contributes to management goals; (2) demonstration that reporting leads produce desired sanctions to punish free-riders (3) adoption of a facilitative approach that rewards reporting rather than sanctioning self-reporting shortfalls, (4) avoidance of adversarial responses to reporting, reflecting the dilemma that non-conformers will not provide honest reports if doing so will lead to punishment; and (5) removal of legal and practical barriers to reporting, by ensuring that there is not an administrative burden on those providing information. Coming back to value chains, it is then possible to ask whether market/economic incentives can add to Mitchell’s list, especially when considering consumer and public transparency.

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The move to transparency though value chains is indicative of an informational governance that combines the permanency of regimes and the dynamism of networks. The design of new forms of information infrastructure within these chains is then illustrative of new forms of transparency that ultimately determine who is providing what information to who, and with what outcome. It also demonstrates the shifting role of private actors in the provision of public information, and the new informational architectures that are emerging to facilitate these informational flows, potentially creating incentives for self-reporting. The rest of the paper explores current innovations in tuna information systems in Indonesia and the Philippines, considering how the limitations of the state in collecting, collating and communicating information for management purposes are being supplemented by privately structured and operated information flows. Understanding where and how informational demands and flows come together then allows an in depth examination of the efficacy of private provision of trans-boundary public information in the management of the regions tuna stocks.

The Global informational architecture for tuna

The global nature of tuna fisheries, and its importance in world seafood trade, means that it has been the focus of a wide range of attempts to create information systems. The oldest attempts have been made by the FAO under their broader remit to collate and present fisheries statistics. In addition to their general statistical database for fisheries they have established tuna specific information systems, most notably the Tuna Atlas. 1 The quality of the FAO data system has come under considerable criticism in terms of the timeliness and accuracy of the data presented (Pauly and Froese, 2012). Most of these criticisms illustrate the limitation that the FAO face in terms sourcing their information from national fisheries statistics offices or, in the case of tuna, from regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs). RFMOs also face limitations based on their membership - data can only be passed on at aggregated levels that reduce their precision, data is not available at the member country level, or parts of the fisheries in question are not included in their membership (e.g. Indonesia in the WCPFC) (Gilman and Kingma, 2013). As we go on to describe, information flows to the FAO pass either through the RFMOs, which in the case of the WCPFC means through the SPC TUFMAN database, or through fisheries statistics offices, for example the Bureau of Agricultural Statistics in the Philippines and the Directorate General for Capture Fisheries in Indonesia.

The FAO is also developing a series of innovative information system for fisheries in general which attempt to draw together data from a range of sources. The yet-to-be-released FAO iMARINE system, is a platform designed to draw together different existing data flows such as ship tracking, catches, biodiversity. This is drawn together

1 http://www.fao.org/figis/geoserver/tunaatlas/

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under visualisations such as time-series, vessel position analyzer based on vessel position logs, and AquaMaps which is used for mapping species distribution mapping. These can be brought together under virtual workspaces for users to extract data for external analysis. Although data on other fisheries parameters drawn from OpenSource databases, such as life history information from FishBase2, is available and deemed accurate enough, the main issue associated with this platform is again the source of data – which, as outlined by Gilman and Kingma (2013), remains problematic due to the inability of RFMOs to release operational level data.

Other data systems have been established that either include tuna, or are of relevance to tuna in the Western Pacific. There are also a number of private and public funded systems, developed by research institutes, NGOs and companies. The Sea Around Us database has been developed with the specific goal of reconstructing catches around the world in response to the perceived failure of the FAO system.3 The database has emerged as an alternative source of data and information on fisheries to the FAO and is widely cited (Pauly, 2007). But while it provides a strongly historical information source the database is limited in its design and resources (including project funding), to capture future changes in global fisheries.

