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Power Games - Politics and Donors, International Non-Government Organisations and States in International Development in Cambodia 1991-2006 Catherine Hope Lewis B.A. (Hons.), Grad. Dip. T. (Sec.) School of Political and Social Enquiry Submission for PhD Date of Submission January 2014
Transcript of Power Games Politics and Donors, International Non ... · Power Games -Politics and Donors,...
Power Games - Politics and Donors, International
Non-Government Organisations and States in
International Development in Cambodia 1991-2006
Catherine Hope Lewis B.A. (Hons.), Grad. Dip. T. (Sec.)
School of Political and Social Enquiry
Submission for PhD
Date of Submission January 2014
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work without the owner's permission.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Copyright Notices ............................................................................................................. ii
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................. iii
Thesis Abstract............................................................................................................... viii
Statement ............................................................................................................................ x
Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................... xi
Acronyms ......................................................................................................................... xiv
Chapter 1 – Introduction ............................................................................................... 18
Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 18
Case Study of the Cambodian Disability Sector 1991-2006 ..........................................................19
Overview of the Study ............................................................................................................ 22
Principal Findings ................................................................................................................... 24
Implications of Findings ......................................................................................................... 25
Chapter 2 – Methodology .............................................................................................. 27
Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 27
The Value of a Historical Qualitative Case Study in this Research ..............................................28
Background and Organisational Context to the Case Study .........................................................28
Establishment of the Disability Action Council .................................................................................32
Data Collection......................................................................................................................................35
Documentary Sources .........................................................................................................................35
Analysis of Data ....................................................................................................................................41
Limitations of the Research Methodology .......................................................................... 42
Chapter 3 – Conceptualising STATE- DONOR-INGO Relationships: A general
theoretical review of interactions ............................................................................... 44
Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 44
History of Development Theory 1944 to the Present ......................................................................45
The Bretton Woods System (1944) and Truman .............................................................................47
The Pearson Commission ...................................................................................................................50
The New International Economic Order (NIEO) ..............................................................................52
The Rise of Neoliberalism ...................................................................................................................54
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The Rehabilitation of the State ...........................................................................................................56
The UN Summits and the MDGs........................................................................................................57
The Paris Declaration ..........................................................................................................................63
The OECD-DAC International Aid System and Emerging Donors ...............................................67
The Tripartite Model of State-Market-INGO Relationships .............................................. 71
Interactions between States, Donors and INGOs in the Tripartite System ..................................73
Debates about the Role of the State in the Tripartite Model ..........................................................76
Debates about the Roles of Donors in the Tripartite Model ...........................................................78
Debates about the Role of INGOs in the Tripartite Model ..............................................................80
Dynamic Model of State-Donor-INGO Relations .............................................................................82
State Goals and Strategies in the Dynamic Model ..........................................................................83
Donor Goals and Strategies ...............................................................................................................86
INGO Goals and Strategies ................................................................................................................90
Political Analysis, State-Donor and State-INGO Relations .............................................. 92
Politics and State-Donor Interactions ................................................................................................93
Politics and State-INGO Relations .....................................................................................................94
The Legitimacy of States, Donors and INGOs .................................................................................95
The Politics of Non-State Providers of Services and the Question of Legitimacy ......................97
Donor and INGO Engagement in Local Politics ...............................................................................98
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 101
Chapter 4 – Political Culture in Cambodia at UNTAC ......................................... 103
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 103
Cambodia’s Political Culture ............................................................................................... 104
Background .........................................................................................................................................104
Power and Patronage ........................................................................................................................105
Buddhism and Power in Cambodia’s Political Culture ..................................................................106
Socialism and Power in Cambodia’s Political Culture ..................................................................108
The Angkor Heritage ..........................................................................................................................109
Impact of Geopolitics on Cambodia’s Political Culture .................................................................110
People’s Republic of Kampuchea/State of Cambodia: 1979-1990 ............................... 110
Background .........................................................................................................................................110
Goals of PRK/SOC .............................................................................................................................111
Strategies of PRK/SOC .....................................................................................................................112
PRK Internal Goals and Strategies - Power and Politics ..............................................................113
PRK/SOC Strategies: Gaining Access to International Resources ............................................114
UNTAC and Cambodia’s Political Culture ........................................................................ 116
Background .........................................................................................................................................116
UNTAC and Cambodian Political Culture .......................................................................................117
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UNTAC Goals and Strategies ...........................................................................................................117
UNTAC and Its Impact on Cambodian Political Culture ...............................................................119
The Impact of UNTAC on Domestic Political Goals ......................................................................121
Post-UNTAC Strategies to Achieve Political Goals .......................................................................123
Post-UNTAC Political Culture and Service Delivery .....................................................................125
The Cambodian Bureaucracy Post-UNTAC ...................................................................................126
Post-UNTAC Bureaucracy and Service Provision .........................................................................130
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 132
Chapter 5 – The Disability Sector in Cambodia 1990-2006 ................................ 134
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 134
Disability in Cambodia 1990-2004 ...................................................................................................135
Incidence of Disability in Cambodia 1990-2004 .............................................................................136
Disability by Classification in Cambodia .........................................................................................137
Poverty and Disability ........................................................................................................................140
Needs of Persons with Disability in Cambodia ..............................................................................141
Disability Sector in Cambodia 1994-2004.......................................................................................144
Donors in the Disability Sector .........................................................................................................146
INGOs in the Disability Sector ..........................................................................................................148
INGOs’ Goals, Motivations, Capacity and Strategies in Service Provision ...............................149
The Relations of INGOs with the Ministry .......................................................................................151
The Government and the Disability Sector .....................................................................................155
MOSALVY’s Culture – Patronage and Power ................................................................................155
MOSALVY and Disability Services: Goals and Motives ...............................................................157
MOSALVY as Manager - Capacity and Strategies........................................................................160
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 162
Chapter 6 – The Role of INGOs, State and Donors in the Development of the
Disability Action Council ............................................................................................ 164
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 164
The DAC: Establishment, Structure and Role, 1997....................................................... 165
Establishment of the Disability Action Council ...............................................................................165
Role and Organisational Structure of DAC in 1997 .......................................................................166
Funding and Relations with Donors .................................................................................................168
INDOs, States and Donors in the Development of the DAC ........................................................169
The DAC and the INGO Community ...............................................................................................169
INGO Concepts and Expectations of the DAC ..............................................................................173
Interactions between INGOs and DAC ...........................................................................................175
DAC and the Government .................................................................................................................179
Funding and USAID Support: 1997-2004 .......................................................................................187
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USAID’s Role in the DAC ..................................................................................................................190
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 196
Chapter 7 – Politics and Development in the Cambodian Disability Sector 1990-
2006 ................................................................................................................................... 198
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 198
1. The Influence of Neoliberal Theory in the Cambodian Disability Sector ...............................199
2 The Tripartite Model and Interactions between States, Donors and INGOs ..........................202
4. Development as a Political Process in the Cambodian Disability Sector ..............................207
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 210
Chapter 8 – Conclusion ............................................................................................... 211
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 211
Empirical Findings ................................................................................................................ 213
Theoretical Implications ....................................................................................................... 219
Policy Implications ................................................................................................................ 220
Recommendations for future research .............................................................................. 223
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 225
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................ 227
Appendix 1 – Cambodia (Political) ........................................................................... 285
Appendix 2 – Confidential Annex ............................................................................. 286
Appendix 3 – Documentary Sources ....................................................................... 287
Documents on Disability Issues .......................................................................................................287
Disability Action Council ....................................................................................................................290
Official Development Aid ...................................................................................................................292
Appendix 4 – UNTAC and Cambodia’s Political Culture .................................... 299
Background .........................................................................................................................................299
UNTAC and Cambodian Political Culture .......................................................................................299
UNTAC Goals and Strategies ...........................................................................................................300
UNTAC and Its Impact on Cambodian Political Culture ...............................................................302
The Impact of UNTAC on Domestic Political Goals ......................................................................303
Post-UNTAC Strategies to Achieve Political Goals .......................................................................305
Post-UNTAC Political Culture and Service Delivery .....................................................................307
The Cambodian Bureaucracy Post-UNTAC ...................................................................................308
Post-UNTAC Bureaucracy and Service Provision .........................................................................312
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 314
Appendix 5 – Pledges and Disbursements of External Assistance to Cambodia
1992-1995 ........................................................................................................................ 316
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Appendix 6 – Data on Disability in Cambodia ....................................................... 317
Appendix 7 – Prakas on Organization of Disability Action Council (DAC) ... 321
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THESIS ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates the impact of the interactions between states, donors and INGOs
on outcomes in international development.
States, donors and INGOs form the central framework of international development in
what is essentially a closed system. The interactions between them are crucial to the
effectiveness of this system in improving the well-being of the up to three billion people in
developing countries who are its intended beneficiaries. Research which sees international
development as an economic, technocratic and universalistic process has strongly shaped
understanding of these interactions. Ongoing questioning of the success of the development
project has given rise to a literature arguing that understanding the political dimensions of the
development process is necessary for successful outcomes. However, there is little field
evidence of the goals, strategies, motivations and capabilities that shape states, donors and
INGO’s interactions in particular situations.
The focus of this research is on the interactions between states, INGOs and donors in the
disability sector of Cambodia between 1990 and 2006. It analyses data collected through
semi-structured interviews, primary documents and secondary sources, using the
establishment of the Disability Action Council, a semi-autonomous body set up in response to
issues in disability service provision, as a key event. The fieldwork was designed to collect
information on the goals, capabilities, motivations and strategies of donors, states and INGOs
in the sector. The data was then analysed to establish how these factors shaped interactions
between the three groups of actors and what the effects of these interactions were on
development outcomes in the disability sector.
The research demonstrated that interactions of the state, donor and INGOs in the
disability sector contributed to dysfunctional development outcomes, which failed to meet the
needs of people with a disability in Cambodia. Of the actors involved, the state was the most
successful in achieving its goals. The research argues that a major factor in these outcomes
was the failure of donors and INGOs to understand the political dimensions of development
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and to operate effectively within them. These findings are consistent with calls in the
literature to strengthen research on development as a political process and for INGOs and
donors to recognise the need to engage with the political sphere and develop the knowledge,
theory and skills to do so effectively.
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STATEMENT
This thesis contains no material that has been accepted for the award of any other degree
or diploma in any educational institution and, to the best of the candidate’s knowledge and
belief, it contains no material previously published or written by another person, except
where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.
Signed: _________________________________
Cate Lewis
Date: ___________________________________
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
People talk of the ‘PhD journey’. This PhD has been more of a long-distance crawl than
a journey. However, thanks to the support, friendship and companionship of many people it
has finally limped home. I would like to acknowledge some of them.
My husband, David Lewis, has been a partner in so many ways. This thesis was
conceived during the time we spent together as a family in West Africa, where David worked
for an INGO committed to disability. It has been a great privilege to share with him the
raising of a family, struggling with why great injustices occur in the world and accepting the
great joys the same world offers. David has unstintingly offered support and taken pleasure in
seeing the thesis gradually take shape, been a patient sounding board for new ideas, given
insights from a practitioner’s perspective and faithfully brought cups of tea. To David,
‘tank’ee boku’ and ‘merci beaucoup’.
Our three children, who have grown to adulthood and independence along with the
thesis, have shown a sympathetic if slightly bemused interest in its progress. They have never
failed to ask solicitously after its wellbeing, as one enquires after an increasingly dotty
relative kept discreetly out of sight, and to nod tactfully when I explain that it was ‘about the
same’. Their vitality, zest for life and companionship have always given fresh energy and the
reminder that there is much more to life than a PhD.
I am deeply grateful to those people who so kindly and patiently gave their time and
thought to the interview process. They are all busy people and their graciousness in making
themselves available for something which offered them little immediate benefit reflects their
commitment to people with disability in Cambodia. I hope that the result is of some benefit to
them and to their work.
Judith Shaw, my primary supervisor, has been a constant and valued companion during
the last ten years. I have always had total trust in her unerring eye for unclear thinking and
‘havering’ and her ability to go to the heart of the problem while I was still dithering around
the edges. I have benefitted enormously from her professionalism, high standards and
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encouragement to extend myself have confidence in my own ability. Above all, Judith taught
me to ignore both the tress and the wood and to keep my eyes on the track through them.
Dr Tikky Wattanapenpaiboon, my second supervisor, has been a tower of unflappable
strength. I have yet to find a situation that she does not meet with a cheerful assurance that it
can be worked out or one that she could not solve. Everyone should have a Tikky, and I am
deeply grateful for her generous and thoughtful presence over the past years.
I am deeply indebted to Emerita Professor Dr Marika Vicziany for her guidance,
oversight and generous gift of her time and skills during the amendment process. Her
uncompromising professionalism, insight into issues and content of the thesis and her
unfailing energy and optimism made what seemed a daunting task manageable. I learnt so
much during the short period we worked together and I am very grateful
Much of the credit for the PhD even beginning goes to Professor Fiona Haines, my friend
and mentor. Professor Haines first opened up the delights of academic research to me,
allowing me to hold the tape recorder and eventually operate it during our memorable forays
into fieldwork together. Her help, advice and insightful challenges have enabled me to stretch
my thinking while her encouragement has sustained the hope that I would one day finish. I
have benefitted more than I can say from seeing her commitment to the highest standards of
research and scholarship and her belief that these should never be used to simply gratify the
researcher’s ego. She also fully understands the importance of a good cup of tea at times of
crisis.
A special thanks to Professor Emeritus David Chandler for his very helpful comments on
Chapters 2 and 3. I have benefitted greatly from his scholarship in the area.
I would also like to thank the examiners for the time and insights they brought to the
thesis. They are all busy people and I very much appreciate their comments and advice. It is a
privilege to have the benefit of the experience and knowledge of experts in the field and I am
very aware of the time and thought which they have put into their assessments and guidance
for improving and strengthening the thesis.
I have been privileged to be part of the Monash Asia Institute for much of my candidacy,
and have warm memories of those who served time with me. In particular, I would like to
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thank those who shared Room 5 with me. I will not name names, but you know who you are
and whose fault it was that the pot plants died.
My warmest thanks also go to Cormac McMahon of Elite Edit who edited and formatted
the final thesis, an achievement which leaves me in awe. I so much appreciated his warmth,
humour, advice and patience as we wended our way through to the final triumph. Many
thanks, Cormac!
I am deeply indebted to the staff at Peter McCallum Cancer Centre. Their skill,
professionalism and never-changing cheerfulness and optimism were an immeasurable help
during a particularly difficult stage of the candidacy.
Katie Poidomani of Edge Editing provided invaluable service in proofreading and editing
the first submission of this thesis.
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ACRONYMS
ABC Association of the Blind in Cambodia
ADB Asian Development Bank/Foundation for International Training
APDCD Asian Pacific Development Centre for Disability
AusAID Australian Agency for International Development
CAP Consolidated Appeal for Cambodia’s Immediate Needs and National
Rehabilitation
CCC Cooperation Committee for Cambodia
CDC Council for the Development of Cambodia
CDPF Civic Development and Partnership Foundation
CDPF China Disabled Persons’ Foundation
CDPO Cambodian Disabled People’s Organisation
CDRI Cambodia Development Resource Institute
CG Consultative Group
CGDK Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea
CMAA Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority
CMAC Cambodian Mine Action Centre
CPP Cambodian People’s Party
CSD Council for Social Development
CT Cambodia Trust
CWD Children with Disabilities
DAC Disability Action Council
DDP Deaf Development Program
DFID Department for International Development (UK)
DoC Drivers of Change
DPO Disabled Persons Organisation
EDUCAM Education Forum of Cambodia
ESAF Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility
EU European Union
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FAO Food and Agricultural Organisation
FIT Foundation for International Training
FUNCINPEC National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative
Cambodia
HI Handicap International
HI-B Handicap International Belgium
ICBL International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICORC International Committee for the Reconstruction of Cambodia
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
IFI International Financial Institutions
ILO International Labour Organisation
IMF International Monetary Fund
INGO International Non-Government Organisation
JBIC Japan Bank for International Cooperation
JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency
JS Jesuit Services
KPRK Khmer People’s Republican Party
LWVF Leahy War Veterans Foundation
MCRRC Ministerial Conference on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia
MDGs Millennium Development Goals
MEDiCAM The Membership Organization for NGOs Active in Cambodia's Health Sector
MOEYS Ministry of Education and Youth Services
MoP Ministry of Planning
MOSALVA Ministry of Social Affairs, Labour and Veterans Affairs
MOSALVY Ministry of Social Affairs, Labour, Veterans and Youth Rehabilitation
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
NCDP National Centre for Disabled People
NIS National Institute of Statistics
NPRD National Programme to Rehabilitate and Develop Cambodia
NPRS National Poverty Reduction Strategy
NSP Non-State Provider
O and P Orthotics and Prosthetics
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ODA Overseas Development Aid
ODI Overseas Development Institute
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OECD-DAC Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Assistance
Committee
PEA Political Economy Analysis
PIU Project Implementation Units
PRK People’s Republic of Kampuchea
PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
QUANGO Quasi-autonomous Non-government Organisation
RGC Royal Government of Cambodia
SAL Structural Adjustment Loan
SAP Structural Adjustment Programme
SEO Special Education Office
SES Socio-Economic Survey
SGRC Secretary-General's Representative in Cambodia
SIDA Swedish International Development Agency
SNC Supreme National Council
SO Strategy Objectives
SOC State of Cambodia
SOE State-owned enterprise
SSC Social Services of Cambodia
TA Technical Assistance
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNESCAP United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
UNRISD United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
UNTAC United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UPIAS Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation
USAID United States Agency for International Development
VI Veterans International
WDR World Development Report
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WHO World Health Organization
WVI World Vision International
CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION
Introduction
What generates good development? The question is more than an academic one for the
over three billion people living in developing countries who are the intended beneficiaries of
the ‘development project’ ushered in by President Truman’s Four Principles speech of 1949.1
Nor is it an academic one for development donors and agencies. Industrial countries have
committed substantial levels of funding to the goal of raising living standards and human
well-being in the developing countries of the world. In 2013, for example, members of the
Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation’s Development Assistance
Committee (OECD-DAC) provided US$134.8 billion of net official development assistance
(ODA)2 (OECD-DAC, 2014).
In order to achieve these goals the OECD-DAC established an aid system in the 1950s
which has developed and evolved over the intervening years and is still responding to
changes in the aid environment. It is based on a range of bilateral and multilateral donors,
together with Non-Government Organisations (NGOs), including a large number of
International Non-Government Organisations (INGOs), providing aid for development in
countries designated by the OECD-DAC as recipient countries. The interactions between
these three groups in the Western aid system have been core to its operation, as these
interactions have been shaped by changes in the theoretical and ideological background in
which the system operates. These changes have had profound implications for states, donors,
INGOs and the people whom aid is designed to benefit.
1 See Footnote 1, Chapter 3 for edited text of the Four Principles.
2 ODA is defined as: i) those flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and to
multilateral institutions which are provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by
their executive agencies; and ii) each transaction of which: a) is administered with the promotion of the
economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and b) is concessional in
character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent)
(OECD-DAC, 2011a).
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Case Study of the Cambodian Disability Sector 1991-2006
The purpose of this research is to better understand both the practice and theory of
development assistance by providing complex and detailed analysis of the interactions
between states, donors and INGOs in a particular situation in order to uncover the processes
at work behind the events. The knowledge gained is used to compare the efficacy of two
theoretical models that seek to explain the events, allowing a review and refinement of the
theory. The case study method selected is particularly suited to investigating such questions
and objectives. The research examines the factors that influenced the interactions between
states, donors and INGOs in the OECD-DAC aid system by drawing on a historical case
study of the Cambodian disability sector during the period 1991 to 2006. It uses the history of
a particular organisation, the Disability Action Council (DAC), as its focus
It should be noted that the Cambodian DAC is an organisation unique to Cambodia and
despite the possible confusion caused by the use of the same abbreviation (namely DAC) it
has no relationship with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC). Throughout this thesis DAC refers only to the
Cambodian Disability Action Council while OECD-DAC refers to the multilateral aid
system.
Following informal discussions with expert contacts in the development sectors of
Australia and Cambodia and after analysing documents on the DAC and the disability sector,
I selected the disability sector in Cambodia from 1991 to 2006 as the site of the research for
several reasons. It was an environment that brought together a number of key factors
involved in the debate over interactions between states, donors and INGOs. The Cambodian
state was virtually bankrupt and its infrastructure devastated by a prolonged period of war
and isolation from international aid, but it still had a very strong and active political culture
(Chandler, 1993; Curtis, 1998; Godfrey et al., 2002). The United Nations Transitional
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) intervention led to bilateral and multilateral donors
committing an unprecedented amount of international aid to the country (Curtis, 1998).
Donors in the early part of the period particularly were strongly influenced by the view of
development as an economic process requiring a free market economy to act as the key to
improved human well-being (World Bank, 1994, 1992; USAID, 2008a, b, c, 2005). This view
encouraged the use of INGOs in place of the state for service provision and care for those
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whom the market had failed. An influx of INGOs in the disability sector followed
(MSALVA, 1996; JICA, 2002a). Finally, the disability sector was chosen because people
with disability represent those in society most at risk of marginalisation, poverty and denial
of basic rights (WHO, 2011). They are, in a sense, the litmus test of development policy and
practice, often the last to feel its benefits and the first to feel its failures.
