Precess interactionism, Kurt Lewin's personality psychology

Japan Society of Personality Psychology

NII-Electronic Library Service

JapanSociety of Personality Psychology

7'he .Jlipanese Jburnal of Personatity

1995, Vol, 3, No. 1.fi g

Precess interactionism, process analysis, and self process:

An extension of Kurt Lewin's approach to personality psychology

Kaoru Kurosawa

Dapartment of Behavioral SbiencesFZicultly of Letters, Chiba Uhiversit:y1-33 lhyoi-cho, J)tage-ku, Chiba Citrv 263

With ideas and suggestions from Kurt Lewin's approach to psychology (1935), a new approach

to personality psychology is proposed. It i$ argued that modeis of internal processes and their

parameters should be central for our understanding of personality. Kurt Lewin]s view of human

behavior as a function of the person and situation is deseribed and named here as processinteractionism. Personality variables of our new paradigm are person and process variables. Person

variables are indices of internal individual differences, and process variables are those measured

to tap the processes within the person that reflect situational changes pestulated in Lewin's

interactionism. The variables then are analyzed to examine possible mediational and moderational

models. Finally, self theories in the framework of `social

psychology of self process' (Nakamura,1990) are reviewed, and their characteristics and limitations discussed. It is suggested that we

need models of internal motivational and self-regulutory processes in order to understand the self

in partlcular, and uur personality in general.

Key words: personality, Kurt Lewin, internal process, process analysis, mediation

In this paper, a new approach te personality

psychology i$ proposed., First, Kurt Lewin's

approach to psychology is briefly reviewed.

The sections to fellow present what is expected

of per$onality psychology as a scientific disci-

pline, and then outline a new conception of

persenality, which is the basis fbr a new `pro-

cess interactionist' approach. Also, new data

analytical methods, now availab}e and already

shown compatible and useful in explicating and

testing internal-process models of the new ap-

proach, are described. Finally, from the new

perspective, various theories of self in the

framework of `social

psychology of self process'

(Nakamura, 1990) are briefiy reviewed and dis-

cussed as an example, Before discussing our

new approach, we shall first look at implicit

'I'he author wishes to thiink the anonymous reviewers fer

their valuable suggestions.

and naive theories, as opposed to scientific and

expert theories, and then Lewinian approach to

psychology, in order to understand why a new

approach is necessary and what it should aim

to achieve.

Lay and expert theories

Human beings are eminently social and cog-

nitive in nature, and each possesses an enor-

mous amount of knowledge about oneself and

others. We can readily describe and explain

what we are like, what we do, how and why

we do what we do, and so on. We can de-

scribe and explain, not only people in general

but also someone in particular, and even pre-

dict or control others' behavior. Moreover,

most people do these without any formal educa-

tion or training in psychology. All of us are,

so to speak, a lay psychologist, specializing in

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personality and social psychology. At the basis

of our knowledge about people is implicit perso-nality theory (Schneider, 1973), and what we

practice ls usually called naive psychology

(Heider, 1958).

However, since people do not normally use

scientific or formal research methodology,

implicit personality theory on people and naive

psychology of social behavior are eften faulty,

with full ef errors and biases (see Nisbett &

Ross, 1980). In contrast, personality and social

psychologists must base their psychology on sci-

entific, empirical knowleclge, aithough their

staning point might be a hunch or intuition

from their own impiicit personality theory and

naive psychology. In a sense, we could eval-

uate an `expert'

theory in the fieid in terrns of

the extent to which it departs from the implicit

and naive, and strives to reach the formal and

scientifie. Needless to say, validity and accura-

cy of an expert psychological theory have to be

superior to those of a lay theory, Many

problems of contemporary personality and social

psychology appear due to failures on the partof researchers to sufficiently distinguish implicit

personality theory and naive psychology on the

ene hand and scientifie psychology pn the eth-

er.

Although Aristotle has often been called the

first social psychologist, Kurt I.ewin (1935)criticized Aristotelian mode of theught as unsei-

entific, and praised and promoted Galileianmode of thought. Perhaps, the readers might

not be famMar with these two medes of

thought; however, they may not be very wrong

if they take these modes as referring to }ay and

seientific psyehology, respectively. This state-

ment is net meant to derogate or denounce im-

plicit persenality theory or naive psychology persq although all of us would certainly be better

off if lay psychology were more valid and accu-

rate. Instead, we scientific psychologists should

be rnore mindful of implicit and naive theories

presented and practiced by fellow `experts.'

The problern of pseudo-･scientific theories,

Process interactionism67

which in reality are nothing but thinly disguisedIay theories in Aristotelian mode of thought, ap-

pears far more serious and consequential in the

field of personality and social psychology.

Lewinian approach to psychology

Let us briefly review and summarize Kurt

Lewin's approach to psycholegy (1935) here.

In addition, some problems of professional

psychelogists' Aristotelian theories, which seems

to have been surprisingly prevalent and tena-

cious since the days of Lewin, shall be dis-

cussed when necessary in the sections to fo11ow

as we discuss the new approach. HewGalileian psychelogy has since become, or howAristotelian it still remains, the readers are

asked to judge for themselves.Classification versus construction: First ;

Lewin (1935) thought that Aristotelian psychol-

ogy classified whole groups of processes accord-

ing to the value of their products, instead of

the nature of the psychological processes in-

volved. Let us loQk at a concrete example by

Lewin. In psychology of Lewin's days, "the

faet that three-year-old children are quite often

negative is considered evidence that negativism

is inherent in the nature of three-year-olds,

and the eoncept of a negativistic age or stage

is then regarded as an explanation for the ap-

pearance of negativism in a given particularcase!" (Lewin, 1935). Notice that similar

theories to what Lewin criticized almost sixty

years ago do not seem unknown among

present-day developmental psychologists, and

that many concepts of personality traits are no

better, in that they too are similarly circular.

We may concede that psychology of personality

traits has probably remained mostly Aristoteli-

an, merely measuring, labelmg, and grouping

people according to certain trait, dimension, or

whatever other schemes. Such procedures

themselves have become the purpose, rather

than the means, of this kind of psychology,

Lewin told us that a psychological theory

should be built through an essentially concrete




68 T7ze .lapanese ,Journal of Persona.ticy 1995, Vo], 3, No, L

constructive method, rather than abstract clas-

sificatory procedure C1935); such an approach

would be necessary for avoiding circular

theories and concepts, for example. In other

words, we need to have what Lewin called

`genotypic'

constructs rather than pay too much

attention to surface phenomena, whieh are

`phenotypic.'

For Galileo, the same,law governs

the courses of the stars, the falling of stones,

the thght of birds, and the flowing and ebbing

tides. These are phenotypic phenomena, each

appearing to be significant on its own and not

at all related to the others; however, the same

genotypic law of gravitation can be applied to

all of ･them, What we psychologists need are

genotypie constructs and theories that can be

generally applied to human behavior, just as

Galileian laws to physics.

Overly emphasizing observable overt behav-

ior, as a behaviorist wQuld, we could easily

loose sight of the need to have a genotypic

psychological law. We need a theory that we

are able to apply to as many surface phepom-

ena as posslble, and at the same time, explain

them with one underlying principle. Another

related argument may be that empirical laws

are phenotypic in Lewinian terms; an empirical

Iaw is sernething to be explained by a theor}J,

rather than becoming a basis for a psycholog-

ical theory, to explain something else. In addi-

tion, we sltould seek construct validity; conver-

gent and discriminant validity of psychological

measures, while certainly desirable, are not

good enough for our purpose (see below). As

we shall presently see, our new approach posits

that personality is a construet, and that person-

ality as a sum of internal processes be studied,

in order to construct genotypic psychological

}aws.

Statics versus dynamics: Lewin was interested

in deep-process dynamie psychology, and not

surface-pbenomenal changes themse]ves. His

field theory has often been called a psychedy-

namic approach, but it has almost nothing to do

with psychodynamics of the psychoanalytical ap-

proach. For I.ewin (1935), dynamic psychologymeans scientific study of psychological proces-ses. and his theory is dynamic because it triedto incorporate the concepts ef time and change.

He tried to learn as much from Galileian and

contemporary physics as pessible, and make his

theory as scientific. In modern physics, Lewin

said, the existenee of a physical veetor always

depends upon the mutua] relations of several

physical facts, especially upon the relation of

the object (e. g., the person) to its environrnellt.

Accordingly, he tried to understand psycholog-

ical processes in terms of obiects, forces, and

locomotions, represented in his concept of lijb

space. From the last concept, it is pessibie to

infer that the psychological processes he had in

his mind were inside the person.

Lewin (l935) also wrote that "if

we try to

deduce the dynamics of a process, particularly

the vectors which direct it, from the actual

event, we are compelled te resort to process

differentials." Despite Lewin's arguments, most

present-day psychological theories of human be-havior may be characterized as static, and

psychologists do not seem to have learned howto incQrporate time and change, let alone

`pro-

cess differentials,' in their theories. We know

that much remains for us psychelogists to do in

order to make our theories dynamic, and to re-

alize the Lewinian idea} of a truly psychological

theory. Our approach, process interactionism,

as outlined in the sections to follow, may be a

step in the right direction, and should help us

conceive and buiid theories that are truly dy-

namlc,Reductionism

versus wholism: In spite of

Lewin's affinity and enthusiasm for Galileian

and contemporary physics, it is wrong to as-

sume that he was a reductionist. On the con-

trary, he was strongly opposed to biological,

biochemical, or physical explanatiens for any

psychological phenomena. Psychologieal phe-nemena could be understood only through the

psychologieal approach. As noted above, al-

though he used such terms as obiects, forces,

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and locomotions, they were representations inlife space, and proeesses involved were com-

pletely psychelogical <Lewin, 1935). In other

words, phenomenology of the person was very

important in his approach, but it was also cog-

nitive even by today's standards without becom-ing overly introspective, emphasizing the signif-

icance of internal processes. Our new ap-

proach naturally attempts to fellow Lewin's

view of the human mind.

