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62 JFQ / Autumn/Winter 1997–98

In August 1898 Admiral GeorgeDewey had to wait 90 days afterdefeating the Spanish at ManilaBay for a 15,000-strong Army force

from California to put boots on theground and secure his victory in thePhilippines. As U.S. Army Pacific (US-ARPAC) celebrates 100 years of servicein the Asia-Pacific region, it can ac-count for two-thirds of the Army cam-paign streamers awarded for action out-side North America. It also reflects the

changing role of America as a Pacificpower. Today, U.S. Pacific Command(PACOM) relies upon trained and readyforces to support military operationsand peacetime engagement. As we nearthe 21st century, USARPAC has the vi-sion and direction to keep the Armycomponent of PACOM relevant, re-sponsive, and ready.

Tyranny of DistanceThe American commitment to the

Pacific over the last century can be di-vided into two major periods: Japaneseexpansionism and confrontation with

Lieutenant General William M. Steele, USA, is commandinggeneral of the U.S. Army, Pacific.

Preparing the Army in the Pacific for the 21st Century

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Autumn/Winter 1997–98 / JFQ 63

the Soviet Union. These two experi-ences challenged the Army to assumevarious roles—expeditionary, occupa-tion, counterinsurgency, and deter-rent—in a theater where vast oceanspaces and faraway land masses pre-sented another passive but significantforce, the tyranny of distance.

The central strategic issue for ourmilitary in the Pacific during the firsthalf of this century was maintaining acredible presence in the Philippinesand countering the growing power ofJapan. The United States could not de-fend the Philippine Islands because theAmerican people would not committhe needed assets until the eve of war.Consequently Hawaii became the cen-ter of gravity for our strategic positionin the Pacific. It was home to Armyand Navy commands as well as the in-dustrial facilities which supported op-erating forces that would be projectedinto the Pacific.

With the Japanese surrender onAugust 15, 1945, the free world soonfaced an even greater danger than thatformerly posed by the Axis powers.The central strategic threat wasthought to be prevention of nuclearwar. The Cold War and lines of con-frontation in the Pacific area, however,were clearly drawn in another way inEast Asia as Task Force Smith jumped,poorly equipped and manned, fromoccupation duty to combat on the Ko-rean peninsula. Both Korea and Viet-nam were major conflicts—proxy warsin a bipolar Cold War world centeredin Europe. PACOM forces and the de-fense establishment as a whole strug-gled with new strategic and opera-tional concepts before and after thosetwo Asian wars. Finally, we adopted adeterrent strategy that has achieved 22years of regional security and stabilityand established a forward presencethat we maintain to this day. We areexperiencing the longest period ofpeaceful engagement in the Asia-Pa-cific for a century.

Nevertheless the shadow of theCold War still extends over the Armyin this region. Today USARPAC hasthree major combat formations: 25th

Infantry Division in Hawaii with onebrigade located at Fort Lewis, Washing-ton; 1st Brigade, 6th Infantry Divisionin Alaska; and 1st Battalion, 1st Special

Forces Group on Okinawa. Supportforces include U.S. Army Japan andU.S. Army Hawaii. USARPAC head-quartered in Hawaii and I Corps at FortLewis provide operational and tacticalcommand and control (C2) respec-tively. This current force mix is the re-sult of the situation in Korea, the re-cent drawdown, and our Cold War

posture. Ultimately, the situation inKorea will resolve itself through atreaty, reconciliation, or reunification,with resultant changes in the size andfunction of Army forces in theater. Thehistory of the region, our security rela-tionship with Japan, and the strategicposition of Japan near force projectionrequirements suggest continued pres-ence of Army support forces in north-east Asia.

The Tyranny of Distance

Javelin anti-tankweapons system.