Private demand for information on tuna, like many other species of fish, has grown exponentially over the last decade, placing considerable informational demands on fishers and governments alike. Building on NGO advocacy around private sector activities, downstream actors in global value chains, such as retailers, are demanding traceable fish products that are certified by the Marine Stewardship Council (see Agnew et al., 2013). In addition, NGO based recommendation lists, such as those from Monterey Bay Aquarium and Oceanwise wallet cards in North America, are being used as advocacy tools to draw in a consumer lobby, based on publically available information. All of these initiatives are voluntary in nature; placing requirements on states and fishers to ensure that basic information on the management systems in place, key indicators on the status of stocks, and various indicators on the wider environmental performance of the fishery (Roheim, 2009; Parkes et al., 2010). In addition, retailers and importers are demanding other information on the legality and source of fish based on their own corporate social responsibility agendas and, in the case of the EU for example, the demands of IUU legislation. As a result global demands for fisheries information is no longer the sole remit of intergovernmental bodies such as the FAO, but now extends to a range of NGOs and private firms.

As summarised in Table 2, the various systems together present a matrix of approaches in terms of whether they present timely dynamic data, the extent of their activities in terms collecting, collating or presenting information, whether they comply with RFMO

2 http://www.fishbase.org/ 3 http://www.seaaroundus.org/

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requirements and how accessible and transparent they are to the public. In general terms, the provision of timely data that meet wider principles for transparent data of public resources, are RFMO compliant, and thereby feeding into trans-boundary management is partial at best. The fragmentation of data flows and systems means that any ambition for improving information in complex fisheries such as tuna remains limited – as indicated by the varied attempts to make the databases interoperable. It also means that the incentives for improved data flows are undermined by poor feedback to those responsible for investing in the collection and collation of information. There are weak downward flows to levels of management responsible for implementation, and where information is made available its aggregated format allows for general descriptions rather than meaningful decision making. Finally, where data is available it is in formats that require considerable technical expertise to analyse; again limiting its utility in more local levels of decision making.

This short overview indicates that the global informational architecture for tuna fisheries is fragmented. Demand information has grown, extending beyond the state to a range of private actors. In addition, new demands are being placed on the governance and quality of information. Market actors has placed greater attention to real time, or near-real-time, data collection and communication. To sell fish in international markets fishers and fishing states have to provide transparent information on its legality and source, while sustainability demands are dramatically expanding the scope of information. Developing states, such as Indonesia and the Philippines, are found wanting in their capacity to address this information at the same that private investment is being made into alternative systems. This presents a central dilemma; how can the permanence of information regimes, underpinned by the state, remain relevant, while private innovation reforms the legality and environmental performance of tuna fisheries. Can private and public information flows come together? What is the domestic structure of the information flows, how can private and public actors on the ground respond to the global demands put before them? In this light, the on-going fragmentation of information regimes is an opportunity to the new demands of markets and state management.

Mapping tuna information flows in Indonesia and the Philippines

The state-based informational regime

Information in the Philippines and Indonesia is being collected through two parallel statistics systems (represented by green in Figure 4). First, data on landings is collected by the Indonesian Department of Fisheries (DKP) and the Philippines Bureau of Agricultural Statistics (BAS), which feed into national primary production inventories aggregated in terms of both geography and ‘fish type’. For example, province X producers Y tonnes of tuna. These systems are designed to give gross estimates of production rather

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than provide an indication of the health of fish stocks. They are therefore expansive in scope, but highly imprecise. It is therefore not possible at the national level to easily determine the difference between landings and catches nor their geographical distribution below broad-scale administrative units (provinces or fisheries management areas). It is also not possible to determine the catches and landings of different tuna species, with statistics often aggregated into the broad category ‘tuna’.

Second, stock assessment statistics including length, weight and species are collected by the Research Center for Fishery Management and Conservation (P4KSI), under the Ministry of Marine Affairs in Indonesia and the National Stock Assessment Program (NSAP) under the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) in the Philippines. Unlike the national inventory statistics, P4KSI and BFAR have developed sampling programmes at specific landing sites, including selected regency (municipal) level sites and major fishing ports – Jakarta, Bali and Bitung in Indonesia, and Manila, Davao, and General Santos in the Philippines. The data protocols used are in accordance with RFMO protocols, to provide inputs to national and regional stock assessment models. Considerable international resources have been put into developing these systems. Both countries have been a focus of the Global Environment Fund (GEF) funded WCPFC West Pacific East Asia Oceanic Fisheries Management (WPEA OFM) project which has invested in the improvement of monitoring and data enhancement and fishery assessment, in addition to overall institutional strengthening for fisheries management (WEPA OFM, 2009). In addition, Indonesia has received considerable assistance from long-term support from the Australian centre for International Agricultural Research project, and more recently, the United States Agency for International Aid (USAID) funded Indonesia Marine and Climate Support (IMACS) programme.