The dynamics of the internal processes is

always to be derived from the relation of the

concrete individual to the concrete situation,

and so far as internal forces are concerned,

from the mutual relations of the various func-

tional systems 6. e.. interna] processes) that

make up the individual (Lewin, 1935). On the

other hand, in Aristotelian psychology, the vec-

tors which determine a person's movements do

not depend upon the retation of the person to

the envirenment, and they belong to himf'her

once for all. irrespective of his/her surround-

ings at any given time; we may refer to such

conceptualization as Aristote]ian main-effeet

psychology. Lewin as a personality psychol-

ogist explained that his view of dynamics did

not mean that the nature of the person be-

cornes insignificant (1935). In addition, he was

not only an interactionist. but also an anti--

structuralist, insisting on study,ing the person in

situation, referring as the starting point to the

totality of the concrete whole situation. If we

break the whoie into cornponents, as a strue-

turaiist would, we loose something in the pro-

eess. A Gestalt psychologist, Lewin was nat-

urally inclined toward a wholistie approach; life

space could not be conceptualized as a simple

sum of its component parts.Historical versus systematic: Lewin also ex-

plained (1935) that Aristotelian mode of thought

required eonfirmation by historical regularity.

Here, a iiistorical approaeh means theorizing

based on the Aristotelian lawfulness: those

things which occur without exception and which

occur frequent]y are la"rful and conceptually in-

Process interactionisrnew

telligible. Notice that regularity and partic-

ularity can only be understood entirely in his-torical terrns. Lewin wanted us to refer to the

full concreteness of the particular situations,

which should mean the objective aspects as

well, instead of a reference to the abstract av-

erage of as many historically given cases as

possible. Opposing the historica] Aristotelian

appreach, Lewin's field theory may be charac-

terized as systematic; the systematic nature of

life space with its full cDncreteness should bestudied, for 1)ehavior is a functfon of the personand the situation at the moment it occurs, and

of nothing else.

Statistics versus lawfulness: Aristotelian con-

cept of lawfulness had a quasl-statistieal charac-

ter, and the approach did not regard exceptions

as counter-arguments, so Iong as their frequen-

cy was not too great, Lewin explained. Sueh

an approach would inevitably exclude a vast

amount of events as unlawful, and such exclu-

sion was unacceptable as a science. Alse, the

statistical procedure, at least its coinmonest ap-

plication in psychology <of Lewin's days) was

the most striking expression of Aristetelian

mode of thinking (Lewin, 1935). In order to

exhibit the common features of a given groupof facts, the average was calculated, This av-

erage acquired a representative value, and was

then used to characterize the properties of the

group. Lewin argued that the content of a law

could not be determined by the caleulation of

averages of historically given cases. Galileianconcepts, on the contrary, which regard histor-ical frequency as accident, must alse consider it

a matter of chance which properties one arrives

at by taking averages of historical cases, It is

often forgotten that there just is no sueh thing

as an "average

situation" any more than an av-

erage child. In Lewin's view, however, the

critical point was not that statistical methods

were applied, but how they were applied and,

especially, what cases were combined inte

groups. In his approach, everything was law-

ful, not only those that were regular or fre-



JapanSociety ofPersonality Psychology

70Zhe Jlapanese ,Journat of Personalily 1995, Vol. 3, No. 1.

quent, and generally, no exceptions were al-

lowed fer psychological laws,

From the preceding arguments, we may

conclude that Aristotelian laws would not con-

ceive exeeptions at phenotypic levels, while

Lewinian laws would not allow exceptions at

genotypic, theoretieal levels. In a sense,

Lewin's view is unusually strict, ior he thought

that the thesis of general validity permitted no

exceptions in the entire realm of the psychic,

whether of child or adult, whether in normal or

pathological psychology (Lewin, 1935). This

view may be equated with understanding and

predicting behavior for "all

the people all the

time" (cf. Bem & Allen, 1974; Bem & Funder,

1978). We contemporary psychologists are cer-

tainly facile with complex statistieal techniques.

Lewin seemed to warn us that statistics was no

substitute fer theory, and that exceptions in the

ferm ef error or residual variances might mean

we are excluding a vast number of cases as

unlawful, meaningless, or otherwise unac-

ceunted for. In Lewinian view, such exclusion,

which has probably becorne iar greater in ex-

tent than Lewin's days, and theorizing based

on it, are thoroughly Aristotelian, .and therefore,

unaeceptable as a science, Our use of stat-

istical techniques seems to need a careful ex-

amination.

In the exceptionless approach, since law and

individual are no longer antitheses, nothing

prevents us from relying for proof upon histor-

ically unusual, rare, and transitory events, such

as most physical experiments are (Lewin, 1935).

Indeed, in a certain sense, the law refers only

to cases that are never realized, or only approx-

imately realized, in the actual course of events.

Only in experiment, that is, under anificially

constructed conditions, do c;ases occur which

approximate the event with which the law is

concerned. The propositions of modern phys-

ics, which are often considered to be anti-spec-

ulative and empirical, in comparison with Aris-

totelian empiricism, unquestionably have a much

less empirical, a much more constructive char-

acter than the Aristotelian concepts that are

based immediately upon historical actuality

(Lewin, 1935). So, we have te be aware that

people's naive views of sciences, theories, ex-

periments, and empiricism are frequently not

what they really should be. For instance, a

scientific theory is not induetively derived from

observable facts, as often believed, but is de-

ductively tested against them. And, we now

come around finally to Lewin's insistence on

the use of experimental paradigm to investigate

the dynamics and complexity of the human

mind. The use of experiments in the sciences

is not only desirable, but also inevitable.

In conclusion, the suggestions and argu-

ments made by Lewin {1935) may be sum-

marized as fo11ows. Lewin told us to build a

theory through a constructive method, rather

than by classification like categorizing, labeling,

and averaging. Rather than statistical averages

from phenotypic phenomena, what we need are

genot)pic constructs and theories that can be

generally applied for human behavior, just likeGalileian laws for physics, Lewin's emphasis

was on dynamic processes, which he tried to

represent in terms of objects, forces, and

locomotions in life space. He also opposed

reductionism; psychological phenomena can be

understoed only through psychology. Lewin

denounced the Aristotelian historical view as

unscientific, and stressed that the tetality of the

concrete whole situation was important, He

was foremost an interactionis4 believing behav-

ior was a function of the person and the sit-

uation as it occurs; moreover, his view was sys-

tematic as well as zvholistic and anti-struc-

turaldst His approach was phenomenologicalbut net entirely or overly introspective, and em-

phasized the significance Qf internal processes.

Also, while Aristotelian laws would rule out

exceptions at phenotypic observable levels,

Lewinian laws would not allow exceptions at

genotypic, theoretical levels; f6r Lewin, the the-

sis of general validity permitted no excaptions

to PsycholQg'ical laTvs, Related to this, Lewin

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warned us that statistics was no substitute fortheorTB and our use of statistical techniques

certainly needs scrutiny. Lewin believed thttt

emperiments were necessary, if we tried to

build a theory through a constructive method,

but we also know that his is very different

from Aristotelian or naive empiricism. His

theories are derived, not through inductions

from observable iacts, but deductiens from

proposition and testing. In addition, it is also

well known that Lewin advocated the use of

formal lagic and mathematics, particularly ge-ometry and topology, in psychological theories,

counseled us to the slow-butLsteady successiwe

approximation approach, and admonished us of

the scientific as well as practical value of a

good theory.

Tasks of personality psycholegy

Without first defining the werd `personality,'

let us enumerate what the field of personality

psychology is expected to do. First, personality

psychology describes and explains the whole

personality of an individual. What are the

characteristics of the person? In what ways, is

this particular person different from, and com-

mon to others that are eharacteristic of hirn/

her? What are the aspects of `personellity,'

what

are they eaeh like, and how are they combined

to make the whole personality of an individual?

Obviously, the iirst task of persenality psychol-ogy presupposes individual differences in peo-

ple; if there were no individuality and everyone

were the same, there would be no personality.

The second task of personality psychology is

assessment of the person with regards te indi-

vidual differences. What kind of in$truments

are we to use for such measurements, and how

good are such instruments? What we measure

in this way may not necessarily be the whole

personality, but most likely fragmented aspects

of the individual's personaiity, and we are again

faced with the question of how such quantitiesshould be combined to characterize and under-

stand the whole persen.

Process interactionismn

If an individual difference, i. e., an aspect of

personality, that is assessed in the second task

is to be reliable and valid, it should be able to

predict the person's behavior, or more accu-

rately, to explain his/her behavior in the eon-

text of individual differences in human behavior.

Prediction of behavior becomes the third task of

personality psychelogy: prediction in the sense

whether we could explain and understand why

certain behavior does or does not occur fer cer-

tain persons in certain situations, A related

question may be how regular and consistent a

person's behavior is; if behavior is not very sta-

ble, cressLsituationally or temporally, its accu-

rate prediction may well be very limited, if not

impossible (cf., Mischel, 1990).

We may also want to know how an

individual's personality is formed and main-

tained, and alternately, how it could be

changed and how changeable it is. If person-ality is not someihing we are born with, at

least not with all of it, it then is shaped grad-

ually as we grow. What changes personality,

and how and why? The fourth task concerns

personality development and change. It is

also related to personal adaptation to life situa-

tions, and to treatment of personality problems,

if any. If the third task, prediction and expla-

nation of behavior, requires close collaboration

and prevides common grounds between persQn-ality and social psychologists, the fburth task of

$tudying personality development and change

links the field of personality psychology to

developmental and clinical psychology. Clinical

psychologists, for instance, look expectantly to

personality psychology, whose task it is to pro-

vide theoretical frarneworks for assessment and

treatment of psycholegical problerns.

In sum, the four tasks just mentioned are a

minimum of what personality psychology is ex-

pected to do. In addition to dealing more or

less with all of them, any successful personalitytheory or approach should have coherence and

consistency to what it does concerning the fbur.For instance, a theory might postulate some in-




72) The ,lapanese ,fournal of PersonaZicv 1995, VoL 3. No. 1-

ner dynamics to account for individual differen-

ces in how the person behaves a$ well as how

he/she adjusts to his/her environment; learning

or cognitive factors might be at the center of

other approaches. Each needs to explain in its

own way how individuality comes about, and

how it could be best measured, A personalitytheory inevitably becomes rather comprehensive,

because the goal of the field is nothing less

than understanding the whole person. A prob-

lem with the lay approach to personality may

be that it often fails to realize the scope of the

field: Laypersons frequently assume that per-sonality simply means personality types or

traits. Of course, it might be a gross Qver-

simplifieation to view tlie layperson as a global

trait theorist who relies exclusively on situation-

free global traits in social perception (Mischel,1990). However, sinee not a few personality

psychelogists themselves appear to have a view

not very different from the lay approach, it

seems worth repeating: Personality psyehologyis not merely psychology of personality types

or tralts,

Even if personality psychelogy were to ex-

plain only how people differ in terrns of typesand/or traits, simple measurements of individual

differences would not be sufficient, because in

science what is measured needs to be meaning-

ful and u$eful. In other words, personality

variables need to be consequential and praeti-

cal. Simply put, being consequential and prac-tical means that what is measured and under-

stood of the individual in relation to persenality

sheuld have something to do with reality, which

sheuld inevitably rnean behavioral prediction or

explanation. Lay psychologists are known to

use `pseude-psychelogical

schemes' that are

completely detached from reaiity, and similarly,

there are not a few Aristotelian personality`schemes

and measurements' that are used by

professional psychologists. Rather subtle ex-

amples may be found in word-by-word trans-

lated versions of personality measures, which

might have been carefully constructed overseas,

but totally lacking in validation and standard-

ization in this country.

