Price Discrimination by Self-Identification. The Basic Problem Suppose the firm faces a somewhat...
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Transcript of Price Discrimination by Self-Identification. The Basic Problem Suppose the firm faces a somewhat...
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Price Discrimination by Self-Identification
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The Basic Problem
• Suppose the firm faces a somewhat different problem. It cannot tell one customer from another, but knows that there are demand differences to exploit.
• It must post a single price schedule.
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An Illustration
• Eduardo’s Fine Foods makes gourmet peanut butter. It has two typical clients– The yuppie market, composed of
swinging singles– The married market, where families
purchase peanut butter for their kids.
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Two Demand Functions
D D
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Two Demand Functions
D D
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Two Demand Functions
QFQS
D D
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Implementation 101
• Eduardo’s Gourmet Peanut Butter comes in two sizes:
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Implementation 101
• Eduardo’s Gourmet Peanut Butter comes in two sizes:– The regular one pound size costs $2– The three pound family size costs $4
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Implementation 101
• Eduardo’s Gourmet Peanut Butter comes in two sizes:– The regular one pound size costs $2– The three pound family size cost $4– The marginal cost of the last two pounds is $1 a
pound.
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Implementation 102
• Office Max has two types of customers for plain paper: households and businesses.
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Implementation 102
• Office Max has two types of customers for plain paper: households and businesses. They sell it– By the ream (500 sheets)– By the case– By even bigger lots
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Two Examples
• At one time, Xerox leased machines at $25 per month and 3.5 cents per page.
• This effectively charged high volume users one price and low volume users another price.
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Two Examples
• At one time, Xerox leased machines at $25 per month and 3.5 cents per page.
• This effectively charged high volume users one price and low volume users another price.
• IBM went at it a different way. It required that users purchase their computer punch cards from IBM.
• They effectively charged high volume users more.
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Two Examples
• At one time, Xerox leased machines at $25 per month and 3.5 cents per page.
• This effectively charged high volume users one price and low volume users another price.
• IBM went at it a different way. It required that users purchase their computer punch cards from IBM.
• They effectively charged high volume users more.
•Why did IBM go one way and Xerox another?
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Two Examples
• At one time, Xerox leased machines at $25 per month and 3.5 cents per page.
• This effectively charged high volume users one price and low volume users another price.
• IBM went at it a different way. It required that users purchase their computer punch cards from IBM.
• They effectively charged high volume users more.
•Why did IBM go one way and Xerox another?
•Xerox could monitor usage, through an internal monitor.
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Two Examples
• At one time, Xerox leased machines at $25 per month and 3.5 cents per page.
• This effectively charged high volume users one price and low volume users another price.
• IBM went at it a different way. It required that users purchase their computer punch cards from IBM.
• They effectively charged high volume users more.
•Why did IBM go one way and Xerox another?
•Xerox could monitor usage, through an internal monitor.
•IBM could not, and so used punch cards as a proxy.
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The Elite Diner
• The Elite Diner serves an all-you-can-eat buffet. It has two types of customers. – Senior Citizens, who know a good meal when
they see it– Singles, who see it as a hot date site.
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The Elite Diner
Friday Night
Saturday Night
Senior Citizens $12 $12 Swinging Singles $20 $35
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The Elite Diner
Friday Night
Saturday Night
Senior Citizens $12 $12 Swinging Singles $20 $35
Friday $12
Saturday $26.99
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The Elite Diner
Friday Night
Saturday Night
Senior Citizens $12 $12 Swinging Singles $20 $35
Friday $12
Saturday $26.99
$8 $8.01
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The Elite Diner
Friday Night
Saturday Night
Senior Citizens $12 $12 Swinging Singles $20 $35
This is an example of pricing on a secondary characteristic
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Airline Pricing
• Airlines want to charge a high rate for business travelers (customers with a low elasticity of demand) and a lower rate for vacation travel (with a significantly higher elasticity of demand).
• They do so by imposing advance purchase requirements and requirements that the passenger stay over Saturday, etc.
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Give Us This Day Our Daily Special
M T W T F Roast Beef 3 5 5 5 5 Ham & Cheese 5 3 5 5 5 Turkey 5 5 3 5 5 Salami 5 5 5 3 5 Tuna 5 5 5 5 3
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Give Us This Day Our Daily Special
M T W T F Roast Beef 3 5 5 5 5 Ham & Cheese 5 3 5 5 5 Turkey 5 5 3 5 5 Salami 5 5 5 3 5 Tuna 5 5 5 5 3
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Give Us This Day Our Daily Special
M T W T F Roast Beef 3 5 5 5 5 Ham & Cheese 5 3 5 5 5 Turkey 5 5 3 5 5 Salami 5 5 5 3 5 Tuna 5 5 5 5 3
If you don’t care what you eat, lunch is $3.00
If you do care, lunch averages $4.60
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Getting all the Consumer Surplus
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Getting all the Consumer Surplus
CS
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The Hatfields and McCoy's
MC MC
DM
DH
MR MR
PM PH
QMQH
QH = 35 - pH
QM = 65 – pM
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Assume
• These are the demand functions for individual Hatfields and McCoys.
• You cannot tell them apart
• They cannot arbitrage
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The Club
• Suppose the firm offers two choices:– Purchase units at a price of $20– Upon payment of a $775 membership fee, the
right to purchase at $5 each.
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The Hatfields
MC
DH
MR
QH
QH = 35 - pH
•Total CS is
(½)(30)(30) = 450
•Hatfields will not take the membership plan.
•The $20 fee is the monopoly price.
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The McCoy's
DM
MR
PM
QM
QM = 65 – pM
• Their CS is
(½)(60)(60) = 1800
$1800- $775= $1025
• They could also buy at $20 each. Then their CS is
(½)(45)(45) = $1012.5
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Can you Top This
• What is the best you can do?– Gold Plan: Pay a $899.98 membership fee and
get the right to purchase for $5– Silver Plan: Pay a $112.49 membership fee and
get the right to purchase for $20.
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Examples
• Any purchaser of a cellular telephone service will recognize the idea here.
• You want to charge one price to the low use customer and another price to the high use customer.
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End
©2003 Charles W. Upton