The history of the DAC gave the opportunity to explore the processes underlying these
interactions between donors, INGOs and the Ministry of Social Affairs, Labour, Veterans and
Youth Rehabilitation (MOSALVY) in the disability sector. As Chapter 6 explains, the DAC
was an innovative attempt to deal with issues in the sector arising from these relations. It was
designed to be neither INGO, Ministry nor local NGO but a ‘semi-autonomous’3 organisation
independent of, but relating to, others working in disability (MSALVA, 1996; MOSALVY,
19994). It was formed as a result of an informal spontaneous cooperation between a number
of representatives of the disability INGO sector and the predecessor of MOSALVY, the
Ministry of Social Affairs, Labour and Veterans Affairs (MSALVA) in response to concerns
and frustration over several issues arising in the sector. A number of these issues stemmed
from the nature of interactions between and within states, donors and INGOs. A report by a
task force made up of INGO and Ministry personnel published by the Ministry in 1996 made
a number of recommendations, including the establishment of a ‘semi-autonomous’ body
independent of the Ministry, INGOs and donors. A disability coordinating committee was set
up in 1997 to implement the recommendations, but due to political events the DAC was not
formally established until October 1999. It received funding from the Leahy War Fund
through USAID as the initial major donor.
The nature and purpose of the DAC thus made it an effective object for studying and
observing state-donor-INGO interactions in an environment where the state seemed weak,
neo-liberal influence in donor policy was strong and INGOs were numerous and well-
resourced compared to the state. The time limits of the research, 1991 to 2006, cover the
period from the signing of the Paris Peace Accord to the decision of USAID to cease its
funding of the DAC. This decision marked the end of an era for the DAC and coincided with
the point at which cumulative changes in the disability sector had altered the environment
3 Semi-autonomous: partially self-governing: or, having the powers of self-government within a larger
organisation or structure (cited in Forsythe et al., 2006, p. 1).
4 See Appendix 7.
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sufficiently to make the date a logical endpoint for this thesis. The story of the DAC from
UNTAC until the withdrawal of funding thus gave clear temporal, spatial and institutional
boundaries to this study.
There were also a number of practical issues which influenced my choice. The presence
of key contacts in the sector was an important one. It was comparatively easy to travel to
Phnom Penh, allowing data collection to be done in the field rather than relying on more
remote means of gathering data. The Cambodian disability sector was relatively well defined
and small which made the accurate collection of data and reconstruction of events feasible in
the research time available.
The main research question is the following:
What does a historical and political study of the Cambodian disability sector from 1991 to
2006 tell us about the factors affecting state, donor and INGO relations in international
development?
This question is examined through three subsidiary questions:
1. What does the case of the disability sector in Cambodia tell us about state-donor-
INGO relations?
2. What were the goals, capabilities, motivations and strategies of the state, donors, and
INGOs in the development of the Cambodian disability sector?
3. How did these factors shape the interaction between states, donors and INGOs in the
Cambodian disability sector?
4. What was the effect of the interaction between these three actors on development in
the Cambodian disability sector?
The Background to the Research Problem
Optimising development outcomes entails using significant amounts of resources as
effectively as possible to promote human well-being. Recipient states, donors and INGOs are
a key part of one of the most important structures for the distribution of aid, namely the
OECD-DAC aid system. Membership of the system is in the gift of the OECD-DAC, which
determines which states, multilateral donors and agencies are able to provide aid and which
states are eligible to receive it (OECD-DAC, 2013c). INGOs do not qualify as donors under
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the definitions used, although they do enjoy rights and recognition under the UN system
(Martens, 2003). The definitions used for states, donors and INGOs are discussed more fully
in Chapter 3 but at this stage it is enough to note that membership of the OECD-DAC system
is clearly defined for states and donors but the definitions and status for INGOs are more
fluid.
The extant literature on the OECD-DAC aid system provided me with a good overview
of the general setting in which states, donors and INGOs interact (Rist, 1995; McKay, J.,
2004; Williams, 1997; Haynes, 2008; Nelson, 2006; Najam, 1996; Mosley et al., 1995;
Hulme et al., 1997). The literature identified key debates and theories about the interactions
between these three actors and the changing perceptions of their different roles over the
period since the inception of the OECD-DAC system (Bird, 1994; Gore, 2000; Hulme et al.,
1997; Lewis et al., 2006; World Bank, 1997, 1991; Munro et al., 1999; Whaites, 2000; Zaidi,
1999). Chapter 2 provides a detailed analysis of this literature. As discussed in that chapter,
there have been concerns about the effectiveness of the OECD-DAC aid system, the
assumptions and theory underlying it and even the concept of development itself (Hout, 2012;
Bojici-Dzelilovi 2002; Rist, 2002; Doornbos, 2001; Gore, 2000; Mosley et al., 1995). One
strand of criticism focuses on what is perceived as the narrowness of the theory and debate
and argues that too strong an emphasis on economic theory mutes awareness of other factors
at work (Hickey 2012, 2009 a, b; Lewis et al., 2006; Leftwich, 2008, 2007; Wilks et al. et al.,
2002; Whaites, 2000; Zaidi, 1999; Hulme, et al., 1997; World Bank, 1997, 1991). Critics
argue that one effect of this dominance is a failure to capture the complexity of political,
cultural, historical and unique local factors that influence interactions within the system. The
associated neglect of important local influences such as domestic politics, culture and values
undermines development outcomes (Duncan et al., 2012; Williams et al., 2009; Bebbington,
A., 2007; Mitlin et al., 2007; Lewis et al., 2006; Tvedt, T., 2006; Storey, 2000; Gosovic,
2000; Hulme et al., 1997). Details of these criticisms, and the arguments mounted in defence
of the OECD-DAC system are examined closely in Chapter 3.
Overview of the Study
Chapter 2 describes and explains the methodology used for the collection and analysis of
the data on which the research is based. It justifies the choice of a qualitative historical case
23
study and the use of semi-structured interviews with experts as the means of collecting data.
The methods of analysis of data and the limitations of the research are also discussed.
Chapter 3 of the thesis examines the literature on the concept of development and
influential attempts since the beginning of the development project to conceptualise the
relationship between states, donors and INGOs to achieve effective development. In
particular, it compares two models conceptualising these three actors and explores the debate
around the influence of the economic model and in particular whether its popularity has led to
the neglect of political, cultural and historical factors in the literature analysing how effective
development is achieved.
Chapter 4 and Appendix 4 set the background for the establishment of the DAC,
particularly focusing on political, cultural and historical factors in the environment. Chapter 3
explores how Cambodian political traditions of power, patronage and leadership shaped, and
were shaped by, social, political, cultural and historical factors during the period from
independence from France to the signing of the Paris Peace Agreements in 1991.
Chapter 5 sets the background for the study of the DAC in the context of the factors that
shaped donor and INGO development practice and the relations between them and with the
state in the disability sector. It examines the impact of the emphasis that donors placed on
economic growth and the influence of INGO culture during and after UNTAC. The chapter
identifies the gaps in development practice to which the DAC was mandated to respond, and
the role played by state, donor and INGO interactions in creating these gaps.
Chapter 6 focuses on the DAC and its history and development. Using material from
interviews with INGO, donor, ministry and DAC personnel, most of whom were participants
in the DAC’s history, the chapter establishes the chronology of events from 1996 to 2006.
The history focuses on the expectations INGOs, donors and the Ministry had of the DAC,
their respective goals in becoming involved, their capacity to achieve these goals and the
strategies available to them. The history allows an understanding of how the interaction
between donors, INGOs and the Ministry shaped the DAC’s role, goals and culture. Donor
pressure saw it move from a body shaped by INGO values of spontaneity, flexibility and
organic growth to an organisation based on managerial, technocratic principles favoured by
donors, while INGOs’ independence, mutual suspicion and competitiveness undermined its
role as a coordinating and enabling body for the sector. The ministry, for its part, undermined
24
the legitimacy and political space available to the DAC in order to gain access to resources
that could be used for political patronage.
Chapter 7 analyses the findings of the research in terms of the research question,
identifying how interactions between states, INGOs and donors affected development
outcomes in the disability sector. It looks at ‘gaps’ between the goals of actors and the
outcomes, finding that a significant factor in the failure of donors and INGOs to achieve
development goals lay in the weakness of their political analysis, insight and knowledge
compared to the ministry and political elites.
Chapter 8 brings together the evidence collected by me in response to the research
questions that I asked at the start of the study. I also relate my empirical findings to the
debates in the literature that I discuss in Chapter 2. The findings of this study were that
understanding state, donor and INGO interactions required an appreciation of many diverse
influences including cultural, political and social factors. This finding challenges the
neoliberal model that has focused too narrowly on economic factors. My conclusions support
the value of the model developed by Hulme and Edwards (1997). In particular, this study
supports the literature which calls for a greater emphasis on political-economic analysis in
understanding interactions between states, donors and INGOs.
The study demonstrated that, although all actors ostensibly shared a commitment to
provide quality disability services, they also had to negotiate a range of unexpected goals,
motivations, strategies and capabilities which sometimes worked synergistically for them but
also often worked against their main objective. The result was a disability system which
served the needy clients in a disorganised and haphazard fashion. My findings have relevance
for future policy developments: if international aid programs can focus on factors other than
economic criteria of development ‘success’ it might be possible to avoid or reduce the
contradictory and competing forces that interfered with the delivery of assistance in this case
study.
Principal Findings
The research found that, despite a stated commitment by all actors to the development of
service provision to meet the needs of Cambodian persons with disability, the outcome of
25
efforts to provide services was, in fact, an ineffective, dysfunctional and unsustainable
system. This failure resulted in suffering and the denial of basic human rights to many people
with disabilities, wastage of resources, the opening up of motivations and opportunities for
corruption and a reduced ownership of responsibility for disability service provision by the
Ministry responsible.
In particular, the research found that a critical factor limiting the ability of donors and
INGOs to function effectively in the Cambodian political and cultural environment was the
lack of political analysis and consequent lack of understanding of the political dimension of
development in Cambodia. The view that development was an economic and bureaucratic
process with principles and policies that could be applied in a wide range of environments
meant that donors were not motivated to understand and engage with local political- and
power dynamics when forming and implementing development programmes. The consequent
vacuum provided a space for local elites and power-holders to operate more freely to achieve
their own goals.
The ideological belief of donors that INGOs were more effective agents than the state for
service delivery because of their private, independent and competitive nature also overlooked
the political dimension in the behaviour of INGOs. In fact, INGOs contributed to the
dysfunctional nature of the disability sector through their competitive nature, their
commitment to their own values and methods, and their reluctance to cooperate or to submit
to external Ministry coordination. The increasing influence of donor values and methods,
through INGO dependence on donor finance, saw INGOs increasingly accepting the position
that development involves strengthening the private sector and reducing the role of
government. This reinforced the already existing reluctance of INGOs to interact with state or
political actors, or develop a political analysis and the political skills to effectively engage
with the unique environment in which they were operating.
Implications of Findings
The research supports the commentators in the literature who challenge the dominance of
the view of development as an economic process (Hickey, 2012, 2009a, b; Leftwich, 2008,
2007; Unsworth, 2009; Fritz et al., 2007; DFID, 2010). These scholars contend that
26
development is, by its nature, political and is concerned with the redistribution of resources
and power in favour of the poor. Political analysis therefore needs to be an integral part of
development research and theory. Participants in development need to build more robust
political skills, and strengthen their theorisation of the role of the state in development and
knowledge and their analysis of the power dynamics in their countries of operation.
The findings of this research support these positions and have identified a number of
areas where a lack of political analysis, insight, skills and theory by donors and INGOs has
compromised the outcomes of development programmes intended to benefit one of the most
vulnerable groups in an already suffering population. The research also highlights the
uniqueness of each development environment and the need to recognise this in policymaking,
rather than focusing on universalistic solutions. Understanding the importance of the local
context means being prepared to engage in detailed and in-depth studies of local power
struggles and political tussles. This is because these have implications for any efforts to
improve the access of the poor and vulnerable to resources and power. Achieving this may
involve finding means to motivate donors and INGOs to develop the skills to undertake the
risky and uncertain strategy of engaging with local politics and power structures. Crucial
areas where research is urgently required include engaging with patrimonial political systems
in a way that will produce pro-poor outcomes, and identifying and developing skills donors
and INGOs need to operate successfully in the political arena. These skills include greater
self-awareness by INGOs and donors of their own political behaviours, cultures and history
and the impact of their behaviour on local political conditions.
CHAPTER 2 – METHODOLOGY
Introduction
The goal of this thesis is to examine the factors which influence state donor-INGO
interactions in international development. By using a case study to explore and reconstruct
events in the disability sector of Cambodia between 1991and 2006, I analyses these events
using two different theoretical models and compare the effectiveness of these models in
predicting and explaining the events. The first of these is the Tripartite Model which is based
on the neo-liberal paradigm, and was selected because of its strong influence in the history of
development. The second is the model based on the work of Hulme and Edwards (1997) and
has its origins in scholarship seeking alternatives to the neo-liberal paradigm (Hulme et al.,
1997). It is a more open-ended model and represents states, INGOs, and donors as interacting
around their goals, capacities, motives and strategies. The model assumes that the interactions
of the three actors are shaped by unique and local factors which do not lead to predetermined
outcomes. According to Hulme and Edwards, the outcomes and processes in each situation
are so distinctive that particular outcomes cannot be predicted by models which generalise
widely (such as the Tripartite Model, for example) (Hulme et al., 1997).
This chapter describes and justifies the methodology used to collect and analyse the
evidence to support my argument. It explains the choice of a historical qualitative case study
and why it is particularly suitable for dealing with the types of questions posed by the thesis.
The background and organisational setting of the case study are described in order to put the
study in its context. I explain the nature and choice of the methods used for the collection and
analysis of the data. This data was based on primary documents and semi-structured
interviews with expert witnesses carefully selected for their knowledge of the history of the
DAC. The semi-structured interview methodology was selected because it not only allows the
reconstruction of the history of the DAC and events in the period under investigation but also
the exploration of motives and beliefs underlying these events. Finally, the limitations of the
research are discussed, with the conclusion drawn that, within these limitations, the research
28
provides much-needed qualitative material on a unique situation in the field of international
development.
The Value of a Historical Qualitative Case Study in this Research
The case study method was selected because of its suitability for dealing with issues of
who, how, when and why in a research situation, given that it is difficult to control for all the
variables (Yin, 2009; Berg et al, 2012; Adler et al, 1987). A case study involves
systematically examining ‘… an event or set of related events which can meaningfully make
use of and contribute to the application of theory’ (Berg et al, 2012:325). Such events need to
have clearly defined spatial and temporal boundaries. The purpose of studying them is to
deepen understanding of and shed light on a wider class of phenomena of which the case is
an example (Hyett et al., 2014; Gerring, 2006). Thomas describes a case study as consisting
of the ‘subject’ or events studied and the ‘object’, which is the ‘theoretical or analytical
framework in which the subject is placed’ (Thomas, 2011:513). The ‘subject’ is chosen for its
ability to illuminate, make clearer or illustrate the ‘object’ (Thomas, 2011:513).
I have selected a historical approach as an appropriate method for reconstructing and
analysing events in the disability sector in order to throw light on the wider analytical
and theoretical framework. The situation being studied deals with a sequence of events
and their significance. The particular value of history lies in its focus on sequencing events
to explain change and the development of institutions, societies and even individuals over
time (Amenta, 2009). The case study approach has the particular advantage of allowing one
to focus on a particular country, event or organisation over time, while taking into account a
multiplicity of events and causes as they developed (Amenta, 2009).
Background and Organisational Context to the Case Study
In the 15 years between 1991 and 2006, the time period of this case study, Cambodia
had one of the highest rates in the world of persons with disability (Connelly, 2009;
UNESCAP/CDPF, 2003). Until 1997 the disability policy of the Government was limited to
paying a small pension for disabled war veterans, usually amputees, and so fell under the
responsibility of the Ministry of Social Affairs, Labour and Veterans Affairs (MSALVA).
Following a redistribution of responsibilities in 1997, however, disability came under the
29
newly formed Ministry of Social Affairs, Labour, Veterans and Youth Rehabilitation
(MOSALVY). MOSALVA, and later MOSALVY, were responsible for developing a
National Strategy for Disability and were (on paper) responsible for disability activity in
Cambodia (MSALVA, 1996; JICA, 2002a, b). However, these areas had low priority in the
Government. This was, in part, because they attracted little ODA from donors, who were
concerned with economic growth (see chapter 5). The Ministry was consequently weak and
under-resourced and offered very limited disability services, running only one small
rehabilitation programme for veterans (MSALVA, 1996). It relied heavily on the INGO
sector for service provision both as a matter of policy and of necessity (MSALVA, 1996;
Interviewee NGO1). INGOs were legally required to be registered with the Ministry but this
was often bypassed (Interviewee DAC1).
Like many of the other social sectors in Cambodia, the disability sector was headed by a
weak Ministry with few resources, little political influence and a demoralised bureaucracy.
Donors, in consequence, attached a low priority to their dealings with the Ministry. A number
of comparatively well-resourced and committed INGOs and a small number of local NGOs
and Disabled People’s Organisations (DPOs) were seen, both by themselves and by the
Ministry, as providing most of the services. These tended to be focused on the capital city
rather than rural areas. Friction between INGOs due to differing philosophies on providing
disability services made coordination difficult and affected the distribution and efficiency of
these services.
Donor activity in the disability sector during the period under investigation was diverse,
with some bilateral donors such as the United Kingdom’s Department for International
Development (DFID) and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) playing an active
role in research and support to the disability sector in Cambodia (JICA, 2002a, 2001; Thomas
2005). The United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation emphasised the inclusion of
people with disability (PWD) in their programmes (Semple, 1999). USAID provided funding
for the DAC but made it clear that this was an exception to its normal policy (Interviewee
DNR1).
Other donors, particularly the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), initially gave
priority to economic development and saw the state as lacking the capacity and integrity
needed to engage with fruitfully (World Bank, 1994; Hughes, 2011, 2003; Curtis, 1998;
30
DNR1). The World Bank gave support to Cambodia in 1994, conditional on the Government
accepting a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) for 1993-96 with targets for reducing
the budget deficit, monetary and fiscal reforms, liberalising external trade and investment and
reforming the public sector (World Bank, 1994; Kannan, 1997; Ear, 2007). The focus,
therefore, was on short-term macro-economic reforms and management. Social issues such as
disability were to be left to INGOs and local NGOs (World Bank, 1994, 1992; Hughes, 2011,
2003). Many of the other larger bilateral and multilateral donors also favoured a policy of
channelling funds through INGOs and local NGOs and encouraging the growth of the INGO
sector (World Bank, 1994, 1992: USAID, 2005).
After the 1998 elections donor approaches to reform shifted to a focus on structural and
institutional reform. Areas covered under these initiatives including legal and judicial reform,
governance, anti-corruption, gender equity and natural resource management (Hughes, 2011,
2003; USAID, 2008a, b, c; 2005). However, progress in these areas was slow, due partly to
opportunities lost by having not engaged with the Government in the earlier years. This
previous lack of engagement with the Government also had the effect of failing to encourage
those reform-based elements which existed in the bureaucracy and government (Hughes,
2011; Calavan et al., 2004). Donor aid had also concentrated on Phnom Penh and the areas
around it, allowing the dominant Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) to maintain a strong hold
over the rural areas and resist reform. As a result, disability services in rural areas were often
neglected, due to the Phnom Penh-centric nature of aid and the lack of political options for
the rural poor to exercise pressure for change (Hughes, 2011, 2003; Curtis, 1998).
Thirty-five INGOs were active in Cambodia in 1996 (MSALVA, 1996). Most were
small, but there were a number of quite large and energetic organisations (ibid). In 1996 the
two largest of these were Handicap International (HI) and Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS). HI
operated 6 prosthetics and orthopaedic (P&O) workshops, 3 rehabilitation programmes and a
physiotherapy school, while JRS operated 5 wheelchair production centres and provided
vocational training (MSALVA, 1996). Other active agencies included Cambodia Trust (CT)
with 3 P&O workshops, Veterans International (VI) with 3 P&O workshops with training and
a school for P&O, Maryknoll, a Catholic relief organisation, with 5 community-based
programmes, American Red Cross (ARC), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
each operating one P&O workshop (ibid). World Vision International (WVI) had a
31
considerable presence in the National Orthopaedic Hospital and vocational training, while
Social Services of Cambodia (SSC) provided social work training (ibid).
These organisations demonstrated a commitment to Cambodia which reflected their
history and values. A study in 2001 showed that all were still operating in Cambodia and had
grown to a considerable size. They were still present in Cambodia in 2006 at the end of the
study period. World Vision was the largest, with a budget of $US5, 816,707, while VI had a
budget of $US1, 985,000 and JRS operated on a budget of nearly a million US dollars. ARS
and CT had budgets of about half a million US dollars (JICA-DAC, 2001). These
organisations had entered Cambodia before or at the time of UNTAC and had seen their
activities grow from small and often difficult beginnings (Handicap International-UK, 2014;
Social Services of Cambodia, 2013; Exceed1, 2014; Veterans International-Cambodia, 2014;
American Red Cross, undated; Jesuit Refugee Services, 2012; International Committee of the
Red Cross, undated). The sector also included a limited number of small local NGOs and a
disabled people’s organisation, the Cambodian Disabled People’s Organisation (MSALVA,
1996; DAC1).2 Handicap International, American Red Cross, Social Services of Cambodia,
Cambodia Trust, ICRC and Veterans International were all actively involved in the
establishment of Cambodian Disability Action (DAC), while a representative of a religious
organisation provided material for my research.
Both INGOs and the Ministry saw INGOs as the main providers of disability services
(MSALVA, 1996; JICA-DAC, 2001; INGO2; NGO3; DAC1). While the activities of INGOs
broadened to focus more on community-based rehabilitation, disability rights, advocacy and
livelihood training during the period under study, initially most of the INGOs in the disability
sector shared a focus on prosthetics and orthotics (P&O), mine victims and people with
mobility disabilities (JICA-DAC 2001; MSALVA, 1996). This led to some overlap and
friction between them due to differing philosophies about the most suitable technology for
the Cambodian situation (Exceed, 2014; Interview INGO1; Interview DAC1). This friction
and overlap was one of the factors that triggered the establishment of the DAC (Interviewee
DAC1; Interview INGO2).
