Prejudicial Question

36. Prejudicial Question Concept and its elements

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 110544 October 17, 1995

REYNALDO V. TUANDA, Mayor of the Municipality of Jimalalud, Negros Oriental, HERMINIGILDO FABURADA, (former Vice-Mayor), SANTOS A. VILLANUEVA, Incumbent Member of the Sangguniang Bayan, MANUEL LIM, NICANOR R. AGOSTO, ERENIETA K. MENDOZA MAXIMINO A. VIERNES, HACUBINA V. SERILLO, ILUMINADO D. ESTRELLANES, and FORMER MEMBERS OF THE SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF JIMALALUD, NEGROS ORIENTAL, petitioners, vs.THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, (THIRD DIVISION), BARTOLOME BINAOHAN and DELIA ESTRELLANES, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

Petitioners institute this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside the resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated 17 February 1992 and its orders dated 19 August 1992 and 13 May 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16936 entitled "People of the Philippines versus Reynaldo Tuanda, et al." denying petitioners' motion for suspension of their arraignment.

The present controversy arose from the following antecedents:

On 9 February 1989, private respondents Delia Estrellanes and Bartolome Binaohan were designated as industrial labor sectoral representative and agricultural labor sectoral representative respectively, for the Sangguniang Bayan of Jimalalud, Province of Negros Oriental by then Secretary Luis T. Santos of the Department of Local Government. Private respondents Binaohan and Estrellanes took their oath of office on 16 February 1989 and 17 February 1989, respectively.

Subsequently, petitioners filed an undated petition with the Office of the President for review and recall of said designations. The latter, however, in a letter dated 20 March 1989, denied the petition and enjoined Mayor Reynaldo Tuanda to recognize private respondents as sectoral representatives.

On 4 May 1990, private respondents filed a petition for mandamus with the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 35, docketed as Special Civil Action No. 9661, for recognition as members of the Sangguniang Bayan. It was dismissed on 23 July 1991.

Thereafter, on 20 June 1991, petitioners filed an action with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City to declare null and void the designations of private respondents as sectoral representatives, docketed as Civil Case No. 9955 entitled "Reynaldo Tuanda, et al. versus Secretary of the Department of Local Government, et al."

On 21 July 1991, an information was filed before the Sandiganbayan, docketed as Criminal Case No. 16936 entitled "People of the Philippines versus Reynaldo Tuanda, et al." charging petitioners thus:

INFORMATION

The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses REYNALDO V. TUANDA, HERMENEGILDO G. FABURADA, MANUEL LIM, NICANOR P. AGOSTO, ERENIETA K. MENDOZA, MAXIMO VIERNES, HACUBINA V. SERILLO, and SANTOS A. VILLANUEVA of Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, committed as follows:

That during the period from February 1989 to February 1991 and subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Jimalalud, Negros Oriental, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused, all public officers, Mayor REYNALDO V. TUANDA, Vice-Mayor HERMENEGILDO G. FABURADA, Sangguniang Members MANUEL LIM, NICANOR P. AGOSTO, ERENIETA K. MENDOZA, MAXIMO A. VIERNES, HACUBINA V. SERILLO, ILUMINADO D. ESTRELLANES and SANTOS A. VILLANUEVA while in the performance of their official functions and taking advantage of their public positions, with evident bad faith, manifest partiality, and conspiring and confederating with each other did, then and there, wilfully and unlawfully cause undue injury to Sectoral Members Bartolome M. Binaohan and Delia T. Estrellanes by refusing to pay despite demand the amount of NINETY FIVE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P95,350.00) and ONE HUNDRED EIGHT THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED PESOS (P108,900.00) representing respectively their per diems, salaries and other privileges and benefits, and such undue injury continuing to the present to the prejudice and damage of Bartolome Binaohan and Delia Estrellanes.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 1

On 9 September 1991, petitioners filed a motion with the Sandiganbayan for suspension of the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 16936 on the ground that a prejudicial question exists in Civil Case No. 9955 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City. 2

On 16 January 1992, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision declaring null and void ab initio the designations issued by the Department of Local Government to the private respondents as sectoral representatives for having been done in violation of Section 146 (2) of B.P. Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code. 3

The trial court expounded thus:

The Supreme Court in the case of Johnny D. Supangan Jr. v. Luis T. Santos, et al., G.R. No. 84663, along with 7 companion cases of similar import, (G.R. Nos. 05012, 87601, 87602, 87792, 87935, 88072, and 90205) all promulgated on August 24, 1990, ruled that:

B.P. Blg. 337 explicitly required that before the President (or the Secretary of the Department of Local Government) may appoint members of the local legislative bodies to represent the Industrial and Agricultural Labor Sectors, there must be a determination to be made by the Sanggunian itself that the said sectors are of sufficient number in the city or municipality to warrant representation after consultation with associations and persons belonging to the sector concerned.

The Supreme Court further ruled —

For that matter, the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code even prescribe the time and manner by which such determination is to be conducted by the Sanggunian.

Consequently, in cases where the Sanggunian concerned has not yet determined that the Industrial and Agricultural Labor Sectors in their particular city or municipality are of sufficient number to warrant representation, there will absolutely be no basis for the designation/appointments.

In the process of such inquiry as to the sufficiency in number of the sector concerned to warrant representation, the Sanggunian is enjoined by law (B.P. Blg. 337) to consult with associations and persons belonging to the sector concerned. Consultation with the sector concerned is made a pre-requisite. This is so considering that those who belong to the said sector are the ones primarily interested in being represented in the Sanggunian. In the same aforecited case, the Supreme Court considers such prior determination by the Sanggunian itself (not by any other person or body) as a condition sine qua non to a valid appointment or designation.

Since in the present case, there was total absence of the required prior determination by the Sangguniang Bayan of Jimalalud, this Court cannot help but declare the designations of private defendants as sectoral representatives null and void.

This verdict is not without precedence. In several similar cases, the Supreme Court invariably nullified the designations where the requirements of Sec. 146 (2), B.P. Blg. 337 were not complied with. Just to cite one case, the Supreme Court ruled:

There is no certification from the Sangguniang Bayan of Valenzuela that the sectors concerned are of sufficient number to warrant representation and there was no consultation whatsoever with the associations and persons belonging to the Industrial and Agricultural Labor Sectors. Therefore, the appointment of private respondents Romeo F. Bularan and Rafael Cortez are null and void (Romeo Llanado, et al. v. Hon. Luis Santos, et al., G.R. No. 86394, August 24, 1990). 4

Private respondents appealed the aforestated decision to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 36769, where the same is currently pending resolution.

Meanwhile, on 17 February 1992, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying the motion for suspension of proceedings filed by petitioners. Said respondent Sandiganbayan:

Despite the pendency of Civil Case No. 9955 of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, it appears, nevertheless, that the private complainants have been rendering services on the basis of their respective appointments as sectoral members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Jimalalud, Negros Oriental; and that their said appointments enjoy the presumption of regularity. Having rendered such services, the private complainants are entitled to the salaries attached to their office. Even assuming arguendo that the said Regional Trial Court shall later decide that the said appointments of the private complainants are null and void, still the private complainants are entitled to their salaries and compensation for service they have actually rendered, for the reason that before such judicial declaration of nullity, the private complainants are considered at least de facto public officers acting as such on the basis of apparently valid

appointments issued by competent authorities. In other words, regardless of the decision that may be rendered in Civil Case No. 9955, the private complainants are entitled to their withheld salaries for the services they have actually rendered as sectoral representatives of the said Sangguniang Bayan. Hence, the decision that may be rendered by the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 9955 would not be determinative of the innocence or guilt of the accused.

WHEREFORE, the subject Petition for the Suspension of Proceedings in Virtue of Prejudicial Question filed by the accused through counsel, is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. 5

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned resolution in view of the decision promulgated by the trial court nullifying the appointments of private respondents but it was, likewise, denied in an order issued by respondent Sandiganbayan on 19 August 1992 on the justification that the grounds stated in the said motion were a mere rehash of petitioners' original motion to hold the case in abeyance. 6 The dispositive portion of its order reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the arraignment of the accused which was scheduled today is cancelled. Mayor Reynaldo Tuanda, Hermenegildo Faburada, Nicanor P. Agosto, Erenieta K. Mendoza, Hacubina V. Serillo and Iluminado Estrellanes are, however, hereby ordered to show cause in writing within ten (10) days from service hereof why they should not be cited for contempt of court for their failure to appear in court today for arraignment.