The result has been the collection of accurate data on key inputs to stock assessment, such as length frequency distributions, but additional data requirements and infrastructure development set by the WCPFC remain problematic. First, there are concerns that the systems in place have not collected accurate information on by-catch, of which SPC requires 20% to be accounted for. Second, although the data that is collected is considered to be accurate it is limited in geographical scope - which is in contrast with national inventory statistics. There is limited structural funding available to expand the scope of sampling, and whatever additional sites are now added are largely funded by the international projects listed above. There is also little political will to better coordinate and/or improve data collection within the national inventories to meet the needs of stock assessment (Satria and Matsuda, 2004; Heazle and Butcher, 2007). Third, the data is narrowly focused on larger, industrial fisheries and completely misses small-scale tuna fisheries. This is particularly notable given the broad assumptions that are made about the contribution of these fisheries to the stock status in stock assessments at both national level and the SPC for both Indonesia and the Philippines. Fourth, coordination of data

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between national and regional databases remains problematic. In the Philippines the NSAP database collates data for a wide range of species. Specific data on tuna required through the SPC TUFMAN database is separated out from NSAP for timely submission.

There are also wider structural problems associated with fishery data collection, as well as access to information once collected. In both countries the national inventory and stock assessment data are in formats which make it difficult for decision makers and scientists alike to access and use. The databases are either too sophisticated (in Indonesia, for example, it was reported that only one employee of P4KSI was trained to use the TUFMAN database), or there are institutional barriers within the government to sharing data. Furthermore, funding is attached to the statistics. In the Philippines the national inventory data provided by BAS determines BFAR's budget. In Indonesia the same national catch statistics are linked to targets for tax revenues in the fisheries sector. Once the targets are met data ceases to be collected. There are also limitations in collecting information from the private sector. Although port sampling is a legislated requirement companies are reticent to participate in fear of incurring higher taxes (see Dutton, 2005). In Benoa Bali, for example, companies limit the access of Tuna Fisheries Research Centre (LPPT), a sub-branch of P4KSI, which restricts their capacity to collect accurate information. Both cases represent perverse disincentives for under reporting and also structural barriers for innovation within existing government information systems.

Finally, there is a dearth of trade and consumption data available in both Indonesia and the Philippines. A number of benefits could be derived from the collection of this information in conjunction with fisheries information. First, while there are assumptions about the importance of tuna fisheries there is little evidence to support their importance. This would provide greater leverage to fisheries departments within the government dependent on production related revenues. Second, this information would also enable a better understanding of the wider impact of these fisheries on domestic economies and food security. Discussions over fisheries management in the region are often focused on the importance of export income for small island nations. When Indonesia and the Philippines are drawn into this discussion it is often in the context of allowing adequate fish, namely yellowfin and bigeye tuna, to escape to the main fishing grounds in the WCPO (Langley et al., 2009; Bailey et al., 2012). Less attention is given to the relative importance of these fisheries for food security and local livelihoods for coastal fishing communities and ‘inland’ population, on this fishery. Likewise the importance of tuna for the export markets of Indonesia and the Philippines is also not well known. There is therefore considerable scope for exploring the possibility of linking traditional fisheries data with a range of other information related to trade – emphasizing the link between government and private sector information systems.

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Alternative data systems and new drivers for fisheries information

Ultimately national information systems feed into the RFMO systems and have therefore been the main focus of attention. Donor driven projects funded by USAID, ACIAR and GEF all work with government to improve existing information systems. While the ACIAR and GEF programmes have long term partnerships with the Indonesian government, the USAID-IMACS programme has also created partnerships with the private sector. The IMACS programme is a case in point. It has invested in OpenSource data infrastructure and an extended enumeration programme focused on smaller scale tuna fisheries that is compliant with SPC data protocols. The long term objective is to bridge the existing relatively closed government databases, with extra coverage and with greater transparency.