For another example, some believers in

ABO blood-typing, which as lay psychology is

quite popular among the general populace in

Japan, might advocate the use of blood-type in-formation in personnel selection, ameng ethers.

However, as a personality theory, blood-typing

has not been shown to be consequential or use-

ful (Ohmura, 1990); even if used accurately and

reliably, such a practice prescribed by the `the-

ory' should make no difference in the outcome.

We also have to be mindful that a wreng the-

ory does not always produce wrong predictions

or results, but is merely irrelevant and inconse-

quential; it therefore is not easy to disprove

such a theory, because cases of apparent suc-

cess are bound to exist. The belief in ABO

blood-typing is an example of inconsequentialtheories, and it is rather disheartening to find

quite a few `expert'

psychelogists who cannot

tell why such a `theory'

is not meaningful or

useful, nor whether their own pet theorie$ are

any better than such an inconsequential lay the-

ory of personality. Personality psychologists are

advised to keep asking whether their theories

are truly consequential and practical. A good

theory is consequential, and Lewin's famous

dictum has said this best: Nothing is more

practical than a good theoay.

We should also argue that lay persenality

types and traits cannot serve, in principle, as

useful concepts in scientiiic personality psychol-ogy. Lay persenality traits are those in implicit

personality theoTy, and are almost always tauto-

logical, in that they are no more or less than

description$ of behavior, semetimes global and

other times situation-specific. Not a few per-senality psychologists appear to make the same

mistake; their Aristotelian personality variables

are merely lay personality traits with scientific-

sounding labels. Tautological lay personalitytraits cannot be useful, because overt behaviors,

albeit important, are but one basis for a scien-

tific personality theory. Besides, people are no-

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toriously poor and unreliable observers of overt

behavier (cf., Nisbett and Ross, 1980).

Sometimes, personality measures are tested

with behavior as criteria. Personality variables

with cencurrent er predictive validity would be

far mure desirable and better than those with-

out any such validity, but unfortunately, there

are not many with clear criterion validity of this

kind (Mischel, 1990). However, criterion valid-

ity, which could be regarded as a sort of em-

pirical law, is a necessary but not sufficient

eondition that we have a good personalitymeasure. As already noted, an empirical law

cannot substitute a theory; it is something to be

explained by a scientific theory, rather than ex-

plaining something else. In other words, even

these measures that are seemingly consequen-

tial in terms of relevant behavior, are not good

enough. What is neecled is construct validity,

which must include behavior-reievant criterion

validity, because it clearly means a theery be-

hind it. Such a theory makes an expert per-

sonality variable different from lay personaiity

traits or those personality measures that are

solely based on mere empirical law$. As al-

ready mentiened, `expert'

theories could be

evaluated in terms of the extent to whieh they

depart from the implicit and naive, and strive to

reach the formal and seientific. Construct valid-

ity should be the sign that a personality meas-

ure has sufficiently achieved a iormal and sci-

entific status.

What is personality?: A new conception

If the tasks ef personality psychology and

necessary characteristics of its theories and

measures discussed in the preceding section are

taken seriously, it should be ebvious that the

concept of `personality'

cannot be defined as

Cregularities and consistencies in the behavior of

individuals in their Iives' (cf., Snyder & lckes,

1985, whe see it mainly from the social psycho-

logica] side). The term `personality'

should be

used for explaining and understanding not

merely behavior, but the whole person. Most

Process interactienism Z3

important, personality cannot be static

characteristics of behavior, or even oi the indi-

vidual. As already rnentioned in the preceding

section, personality cannot be equated with per-

sonality types or traits. Neither can it be ex-

plained in terms of relatively stable and endur-

ing propensities (e. g., dispositions, needs, mo-

tives, attitudes) that reside "within"

individuals

(Snyder & Ickes, 1985). Dispositional strategy,

which attempts to explain people's behavior in

terms of people's dispositions alone (Snyder &

Ickes, 1985), has failed; they do not predict or

explain our behavior very well. In this regard,

many dispositions and related concepts in ex-

pert psychology are no better than the lay per-sonality types and traits, and therefore could beregarded as Aristotelian.

Instead of relatively stable and enduring

propensities, the new approach turns to inter-

naZ processes of･the person as central to hisl

her personality, It is important to note that

these internal proces$es, by definition dynamic

and ongoing, should be seen as psychological,

and not as biologically or physiologically real in-

side the person. In other words, personality in

the new approach is a psychological construct,

or a set of such constructs, This view is dif-

ferent from a traditional approach that has

defined personali4)) traits as constructs. A be-

haviorist would criticize such a construct, argu-

ing that defining kindne$s, for instance, as the

trait of someone whe behaves kindly toward

others is circular and meaningless, It is exactly

the same as instinct eorrcepts, which are thor-

oughly Aristotelian and no longer popularamong psychologists, that seemingly label and

at the same time explain behavior, but accom-

plish little as concepts to explain why an organ-

ism shouid behave the way it does.

Our new approach proposes that personalityshould be understood in terms of models of in-

ternal processes and their parameters. It fol-lows that the appreach sees individual differen-ces in terms of variations in the model

parameters. Personality of an individual should

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74 77ie Jbpanese Journal of Personalicy 1995, Vol. 3, No.

be mea$ured, understood, and described in

terms of such individual differences. Individual

behavioral variations should then beeome pre-

dictable and explainable with the same individ-

ual differences. Personality development and

change could be conceptualized in terms of

graclual or sudden changes in the individual's

internal parameters. We would like to urge

personality psychologists to study models of in-

ternal processes, their parameters, and related

individual differences, instead of the worn-out

concept of personality types and traits.

The paradigmatic model of the new ap-

proach is T-P-O; antecedent Treatment vari-

ables are the cause ef intervening Proeess vari-

ables, which in turn determine subsequent Out-

eome variables. For exarnple, in cognitive in-

terference theory for test anxiety perforrnance

effect (see Kurosawa & Harackiewicz, in press;

and beiow), situation and trait test anxiety as

treatment variables might jointly determine the

amount of cognitive activity, a process variable;

cognitive activity in turn might adversely affect

the performance level as an eutcome. The T-

P-O model should sound familiar to many

psychologists; it is much the same as the old S

-O-R model of neobehaviorism. Curiously,

though, such propensities as dispositions, traits,

needs, motives, and attitudes `within

individuals'

seem most often to have taken the role of the

intervening variable O in our field's theoretical

thinking and research.

As we are currently arguing, such propen-

sities, if proven behavierally consequential, are

not influenced by experimental treatments {e. g., situational rnanipulations), but jointly with such

treatments would influence an internal process,

Such a process, dynamic and ongoing by def-

inition, should be measured with the interven-

ing variable O. Therefore, it appears that the

intervening variable O in the S-O-R model has

not been fully examined and explored in per-

sonality and social psychology. The variable

has largely remained only a coniecture of the

researcher, and has rarely been studied. Even

1.

if such a variable is ever measured, the causal

link between it and outcome variables has al-

most never been examined. Thus, models of

the current paradigm in our field most eften

test enly the main and interaction effects of

treatment variables on outcome variables in

analyses of variance, completely neglecting the

role of process variables.

At present, few specifics of our internal

processes are known, since no systematic re-

search has been undertaken. However, it is

probably Mischel's social-cognitive factors (1990)that come closest to the conception of

parameters in the new approach. Briefly, helists competenci.es, personal constructs and en-

coding strategies, expectancies, subiective

values, preferences, goals, and self-regulations,

as the variables to understand an individual's

personality (Mischel, 1990). Broadly defined,

these could be the personalitpu variables of our

new paradigm. However, we should peint out

that these personality variables of Mischel's in-

clude both person and process warz'abJes. Per-

son variables, such as preferences and goals,are thought to be antecedent to process vari-

ables, such as expectancies. Of course, it is

the theorist in his/her model who determines

which variable is anteeedent and which one

subsequent; and making as explicit as possible

models and processes, which have so far

remained Iargely implicit, is the crucial argu-

ment made by the new approach.

In the new paradigrn, situational manipula-

tions and person variables are the treatment

variables. Person variables, which would influ-

ence process variables -

our intervening vari-

ables -

in concert with situation$, serve as in-

dices of individual differences in the model

parameters of affected internal processes. Sev-

eral existing personality variables should be

able to serve as person variables of the new

approaeh; some of them are listed by Mischel:

eompetencies, goals, values, and preferences.We may add internalized social norms and at-

titudes, as well as self-esteem, self-conscious-

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ness, self--monitoring, and other self variables

{see below}. And possible internal processes of

our interest may be information processing (e.g., attentional, interpretatienal, and judgmental),metivatiena] (e. g., preferential, intentional, and

emotionai), and selfLregulatery (e. g., concerning

aspiration, expectaney, and effort) processes.

What processes are involved, and what should

be measured and thus beceme modei

parameters, should be $uggested by models to

be proposed.

By now, the consensus ameng personality

and social psychologists is that our behavior

should be approached and understood from an

interactionist perspective (Mischel, 1990;

Snyder & Ickes, 1985). Our new approach is

in agreement with this consensus; behavior is a

function of both the person and the situation,

as Kurt Lewin (1935) taught us long tlme ago.

In its $implest form, the approach suggests that

the two kinds of treatment variabies: situational

rnanipulation and person variable, determine the

level ef process variables in an interaction of

the two. Subsequently, behavior is determined

as a main effect of the process variables in-

volved. In a more complex model, interaction

effects among the treatment and precess vari-

ables too should be examined in order to un-

derstand the whole process. Theref6re, for this

reason and ethers, ours is an interactionist ap-

proach, but is somewhat different frem those

that have been known. Our process interac-

tionist approach, as well as details of models

and analyses, are discussed rnore fully below.

Approaches to person-situation interac-

tion

In part/ because of the arguments made by

Walter Mischel (1968; 19ee), who wrote that

traditional personality measures are poor predie-

tors of behavior, and that people's behavior ap-

parently lacks cross-･situational consistency, in-

teractionist approaches to behavior became pop-

ular among personality and social psychologists.