In case of an adverse resolution on the motion to quash which is to be filed by the counsel for the defense, set this case for arraignment, pre-trial and trial on January 4 & 5, 1993, on all dates the trial to start at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.

SO ORDERED. 7

On 19 February 1993, respondent Sandiganbayan issued an order holding consideration of all incidents pending the issuance of an extended resolution. 8

No such resolution, however, was issued and in its assailed order dated 13 May 1992, respondent Sandiganbayan set the arraignment of petitioners on 30 June 1993. The dispositive portion of the order reads:

WHEREFORE, considering the absence of the accused from the scheduled hearing today which We deem to be excusable, reset this case for arraignment on June 30, 1993 and for trial on the merits on June 30 and July 1 and 2, 1993, on all dates the trial to start at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.

Give proper notice to the accused and principal counsel, Atty. Alfonso Briones. Considering that the accused come all the way from Himalalud, Negros Oriental, no postponement will be allowed.

SO ORDERED. 9

Hence, this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition where petitioners attribute to respondent Sandiganbayan the following errors:

A. The Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners' motions for the suspension of the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 16936 in spite of the pendency of a prejudicial issue before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 36769;

B. The Respondent Court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in refusing to suspend the proceedings that would entail a retrial and rehearing by it of the basic issue involved, i.e., the validity of the appointments of private respondents and their entitlement to compensation which is already pending resolution by the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 36769; and

C. The Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion and/or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in effectively allowing petitioners to be prosecuted under two alternative theories that private respondents are de jure and/or de facto officers in violation of petitioners' right to due process. 10

In sum, the only issue in the case at bench is whether or not the legality or validity of private respondents' designation as sectoral representatives which is pending resolution in CA-G.R. No. 36769 is a prejudicial question justifying suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case against petitioners.

A prejudicial question is one that must be decided before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or before it may proceed (see Art. 36, Civil Code) because a decision on that point is vital to the eventual judgment in the criminal case. Thus, the resolution of the prejudicial question is a logical antecedent of the issues involved in said criminal case. 11

A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. 12 It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from "the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. It comes into play generally in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case." 13

The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. 14 It has two essential elements:

(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and

(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. 15

Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bench, we find that the issue in the civil case, CA-G.R. CV No. 36769, constitutes a valid prejudicial question to warrant suspension of the arraignment and further proceedings in the criminal case against petitioners.

All the elements of a prejudicial question are clearly and unmistakably present in this case. There is no doubt that the facts and issues involved in the civil action (No. 36769) and the criminal case (No. 16936) are closely related. The filing of the criminal case was premised on petitioners' alleged partiality and evident bad faith in not paying private respondents' salaries and per diems as sectoral representatives,

while the civil action was instituted precisely to resolve whether or not the designations of private respondents as sectoral representatives were made in accordance with law.

More importantly, ,the resolution of the civil case will certainly determine if there will still be any reason to proceed with the criminal action.

Petitioners were criminally charged under the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019, sec, 3[e]) due to their refusal, allegedly in bad faith and with manifest partiality, to pay private respondents' salaries as sectoral representatives. This refusal, however, was anchored on petitioners' assertion that said designations were made in violation of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) and thus, were null and void. Therefore, should the Court of Appeals uphold the trial court's decision declaring null and void private respondents' designations as sectoral representatives for failure to comply with the provisions of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337, sec. 146[2]), the charges against petitioners would no longer, so to speak, have a leg to stand on. Petitioners cannot be accused of bad faith and partiality there being in the first place no obligation on their part to pay private respondents' claims. Private respondents do not have any legal right to demand salaries, per diems and other benefits. In other words, the Court of Appeals' resolution of the issues raised in the civil action will ultimately determine whether or not there is basis to proceed with the criminal case.

Private respondents insist that even if their designations are nullified, they are entitled to compensation for actual services rendered. 16 We disagree. As found by the trial court and as borne out by the records, from the start, private respondents' designations as sectoral representatives have been challenged by petitioners. They began with a petition filed with the Office of the President copies of which were received by private respondents on 26 February 1989, barely eight (8) days after they took their oath of office. 17 Hence, private respondents' claim that they have actually rendered services as sectoral representatives has not been established.

Finally, we find unmeritorious respondent Sandiganbayan's thesis that even in the event that private respondents' designations are finally declared invalid, they may still be considered de facto public officers entitled to compensation for services actually rendered.

The conditions and elements of de facto officership are the following:

1) There must be a de jure office;

2) There must be color of right or general acquiescence by the public; and

3) There must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith. 18

One can qualify as a de facto officer only if all the aforestated elements are present. There can be no de factoofficer where there is no de jure office, although there may be a de facto officer in a de jure office. 19

WHEREFORE, the resolution dated 17 February 1992 and orders dated 19 August 1992 and 13 May 1993 of respondent Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 16936 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent Sandiganbayan is enjoined from proceeding with the arraignment and trial of petitioners in Criminal Case No. 16936 pending final resolution of CA-G.R. CV No. 36769.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 137567. June 20, 2000]

MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HON. JUDGE FLORENTINO TUAZON, JR., being the Judge of the RTC, Branch 139, Makati City, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

BUENA, J.:

This petition for review, filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeks to review and set aside the Order dated January 28, 1999 issued by Judge Florentino A. Tuazon, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 139 in Special Civil Case No. 98-3056, entitled "Meynardo Beltran vs. People of the Philippines and Hon. Judge Alden Cervantes of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati city, Branch 61." The said Order denied petitioner’s prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Judge Cervantes from proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case No. 236176, a concubinage case against petitioner on the ground that the pending petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by petitioner against his wife constitutes a prejudicial question.

The antecedent facts of the case are undisputed:

Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix were married on June 16, 1973 at the Immaculate Concepcion Parish Church in Cubao, Quezon City.[1]

On February 7, 1997, after twenty-four years of marriage and four children,[2] petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code before Branch 87 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-97-30192.[3]

In her Answer to the said petition, petitioner's wife Charmaine Felix alleged that it was petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named Milagros Salting.[4]Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal complaint for concubinage[5] under Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner and his paramour before the City Prosecutor's Office of Makati who, in a Resolution dated September 16, 1997, found probable cause and ordered the filing of an Information [6] against them. The case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 236176, was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61.

On March 20, 1998, petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant for his arrest, filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case. Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case. Judge Alden Vasquez Cervantes denied the foregoing motion in the Order[7] dated August 31, 1998. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said Order of denial was likewise denied in an Order dated December 9, 1998.

In view of the denial of his motion to defer the proceedings in the concubinage case, petitioner went to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 139 on certiorari, questioning the Orders dated August 31, 1998 and December 9, 1998 issued by Judge Cervantes and praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.[8] In an Order[9] dated January 28, 1999, the Regional Trial Court of Makati denied the petition for certiorari. Said Court subsequently issued another Order[10] dated February 23, 1999, denying his motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of his petition.

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Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant petition for review.

Petitioner contends that the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage based on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code is a prejudicial question that should merit the suspension of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him by his wife.

Petitioner also contends that there is a possibility that two conflicting decisions might result from the civil case for annulment of marriage and the criminal case for concubinage. In the civil case, the trial court might declare the marriage as valid by dismissing petitioner's complaint but in the criminal case, the trial court might acquit petitioner because the evidence shows that his marriage is void on ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner submits that the possible conflict of the courts' ruling regarding petitioner's marriage can be avoided, if the criminal case will be suspended, until the court rules on the validity of marriage; that if petitioner's marriage is declared void by reason of psychological incapacity then by reason of the arguments submitted in the subject petition, his marriage has never existed; and that, accordingly, petitioner could not be convicted in the criminal case because he was never before a married man.

Petitioner's contentions are untenable.

The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.[11]

The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.

Article 40 of the Family Code provides:

"The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."

In Domingo vs. Court of Appeals,[12] this Court ruled that the import of said provision is that for purposes of remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable. The pertinent portions of said Decision read:

"xxx Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party might well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the custody and support of their common children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These needs not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void."

So that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void.



With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense.

Analogous to this case is that of Landicho vs. Reloval[13] cited in Donato vs. Luna[14] where this Court held that:

"xxx Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, that fact would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy."