IMACs has developed the iFish database4 which is an cloud-computing data system based on - Parsecress SQL OpenSource software. The decision to develop an alternate system was in response to the operational difficulties of the SPC TUFMAN database in Indonesia, which is limited to single computers and a high degree of technical expertise. In all but the largest harbours in Indonesia, once a computer breaks down, a CD is lost, or a trained staff member is transferred the system breaks down. There are also limitations to making TUFMAN interoperable with other systems. The iFish system is an attempt to overcome these limitations and create a system that makes data collection at smaller landing sites accessible. The system is based on emailing excel data sheets to a cloud-based server which then parses data into the system. This also means that within one week data that has been collected at landing sites is stored centrally in the system based in Jakarta. In addition, access to the data is managed such that the data can be made available in a variety of forms – both raw and analysed. As such it lowers the technical expertise needed, increases the speed at which information is uploaded and, because it is based on SQL, allows for interoperability with the SPC TUFMAN system.

The IMACs programme has also been able to extend beyond the limitations faced by donor driven technical assistance, such as the CSIRO and WPEA programmes, by stimulating public-private partnerships for improved enumeration at landing sites. In West and East Nusa Tenggara provinces for example, the programme has established a data management committee that brings together both government representatives and private sector to provide oversight on the protocols for the data system. Industry partners are varied, including both local investor-middlemen (pongawwa) (cf. Kusumawati et al., 2013), exporters and importers such as the Dutch-American company Anova Seafoods. In doing so, the programme has been able to support improvements at landing sites that otherwise fall outside of the government’s data collection systems.

4 http://imacsindonesia.com/I-Fish/?q=id/content/about

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The participation of the private sector is based on a wider realisation of the need to invest in improved information systems to meet catch documentation requirements for accessing export markets. To fulfil requirements of these markets Anova has invested, through their Fishing and Living programme, in improved fisheries information systems to ensure better overall compliance to WCPFC requirements for data collection in Indonesia, which also allows them to fulfil catch documentation requirements for export. In partnership with IMACs, Anova has developed an enumeration programme that uses data protocols that meet SPC requirements, including data on length frequency distributions, by-catch, and fishing ground estimates. The data is collected by trained enumerators, filled into excel spread sheets and then uploaded by email to the iFish database.

In the Philippines a similar enumeration programme has been developed by WWF. Although the data systems are more advanced than in Indonesia, small scale fisheries also remain largely absent from the NSAP database, and ultimately the SPC TUFMAN system. The enumeration programmes established by WWF are currently being developed, but are also designed to be compliant with SPC data protocols. Similar to the Anova programme in Indonesia, it is in WWF’s partnership with local fishers and middlemen (casas) in Mindoro and Laquenoy Gulf that access to this data is possible (WWF) (Doddema, 2012). Again, the long term goal is to build the capacity of these fisheries to develop the transparency necessary to meet the requirements of catch documentation and, ultimately, MSC certification. Once collected the data will feed into the NSAP database at BFAR. At the same time, similar programmes being developed by the University of the Philippines Visayas (UPV) and BFAR to develop local data collection protocols in areas currently not covered by the NSAP system. Unlike the iFish system in Indonesia, however, no parallel cloud-based system is being developed to TUFMAN. As a result operational difficulties for provincial staff remain difficult and opportunities for data sharing remain limited.

The development of alternative information systems in both countries presents a range of opportunities for innovation. The inclusion of the private sector draws in new data which can greatly improve the accuracy of stock assessment. SQL OpenSource cloud-based databases provide a basis on which better coordinate both new and existing flows of data at both national and regional levels. Despite the gains that have been made by these systems there remain key limitations to their impact on existing government information systems. First, there is reluctance to take up the data collected into government databases, and second, there is no certainty that private sector, NGO and donor-led programmes will continue funding port-level enumeration programmes. Looking beyond the project horizon of these programmes incentives are required that ensure that private investment is made in the collection of otherwise absent data on tuna fisheries.