1 Cambodia Trust changed its name to Exceed in 2014 (Exceed, undated).
2 The MSALVA Report, which is not a complete list of INGOs and NGOs in the sector, includes 16 INGOs
out of a total of 35 INGOs, local NGOs and one Disabled People’s Organisation (DPO).
32
Establishment of the Disability Action Council
The growth of the INGO sector in Cambodia involved a wide range of very different
organisations operating independently of each other and, often, of the Government. The
consequent dysfunctions in the disability service sector led a group of individuals, through a
process of self-selection, to initiate and assist MOSALVY to set up a coordinating body with
semi-independent status, namely the DAC. In the following sections I explain how the DAC
was established. This is followed by an account of how I selected the data and interviews
needed for this research and the strengths and weaknesses of my approach.
The initial impetus for the1996 MSALVA Task Force on Disability Issues Report, which
recommended the establishment of the DAC, came from discussions and planning between a
number of senior staff from some of the larger disability INGOs rather than from formal
INGO policy at an organisational level (NGO1; NGO2). These individuals at first met
informally and continued to work closely throughout the establishment and early years of the
DAC. INGOs became involved through the actions of these key members (DAC 1; NGO1;
NGO2; MSALVA, 1996). Some disability INGOs elected to stay out of the process or felt
disconnected from it because they felt the new initiative would undermine structures already
in existence (Interviewee NGO1; Interviewee DAC1).
MSALVA, the relevant Ministry, played no part in these initial stages and only became
involved after the INGO personnel approached it with the suggestion of setting up a Task
Force into a National Strategy for Disability Issues in Cambodia (MSALVA, 1966; DAC1).
This approach was the result of a decision by the INGO personnel that the investigation
should be undertaken by the Ministry with the help of personnel and resources from their
INGOs (DAC1). MSALVA was, according to one interviewee, happy to take part because of
the possibility of access to resources (DAC1). Thus, the movement was driven initially by
informal relationships between key individuals in the disability INGO sector. These key
individuals drew the INGOs they worked for into a core group which then worked with the
Ministry to establish the DAC.
The INGOs which formed this core group shared values and priorities which drove
processes and actions that give us an insight into their place in the sector. They had formed
strong links to Cambodia and were a stable presence, making long-term commitments to the
33
country. CT, HI and ARC all began work in Cambodia in 1991 and SSC and Veterans
International in 1992 (Exceed, undated; Simon, 1996; American Red Cross undated; Social
Services of Cambodia, 2013; Veterans International, undated). For some, their links with the
country went back even further. HI was founded in 1982 and worked among Cambodian
refugees in the Thai-Cambodian border camps (Handicap International UK, 2014; Simon,
1996). Cambodia Trust was founded in Oxford, U.K., in 1989 in response to an appeal by
Prime Minister Hun Sen of Cambodia for help for amputees in Cambodia (Exceed, undated).
VI, a US-based group founded by Vietnam War veterans, established Veterans International-
Cambodia in 1992 (Veterans International undated). In the same year SSC began work
training village volunteers and MOSALVY staff in social work skills as the result of an
initiative by American Cambodian refugees (Social Services of Cambodia, 2013; NGO2).
ICRC has been operational in Cambodia since 1965, with a brief withdrawal from 1975 to
1974 (International Committee of the Red Cross, undated). ARC had worked in P&O and
medical support in Cambodia since 1991 (American Red Cross, undated).
The MSALVA Task Force Report, presented in October 1996, recommended among
other things that a body composed of representatives from the INGO sector, the Ministry,
Cambodian Disabled Persons Organisations (DPOs) and a technical adviser, be established to
implement the recommendations of the Report (MSALVA, 1996, p. 48). The Ministry
accepted the report and its recommendations and with a core group of INGOs and expatriate
advisers began the process of establishing the body. In 1997 the legal structure of the
organisation, named the Disability Action Council, was defined as a ‘semi-autonomous
national coordinating body’ under the leadership of MOSALVY (DAC 2000, 1999; Forsythe
et al., 2006). It was very clear that the body was not to be an INGO, local NGO or a
Ministerial body (DAC1; MOSALVY, 1999). Its ‘semi-autonomous’ status was seen as
crucial to allowing it to be independent of the Government and thus to maintain the
confidence of INGOs and local NGOs, while gaining legitimacy by operating under the aegis
of Government legislation (Interview DAC1). As a ‘semi-autonomous’ body, it was to an
official government-backed status, thus separating it from INGOs and NGOs, but to retain its
autonomy of action, thus limiting its control by the Government. Defining, maintaining and
negotiating what this status meant was to be a major challenge and to be a large part of the
story of the DAC.
34
Political events intervened to delay these decisions from passing into law. A coup in
1997 resulted in a political hiatus with little government business being done. The status of
the DAC was finally formalised under Ministerial Prakas No. 757/MOSALVY3 in October
1999. (MOSALVY, 1999; INGO3). The Prakas defined the structure of the DAC, established
its ‘semi-autonomous’ nature and set up a secretariat within the Ministry to provide
administrative and technical support (MOSALVY, 1999). It instituted the DAC as a
‘professional advisory body to government, policymakers and key INGOs on ‘all issues
affecting the well-being of people with disabilities’ (ibid). Its goal was to be a national focal
point for disability matters and a facilitator of the national disability strategy (ibid).
These guidelines were reflected in the reports and strategies of the DAC, in which it
defined its role as bringing together government, non-government, business, religious and
local communities and persons with disability to develop and implement a Cambodian Plan
of Action for the Disability and Rehabilitation Sector (DAC 2002a, b, c, 2001, 2000, 1998).
Its ten goals and nine objectives were wide-ranging and followed those of the Prakas, giving
the DAC a central place in planning and implementing a national disability plan, coordinating
and linking organisations in the sector, facilitating information-sharing and research, as well
as advising the Ministry and other bodies involved with disability (DAC, 2000). Recurrent
themes included the role of the DAC as a ‘forum’ for debate and consensus and a means of
improving coordination, minimising duplication and ensuring services and research were
based on the needs of persons with disability (DAC, 2000, pp. 8-9; Interviewee DAC1).
The DAC was structured to work through a system of committees, covering the main
issues in the disability sector and made up of INGO personnel and ‘relevant ministries’
(MOSALVY, 1999). The Executive Board of the DAC was designed to avoid control by a
Ministry or INGOs. Of the eleven members appointed for a period of three years, five were
representatives of the Government of Cambodia, three were disabled persons from local
MOSALVY-registered4 NGOs involved with disability activities and three were
representatives of MOSALVY-registered INGOs involved in activities relating to disability
(MOSALVY, 1999). While it also aimed to be independent of donor influence, the need of
3 ‘Prakas’ is a Khmer word meaning ‘Proclamation’. It is used by the government to mean an order or
regulation issued by a minister (Ministerial Order), as distinct from a piece of legislation or law passed by
the Parliament (ILO, 2007, p. 2; UNESCAP, 2004, p. 4).
4 By law all INGOs and NGOs were to be registered with MOSALVY. Evidence from interviewees suggested
that this was often ignored by INGOs (DAC1: NGO!).
35
the DAC for finance ultimately drew it into what was to be a complex relationship with
USAID.
Data Collection
I collected data from primary and secondary documentary and oral sources and the
importance of these will be assessed below. The nature of expert interviews and semi-
structured interviews and in particular the process by which I selected and interviewed the
participants in this study is explained.
Documentary Sources
Documentary data was collected from both primary and secondary sources (see
Appendix 3). Primary sources are documents created during the time under study. These
documents served as an original source of information about the topic because the writer had
first-hand and immediate knowledge of the events in question. It also included oral history,
when the personal experiences and opinions of individuals involved in a period or subject
under study were recorded, preserved and interpreted.5 Secondary sources summarised,
analysed and criticised primary sources and other scholarship and organised events into a
chronology (Marwick, 1970; Bombaro, 2012). The quality of secondary sources relied
heavily on the reliability of the primary sources on which they were based (ibid).
I closely scrutinised the primary sources generated by the DAC, USAID, World Bank,
Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC), MOSALVY and various INGO sources so as to
identify key data, dates, issues and actors. This information was used to guide the selection of
interviewees (see Appendix 2). Information on disability statistics and services was obtained
from reports drawn up by MSALVA and MOSALVY and reports by the DAC in cooperation
with JICA in 2002 and 2001 (MSALVA, 1996: JICA, 2002a, b; JICA/DAC, 2001). World
Vision also carried out a major study in 2004 (Mackinlay, 2004). Donor sources on disability
were drawn mainly from United Nations organisations, DFID and the Asia Development
Bank (Thomas 2005; ADB, 2005; UNESCAP, 2003, 1999; ILO, 2003; Semple, 1999). INGO
primary sources were drawn from their respective websites and online material. Primary
5 Oral history n. (also) the branch of history that deals with the compilation and study of recollections of past
event , usually through the use of recorded interviews with people having personal knowledge of the past
(Oxford English Dictionary ).
36
sources for the DAC included their annual reports6, reports published on disability in
Cambodia, strategies and plans and three crucial assessments of the organisation made by
USAID (DAC, 2003 a, b, 20002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2001, 2000, 1999; Horvath et al, 2001;
Horvath 1998; Forsythe et al., 2006)
Material on economic development and ODA was drawn from donor, RGC and INGO
sources. World Bank sources were particularly rich in data on policy and goals for
Cambodian development as were USAID documents. Responses to these policies in a
number of INGO documents gave different perspectives on international development
programmes (World Bank, 2006, 2004b 1999, 1997, 1995, 1994, 1992; USAID 2008a, b, c;
2005; Non-Government Forum of Cambodia, 2001 a, b; Kannan, 1997; McAndrew, 1996).
Expert interviews
Expert interviews constituted the major source of primary oral data. This is an
appropriate methodology for research which is concerned with understanding motives and
attitudes of the key stakeholders (Kumar, 1989). The experiences and insights of experts can
also be invaluable in generating suggestions and recommendations for better policy-making
in the field whether by the state, donors or INGOs.
Bogner and Menz (2009) argue that in expert interviews relations between the
interviewer and expert are strongly influenced by the perception of the interviewer and their
competence, professional status, values and influence by the expert (Bogner et al, 2009).
They suggest a typology of the relations. Interviews with the INGO and DAC interviewees
fell into what they call the ‘co-expert’ category where the interviewer is regarded by the
interviewee as an expert from the same or a different knowledge area whose specialist
competence is the same or of equal value to their own (Bogner et al., 2009). In this situation
the distribution of power in the interview situation was seen as symmetrical with the
interviewees feeling free to ask counter-questions and respond in an informal and
spontaneous manner.
The expert interview method provides flexibility to follow up leads in the interviews, but
also gives guidelines for keeping the interview focused on the issues being investigated.
Experts can express themselves in their own words without the intervention of more formal
6 See Appendix 3.
37
documents or questionnaires (Kolb, 2008; Galletta et al., 2013). There are other practical
advantages. It is among the quickest and least expensive forms of data collection, with each
interview providing a plentiful supply of data for analysis. Because of the length and
openness of the technique, it does not need a large number of interviewees to provide
sufficient material for a study (Kumar, 1989). In my own case, I completed a total of 9
interviews as explained in detail in the Appendix 2 (Confidential Annex).
I was fortunate in locating experts who had an extensive knowledge of the subject matter
of this thesis. Moreover, many of the interviews lasted for between two to four hours. This
gave my informants plenty of opportunity to go into detail and recall and reflect on the
material discussed. The information I collected by this means could then be cross-checked
with other interviews and with documentary material. As Appendix 2 (Confidential Annex)
shows, the range of interviewees represented a variety of backgrounds, perspectives and
interests. These differences complemented the basic understanding that they all had about the
disability sector in Cambodia and the DAC. Material of this quality and variety gave me
confidence in the reliability of the data that I collected.
Interviewees were selected by a purposive sampling strategy; in other words, I carefully
sought out informants who had detailed knowledge of and experience in the Cambodian
disability sector and the DAC between 1991 and 2006. I identified the disability sector in
Cambodia as an area where states, donors and INGOs worked together in an environment
where the state was weak and heavily reliant on aid and the INGO presence was strong. I
already had strong links with CBM International, a disability INGO which has supported
work in Cambodia since the 1980s, as my husband and I had spent seven years with them in
West Africa and he was still employed with the organisations. I knew Contact LC through
these links. LC was based in Cambodia with CBM as an advisor with the DAC and had
worked in the country with CBM International since1993, implementing community-based
rehabilitation for people with disability and access to eye-care services. LC was seconded by
CBM International as an Advisor to the DAC in 1999 and was still in that position at the time
of the interviews. I explained the background to the research while LC was on a visit to
Australia and she agreed to identify key potential interviewees. We continued to correspond
and a high level of trust developed. She hosted me during my time in Cambodia but decided
not to be interviewed.
38
The contact provided a list of individuals who had held responsible positions in
organisations in the disability sector during the period under study. Using this list, and an
analysis of key government documents, I identified 19 individuals in various organisations as
potential interviewees. These included persons who had been involved with the original
group which initiated the process establishing the DAC or had been in the disability sector at
the same time, civil servants in MOSALVY, employees of the DAC and those involved with
the USAID reviews into the DAC. I also identified other Ministries that overlapped with
disability services. Participants were not selected because of their connections with particular
INGOs, donors or other organisations but because of their personal knowledge and
experience of events in the disability sector in the defined period and of the DAC in
particular. The area of their expertise thus was clearly delineated, allowing the sampling to be
focused (Kopecky et al, 2012).
The second criterion for selecting interviewees was their accessibility. Due to restrictions
on resources and time, it was necessary to limit interviewing to a twelve day period in Phnom
Penh from June 14th
to 26th
2004. The decision to interview in Phnom Penh was made to
allow access to as many participants as possible and to gain greater understanding of the
environment in which the events being researched were located. The one exception was an
interview with Interviewee DAC1, which was conducted in Australia.
Letters of invitation were sent to the selected individuals and organisations. I introduced
myself, explaining the nature and purposes of the research and requesting their consent to be
interviewed. The letter explained what they would be asked, the expected length of the
interview and mentioned that the interview would be taped. I stressed that there was no
compulsion to take part in the interview, that they could withdraw at any time and that they
would be assured of confidentiality. Also, if necessary, an interpreter would be provided.
These conditions met the requirements of the Monash University Ethics Committee.
Of the 19 persons approached, nine agreed to participate. Twelve of the nineteen
individuals had been involved in establishment of the DAC or were involved in the sector
during at that time. Nine had left Cambodia but the remaining three consented to be
interviewed. A fourth was interviewed later in Australia. Two interviewees from INGO
backgrounds who had worked for the DAC or were involved in consultancies with the DAC
approached me while I was in Phnom Penh and volunteered to participate. I accepted their
39
offer because of their knowledge and experience with the DAC and the disability sector. A
current employee at a senior level of the DAC was also interviewed. A senior officer with
USAID (the major sponsor of the DAC) and a senior official of MOSALVY also made
themselves available. There was no response from the Ministries of Health, Education and
Youth Services, Women’s and Veterans Affairs and the Cambodian Mine Action and Mine
Victim Assistance Authority, all of which had been approached.
The final group of nine interviewees thus constituted five participants from an INGO
background, two past or present employees of the DAC, one donor representative and one
senior member of the Ministry. There was some overlap between the groups, such as
participants from an NGO background working for the DAC. All but one of the interviews
were conducted without the use of an interpreter.7 (Appendix2 Confidential Annex) provides
the details about the informants and the codes by which I refer to them in the text. The key
informants cited in the text below were coded as follows:
DAC1, DAC2, etc. stand for interviewees from the Disability Action Council
INGO1, INGO2, etc. stand for interviewees from International Non-Government
Organisations
DNR1 stands for interviewees from donor organisations
MIN1 stands for interviewees from the Ministry of Social Affairs, Labour, Veterans
and Youth Rehabilitation (MOSALVY)
I employed a semi-structured technique for the interviews. I had prepared a list of
questions prior to the meetings but allowed myself to explore the unanticipated issues and
angles that emerged (Galletta et al., 2013). The use of a semi-structured interview method
allowed me to work through a carefully selected series of questions which became more
specific as the interviews progressed. I also gave my respondents an opportunity to return to
issues raised in the earlier part of our meetings – this helped to ensure that the most important
information was captured. Typically I only met with each informant on one occasion. The
interviews were built around the following questions:
7 For further details on the interviewees see Appendix 1 (Confidential Annex).
40
Can you tell me a little about your organization/yourself and the history of your
involvement in disability work in Cambodia? What part did you and/or your
organization play in the decision to establish the DAC?
Did you/your organization support the establishment of the DAC? Why, or why not?
What did you/your organization want the DAC to do? Who did you want to be on it?
How much power did you think it should have?
Has the DAC fulfilled your expectations of it? Why, or why not?
What can you tell me about the involvement of the state, INGOs and major donors
such as USAID, the UN and the World Bank?
What is your view of the most appropriate model of disability service provision?
Interviews were carried out at a site selected by the interviewees and were all held in a
private place where the interviewee could speak freely. Before the interview, participants
read and signed consent forms which included the option of asking for confidentiality. As
some of the interviewees requested this option I made the decision to keep all interviewee
details confidential to reduce the risk of identification. The tape was not turned on until it was
clearly indicated that the interview was formally beginning, and the attention of the
interviewee was drawn to the fact that taping had begun.
41
Analysis of Data
In analysing the data I focused on reconstructing the events around the establishment and
history of the DAC and investigating what this revealed about donor, state and INGO
interactions in the Cambodian disability sector from 1991 to 2006. This included
reconstructing the goals, motives, capacities and strategies of these actors during the setting
up of DAC and its subsequent workings. How these three actors shaped the organisation and
its outcomes is a critical consideration in this thesis.
The material from the interviews was first transcribed. Eight of the interviews each took
up between 40 to 60 pages of double-spaced typing; one interview transcript covered only ten
pages. I then coded the transcripts using the following themes:
1. Factual details about the establishment of the DAC, including dates, personnel
involved, the sequence of events, issues such as funding, relations with the
Government, relations between the individuals and organisations involved, relevant
documents, goals and expectation of those involved;
2. Details about the involvement of the wider community of INGOs with the DAC,
including expectations, attitudes, relations;
3. Information on the involvement of the Government during the period, the policy
and philosophy of the Government towards disability service provision, its
involvement in the establishment of the DAC, significant dates and documents,
sequence of events, its resources, the impact of the political culture, their motives,
expectations and responses in regard to the DAC and issues affecting its role;
4. Details about the involvement of USAID in the establishment of the DAC,
including dates, sequence of events, personnel, relevant documents, motives for
supporting the DAC and the reasons for the withdrawal of funding, expectations
and understanding of the DAC and its philosophy on disability policy;
5. Details about the provision of services in the Cambodian disability sector, including
which organizations provided them, the extent and suitability of services, issues in
service provision, successes and failures;
6. Details about INGOs and service provision, including data on their services,
resources, goals, issues arising over provision of services by INGOs, and the
philosophy, motives, self-perception of INGOs in the sector;
42
7. Data about donors in the Cambodian disability sector, including policy, philosophy,
role in disability service provision;
8. Influence of neo-liberal policy on disability service provision in Cambodia;
9. Data on the wider Cambodian environment, including impact of patrimonialism
politics and local cultural attitudes to service provision by Government or INGOs;
and
10. Opinions of interviewees about appropriate models of service provision.
I coded the interviews by reading and highlighting text with colours according to the
selected themes. I tabulated the data from each interview separately according to themes to
allow an understanding of the position and perspectives of each interviewee. The results from
all the individual interviews were then collected and collated and tabulated according to the
themes. This allowed data from all interviewees to be compared and similarities and
differences to be identified during the writing-up process. Constant comparison of the
transcripts while writing up increased my familiarity with the material and ability to compare
and make connections between the interviews. I noticed from the beginning that there was
considerable consistency between the interviewees on the factual events and details of the
story of the DAC, while their responses on the subject of their philosophies and perception of
appropriate disability policy varied considerably.
The length of the interviews, the quality of the experts selected and the rigorous process
of coding and analysing produced the most reliable set of data that could be managed with the
interview materials I had and the time available to complete the study.
Limitations of the Research Methodology
My choice of a fine-grained qualitative case study based on the history of a particluar
organisation was made in response to the lack of such research in the development literature.
However, the strengths of such a case study point also to its limitations. It is tied to a
particular time and place and based on material from a relatively limited number of sources.
This means that generalisations from this study need to be made cautiously and with
reference to the wider literature for validation.
43
It thus needs to be noted that this research drew primarly on Ministry, donor and INGO
sources. While this was consistent with the scope of the research, it means that reports from
DPOs, people with disability and their families and communities and local NGOs8 have not
been accessed or assessed. There was also little input from civil servants working at field
level, which would have given insights into their morale, priorites and loyalites. The reasons
for this, as explained in Chapter 1, were the limitations both of time and of access to them
through the contacts I had at my disposal.
Interviewing at Ministerial level has the potential to provide rich data to inform future
operations in Cambodia and other patrimonial states. However, it presents a number of
practical difficulties. These include those raised in this research around the need to be
politically aware. Similarly, interviews with desk- and project officers from the IFIs and other
bilateral donors were not possible. They would have enabled comparison with USAID’s
experiences and policies. The choice to concentrate on a few informants closely connected
with the history of the DAC had the distinct and powerful advantage of enabling depth of
information and analysis but concomittantly limited the range of information which could be
gathered.