Thus, in the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage. The lower court therefore, has not erred in affirming the Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court ruling that pendency of a civil action for nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial question in a criminal case for concubinage.

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.


Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 159186 June 5, 2009

JESSE Y. YAP, Petitioner, vs.HON. MONICO G. CABALES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, General Santos City; MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 1, General Santos City; COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, JOVITA DIMALANTA and MERGYL MIRABUENO, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or issuance of status quo order seeking to annul and set aside the



Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 17, 2003 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the Decision2 dated April 30, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 68250.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioner Jesse Y. Yap and his spouse Bessie Yap are engaged in the real estate business through their company Primetown Property Group.

Sometime in 1996, petitioner purchased several real properties from a certain Evelyn Te (Evelyn). In consideration of said purchases, petitioner issued several Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) postdated checks to Evelyn. Thereafter, spouses Orlando and Mergyl Mirabueno and spouses Charlie and Jovita Dimalanta, rediscounted the checks from Evelyn.

In the beginning, the first few checks were honored by the bank, but in the early part of 1997, when the remaining checks were deposited with the drawee bank, they were dishonored for the reason that the "Account is Closed."Demands were made by Spouses Mirabueno and Spouses Dimalanta to the petitioner to make good the checks. Despite this, however, the latter failed to pay the amounts represented by the said checks.

On December 8, 1997, Spouses Mirabueno filed a civil action for collection of sum of money, damages and attorney's fee with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City, docketed as Civil Case No. 6231.3 On December 15, 1997, Spouses Dimalanta followed suit and instituted a similar action, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 6238.4

Subsequently, on various dates, the Office of the City Prosecutor of General Santos City filed several informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 22 against the petitioner with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), General Santos City. The criminal complaints were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 34873, 34874, 34862 to 34869, and Criminal Case No. 35522-I.5

In the criminal cases, petitioner filed separate motions to suspend proceedings on account of the existence of a prejudicial question and motion to exclude the private prosecutor from participating in the proceedings.6 Petitioner prayed that the proceedings in the criminal cases be suspended until the civil cases pending before the RTC were finally resolved.

The MTCC, in its Orders7 dated June 21, 2000 and July 4, 2000, denied the motions for lack of merit. Petitioner filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration8 relative to Criminal Case Nos. 34873, 34874, 34862 to 34869 and a Motion for Reconsideration of the Part of the Order Denying the Motion to Suspend Proceedings on Account of the Existence of a Prejudicial Question relative to Criminal Case No. 35522-I.9 The subsequent motions were denied in the Order10 dated October 18, 2000.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with a Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction11 before the RTC, docketed as SPL. Civil Case No. 539, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTCC Judge. On July 2, 2001, the RTC issued an Order12 denying the petition.

Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration,13 which was denied in an Order dated October 18, 2001.14

Thereafter, petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari Prohibition and Mandamus with Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of Status Quo Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction,15 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68250.

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On April 30, 2003, the CA rendered a Decision16 dismissing the petition for lack of merit. The CA opined that Civil Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 did not pose a prejudicial question to the prosecution of the petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

The CA ruled:

In the instant case, a careful perusal of Civil Cases Nos. 6231 and 6238 reveals that the issue involved therein is not the validity of the sale as incorrectly pointed out by the petitioner, but it is, whether or not the complainants therein are entitled to collect from the petitioner the sum or the value of the checks which they have rediscounted from Evelyn Te. It behooves this Court to state that the sale and the rediscounting of the checks are two transactions, separate and distinct from each other. It so happened that in the subject civil cases it is not the sale that is in question, but rather the rediscounting of the checks. Therefore, petitioner's contention that the main issue involved in said civil cases is the validity of the sale stands on hollow ground. Furthermore, if it is indeed the validity of the sale that is contested in the subject civil cases, then, We cannot fathom why the petitioner never contested such sale by filing an action for the annulment thereof or at least invoked or prayed in his answer that the sale be declared null and void. Accordingly, even if Civil Cases Nos. 6231 and 6238 are tried and the resolution of the issues therein is had, it cannot be deduced therefrom that the petitioner cannot be held liable anymore for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.17

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,18 which was denied in the Order19 dated July 17, 2003.

Hence, the petition assigning the following errors:

1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE IS NO PREJUDICIAL QUESTION IN THE CIVIL CASES (FOR COLLECTION OF SUMS OF MONEY INSTITUTED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS OVER CHECKS ISSUED BY THE PETITIONER, CIVIL CASE NOS. 6238 AND 6231) THAT WOULD WARRANT SUSPENSION OF THE CRIMINAL CASES (CASE NO. 35522-1, FOR VIOLATION OF B.P. 22, SUBJECT OF WHICH ARE THE VERY SAME CHECKS).

2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT GRANTING THE PRAYER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND/OR STATUS QUO ORDER.20

The main contention of the petitioner is that a prejudicial question, as defined by law and jurisprudence, exists in the present case. It is the petitioner's assertion that Civil Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 for collection of sum of money and damages were filed ahead of the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. He further alleged that, in the pending civil cases, the issue as to whether private respondents are entitled to collect from the petitioner despite the lack of consideration, is an issue that is a logical antecedent to the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. For if the court rules that there is no valid consideration for the check's issuance, as petitioner contends, then it necessarily follows that he could not also be held liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

Petitioner further avers that B.P. Blg. 22 specifically requires, among other elements, that the check should have been issued for account or for value. There must be a valid consideration; otherwise, no violation of the said law could be rightfully pursued. Petitioner said that the reason for the dishonor of the checks was his order to the drawee bank to stop payment and to close his account in order to avoid necessary penalty from the bank. He made this order due to the failure of Evelyn to deliver to him the titles to the purchased properties to him.

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that there is no prejudicial question in Civil Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 which would warrant the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against the petitioner. The issue in the civil cases is not the validity of






the sale between the petitioner and Evelyn, but whether the complainants therein are entitled to damages arising from the checks. These checks were issued by the petitioner in favor of Evelyn, who, thereafter, negotiated the same checks to private complainants. The checks were subsequently dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. The OSG maintains that the resolution of such issue has absolutely no bearing on the issue of whether petitioner may be held liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.21

The present case hinges on the determination of whether there exists a prejudicial question that necessitates the suspension of the proceedings in the MTCC.

We find that there is none and, thus, we resolve to deny the petition.

A prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (i) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (ii) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.22

If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues, or the issue in one is intimately related to the issues raised in the other, then a prejudicial question would likely exist, provided the other element or characteristic is satisfied. It must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or if there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question.23 Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other.24

The issue in the criminal cases is whether the petitioner is guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22, while in the civil case, it is whether the private respondents are entitled to collect from the petitioner the sum or the value of the checks that they have rediscounted from Evelyn.lavvphil

The resolution of the issue raised in the civil action is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal cases against him, and there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal cases.

In the aforementioned civil actions, even if petitioner is declared not liable for the payment of the value of the checks and damages, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The mere issuance of worthless checks with knowledge of the insufficiency of funds to support the checks is in itself an offense.25

In Jose v. Suarez,26 the prejudicial question under determination was whether the daily interest rate of 5% was void, such that the checks issued by respondents to cover said interest were likewise void for being contra bonos mores, and thus the cases for B.P. Blg. 22 will no longer prosper. In resolving the issue, We ruled that "whether or not the interest rate imposed by petitioners is eventually declared void for being contra bonos mores will not affect the outcome of the BP Blg. 22 cases because what will ultimately be penalized is the mere issuance of bouncing checks. In fact, the primordial question posed before the court hearing the B.P. Blg. 22 cases is whether the law has been breached; that is, if a bouncing check has been issued."

Further, We held in Ricaforte v. Jurado,27 that:








The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check; that is, a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. In Lozano v. Martinez, we have declared that it is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making and circulation of worthless checks. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. In People v. Nitafan, we said that a check issued as an evidence of debt - though not intended to be presented for payment - has the same effect as an ordinary check and would fall within the ambit of B.P. Blg. 22.

x x x x

x x x The mere act of issuing a worthless check - whether as a deposit, as a guarantee or even as evidence of pre-existing debt - is malum prohibitum.

To determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring about havoc in trade and in banking communities. So what the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued or the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum.28

Moreover, petitioner's reliance on Ras v. Rasul29 is misplaced. The case of Ras involves a complaint for nullification of a deed of sale on the ground of an alleged double sale. While the civil case was pending, an information for estafa was filed against Ras (the defendant in the civil case) arising from the same alleged double sale, subject matter of the civil complaint. The Court ruled that there was a prejudicial question considering that the defense in the civil case was based on the very same facts that would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the estafa case.