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A sustainable mechanism for maintaining information flows

Incentivising change in the design and operation of information systems in Indonesia and the Philippines is ultimately driven by from two sides. The investment made by the RFMOs in supporting the development of new data protocols has led to institutional changes driven by pressure to obtain comply with membership requirements. While this presents an incentive for national government RFMO membership remains largely outside the concern of industry. At the same time market regulation in the form of catch documentation and traceability, under the guise of Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) policies, is pushing states to invest in greater transparency in response to markets and NGO pressure. Recent reports of between 33 and 82% of seafood being mislabelled in major international markets is also driving demand for greater transparency about trading activities (Jacquet and Pauly, 2008; Miller and Mariani, 2010; Marko et al., 2011). Market access is now dependent on the existence of information systems being in place, not only to record landings but also to account for post-harvest activities up to the level of the consumer.

The EU IUU policy has been a major driver of greater transparency in global fisheries. The basis of the regulation are threefold (EC, 2009; Tsamenyi et al., 2009). First, the EU has set up a catch certification scheme as a formal procedure for ensuring that all flag states can certify compliance with coastal state conservation and management measures. This requires flag states to certify that its vessel’s catch is legitimate, and coastal states to verify this legitimacy if the catch is trans-shipped or processed onshore. Second, the EU has their own IUU vessel list, for vessels that are known to have engaged in IUU activities – which additional to the RFMO IUU vessel lists. Finally, the EU has an additional list for non-cooperating third countries, under which the IUU Regulation prohibits the importation of fish caught by vessels flying their flag into the EU and will also not accept catch certificates that accompany these fish. Together these three dimensions of IUU regulation mean that countries like Indonesia and the Philippines are at risk of being excluded from the EU market if they are unable to put adequate information and regulatory systems in place.

Industry has also responded to IUU regulation by either conforming to state systems of control or, where these systems are weak or not in place, have taken up initiatives themselves to ensure they are able to maintain market access. The information systems that are being established by Anova, IMACs and WWF are all examples of partnerships with fishers to improve data collection for stock assessment, but can also contribute the necessary data for meeting catch documentation requirements. Additional requirements for traceability are also being invested in by private sector actors, primarily to meet food safety requirements, but face difficulties when dealing with small-scale fishers (Jacquet et al., 2010). These value chains are often convoluted and fishing vessels are difficult to track to the locations where fish were caught. However, the growing demands of international

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markets requires full traceability and transparency of seafood is becoming increasingly important given the lack of trust in the various cases of mislabelling seen in the US and EU. Voluntary governance arrangements are also making traceability more important. In both Indonesia and the Philippines wider aspirations for MSC certification also means a well-managed chain of custody will have to be developed (MSC, 2011). Bringing together statistics, catch documentation and traceability therefore opens up considerable opportunities to improve the transparency of information flows around on tuna fisheries, as well meet requirements for international market access, for both Indonesia and the Philippines.

In line with greater emphasis on transparency in fisheries trade, there is currently a move to consumer facing traceability systems that communicate not only the chain of custody but also information related to the status of fish stocks and fisher practices. Leading tuna canning companies are at various stages of developing consumer facing systems, including John West5, Saupiquet, Rio Mare6 and Pacifical7. While communicating more than traditional ‘backstage’ traceability systems, which have been developed for food safety, these remain proprietary systems with information limited to the operations of those companies. An alternative approach, represented by ‘ThisFish.org’, is to create an open system to fishers and downstream value chain actors can participate to communicate a wide range of information related to traceability.

The ThisFish model, developed by the Canadian EcoTrust, is a fisher-led platform enabling consumers to view both the chain of custody through which their product has passed and a range of other information about each actor along the chain. The system not only collects information on trade flows but also fisheries data which EcoTrust plans to link to government-based fisheries statistics. The database has also been transformative in terms of creating incentives for the collection of data in fisheries that are otherwise poorly represented in catch statistics. The transparency that the systems offer has also empowered fishers by communicating market information that has in turn enabled them to improve their bargaining power with downstream actors. Although pressure is now coming from retailers for the system to conform to their own needs, ThisFish remains a fisher-led system, enabling greater ownership and therefore incentive for on-going participation.

