Practice Exam 3 with Solutions - Texas A&M...

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Econ 323 Microeconomic Theory Practice Exam 3 with Solutions

Transcript of Practice Exam 3 with Solutions - Texas A&M...

Page 1: Practice Exam 3 with Solutions - Texas A&M Universitypeople.tamu.edu/~aglass/econ323/E323Practiceexs3Slides.pdf · Chapter 13, Question 2 In the Bertrand model of oligopoly, a. each

Econ 323 Microeconomic Theory

Practice Exam 3 with Solutions

Page 2: Practice Exam 3 with Solutions - Texas A&M Universitypeople.tamu.edu/~aglass/econ323/E323Practiceexs3Slides.pdf · Chapter 13, Question 2 In the Bertrand model of oligopoly, a. each

Chapter 13, Question 1

Which assumption in the model of perfect competition differs for monopolistic competition? 

a. free entry and exit

b. product homogeneity

c. large number of firms

d. perfect information

e. none of the above

Page 3: Practice Exam 3 with Solutions - Texas A&M Universitypeople.tamu.edu/~aglass/econ323/E323Practiceexs3Slides.pdf · Chapter 13, Question 2 In the Bertrand model of oligopoly, a. each

Chapter 13, Question 2

In the Bertrand model of oligopoly, a. each firm takes the quantities produced by its rivals as 

givenb. each firm takes the prices charged by its rivals as 

givenc. one firm plays a leadership role and its rivals followd. prices are higher and quantities lower than if the 

firms colluded to achieve the monopoly outcomee. none of the above

Page 4: Practice Exam 3 with Solutions - Texas A&M Universitypeople.tamu.edu/~aglass/econ323/E323Practiceexs3Slides.pdf · Chapter 13, Question 2 In the Bertrand model of oligopoly, a. each

Chapter 13, Question 3

The interdependence between Cournot duopolistscauses a. higher price and lower total quantity than for a 

monopolyb. lower price and higher total quantity than for a 

monopolyc. same price and total quantity as for a monopolyd. same price and total quantity as for perfect 

competitione. none of the above

Page 5: Practice Exam 3 with Solutions - Texas A&M Universitypeople.tamu.edu/~aglass/econ323/E323Practiceexs3Slides.pdf · Chapter 13, Question 2 In the Bertrand model of oligopoly, a. each

Chapter 13, Question 4

Which duopoly model has the highest overall combined profit level?

a. Cournot model

b. Bertrand model

c. Stackelberg Leader‐Follower model

d. shared monopoly model

e. none of the above

Page 6: Practice Exam 3 with Solutions - Texas A&M Universitypeople.tamu.edu/~aglass/econ323/E323Practiceexs3Slides.pdf · Chapter 13, Question 2 In the Bertrand model of oligopoly, a. each

Chapter 13, Question 5

Which duopoly model has the lowest overall combined profit level?

a. Cournot model

b. Bertrand model

c. Stackelberg Leader‐Follower model

d. shared monopoly model

e. none of the above

Page 7: Practice Exam 3 with Solutions - Texas A&M Universitypeople.tamu.edu/~aglass/econ323/E323Practiceexs3Slides.pdf · Chapter 13, Question 2 In the Bertrand model of oligopoly, a. each

Chapter 13, Question 6

The market demand curve for a pair of Cournot duopolists is given as    90    , where      1    2. The constant per unit marginal 

cost is 30 for each duopolists (there are no fixed costs). What is the marginal revenue function for the first firm? a.    90   2  b.              c.    90   2 2    1 d.    90     e. none of the above

6b Residual demand for the first firm is  90  2 1; marginal revenue for the first firm has the same intercept but twice the slope on  1.

Page 8: Practice Exam 3 with Solutions - Texas A&M Universitypeople.tamu.edu/~aglass/econ323/E323Practiceexs3Slides.pdf · Chapter 13, Question 2 In the Bertrand model of oligopoly, a. each

Chapter 13, Question 7

And what is the reaction function for the first firm? 