While such caveats need to be kept in mind, one of the arguments of this thesis is that
each situation is unique and needs to be understood on its own terms. The study of the DAC
and the Cambodian disability sector from 1991 to 2006 may provide insights into
development policy and practice in other developing countries but such policy and practice
should always be informed by local research. If the story of the DAC has one lesson to teach
us, it is this.
8 I made the decision to focus on INGOs in the research rather than local NGOs. The main reasons were the
nature of the questions, as I wanted to examine relationships between organisations who were based outside
the state they were operating in and how this influenced their relationship with the host government. The
dynamics of an international body operating in foreign country are different to those of a domestic agency
and raise different issues.
CHAPTER 3 – CONCEPTUALISING STATE- DONOR-
INGO RELATIONSHIPS: A GENERAL THEORETICAL
REVIEW OF INTERACTIONS
Introduction
States, donors and INGOs conduct their relationships in the context of a complex system
which none of them control completely. This chapter explores the literature about the
interaction of states, donors and INGOs in the aid system, and the implications of these
interactions for service delivery in developing countries. It explores two influential attempts
to conceptualise the interactions between these actors in the development process, the
perspectives that each offers on the nature, goals and mechanisms of these interactions, and
the effectiveness of these models in providing insights into the domestic political situation in
countries receiving international aid. In the final section of this chapter I ask whether
development assistance helps or undermines the legitimacy of newly independent nations.
Perhaps the most influential of these models, arising from the neoliberal tradition, was
the tri-partite model (Bojici-Dzelilovi, 2009; Chang et al., 2004). This model conceptualises
the interactions from a normative, universalistic perspective, with the goal of donors being to
develop policies that will result in the three sectors playing predetermined roles that optimise
the operation of the free market. However, development literature has expressed concerns
over the strongly normative and wide-ranging claims of the Tripartite Model and what is seen
as a lack of political analysis (Wright et al., 2010; Pavanello et al., 2005; Robins et al., 2008).
This latter criticism has been directed at donors and INGOs in particular. In this chapter I
explore the reasons for this perceived failure, its consequences on the interaction between
states, donors and INGOs and the nature of political analysis needed (Cammet et al., 2011;
Mercer, 2002; Maclean, 2011). An alternative model developed by INGO and academic
commentators sees interactions between states, donors and INGOs as fluid and diverse,
responding to unique circumstances in the aid recipient countries rather than universal
economic laws (Hulme et al.1997; Hamilton, 1989). Each sector pursues goals and develops
45
strategies that are shaped by the local context. The focus of my own research is thus on
understanding the context and identifying the empirical objectives and strategies of the
various actors.
History of Development Theory 1944 to the Present
This section deals with the history of development theory over the seven decades in
which development has been accepted as a global project (Willis, 2011; Harman et al, 2014;
Sorensen, 2010; Harriss, 2014; Willis, 2011; Yusuf, 2014; Chongli, 2013 Brohman, 1996). It
provides a broader context for the issues discussed in the rest of the chapter and in other parts
of this thesis. Development theory has undergone profound changes and reinventions during
this period, with a number of academics dividing this history up into distinct decades
(Duncan et al, 2012; de Haan, 2008). The 1950s and 1960s, for example, have been labelled
the ‘Golden Age of Development’, the 1970s as the decade of basic needs, rural development
and the emergence of the New International Economic Order, followed by the ‘Lost Decade’
of the 1980s and the dominance of neoliberal development during the 1980s and most of the
1990s (Duncan, et al, 2014; De Haan, 2008; Cypher, 2014; Willis, 2011). This period was
followed by a focus on state institution-building, poverty reduction, partnership and country
ownership, with universal commitment to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The
2000s have seen even more upheaval in the development environment, with the emergence
and re-emergence of new donor countries operating outside the traditional hegemony of the
OECD-DAC system (Chongli, 2013, Chin, 2012; Gore, 2013; Cypher, 2014). All these
changes had implications for the respective roles of states, INGOs and donors, creating a
series of often markedly contrasting theoretical and policy backgrounds within which they
have had to relate and negotiate their positions.
Development has been called ‘the organising principle of our time’ (Cowen et al.,
1995:44), and compared to a religion for those involved in it, providing a set of beliefs, the
hope of salvation and shared rituals and language (Rist, 1997). The complex origins of the
concept began in the 18th
Century when it referred to the unfolding of an organism, but by the
19th
Century it was firmly entrenched in European philosophy as a theory of linear progress
based on Western capitalism (Rist, 2002; Watts, 1998). The term drew its respectability from
its scientific origins, and inferred that, like organic growth, development in the social and
46
economic sense had a direction and a purpose. Each stage built on the previous one and was
irreversible and to a certain extent inevitable (Rist, 2002; Schuurman, 2000).
Inherent in Western definitions of development are assumptions about the value of
individualism, economism and social evolution that are largely Eurocentric in their origin
(Rist, 1997; Cowen et al., 1995; Watts, 1995). Development practice has been strongly
informed by the belief that if under-developed countries can be given enough resources and
Western scientific and technological expertise, efficiently administered by governments with
the guidance of external agents, the South will catch up with the North and poverty and
inequality will disappear (Haynes, 2008; Thorbecke, 2007; Sorenson, 2010; Harman et al,
2014; Nafziger, 2007). While this Western-centric view of development has strongly
influenced theory and practice, it has also been challenged by scholars and practitioners.
These challenges, as well as changes in the development environment, have helped shape it
(Lewis et al., 2009; Emmerij, 2007; Schuurman, 2000; Fialho, 2012). The history of the
concept of development and the debates around it provide insight into the roles of states,
INGOs and donors during this evolution.
The Bretton Woods System (1944) and Truman
The modern development era is commonly held to begin with the ‘bold new program’
announced by President Truman in his Inauguration Speech on 20 January 1949 1(Remenyi,
2004; Sorenson, 2010; Lumsdaine, 1993; Houghton, 2007; Desai, 2013). The Four Principles
carried within them a fundamental shift in the focus and nature of development. They drew
the newly independent and soon-to-be independent ex-colonies into the development project
(Thorbecke, 2007, 2000; Desai, 2013). Under the colonial system, the development of the
colonies had been controlled by the interests of the metropoles and by the existing trade
patterns within and between colonial blocs. With independence, their policies could
theoretically be more focused on their own needs and goals (Thorbecke, 2000).
At the time, Europe and the USA were preoccupied with their recovery from World War
II and their determination that the traumatic events of the 1930s and 1940s would not be
repeated. In 1944 delegates from 44 allied nations met at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire to
discuss the establishment of a global monetary system to this end (Wolff, 2013; Eichengreen,
1 ‘In the coming years, our program for peace and freedom will emphasize four major courses of action.
First, we will continue to give unfaltering support to the United Nations and related agencies, and we will
continue to search for ways to strengthen their authority and increase their effectiveness. […]
Second, we will continue our programs for world economic recovery.
This means, first of all, that we must keep our full weight behind the European recovery program. We are
confident of the success of this major venture in world recovery. We believe that our partners in this effort
will achieve the status of self-supporting nations once again.
In addition, we must carry out our plans for reducing the barriers to world trade and increasing its volume.
Economic recovery and peace itself depend on increased world trade.
Third, we will strengthen freedom-loving nations against the dangers of aggression. […]
The primary purpose of these agreements is to provide unmistakable proof of the joint determination of the
free countries to resist armed attack from any quarter. Every country participating in these arrangements
must contribute all it can to the common defense. […]
Fourth, we must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and
industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. […]
The United States is pre-eminent among nations in the development of industrial and scientific techniques.
The material resources which we can afford to use for assistance of other peoples are limited. But our
imponderable resources in technical knowledge are constantly growing and are inexhaustible. […]
If we are to be successful in carrying out these policies, it is clear that we must have continued prosperity in
this country and we must keep ourselves strong. […]’
Extracts from President Harry S. Truman’s Inaugural Address, 20 January, 1949. Resource accessed at
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/50yr_archive/inagural20jan1949.htm, 28.02.2015.
48
2008). The system and institutions which were finally agreed on were strongly influenced by
the US vision of an open international trading system and global financial stability, while
simultaneously reconstructing international relations and the national infrastructures of
countries devastated by war (Wolff, 2013; Eichengreen, 2008). The Bretton Woods
agreements established the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to maintain international
stability by disciplining nations whose policies threatened monetary impediments to trade and
extending loans to those at risk of balance-of-payments issues (Eichengreen, 2013; Boughton,
2007). Another institution, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
(IBRD), better known as the World Bank, focused on post-war reconstruction (Einhorn,
2001; Eichengreen, 2008). Its initial goal was a new experiment, namely, the use of public
loans for economic development. It was committed to open trade and supported the use of
loans to build public infrastructure in the belief that such projects, along with financial
stability and private investment, would ensure growth (Einhorn, 2001). The key to the
Bretton Woods system was the restoration of open multilateral trade (Eichengreen, 2008).
The Four Points announced by President Truman reflected this policy background and the
preoccupations of the post-war Western nations.2
Initially the Bretton Woods institutions concentrated on the reconstruction of Europe,
with the World Bank acting as financier for this reconstruction in the 1940s and shifting to
2 His first Principle was a commitment to internationalism through the United Nations. His second Principle,
calling for a commitment to world economic recovery, reflected the concern for global economic stability.
The Third Principle tapped into the deep fears around the aggression of the Communist bloc and its
aspirations for global power. The concern for development in ‘under-developed’ countries thus took place in
the context of Western preoccupation with restoring and maintaining prosperity, avoiding another global
depression and conflict and managing the threat from the Communist bloc. Development had its part to play
in meeting these goals, for global security was seen to be enhanced by the involvement of all countries in a
free and open global trade system (Desai, 2013; Sorensen, 2010; Haynes, 2008; Griffin, 1991; Boughton,
2007; Lateef, 1995). It also resonated with liberal values of equality, the rights of all people to a decent
standard of living, compassion and ‘democratic fair dealing’ (Inaugural Speech, 1949 line 58).
49
the role of conservative lender in the 1950s (Joshi et al., 2013; Lateef, 1995).3 A number of
factors a greater preoccupation with an increasing number of newly independent countries.
The needs in Europe became less pressing, while the Fourth Point made the issue of the new
countries a matter of policy (Denizer et al., 2011). Developing countries participated fully in
the Bretton Woods System, reflecting the commitment to international cooperation as a key
to avoiding repeating past experiences (Eichengreen, 2008; Lateef, 1995). However, these
states were more vulnerable than Western countries to economic shocks which threatened
global economic stability, and the Bretton Woods institutions quickly became increasingly
involved in their affairs. The first development loan of the World Bank (to Chile) in 1947,
three years after its establishment, was only its second loan, the first being to France.
The focus on countries labelled as ‘underdeveloped’ led to increased interest in the study
of why some countries were less ‘advanced’ than others and how ‘development’ occurred
(Thorbecke, 2007). Post-war development theory during the 1950s and 1960s was dominated
by two broad paradigms; modernisation, which was an extension of the growth theory of the
1940s and 1950s, and dependency theory (Haynes, 2008). Modernisation theory presented
development as a series of stages through which a country had to pass to arrive at the
‘advanced’ stage which modern Western societies had achieved (ibid; Brohman, 1996;
Thorbecke, 2007, 2000). Development was narrowly defined as economic growth, which was
seen as the cure for social and income inequalities, both within and between countries.
Growth was conceptualised simplistically as an accumulation process and policies were
guided by models such as the Harrod-Domar and Solow models (Denizer et al., 2011).
Poverty, technological backwardness and a lack of industrial development were seen as part
of a package of ‘underdevelopment’ which growth could overcome (Brohman, 1996;
Thorbecke, 2007; Schuurman, 2000). Industrialisation and injections of investment were
accepted as the keys to this growth. It was assumed that the leaders of underdeveloped
3 The goal of the World Bank was to act as a global club to reduce borrowing costs for the poorer members at
minimal cost to the wealthier members and at the same time to encourage an open and liberal international
system driven by the market and growth (Birdsall, N., 2007; Taylor, 1997). The IMF was seen as an episodic
lender for emergencies and monetary crises, designed as a ‘club pf peers’ in which any member could
become a creditor or debtor at short notice (Boughton, 20007:33). For the first decade, from 1946 to 1955,
the US was the only creditor state, with virtually all members likely to borrow occasionally to meet external
balance of payments issues (Boughton, 2007). The voting structure of the IMF was based on the relative
importance of member states in the international economy, a fact which was a cause of friction from the
beginning (Wolff, 2013). With the World Bank, voting power was proportional to the number of shares held,
giving considerable weighting to the largest economies3 (Wolff, 2013)
50
countries shared in the goal of moving through the stages of development and reaching the
same economic, social, cultural and political status as the Western nations (Haynes, 2008).
The 1950s was a decade of confidence in international development (de Haan, 2009;
Thorbeche, 2007). The state was seen as the agent responsible for directing and managing
this growth, and aid flowed largely from donor to recipient states (Sorensen, 2010). This
optimism and commitment to increasing GNP and injecting investment to ‘kick-start’ the
economy continued into the 1960s, but doubts began to emerge about the focus of the single-
sector model on the industrial sector (Haynes, 2008; Thorbecke, 2000). Domestic factors in
the developing countries were still seen as the cause of under-development, there was a move
away from the single-sector model to a dual-sector model. This laid more emphasis on the
role of the agricultural or ‘traditional’ sector (Thorbecke, 2007; Biel, 1995).
At the same time, criticism of the view of ‘underdevelopment’ as the result of domestic
internal weaknesses became more vocal as the less developed countries gained confidence
(Denizer, 2011; Emmerij, 2007). Development thinkers, beginning with those from Latin
America, argued that the causes of wealth and development inequality did not lie so much in
the internal inadequacies of developing countries as in external factors over which they had
little control (Emmerij, 2006). They condemned the concept of ‘underdevelopment’ as an
artificial construct which transformed whole populations to an inferior and backward status
because they did not fit a Western-based definition of normality (Desai, 2013). They argued
that the differences between the industrialised countries and the less developed ones were the
result of historical factors and the continuing existence of inequalities in global trade,
economic and political relationships which had not been eliminated by political independence
(Haynes, 2008; Biel, 1995).
The Pearson Commission
The 1960s began optimistically with the UN declaring it the ‘First Development Decade’
and setting a goal of at least 5% growth in national income for developing countries as a
whole by 1970. However, there were also increased challenges to the development project
from the dependency theorists, the increasing assertiveness of newly independent and non-
Western countries and the rise of the Communist bloc (Denizer, 2011). These criticisms
included the perceived use of aid for political ends and increasing cynicism of the motives of
51
donors. Donors themselves were becoming increasingly disenchanted with aid outcomes
(Denizer, 2011; Pearson, 1970). The focus on economic growth had not seen any decrease in
poverty or inequality and in 1967 the President of the World Bank set up the Pearson
Commission under Nobel Laureate for Peace and former Canadian Prime Minister, Lester
Pearson. The Pearson Commission Report described what it termed a ‘crisis’ of confidence in
development among both donors and recipients and the gap between nations was increasing
rather than decreasing (Pearson, 1970). The report, however, reaffirmed the importance of aid
and development, stressing not only the moral imperative but the interconnectedness of all
nations, and argued that aid was achieving some success. Rather than abandoning the cause
of development, it called on nations to commit to a greater engagement with each other and
more and better-managed international cooperation and partnership. It recommended an
overall target of 6% growth for the entire developing world and a target of 1% of GNP for aid
from developed nations with 0.7% coming from ODA (Pearson, 1970). Aid should be
directed to those countries which were already achieving economically (ibid; Davenport,
1970)
The Pearson Commission Report included a number of recommendations of significance
for the role of states and donors in development. It reaffirmed the importance of the nation-
state and its strategic role as the driver and manager of development. It also called for a
greater role for the multilateral donors, urging that they create and strengthen the
international structure of development and organise fora, consultative groups and cooperation
between nations. The Pearson Report argued that the ability of multilateral donors to conduct
objective feasibility and performance assessments made then the logical means of distributing
aid (Pearson, 1970). Consequently, their share of aid contribution should be increased from
10% to 20% and the International Development Association (IDA) the recently formed easy-
loan institution of the World Bank, be a pivotal part of multilateral aid efforts (Pearson,
1970). At this stage, INGOs and civil society were not seen as a significant part of the
development process.
The challenges of the 1960s resulted in a greater concern with poverty and ‘basic needs’
in the 1970s (Thorbecke, 2007). While growth in GNP was still the major objective, the
complexities of relationships between the ‘industrial’ or ‘modern’ sector and the
‘agricultural’ or ‘traditional’ sector were recognised (Haynes, 2008). There was greater
awareness of the importance of ‘human capital’ in terms of health and education and the need
52
for high employment (Haynes, 2008; Thorbecke, 2007). With this came the stronger link
between development and poverty reduction.
The New International Economic Order (NIEO)
The focus of development on growth of GNP among industrialised countries was not shared
by the poorer and less developed countries (Salomon, 2013; Sauvant, 1981). Their concerns
were to do with protecting and strengthening their state sovereignty, which many had only
achieved by the early 1970s. The issues of the rights of the state to self-determination and
protection against external interference were therefore crucial policy concerns for them
(Sauvant, 1981). These concerns coalesced around the rights of the state to freely choose its
economic system, to enjoy permanent sovereignty over its natural wealth and resources and
to have equal participation in international economic relations (Sauvant, 1981; Salomon,
2013; Streeten, 1981). They found that political independence did not give them many of the
outcomes which they had assumed it would, including an equitable share in the economic
prosperity of the world system and freedom from external interference in their affairs
(Salomon, 2013). Furthermore, they saw the international trade and monetary systems as
weighted against their interests and in favour of the industrialised countries (Golub, 2013).
The role and sovereignty of the state were thus core issues for developing countries in their
attempts in the 1960s and 1970s to institute what became known as a New International
Economic Order (NIEO) (Salomon, 2013; Ogle, 2014). Individual human rights were seen as
tethered to the rights of the state to be independent, sovereign and have control over its
natural resources and means of production (Ogle, 2014). Despite their heterogeneity and the
often deep divides between them, they were able to organise into loose but cohesive
coalitions to lobby and act politically. These coalitions included the Non-Aligned Movement
(NAM), established in 1961 on the basis of mutual benefit and respect for territory and
sovereignty, non-aggression, and equality (Ogle, 2014; Vieira et al., 2010). In 1964, the
Group of 77 (G77), a loose coalition of developing countries designed to collectively foster
their members’ interests, and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) were formed.
The developing nations chose the UN General Assembly and a number of independent
platforms such as the Bandung Asia-Africa Conference of 1955 and the NAM as their arenas
of action (Ogle, 2014). These sites allowed them a stronger voice than the Bretton Woods
53
institutions, where voting was weighted in favour of the larger economic powers (Salomon,
2013). The campaign for the NIEO focused on altering the economic relations between
industrialised and developing nations by stabilising prices for commodities, transferring
resources from rich to poor nations, expanding industrialisation and technology in the
developing countries, controlling transnational companies, opening up access to markets,
reforming the international monetary system and giving developing nations a greater voice in
international affairs (Streeten, 1982).
The NIEO movement achieved a number of successes, due in no small part to the OPEC
oil embargo and the resulting alarm and conciliatory mood of the industrialised countries.4
Early success was soon overtaken by international events, however. The oil embargo led to
spiralling prices and debt for many developing countries, while recession in the industrialised
nations reduced demand for their commodities. Developing countries resorted to borrowing
heavily from commercial banks, and found themselves facing steep interest repayments
(Missoni et al., 2013). The default by Mexico on its repayments in 1982 led to a drying-up of
credit for developing countries forcing them back to the Bretton Woods institutions and the
conditions which were attached to their loans (Ogle, 2013; Salomon, 1913).While these
global issues undermined the momentum of the NIEO, arguably the crucial cause of its
failure was the opposition of the industrialised countries (Salomon, 2013; Goldstein, 1982;
Ogle, 2013). At the North-South Summit in Cancún (1981), called to discuss ways of
bridging the wealth gap between nations, the developed countries refused a proposal for an
NIEO (Goldstein, 1882). Instead, President Reagan announced a programme based on the
opening up of markets, improving the climate for private investment and the creation of
political environments which would not ‘restrain’ the market (Ogle, 2014:224; Goldstein,
1982). It seemed that a moment for asserting the central role of the state in the development
process had passed and the agenda for global economic policy and international development
4 These successes included the UN Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources in 1962,
the Declaration of a New International Economic Order with a Programme for Action in 1974 and a Charter
on the Rights and Duties of States in the same year (Ogle, 2014; Vieira et al, 2010). The Charter on the
Rights and Duties of States declared that every state had the right to choose its economic system, to exercise
authority over foreign investment, regulate the activities of multinationals and nationalise and expropriate
foreign property with compensation (Ogle, 2014). It appeared that the climate of development was changing
in favour of the sovereign power of the state to control how development was practised within its borders.
54
was henceforth to be shaped by the increasingly neoliberal stance of the more powerful
Western economies.
The Rise of Neoliberalism
The development strategy of the 1970s had been focused on growth and the ‘basic needs’
agenda (Thorbecke, 2007; Missoni et al, 2013; de Haan, 2009). The debt crisis and the
collapse of the Bretton Woods system reinforced the increasing influence of neoliberalism in
the 1970s and 1980s and into the 1990s, with individual rights, rather than the rights of states,
being the basis of international law and relations (Goldman, 2005). The growth of free-trade
zones and the increasingly free movement of capital weakened the concept of sovereign
territory (Ogle, 2014). With the increased influence of neo-liberalism, aid policy became
more concerned with economic reforms and structural adjustment in a set of policies which
became known as the ‘Washington Consensus’5 (Gore, 2000; Williamson, 2005, 1993;
Broad, 2006; Joshi et al, 2013). These policies were designed to bring about progress through
‘economic discipline, outward orientation and the market economy in developing countries’
(Williamson, 2005:197; Emerij, 2007; Sorensen, 2010). Developing countries were
increasingly having to turn to the IMF and the World Bank – known together as ‘the
International Financial Institutions’ (IFIs) – for funding. As a condition of the loans they had
to commit to a package of measures designed to achieve these outcomes. Known as
Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs) and later Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs),
the reforms focused on redressing balance of payments deficits and creating a
macroeconomic environment conducive to the growth of the private sector and the free
market (Williamson, 1993, 2005; Missoni et al., 2013). These measures included reducing
government spending on the civil service, food subsidies and social service provision,
opening up economies to world markets, devaluing the currency and reducing tariffs and
taxes. Countries were encouraged to make use of their ‘competitive advantage’, usually cheap
labour (de Haan, 2009; Williamson, 1993).