The instant case is different from Ras, inasmuch as the determination of whether the petitioner is liable to pay the private respondents the value of the checks and damages, will not affect the guilt or innocence of the petitioner because the material question in the criminal cases is whether petitioner had issued bad checks, regardless of the purpose or condition of its issuance.

Guided by the following legal precepts, it is clear that the determination of the issues involved in Civil Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 for collection of sum of money and damages is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the petitioner in the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

In addition, petitioner's claim of lack of consideration may be raised as a defense during the trial of the criminal cases against him. The validity and merits of a party’s defense and accusation, as well as the admissibility and weight of testimonies and evidence brought before the court, are better ventilated during trial proper.

Precisely, the reason why a state has courts of law is to ascertain the respective rights of the parties, to examine and to put to test all their respective allegations and evidence through a well designed machinery termed "trial."Thus, all the defenses available to the accused should be invoked in the trial of the criminal cases. This court is not the proper forum that should ascertain the facts and decide the case for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 filed against the petitioner.

In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in affirming the decision of the RTC.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision dated April 30, 2003 and the Resolution dated July 17, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68250 are AFFIRMED.



SO ORDERED.


Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 184861 June 30, 2009

DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC., Petitioner, vs.CLEOFE S. JANIOLA and HON. ARTHUR A. FAMINI, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

Petitioner Dreamwork Construction, Inc. seeks the reversal of the August 26, 2008 Decision1 in SCA No. 08-0005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 253 in Las Piñas City. The Decision affirmed the Orders dated October 16, 20072 and March 12, 20083 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 79 in Las Piñas City.

The Facts

On October 18, 2004, petitioner, through its President, Roberto S. Concepcion, and Vice-President for Finance and Marketing, Normandy P. Amora, filed a Complaint Affidavit dated October 5, 20044 for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22) against private respondent Cleofe S. Janiola with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City. The case was docketed as I.S. No. 04-2526-33. Correspondingly, petitioner filed a criminal information for violation of BP 22 against private respondent with the MTC on February 2, 2005 docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, entitled People of the Philippines v. Cleofe S. Janiola.

On September 20, 2006, private respondent, joined by her husband, instituted a civil complaint against petitioner by filing a Complaint dated August 20065 for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for damages. The case was filed with the RTC, Branch 197 in Las Piñas City and docketed as Civil Case No. LP-06-0197. Notably, the checks, subject of the criminal cases before the MTC, were issued in consideration of the construction agreement.

Thereafter, on July 25, 2007, private respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings dated July 24, 20076 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, alleging that the civil and criminal cases involved facts and issues similar or intimately related such that in the resolution of the issues in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. In other words, private respondent claimed that the civil case posed a prejudicial question as against the criminal cases.

Petitioner opposed the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases in an undated Comment/Opposition to Accused’s Motion to Suspend Proceedings based on Prejudicial Question7 on the grounds that: (1) there is no prejudicial question in this case as the rescission of the contract upon which








the bouncing checks were issued is a separate and distinct issue from the issue of whether private respondent violated BP 22; and (2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that one of the elements of a prejudicial question is that "the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action"; thus, this element is missing in this case, the criminal case having preceded the civil case.

Later, the MTC issued its Order dated October 16, 2007, granting the Motion to Suspend Proceedings, and reasoned that:

Should the trial court declare the rescission of contract and the nullification of the checks issued as the same are without consideration, then the instant criminal cases for alleged violation of BP 22 must be dismissed. The belated filing of the civil case by the herein accused did not detract from the correctness of her cause, since a motion for suspension of a criminal action may be filed at any time before the prosecution rests (Section 6, Rule 111, Revised Rules of Court).8

In an Order dated March 12, 2008,9 the MTC denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration dated November 29, 2007.

Petitioner appealed the Orders to the RTC with a Petition dated May 13, 2008. Thereafter, the RTC issued the assailed decision dated August 26, 2008, denying the petition. On the issue of the existence of a prejudicial question, the RTC ruled:

Additionally, it must be stressed that the requirement of a "previously" filed civil case is intended merely to obviate delays in the conduct of the criminal proceedings. Incidentally, no clear evidence of any intent to delay by private respondent was shown. The criminal proceedings are still in their initial stages when the civil action was instituted. And, the fact that the civil action was filed after the criminal action was instituted does not render the issues in the civil action any less prejudicial in character.10

Hence, we have this petition under Rule 45.

The Issue

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT PERCEIVING GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE INFERIOR COURT, WHEN THE LATTER RULED TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS IN CRIM. CASE NOS. 55554-61 ON THE BASIS OF "PREJUDICIAL QUESTION" IN CIVIL CASE NO. LP-06-0197.11

The Court’s Ruling

This petition must be granted.

The Civil Action Must Precede the Filing of the

Criminal Action for a Prejudicial Question to Exist

Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended by Supreme Court Resolutions dated June 17, 1988 and July 7, 1988, the elements of a prejudicial question are contained in Rule 111, Sec. 5, which states:

SEC. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. — The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.





Thus, the Court has held in numerous cases12 that the elements of a prejudicial question, as stated in the above-quoted provision and in Beltran v. People,13 are:

The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

On December 1, 2000, the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, however, became effective and the above provision was amended by Sec. 7 of Rule 111, which applies here and now provides:

SEC. 7. Elements of prejudicial question.—The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner interprets Sec. 7(a) to mean that in order for a civil case to create a prejudicial question and, thus, suspend a criminal case, it must first be established that the civil case was filed previous to the filing of the criminal case. This, petitioner argues, is specifically to guard against the situation wherein a party would belatedly file a civil action that is related to a pending criminal action in order to delay the proceedings in the latter.

On the other hand, private respondent cites Article 36 of the Civil Code which provides:

Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions which must be decided before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed, shall be governed by rules of court which the Supreme Court shall promulgate and which shall not be in conflict with the provisions of this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)

Private respondent argues that the phrase "before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed" must be interpreted to mean that a prejudicial question exists when the civil action is filed either before the institution of the criminal action or during the pendency of the criminal action. Private respondent concludes that there is an apparent conflict in the provisions of the Rules of Court and the Civil Code in that the latter considers a civil case to have presented a prejudicial question even if the criminal case preceded the filing of the civil case.

We cannot agree with private respondent.

First off, it is a basic precept in statutory construction that a "change in phraseology by amendment of a provision of law indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of the provision from that it originally had."14 In the instant case, the phrase, "previously instituted," was inserted to qualify the nature of the civil action involved in a prejudicial question in relation to the criminal action. This interpretation is further buttressed by the insertion of "subsequent" directly before the term criminal action. There is no other logical explanation for the amendments except to qualify the relationship of the civil and criminal actions, that the civil action must precede the criminal action.

Thus, this Court ruled in Torres v. Garchitorena15 that:

Even if we ignored petitioners’ procedural lapse and resolved their petition on the merits, we hold that Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in denying their omnibus motion for the suspension of the proceedings pending final judgment in Civil Case No. 7160. Section 6, Rule lll of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, reads:





Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. - A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.

Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the criminal action and which requires a decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal action with which said question is closely connected. The civil action must be instituted prior to the institution of the criminal action. In this case, the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan ahead of the complaint in Civil Case No. 7160 filed by the State with the RTC in Civil Case No. 7160. Thus, no prejudicial question exists. (Emphasis supplied.)

Additionally, it is a principle in statutory construction that "a statute should be construed not only to be consistent with itself but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible system."16 This principle is consistent with the maxim, interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus or every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.171 a vv p h i l

In other words, every effort must be made to harmonize seemingly conflicting laws. It is only when harmonization is impossible that resort must be made to choosing which law to apply.

In the instant case, Art. 36 of the Civil Code and Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are susceptible of an interpretation that would harmonize both provisions of law. The phrase "previously instituted civil action" in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 is plainly worded and is not susceptible of alternative interpretations. The clause "before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed" in Art. 36 of the Civil Code may, however, be interpreted to mean that the motion to suspend the criminal action may be filed during the preliminary investigation with the public prosecutor or court conducting the investigation, or during the trial with the court hearing the case.