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Alaska to Australia

14 Hours

18 Days

Hawaii to Korea

9 Hours

10 Days

Seattle to Thailand

15 Hours

19 Days

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The Pacific, the largest ocean inthe world, dominates this region andpresents a tyranny of distance of over5,000 miles from the west coast of theUnited States to the Pacific Rim coun-tries of Japan and the Philippines. In1898 it took IX Corps 90 days to sailfrom California to Manila. By WorldWar II that was cut to 30 days steam-ing time. It still requires 21 days tomove troops, equipment, and suppliesby sea from Oakland to Manila and 16

more to reach the western limits of thePACOM and USARPAC area of respon-sibility (AOR) in the Indian Ocean. Wehave reduced but not eliminated thetyranny of distance with airlift andfaster ships. Control and security ofthe sea, sea and air lines of communi-cation, and theater power projectionplatforms remain an essential task formilitary forces in the Asia-Pacific.

The 21st CenturyThe end of the Cold War has led

to another transitional period for themilitary in the Pacific. Few signs ofconfrontation remain. Korea is in thethroes of political and military con-tention under a 44-year-old armistice.

The world is increasingly multipolar.The predictability and stability thatsprang from the bipolar alignments ofthe Cold War have eroded. Stability isthe result of regional security and eco-nomic prosperity. This is certainly truein the Pacific where emergingeconomies and developing nations aredivided by enduring tensions alongtheir borders. The relative stability en-joyed across the area results from thepresence of U.S. forces together with

military contacts and eco-nomic prosperity. PACOMand its components reflectthis presence and affordthe security for continued

growth in the region. They also main-tain military overmatch to prevail inany conflict.

While there is no Asia-Pacificequivalent of the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization, five of the seven mutualdefense treaties signed by the UnitedStates involve the PACOM AOR. Rela-tions with countries in the region tendto be bilateral and limited in scope. Yetthere is growing interest in both multi-lateral dialogue and partnership in theface of challenge. The Association ofSoutheast Asian Nations (ASEAN) isthe foremost multinational partner-ship, but it has no military charter.

This region will become central tothe global economy in the next cen-tury, replacing Europe in many regards.It contains 56 percent of the worldpopulation. China’s total is 1.2 billionpeople while India’s is 950 million andis expected to surpass China early inthe next century. Indonesia, the mostpopulous Muslim nation, has 206 mil-lion and is the fourth largest in theworld. By 2020 there may be 25 citiesin Asia with populations over 10 mil-lion. Such huge markets are impressivebut are only partially developed today.

U.S. ties to Asia are growing as thepercentage of Asian-Americans in-creases. Trade with Asia in 1996 was$920.8 billion, 37 percent of the U.S.total, more than with Europe, Canada,or Latin America. Some 60 percent ofglobal economic growth in the nextdecade will occur in East Asia. As a re-sult, the Asia-Pacific region will de-velop a powerful new middle class of500 million. It will create market-dri-ven economies and shift from labor-oriented production to both industrialand information age technology. Theeffect on area culture and societies willbe equally profound. New wealth anda powerful middle class will transformtraditional social structures to comple-ment economic well-being and meetrising expectations. This prosperity willlead to development that is commen-surate with political, informational,and military potential. To maintain re-gional stability in this dynamic futureit is vital to shape the security environ-ment to facilitate economic growth.

While we often think of the Asia-Pacific region as primarily maritime be-cause of the Pacific and Indian Oceans,armies rather than navies dominatemilitary organizations. Asia claimseight of the ten largest militaries in theworld, and substantial modernizationprograms reflect new wealth and di-verse security concerns in the region.Spending on modernization has in-creased 35 percent over the last sixyears. This contrasts with the generaldecline in military spending elsewheresince the end of the Cold War. Whilethese forces are likely to shrink, theywill undergo modernization in the in-terim. Short- and mid-range ballisticmissiles, weapons of mass destruction(WMD), and limited power projection

there is no Asia-Pacific equivalent ofthe North Atlantic Treaty Organization

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will be common and increase the scopeand lethality of regional conflict. More-over, the demands of natural/humani-

tarian disasters will expand the role ofregional militaries.