The changing policy environment had significant implications for the roles of states,
donors and INGOs. The shift to the market rather than the state as the main driver of
5 The term ‘Washington Consensus’ was coined by John Williamson in 1989 to refer to ten key policies which
he argued constituted a ‘universal convergence’ which summed up ‘the common core of wisdom embraced
by all serious economists’ (Gore, 2000:790; citations from Williamson, 1993:1334).
55
development, the development of standard and clearly defined macro- and micro-economic
reforms for all borrowing countries, the increased involvement through aid conditionality of
the IFIs in the internal affairs of developing states and the encouragement of and increased
space for INGO activity meant new roles and interplay for all the actors (Denizer, 2011;
Wolff, 2013; Lewis et al., 2009; Taylor, 1997). The 1980s also saw a decline in the influence
of the UN as the source of policies and ideas, while the NIEO agenda moved to the
background (de Haan, 2009; Goldman, 2005; Joshi et al., 2013).
The increased prominence of INGO activity arose initially from their appeal to activists
and those looking for development alternatives, who saw them as a source of new ideas, an
alternative to the state and a means of development at grass-roots level (Lewis et al., 2009;
Malena, 2000; Tvedt, 2006; Edwards, 1999). The campaign against the Structural Adjustment
Progams (SAPs) encouraged interaction and organisation between agencies and raised their
profile, as did the growing impact of global media (Lewis, 2009; Willetts, 1996). INGOs
became more involved in UN conferences from the 1970s as a source of new ideas, as
development theory increasingly seemed to have reached an impasse (Lewis, 2009).
While INGOs had provided a robust critique of SAPs and the World Bank-led
development of the 1980s, the disenchantment of donors and their ideological objections to
the state made INGOs, with their voluntary base, diversity, apparently philanthropic values
and flexibility, increasingly attractive to them (Lewis, 2009 Williams, 1990; Fowler, 1990).
The IFI-led ‘New Policy Agenda’ was a response to the criticism of the harshness of the
neoliberal reforms of the 1980s and early 1990s and combined alternative development ideas
on participation and empowerment with the more traditional policy elements (Lewis et al.,
2009; Kabeer et al., 2012; Malena, 2000). (Hope, 1999; Thiele, 2001; Cornia et al, 1987;
Easterly, 2005; Harrigan et al.1991; Dembele, 2005; Ihonvbere, 2003; Pender, 2001). INGOs
were valued by World Bank development policy for their place as part of ‘civil society’,
which was seen as a balance and control on the state, and for their perceived advantages over
the state as providers of social services and promoters of democratic institutions (Agg, 2006;
Kabeer, 2012; Lewis et al., 2009). Other bilateral donors, particularly the USA, saw INGOs
as useful in increasing public support for official aid programmes (Tvedt, 2002).
While the rise of neoliberal policy gave more space for INGOs, it aimed to limit the role
of the state to the provision of the basic structure within which the free market would operate,
56
and saw it as overly-bureaucratic and regulatory, prone to corruption and inefficient (de
Haan, 2009, Lewis et al, 2009; Biersteker, 1990, Williams, 2011). This meant a radical shift
for the state in developing countries from the centre of the development process to the
sidelines and placed considerable limits on its ability to carry out traditional roles and access
resources (Williams, 2011; Schuurman, 2000).
The period was also a time of increasing change for donors, and particularly the IFIs.
Their roles expanded from their initial focus on European post-war rehabilitation and stability
to a global scale of managing aid flows and reforms of the economies of a large number of
developing countries (Einhorn, 2001; Birdsall, 2007; Boughton, 2007; Wolff, et al, 2013;
Goldman, 2005). The large resource transfers which they provided to developing countries
and the leverage which they were able to exercise over recipients meant that they could
extensively shape economic and social conditions in a large part of the world, The neo-liberal
policy environment encouraged greater interventionism than their original remit (Wolff, et
al., 2013; Joshi, et al., 2013; Broad, 2006). As well as providing aid, the Bank supplied
advice from its well-resourced research unit to recipient countries and development agencies
which, in turn, shaped the development policy environment on a global scale (Broad, 2006;
Storey, 2000; Goldman, 2005).
The Rehabilitation of the State
The harshness of neoliberal policy as practised by the IFIs in the 1980s led to a
reassessment and realignment of policy in the 1990s (Denizer et al., 2011; Haynes, 2008;
Sorensen, 2010). The 1990 World Development Report of the World Bank (WDR)
demonstrated its new commitment to poverty reduction (Thorbecke, 2007; Sorensen, 2010).
While still maintaining stabilisation and adjustment as its key objectives, the IFIs committed
themselves to institutional and governance reforms to remove perceived barriers to growth
(Sorensen, 2010; Rodrik, 2006; de Haan, 2009). The result was a focus on issues such as anti-
corruption policies, democratisation, increased efficiency of bureaucracies, strengthening
judicial systems and other elements of ‘good governance’ (Thorbecke, 2007; Sorensen,
2010).
This shift in emphasis was accompanied by a renewed interest in the need for a dynamic
state in development, along with greater country ownership of policies and reforms. This was
57
reflected in the1997 World Development Report ‘The State in a Changing World’ (World
Bank, 1997). In 1999, the World Bank and IMF introduced Poverty Reduction Strategies
(PRSs) which were a significant change in the way developing countries received aid. The
PRSs were designed as a broader process with a high degree of country ownership. The
framework aimed to integrate poverty analysis, public policy, macroeconomic policies,
budgetary processes and monitoring systems in a participatory way. The PRSs were
formalised for each country in a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) which was
prepared by recipient country governments in participation with donors and included all aid
and not just that from the IFIs (Caillods et al., 2004; IMF, 2014).
The UN Summits and the MDGs
The new approach incorporated many of the IFIs policy shifts during the 1990s,
including greater concern with the state and country ownership, poverty reduction,
institutions and governance The 1990s were also a time of increased focus on development in
terms of human well-being and a view that the preoccupation with GNP had obscured the real
aims of development (Hulme, 2009; Hulme et al., 2010; Fukuda-Parr et al., 2011). The
decade culminated in the UN Millennium Declaration of 2000 and the subsequent
formulation of the eight Millennium Development Goals which placed ending global poverty
at the core of development policy (Fukuda-Parr et al., 2011; Anstee, 2013; Fukuda-Parr,
2013). This change was not without controversy, with some scholars arguing that it distracted
from building national capacities and distorted the research- and intellectual agendas (Hulme,
2009; Gore, 2010; Fukuda-Parr et al., 2011). It did, however, allow for the emergence of a
broad consensus between donors, states and INGOs over goals, made the idea of ending
poverty both specific and concrete and gave a vehicle with which to communicate this idea to
governments, donors, INGOs and the public (Fukuda et al., 2011; Nelson, P., 2007; Hulme et
al., 2010).
The declaration of the MDGs was not a sudden development but the result of antecedents
which can be traced back to the ‘Four Freedoms’ speech of President Roosevelt in 1941
(Hulme, 2009). However, 1990 was a pivotal year in the process of poverty reduction
becoming a subject of global goal-setting in development (Hulme, 2009). The 1990 World
Development Report by the World Bank on Poverty and the first Human Development Report
by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) focused on the need for a broad-
58
based conceptualisation of poverty and for poverty-reduction policies to focus on ends as
well as on means. At the same time, the UN, whose influence had been overshadowed by the
IFIs during the 1970s and 1980s, instigated a number of international summits in the 1990s
aimed at redefining the world agenda on social and economic issues (Pianta, 2005; Sorensen,
2010). The Summits differed from typical UN meetings in that they included INGOs, donor
agencies and the media, as well as national governments.
The UN Summits of the 1990s were mounted in the face of considerable scepticism and
opposition (Fukudu-Parr et al., 2009). However, while the World Conference on Education
for All in Jomtien in 1990 stimulated little response, the UN World Summit for Children
resulted in UNICEF advancing an agenda for improving the lives of the world’s children and
showed that successful summits could generate political commitment (Hulme, 2009). This
summit set specific goals and in many ways provided the model for following summits. In
1992 the UN Conference on the Environment and Development, or ‘Earth Summit’, was held
at Rio de Janeiro. It succeeded in raising awareness of environmental issues but was unable to
achieve a global consensus on large issues such as climate change and deforestation. This
was followed in December 1992 by the International Conference on Food and Nutrition in
Rome, which, while having a much lower public profile, did set the target of halving the
number of hungry people in the world which was to become one of the MDGs. The World
Conference on Human Rights in 1993 reaffirmed the principles which were to underlie the
MDGs and also led to the establishment of the Office of High Commissioner of Human
Rights. In 1994 the International Conference on Population and Development (ICDP) in
Cairo marked the inclusion of population as a development issue, but also revealed the
tensions between human-rights based approaches to reproductive and sexual health and the
views of some religious groups and countries. This was to be an area of contention
throughout the MDG process (Friedman, 2003).
Two important summits followed in 1995. The World Summit for Social Development,
which took place in Copenhagen, was designed to be a synthesis of all the previous Summits
and Conferences (Hulme 2009; Hulme et al., 2009). It was built around the three main issues
of poverty reduction, employment and social integration, although poverty-reduction
dominated. Support for the Summit from governments was unprecedented, with 117 heads of
state and government attending. This support gave the final Copenhagen Declaration
‘exceptional legitimacy’ (Hulme, 2009:11). The Declaration was not radical, described by
59
scholars as ‘market-friendly state interventions’ (Eyben, 2006:598) and was influenced by the
paradigm of economic rational choice theory. It did, however, lead to Poverty Reduction
Strategies and the first Millennium Development Goals (Eyben, 2006; Hulme, 2009). The
UNDP described Copenhagen as ‘…a giant step forward…with the new political
commitment to eradicate poverty’ (UNDP 1997:108 cited Hulme, 2009:108) The Declaration
articulated the concept of multi-dimensional poverty and committed the participants to the
eradication of poverty, the achievement of full employment, the protection of human rights,
the achievement of gender equality and the securing of increased resources for social
development and universal access to primary education and health care (Fukuda-Parr et al.,
2009).
The UN Fourth World Conference on Women took place in Beijing six months later with
over 30,000 women’s rights advocates attending. It was the result of a long process of skilled
and disciplined lobbying begun by the transnational women’s movement in the period
between the 1970s and 1990s (Friedman, 2003). The women’s movement had learned to use
the political opportunities opened up by the UN Conferences and Summits to organise and
expand. As a result they had been successful in ‘gendering the agenda’ of all the global
conferences in the 1990s by presenting a shared framework through networks and coalitions
(Friedman, 2003; Eyben 2006). Beijing offered the chance to present another paradigm of
development based on transformational change, which was articulated as an explicit agenda
in the Beijing Platform for Action (Eyben, 2006). However, this paradigm did not share the
success of the Copenhagen Declaration, despite the energy behind it. Eyben argues that one
reason for this is that development as a construct does not give sufficient importance to the
role of power, society, and culture in shaping history and the lives of individuals (Eyben,
2006). Nevertheless, while Beijing may have failed to transform the paradigm of
development to one of social transformation, the transnational women’s movement did
succeed in gendering all the major themes dealt with by the global conferences of the 1990s
and had mainstreamed gender analysis into areas previously considered ‘gender-neutral’
(Friedman, 2003). This was their central gain.
While the UN was taking back some of the leadership which it had lost to the IFIs during
the 1970s and 1980s, the OECD aid agencies were entering a period of crisis, with ODA
allocations declining (Hulme et al., 2009). The OECD-DAC wanted to find a new way of
engaging with donor governments and stimulating aid flows. A Groupe de Réflexion [Study
60
Group] was set up in 1995 to develop a list of achievable, specific and measurable goals that
would be appealing for OECD politicians and their publics (Hulme, 2009). The junior
bureaucrats charged with the task drew up a coherent list from the declarations agreed at UN
summits (Hulme et al., 2009). The document they finally produced, ‘Shaping the 21st
Century: The Contribution of Development Cooperation’ (OECD-DAC, 1995), presented a
list of targets called the International Development Goals (IDGs). These were grouped under
economic, social and environmental headings. Implementation of the IDGs faced a number of
barriers. They were the product of minor ministries in wealthy countries and thus had little
resonance with wealthy governments, developing countries and a number of INGOs.
However, due to the energetic support of Claire Short, the Secretary of State for International
Development in the UK, the IDGs achieved far more acceptance than originally expected.
Most importantly, they introduced the concept of measurable, specific targets as a medium of
communicating development to the public, to governments and to aid agencies (Hulme, 2009;
Hulme et al., 2009).
During the time that the IDGs were being developed and presented, the UN was looking
for ways to use the upcoming Millennium Assembly to re-assert its role in development and
win back its declining credibility (Hulme. 2009). The Assembly was the focus of intense
lobbying by activists, INGOs and aid agencies. Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-General, took
personal responsibility for producing the document which would provide the basis for the
Millennium Declaration. He was keen to win a commitment from the members of the UN to
reforming the organisation and financing it. The ensuing Report, We the Peoples: The Role of
the United Nations in the 21st Century (Annan, 2000), was the work of bureaucrats within the
UN and was based on the results of Conferences and Summits which could be agreed to by
all members. It differed from the OECD-DAC report ‘Shaping the 21st Century’ by being
longer and covering a much wider range of topics and a very different set of poverty
education goals (Hulme, 2009). The need to win acceptance from all members meant that
gender equality and women’s empowerment, reproductive health and health goals were
weakened, while economic growth, setting of goals for the rich countries, the environment
and the highlighting of Africa’s problems, were strengthened.
Kofi Annan also needed to demonstrate that the UN was coordinating with the other
major players in development, particularly the IFIs. In 2000, a common document, A Better
World for All: Progress towards the International Development Goals was put out by the
61
IMF, OECD, UN and World Bank (IMF, OECD, UN and IMF, 2000). However, the launch
of the report revealed that the process of setting global-poverty reduction targets was a ‘twin-
track’ one, with the OECD and UN working on competing lists. At the same time, the UN
was having to deal with intense lobbying over the final text of the Millennium Declaration,
with the OECD making it clear that it wanted the IDGs to be the goals while UN member
states, INGOs, social movements and private businesses each pressed their case. The UN
developed a useful device to deal with these pressures, dividing the resolutions into two
paragraphs. Items in Paragraph 19, beginning ‘We resolve further’ were to be included in the
‘road map’ of the Secretary-General. Those in Paragraph 20, beginning with ‘We also
resolve’, were not included as concrete items to be implemented. This ingenious technique
and the hard work of UN personnel paid off, with the Millennium Declaration being
unanimously accepted on 8th
September 2000.
The issue of two sets of competing goals existing globally, however, still remained and
needed to be resolved before Kofi Annan could put together the Road Map towards the
Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration (UN, 2001). This resolution
was reached at a meeting convened by the World Bank in March 2001 in Washington, at
which it was agreed that the two agendas would be merged. The IFIs would continue to be
responsible for the national Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and the UN would
manage the MDG process (Hulme et al., 2010).These compromises meant that Kofi Annan
could complete the Road Map containing the eight MDGs,6 by 2001.
The process had been an ongoing one, with input from states, donors and INGOs and
was shaped by the differing powers and strategies available to these actors, as well as their
often conflicting goals (Hulme, 2009). While the process of drawing up the Millennium
Declaration was driven by the UN, the final MDGs were strongly influenced by the large
donors, particularly the OECD and the IFIs. The Summits and Conferences had made room
for active lobbying by INGOs and activists and this shaped many of the outcomes. The
interests of states diluted gender issues, while many developing countries and INGOs argued
6The eight Millennium Goals: MDG 1: Halve the proportion of people living in extreme poverty and hunger;
MDG 2: Achieve universal primary education; MDG 3: Promote gender equality and empower women;
MDG 4: Reduce child mortality; MDG 5: Improve maternal health; MDG 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria
and other infectious diseases; MDG 7: Ensure environmental sustainability, and MDG 8: Develop a global
partnership for development.
62
that the MDGs still represented global capitalism and the market economy and reflected the
interests of the wealthy states and large donors (Fukuda-Parr et al., 2011; Hulme, 2009).
The UN Summits and the MDGs were the outcome of an almost unprecedented
participatory political process between civil society groups, donor nations and developing
countries (Fukuda-Parr, 2010; Fukuda-Parr et al., 2009; Hulme, 2007). Despite the apparent
unity, however, tensions and conflicting positions had marked the process and continued to
be features of policy-making to combat global poverty (Nelson, 2007; Vandemoortele, 2009;
Manning, 2010). The impact of MDGs on policy and behaviour varied from country to
country and between institutions. While many donor countries did talk extensively about the
MDGs in domestic dialogue to support aid spending, their policy documents dealt with areas
not specifically covered by the MDGs (Manning, 2010). The US was suspicious of the UN
and, like Japan, did not mention the MDGs in its development policies in 2003 (Hulme,
2009). Attitudes among donors also varied. While the EU donor countries committed strongly
to them, the MDGs made little impact on the IFIs who shared the wariness of the US towards
the UN (Fukuda-Parr et al., 2009; Manning, 2010; Hulme et al, 2010). Global civil society
was distrustful of the motives of donor organisations such as the OECD-DAC and the World
Bank, accusing them of attempting to use the MDGs as a ‘one size fits all’ measuring stick to
gain support for donor-centric views of aid (Manning, 2010; Vandemoortele, 2009; Nelson,
2007).. The impact on the allocation of aid resources is hard to determine, although it does
seem that there was an increase in spending in the social sectors (Manning, 2010). However,
there are also criticisms that responses tended to focus on areas which give quick and
measurable results, such as the eradication of specific diseases without addressing the social
and physical factors which cause them (Molyneux, 2008; Fukuda-Parr, 2008). It is argued
that the global focus on absolute poverty works against achieving poverty reduction in certain
counties with low resources and for the chronically- but less-than-abjectly poor (Tomlinson,
2000; Vandemoortele, 2009; Clemens et al., 2007).
While donors have varied in their willingness to incorporate the MDGs into policy, the
uptake with developing countries has been much stronger (Manning, 2010). A study by
Fukuda-Parr of 22 PRSPSs showed that almost all stated a commitment to the MDGs
(Fukuda-Parr, 2008). However, the focus was often selective and mirrored the priorities of
donors, suggesting that PRSPs and MDGs were being used to achieve donor goals (Manning,
2010; de Barra, 2005; Fukuda-Parr, 2010). PRSPs consistently emphasised income poverty
63
and growth, including social investments for health and education, but were far less
concerned with MDGs dealing with empowerment and inclusion of the most vulnerable
(Fukuda-Parr, 2010). The lag in achieving MDGs at country-level suggested a lack of
ownership by national governments and a degree of politicisation of the goals by donors
through PRSPs (de Barra, 2005; Hulme et al., 2010; Gutner, 2010). While the MDGs have
arguably achieved some change in international values and norms, there remain debates about
whether they have been used by proponents of growth and economic development and
whether other frameworks such as human rights might be more effective agents of change for
the poor (Nelson, 2007; de Barra, 2005; Tomlinson, 2000).
The Paris Declaration
Despite these moves, developing countries still felt the need for a new global partnership,
allowing greater involvement of developing countries in the global economy and recognising
the need for national ownership and leadership in development (Missoni, 2013; de Haan,
2009). These concerns were expressed in the 2002 Monterrey Consensus which called for
more innovative sources of funding, opening up the way for new and more varied actors into
development funding (Missoni 2013). The OECD-DAC 2001 ‘Guidelines on Poverty
Reduction’ (OECD, 2001) had already encouraged the idea of public-private partnerships,
while large philanthropic organisations such as the Gates Foundation entered the field. The
increased fragmentation in the aid industry which this created stimulated the creation of a
Working Party on Aid Effectiveness in 2003 (Missoni, 2013).
The culmination of the efforts of the Working Party was the Paris Declaration on Aid
Effectiveness in 2005. It defined the five pillars of aid effectiveness as ownership, alignment,
harmonisation, management for results and mutual accountability (OECD, 2005). It was
followed up in 2008 by the Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Accra which
included representatives from a far wider range than ever before, with traditional developing
donor and developing counties, the UN and multilateral agencies and civil society
organisations (CSOs), and emerging economies and donors attending. The Forum set the
agenda for achieving the goals of the Paris Declaration as quickly as possible, emphasising
improvement in ownership, partnership and results-based development. The Busan
Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation was signed at the fourth High Level
Forum in Busan in 2011. It was hailed as a re-shaping of the architecture of international
64
development cooperation and included traditional OECD-DAC donors, South-South co-
operators, the BRICs countries, civil society organisations and private funders.7
The Four High Level Fora and the documents issuing from them were a response to
concerns by recipient countries at the lack of coordination between donors, their lack of
alignment with the systems of recipient countries, the complexity and duplication of donor
procedures and their lack of transparency (de Haan, 2009). The Paris Declaration affirmed
that developing countries were responsible for their destinies and therefore needed to draft
their own policies with support from donor countries. UN and donors should align their
system with those of developing countries, using the instructions and procedures of the latter,
and should not establish alternative systems within recipient countries. To avoid burdening
developing countries with a multitude of complex and duplicated systems, donors should
coordinate policies and programmes. The focus for development needed to be on results
rather than the amount of money spent, while donors and recipients needed to be mutually
accountable and responsible for outcomes.