This interpretation would harmonize Art. 36 of the Civil Code with Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court but also with Sec. 6 of Rule 111 of the Civil Code, which provides for the situations when the motion to suspend the criminal action during the preliminary investigation or during the trial may be filed. Sec. 6 provides:

SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question.—A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.

Thus, under the principles of statutory construction, it is this interpretation of Art. 36 of the Civil Code that should govern in order to give effect to all the relevant provisions of law.

It bears pointing out that the circumstances present in the instant case indicate that the filing of the civil action and the subsequent move to suspend the criminal proceedings by reason of the presence of a prejudicial question were a mere afterthought and instituted to delay the criminal proceedings.



In Sabandal v. Tongco,18 we found no prejudicial question existed involving a civil action for specific performance, overpayment, and damages, and a criminal complaint for BP 22, as the resolution of the civil action would not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. In resolving the case, we said:

Furthermore, the peculiar circumstances of the case clearly indicate that the filing of the civil case was a ploy to delay the resolution of the criminal cases. Petitioner filed the civil case three years after the institution of the criminal charges against him. Apparently, the civil action was instituted as an afterthought to delay the proceedings in the criminal cases.19

Here, the civil case was filed two (2) years after the institution of the criminal complaint and from the time that private respondent allegedly withdrew its equipment from the job site. Also, it is worth noting that the civil case was instituted more than two and a half (2 ½) years from the time that private respondent allegedly stopped construction of the proposed building for no valid reason. More importantly, the civil case praying for the rescission of the construction agreement for lack of consideration was filed more than three (3) years from the execution of the construction agreement.

Evidently, as in Sabandal, the circumstances surrounding the filing of the cases involved here show that the filing of the civil action was a mere afterthought on the part of private respondent and interposed for delay. And as correctly argued by petitioner, it is this scenario that Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court seeks to prevent. Thus, private respondent’s positions cannot be left to stand.

The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal Action

In any event, even if the civil case here was instituted prior to the criminal action, there is, still, no prejudicial question to speak of that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case.

To reiterate, the elements of a prejudicial question under Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are: (1) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; and (2) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

Petitioner argues that the second element of a prejudicial question, as provided in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules, is absent in this case. Thus, such rule cannot apply to the present controversy.

Private respondent, on the other hand, claims that if the construction agreement between the parties is declared null and void for want of consideration, the checks issued in consideration of such contract would become mere scraps of paper and cannot be the basis of a criminal prosecution.

We find for petitioner.

It must be remembered that the elements of the crime punishable under BP 22 are as follows:

(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;

(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue there are no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and

(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.20




Undeniably, the fact that there exists a valid contract or agreement to support the issuance of the check/s or that the checks were issued for valuable consideration does not make up the elements of the crime. Thus, this Court has held in a long line of cases21 that the agreement surrounding the issuance of dishonored checks is irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of BP 22. In Mejia v. People,22 we ruled:

It must be emphasized that the gravamen of the offense charge is the issuance of a bad check. The purpose for which the check was issued, the terms and conditions relating to its issuance, or any agreement surrounding such issuance are irrelevant to the prosecution and conviction of petitioner. To determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring havoc in trade and in banking communities. The clear intention of the framers of B.P. 22 is to make the mere act of issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum.

Lee v. Court of Appeals23 is even more poignant. In that case, we ruled that the issue of lack of valuable consideration for the issuance of checks which were later on dishonored for insufficient funds is immaterial to the success of a prosecution for violation of BP 22, to wit:

Third issue. Whether or not the check was issued on account or for value.

Petitioner’s claim is not feasible. We have held that upon issuance of a check, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the same was issued for valuable consideration. Valuable consideration, in turn, may consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to the party who makes the contract, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or some responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given, suffered or undertaken by the other side. It is an obligation to do, or not to do in favor of the party who makes the contract, such as the maker or indorser.

In this case, petitioner himself testified that he signed several checks in blank, the subject check included, in exchange for 2.5% interest from the proceeds of loans that will be made from said account. This is a valuable consideration for which the check was issued. That there was neither a pre-existing obligation nor an obligation incurred on the part of petitioner when the subject check was given by Bautista to private complainant on July 24, 1993 because petitioner was no longer connected with Unlad or Bautista starting July 1989, cannot be given merit since, as earlier discussed, petitioner failed to adequately prove that he has severed his relationship with Bautista or Unlad.

At any rate, we have held that what the law punishes is the mere act of issuing a bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. This is because the thrust of the law is to prohibit the making of worthless checks and putting them into circulation.24 (Emphasis supplied.)

Verily, even if the trial court in the civil case declares that the construction agreement between the parties is void for lack of consideration, this would not affect the prosecution of private respondent in the criminal case. The fact of the matter is that private respondent indeed issued checks which were subsequently dishonored for insufficient funds. It is this fact that is subject of prosecution under BP 22.lawphil.net

Therefore, it is clear that the second element required for the existence of a prejudicial question, that the resolution of the issue in the civil action would determine whether the criminal action may proceed, is absent in the instant case. Thus, no prejudicial question exists and the rules on it are inapplicable to the case before us.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT this petition. We hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the August 26, 2008 Decision in SCA No. 08-0005 of the RTC, Branch 253 in Las Piñas City and the Orders dated October 16, 2007 and March 12, 2008 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 of the MTC, Branch 79 in Las Piñas City. We order the MTC to continue with the proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 with dispatch.





No costs.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL, G.R. No. 172060 Petitioner, Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, - versus - PERALTA, BERSAMIN,* ABAD, and VILLARAMA, JR.,** JJ. MARIA CHRYSANTINE L. PIMENTEL and PEOPLE Promulgated: OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. September 13, 2010 x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review[1] assailing the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals,

promulgated on 20 March 2006, in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.

The Antecedent Facts

The facts are stated in the Court of Appeals’ decision:

On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an action for

frustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner), docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415,

before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, which was raffled to Branch 223 (RTC Quezon City).

On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of

Antipolo City, Branch 72 (RTC Antipolo) for the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392 (Maria

Chrysantine Lorenza L. Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section

36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.

On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC

Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the

relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of Civil Case

No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.

The Decision of the Trial Court

The RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May 2005 [3] holding that the pendency of the case

before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case

before it. The RTC Quezon City held that the issues in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 are the injuries

sustained by respondent and whether the case could be tried even if the validity of petitioner’s marriage

with respondent is in question. The RTC Quezon City ruled:

WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings On the [Ground] of the Existence of a Prejudicial Question is, for lack of merit, DENIED. SO ORDERED.[4]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22 August 2005 Order,[5] the RTC Quezon City

denied the motion.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or

temporary restraining order before the Court of Appeals, assailing the 13 May 2005 and 22 August 2005

Orders of the RTC Quezon City.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

In its 20 March 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals

ruled that in the criminal case for frustrated parricide, the issue is whether the offender commenced the

commission of the crime of parricide directly by overt acts and did not perform all the acts of execution by

reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. On the other hand, the

issue in the civil action for annulment of marriage is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to

comply with the essential marital obligations. The Court of Appeals ruled that even if the marriage

between petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal

case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated

parricide had already been committed. The Court of Appeals ruled that all that is required for the charge

of frustrated parricide is that at the time of the commission of the crime, the marriage is still subsisting.

Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court assailing the Court of Appeals’ decision.

The Issue

The only issue in this case is whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a

prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against

petitioner.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has no merit.

Civil Case Must be Instituted

Before the Criminal Case

Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure[6] provides:

Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action. In

this case, the Information[7] for Frustrated Parricide was dated 30 August 2004. It was raffled to RTC

Quezon City on 25 October 2004 as per the stamped date of receipt on the Information. The RTC

Quezon City set Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 for pre-trial and trial on 14 February 2005. Petitioner

was served summons in Civil Case No. 04-7392 on 7 February 2005. [8] Respondent’s petition[9] in Civil

Case No. 04-7392 was dated 4 November 2004 and was filed on 5 November 2004. Clearly, the civil

case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the

requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil

action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.

Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question

in Criminal Case for Parricide

Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the

suspension of the criminal action.

There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there

exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may

proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the

guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.[10] A prejudicial question is defined as:

x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.[11]

The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide,[12] which punishes any person “who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate,

or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse.” [13] The relationship between the offender and

the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from murder [14] or homicide.[15] However, the issue in the

annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for

parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or

innocence of the accused.