However, laypersons seem to find an interaction

Process interactionismre

theory hard to understand; in a sense, it is

charaeteristic of lay psychologists to try to pre-dict and explain people's behavior in terms of

the person main effect alone, and doggedly

pursue the discredited dispositional appreach.

Kurt Lewin (1935) already rejected such con-

ception of behavier as Aristotelian. This well-

known underestimation, or even neglect, of

situational infiuences on behavior common in

naive psychology is called the fundamental attri-

butien error (Nisbett & Ross, 19801 Ross,l977).

Even personality psychologists are not im-

mune to this kind ef `error'

(Nisbett & Ross,

1980); professional journals are replete with

main-effect hypotheses, stating this-or-that trait

predicts this-or-that behavior, regardless of

situations. For instanee, a hypothesis might

state that "peeple

,high on public self-conscious-

ness confonn more to social pressure than

those low," with no mentien of situation at all.

The procedure to establish convergent and dis-

criminant validity of a new personality measure

may be another example; correlation coefficients

are calculated between the scores of new and

related personality variables, with situatioRal

factors put aside, How meaningful is such a

procedure? Obviously, to the extent that Aristo-

telian main--effect psychology, which is not at

all different from lay psychology, is meaningful

and useful. However, as we all know, the cor-

relational procedure is the state of the art in

personality psychology, and many if not most of

us mindlessly use it and report its results as`evidence

of validity' for the new persenalitymeasures. We professional psychologistsshould remember that any person variable that

purports to transcend situational factors is al-

ready suspect, because no such person vari-

ables are likely to exist.

So far, three types of person-situation inter-

actionism are known, and each will be

de$cribed briefly. The first type sees an inter-

action as situational modifications of the disposi-

tional strategy. As already mentioned, the dis-




76 The JLtpanese Journal of'Personalidy± 1995, Vel.3. No.

positional strategy assumes that some meaning-

ful amount of the regularities and censistencies

in social behavior can be accounted for in terms

of relatively stabie and encluring propensities

that reside within individuals (Snyder & Ickes,

1985). In order to save the dispositional con-

cepts of the strategy, which alone could not

work well, the first interaetion approach might

have been proposed. It may be best ex-

emplified by Christie's view (1978): In one sit-

uation, where per$on and situation are exactly

matched, near perfect prediction of behavior is

possible from the person variable, but in anoth-

er, the person variable rnight be cornpletely

useless. This and the second approach below

are somewhat simiiar, but it is not statistical

but rather determini$tic; specifie person in spe-

cific situation could mean specific behavior. A

corollary to this approach may be that the psy-

cholegist should use only those personality

measures that are meaningful when used in as-

sociation with situatiens. Mischel's `conditienal

view of dispositions' (1990> might be classified

under this interactional approach.

The second is statistical or mechanical (see Snyder & Ickes. 1985). We may conduct an

experiment with a person-by-situation factorial

design, and in the resultant analysis of var-

iance, this approach helds, more behavioral var-

iance would be accounted for by the person by

situation interaction effect than either of the

main effects. The term `situation'

seems to be

used here in a generic sense; therefore, unlike

the first, this approach might implicitly assume

cross-situational consistency in our behavior.

The situation factor cannot be ignored, but

could be conveniently treated statistically. So,

this approach is net very far apart from the ag-

gregate approach te behavioral consistency; lf

aggregate measures of dispositions as well as

behaviors are taken, the correlations between

them should be considerable (see Snyder &

Ickes, 1985>. In this sense, `situation'

in the

statistieal er rnechanical approach could

paradoxicaliy become a generic and ab$tract

1.

concept.

It is obvious that the two approaches justdescribed follow the traditional research par-

adigm of persenality and social psychology; forthem, the factorially designed experiment i$

good enough to study the causes of people'ssocial behavior. In contrast, the third, which

may be called active or dynamic interaction ap-

proach (Snyder & Ickes, 1985), sees differently.

The person in this approach is seen as active,

in that she actively seeks situation$ where her

personality could be fully expressed. This view

is anathema to the experimental approach, for

an experiment specifically precludes expressions

of individual tendencies, personality for one,

through the actor's selection of situations.

Therefore, those who endorse the active inter-

action approach see experimental methodelogy

as semething that is too restrictive and not

ecologically valid. (For other shortcomings and

limitations of interactional approaches, see

Snyder and Ickes, 1985,)

For example, an introductory textbook (At-kinson, Atkinson, Smith, Bem, & Hilgard,

1990) tells us that person-situation interaction

occurs, not only because of reactive interaction

due to each individual's phenomenological inter-

pretation of situat.ions, but also of ewocative in-

teraction, through which each individual's per-sonality evokes distinctive responses frem

others, and proactive interaction, where the

person seeks out some situatiens and avoids

others or else reshapes the situation he enters.

Evocative and proactive interactions are specif-

ically precludedi in our experimental paradigm,

not allowing personality's major manifestations

(Atkinson, et ai., 1990). Similarly, Snyder &

Ickes (1985) argue for their situational strategy,

a version of dynamic interactionism, that stres-

ses an interactional process in which persons

and situations form an inextrieably interwoven

structure, From this perspective, competitive

individuals are defined as those who choose

whenever possible to enter competuive situa-

tions ttnd who act whenever possib}e te max-

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imize the competitive character of the situation

they are in. The reguiarities and consistencies

in these individuals' competitive behavior are to

be regarded as the product of regularities and

consistencies in the competitive social situations

within which they (choose to) live their lives.

Hence, this view i$ called the situational strat-

egy (Snyder & Ickes, 1985) to understand

people's social behavior,

A prob]em with the active or dynamic ap-

proach might be that without careful thoughts

and strict methedelogy, it eould become another

form of main-effect psychology; at first, situu-

tions s ¢ em all important, but in the end they

do not matter much, for the person somehow

expresses her true self by skirting and negating

the effeets of situational ferces. Even the situa-

tional strategy (Snyder & Ickes, 1985) could re-

main circular and atheoretical; situations could

be defin¢ d in terms of preferences expressed

and modifications iriade by people of certain

personality characteristics, Another problemmight be the complexity of eausal models; most

psychologists have so far ehosen either of the

first two approaches, and not the third, ebvi-

ously because of the conceptual parsimony and

psychonietrie economy promised by the assump-

tion of linearity and unidireetionality of the

hypothesized causa] relation$hips (Snyder &

Ickes, 1985) in the first two. We know and

understand weEl that these processes eould be

complex; what we need are models and re-

search methodelogy to disentangle such com-

plexity, J'Iowever, the third appreaeh has not

yet provided us, as we have reviewed, with

productive causal models or research methedol-

ogy.

Process interactionism

Kurt Lewin's formula, B=f(R E), has al-

ways been the best known symbol of the inter-

action approach. As already mentioned, Lewin

(1935) was against main--effect theories of be-

havior, and wrote that "oniy

by the cencrete

whole whieh cemprises the object and the sit-

Process interactionism77

uation are the vectors which determine the dy-

namics of the event defined," the object in this

sentence meaning the person in the situation.

Careful reading of Lewin]s writing indicatesthat his interactionism is none of the three al-

ready mentioned. Lewin saw human beings as

active, not merely responding to outer stimuli,

which is similar to the active or dynamic inter-

actionist view, But we have to remember that

he also insisted on the use of experiment to in-

vestigate the dynamics and complexity of the

human mind,

Lewin's interaction approach may best be il-

lustrated with ene of his examples. In Figure

1, a child stands before two attractive objects.

In Lewin's field theory, the valence of each eb-

ject becomes a field force, each impelling the

child {I.ewin, 1935}. And a resulting force Rshould rnake the child to move toward one di-

rection. This description is only for the child

and situation at the onset, and if our analysis

here were complete and offered nothing more

for us to examine, we would have to conclude

that the child reach neither Toy nor Cheeolate.

In reality, however, such a conclusion would

certainly prove wrong. for even if the vector

has the direction R at the moment of starting,

it does not mean the vector's strength and

direction permanently remains the same

Tov Chocolate

o

Figure 1. Initial forces and the child's

lecomotion.

Adopted from Fig. 1 & 2

1, Lewin, 1935

course of

of Chapter




rs The Jbpanese Jbzarnal of I'ersonaZity 1995, Vol. 3, No. 1.

throughout the actual process. Instead, the

whole situation changes with the process,

thus changing aiso, in both strength and di-

rection, the vectors that detemine the dynamics

at each mement. Thus, because of changes in

the situation, the actual process will always fi-

nally bring the child to one or the other of the

attractive objects (Lewin, 1935).

The example in Figure 1 should impress on

us that psychology's current research paradigm

is just like trying to predict outcomes from

initial conditions alone, ignoring processes inter-

vening between them. No wonder psycholo-

gists' efforts so far have not been plentifully

rewarded. If we followed the whole process

from initial conditions to outcemes, our under-

standing of the dynamic$ of mind and behavior

might be reasonably complete. But such a real

-･time

analysis of situation and behavior might

be unrealistic and may well b.e impossible.

However, we could trlJ to tap at least one of

intervening stages or internal processes; such a

stage or process should possibly refiect the sit-

uation surrounding the acter, which for him!her

is phenomenologically and continually (or per-

haps suddenly) changing. We argue here that

a process variable could provide us with useful

information regarding the intervening stages

and internal processe$.

The approach just discussed, process inter-

aetionism, does not require the complex models

or methodology that might be expected of the

active or dynamic interaction approach. Rather,

for better understanding and prediction of

people's behaviQr, it attempts to present an al-

ternative view that is based on the assumption

of causal linearity and unidirectionality, thus still

simpie enough and compatible with the tradi-

tional experimental paradigm, and at the same

time able to overcome some of the shortcom-

ings and limitations of person-situation interae-

tionisms (cf., Snyder & Ickes, 1985). Altheugh

the arguments made by the proponents of the

active or dynamic interaction approach (e. g., Snyder & Ickes, 1985) are cogent, the jump

from psychology's current research paradigrn to

a new unestablished one might be considerable.

It could be so big and drastic that the new

paradigm might have almost no continuity with

our current approach. Would such a radieal

change be necessar}i or desirable? Just adding

a few intervening process variables, or even

one, we argue, sheuld help us understand

people's secial behavior far better than we de

now.