While there have been some encouraging indications of progress towards some of the
goals of the Paris Declaration, there has also been a great deal of criticism and disquiet
(Wood et al., 2013; Nunnenkamp et al., 2013; Sjostedt, 2013; Bigsten et al, 2013; Owa,
2011; Booth, 2012; Winter, 2012). Early monitoring reports on the uptake of the principles of
the Paris Declaration were disappointing, with coordination among donors even weakening,
although the most recent OECD reports show limited progress in donor coordination
(Nunnenkamp et al., 2013; Roberts, 2009; Zimmermann et al., 2008; Owa, 2011). Observers
suggest a number of reasons for the low level of progress overall. One is the complex
political economy of the international aid system and the failure of donors to manage it
(Nunnenkamp et al., 2013; Hyden, 2008; Booth, 2012; Zimmermann et al., 2008; Bigsten et
al., 2014).
Others identify inherent contradictions between the Principles which make achieving
then problematic (Hyden, 2008; Sjostedt, 2013; Roberts, 2009; Zimmermann et al., 2008).
Issues arising from the nature of the aid system itself hinder the process of increasing country
ownership and alignment (Cameron et al, 2012; Nunnenkanp et al., 2013). The development
policies of most receiving countries are based on PRSPs and are thus still strongly influenced
7 The BRICs countries refers to Brazil, Russia, India and China,
65
by donors (Booth, 2012; Zimmermann et al., 2008; Zimmermann et al., 2005). Recipient
countries often lack the capacity to develop alternative policies and are stretched to meet the
administrative demands of alignment and country ownership (Roberts, 2009; Owa, 2011).
Mutual accountability is thus scarcely transparent when the donor country is reporting on
policies which they helped to formulate through the PRSP process.
Donor preferences also shape the nature and extent of alignment, as they tend to choose
agencies or projects which are ‘low risk’ in terms of corruption and potential results.
However, this may result in inadvertently supporting a politically biased project on the basis
of superior programming (Winter, 2013). Even the quest for ‘corruption-free aid’ may result
in aid only being used in areas of the society which are unrelated to or insulated from the
local context (Bigsten et al., 2014).
Booth maintains that in many ways the concept of country ownership has been loaded
with so many concerns and assumptions that it is in danger of losing its original usefulness
(Booth, 2012). An example is the assumption that recipient countries have political leaders
who are development-oriented, a view which reflects a lack of understanding of the political
and cultural realities (ibid; Cameron et al., 2012). Donors need to understand the
complexities of balancing country ownership, results-based aid, alignment harmonisation and
mutual accountability. A number of observers argue that harmonisation and ownership create
tensions, with the movement of donors from project level to higher levels of political
decision-making demanding greater political skills of donors than they necessarily have
(Owa, 2011; Hyden, 2008; Nunnenkamp et al, 2013; Sjostedt, 2013; Roberts, 2009;
Gulrajani, 2014).
Tensions also exist between the principles of country ownership and results-based
management, where ownership requires that aid should ideally be channelled into the central
budget of the recipient country (Sjostedt, 2013). However, results-based aid means that the
donor must constantly monitor its partner country, with the knowledge that the outcomes of
the monitoring and reporting will affect aid prioritisation (Sjostedt, 2013). Alignment, too,
becomes problematic where donors must balance the expectations of their domestic
constituencies with the ‘on the ground’ realities of clientelism, corruption and under-
resourced local bureaucracies (Roberts, 2009; Booth, 2012; Gulrajani, 2014; Zimmermann et
66
al., 2008). This is often exacerbated by the lack of understanding by donors of the political
and cultural environment in which they are working (Booth, 2012; Hyden, 2008; Owa, 2011).
A number of critiques of the progress of the implementation of the Paris Declaration,
Accra Agenda and the 2011 Busan Partnership have identified disappointing outcomes with
harmonisation, the principle over which donors potentially exert the most control (Bigsten et
al, 2014; Gulrajani, 2014; Nunnenkamp et al., 2013; Winters, 2012; Wood et al., 2013).
Harmonisation offers the potential to reduce transaction costs, simplify negotiations with
recipient countries and lessen the burden of administration on the bureaucracies of
developing countries (Bigsten et al.; Owa, 2011; Winter, 2012; Roberts, 2009). However,
despite the apparent advantages of harmonisation for donors, they have been slow to act
(Wood et al., 2013; Gulrajani, 2014). Political and cultural differences between donors act as
barriers (Winter, 2014; Nunnenkamp et al., 2013; Cameron et al., 2012). Donors are
institutionally accountable to taxpayers in their country of origin and often have political or
strategic policies to be considered (Nunnenkamp et al, 2013; Owa, 2011; Bigsten et al.,
2014). Further, donors are competitive and need to maintain their profiles as strong and
virtuous donors (Owa, 2011; Nunnenkamp et al., 2013; Hyden et al., 2008; Sjostedt, 2013).
Harmonisation is often also hampered by the nature of donor bureaucracies, with quick
turnover of staff lack of long-term commitment and often perverse incentives by rewarding
quantity rather than quality in aid allocation (Cameron et al., 2012; Winter, 2013; Gulrajani,
2014).
A number of writers have criticised donors for their lack of lack of understanding of and
skill in the political dimensions of achieving the goals of the Paris Declaration and its
associate documents (Hyden, 2008; Cameron et al., 2012; Bigsten et al., 2014; Nunnenkamp
et al., 2013). Their political ‘naivety’ about the nature of recipient governments’ commitment
to development goals can lead to a privileging of politicians and groups with narrower local
goals, such as advancing ethnic or party interests (Booth, 2012; Roberts,2009; Winter, 2012).
Lack of knowledge of local politics and putting the priority on technical and programming
expertise can lead to aid unwittingly resourcing one political group against another and
preventing disputes being resolved by local political processes (Winter, 2012). This
undermines collective action for good development outcomes and can replace country
ownership with government ownership of development, sidelining some groups and
organisations (Booth, 2012; Roberts, 2009). Donors are faced with complex political choices
67
in situations where governments are based on patrimonial and clientelist principles. Directing
aid through safer channels offers better outputs, but risks weakening government ownership
of development (Winter, 2012; Roberts, 2009; Sjostedt, 2013; Bigsten et al, 2014).
The donor environment is also the site of complex dynamics operating as a result of
differing goals, expectations and accountabilities, and donors need to be aware of this
(Bigsten et al., 2014; Hyden, 2008; Nunnenkamp, et al., 2013). Greater use of political
economy analysis both in the interactions between donors and each other, with recipient
governments and within recipient countries, longer commitments to countries and the
willingness to accept slow progress and to engage with high-risk areas such as legal reform
are suggested as steps which may strengthen donor capacity to achieve the aims of the Paris
Declaration (Cameron et al, 2012; Nunnenkamp, 2013; Booth, 2012; Hyden, 2008; Wood,
2013; Bigsten et al., 2014).
While the four High Level Fora were able to reach a number of global agreements, the
aid environment became more diverse and fluid during the 2000s (Kragelund, 2011;
Zimmermann et al., 2011; Mawdsley et al., 2012). The importance of ODA was declining as
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) increased, and aid was losing credibility with partner
nations because of its slowness and the inertia of the system (Gore, 2013). Many recipient
countries felt disillusioned by the failure to follow through on commitments made at the 2002
Monterrey Consensus (Chin et al., 2013). While the OECD-DAC donors continued to
dominate aid in terms of volume, new donors were entering the arena, offering alternatives to
recipient countries and challenging the theories and practices of traditional donors (Gore,
2013; Dreher et al., 2011; Keeley, 2012; Mawdsley et al., 2014).
The OECD-DAC International Aid System and Emerging Donors
The UN aid and development institutions and philosophies outlined in the previous
section were increasingly overshadowed by a parallel system, the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and its development arm, the Development
Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC). That system was controlled by a core group of
members, selected by wealth. Membership of the DAC as a donor country was based on strict
criteria based on their capacity to manage a national aid programme. The OECD-DAC also
decides which nations are eligible to receive ODA). These countries include all low- and
68
middle-income countries based on gross national income (GNI) per capita as published by
the World Bank8).
A complex mix of idealism and confidence in the superiority of Western knowledge,
technology, and economic, political and military self-interest gave rise to the OECD-DAC
international aid system. Officially, the system exists to take less developed countries in an
‘orderly’ way (Gore, 2000:789) to a more developed level through transforming their
economies, and has been responsible in large part for producing the dominant meta-narratives
of world historic development and theories of development (Tvedt, 2006; Rist, 1997). The
OECD-DAC system has enjoyed strong control over membership, (OECD, 2013a, b, c, d;
Tvedt, 2006). It also has official relationships with a wide range of international bodies and
organisations such as the IFIs and UN bodies (OECD 2014, a, c, d, e). It includes funding
from multilateral donors and private funding, including INGOs, in the calculation of ODA.
The annual OECD Forum brings together country ministers and leaders from business, labour
and non-governmental organisations to discuss key issues on the ministerial agenda with
government ministers and senior officials of international organisations.
The OECD-DAC system division of nations into donors and recipients has become more
difficult as the world has become more complex (Gore, 2013; Zimmermann et al., 2011;
O’Keefe, 2007; Reisen, 2008). Five major groups providing development assistance can be
identified. The traditional OECD-DAC donor countries have been joined by non-OECD-
DAC government donors, global funds, private foundations such as the Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation and INGOs (Gore, 2013). Zimmermann and Smith identify three sub-
groups in the non-OECD-DAC government section (Zimmermann et al., 2011). One sub-
group, including the Eastern and Central European countries, tend to follow OECD-DAC
practices and policies. The second, comprising the large economies of Brazil, Russia, India,
China and South Africa, or the BRICS group, and the ‘Asian tiger’ countries, are focused on
South-South cooperation rather than working through the OECD-DAC and do not see
themselves as donors. The third non-OECD-DAC group are Arab donors, who are
comfortable with being described as donors but do not align their policies with OECD-DAC
norms.
8 The list excludes G8 members, EU members, and countries with a firm date for entry into the EU. The list
also includes all of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) as defined by the United Nations DAC List of
ODA Recipients, www.oecd.org/dac/stats/daclist. (Resources accessed: 28.02.2015.)
69
It is difficult to quantify the amount of ODA coming from non-OECD-DAC sources,
although Zimmermann and Smith suggest at that it represents at least 8% of total ODA
(Zimmermann et al., 2011). However, the impact of the new donors on the aid environment
has gone beyond the amount of aid. First, they have offered an alternative to the dominance
of the Western discourse on development. While there are numerous differences among the
emerging donors’ policies and approaches, there are a number of common themes which
challenge traditional donors and make the new donors attractive to recipient countries (Chin
et al., 2013; Soderberg, 2010; Kragelund, 2011). They strongly stress their ‘Southern’
identity, and argue that this gives them an understanding of the experience of receiving aid
and of being colonised (Eyben et al, 2013; Chin et al., 2013).
The BRICs group, and South East Asian ‘tigers’ in particular, reject the ‘aid donor’
model and describe their relationship with recipient countries as being South-South
Cooperation (Eyben et al, 2013;Mawdsley et al., 2014). Such cooperation has emphasised
non-interference in the internal affairs of the recipient state and mutual respect and benefit as
well as a lack of conditionality and focus on training and transferring knowledge (Keeley,
2012; Chin et al., 2012; Soderberg, 2010; Krugelund, 2011). Their preferred models echo
their own experiences as aid recipients in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. There is an emphasis
on infrastructure investment, industrialisation and economic growth, moving away from the
poverty reduction, governance and human rights agenda of the OEDC-DAC bloc (Chin et al.,
2013; Zimmermann et al., 2011; Kragelund, 2011). It is made quite clear by many of the
emerging donors that “cooperation means ‘mutual self-interest’”, with the country providing
aid benefiting from access to contracts, commerce and resources (Eyben, 2013:79; Soderberg,
2010; Mawdsley et al., 2014).
Recipient countries have welcomed many aspects of the new models but they have
attracted criticism from traditional donors (Dreher et al., 2011; Zimmermann et al., 2011;
Kragelund, 2011). They have expressed concern that the ‘non-interference’ policy would
enable dictatorship, corruption and poor governance (Kragelund, 2011; Chin et al., 2012).
Other criticisms have included weak targeting of aid, selfish aid motivation, tying aid and
poor coordination of aid (Dreher et al., 2011; Besharati, 2013; Keeley, 2012; Kragelund,
2011; Zimmermann et al., 2011). Recipient nations, on the other hand, see the policy of non-
interference in their internal affairs as mutual respect. More fundamentally, the new donors
offer an alternative discourse to what had been the sole narrative offered by the rich Western
70
nations, which gave them a sense of room to manoeuvre. Most of the new donors had not
achieved their prosperity through the Washington Consensus and had, in many cases, been
colonies themselves.
The extent of the fragmentation in the aid environment became clear at the Busan
Conference, which was originally called to review the progress of the Paris Declaration
(Eyben et al., 2013). However, the challenges to the West-North definitions of development
dominated and were reflected in the outcome document, the Busan Partnership Document for
Effective Development Cooperation (OEDC, 2011; Eyben et al., 2013; Chin et al., 2013).
The use of the term ‘effective development’ rather than ‘effective aid’ in the document
illustrated the increasing negativity with which aid was viewed and the capacity of new
donors to influence the discourse (Eyben et al, 2013; Mawdsley et al., 2014). The Partnership
highlighted ownership, a focus on results, partnership and transparency and shared
responsibility, and included a commitment to ‘broaden support for South-South and
triangular cooperation, recognising ‘horizontal partnerships’ and the greater diversity of the
aid environment (OECD, 2011:3).
However, while the Partnership recognises and attempts to accommodate the increasing
complexity of the aid and development environment, critics question whether it is capable of
achieving this goal (Kim et al., 2013; Besharati, 2013; Eyben et al, 2013). Kim et al., for
example (Kim et al., 2013) acknowledges that it includes new donors and represents a shift to
the paradigm of development effectiveness, but argues that there is still a commitment to the
aid effectiveness agenda (Kim et al., 2013). There is also debate around the meaning of basic
terms such as ‘differential commitments’ and even ‘emerging development partners’, the
differences between South-South cooperation and North-South cooperation, different
discourses on the meaning of development and a lack of empirical evidence to help resolve
these issues (Besharati, 2013;Gore, 2013; Chin et al, 2013; Dreher et al., 2011). The
emergence of new fora such as the G20, summits of the BRICS leaders, national development
banks and state export-import banks reinforce the reluctance of South-South Development
Cooperation countries to engage with the OEDC-DAC (Chin et al., 2013; Zimmermann et
al., 2011; Eyben et al, 2013; Eyben, 2013). In the face of such divergent forces it seems that
likely that, in the future, the vertical Western-based system of aid will evolve in to a multi-
centred international structure with horizontal South-South linkages as well as vertical North-
71
South connections at regional and transnational levels (Golub, 2013; Mawdsley et al., 2014;
Eyben, 2013; Eyben et al, 2013).
As the foregoing review of the evolution of the institutions and theory of development
aid has shown, since the Second World War there have been innumerable paradigm shifts in
the roles of states, donors and INGOs. During the 1950s and 1960s the state was the engine
of development but by the 1980s it was seen as a barrier to the market forces that were
perceived to be the essential preconditions for growth. This neoliberal assumption was then
shaken by the failure of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) of the 1980s, giving
way to the partial re-birth in the 1990s of confidence about the capacity of the state to
facilitate economic growth. Critically, the state’s role was to now facilitate market forces, a
policy priority driven by donor convictions about the efficacy of neo-liberal approaches. The
World Bank and IMF in particular shaped the policy environment from the late 1970s
onwards.
In the following sections I examine the World Bank’s ‘Tripartite Model’ of state-market-
INGO interactions as a specific example of how neo-liberal theories were supposed to work. I
then explain the criticisms of the Tripartite Model by Hulme and Edwards whose influential
work pointed to the rigidity and unrealistic expectations that characterised it. The alternative
model constructed by Hulme and Edwards (1997) belongs to a larger body of work stressing
the importance of the role of domestic politics and the question of state legitimacy in
analysing development.
The Tripartite Model of State-Market-INGO
Relationships
The Tripartite Model has shaped much of aid practice and the interactions between state,
donors and INGOs since disillusionment with the progress of development in the 1970s and
1980s saw the growth in influence of neoliberal economic theory in donor circles (Denizer et
al., 2011; World Bank, 2005). The imprudent lending and borrowing of petrodollars at low
interest rates, combined with a surge in interest rates in the late 1970s, led to a debt crisis in
the 1980s. Bilateral donor policy sought to avert a global financial crisis by enabling
developing countries to service their debts through stabilising and adjusting their economic
72
environments and policies (Thorbecke, 2000; Mosley, 1995). At the same time, the 1980s and
1990s saw an increasing commitment by the IFIs to neoliberal policy and theory (Hjertholm
et al., 2000; Thorbecke, 200l).
Neoliberalism, the theoretical and ideological base of the Tripartite Model, sees the
market, through its ability to use the naturally self-seeking behaviour of people to distribute
resources in a rational way, as the most effective agent of national development (Gore, 2000).
The aid system is conceptualised as three distinct organisational sectors, composed of a) the
government, b) commercial or market sector and c) the voluntary sector (World Bank, 1991).
Each sector has particular roles to play and uses distinctive means to mobilise resources to
these ends (Najam, 1996). The commercial, or market, sector produces and distributes goods
and services through free exchange. Operating within the framework of a stable legislative,
judicial and financial system, with established law and order and relying on an adequate
infrastructure, it needs to be free as far as possible from interventions by the state or civil
actors (World Bank, 1997). The role of the state, therefore, is to maintain social order and
control, which it achieves through the mechanisms of authority and legitimate coercion.
However, the state is seen as constrained from innovation by its need to obtain broad-based
consensus (World Bank, 1997; Munro et al., 1999). The voluntary sector, finally, mobilises
resources through shared values and expectations (World Bank, 1997; Munro et al., 1999).
No single sector acting alone can deliver all of society’s needs and so all three must work
together. However, their interactions are imperfect, as all are reluctant to give up power but
none is powerful enough to take sole control (Wood, 1997). The relationships between them
thus ebb and flow, as each seeks to achieve its ends while striving to retain its power. The
goal of the neoliberal development model (see Diagram 1.1) is to create an environment that
will allow the optimal functioning of the market. The state is ideally limited to its ‘proper’
role of organising and facilitating a free-market economy and liberal democracy while
INGOs are enabled to efficiently and competitively use their voluntary, independent and
private nature to provide services, advocate for vulnerable groups, and monitor and regulate
the state. Donors are responsible for developing aid policy and for providing funding to
encourage the conditions that will produce this outcome.
Figure 2.1 Tripartite Model of State-Market-INGO Relations
Source: World Bank WDR, 1997 State in a Changing World, p. 116
Interactions between States, Donors and INGOs in the Tripartite System
Neoliberalism is predisposed to seeing the state, particularly the Third World state, as
prone to capture by self-seeking politicians, bureaucrats and other interest groups, resulting in
government failures such as regulatory misuse, rent-seeking, corruption and inefficiency
(Chang, 2001; Brohman, 1996). It is typified as bureaucratic and paternalistic and is seen as
prone to discouraging participation, and inclined to implement policies developed by
powerful officials and technocrats (Uphoff, 1993, cited in Zaidi, 1999). The solution,
therefore, is to limit the role of the state, ideally standing apart from society (Radice, 2008).
74
The neoliberal view of the ‘proper’ role of the state has changed over time. From the
high point of the 1980s minimalist view of state action (coupled with an emphasis on the role
of the market), neoliberal practices in the 1990s have increasingly come to recognise a wider
role for the state in development (World Bank, 1997; Aron, 2003). However, they still
stopped short of giving the state a role as a direct economic actor, seeing it as a partner,
regulator and facilitator for the market (World Bank, 1997). This ‘framework state’ was
responsible for establishing a foundation of law and order, maintaining a pro-market policy
environment and for ensuring macroeconomic stability, investing in basic social services and
infrastructure, regulating and organising the overall provision of welfare services and
protecting the vulnerable and the environment (World Bank, 1997; Munro et al., 1999). In the
1990s, poverty alleviation resurfaced as the overarching donor goal, and with it, a wider
definition of the essential functions of the state, along with an increased concern to develop
its ability to perform these functions (WDR, 1991; World Bank, 1997).
The Tripartite Model encouraged and made possible a significant increase in INGO
involvement in development practice, particularly in the area of replacing or monitoring the
state (World Bank, 2004, 1997; Paul, 1991). The transformation of ‘development’ to a
political project in the 1950s and the establishment of an official aid system had seen INGOs
move from independent philanthropic societies to a more self-aware view of themselves as a
sector. The shift in official aid policy in the 1970s towards poverty alleviation and the
provision of services to vulnerable groups, albeit by the state, involved activities which
INGOs were experienced in. This opened up an interface between the INGOs and the official
aid system (Williams, 1997; Fowler, 2000a). From the 1980s, neoliberal theory increasingly
saw INGOs as natural agents for the provision of public goods where the market had failed
(World Bank, 1997; 1991a, b; Clayton et al., 2000). International condemnation of the social
hardships created by the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) led the World Bank and
the INGO lobby to call for INGOs to provide social protection and compensation for losses
(Cornia et al., 1987; Jolly, 1991; Pearce, 2000; World Bank, 1990). This shift in policy
presented INGOs with further opportunities for growth and funding from official donors and
brought them into the aid mainstream, a change that was strengthened by the World Bank’s
‘good governance’ policy of the 1990s (Doornbos, 2001; Clayton et al., 2000). This policy
valorised the role of ‘civil society’ as a third sector, outside both state and market, made up of
75
multitudinous organisations, including INGOs, which could regulate both the market and the
state by their combined activism (World Bank, 2004, 1997).