The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is

whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The

issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with

frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed

respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes

independent of petitioner’s will.[16] At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and

respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case

No. 04-7392 is granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the

subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is

annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged

crime, he was still married to respondent.

We cannot accept petitioner’s reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals[17] that “the judicial

declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of

the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned x x

x.” First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent

marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy. There was no issue

of prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that “[t]here is x x x a

recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal

consequences.”[18] In fact, the Court declared in that case that “a declaration of the nullity of the second

marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s

penal laws are concerned.”[19]

In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision of the Court of Appeals. The trial

in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 may proceed as the resolution of the issue in Civil Case No. 04-7392

is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of petitioner in the criminal case.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 20 March 2006 Decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.

SO ORDERED.


Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 159823 February 18, 2013

TEODORO A. REYES, Petitioner, vs.ETTORE ROSSI, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

BERSAMIN, J.:

The rescission of a contract of sale is not a prejudicial question that will warrant the suspension of the criminal proceedings commenced to prosecute the buyer for violations of the Bouncing Checks Law (Batas Pambansa Blg.22) arising from the dishonor of the checks the buyer issued in connection with the sale.

Antecedents

On October 31, 1997, petitioner Teodoro A. Reyes (Reyes) and Advanced Foundation Construction Systems Corporation (Advanced Foundation), represented by its Executive Project Director, respondent Ettore Rossi (Rossi), executed a deed of conditional sale involving the purchase by Reyes of equipment consisting of a Warman Dredging Pump HY 300A worth P10,000,000.00. The parties agreed therein that Reyes would pay the sum of P3,000,000.00 as downpayment, and the balance of P7,000,000.00 through four post-dated checks. Reyes complied, but in January 1998, he requested the restructuring of his obligation under the deed of conditional sale by replacing the four post-dated checks with nine post-dated checks that would include interest at the rate of P25,000.00/month accruing on the unpaid portion of the obligation on April 30, 1998, June 30, 1998, July 31, 1998, September 30, 1998 and October 31, 1998.1

Advanced Foundation assented to Reyes’ request, and returned the four checks. In turn, Reyes issued and delivered the following nine postdated checks in the aggregate sum of P7,125,000.00 drawn against the United Coconut Planters Bank,2 to wit:

Check No. Date Amount

72807 April 30, 1998 P 25,000.00

79125 May 1, 1998 1,000,000.00

72802 May 30, 1998 2,000,000.00

72808 June 30, 1998 25,000.00

72809 July 31, 1998 25,000.00

72801 August 31, 1998 2,000,000.00

72810 September 30, 1998 25,000.00

72811 October 31, 1998 25,000.00

72903 November 30, 1998 2,000,000.00

Rossi deposited three of the post-dated checks (i.e., No. 72807, No. 79125 and No. 72808) on their maturity dates in Advanced Foundation’s bank account at the PCI Bank in Makati. Two of the checks were denied payment ostensibly upon Reyes’ instructions to stop their payment, while the third (i.e., No. 72802) was dishonored for insufficiency of funds.3

Rossi likewise deposited two more checks (i.e., No. 72809 and No. 72801) in Advanced Foundation’s account at the PCI Bank in Makati, but the checks were returned with the notation Account Closed stamped on them. He did not anymore deposit the three remaining checks on the assumption that they would be similarly dishonored.4

In the meanwhile, on July 29, 1998, Reyes commenced an action for rescission of contract and damages in the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City (RTC). His complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. Q98-35109 and entitledTeodoro A. Reyes v. Advanced Foundation Construction Systems Corporation, sought judgment declaring the deed of conditional sale "rescinded and of no further force and effect," and ordering Advanced Foundation to return the P3,000,000.00 downpayment with legal interest from June 4, 1998 until fully paid; and to pay to him attorney’s fees, and various kinds and amounts of damages.5

On September 8, 1998, Rossi charged Reyes with five counts of estafa and five counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati for the dishonor of Checks No. 72807, No. 72808, No. 72801, No. 72809 and No. 79125. Another criminal charge for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was lodged against Reyes in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City for the dishonor of Check No. 72802.6

On September 29, 1998, Reyes submitted his counter-affidavit in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati,7claiming that the checks had not been issued for any valuable consideration; that he had discovered from the start of using the dredging pump involved in the conditional sale that the Caterpillar diesel engine powering the pump had been rated at only 560 horsepower instead of the 1200 horsepower Advanced Foundation had represented to him; that welding works on the pump had neatly concealed several cracks; that on May 6, 1998 he had written to Advanced Foundation complaining about the misrepresentations on the specifications of the pump and demanding documentary proof of Advanced Foundation’s ownership of the pump; that he had caused the order to stop the payment of three checks (i.e., No. 72806, No. 72807 and No. 79125); that Advanced Foundation had replied to his letter on May 8, 1998 by saying that the pump had been sold to him on an as is, where is basis; that he had then sent another letter to Advanced Foundation on May 18, 1998 to reiterate his complaints and the request for proper documentation of ownership; that he had subsequently discovered other hidden defects, prompting him to write another letter; and that instead of attending to his complaints and request, Advanced Foundation’s lawyers had threatened him with legal action.

At the same time, Reyes assailed the jurisdiction of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati over the criminal charges against him on the ground that he had issued the checks in Quezon City; as well as argued that the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati should suspend the proceedings because of the pendency in the RTC of the civil action for rescission of contract that posed a prejudicial question as to the criminal proceedings.8

On November 20, 1998, the Assistant City Prosecutor handling the preliminary investigation recommended the dismissal of the charges of estafa and the suspension of the proceedings relating to the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 based on a prejudicial question.9

On January 5, 1999, the City Prosecutor of Makati approved the recommendation of the handling Assistant City Prosecutor,10 stating:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint for Estafa is respectfully recommended to be dismissed, as upon approval, it is hereby dismissed.

Further, it is respectfully recommended that the proceedings in the charge for Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against the respondent be suspended until the prejudicial question raised in Civil Case Q-98-35109 for Rescission of Contract and Damages which is now pending with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 224, has been duly resolved.

Rossi appealed the resolution of the City Prosecutor to the Department of Justice, but the Secretary of Justice, by resolution of July 24, 2001, denied Rossi’s petition for review.

After the denial of his motion for reconsideration on April 29, 2002, Rossi challenged the resolutions of the Secretary of Justice by petition for certiorari in the CA.

Ruling of the CA

In the petition for certiorari, Rossi insisted that the Secretary of Justice had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in upholding the suspension of the criminal proceedings by the City Prosecutor of Makati on account of the existence of a prejudicial question, and in sustaining the dismissal of the complaints for estafa.

On May 30, 2003, the CA promulgated its assailed decision,11 to wit:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the assailed resolution is hereby MODIFIED and the instant petition isGRANTED in so far as the issue of the existence of prejudicial question is concerned. Accordingly, the order suspending the preliminary investigation in I.S. No. 98-40024-29 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the dismissal of the complaint for estafa is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Issues

Hence, this appeal by Reyes.

Reyes asserts that the CA erred in ruling that there was no prejudicial question that warranted the suspension of the criminal proceedings against him; that the petition suffered fatal defects that merited its immediate dismissal; that the CA was wrong in relying on the pronouncements in Balgos, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan12 and Umali v. Intermediate Appellate Court13 because the factual backgrounds thereat were not similar to that obtaining here; and that the Secretary of Justice did not commit any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

In his comment,14 Rossi counters that the petition for review should be outrightly dismissed because of its fatal defect; that the CA did not err in ruling that the action for rescission of contract did not pose a prejudicial question that would suspend the criminal proceedings.

Reyes submitted a reply,15 declaring that the defect in the affidavit of service attached to his petition for review had been due to oversight; that he had substantially complied with the rules; that there existed a prejudicial question that could affect the extent of his liability in light of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 12-2000; and that the CA erred in finding that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion.

To be resolved is whether or not the civil action for rescission of the contract of sale raised a prejudicial question that required the suspension of the criminal prosecution for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.

Ruling

The petition for review is without merit.

A prejudicial question generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that must first be determined before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.16 The rationale for the suspension on the ground of a prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting decisions.17

Two elements that must concur in order for a civil case to be considered a prejudicial question are expressly stated in Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:

Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. – The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

In Sabandal v. Tongco,18 the concept of prejudicial question is explained in this wise:

For a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil, the following requisites must be present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal.