Also, the situationag strategy (Snyder &

Ickes, 1985), though perhaps not as complex as

we tend to conceive it to be, might not be very

useful for understanding the person because of

its inherent cifcularity, although behavioral pre-diction might be atheoretically improved. In

addition, while based on new thinking, the ap-

proach might not be dynamic enough. A the-

ory does not automatically become dynamic, be-

cause it purports to study dynamic processes; it

becomes dynamic because it incorporates the

concepts of time and change in it. However

complex a theory may become, it could still re-

main static if time and change factors are left

out. As in the traditienal methodology, twe

points in time, i. e., the initial and outcome

stages, or measurements of independent and

dependent variables, are prebably not enough

to make a model `dynamic.'

At least another

point in time is necessary, which intervening

process variables could easily and nieely pro-vide, It is not certain that simply turning a de-

pendent variable into one of the independent

variables of the subsequent causal stage, or

chaining one causal stage after anQther, as dy-

namic or active interactionism might suggests,

would make a model dynamic.

In sum, we are proposing a different ap-

proach, which we shall call process interac-

tionism for twe obvious reasons: Kurt LewinJs

exhortation to examine, not only initial condi-

tions and final outcomes, but also the whole

pertinent processes in between, and our re-

sponse to include process variables in order to

implement his proposal.

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Pro ¢ ess models and mediation

We are now ready to discuss new models

and analyses, which particularly suit and cem-

plernent the new approach, process interac-

tionism. First, the model of traditional ap-

proach is depicted in Figure 2, a and b. In

the rnodel, the outcome (O), such as behavior,

is determined by the treatment variables of in-

dividual differences (I) and situations (S), In

the traditional interactionism described above,

an interaction of person by situation (IxS)should have a significant effect on the outeome

{O). Alternately, the interaction effect can be

described as either situation (S) moderating a

person (I) effect on the outcome (O) (see Figure2b, left), or person (I) moderating a situation

{S) effect <Figure 2b, right). In an interaction,

if one predicter is theoretically mere important

or otherwise more centraliy positioned, the re-

searcher may decide to call the other predictora rnoderator; moderation occurs when the effect

of a rnain predictor does not remain constant,

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Person Variable (I)

(O) Behavior

Situation Variable (S)

(S) {I}

(i)k

<o)(s)->L>(o>

(I)

<p)e (o}

Process Variable (s)

(s}

x (Ie {P> pt CO>

Figure2. Varieus causal models, and

moderation and mediation

Process interactienism 79

but changes systematically with the value of an-

other predictor (i. e., moderator).

A mediation model is shown in Figure 2, c

and d. If the mediator variable measures a

postulated internal process within the persen,we call it a process variable. Therefore, a pre-cess variable in the new approach is a type of

mediator; psychologically, it may well be the

most important type of mediator. In Figure 2c,

an intervening process (P) is determined as a

function ef the treatment variables, perso.n (I)and situation (S), and in turn inffuences the

outcome (O), such as behavior, performance, or

other resulting states. If an interaction of per-

son by situation (IxS) has an effect on the pro-cess variable (P), it can be described that sit-

uation (S) moderates a person (I) effect on the

process (P>, as shown in Figure 2d, or vice

versa, in the same ways as shown in Figure

2b, left and right.

Mediation occurs when the effects of treat-

ment variables go through a mediator to reach

outcome variables. Mediation can be whole,

with all the influence of the treatment on the

outcome going through the mediator, or partial,in which case, the treatment variables have ef-

fects on the outcome in addition to the medi-

ation. In other words, partial or no mediation

means that there exists a direct, unknown path

from the treatment to the outcome, independent

and parallel to the mediation path, Mediation,

therefore, can provide a theoretical explanation

why and how the treatment variables influence

the outcome variable. To the extent an effect

is going through a mediator rather than unspec-

ified paths, the mediator and mediation models

illuminate and help us understand complex phe-nomena (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Judd &

Kenny, 1981).

Mediational analyses of process models

In order to test whether or not mediation

through a process variable has indeed taken

place, a process or mediational analy$i$ has to

be performed. Let us illustrate such an anal-




80 T7ze .lapanese Jb"rnal of Personality 1995, Vol, 3, No, 1.

ysis with a mode] of four variables: two treat-

ment variables, a mediator, and an outcome

variable. The model could be more complex,

but the basic proceduTe remains the same, re-

gardless of the number of variables involved.

It has been known in test anxiety literature,

for example, that performance is jointly deter-

mined by the person's trait test anxiety and the

situation hefshe is in (see Kurosawa &

Harackiewicz, in press). Here, trait test anxiety

is the individual difference person variable (I); whether situation is evaluative or not, the sit-

uation (S}; and performanee measured with test

scores, the outcome (O>. In addition, if a the-

ory argues that cognitive activity in the form of

extraneous thoughts during the task period in-

terferes with efficient perfermance, and is thus

responsible for the joint effeet on the test score

of the person and situation factors, we have to

measure cognitive activity, which is a prQcess

var,iable (P), to test the theory, In order for

the proposed theory to be supported, mediation

of the test anxiety perforrnance effect needs to

take place; cognitive activity has to be the me-

diator of the treatment effect {s) on the test

scere.

To examine a possible mediational precess

requires a set of four regressions (cf., Baron &

Kenny, 1986; Judd & Kenny, 1981; see also

Kurosawa & Harackiewicz, in press). The first

step is a simple test ef treatment effects on

outcome. In our example, we would perform

an ANOVA on the test score, with the main

effects of trait test anxiety (I) and situation (S), as well as the predicted interaction effect of the

two (IxS). Such an interaction may be

described as the I effect moderated by S, in

the terminology of Baron & Kenny (1986); i. e.,

the effect of trait test anxiety weuld be different

depending on the nature of situations. Specif-

ica}ly, trait test anxiety shoulcl have a negative

effect on the test score in an evaluative sit-

uation, and a positive er no effect under a non

-evaluative

condition. It is important to remem-

ber that if we find no effect of treatment vari-

ables on the outcome variable, failing in this in-

itial step of mediational analysis, we have no

effect that needs to be mediated, or explained,

by a rnediator.

In the second step, the process variable (P)is regressed on the treatment predictors. We

would perform an ANOVA on cognitive activ-

ity, which could be measured as the ameunt of

$elf-reported extraneous thoughts during task

performance (e. g., Kurosawa & Harackiewicz,

in press; Sarason, 1984; Sarason & Stoops,

1978), with the main effects of trait test anxiety

(I) and situation (S), and the interaction effect

of the two (IxS) in the model. In order to me-

diate the treatment .effects on the outcome, the

process variable itself needs to be affected bythe treatment factorsl otherwise, no mediation

would be possible. If the person by situation

interaction effect en the outcome, of Step 1, is

to be explained, an interaction effect of the

same pattern is usually required on the process

variable. However, even if such an interaction

is not found, more eomplex models that might

sti11 explain the interaction effect on the out-

come are possible; such models can be tested

in Step 4, as explained below,

For the third step, we add the main effect

of the process variable in the Step 1 ANOVA

equation. If its effect on the outcome is signif-

icant, controlling for the effects of all other

predictors in the equation, we may cenclude

that mediation through the process variable has

been established. And if a treatment effect, in-cluding the interaction effect, on the outceme

that has been significant, beeomes now nonsig-

nificant, whole mediation of the now-nonsig-

nificant effect can be inferred. On the other

hand, if such an effect remains significant, par-

tial mediation has occurred; some direct effect

of the treatment effect exists alongside the

mediated effect. It is important to remember

that these estirnations and significance testings

be done with the effects of all other factors

controlled for, in order to make such inferences.

In our example, if the person aRd situation (i.

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e., treatmenO variables have an interaction ef-

fect en both the process and outcome variables,

and the process variable affects the outcome in

the Step 3 equation, controlling for the direct

person-by-situation interaction effect, then and

only then is the hypethesized mediation model

established, and the cQgnitive interference the-

ory described above supported. The model

described here, a derivation from the theory, is

of the type called mediated moderation

(Baron & Kenny, l986).

Our !process analysis might be eomplete with

a fourth step; adding interaction effects of IxP,

SxP, and IxSxP to the Step 3 equation enables

us to test interactional mediation (Judd &

Kenny, 1981) or moderated mediation (Baron &Kenny, 1986) models. Even if the lxS interac-

tion effect en the process variable is not signif-

icant in Step 2, one of the Step--4 interaction

effects may still mediate (i. e., explain) the IxS

interaction effect on the outcome variable found

in Step 1, if we also have found a main effect

on the precess variable in Step 2. For in-

stance, a situation main effect on cognitive ac-

tivity rnay mean that the evaluation situation

produces more extraneous thoughts. 1'hen the

ameunt of extraneous thoughts might interact

with trait test anxiety (i. e., a significant IxP in-

teraction on the outcome in Step 4), in that the

higher cognitive activity level is particularly

debilitating for those who are high on trait test

anxiety, On the other hand, a main effect of

trait test anxiety might be found on cognitive

activity: the higher the trait, the more the ex-

traneous thoughts, The $ituation variable

would then moderate the effect of extraneous

theughts on the outcome (a significant SxP in-

teractien effect in Step 4}; in an evaluative sit-

uation, such thoughts could become especially

detrimental to the person's efficient perform-ance, while in the non-evaluative situation, no

such deterioration might occur. An even more

complex IxSxP interaction effect might be

found, which ceuld subsume both IxP and SxP

interactien effects.

Process interactionism 81

Notice that the complete model of Step 4 is

none other than the three-way factorialANOVA on the outcome, with I, S, and P as

the predictor variables. However, the complete

model is too complicated for simple illustratien,

and Figure 3 is used instead, where all the

possible paths are included. In the figure, the

individual difference person variable (I) is

shown to possibly influence both the process

(P) and outcome (O) variables. In addition, the

process variable has a potential path to the out-

come, as well as a probable moderating infiu-

ence on the I effect on O, as shown in the fig-

ure. The situation variable not ineluded in the

figure is then examined to see whether it

moderate$ each of the paths (i.e., arrows) inthe figure, as well as whether its own main ef-

fects on the process and outcome variables are

significant.

Figure 3 could be useful when testing the

whole model with structural analysis, using

LISRELTM, for instance. Since Csituatien' is

usually a grouping variable, a variance/

covariance matrix for each situation is com-

puted, the matrices simultaneously entered as

input data, and the model estimated without the

equality constraint across the situations for each

of the paths, The equality constraint then isadded, and the worsening ef the model fit, in-

dexed by the goodness-of-fit X2, is tested. If

the change by such an alteration is significantly

more than chance would produce, we prefer the

model that includes the situation interaction ef-

fect to the simple main-effect model of Figure

{I)

(O)

Figure 3. A complete model




Ece 71ze ,Japanese Jbumial of Personality l995, Vol, 3, No, 1.