The increased involvement of INGOs through donor policy, including service provision
and programme implementation, was controversial and led to lively debates in donor-, INGO-
and academic literature (Hulme et al., 1997). Commentators have noted the irony of
increased INGO involvement and influence coming as a result of the growing dominance of
the neoliberal agenda and in the teeth of criticism from much of the INGO sector (Mitlin et
al., 2007; Wilks et al., 2000).
The role of donors in the Tripartite Model is to provide aid in a manner that encourages
the creation of a stable global economic, financial and trading environment based on free
market principles for the successful functioning of Northern economies, as well as raising
prosperity and reducing poverty in developing countries (Remenyi, 2004). Commentators
suggest that this demands a wide range of activities that combine capital-style investment
with society-wide change, implemented through the combined efforts of donors, INGOs,
lenders and state agencies (Goldman, 2005). To achieve their goals donors thus need to
influence the behaviour of both states and INGOs.
The Tripartite Model has tended to draw INGOs into closer relationships with donors
and states (Ossewarde et al., 2008; Cooley et al., 2002). INGOs are encouraged to serve as
alternative agents to the state, providing public services, advocacy, infrastructure, and
interacting with the state as the manager and partner of their activities (World Bank, 2004).
The state, for its part, is expected to limit interference with INGOs to its ‘proper’ role of
organisation and regulation of the third sector (Allison et al., 1993; Nelson, 2006).
At the same time, some commentators expressed concern that, while the Tripartite Model
acknowledges the sovereignty of beneficiary nation-states, it allows a disturbing amount of
interference by donors and external states in their internal policies, political practices and
institutions (Nelson, 2006; Gore, 2000). Through conditionality, technical advice and the use
of tied-, and food aid, donors have sought to encourage states to limit the size of their
bureaucracies, to alter monetary, fiscal and trade policies, to privatise state utilities, to engage
with private actors, to increase democratic practices and to limit corruption. The direct link in
donor policy between development and ‘good governance’ has produced greater involvement
by external governments in the internal state-building processes of beneficiary states
76
(Doornbos, 2001; Wood, 2005). Strengthening state institutions, governance and regulation,
and providing institutional safety nets became accepted by donors as essential for adjustment
to succeed (WDR, 1997). This was reflected in the literature by an increased concern with
policies that sought to bring about a wide range outcomes: limiting corruption and checking
arbitrary state action; strengthening the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law;
exposing state institutions to competition from the private and voluntary sectors; improving
the quality and performance of the bureaucracy; and increasing accountability to citizens
through voting and intermediary organisations (Doornbos, 2001; O’Reilly, 2010).
The World Bank and many of the bilateral donors have generated a large amount of
research and material – often quantitative and econometric in nature – arguing for the
effectiveness of this model and for the relations between states, INGOs and donors which it
has generated (Burnside et al., 2004; World Bank, 2005a, b, 2004, 2003). However, there has
also been criticism, as well as calls for change from within donor literature (World Bank,
2005a, 1997). The Tripartite Model has been criticised as being too normative and
universalistic, and lacking empirical analysis of the context of state-INGO-donor relations
and interactions (Robins et al., 2008). This context includes the international aid system, as
well as local political, cultural, historical and social factors (Lorgen, 1998; Mayhew, 2005;
Makoba et al., 2002). The issues around relationships are often not caught by mainstream
analysis either because they are political in nature or because they are linked to local and
specific factors (Lorgen, 1998; Mayhew, 2005).
Debates about the Role of the State in the Tripartite Model
A number of commentators have argued that donor and INGO analysis of the state is too
universalistic, seeing beneficiary states as simply ‘apolitical, technocratic implementers of
policy’ (Chang, 2001; Storey, 2000). The analysis fails to recognise that the state’s role as the
institution responsible for social cohesion and control is essentially political in nature
(Munro, 1999). It has been criticised for its tendency to see the state as prone to self-seeking
behaviour and to capture by interest groups (Aron, 2003). Commentators argue that this
underestimates the extent to which local moral and social norms can and do restrain self-
seeking political behaviour by individuals, groups and governments (Chang, 2001; Leonard,
2008). Donor and INGO assumptions can thus lead to a failure to strengthen altruistic
77
behaviour and may unwittingly reinforce perverse goals and strategies by local power groups
(Girishankar, 1999; Moore & Putzel, 1999; Hossain et al., 2002).
Some writers suggest that the Tripartite Model itself creates tensions and adversarial
relationships between states, donors and INGOs. The state has a number of reasons for
resenting the increased role and influence of INGOs. For example, from 1985-95 the
proportion of ODA directed through INGOs rose from 3.6% to 10% and by 2001 had grown
to between 15% and 20% (Hulme et al., 1997; Fugere, 2001). In 2009, DAC members,
excluding the EU institutions and the United States, directed 13% of their aid through NGOs
(OECD, 2011). Observers argue that while beneficiary governments, at one level, may
welcome the assistance in service provision or technical support, most would prefer direct
control over aid funds (Larbi, 1999). The literature has also raised issues around the impact of
the gap in resources on relationships between well-equipped donors and INGOs and
struggling governments. It is argued that such gaps can lead to jealousy and a reluctance by
the state to cooperate, along with a weakening of the state bureaucracy as badly-paid civil
servants are ‘poached’ by INGOs and donors. With this loss of key human resources
government bureaucracies lose the opportunity to gain experience as projects are contracted
out to INGOs (Knack et al., 2004; Berry, 2010; Lange, 2008). The universal and apolitical
nature of neoliberal analysis can overlook such local nuances (Rose, 2006).
The weakness of the model in recognising and addressing the issue of the accountability
of INGOs to the state has also been raised. Donor literature argues that INGOs, as service
providers, provide a ‘short route’ of accountability, cutting out the bureaucracy of the state
and allowing recipients of services to exert pressure directly on service providers as ‘clients’
(WDR, 2004; see Figure 2.2). However, others argue that the beneficiary state is the
institution ultimately accountable to its citizens for the quality of INGO work, and can
legitimately claim some control over INGOs activities, but often lack the capacity to regulate
them (Mayhew, 2005). As a result, states can feel by-passed or undermined by the shift to
INGO service-providers. In addition, there is a risk that they may lose their sense of
ownership of service provision when it is out-sourced to INGOs, which they see as being
more accountable to foreign donors (Rose, 2006; Osodo, 1998). Thus, donor policy may lead
to a reduced sense of accountability and responsibility by the state for the delivery of its
citizens’ public goods (Lorgen, 1998).
78
Figure 2.2 Key Relationships of Power in Service Delivery
Source: World Bank, 2004, p. 49
Debates about the Roles of Donors in the Tripartite Model
There has been debate and criticism within donor literature regarding the model’s
outcomes, as well as in INGO and academic sources (Moncrieffe et al., 2005; Pavanello et
al., 2008; World Bank, 2008; Armon, 2007). While still maintaining the centrality of the
market model of development, donor sources have argued that the ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach
and short-term technical responses have failed to produce lasting solutions, particularly in
building state capacity (Baird, 2011; World Bank, 2008). There has been particular concern
over the failure of policies generated by the model to understand the relationships and
interactions between stakeholders, political policies and social institutions (World Bank,
2008; Carlson et al., 2005). Many donor commentators insist that a greater understanding of
the local context – including the influence of history, institutions, power relationships,
ideologies and values, and country mapping of power relationships – is necessary for
engaging effectively in dialogues over policy (Moncrieff et al., 2005; Carlson et al., 2005).
The World Bank has acknowledged that there is a need to move away from the ‘rigid’ policy
and conditionalities of the structural adjustment era and to look at incentives for change
within countries (World Bank, 2008).
79
The programmes of the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development
(DFID) in Nepal, Afghanistan and Burma have reflected this increased sensitivity to political
environments (Berry et al., 2004). In Afghanistan, health was not a main DFID focus, but
building the legitimacy of the government was, and technical support for public
administration was a core strategy to achieve this. In 2004, DFID reported that, in accordance
with these goals and strategies, it supported the Ministry of Health through a number of
quick-impact projects, technical assistance and some budget assistance. The report claimed
that these actions had increased the ministry’s capacity to develop policy and planning.
Although these steps would not lead to an increase in services on the ground, DFID saw them
as contributing to its wider policy of ‘state-building’ and increasing people’s ‘belief in the
state’ (Berry et al., 2004, p. 8). Similarly, DFID’s work in health service provision in Nepal
was designed not only to provide much-needed services but also to demonstrate to
communities in rebel Maoist-held territory that the government was capable of delivering
services. The long-term view was that stronger state legitimacy would contribute to
resolution of the conflict (Berry et al., 2004). In Burma, by contrast, DFID was working in an
environment where the state’s legitimacy was in question, and there were dangers in being
seen to reward it by aid. To avoid appearing to endorse the legitimacy of the state, DFID
chose to work through the UN, as well as small, local NGOs and low levels of government in
AIDS/HIV projects (Berry et al., 2004).
Sources in the donor literature have argued for the importance of engaging with the state
and understanding local context, while engaging in more complex political analysis (WDR,
2004; Baird, 2011; World Bank, 2008). A number of commentators have advocated
identifying local incentives for reform rather than trying to impose change from outside
(World Bank, 2008; Pavarello et al., 2008; Moncrieff & Luttrell, 2005). Some suggest that a
greater understanding of the local political economy could help identify ‘points of entry’ or
‘pockets of effectiveness’ with which donors could engage (Carlson et al., 2005; Leonard,
2008).
Sources within donor literature also argue that much donor analysis of the role of the
state has given rise to a number of practices that weaken state capacity and accountability
(Carlson et al., 2005; Baird, 2011). These practices include parallel bureaucratic structures,
donor fragmentation, short-term technical experts and Project Implementation Units as
having perverse results on state capacity (WDR, 2004; Carlson et al., 2005). It is argued that
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donors instead need to support state legitimacy by strengthening the ‘long’ route of state
accountability (see Figure 2.2), where clients apply pressure on political sources rather than
on service providers (WDR, 2004; Pavarello et al., 2008).
Debates about the Role of INGOs in the Tripartite Model
Some INGO- and academic commentators have welcomed the greater involvement of
INGOs in development and aid that the Tripartite system encourages (Nelson, 2006). Others
have challenged the theoretical basis of the model, arguing that its neoliberal theoretical basis
limits human behaviour to individual or group self-interest and militates against an
understanding of a wide range of behaviour and structures, particularly political behaviour
(Mosley, 1995). This leads to a questioning of the model’s assumptions about the nature of
states and INGOs, the roles assigned to them by donor policy and the possibly perverse
outcomes of these on aid and development practice (Tvedt, 2006; Larbi, 1999).
For example, critics argue that the model’s assumptions that INGOs are virtuous and
altruistic are two-dimensional and depoliticising (Munro, 1999; Nelson, 2006). They point to
the diverse nature of the INGO sector as proof of the difficulty of making such broad claims
(Werker et al., 2008). Other commentators have challenged the belief that INGOs can be
effective monitors, watchdogs, advocates, educators and campaigners for the poor (Munro,
1999; Clayton et al., 2000). They argue that these outcomes assume an organised and well-
developed civil society, motivated by a commitment to the poor and free of self-interest,
assumptions that are not justified, given the heterogeneous nature of the INGO sectors and
the diverse environments in which they work (Hailey, 2000; Zaidi, 1999).
INGO scholarship has been accused of being too willing to believe INGOs’ own rhetoric
and failing to understand the complex relationships and pressures engendered by the aid
system (Nelson, 2006; Makoba, 2002). It is argued that their history of relations with
governments – often adversarial in nature – has meant that their skills are based around
campaigning or confrontation, making it difficult for them to negotiate or reach consensus
with political bodies (Mitlin et al., 2007). Critics contend that this limits INGOs’ ability to
fulfil their responsibilities to their constituents (Tandon, 2000). Commentators have called for
a greater sophistication in INGO research and analysis of their own nature, the aid system,
the state, donors and the relations between them (Fowler, 2000b, c; Williams et al., 2009).
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Such research would enable INGOs to appreciate the extent to which they are influenced by
states and donors, rather than seeing themselves as heroic individualists (Nelson, 2006).
This self-perception, commentators suggest, can hinder INGOs’ willingness to be
reflective and self-critical, allowing the perpetuation of unhelpful attitudes, practices and
beliefs about themselves and the agencies with which they are interacting (Easterly, 2007;
Tvedt, 2006). Some writers argue, for instance, that INGOs’ lack of self-awareness and
understanding of local political and cultural factors have resulted in their contributing
unwittingly to local violence in Rwanda (Uvin, 1997). Local studies have suggested that
INGOs can be drawn into reinforcing local patronage structures without realising it
(O’Reilly, 2010). This literature argues that such examples support the need for INGOs to
develop more nuanced analyses of themselves, which include a political dimension and the
awareness that their relationships with state and beneficiaries are shaped by dynamic external
and internal factors (Mercer, 2002; Lewis, 2006).
However, donors point to the increasing involvement of INGOs in service delivery and
aid disbursement from the mid-1980s as a vindication of the policy, arguing that state and
INGO roles complement each other (World Bank, 2005a, b; 2004, 2003; Brautigam et al.,
2007). However, critics argue that by their nature as values-based, ideological organisations,
INGOs lack the political skills to negotiate, compromise and bargain, which are necessary to
relate with the state, given its essentially political nature (Lewis, 2006; Mitlin et al., 2007;
Jaime, 2000). There are also historical and local factors acting as barriers to their involvement
with each other. INGOs have often been in an adversarial relationship with governments,
partly because of INGOs suspicion of ‘top-down’ development and partly because of their
commitment to acting for marginalised or disadvantaged groups (Tandon, 2000; Osodo et al.,
1998). INGOs, it is argued, are reluctant to engage with government due to concerns over co-
option by the state, the risks of their management cultures becoming more bureaucratic or
corrupt and the loss of their independence and scope to innovate (Fowler, 2000a; Sanyal,
1997).
There have been increasing challenges to donor confidence in the suitability of INGOs as
service deliverers (Werker et al., 2008). The extent of political and economic achievements
of INGO-led, bottom-up development has been questioned, as has their purported greater
efficiency (Werker et al., 2008; Clayton et al., 2000; Sanyal, 1997). Commentators argue that
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there is little evidence for the claim that NGOs are more accountable to their beneficiaries
than the state, and some evidence that they are less so (Werker et al.2008; Mayhew, 2005).
INGOs can withdraw from programmes and countries due to internal policy changes or
failure of funding (Tandon, 2000; Zaidi, 1999). Beneficiary governments have expressed
concerns about their own ability to monitor and regulate the quality of services supplied
(Lorgen, 1998). Even the claims that INGOs are closer to the most vulnerable have been
disputed (Sanyal, 1997).
One of the advantages of INGOs as service providers, cited in donor literature, is the
independent and competitive nature of INGOs (WDR, 2004; World Bank, 2003, 2001, 1991).
However, critics contend that these qualities create problems. They point to the lack of
cooperation and coordination between INGOs which, they argue, handicaps the development
of national frameworks and leads to duplication of service provision, piecemeal delivery,
regional imbalances and the possibility of political tension with the state (Sanyal, 1997;
Zaidi, 1999). Commentators have also questioned the ability of INGOs to handle the scale
and complexity of linkages at a national level (Clark, 1997; Zaidi, 1999). Criticism of the
Tripartite Model in INGO, academic and donor literature has stimulated alternative models,
such as the analysis by Hulme and Edwards, the subject of the next section of this chapter.
Dynamic Model of State-Donor-INGO Relations
Hulme and Edwards (1997) suggested a model based on seeing interactions between the
different agents as dynamic relationships in which the players have unique goals, both overt
and hidden, and access to both formal and informal power through the use of strategies
particular to their individual natures (see Figure 2.3; Hulme et al., 1997). They argue that
relations between states, donors and INGOs need to be seen in terms of bargaining and
negotiation strategies, although coercion is also possible. The actors are involved at multiple
levels with each other and dominance can change as resources and strategies vary (Hulme et
al, 1997). These relationships affect two main dimensions for their interactions. One is the
objectives or goals of the actors, both formal and informal, which they hope to achieve
through engaging with others. For instance, a government may espouse pro-poor goals
because of cultural or moral values or it may have a secondary goal of rewarding supporters
or gaining new ones. The second dimension is to do with the strategies or ‘levers’ which
states, donors and INGOs can employ to achieve these goals. These range from negotiations,
83
persuasion, financial inducement, the use of patronage networks and rewards and moral
pressure to coercion and the use of force (Hulme et al., 1997). This section explains in more
detail how the Hulme and Edwards approach can be used to explain what these goals and
strategies are and how they interact to shape interactions between states, donors and INGOs.
In doing this I draw on a wide number of sources beyond the work of Hulme and Edwards,
but nonetheless drawing on the same principles.
Figure 2.3 The Hulme and Edwards Dynamic model of NGO-state-donor
relations
Source: Hulme, D. & Edwards, M., 1997, p. 12
State Goals and Strategies in the Dynamic Model
One view of the modern nation-state is strongly influenced by Max Weber’s definition of
the state as ‘…a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate
use of physical force within a given territory (Weber, cited Lemert et al., 2010:115) As will
be discussed in more detail later (Section 4:3 in this chapter), states are concerned to maintain
this monopoly by establishing their legitimacy, which is the quality conferred on them by
those who are ruled by them and which makes them willing to accept this monopoly of force
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(Levi, 2009; Fritz et al., 2007; Bellina et al., 2009). Legitimacy is based on input or agreed
rules, output or the services, particularly security, which the state provides, shared beliefs and
international legitimacy (OECD, 2009; Bellina, et al., 2009; Fritz et al., 2007). Thus the goals
of the state are to establish agreed rules of procedure, provide services expected by its
citizens, achieve shared beliefs and establish international legitimacy.
Others argue, however, that it is too simplistic to transplant Western concepts,
institutions and rules onto those of developing countries and expect a Western type of state to
be established (Bellina et al, 2009; OECD, 2010, 2009). The states of developing countries
can better be described as hybrid states, where Western and traditional sources of legitimacy
co-exist (OECD, 2010, 2009; Hughes et al., 2003; Leftwich, 2009). These sources can
reinforce each other and produce outcomes satisfactory to both systems, or they can work
against each other (Easterly et al., 2008; Hossain et al., 2002). An example is the patronage
of elites, which in many developing countries is accepted as a source of legitimacy by most
people. While it seems to be against their self-interest, Bellina argues that it can provide some
accountability (Bellina, 2009).
It can therefore be expected that, as in Western nations, there is diversity among
developing nations when it comes to the beliefs, services, rules and level of international
recognition that underpin a state’s legitimacy (Bellina et al., 2009). The developing state has
to engage with several levels of legitimacy. At the international level, it must not only engage
with other states and international bodies to gain international recognition, but also with
donors whose aid programmes have influence on their internal affairs. Internally, it must
satisfy the requirements of donors that it establish and maintain the institutions, rules and
values appropriate to a modern liberal democracy, but it cannot afford to undermine domestic
legitimacy by rejecting traditional beliefs and values. Achieving these diverse goals is a
political process which can involve the use of force, exploitation of traditional sources of
influence, provision of services, negotiation, bargaining and compromise. Above all, it is a
process that requires resources (Brautigam, 2000; Godfrey et al., 2002; Menocal, 2011).
From the point of view of a state, donors and INGOs are both potential sources of
resources, while INGOs are also potential competitors. Resources may be wanted to maintain
legitimacy through the supply of goods and services, with a view to sustaining or increasing
85
patronage and client networks or preventing them falling into competitors’ hands (Robins et
al., 2008; Dreher, 2004).
The most effective strategies of the state come from its monopoly as a legislator within
its own borders. It can use legislation to try to coordinate and regulate agencies’ activity,
control entry to the country. It can also help or frustrate the efforts of agencies by adjusting
the demands of bureaucracy, the levying of fees, the imposition of monitoring requirements
and controlling access to information and the media (Mayhew, 2007; Clark, 1997).
Commentators argue that through legislation even aid-dependent states can define the
political space available to INGOs (Godfrey et al., 2002). As this legislation is shaped by the
local political, historical and economic context, these factors will in turn influence INGO
activities (Mayhew, 2005).
Commentators also contend that states have developed less formal methods to achieve
their goals and effectively resist or manipulate donor influence (Mosley, 1995, 1987;
Doornbos, 2001). These include lip-service tactics, delaying the implementation of
conditionality, misappropriation of funds, diverting fungible funds, and forming docile
‘opposition parties’ to meet governance demands (Doornbos, 2001; Fowler, 2000a, b, c).
Recipient countries are capable of changing or playing donors against each other, as in
the case of Somalia and Ethiopia during the Cold War. The US and Soviet Union both
wanted to establish military footholds in the Horn of Africa and exclude each other for
geopolitical and strategic reasons, but found their ability to manoeuvre was severely
restricted by the political exigencies of the Ethiopian-Somali conflict. Both protagonists
demanded total loyalty from their superpower donors, and were prepared to terminate
relations brusquely if they felt this was violated (Lefebvre, 1992). Until the fall of Ethiopian
Emperor Haile Selassie and the ensuing rise of the Marxist Mengistu regime, the USA had
been the dominant supporter of Ethiopia, while the USSR had sponsored Ethiopia’s arch-
enemy Somalia. The increasing hostility of the Mengistu regime to the US led to the USSR
secretly offering aid to Mengistu, which he accepted. An agreement was signed in 1976 and
Ethiopia closed the US military mission and their communications centre in April 1977. The
aid monopoly of the USSR in the region was short-lived, however. In response to the support
of Ethiopia by the USSR, the Somali government abruptly abrogated its 1974 treaty with
Moscow in 1977 and ordered the Soviet military mission to leave, while the US stepped into
86
the USSR’s previous role in Somalia (Petras et al., 1984). The numerous occasions on which
bilateral donors have resorted to more extreme and costly measures, such as sanctions and
even military intervention, suggests that aid has its limits as a method of control over
recipient countries (Burnell, 1997).