If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues or the issue in one is intimately related to the issues raised in the other, then a prejudicial question would likely exist, provided the other element or characteristic is satisfied. It must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or there is no necessity "that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case," therefore, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question. Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other.

Contending that the rescission of the contract of sale constitutes a prejudicial question, Reyes posits that the resolution of the civil action will be determinative of whether or not he was criminally liable for the violations ofBatas Pambansa Blg. 22. He states that if the contract would be rescinded, his obligation to pay under the conditional deed of sale would be extinguished, and such outcome would necessarily result in the dismissal of the criminal proceedings for the violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.

The action for the rescission of the deed of sale on the ground that Advanced Foundation did not comply with its obligation actually seeks one of the alternative remedies available to a contracting party under Article 1191 of theCivil Code, to wit:

Article 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him.

The injured party may choose between the fulfilment and the rescission of the obligation, with the payment of damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen fulfilment, if the latter should become impossible.

The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just cause authorizing the fixing of a period.

This is understood to be without prejudice to the rights of third persons who have acquired the thing, in accordance with Articles 1385 and 1388 and the Mortgage Law.

Article 1191 of the Civil Code recognizes an implied or tacit resolutory condition in reciprocal obligations. The condition is imposed by law, and applies even if there is no corresponding agreement thereon between the parties. The explanation for this is that in reciprocal obligations a party incurs in delay once the other party has performed his part of the contract; hence, the party who has performed or is ready and willing to perform may rescind the obligation if the other does not perform, or is not ready and willing to perform.19

It is true that the rescission of a contract results in the extinguishment of the obligatory relation as if it was never created, the extinguishment having a retroactive effect. The rescission is equivalent to invalidating and unmaking the juridical tie, leaving things in their status before the celebration of the contract.20 However, until the contract is rescinded, the juridical tie and the concomitant obligations subsist.

To properly appreciate if there is a prejudicial question to warrant the suspension of the criminal actions, reference is made to the elements of the crimes charged. The violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 requires the concurrence of the following elements, namely: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.21 The issue in the criminal actions upon the violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 is, therefore, whether or not Reyes issued the dishonoured checks knowing them to be without funds upon presentment. On the other hand, the issue in the civil action for rescission is whether or not the breach in the fulfilment of Advanced Foundation’s obligation warranted the rescission of the conditional sale. If, after trial on the merits in the civil action, Advanced Foundation would be found to have committed material breach as to warrant the rescission of the contract, such result would not necessarily mean that Reyes would be absolved of the criminal responsibility for issuing the dishonored checks because, as the aforementioned elements show, he already committed the violations upon the dishonor of the checks that he had issued at a time when the conditional sale was still fully binding upon the parties. His obligation to fund the checks or to make arrangements for them with the drawee bank should not be tied up to the future event of extinguishment of the obligation under the contract of sale through rescission. Indeed, under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the mere issuance of a worthless check was already the offense in itself. Under such circumstances, the criminal proceedings for the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 could proceed despite the pendency of the civil action for rescission of the conditional sale.

Accordingly, we agree with the holding of the CA that the civil action for the rescission of contract was not determinative of the guilt or innocence of Reyes. We consider the exposition by the CA of its reasons to be appropriate enough, to wit:

x x x x

We find merit in the petition.

A careful perusal of the complaint for rescission of contract and damages reveals that the causes of action advanced by respondent Reyes are the alleged misrepresentation committed by the petitioner and AFCSC and their alleged failure to comply with his demand for proofs of ownership. On one hand, he posits that his consent to the contract was vitiated by the fraudulent act of the company in misrepresenting the condition and quality of the dredging pump. Alternatively, he claims that the company committed a breach of contract which is a ground for the rescission thereof. Either way, he in effect admits the validity and the binding effect of the deed pending any adjudication which nullifies the same.

Indeed, under the Jaw on contracts, vitiated consent does not make a contract unenforceable but merely voidable, the remedy of which would be to annul the contract since voidable contracts produce legal effects until they are annulled. On the other hand, rescission of contracts in case of breach pursuant to Article 1191 of the Civil Code of the Philippines also presupposes a valid contract unless rescinded or annulled.

As defined, a prejudicial question is one that arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal.

It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case,

the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. It comes into play generally in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.

In this light, it is clear that the pendency of the civil case does not bar the continuation of the proceedings in the preliminary investigation on the ground that it poses a prejudicial question. Considering that the contracts are deemed to be valid until rescinded, the consideration and obligatory effect thereof are also deemed to have been validly made, thus demandable. Consequently, there was no failure of consideration at the time when the subject checks were dishonored. (Emphasis supplied)

x x x x

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review; AFFIRMS the decision the Court of Appeals promulgated on May 30, 2003; and DIRECTS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.


Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 183805 July 3, 2013

JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI, PETITIONER, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SHIRLEY TISMO-CAPILI, RESPONDENTS.

D E C I S I O N

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision1 dated February 1, 2008 and Resolution2 dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444.

The factual antecedents are as follows:

On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City in an Information which reads:

On or about December 8, 1999, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused being previously united in lawful marriage with Karla Y. Medina-Capili and without said marriage having been legally dissolved or annulled, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Shirley G. Tismo, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jul2013/gr_183805_2013.html#fnt2


Contrary to law.3

Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a pending civil case for declaration of nullity of the second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in the event that the marriage is declared null and void, it would exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second marriage serves as a prejudicial question in the instant criminal case.

Consequently, the arraignment and pre-trial were reset by the RTC of Pasig City, in view of the filing of the Motion to Suspend Proceedings filed by petitioner.

In the interim, the RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision declaring the voidness or incipient invalidity of the second marriage between petitioner and private respondent on the ground that a subsequent marriage contracted by the husband during the lifetime of the legal wife is void from the beginning.

Thereafter, the petitioner accused filed his Manifestation and Motion (to Dismiss) praying for the dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy filed against him on the ground that the second marriage between him and private respondent had already been declared void by the RTC.

In an Order4 dated July 7, 2006, the RTC of Pasig City granted petitioner’s Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss, to wit:

The motion is anchored on the allegation that this case should be dismissed as a decision dated December 1, 2004 had already been rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 in Civil Case No. 01-6043 (entitled: "Karla Medina-Capili versus James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo," a case for declaration of nullity of marriage) nullifying the second marriage between James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo and said decision is already final.

In the opposition filed by the private prosecutor to the motion, it was stated, among others, that the issues raised in the civil case are not similar or intimately related to the issue in this above-captioned case and that the resolution of the issues in said civil case would not determine whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

WHEREFORE, after a judicious evaluation of the issue and arguments of the parties, this Court is of the humble opinion that there is merit on the Motion to dismiss filed by the accused as it appears that the second marriage between James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo had already been nullified by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72 of Antipolo City which has declared "the voidness, non-existent or incipient invalidity" of the said second marriage. As such, this Court submits that there is no more bigamy to speak of.

SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, private respondent filed an appeal before the CA.

Thus, in a Decision5 dated February 1, 2008, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s decision. The fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated 07 July 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 152 in Crim. Case No. 128370 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. No costs.

SO ORDERED.6





Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration against said decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution[7] dated July 24, 2008.

Accordingly, petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari alleging that:

THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO DISREGARD EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE PRONOUNCED BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT AND TO REVERSE THE ORDER DATED JULY 7, 2006 OF THE TRIAL COURT (REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PASIG CITY, BRANCH 152) ISSUED IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 128370 GRANTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE CASE OF BIGAMY AGAINST PETITIONER, INASMUCH AS THE ISSUANCE OF THE SAID ORDER IS BASED ON THE FINDINGS AND/OR FACTS OF THE CASE IN THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72, IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043 AND THE CONCLUDING AND DISPOSITIVE PORTION IN THE SAID DECISION WHICH STATES THAT, AFTER PERUSAL OF THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD AND THE TESTIMONIES OF WITNESSES X X X, THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT SHIRLEY G. TISMO, IS HEREBY NULL AND VOID.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72 IN ITS DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043, IS ON THE GROUND THAT IT IS BIGAMOUS IN NATURE, DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF ANY SUCH FINDINGS OR FACTS ON WHICH IT IS BASED IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 14 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, AND IN CONCLUDING THAT THE SAID DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS NOT A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL OF THE BIGAMY CASE AGAINST THE PETITIONER, WHICH RULING IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FACTS OF THE CASE OF THE SAID DECISION AND WHICH IS CONTRARY TO APPLICABLE LAWS AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.

