Preventing the Entry of Weapons of Mass Effect into the United States

Pre-Decisional Draft

Preventing the Entry ofWeapons of Mass Effect

intothe United States

Task Force Report

Lydia Waters Thomas10 January 2006

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Charge to the Task Force

• Purpose

Recommend specific steps the nation can take to prevent the entry into the country of weapons of mass effect (WME) and the people who would use them

• Scope, for this study:– WME = weapons capable of inflicting grave destructive,

psychological and/or economic damage – includes CBRNE – excludes cyber threats

– Border = physical, institutional and facility-based– Neutralization of terrorists, non-proliferation and securing of

weapons materials excluded– Consequence management excluded

• Purpose

Recommend specific steps the nation can take to prevent the entry into the country of weapons of mass effect (WME) and the people who would use them

• Scope, for this study:– WME = weapons capable of inflicting grave destructive,

psychological and/or economic damage – includes CBRNE – excludes cyber threats

– Border = physical, institutional and facility-based– Neutralization of terrorists, non-proliferation and securing of

weapons materials excluded– Consequence management excluded

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Task Force Members

Lydia Thomas – HSAC

(Chair)

Jerry Cohon – HSAC

(Vice Chair)

Norm Augustine – HSAC

(Chair, Air Domain Subgroup)

James Schlesinger – HSAC

(Chair, Land Domain Subgroup)

David Abshire – APRSAC

(Chair, Sea Domain Subgroup)

Bill Webster – HSAC

Chuck Canterbury – HSAC

Lee Hamilton – HSAC

Victoria Haynes – APRSAC

Dan Goure – APRSAC

Roxane Silver – APRSCA Rocky Spane – APRSAC

Steve Gross – PVTSAC

Kathleen Bader –HSAC

Jack Skolds - PVTSAC

Dirk Kempthorne – SLSAC

Brian Sandoval – SLSAC

Bernard Kerik – ERSAC

Scott Lillibridge – ERSAC

Jane Perlov – ERSAC

Edward Plaugher – ERSAC

Steve Kerr – APRSAC

Federal Participants: Daniel Ostergaard, Kathryn Knapp, Richard Davis, Benjamin Gray, Michael Fullerton

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Approach

• Organization: Subgroups based on corridors of entry

• Air: Norm Augustine, Chair• Land: Jim Schlesinger, Chair• Sea: David Abshire, Chair

• Information Collection– Diverse group of experts at strategic, tactical and

operational levels from U.S. government, allies, and private sector

– Presentations on threats, vulnerabilities, current systems and plans

• Meeting Dates (2005): March 21,22; May 9,10,18; June 13, 23; August 1,2,5,10; October 3

• Organization: Subgroups based on corridors of entry

• Air: Norm Augustine, Chair• Land: Jim Schlesinger, Chair• Sea: David Abshire, Chair

• Information Collection– Diverse group of experts at strategic, tactical and

operational levels from U.S. government, allies, and private sector

– Presentations on threats, vulnerabilities, current systems and plans

• Meeting Dates (2005): March 21,22; May 9,10,18; June 13, 23; August 1,2,5,10; October 3

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Approach (concl.)

• Analysis– Assessed information on threat, current systems,

plans and practices in WME prevention– Identified critical deficiencies

• Developed Recommendations

• Analysis– Assessed information on threat, current systems,

plans and practices in WME prevention– Identified critical deficiencies

• Developed Recommendations

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The Threat

• WME attack is the gravest threat to the nation

• Regardless of the scenario, consequences are unimaginable

• WME includes chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive

• Nuclear is the greatest threat in terms of consequences (although still a low likelihood)

• WME attack is the gravest threat to the nation

• Regardless of the scenario, consequences are unimaginable

• WME includes chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive

• Nuclear is the greatest threat in terms of consequences (although still a low likelihood)

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Observations on WME Prevention Today

• Progress has been made– Organizations established – Department, HSC– Programs underway – e.g., Container Security

Initiative, Megaports Initiative– New facilities – e.g., Command Centers– Dedicated people, evolving capabilities

• Progress has been made– Organizations established – Department, HSC– Programs underway – e.g., Container Security

Initiative, Megaports Initiative– New facilities – e.g., Command Centers– Dedicated people, evolving capabilities

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Observations on WME Prevention Today