3. While such structural analysis should pro-duce identical results to the ANOVA or gen-

eral linear model procedure described here, the

causal diagram may be especially helpful in un-

derstanding and summarizing a mediation rnod-

el. Whenever an arrow goes from Variable A

to Variabie B, then frem Variable B to Variable

C in the diagram, Variab}e A has an effect on

Variable C, which is mediated by Variable B.

If there is no other path, it is whole mediation.

In sum, structural equation models are very

useful for mediational analysis, and should be

used more frequently.

While nermally the four steps described

here are sufficient, we might want to test an-

other model, which is depicted in Figure 4; the

situation variable is not shown here again, but

should be treated as in Figure 3, The model

is non-recursive, and the persen variable (I) in-fluences both the process (P> and outcome <O)variables, similarly to the models described

above. However, in this model, the processand outcome variables have reciprocal influen-

ces on each other. In our example, cognitive

activity increases as level of perfdrmance

decreases, and vice versa, Therefore, cognitive

activity simultaneously serves as process and

outcome variables, Exactly the same can be

said of test score; it partially determines and is

determined by cognitive activity. The mutual

causal paths are indicatecl with the two arrows

El

cp)

(I)

<o)

E2

Figure 4. A non-recursive model

between them in the figure. A special model

like this requires structural analysis for estima-

tion and testing, rather than ANOVA or multi-

ple regression of the general linear model.

Structural equation modeling or structural anal-

ysis is perhaps the most exciting development

in data analysis in the social sciences during

the 1970s (Kenny, 1985).

The non-recursive model shown in Figure 4

requires not only a special analytical technique,

but additional data as well. If we have meas-

ured only the three variables, I, P, and O, the

model is under-identified, meaning it cannot be

solved uniquely. In addition, we need the so-

called in$trumental variables to estimate such a

non-recursive model. Instrumental variables

are indicated in the figure as El and E2; they

should be conceptually and operationally distinct

from the person variable (I), and at the same

time affect only one of the reciprocally infiuenc-

ing variables, Only when we have such a

model, and necessary data for its estimation,

are we able te intelligibly and empirically dis-

cuss mutual causal influences.

We have argued in the section on interac-

tionism above that a theory involving only inde-

pendent and dependent variables should no

longer be acceptable. A theory with more ･than

the two kinds Qf variables inevitably requires a

careful causal specification, as discussed so far

in this section, in order for it to be intelligible.

While there have been sorne theories and re-

search that have involved more than independ-

ent and dependent variables, their causal spec-

ification has most often remained implicit. We

should no lenger tolerate ambiguous theory

$tatements, Process and mediational models

force us to make theoretical models explicit (e.f., Kenny, 1985}; if not sufficiently explicit, we

cannot collect data, let alone analyzing them.

There are four tasks or issue$ fbr model

construction and data analysis in social sciences

(Kenny, 1985). The first is model specification;

we need to translate theoretical statements, and

specify a statistical or causal model to math-

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ematically or graphically represent them as ac-

curately and precisely as possible, indicating

which variable sheuld influence which. Certain-

ly, specification is necessary for any theoretical

statement; however, written in prose, a theory

could be implicit, ambiguous, or sometimes

even outright illogical, A causal diagram could

easily help us avoid such an elementary and

unnecessary problem. Even when a model is

clearly and unequivocally specified, its

parameters may not always be possible to esti-

mate; identification is the next issue that we

have to deal with.

Identification refers to whether there is suffi-

cient information available so that estimation of

a specified model can neces$arily be made po$-

sibie. If we have properly specified causal

relations among variables, and have sufficient

data and informatioR te estimate them, the task

of identification is complete. An example of

identification problem may be illustrated with

the model in Figure 4; without the instrumental

variabies, we cannot uniquely solve the equa-

tions. Kenny (1985) has･ another example; if

we are interested in estimating a treatment ef-

fect or testing whether it is non-zero, a control

group is absolutely necessary. Tg claim that

treatment cattses outcome er treatment is effec-

tive, we need a proper experimental design,

whieh indeed mean$ valid model specification

and identification we are now discussing.

It is often mistakenly believed that structural

analysis, or path anatysis which is structural

analysis of a model whose variables are stan-

dardized, can prove causal relationships among

variables. On the contrary, eausal relationships

have to be specified first, in order for model

estimation to be made possible, If we de not

know whether Variable A affects Variable B or

vice versa, and want to let the data decide the

forrn of eausal relationship between them, we

have an under-identification problem. If the

model is under-identified, it needs to be re-

specified so that its estimation becomes possi-

ble, meanlng we have to redesign our research.


While identification problem might appear tricky

and not easy for the uninitiated to understand,

it should not be; in most cases where exper-

imental methodology is appropriately applied,

and ANOVA or multiple regression analysis

can be used, we have no identification preblem.On the other hand, it is also probably true that

we psychologists have not been careful enough

about theoretical statements, and quite a few

eausal conclusions seem to have been drawnfrom studies using only correlational rnethods,

as if data by themselves could decisively prevea causal relationship.

When our model is properly identified, we

try to obtain the best estimates for model

parameters, which is referred to as estimation.

Model parameters include effects in ANOVA

and coefficients in multiple regression. In the

figures ef the current paper, each arrow has a

parameter, which is an effect or coefficient,

with an appropriate positive or negative sign.

We are usually interested in such parameters,

while we pay little attention to error or residual

variances, which too are necessary parameters

of a model. Normally, methods with least

squares or maximum likelihood criteria are used

for estimation of model parameters. And com-

puters with data analytical packages are now

widely and conveniently used for this stage of

empirical research. Kenny (1985) says that ex-

amination of the parameter estimates should bethe essential aspect of data analysis, Perhapsthe most common mistake is the failure to care-

fully study the estimates. Instead, we are fre-

quently more interested in and concerned for

the parameters' significance level, which is re-

lated to the next issue,

We are usually interested in determining

whether a parameter, or its associated causaL

path, is dispensable. Normally, as in ANOVA

or multiple regression, we test a null hypothesisthat an effect or coefficient is really zero, byfirst assuming no effect, and then computing

the probability that given data is obtained un-

der such an assumption. The logic is that we




84 TVie .Ihpanese Jbumat of Pensonality 1995, Vol, 3, No. 1.

should reject the null hypothesis if the prob-

ability is sufficiently small. This proeedure is

logically identicai to the model modification ap-

proach for testing whether a parameter is nec-

essary. As already deseribed above, first a

measure of model fit, such as X2 or R2, is

computed vis-a-vis the actual data obtained,

and then modification to the model is made one

by one. If an alteration causes the model fit to

the data to worsen $ignificantly more than

chance would produce, we conclude that the

parameter and its associated path are necessary

for our model, and the modification should not

be made,

For example, a person-by-situation interac-

tion model may be estimated first, and its mod-

el fit computed with R2. Then, a main-effect

model of persc)n variabie may be estimated,

with interaetion parameters combined by equal-

ity constraint, which means only one parameter

is retained, For the model, R2 is recomputed,

whieh should necessarily be lower with a

smaller number of predictors. If it decreases

more than chanee deletion of parameters weuld

cause, then the pararneters, and the associated

interaction, are statisticaily significant. In that

case, we deeide that we need the parameters,

and the interaction effect is indispensable for

the modei, Normally, the number of parame-

ters removed becomes the degree of freedom

for significance testing.

There are other problems not discussed so

far, but related to issues of specification, identi-

fication, estimation, and testing. Comments are

in order fer twe of them in particular: power

and measurement error issues. Briefiy, the

power issue means that psychologists most of-

ten do not have a large enough number of par-

ticipants in their study. The issue becomes

particularly troublesome for process analysis, for

we could simply fail to detect mediation if the

pewer of the experiment is not sufficient. The

only solution to this problem, which also should

not be particularly esoteric to come up with, i$

having a large number of participants. Meas-

urement errors too make the detection of medi-

ation more difficult, since they lower the ceiling

of correlation coefficients ameng variables. Al-

though there are ways to make correction for

the ceiling eifect, basically we need to improve

our measurements so that they contain less er-

rors. Also, the latent variable approach with

multiple indieaters could be used; such a meas-

urement model should conceivably have more

construct validity as well, Finally, there are

also careless mistakes (see Kenny, 1985) in

data analysis, as in any area of empirical re-

search; needl'ess to say, the researchers should

make every effQrt to eliminate them from their

reports.

In this section, process models and media-

tional analyses are briefly described a$ only one

example, albeit perhaps the most important, of

the statistical procedures that should be increas-

ingly used in the process interactionist ap-

proach. The statistical models and analyses

described here are discussed in greater details

by Kenny and his colleagues (e, g,, Baron &

Kenny, 1986; Judd & Kenny, 1981; Kenny,

1985). Arguments are made that results from

mediational analyses are particularly informative;

these analyses could be used more for tracli-

tional research as well. At the same time, the

issues in model construction and data analysis,

for example, should impress on us that re-

search design and data analysis ef the field

have not suMciently become formal and scientif-

ic, Our use of statistical techniques surely

needs scrutiny. As Lewin warned us, statistics

is no substitute for theory, and the content of a

psychological law cannet be simply determined

by parameter estimates. However, the critical

point is not that statistical methods are used,

but how they were applied. Causal modeling

in particular is recommended, for structurai

analysis has major advantages (Kenny, 1985),

and is particularly useful for process interac-

tionism, our new approach. With it, we could

be conceivably more mindful of Lewin's ad-

monltlons,

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Self theories and self processes

In the new approaeh, internal processes of

the person are central to his/her personality,and personality is to be described and under-

stood in terms of models of internal processesand their parameters. As already mentioned, a

view that comes close to the eurrent theoretical

pesition is Misehel's cognitive-social learningapproach (1990). His approach ealls for a con-

ditional view ef dispositions rather than a per-spective based on global traits inferred from be-

havior, and thus proposes a particular form of

person-･situation interactionism, in which the

person's cognition und affect too are taken into

consideration. Each of Mischel's person vari-

ables may be cenceptualized as the product of

the individual's social-cognitive development up

to the time; it also may be conceptualized in

terms of a relevant psychological precess at the

time of behavior. Thus, each variable ha$ both

a struetural and a func:tiona] aspect (Mischel,1990).