The proliferation of nuclear, bio-logical, and chemical weapons risksplacing them in the hands of roguestates or terrorists. Countering prolifer-ation requires multinational and mul-tiagency efforts as will combating thedrug trade, terrorism, maritime piracy,and insurgency.

Foreign policy will continue todictate that the United States accept amantle of international leadership andbuild alliances and institutions. In aJuly 23, 1997 address to the PacificCouncil on International Policy, Secre-tary of State Madeleine Albright saidthat the objective of U.S. strategy mustbe to “work with our many friends inthis region of rising powers to ensure

stability, build prosperity, and promotedemocracy.” The Nation should “fortifycore alliances” while remaining for-

ward deployed and sup-porting multinationalsecurity dialogues. TheUnited States mustfocus on peacefully re-

solving disputes and avoid “misunder-standings that could lead to armedconflict.” Forward basing and engage-ment enables this strategy by means ofUSARPAC involvement with regionalmilitaries. Maintaining strong army-to-army relations is a principal role of US-ARPAC in peacetime to support ourpreventive defense strategy.

Shape, Respond, PrepareNational military strategy uses the

three concepts of shape, respond, andprepare to provide an integrated ap-proach to promoting peace and stabil-ity and defeating adversaries whennecessary. PACOM and its componentswill continue to pursue these objec-tives through regional engagement toshape the Asia-Pacific and create con-ditions favorable to U.S. interests. US-ARPAC forces will support PACOM and

maintain the ability to respond world-wide across a full crisis spectrum.

PACOM theater engagement strat-egy supports our national military ob-jectives. So long as the region remainsdevoid of a substantial multilateral se-curity mechanism, most nations willdesire the continued presence of theU.S. military and its Pacific Army. InJanuary 1997 Japanese Prime MinisterHashimoto cited “the presence of theUnited States in Asia” as the most im-portant factor in assuring stability.

USARPAC helps to shape the re-gion through forward basing and de-ployments. Combined training and en-gagement activities such as engineering,medical, and civic projects also con-tribute to forward presence by sendingour soldiers abroad. The Pacific Army ofthe 21st century must maintain forwardpresence to provide access to army-dominated military organizations. Exer-cises such as Cobra Gold in Thailandand Balikatan in the Philippines are ex-amples. Forward presence demonstratesour commitment and negates some ofthe tyranny of distance.

As USARPAC presence and engage-ment shape the security environmentthey also serve as a preventive defense.Forward basing and engagement activi-ties signal the readiness of our forces tomore than friends and allies. Exercisesalso demonstrate readiness in supportof PACOM and contribution to jointand combined warfighting.

Shaping enables the Nation tomaintain an objective role as a re-gional power. The benefits of mutualtraining and increased interoperabilityamong countries helps set the stage forconducting combined operations withallies or coalition partners. Althoughwe will be ready to act unilaterally,combined operations are the preferredmethod. Our ability to conduct suc-cessful operations is well known bystates that might consider destabilizingthe region. The PACOM strategy of en-gagement and presence is the rightway to shape regional stability andU.S. interests into the next century.

Since shaping efforts alone cannotguarantee peace and stability, ourforces must be capable of responding

forward basing and engagement signalreadiness to more than friends and allies

City of Pará with soldiers leaving for thePhilippines, 1898.

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to a full spectrum of crises. On an aver-age day USARPAC has 3,000 soldiers in20 countries. Just 3 percent of the U.S.Army, the Pacific Army, conducts 10percent of total Army deployments.That is a high payoff.

The Army has fought four wars inthe Asia-Pacific over the last century. InWorld War II and Korea, it was unpre-pared and paid the price. Tomorrow’sPacific Army, like its predecessors, willnot have forces in theater to prosecutea major war, so it must be able to pro-ject USARPAC forces from CONUS.

PACOM needs a ground detach-ment with a limited forced entry capa-bility that can respond quickly and de-cisively. It can evolve from the currentforce and address regional crises. It alsorequires access to CONUS land forcesfor either theater engagement or strate-gic power projection to protect Ameri-can citizens and interests or preventconflict. Speed argues for a responseforce in a central location and the abil-ity to project forces by air and sea withprepositioned stocks.