Although not yet implemented in Indonesia or the Philippines, when link to the wider ambitions of complying to IUU regulation and aspirations for MSC certification, consumer-led transparency linked to offers a means of meeting various demands of transparency. Adapting the ThisFish model to Indonesian and Philippine tuna fisheries offers an incentivised means of supporting existing enumeration programmes beyond

5 http://www.john-west.co.uk/discover-the-story-behind-your-can 6 http://www.riomare.com/en/traceability 7 http://www.pacifical.com/

15

their project horizon, as well as creating opportunities for fishers to access markets requiring documentation and traceability. The hypothetical benefits of such a system to the different groups are summarised in Table 3. In summary, short-term benefits may be realised by private market actors able to meet new export market requirements and international regulation, as well as claim value on the added information that is included with the sale of their product. Longer-term benefits of the system may extend to the maintenance of public-private partnerships in data collection and information generation which can feed into joint decision making in fisheries management. It is also possible that the development of these systems feed into future opportunities for Fair Trade, as well as MSC certification of small scale fisheries and chains of custody in the region. Ultimately, regulatory actors, such as managers and government, benefit from the flow of information which contributed to improved decision making and management.

Private provision of public information - a new architecture?

The results point to a number of new relations that are emerging between private and public actors to shape a new hybrid architecture of informational governance. Informational regimes remain an important backbone to the overall structure of informational flows. Despite being often inaccurate and struggling to maintain a timely delivery of information, they maintain authority through the support that is afforded by states to both the RFMO and United Nations system as a whole. This however, does not mean that these systems are unable to change, nor be supplemented with new, more timely informational arrangements. The emergence of more timely information platforms can be a valuable addition to the overall architecture of tuna information systems. Understanding the conditions under which actors contribute to these systems enables a better understanding of the role of private and public information.

In theoretical terms, the nascent partnerships evident in Indonesia and the Philippines between public and private actors represent hybrid arrangements that bridge the permanency of informational regimes and the dynamism of private-led networks. Private investment to make the tuna they catch or trade saleable in international markets, is widely evident. Although mostly isolated cases, the efforts being made by companies to ensure catch documentation, traceability, and (in some cases) evidence of local management systems, is in lieu of state efforts at the national scale. For instance, the absence of a national management plan in Indonesia means that individual efforts to be IUU compliant and MSC certified are severely constrained. Nevertheless, the build-up of enough working examples, with some oversight from NGOs such as WWF at the national level, is collectively placing pressure on the state to adopt improved systems of reporting and management. At the same time, political pressure through the RFMOs, represented largely by SPC, is also being maintained. The result is a push-pull effect on

16

the state to change – but one that promises to provide improved participation of those working in the Industry.

The case also demonstrates the potential gains of improved linkages between informational regimes and networks in reducing the informational burden being placed on developing countries, which in general terms have poor informational infrastructure (Mol, 2006; Mol, 2009). The emergence of private demands for information are placing new requirements on developing countries, via the globalisation of trade, multi-lateral agreements and a globalising civil society. Countries like Indonesia and the Philippines can either respond by resisting these new informational obligations either because they require levels of transparency that are not deemed politically feasible to those in power, or because they are create or strengthen inequalities by excluding producers from international markets – as seen in the case of IUU regulation and its catch documentation requirements (Tsamenyi et al., 2010). The results indicate that traceability is one such hybrid arrangement, which offers a new innovative means of governing information flows and providing new forms of transparency. The promise of systems is that they appear capable of overcoming the informational burden on producers in developing countries by create efficiencies in informational flows that fisher lead and, to varying degrees, control.

Any concern over greater private control if tuna fisheries information, given the sensitivities of proprietary information in tuna fisheries, appear justified by the existing constraints placed on public data systems at the RFMO level (Gilman and Kingma, 2013). However, the assertion of ‘ varying degrees’ of control is an important one; the ultimate aim is to ensure that the required information by both the RFMOs and the market (either through private actors or market regulators such as the EU) is made interoperable – that is, available to both regimes and networks. Traceability appears to be able to deliver on this promise if the management of data flows between regimes and networks are set in conjunction with market actors, and states are able to meet their own obligations through the RFMO.