A number of self theories too suggest prob-able internal prucesses and related person vari-

ables that could readl}y become useful com-

ponents of the new approach. Psyclloiogists in

general used to see `selP

as a concept that was

at best vague, ambiguous, or otherwise not well

defined, and therefore among the lea6t amena･

ble to empirical research. Situations seem to

have ehanged, and not only have studies of self

increased ln experimental social psyehology and

become popular among personality psychologistsas well, but also intensive and extensive re-

search in the area during the l980s seems to

have made substantiai progress (Nakamura,1990). The concept might still remain vague

and ambiguous for serne psychologists' taste,

but variables related to self are increasingly

employed in empirical research. In order to

make the current revlew coherent and man-

ageable, we shall make use ef the framework

that has been proposed to cover systematically

a wide variety of self theories.

`Social

psychology of self process'

Processinteractionism 85

(Nakamura, 1990) attempts a synthesis of a

number of research areas related to self, which

so far have mostly been conducted independ-

ently and remained theoretically unrelated to

each other. The self may be conceptualized as

process or structure, and Nakamura (1990) cau-

tions that despite the term `self

process,' the

authors have not wholly embraced the thesisthat se4f' is process, and that their approach

might better be characterized as more structural

in its orientation. Psychological processes relat-

ing to selL especially phenomenal processes,

could be called self process, and they could be

conceptually organized into four phases

(Nakamura, 1990}. These four constituents ef

self process have a specific order to appear,

and the orderly sequence as a whele could be

a process, and at the same tSme, the structure

of self should emerge from the orderly and ce-

herent relationship among the four. Nakamura

(1990) identifies them as attention, comprehen-

sion, evaluation, and expression phases; a num-

ber of studies for each of the four have so far

separately been conducted by varieus theorists

and researchers, as already mentioned.

In the first stage, we pay attention to our

own existence, appearance, or internal states.

In other words, we become conscious of our

self and state; this is the phase of self-focused

attention. Starting with theory of obiective

self-awareness (Duval & Wicklund, 1972), a

great number of experiments have been con-

ducted to study the state of self-awareness,

Our attention may be wholly directed toward

self or toward external events, the theory as-

sumes CDuval & Wicklund, 1972); and self-

focused attention typically is aversive or oth-

erwise areusing, motivating the person to act in

certaln ways.

Now there are several theories concerning

the effects of self-awareness on the persen's in-ternal states and behavior (e. g., Carver &

Scheier, 1981; Duval & Wieklund, 1972; Gib-

bons, 1990; Hull & Levy, 1979; Wicklund,

1975). In addition, a related trait of self-con-

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86Tlte Japanese .lo"rnal of PersonaZity 1995, Vol, 3, No, l.

sciousness is introduced; the SelfLConsciousness

Seale measures the dispositional tendency to

beeome self-focused (Fenigstein, Scheier, &

Buss, 1975). The scale has three subscales

derived from erthogonal factors: private and

public $elf-"eonsciousness, as well as social anx-

iety. The three-factor structure has also been

replicated in a Japanese version (Kurosawa,1992; see also 1993). Research continues on

how people become self-aware, what is the

characteristic of the self-focused state, and

what are its consequences.

Self-focused attention may result in a clear

image and profile of our self, which we may be

able to capture in the second stage; we come

to know and understand ourselves (Nakamura,1990). It is the phase of self knowledge and

comprehension, and ,various concepts like self-

image and self-eoncept, as well as actuallideal

selves and ego-identity, have traditionally been

the targets of empirical research of the second

phase. Newer interests seem largely to have

taken over, although older concepts have not

faded away completely. For instance, `self-con-

cept' has been recast as self-schema (e. g.,Markus, 1977> from informatien processing ap-

proach. Processing of self-relevant information

becomes one of the more exciting topics of the

second phase, but studies of self-concept are

still alive and welL

Now there are a number of approaches one

could take concerning the question ef "how

we

come to know and understand ourselves"; per-

haps the rnost prevocative may be self-percep-

tion theory (Bem, 1972). We ceme to know

ourselves just as we do anyone else: observa-

tion of overt behavior (Bem, 1972). Such a

view at first must have sounded counter-intu-

itive and controversial, but more and more

psychologists are appreciative and supponive of

the perspective, The reason for this change

may be found in the popularity ef social cogni-

tion researeh, which started during the 1970s.

Seff-perception may best be understood in the

context of attribution theory; ironically, attribu-

tion theory is as cognitive as Bem was be-

havioristic (and therefore anti-cognitive> in his

proposal of the theory. And even a theory of

emotion (Schachter & Singer, 1962; Schachter,

1964) is now cast and understood in the frame-

work of self"perception and attribution.

Our knowledge and understanding of our-

selves seem to lead us to the next phase: eval-

uation (Nakamura, 1990). We have a powerfultendency to evaluate our opinions, abilities, and

self as a whole; Festinger (1954) posited such a

tendency as the basis of his theory of social

comparison. Social comparison, others' opinions

of the self, and internal standards including ide-

al self may be involved in the process of self-

evaluation. And self-esteem can be defined as

the outcome of the evaluative process concern-

ing the self as a whole; Rosenberg's self-es-

teem scale (1965) measures the direction, favor-

able or unfavorable, and strength of the atti-

tude toward oneself, Related concepts may in-

clude self--wonh, self-value, inferiority, self-sat-

isfaction, and self-aeceptance; they have tradi-

tionally been topical concepts of the third phase

in self process.

Interestingly, social anxiety of the Self Con-

sciousness Scale (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss,

1975) is related to self--esteem. When items of

the scale were factor analyzed (Kurosawa, !985)

together with Eagly's version {1967) ef the Janis--Field

Feelings of Inadequacy Scale as well as

the Cheek and Buss self-esteem scale (Buss,1980), four orthogonal factors emerged. Two ef

them substantially replicated the private and

public subscales of self consciousness. On the

other hand, the Eagly scale, which has beenfrequently used as a self-esteern scale, split up

into two, one faetor for non-social self-esteem

factor along with the Cheek-Buss items, and

the other for social self-esteem, with social anx-

iety items of the Self Consciousness Scale load-

ing negatively (Kurosawa, 1985). Exactly the

same factor structure has now been replicated

with a Japanese version with Japanese college

students as respQndents (Kurosawa, 1992).

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Therefore, evaluation of the self has (at least)two aspects; ene of the self in the context that

is free of social implications, and the other in

social situations, which is reversely related to

socia] anxiety (Kurosawa, 1985; 1992}, There

are now studies that indicate two dimensions

for self-esteem: social and non-social factors (orinner vs. outer self-esteern; see Briggs &

Cheek, 1986).

Finally, the self may be cenceptualized as

what is expressed by the person in social set-

tings; self expression is the fburth phase of self

process {Nakamura, 1990). Goffman (1959) saw

human social behavior in everyday life as pres-entation of the self, i. e., role-playing or dis-

playing the soeial self. An aspect of the fourth

phase is impression management; people may

behave in a social setting in order to create a

certain impression Qf the self, more likely favor-

able one, on others. For instance, self-hand-

icapping is a strategy to avuid an internal, sta-

ble attribution of unfavorable outcomes

(Berglas & Jones, 1978; Snyder & Wicklund,

1981), Another aspeet may be self-disclosure;

you may verbally disclose your personal infor-

mation in a social interaction, letting your part-ner know your true self better, deeper and

wider. While self-diselesure may not necessari-

ly be related to manipulation or management of

your impression, it nonetheless expresse$ your

self and creates on the other person certain im-

ages or impressions of you.

Related to self presentation, self-monitoring

<SMI Snyder, 1979) is a broader concept than

lmpresslon management; a person may monltor

hislher own behavior in soeial settings, and at-

tempt to censtruct a pattern of social behavior

appropriate to particular social settings. In-

dividuals differ in the extent to which they rely

on two sources ef information for their cues for

appropriateness of their behavior: situational or

interpersonal information vs. that from inner

states, dispositions, and attitudes, The selfi

monitoring scale measures the individual differ-

ence to monitor and control one's social behav-

Precess interactioni$m 87

Comprehension

Attrib

,8 Private ut

S .g

<public

Disclosure Prese

Expression

Figure 5. Four phases of self process

ior; a high SM individual is assumed to pay

particular attentien to situatienal information,

and a low SM person is thought to attune his/

her behavior more te personal characteristics

and inner states CSnyder, 1979). Therefore, so-

cial behavior of the high SM persons should bemore changeable depending on the situation,

while the low tend to be cross-situationally con-

sistent in their behavior (Snyder & Ickes,1985).

Figure 5 summarizes and shows the four

phases of self process just discussed. While

reverting to a preceding phase might be a pos-sibility, the four phases of the self in generalappear in the fixed order, without skipping

(Nakamura, 1990). Therefore, the four steps as

a whele could be a process, and at the same

time, the sequence becomes a structure as well,

giving both a functional and structural aspects

to the self (cf., Mischel, 199e). The structure

is represented here as circular; a new cycle

would begin as the fourth phase of self-expres-

sion ends, and self-focused attention occurs

anew. However, the circular `self

process'depicted in the figure is most likely only one of

the processes related to the self; each phase

must include a number of relevant internal

processes, although not many self theories so

far seem to have explicitly pesited such proces-

ses, A hierarchical model of internal processes




88 7:Pte lapanese ,fournal of Personality 1995, Vol. 3, No.

might be possible, fer instance, with the circu-

lar self proeess at the top of several levels of

various self processes.

This brief exposition of `social

psychology of

self process' <Nakamura, 1990) hopefully helps

the readers realize the importance of self

processes not only in social psychelogy, but

alse in personality psychology. For our new

approach, personality processes are central to

our understanding of psychology of the person;

his/her personality is understood and described

in terms of mode]s of internal processes and

their parameters. Although the model of self

suggested by Figure 5 is based on a perspec-

tive not wholly proeess-oriented (Nakamura, 1990), it is pessible to conceive the self as all

relevant {i. e., psychelogieal} internal processes

of the person. There should be no preblem

defining and treating self-related processes as

kind of personality 'processes;

a'nd no person-

ality variable is likely to be conceptualized or

operationalized totally without relating it to the

concept of self, if it is process--oriented and has

semething to do with social behavior. In this

centext, theerizing and understanding self

processes become one of the most important

goals of the new approach to personality.

There are other reasons why research in

seif theeries and variables should preve to be

valuable for the new approach. First, self as a

construet can be operationalized so that self

variables are related to internal but measurable

processes; recent self research has taken this

approach, and we believe that it should become

standard procedure for personality research in

general as well. In such a conceptualization, a

self-related variable may serve as an independ-

ent, dependent, or process variable of the

study. We have argued that we should best

avoid traditional concepts like personality type

and trait. Self variables are coneeptually supe-

rior to such coneepts; while those traditional

concepts are mostly atheoretical as already

pointed out, it is very hard tQ imagine a self

variable that is atheoretical to the extent as a

1.

trait would be. We should resist by all means

the temptation to make traits or traitlike con-

cepts out of self variables, e. g., self censcious-

ness and self monitoring. Fortunately, most

self variables do not seem very intuitive as a

psycholegical concept, and have not appeared

much in lay psychoiogy; therefore, se]f could

potentially generate totally new personality vari-

ables without being encumbered with irnplicit

personality theory and naive psychology.