The Army in the Pacific must be atheater engagement force and a strate-gic projection force. Theater engage-ment serves as a deterrent to aggres-sion by demonstrating the capabilityto fight and decisively win smallerscale contingencies. Its secondary mis-sion is engaging regional militaries aspreviously discussed. The strategic pro-jection force, like the engagementforce, must be forward based andquickly augmented by CONUS-basedforces which deploy worldwide to rein-force either in-place theater forces oruse air and sea lines of communicationthrough the theater in support of amajor theater war.

Strategic mobility is critical whenprojecting power into or through theAsia-Pacific region. It largely resides insealift and airlift, though infrastruc-ture plays a significant role. Preposi-tioned equipment together withstrategic lift enables us to react withthe appropriate speed for strategicallydecisive maneuver.

The FutureThe Army of the 21st century must

be built on a sound foundation andsupporting pillars. That foundation iscomprised of quality people; com-mand, control, communications, com-puters, and intelligence (C4I); and atheater infrastructure to support powerprojection. The four pillars are atrained and ready force, forward pres-ence, an expeditionary force, and mod-ern equipment. Our training today andtomorrow should range from the low-est tactical echelon to operational exer-cises to improve interoperability withother armies. Additional efforts to en-hance and sustain readiness include es-tablishing multicomponent units aswell as other forms of active and Re-serve integration in training and oper-ations. We participate in joint andcombined exercises to maintainwarfighting capabilities just as we mustcontinue to expand relations with thearmies in the region.

The cost of current training pro-grams is too high because of thetyranny of distance. Army forces musttravel to the Joint Readiness TrainingCenter or National Training Center totake part in priority tactical training.Moving equipment to either center,even with prepositioned brigade setsfor training, is costly and time consum-ing. We need joint training areas in theAsia-Pacific located within proximity ofour bases and along air and sea lines ofcommunication in the theater.

The chief means of achieving fullspectrum dominance for the PacificArmy in a peacetime environment isrealized by the second pillar, forwardbased forces. Even though I Corps is lo-cated on the west coast at Fort Lewisand USARPAC is headquartered inHawaii, the latter remains five timezones from the eastern edge of theAsian mainland and fourteen from thewestern edge of the Indian Ocean. Po-sitioning forces and Army C2 head-quarters farther in the AOR enhancesregional presence and tangibly im-proves the ability to conduct crisis re-sponse, forward presence, and C2.

The third pillar is creating an ex-peditionary force capability from Armydivisions, brigades, and battalions.These force packages would be capableof rapid deployment to crisis spots

within the Asia-Pacific from powerprojection platforms and the preposi-tioned stocks placed in the theater in-frastructure force. Much of this capa-bility already exists.

The last pillar is modern equip-ment to sustain the first to engage op-erations and keep pace with regionalpowers. Forward presence, regardless ofits other advantages, also demonstratesthe quality of U.S. equipment to areamilitaries. The requirement for contin-ual C4I modernization is obvious giventhe tyranny of distance in the AOR.We also need improved strategic mo-bility from more fast sealift ships, justin time logistics, Crusader, Javelin,Apache Long Bow, and other newweapons and equipment to conductpreventive defense well forward.

The future is certain. The promi-nence of the Asia-Pacific region isgrowing and so are both the impor-tance and the contributions of US-ARPAC to national security. We canand must achieve a trained and readyforce, one with expeditionary capabili-ties postured and positioned well for-ward in the area with the training, in-frastructure, C2, and quality people toperform its missions. It must be a mod-ern, tailorable theater engagementforce based to provide effective initialentry forces that contribute to fullspectrum dominance. It must be ex-pandable to supply sufficient groundforces, theater Army C2, and sustain-ment to support a joint and combinedmajor theater war. We are able to per-form these tasks. Today our challengein the dynamic Asia-Pacific environ-ment is to remain relevant, responsive,and ready for tomorrow. JFQ

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