The result is the facilitation of the different forms of disclosure, and therefore transparency, through supply chains as outlined by Mol (forthcoming) in Table 1. The hybrid arrangements that are emerging around tuna traceability between private and public actors in Indonesia and the Philippines, represent each of the arrangements to differing degrees. Regulatory transparency is currently most prominent, with economic actors disclosing information for regulatory and inspection bodies. This is inherent in demands placed on the state around catch documentation for IUU and fisheries indicators for RFMO stock assessment – as well as food safety requirements. The introduction of traceability is in this sense a basic tool, providing the architecture through which to ensure that existing informational demands are met. It is novel in the sense that it brings together information flows together, creating efficiencies in collection and collation. However, seeing traceability as facilitating regulatory transparency only

17

reinforces many of the demands already placed on the state and industry actors in countries like Indonesia and the Philippines, without adding any further incentive for wider disclosure, and without stimulating any further social or environmental change.

The results indicate that management transparency, characterised as upstream economic actors (e.g. retailers or market regulators) disclosing information for downstream actors (e.g. fishers or exporters) is not evident in tuna fisheries. Those actors at the global scale, i.e. exporters and importers, are aware of the reasons for greater informational demands on tuna fisheries. As demonstrated elsewhere (Bush and Oosterveer, 2007), this disclosure is far weaker further downstream in the chain, where fishers and other industry actors are know very little about anything further than one step above or below. Although based around the supply chain, Mol’s notion of management transparency also highlights the lack of disclosure of information on management to fishers with the state or state system – with fishers also largely disenfranchised from any information and discussion over tuna management at the national and regional level. The perfunctory role of traceability in providing ‘source’ information downwards to consumers, rather than vice-versa, means that without added elements of consumer or public transparency there will be no greater availability of information for fishers.

Consumer and public transparency are increasingly evident in fisheries through NGO-based certification and recommendation lists (such as wallet cards). Both consumer and public transparency require public disclosure of information about the fishery, often moving beyond data on stock status, to management and wider environmental performance. As discussed above, the Indonesian and the Filipino governments are limited in their capacity to disclose information about all three information flows and private initiatives are attempting to fill in as much of this information as is possible. It is here that consumer facing traceability may be additional to the existing regulatory and management transparency discussed above – especially in terms of self-reporting. Consumer and/or public facing traceability has the potential to incentivise self-reporting by giving a greater degree of control of information back to fishers and other chain actors and, if structured in the same way as platforms such as ThisFish, can provide upward transparency from consumers to fishers on where the fish is traded and consumed.

Reorienting Mol’s typology to a spectrum, moving from regulatory to management to consumer and finally public transparency, the complexity of the informational architecture increases, but so too does the potential/imperative for self-reporting. While regulatory transparency essentially requires a strengthening of existing information flows to existing databases, the other three forms of disclosure would require changes to database structures and availability/transparency of both private and private information. Consumer facing traceability has the potential to facilitate greater transparency by supplementing regulatory information flows to the state, such as stock assessment indicators, with catch documentation information necessary for IUU regulation

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compliance, and ultimately any further environmental and social information necessary for MSC certification, or wider advocacy to NGO-run recommendation lists. As such, the tuna information regime is strengthened by having near-real-time data for assessment and legal compliance, while informational networks maintain dynamic information flows to a wider consumer-civil society-public.

Perhaps the most important impact of consumer and public transparency is that they can deliver incentives to producers for self-reporting that go beyond regulatory compliance. Leading on from Mitchell’s conditions for incentivising self-reporting, that focus mainly on compliance to regulated information flows from the state, we argue that consumer and public transparency provides economic incentives in the form of market access. Should these economic incentives be then supplemented with Mitchell’s (1998) other incentives, such as demonstrated effectiveness in management, then consumer facing traceability offers the potential to provide a sustainable mechanism; one that is perpetuated by fishers and brings together regime and networked information flows together.