Having discussed the necessities and merits

of studying self theories from the current the-

oreticai perspective, let us briefiy review their

other characteristics. These characteristics are

naturally refiected in `social psychology of self

process' (Nakamura, 1990), First, when we Iook

at self theories, we are impressed with their

great number and variety. In a sense, this

might be inevitable, for we each have many so-

cial selves, and each self has many aspects as

well. Self theories as a whole are multi-faceted

and deal with various phenomena; on the other

hand, each theory deals piecerneal with only a

tiny part of the self, and no comprehensive the-

ory of the whole self exists. Incidentally, it is

somewhat similar to the state of social psychol-ogy, which does not have one single theory that

is central or comprehensive when explaining so-

cial behavior. That is why higher Ievel

theories, like `self process' (Nakamura, 1990),

become all the more important, when trying te

understand the totality of the self.

Another characteristic of recent self theories

is that many of them are eognitive, rather than

motivational, in their orientation. Lewin's ap-

proach to personality (1935) may also be charae-

terized as cognitive, but it has motivational and

behavioral aspects as well, and the person is

seen as active. In contrast, many recent self

theories are merely cognitive; psychologists are

more interested in cognition than behavior, and

the image of the person is rather passive and

reactive. Cognitive approaeh to psychology in

general, and infQrmation processing approach in

particular, is known for its emphasis of internal

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processes; curiously, with a few exceptions, self

theories have not beceme process-oriented, and

although cognitive, contents and outcomes of

pTocesses rather than processes themselves are

studied. At any rate, cognitive and information

proeessing approaches are usually devoid of

motivational constructs. And because they are

currently popular among psychologists, finding a

new good motivational theery in psychology is

not easy recently, and self research seems to

be no exception.

Many of the recent self theories are based

on the phenomenological self: i. e,, the self

known, not the knower. Social psychology of

self process (Nakamura, 199e) defines psycho-

logical processes relating to self, especially phe-

nomenal processes, as Cself

process.' While the

person may be concerned with hislher objective

self (i. e., becoming objectively self aware), the

psychologist is interested in such a

phenemenological and experiential state of the

person, and tries to study the effects of the

state. In other words, to a large extent, phe-nomenology and subiective feelings and

knowledges have become central to recent self

research. This tendency may have something

to do with a trend in personality,and social

psychology; scientific study of lay psychologyhas beceme popular, including attribution and

implicit personality theories. For instance, fac-

ter structures of personality traits are studied,

and five factors are generally found (Goldberg,1993}, Notice that the structure is of

phenotypic persenality traits seen by lay people

(i. e., based on implicit personality theory), and

generally not by expert psychologists. Recent

self researeh has similar data sources.

Self theories could be more obiective and

functional, and the data may come from other

sources than self--reports about the self. In

such a approach, what the person explicitly or

implicitly thinks er feels about the self is not

central, and the p$ychologist tries to obiectively

see the self as serving certain psychological

functions for the person. In other words, self


in such an approach is a construct being stud-

ied by the psychologist, rather than what is felt

by the person who is being studied as in a

phenomenological appreach. An example of ob-

jective and functional approaches may beAronson's selftiustification theory (1992), which

is a reinterpretation ef Festinger's cognitive dis-

sonance theory (1957). Another exarnple may

be the totalitarian ege of Greenwald (1980);here the ego is seen as an organizer of person-al knowledge. Similarly, Hull and Levy (1979)see the rele of self-awareness in terms of or-

ganizational functions in information proeessing.

In each case, the objective and functional as-

pect of the self or ego, rather than the ex-

periential and subiective aspect, is emphasized

and theorized. Altheugh Lewin's approach too

is phenomenological, it also has obiective and

functional aspects with motivational and be-havioral concepts; at least we know that

Lewin's psychology does not rely much on in-

trospection for empirical research.

It is not always possible to tell whether

some of the self `theories'

are mere de$criptions

ef self-related phenomena or theoretical ex-

planations of such phenomena (Nakamura,1990). As already argued, there is no such

thing as a descriptive theory, and an empirical

law is no theory, Aiso, not many theories are

very explicit about the processes involved; we

sometimes wonder whether a theory is abeut

the whoie process, from tl)e beginning to theend, or only some part of it in between, e, g.,the mediational process, Although a p$ycholog-

ical state based on self-reports is presumablystudied, we are not informed whether the per-

sen is assumed to be able to become conscious,

or otherwise knowledgeable, of the processes

under investigation. A theory may be equiv-

ocal about the consequences of self-awareness

or self-reports; sometimes, it presumably in-

fluences an outcome, and other times, it may

become totally epiphenomenal. These and

many other confusions need clarification; for a

coherent perspective that incorporates those var-




90 T7ie Jdpanese Jburnal of PeTsonalit.y 1995, Vol. 3, No. 1. '

iou$ self theories, we seem to neeti great more

work,

Finally, we may ask whether any aspect of

the self is missing from `social

psychology of

self process' (Nakamura, 1990>. As we have

already peinted out, the $elf precess perspective

centers around information processing and phe-

nomenal processesl the processes included in

the per$pective appear in general te be

phenotypic and superficial, in Lewinian terms.

Perhaps, a group of important concepts, among

others, that are missing from the perspeetivemay center around the concept of

`control'.

These surface phenornena are manifestations, it

can be argued, of some core or genotypical

processes of self, which probably concerns the

relation of the self to the non-self or outer

world. We appear to need, in other words,

motivational and self--regulatory processes,which should accoUnt for the processes of the

self process approach. The core or genotypical

processes of self, which supposedly take place

deep inside the person, are shown as a `?'

in

the center of Figure 5.

There are a number of concepts in this as-

pect of the self; for instanee, control and mas-

tery, self-efficacy, self-acceptance, self-reliance,

and self-control come readily to mind. Similar

and related concepts may be primary and sec-

ondary control, iocus of control, and intrinsic

motivation and self-actualization on the one

hand, and defense mechanisms, illusion of con-

trol, and learned helplessness on the other. In

sum, while the social psychology of self process

(Nakamura, 1990) is provocative and eonstruc-

tive, and self theories included in it are partic-

ularly interesting and should be useful for our

new approach, we need great more work to

make them fit the requirements of the new pro-

cess approach, In particular, we should paymore attention to motivational and self-

regulatory aspects of the self, which are also

important in Lewinian approach, and which

should provide us with more genotypical the-

oretical variables to understund the whole self.

Summary

In this paper, a new approach to personality

psychology is discussed. First, it is argued that

expert psycholegy should be different and `bet-

ter' than lay psychelogy. Personality psycholo-

gists are asked how better their psychelogy is

than a lay psycholegy; hew far advanced it is

from common sense; and what it could offer to

other fields of psychology. In the same con-

text, Lewinian approach to psychology is brieflyreviewed and sumrnarized, and why a new ap-

proach is necessary is diseussed. Then, the

tasks of personality psychelogy are redefined,

and a new eoncept of personality proposed.

Specifically, internal precesses of the personare put at the center of the new approach.

The approach proposes that personality should

be understood in terms of models of internal

processes and their parameters. Possible inter-

nal preeesses of our interest may be, among

others, information processing, rnotivational, and

self--regulatory processes. The parameters of

internal processes, rather than static

characteristics ef the person, should become

personality variables of the new approach. Per-

sonality variables of our new paradigm include

both person and process variabZes. Psycholo-

gists should measure interna} parameters to ob-

tain person variables, which should replace

such traditional personality variables as traits

and types. Individual differences can be

defined in terms of variations in model

parameters, Personality development and

change could then be conceptualized as chan-

ges in the individual's internal parameters,

Also, various interaction approaches concern-

ing the relation between personality and behav-

ior are reviewed. It is argued that Lewin's in-

teractionism, called here as process interac-

tionism, is different from others, in that it em-

phasizes the importance of process. Aecording

to him, the situation changes with the process,

thus changing also the forees that determine

the dynamics at each moment, It is suggested

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that process variabies should be measured to

tap the situational changes postulated in

Lewinian process interactienism. The variables

then may be analyzed to examine whether they

mediate the effects of the treatment variables

on the outcome variables. Process models and

mediational analyses are briefly described as an

example of statistical procedures that partic-ularly suit our new paradigm. Mediational

analyses illuminate and help us understand

eomplex phenomena (Baron & Kenny, 1986;

Judd & Kenny, 1981); the new models and

data analyses would be very useful for building

new theories of personality.

Finally, self theeries in the framework of

`self process' (Nakamura, l.990) are reviewed

from the viewpoint of the new approach to per-

sonality psychology. Se]f related processes are

a kind of personality process; therefore, study-

ing them should be one of the most important

goals of the new personality psychology. Self

theories as a whole lack a coherent framework,

it is argued, and many theories are merely cog-

nitive and' phenomenological. It is also argued

that self theories need not be so, but could be

more objective and functional. There may be

sorne aspects ef the self that is rnissing from

the se]f process perspective (Nakamura, 1990).

The perspective centers around informatien

processing and phenomenal processes, and the

processes involved may be phenotypic and su-

perficial, in Lewinian terms. It is suggested

that what we may need most is the concept of

`control';

self theories need mere motivatienal

and seif-regulatory processes. While the social

psycholegy of self process <Nakamura, 1990) is

provocative and compatible with the new ap-

proach, we seem te need great more work,

with more genotypic, as opposed to phenotypic,variables to understand the whole self.

As we all probably agree, of all fields of

psychology, personality psychology comes

closest te lay people's image of psychology,

Perhaps, personality psychologists have a dilem-

ma: if they try to be scientific ancl formal, their


theory tends to become eseteric and not very

intuitive, and therefore not very popular among

lay people. On the other hand, if they try to

make their theory intuitively and readily under-

standable to the general public, it tends to be-

come unscientific. It may be the high expecta-

tions of professional and lay people alike that

personality psychology suffers from. However,

personality psychologists' choice should be

clear; the field sti11 needs to be more rigorously

scientific and formal. Carefully studying

Lewin's approach to psyehology and following

his advices may very well provide the guidance

we need at the moment.

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(Reeeived Sep, 10, 1993; accepted Feb.6, 1995)

Precess interactionism, Kurt Lewin's personality psychology

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