1 2

1 2

1 2

e. none of the above

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Chapter 13, Question 7

7c Set marginal revenue  2 1

equal to marginal cost  and solve for firm one’s output in terms of firm two’s output (firm one’s reaction curve)

2 1

1 2

1 2 1 2

Page 10: Practice Exam 3 with Solutions - Texas A&M Universitypeople.tamu.edu/~aglass/econ323/E323Practiceexs3Slides.pdf · Chapter 13, Question 2 In the Bertrand model of oligopoly, a. each

Chapter 13, Question 8

And what total quantity would the firms produce? 

e. none of the above

Page 11: Practice Exam 3 with Solutions - Texas A&M Universitypeople.tamu.edu/~aglass/econ323/E323Practiceexs3Slides.pdf · Chapter 13, Question 2 In the Bertrand model of oligopoly, a. each

Chapter 13, Question 8

8d By symmetry, firm two’s reaction curve is

2 1 2 3012 1

Substitute firm two’s reaction curve into firm one's to find firm one’s optimal quantity

1 3012 2 30

12 30

12 1

114 1 30 15,

34 1 15

1 2 20Total quantity  1 2 20 20 40

Page 12: Practice Exam 3 with Solutions - Texas A&M Universitypeople.tamu.edu/~aglass/econ323/E323Practiceexs3Slides.pdf · Chapter 13, Question 2 In the Bertrand model of oligopoly, a. each

Chapter 13, Question 9

And what price would they charge? 

e. none of the above

9d 

Page 13: Practice Exam 3 with Solutions - Texas A&M Universitypeople.tamu.edu/~aglass/econ323/E323Practiceexs3Slides.pdf · Chapter 13, Question 2 In the Bertrand model of oligopoly, a. each

Chapter 13, Question 10

And how much economic profit will each firm earn? 

a. 500

b. 800

c. 900

d. 1,200

e. none of the above

10e Profit 

Page 14: Practice Exam 3 with Solutions - Texas A&M Universitypeople.tamu.edu/~aglass/econ323/E323Practiceexs3Slides.pdf · Chapter 13, Question 2 In the Bertrand model of oligopoly, a. each

Chapter 13, Questions 6‐10

0

30

60

0 30 60

R1

R2Q1

Q2

20

20

14

Page 15: Practice Exam 3 with Solutions - Texas A&M Universitypeople.tamu.edu/~aglass/econ323/E323Practiceexs3Slides.pdf · Chapter 13, Question 2 In the Bertrand model of oligopoly, a. each

Chapter 13, Question 6‐10

0

90

0 90Quantity

Price

MR

D

MC = 30

20

50

30

15

40                    55

Page 16: Practice Exam 3 with Solutions - Texas A&M Universitypeople.tamu.edu/~aglass/econ323/E323Practiceexs3Slides.pdf · Chapter 13, Question 2 In the Bertrand model of oligopoly, a. each

Chapter 14, Question 11

The value of the marginal product of labor, VMPL, for the perfectly competitive firm equals thea. total revenue from selling the equilibrium 

outputb. added revenue from selling output of one more 

hour of laborc. added revenue from selling one more unit of 

outputd. price of the product being produced by labore. none of the above

Page 17: Practice Exam 3 with Solutions - Texas A&M Universitypeople.tamu.edu/~aglass/econ323/E323Practiceexs3Slides.pdf · Chapter 13, Question 2 In the Bertrand model of oligopoly, a. each

Chapter 14, Question 12

Economic theory suggests that increasing the minimum wage will 

a. increase the employment of teenagers

b. decrease the employment of teenagers

c. Increase the employment of unionized labor

d. increase the number of monopsony firms

e. none of the above

Page 18: Practice Exam 3 with Solutions - Texas A&M Universitypeople.tamu.edu/~aglass/econ323/E323Practiceexs3Slides.pdf · Chapter 13, Question 2 In the Bertrand model of oligopoly, a. each

Chapter 14, Question 13

The backward‐bending portion of the labor supply curve implies that a. higher wages lead to an increase in hours of 

work suppliedb. the law of diminishing returns has settled inc. higher wages lead to fewer hours of work 

suppliedd. a minimum wage law is in effecte. none of the above

Page 19: Practice Exam 3 with Solutions - Texas A&M Universitypeople.tamu.edu/~aglass/econ323/E323Practiceexs3Slides.pdf · Chapter 13, Question 2 In the Bertrand model of oligopoly, a. each