Conclusion

This paper has explored what demand exists for information on tuna fisheries in the Western and Central Pacific and has illustrated the on-going shift towards private provision of public information in Indonesia and the Philippines. The results of the study demonstrate that although there is an abundance of existing information systems available to tuna in the Western Pacific there remain clear limitations in terms of coverage, interoperability and precision of data. While the regional architecture of data is firmly in place, and coverage in the pelagic fisheries of the Western Pacific are well covered, problems remain in Indonesia and the Philippines. In particular, smaller scale fisheries operating in their territorial waters are poorly represented in state and therefore RFMO statistics and stock assessments. The development of sustainable data mechanisms that can include these ‘missing’ fisheries is therefore clearly needed. ‘Information rich’ consumer facing traceability which can facilitate the collection of data and the flow of information to existing databases is one such mechanism. A wide range of questions remain as to how traceability can be implemented in the context of small scale fisheries in both Indonesia and the Philippines, and also how information flows can be facilitated over long term. However, should this system demonstrate a business case to fishers and downstream chain actors, its potential impact in facilitating informational flows appears considerable. Systematic research following the implementation of consumer facing traceability can also provide fundamental insights into how incentive based mechanisms for fisheries data collection, tied to trade and markets, can facilitate the state-based statistics, can also feed into decision making across long and short term time horizons.

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In theoretical terms the results also contribute to the possibility of maintaining the permanence of information regimes, while also allowing private networks to stimulate innovation in the transparency of information flows. Thus providing improvements to the legality and environmental performance of trans-boundary fisheries such as tuna. Further research will elaborate the specific conditions under which traceability can build different forms of transparency and the role transparency plays in setting an agenda for further innovations in creating hybridized informational arrangements between regimes and networks.

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Figures and tables

Figure 1. Hierarchical map of tuna related data-flows and database in Indonesia and the Philippines.

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Figure 2. The area of jurisdiction of the Western and Central Pacific Commission, showing the various countries and their Exclusive Economic Zones.

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Table 1. Forms of transparency in supply chains and networks (Mol Forthcoming)

Forms of transparency Disclosure of information by

Disclosure of information for

Management transparency Upstream economic actors in chains

Downstream economic actors in chains

Regulatory transparency Economic actors in chains

Regulatory and inspection bodies

Consumer transparency Economic actors in chains

Consumers and certification bodies

Public transparency Economic actors in chains, certification bodies

Public (citizen-consumers)

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Table 2. Characteristics of information systems that include tuna

Database

Static data

Dynam

ic data

Enum

eration (E

), Collation

(C), R

eporting (R

)

RFM

O

compliant

Public/private

Open Source

system

Open A

ccess data

Interoperability (high/low

)

Mobile A

pp.

FAO Tuna Atlas X

C R X Public

X Low Sea Around Us X

C R

Public

X High

FAO iMarine X

C R

Public

X High X ThisFish

X E C R

Private X X High X

Oceanwise

R

Private

X Pacifical b.v.

X E C R X Private

Low

IMACS/Anova

X E C R X Both X High

CSIRO/ACIAR

X E C X Public

High SPC TUFMAN

X C R X Public

Low

DGCF Indonesia X

E C R

Public

Low BAS Philippines X

E C R

Public

Low

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Table 3. Benefits to stakeholders derived from consumer facing traceability.

Stakeholder group

Benefits

1. Fishers • Increased control and reduced overall cost of traceability • Better able to meet documentation and CoC requirements

for market access • Market intelligence on where fish is sold, by who and how • Communication with downstream actors • Potential to meet requirements for MSC and/or Fairtrade

certification 2. Processors • Platform enables transparency of activities for marketing

purposes • Fulfil documentation requirements of export markets • Added-value of analysis of companies and market • Reduction of reputational risk associated with sector

3. Retailers • Transparency about where their fish is coming from • Claim value on providing information on products sold • Reduce reputational risk associated with mislabelling

4. Consumers • Clear information on source of fish • Communication with fishers • Educated on fishing practices and global trade

5. Managers • Data available on key fisheries indicators for stock assessment

• Inclusion of small scale fisheries enables more informed decisions over benefits and allocation

• Economic indicators can be included in management decisions

6. Government • Data flows available to feed into national and regional databases

• Meet international obligations set by RFMOs • Better facilitation of fishers to meet IUU regulations for

export markets • Improved information on trade and non-fishery related

benefits of otherwise unreported fisheries • Decision making made under less uncertainty

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