THE CASE OF TENEBRO V. COURT OF APPEALS SPEAKS FOR ITSELF. IT IS AN EXCEPTION TO EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE INVOLVING DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE AND IS APPLICABLE ONLY TO THE SET OF FACTS IN THE SAID CASE, AND THE GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY, HENCE, THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR ABANDONING EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE AS WHERE IN THE INSTANT CASE THE GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 3 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 4 OF THE FAMILY CODE.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE USE BY RESPONDENT SHIRLEY G. TISMO OF THE SURNAME "CAPILI" IS ILLEGAL INASMUCH AS THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72 IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043 DECLARING NULL AND VOID THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO HAD LONG BECOME FINAL AND UNAPPEALABLE AS OF THE DATE OF THE SAID DECISION ON DECEMBER 1, 2004 AND DULY RECORDED IN THE RECORDS OF ENTRIES IN THE CORRESPONDING BOOK IN THE OFFICE OF THE CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PASIG CITY AND THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE.8

In essence, the issue is whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a ground for dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy.

We rule in the negative.



Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of bigamy as follows:

Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.

The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.9

In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of bigamy were present when the Information was filed on June 28, 2004.

It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private respondent was contracted on December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a valid first marriage between petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted on September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature of the second marriage between petitioner and private respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage for being bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.

Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be charged with the crime of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so long as the first marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated.

In Jarillo v. People,10 the Court affirmed the accused’s conviction for bigamy ruling that the crime of bigamy is consummated on the celebration of the subsequent marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void, viz.:

The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioner’s assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to [private complainant] had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.

Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.11

In like manner, the Court recently upheld the ruling in the aforementioned case and ruled that what makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid first marriage. It further held that the parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.12





Finally, it is a settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense, and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law.13 It is clear then that the crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner from the time he contracted the second marriage with private respondent. Thus, the finality of the judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner’s second marriage does not impede the filing of a criminal charge for bigamy against him.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 1, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 148193. January 16, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. RAFAEL JOSE CONSING, JR., respondent.

D E C I S I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the May 31, 2001 decision[1] of the Court of Appeals[2] in CA-G.R. SP No. 63712, which reversed and set aside the January 23, 2001 order[3] of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 7668-00 denying respondent’s motion for deferment of arraignment.

Sometime in February 1997, respondent Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. and his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz,[4] represented to Plus Builders, Inc. (PBI) that they are the true and lawful owners of a 42,443 square meter lot situated in Imus, Cavite and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 687599 in the name of Cecilia de la Cruz. They further represented that they acquired said lot, which was previously covered by TCT No. 191408 from Juanito Tan Teng and Po Willie Yu. Relying on the representations of respondent and his mother, PBI purchased the questioned lot.

In April 1999, PBI discovered that respondent and his mother did not have a valid title over the subject lot. PBI came to know that Juanito Tan Teng and Po Willie Yu never sold said lot to respondent and his mother and that TCT No. 191408 upon which TCT No. 687599 was based is not on file with the Register of Deeds.

In August 1999, PBI was ousted from the possession of the disputed lot by Juanito Tan Teng and Po Willie Yu. Despite written and verbal demands, respondent and his mother refused to return the amount of P13,369,641.79 alleged to have been initially paid by PBI.

On July 22, 1999, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 68, an action for “Injunctive Relief” docketed as Civil Case No. SCA 1759, against PBI, Unicapital Inc, Unicapital Realty Inc., Jaime Martires, Mariano D. Martinez, Cecilia de la Cruz and 20 other John Does. [5] Respondent sought a declaration that he was merely an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz, and therefore was not under any obligation to PBI and to the other defendants on the various transactions involving TCT No. 687599.

On October 13, 1999, PBI filed against respondent and his mother a complaint for “Damages and Attachment,” docketed as Civil Case No. 99-95381, with Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.


http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/148193.htm#_ftn5





[6] Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum shopping and pendency of Civil Case No. SCA 1759.[7]

On January 21, 2000, a criminal case for estafa through falsification of public document was filed against respondent Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. and his mother with the RTC of Imus, Cavite.[8]

On April 7, 2000, respondent filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground of prejudicial question, i.e., the pendency of Civil Case Nos. SCA 1759 and 99-95381. [9] On January 27, 2000, the trial court denied respondent’s motion.

A motion for reconsideration thereof was likewise denied on February 27, 2001.[10]

Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals seeking to enjoin the arraignment and trial of the estafa through falsification case.[11] The Court of Appeals granted respondent’s prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order in a resolution dated March 19, 2001.[12]

On May 31, 2001, a decision was rendered setting aside the January 27, 2000 order of the trial court and permanently enjoining it from proceeding with the arraignment and trial of the criminal case until the civil cases for Injunctive Relief and for Damages and Attachment shall have been finally decided.

Hence, the People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor General, filed the instant petition seeking the reversal of the May 31, 2001 decision of the Court of Appeals.

The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether or not the pendency of Civil Case Nos. SCA 1759 and 99-95381, for Injunctive Relief and for Damages and Attachment, is a prejudicial question justifying the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case for estafa through falsification of public document, filed against the respondent.

A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. For a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil action, the following requisites must be present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal.[13]

If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues or the issue in one is intimately related to the issues raised in the other, then a prejudicial question would likely exist, provided the other element or characteristic is satisfied. It must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case, therefore, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question.[14]

In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case. The issue in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is whether or not respondent merely acted as an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz; while in Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment, the question is whether respondent and his mother are liable to pay damages and to return the amount paid by PBI for the purchase of the disputed lot. Even if respondent is declared merely an agent of his mother in the transaction involving the sale of the questioned lot, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability. An agent or any person may be held liable for conspiring to falsify public documents. Hence, the determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal case for estafa through falsification of public document.










Likewise, the resolution of PBI’s right to be paid damages and the purchase price of the lot in question will not be determinative of the culpability of the respondent in the criminal case for even if PBI is held entitled to the return of the purchase price plus damages, it does not ipso facto follow that respondent should be held guilty of estafa through falsification of public document. Stated differently, a ruling of the court in the civil case that PBI should not be paid the purchase price plus damages will not necessarily absolve respondent of liability in the criminal case where his guilt may still be established under penal laws as determined by other evidence.

Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other. [15] Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.

Thus, in Rojas v. People,[16] the petitioner was accused in a criminal case for violation of Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code, for executing a new chattel mortgage on personal property in favor of another party without consent of the previous mortgagee. Thereafter, the offended party filed a civil case for termination of management contract, one of the causes of action of which consisted of petitioner having executed a chattel mortgage while the previous chattel mortgage was still valid and subsisting. Petitioner moved that the arraignment and trial of the criminal case be held in abeyance on the ground that the civil case was a prejudicial question, the resolution of which was necessary before the criminal proceedings could proceed. The trial court denied the suspension of the criminal case on the ground that no prejudicial question exist. We affirmed the order of the trial court and ruled that:

… the resolution of the liability of the defendant in the civil case on the eleventh cause of action based on the fraudulent misrepresentation that the chattel mortgage the defendant executed in favor of the said CMS Estate, Inc. on February 20, 1957, that his D-6 “Caterpillar” Tractor with Serial No. 9-U-6565 was “free from all liens and encumbrances” will not determine the criminal liability of the accused in the said Criminal Case No. 56042 for violation of paragraph 2 of Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code. . . . (i) That, even granting for the sake of argument, a prejudicial question is involved in this case, the fact remains that both the crime charged in the information in the criminal case and the eleventh cause of action in the civil case are based upon fraud, hence both the civil and criminal cases could proceed independently of the other pursuant to Article 33 of the new Civil Code which provides: “In cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.” (j) That, therefore, the act of respondent judge in issuing the orders referred to in the instant petition was not made with “grave abuse of discretion.”

In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment on account of the alleged fraud committed by respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the criminal case at bar.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The May 31, 2001 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The permanent injunction issued by the Court of Appeals is LIFTED and the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 21 is ORDERED to proceed with the arraignment and trial in Criminal Case No. 7668-00.

SO ORDERED.



Prejudicial Question

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Transcript of Prejudicial Question