• However, there are critical deficiencies– Absence of an integrated systems approach– Absence of a systematic, risk-based approach to

investment– Dispersed capabilities, leadership and decision

making– Inadequate engagement with foreign partners– Outdated deterrence concepts– Lack of sufficient urgency and priority in technology

innovation– Lack of citizen engagement

• However, there are critical deficiencies– Absence of an integrated systems approach– Absence of a systematic, risk-based approach to

investment– Dispersed capabilities, leadership and decision

making– Inadequate engagement with foreign partners– Outdated deterrence concepts– Lack of sufficient urgency and priority in technology

innovation– Lack of citizen engagement

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Addressing the Deficiencies

• Conceptual Framework (A Systems View)– Adopt a strategy with three thrusts:

• Neutralize terrorists

• Secure WME and/or critical components

• Detect and interdict in transit

– Consider the problem in three dimensions • Geographical/Spatial

• Functional

• Operational

• Conceptual Framework (A Systems View)– Adopt a strategy with three thrusts:

• Neutralize terrorists

• Secure WME and/or critical components

• Detect and interdict in transit

– Consider the problem in three dimensions • Geographical/Spatial

• Functional

• Operational

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Geographical/Spatial Dimension

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Geographical/Spatial Dimension

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Functional Dimension

Deterrence

Deterrence

Detection

Detection

Elimination

Elimination

Dissuasion

Dissuasion

Interdiction

Interdiction

DenialDenial

Disruption

Disruption

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Operational Dimension

• Institutions (governmental and private)• Tools

– Transactional – process associated with purchasing, shipping, travel, etc.

– Informational – intelligence collection or operational information

– Technological – identity management (biometric, data mining) or detection (sensors, detectors)

• Institutions (governmental and private)• Tools

– Transactional – process associated with purchasing, shipping, travel, etc.

– Informational – intelligence collection or operational information

– Technological – identity management (biometric, data mining) or detection (sensors, detectors)

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Value of a Systems View:Fundamental Questions

• What should be the relative balance of investments for the three basic thrusts: neutralizing terrorists, securing potential WME sources, and detecting WME in transit?

• Are investments correctly balanced between air, land and sea corridors as a function of threat and risk?

• How should investments in alternative detection technologies be balanced in relation to the threat?

• How much of the investment portfolio should go to longer range technology development versus shorter range improvements?

• What combination of approaches should be used for WME detection in non-U.S. controlled areas?

• What functions should be assigned to specific government entities?• What interfaces must exist between different entities with

complementary functions?

• What should be the relative balance of investments for the three basic thrusts: neutralizing terrorists, securing potential WME sources, and detecting WME in transit?

• Are investments correctly balanced between air, land and sea corridors as a function of threat and risk?

• How should investments in alternative detection technologies be balanced in relation to the threat?

• How much of the investment portfolio should go to longer range technology development versus shorter range improvements?

• What combination of approaches should be used for WME detection in non-U.S. controlled areas?

• What functions should be assigned to specific government entities?• What interfaces must exist between different entities with

complementary functions?

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Risk Reduction Approach

• Risk reduction should be the central decision-making criterion for WME prevention

• With a systems view, trade-offs can be made based on benefits and costs rather than ancillary factors– Budget should result from risk calculation– Integrated WME budget with up or down approval

• Risk reduction should be the central decision-making criterion for WME prevention

• With a systems view, trade-offs can be made based on benefits and costs rather than ancillary factors– Budget should result from risk calculation– Integrated WME budget with up or down approval

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Layered Approach

• Successfully used in civilian and military contexts:

• Provides redundancy, flexibility and robustness– Layer is a combination of geographical/functional/operational

dimensions– Failure of a single element is not fatal; protective effect is

cumulative

• Successfully used in civilian and military contexts:

• Provides redundancy, flexibility and robustness– Layer is a combination of geographical/functional/operational

dimensions– Failure of a single element is not fatal; protective effect is

cumulative

Nuclear Power Safety Air Defense

Strategic Nuclear Defense Crisis Management

Conventional Warfare Controlling Infectious Disease

Preventing Entry of Foreign Animal Disease

Drug Interdiction

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Path Forward: Recommendations

• Authority, Alignment and Incentives– Strengthen Leadership Structures: clarify and strengthen the role

and authority of the Secretary and Homeland Security Council and adopt a model such as a Joint WME Prevention Office

– Engage Internationally: better engage foreign governments and international organizations with increased capacity in DHS and in the diplomatic corps

– Require Joint Effort: institute career incentives based on joint efforts and foster personnel exchanges

– Improve WME Intelligence: include DHS as a principal driver for WME intelligence

– Clarify the DOD Role in Disaster Response: require federal, state and local agencies and authorities to more effectively plan for contingencies that will require the unique capabilities of the military