Chapter 14, Question 14

The substitution effect of a higher wage on the amount of leisure demanded a. makes leisure more expensive so people work 

moreb. makes leisure less expensive so people work lessc. gives people more buying power so they 

demand more leisured. gives people less buying power so they demand 

less leisuree. none of the above

Page 20: Practice Exam 3 with Solutions - Texas A&M Universitypeople.tamu.edu/~aglass/econ323/E323Practiceexs3Slides.pdf · Chapter 13, Question 2 In the Bertrand model of oligopoly, a. each

Chapter 14, Question 15

The income effect of a higher wage on the amount of leisure demanded a. makes leisure more expensive so people work 

moreb. makes leisure less expensive so people work lessc. gives people more buying power so they 

demand more leisured. gives people less buying power so they demand 

less leisuree. none of the above

Page 21: Practice Exam 3 with Solutions - Texas A&M Universitypeople.tamu.edu/~aglass/econ323/E323Practiceexs3Slides.pdf · Chapter 13, Question 2 In the Bertrand model of oligopoly, a. each

Chapter 14, Question 16

If a poor person has perfect complement preferences requiring 1 hour of leisure for every $5 of income and can work for $10/hour, how many hours of leisure will be consumed and how much income earned? 

e. none of the above

Page 22: Practice Exam 3 with Solutions - Texas A&M Universitypeople.tamu.edu/~aglass/econ323/E323Practiceexs3Slides.pdf · Chapter 13, Question 2 In the Bertrand model of oligopoly, a. each

Chapter 14, Question 16

16c Income/leisure constraint for wage  is

If view income and leisure as perfect complements, needing one hour of leisure for every $5 of income, then combinations of leisure and income must satisfy the ratio  . Solve for optimal leisure & income:

Page 23: Practice Exam 3 with Solutions - Texas A&M Universitypeople.tamu.edu/~aglass/econ323/E323Practiceexs3Slides.pdf · Chapter 13, Question 2 In the Bertrand model of oligopoly, a. each

Chapter 14, Question 17

If given $30/day, this person’s new daily budget constraint would be 

e. none of the above

Page 24: Practice Exam 3 with Solutions - Texas A&M Universitypeople.tamu.edu/~aglass/econ323/E323Practiceexs3Slides.pdf · Chapter 13, Question 2 In the Bertrand model of oligopoly, a. each

Chapter 14, Question 18

And how many hours of leisure will be consumed and income earned (if have the same perfect complement preferences as above)? 

e. none of the above

Page 25: Practice Exam 3 with Solutions - Texas A&M Universitypeople.tamu.edu/~aglass/econ323/E323Practiceexs3Slides.pdf · Chapter 13, Question 2 In the Bertrand model of oligopoly, a. each

Chapter 14, Question 18

18a Solve  and for optimal leisure and income

Page 26: Practice Exam 3 with Solutions - Texas A&M Universitypeople.tamu.edu/~aglass/econ323/E323Practiceexs3Slides.pdf · Chapter 13, Question 2 In the Bertrand model of oligopoly, a. each

Chapter 14, Question 19

If instead the poor person receives a subsidy equal to 50 percent of any wage income earned, what would be the new daily budget constraint? 

e. none of the above

19c 

Page 27: Practice Exam 3 with Solutions - Texas A&M Universitypeople.tamu.edu/~aglass/econ323/E323Practiceexs3Slides.pdf · Chapter 13, Question 2 In the Bertrand model of oligopoly, a. each

Chapter 14, Question 20

And how many hours of leisure will be consumed and income earned (if have the same perfect complement preferences as above)?

e. none of the above

Page 28: Practice Exam 3 with Solutions - Texas A&M Universitypeople.tamu.edu/~aglass/econ323/E323Practiceexs3Slides.pdf · Chapter 13, Question 2 In the Bertrand model of oligopoly, a. each

Chapter 14, Question 20

20a Solve  and  for optimal leisure and income

Page 29: Practice Exam 3 with Solutions - Texas A&M Universitypeople.tamu.edu/~aglass/econ323/E323Practiceexs3Slides.pdf · Chapter 13, Question 2 In the Bertrand model of oligopoly, a. each

Chapter 14, Question 16‐20

0

90

180

270

360

0 6 12 18 24Hours of Leisure (h)

Income (M

)

240

80

M = 5h

M = 360 – 15h

M = 270 – 10h

29

16

M = 240 – 10h