• Authority, Alignment and Incentives– Strengthen Leadership Structures: clarify and strengthen the role

and authority of the Secretary and Homeland Security Council and adopt a model such as a Joint WME Prevention Office

– Engage Internationally: better engage foreign governments and international organizations with increased capacity in DHS and in the diplomatic corps

– Require Joint Effort: institute career incentives based on joint efforts and foster personnel exchanges

– Improve WME Intelligence: include DHS as a principal driver for WME intelligence

– Clarify the DOD Role in Disaster Response: require federal, state and local agencies and authorities to more effectively plan for contingencies that will require the unique capabilities of the military

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• Update Deterrence– Make Deterrence Policy Clear: reiterate policy of swift,

certain and severe consequences for any nation associated with a terrorist act using WME

– Expand Deterrence : use layered defense system to increase uncertainty and likelihood of failure for potential attackers and couple this with resilience in managing the aftermath to expand deterrence

– Engage Citizens: develop locally controlled volunteer-based measures to demonstrate national resilience by assisting law enforcement with civil support functions such as traffic control and delivery of food and water

• Update Deterrence– Make Deterrence Policy Clear: reiterate policy of swift,

certain and severe consequences for any nation associated with a terrorist act using WME

– Expand Deterrence : use layered defense system to increase uncertainty and likelihood of failure for potential attackers and couple this with resilience in managing the aftermath to expand deterrence

– Engage Citizens: develop locally controlled volunteer-based measures to demonstrate national resilience by assisting law enforcement with civil support functions such as traffic control and delivery of food and water

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• Institute a Risk-Based Process for Resource Allocation: – Create an open process for allocating all WME prevention

funding.

• Improve Private Sector Contributions to the Process for Risk Management: – Tapping its knowledge and vital interest in an effective defense

program, engage the private sector in developing the risk management approach in partnerships similar to those in shipping security (CSI, C-TPAT)

• Initiate a System Management Effort: – Adopt one of several models of integrated system management

to guide and oversee the development and integration of a national WME prevention system

• Institute a Risk-Based Process for Resource Allocation: – Create an open process for allocating all WME prevention

funding.

• Improve Private Sector Contributions to the Process for Risk Management: – Tapping its knowledge and vital interest in an effective defense

program, engage the private sector in developing the risk management approach in partnerships similar to those in shipping security (CSI, C-TPAT)

• Initiate a System Management Effort: – Adopt one of several models of integrated system management

to guide and oversee the development and integration of a national WME prevention system

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• Innovation– Make Detection a Priority for Innovation: Make it a

high national priority for the Secretary, the President and the HSC to bring together elements of the research community to undertake transformational research

– Encourage and Nurture New Ideas: Drawing from organizational innovation models from government and industry, create an Innovations Office that encourages “out-of-the-box” ideas from all levels and sectors; provide a clear path for ideas to gain visibility and action

• Innovation– Make Detection a Priority for Innovation: Make it a

high national priority for the Secretary, the President and the HSC to bring together elements of the research community to undertake transformational research

– Encourage and Nurture New Ideas: Drawing from organizational innovation models from government and industry, create an Innovations Office that encourages “out-of-the-box” ideas from all levels and sectors; provide a clear path for ideas to gain visibility and action

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Additional Information Available in the Task Force Report

• Specific Actions Supporting Recommendations– Example: Establish joint government/industry working

groups. Pattern the groups after the National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee to promote coordinated government/private sector efforts.

• Additional Ideas and Observations in Appendix– Example: Eliminate unnecessary redundancies such

as the multiple background checks and certifications required of cross-border truckers

• Specific Actions Supporting Recommendations– Example: Establish joint government/industry working

groups. Pattern the groups after the National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee to promote coordinated government/private sector efforts.

• Additional Ideas and Observations in Appendix– Example: Eliminate unnecessary redundancies such

as the multiple background checks and certifications required of cross-border truckers

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Appreciation

• The Task Force appreciates the efforts of many individuals and organizations, including:– Individuals in government, academia and industry

who met with and presented to the Task Force– Agencies that hosted Task Force meetings and gave

tours and demonstrations of their facilities– The writing team that assisted with compilation,

synthesis, and analysis of information

• The Task Force appreciates the efforts of many individuals and organizations, including:– Individuals in government, academia and industry

who met with and presented to the Task Force– Agencies that hosted Task Force meetings and gave

tours and demonstrations of their facilities– The writing team that assisted with compilation,

synthesis, and analysis of information

Preventing the Entry of Weapons of Mass Effect into the United States

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