The power of donors, too, has varied over time, shaped by the changing influences in the
wider environment. During the 1960s, for instance, the increase in donor numbers weakened
the bargaining power of donors, while a lack of coordination between donors at times
reduced their ability to control recipients (Knack et al., 2004; Hopkins, 2000; Burnell, 1997).
However, like-minded donors such as USAID and DFID have successfully responded to the
latter issue by coordinating their policies through the World Bank and IFIs. The 1980s debt
crisis saw an increase in their power, but changing US policies under the Bush presidency led
to a decline of the influence of the World Bank. Since 2007, wider global changes in wealth
distribution and the rise of China as a donor have changed the traditional dynamics of donor
influence and led to a decrease in power for many donors. The relationships between donors
and their beneficiaries, then, are far from static and one-sided, but are subject to complex and
shifting influences, which can alter established power relationships and open up new
scenarios with new demands and new opportunities for donors and beneficiaries.
Donor Goals and Strategies
Since the 1980s, the goals of the major bilateral and multilateral donors have focused on
economic reform, aimed at encouraging the development of market-based, open economies in
developing countries (World Bank, 2005). A lively debate continues around the goals and
motivations of donor behaviour. A strong stream in the literature argues that the goals of
donors are to maintain stable economic, financial and trading systems, which ensure the
continued dominance of Northern economies (Hopkins, 2000; Hjertholm, 2000). The well-
being of developing countries is strategically important insofar as it furthers this goal
(Remenyi, 2004; Griffin, 1991; Goldman, 2005). While initially this took the form of
resource flows to maintain growth and stability in developing countries, it has since turned
increasingly to trying to shape internal political and economic policies in developing
countries, which are congruent with a Western-based international trading and financial
system (Burnell, 1997; Hopkins, 2000). Against this are arguments that the actions of
multilateral and bilateral donors arise from genuine humanitarian principles and a
87
commitment to reduce poverty and raise living standards in developing countries
(Lumsdaine, 1993; Hjertholm et al., 2000).
The World Bank moved from its original role as lender to middle-income countries, with
the goal of ensuring the industrial development of the North, to a focus on poverty reduction
as the means of developing a stable international economic environment for Western
industrial development (Goldman, 2005; Storey, 2000). The move of the IMF to lending
exclusively to developing countries by the mid-1980s was also seen as a response to the
threat to international financial stability posed by the balance of payments problems of the
developing countries rather than a move to promote development (Bird, 1994). Other
commentators attribute the change to the dependence of the Bank on world financial markets,
the influence of the US Government on senior management and the rising influence of North
American-trained economists in the Bank (Storey, 2000; Chwerioth, 2011).
Sources in the literature argue that donor activity became more political in the 1980s and
1990s. The Bank took on the role of chief negotiator between donor and recipient countries
and began actively working to bring about changes designed to advance the neoliberal agenda
in the internal economic, social and financial institutions and behaviour of the recipients
(Mosley et al., 1995; World Bank, 2005). This, according to some commentators, has blurred
the boundaries between the political and the economic (Wood, 2005).
Those who see self-interest as the dominant motive in donor behaviour point to the
impact of Cold War politics on aid distribution (Stokke, 1996; Griffin, 1991). Aid was often
directed to strengthening militaristic or undemocratic governments and high military spenders
(Raffer et al., 1996). The geographic distribution of aid is also cited as evidence that strategic
and political interests of donors, not development concerns, were dominant, with aid
bypassing the poorest countries to go to higher income but strategically important states
(Raffer et al., 1996; Griffin, 1991). During the Vietnam War, for instance, South Vietnam
accounted for more than 10% of US aid in some years (Raffer et al., 1996). In the Middle
East, aid to Egypt and Israel comprised between 33% to 43% of the entire US foreign
assistance programme from the late 1970s to 1997 (Clarke, 1997). The 1991-92 Gulf War
saw Egypt, an active participant, receive more than a $US15 billion debt write-off from the
West and a $US300 million Bank Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL) (Harrigan et al., 2006;
Clarke, 1997). Japan’s ODA to Tanzania in the 1980s was an acknowledgement of that
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country’s ‘understanding’ of Japan’s trading with South Africa (Tarp, 2000). However, others
argue that the pattern of aid distribution suggests that, while the US may have been
influenced by geopolitical concerns, most of the DAC donors were not strongly anti-
communist or supportive of US hegemony (Tarp, 2000; Lumsdaine, 1993). They argue that
the goals of bilateral aid are too diverse to make generalisations. A link can be found between
aid from previous colonial powers, such as France to Cambodia, to their former colonies,
which cannot be entirely explained by economic self-interest (JICA, 2002).
While multilateral donors such as the IFIs are technically apolitical, commentators argue
that by their nature they are subject to strong pressures from their shareholders, who are
dominated by the main Northern economies ((Dreher et al., 2009; Dreher, 2004; Thacker,
1999). They point out that the Bretton Woods conference was driven by US concerns and that
IFIs were developed to meet the goals of Northern industrial countries (Burnell, 1997;
Griffin, 1991). The G8, for example, controlled 40% of shareholder votes in 2009 (Dreher et
al., 2009). The US exercises a particularly strong influence, holding 15.82% of the shares and
14.97% of the voting power in the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in
2013 (World Bank, 2013). Sources argue that Bank and Fund lending have been influenced
by the political and strategic interests of shareholders, particularly the US, to help win
influence over temporary UN Security Council members (Dreher et al., 2009; Thacker,
1999).
Other scholars, however, argue that factors internal to the IFIs account for much of their
behaviour (Mosley et al., 1995; Chwerioth, 2011; Dreher, 2004). As lending institutions, the
Bank and the Fund are under pressure to disburse funds, and staff are judged according to
their ability to lend the money assigned for their region. The staff of the Fund, faced with a
reduced role after the debt crisis, welcomed the structural adjustment programmes as a new
stimulus for lending (Thacker, 1999).
Mosley et al. (1995) suggest that the Bank has not so much followed a clear strategy as
fluctuated between its four major roles of: i) financial intermediary between world capital
markets and its borrowers; ii) advancing the interests of its major shareholders, the wealthy
Northern countries; iii) changing the beliefs and attitudes of developing countries; and iv)
acting as an agent to transfer funds from wealthy to poor countries (Mosley et al., 1995). He
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argues that differences within the Bank1 and the pressures of managing priorities between its
four ‘hats’ have made it difficult for it to focus on clear strategies and goals (Mosley et al.,
1995).
Donors would seem to enjoy a considerable share of power in the relationship triangle
between states, donors and INGOs (Dreher, 2004). They have control over access to funds
needed by states and INGOs and are able to impose conditions on this access. From the
1970s, the Bank developed research, policy and expertise institutions which have dominated
the development discourse and policy since (Broad, 2006; Wilks et al., 2002; Denizer, 2011).
Some commentators feel that this was a deliberate Bank strategy to legitimise its leadership
and expand its role in developing countries and has resulted in increasing dominance of
neoliberal influence in the development and aid system (Lewis et al., 2006; Goldman, 2005).
However, others suggest that the apparent dominance of donors is limited in reality by
the complex political, social and cultural influences overlooked by normative models. The
role of aid conditionality as a tool of control by donors has been keenly debated (Dreher et
al., 2009, 2004; Mosley et al., 2004). Commentators suggest that the use of policy-based
lending dramatically has changed the balance of power between the receiving country and the
lenders (O’Reilly, 2008; Goldman, 2005). The subsequent good governance and
democratisation agenda similarly enabled donors to facilitate the neoliberal agenda in
receiving countries (Doornbos, 2001; Wood, 2005). However, others have pointed out that
conditionality has often proved a blunt tool. Factors within the IFIs themselves create
pressure for staff to continue lending even when conditions are not met (Mosley et al., 1995;
Dreher et al., 2009). Recipient states have shown themselves to be shrewd appraisers of the
limits of the ability of donors to enforce conditions and have deftly exploited the need of the
IFIs to keep lending. In Sierra Leone in the 1980s, for example, civil servants described IMF
officials pleading with them to pay something, no matter how small, so that the Fund could
approve the next tranche (Reno, 1995). Similarly, in Cote d’Ivoire the commitment of the
Bank administrators to loan disbursement allowed the government to continue to receive
loans despite failing to implement promised reforms (Wick et al., 1998).
1 The research department, for example, had a strong neoliberal orientation, while the operational side was
much more realistic in its expectations of what could be achieved in developing countries (Mosley, 1995).
90
A number of studies show that local political leaders have been able to appropriate donor
policies and even conditionality for their own gain. The Suharto family of Indonesia, Sitka
Stevens of Sierra Leone and Houphouet-Boigny of Cote d’Ivoire all sold public utilities to
family or party members as part of privatisation reforms (Storey, 2000; Reno, 1995; Bayart,
1993). Receiving states have avoided good governance reforms by transforming dominant
parties into multi-party facades, arguing for ‘local values’, as in Uganda, or, like
Mozambique, entangling change in local internal policy processes (Doornbos, 2001).
INGO Goals and Strategies
While development and aid literature has tended to see INGOs as pursuing altruistic
goals, there has been increasing concern that these goals are being compromised by their
need for resources and subsequent vulnerability to donor and supporter pressures (Palmer,
2006; Mowles, 2007; Ossewards, 2008). In order to satisfy donor and supporter demands for
accountability through regulation, reporting and outputs, for example, commentators suggest
that INGO values are converging with those of private sector actors due to the increasing
professionalisation and marketisation of development (Mowles, 2007; Edwards et al., 2000).
Cooperation with donors has been an increasingly important but controversial INGO
strategy, welcomed as a means of achieving INGOs altruistic goals. However, critics contend
that a lack of strategic analysis has reduced awareness of the risk of perverse outcomes of
increasing donor support (Clayton et al., 2000; Nelson, 2006). Sources in the literature
express concern that INGOs have changed their managerial, reporting, recruiting and project
priorities as strategies to gain access to donor funding (Ossewarde et al., 2008; Cooley et al.,
2002). Such strategies raise the uncomfortable possibility that INGOs could become merely
‘implementers of donor policies’ with their legitimacy weakening as they appear to be
moving further from their core values (Hulme et al., 1997, p. 8; Hailey, 2000). Others cite
examples of the desire to secure new contracts and reinforce INGO importance producing
dysfunctional behaviour, such as some post-tsunami INGOs artificially increasing the number
of beneficiaries by over-distribution of aid (Ossewarde et al., 2008). Others argue that INGO
fundraising can become a public relations exercise removed from their actual development
goals, leading to ‘mission drift’ as competition for funds draws INGOs to activities most
likely to appeal to donors (Werker et al., 2008).
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Some strands of the literature also express concerns that accepting donor funding
depoliticises INGOs, narrowing their development goals and reducing their ability to press
for change (Mitlin et al., 2007; Bebbington, 2005). Field evidence is cited to support the
contention that in some situations INGO goals have been undermined to the point where they
have become conduits for neoliberal values at grassroots level (O’Reilly, 2010; Yaworsky,
2005).
INGO goals and strategies in relation to the state have historically been limited. Many
INGOs are reluctant to engage with the state, preferring to keep a low profile, fearing that too
much activity will attract government regulation and limitation of their independence
(Mayhew, 2005). INGOs are also concerned about co-option by the state, with the consequent
risks of their management culture becoming more bureaucratic or corrupt, while dependence
on the state could lead to the loss of innovation and independence (Fowler, 2000a, b, c;
Sanyal, 1997).
However, other sources in the literature argue that it is consistent with INGO altruistic
goals to engage with the state. It is ultimately the state which provides the space for civil
actors to operate, and a weaker state potentially reduces the ability of INGOs to operate
effectively (Whaites, 2000). Bypassing the state or undermining its authority can open up the
risk of civil insecurity (Lorgen, 1998; Wood, 1997). A weak or insecure state is more likely
to view INGOs with suspicion and try to limit their activities through legislative and policy
environments, obstructionism and limited collaboration (Whaites, 2000; Clark, 1997). It is
thus argued that it is in the interests of INGOs to consciously work to strengthen state
capacity (Whaites, 2000). Some research indicates that when INGOs agreed to work within
government structures from the outset, the chances of influencing policy and practice
improved, and the intervention was more likely to be sustainable (Edwards et al., 2000).
Opportunities to relate to the government include consultation, advising, training of
government personnel and sitting on government bodies.
In the foregoing section, I have discussed the value of the model put forward by Hulme
and Edwards by reference to work sympathetic to their principles in the wider literature about
the interaction between states, donors and INGOS. The Hulme and Edwards critique of the
Tripartite Model is at its core a criticism of the economism that has dominated mainstream
development theories to the detriment of understanding the non-economic factors that shape
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the behaviour of states, donors and INGOs. One of the factors overlooked by such
economism is politics. In the next section I examine the argument that development is
essentially a political process. Any analysis which neglects politics will be limited in its
explanation of interactions between states, donors and INGOs. In particular, politics
highlights the issues of non-state service provision (NSP) and the question of legitimacy in
these interactions.
Political Analysis, State-Donor and State-INGO
Relations
Mainstream development theory typically fails to recognise that development is an
essentially political process (Leftwich, 2008, 2006; Hickey et al., 2005). Leftwich argues that
the concept of politics includes:
‘…all the activities of conflict, negotiation and cooperation in decisions about the use,
production and distribution of resources’. (Leftwich, 2006, p. 3)
Decisions about the distribution of resources and power take place at all levels of society,
and are not confined to a separate and autonomous activity of elites. This means that
development, with its goal of improving the access of the poor and disadvantaged to
resources and power, is by its nature, a political process (Hickey, 2009, 2008; Hughes et al.,
2012; Leftwich, 2007). Analysis and research about the role of politics in development have
been criticised for lacking a robust base for conceptualising the nature of development (Hout,
2012; Hickey 2912, 2008; Leftwich, 2012, Menocal, 2006; Yanhuas, 2014; Fritz et al., 2006).
Critics argued that this resulted in the de-politicisation of theory; they have called for a
change in approaches and for a greater engagement with political analysis (Hickey, 2012,
2009; Duncan et al., 2012; Leftwich, 2007 a, b). My own analysis of the situation in
Cambodia for the period 1991 to 2006 confirms the importance of comprehending the
political environment of development assistance, as later chapters show.
A number of commentators have argued that political analysis was neglected in
mainstream development theory until the 2000s (Duncan et al., 2012; Wild et al., 2011;
Leftwich, 2010). While development history indicates that politics did form some part of
development theory, international development has been described as largely an ‘anti-politics
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machine’ (Hickey, 2008). As a result, development theory has also failed to recognise the
political nature of development ((Leftwich, 2005; Hout, 2012; Hickey, 2008). Interactions
between states and donors and also states and INGOs have been defined by an only partial
recognition of the centrality of politics (Harris, 2014; Kerstenesky, 2014; Brinkerhoff, 2008:
Cypher, 2014; Haynes, 2008; Desai, 2013).
Politics and State-Donor Interactions
After the period of neo-liberal dominance in the 1980s and early 1990s, the World Bank
emphasised the need for the state to have strong institutions and good governance if
development is to be successful (WDR, 1997; Harriss, 2014; Keeley, 2014). This has resulted
in a focus on domestic political issues and the involvement of the beneficiary state in setting
development goals (World Bank, 2000, 1997; Hickey, 2009; Nunberg, 2007). Donors have
also developed a number of tools to ensure that political issues are integral to development
strategies, for example the ‘Drivers of Change’ (DoC) approach of DFID, the power analysis
policy of the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), the Good Governance
Assessments of the USAID and the Political Economy Analysis (PEA) of the World Bank
(Yanguas et al, 2014; Duncan et al., 2012). These initiatives have recognised the centrality of
politics and the uniqueness of the political realities of individual country situations as well as
valorising the importance of assisting with the development of civil society (Duncan et al.,
2012; Hickey; 2009). The widespread acceptance of the Paris Declaration in 2005 also
indicated an increasing commitment by donors to the state in development.
Nevertheless, the manner in which political factors have been included in donor
development theory has not gone far enough and still appears to weaken rather than
strengthen the links between politics and development (Hickey, 2008a; Hout, 2012). These
depoliticising tendencies include a narrow definition of politics, an economic and
technocratic view of development by donors and development agencies and the failure of aid
agencies to engage critically with development as a political process and themselves as
political actors (Hickey, 2009; Duncan et al., 2012; Wild et al., 2011). The persistent focus of
development theory on technocratic and economic solutions has resulted in politics being
marginalised as an autonomous system separate from development (Hickey, 2008; Leftwich,
2007).
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Moreover, there is concern that not all donors have embraced the principles of the Paris
Declaration and Busan Partnership, especially when it comes to supporting the notion of
country ownership of development initiatives (de Haan, 2008; Sjostedt, 2013; Owa, 2011;
Booth, 2012). Cameron and Low (2012) argue that in Cambodia many donors continue to act
independently and are reluctant to make long-term commitments to engage with state actors
(Cameron et al., 2012). The commitment of donors to country ownership and partnership can
also be limited by their sense of responsibility to the values of their domestic constituency.
Examples include the experience of the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA)
in implementing its gender policy in Tanzania, Zanzibar and Cambodia, and the pressures
from domestic constituents on donors and INGOs in Afghanistan to support the security
agenda (Sjostedt, 2013; Roberts, 2009). Similarly, donors face tensions between their role as
banks or lenders, the requirements of their governments to disburse funds to meet established
deadlines and their need to regulate and control the use of funding by beneficiaries (Williams
et al., 2009; Hout, 2012). Pressure to disburse funds quickly, pressure from external funders
and lobby groups and the high turnover of staff all serve to limit long-term commitments,
even to learning the language (Williams et al., 2009; Hout, 2012).
Politics and State-INGO Relations
INGOs have also been criticised for their failure to appreciate the importance of
domestic politics and the role of the state in development practice (Hickey. 2012, 2007; Nega
et al., 2014; Marcussen, 2007). As a result, INGOs can be reluctant to engage with the state
but there are also barriers to their becoming more involved (Murtaza et al., 2011; Mayhew,
2005; Dammers, 2008). For example, governments may respond with hostility, indifference
or suspicion to INGO activities, and they can enact legislation to limit or even prohibit these
activities (Mayhew, 2005). On their side, the reluctance of the INGOs to engage may be
driven by their perception of governments as being inefficient, obstructionist or venal. A
study on the European Commission and NGOs – both local and international – in Cambodia
in 1996 questioned the ‘desirability’ of working in ‘direct support’ of the government,
describing it as ‘not the most productive type of intervention for NGOs in Cambodian
circumstances’ (Dammers et al., 1996:7, 9). My research found that many INGOs saw the
corruption and incapacity of the state as reasons to avoid engagement, and it was common for
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INGOs to fail to comply with the legal requirement to register with the Government
(Kimchoeun et al., 2007; Interviewee NGO1; DAC1 see also Annex1 and chapter 4).
Disincentives to political involvement also arise from the intrinsic nature of donors and
INGOs. The cultural and political background from which INGOs come shapes attitudes to
political engagement with the state and perceptions of its proper role. Some of my
interviewees in Cambodia commented on such disparities (Interviewee NGO 2, Interviewee
NGO 3). They observed that INGOs from European backgrounds, for example, tended to see
the state as the natural provider of social services and safety nets, while those from an
American background believed that development depended mainly on the role of the private
sector and particularly the voluntary sector (ibid). INGOs can also be reluctant to recognise
that they are part of a political process. This leads them to behave politically. (Ghosh, 2009).
This political behaviour arises in part from their need for resources (Ossewarde et al., 2008;
Ghosh, 2008). INGOs can find themselves involved in negotiation, competition and
cooperation, both within their own structures and with external stakeholders, in order to gain
resources or maintain values (Ossewarde et al., 2008). It is argued that such activities can
compromise the values which are seen as one their main advantages in development (Hulme
et al, 1997)
These barriers can be reinforced by the exaggerated views of INGOs and donors of their
own competence and influence, both of which may be more limited than they would like to
think (Leftwich, 2011). This results in a lack of insight into the impact of their interventions
on the state and on effective development (Ear, 2007; Booth, 2005; Grindle, 2004). This
situation arises partly from what is seen as a weak understanding of legitimacy in political
analysis by many donors and INGOs and a consequent lack of skill in negotiating the
political terrain (Hout, 2012; Hickey, 2012, 2009 a; Duncan et al., 2012). It is argued that
donors and INGOs need to focus on creating the stable state necessary for successful
development rather than their current preoccupation with the value of market forces
(Brinkerhoff et al., 2012; Fritz et al., 2007).
The Legitimacy of States, Donors and INGOs
The size and complexity of the international aid system and the number of actors
involved in it has increased, and there has been growing concern over the legitimacy of those
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involved in it (Steffek, 2010; Collingwood, 2006; Vedder et al., 2007). Legitimacy has
emerged as a key question in political research and in international development and is
integral to the roles of states, donors INGOs (Steffek, 2010; Smyth, 2012).
Legitimacy is seen as the quality conferred on rulers by those who are ruled. Legitimacy
leads them to voluntary accept and obey the authority of the state (Lassman, 2006; OECD,
2010; Levi, 2009). The basis for legitimacy is, however, contested. One school sees it to be
based on the normative quality of the rulers (Steffek, 2010; Brinkerhoff et al., 2010; Levi,
2009). This view holds that legitimacy is based on the quality of values and systems of
government of the rulers or the fact that norms are shared by the rulers and their constituency
via a social contract (Brinkerhoff et al., 2012).
On the other hand, the realist or empirical view, strongly influenced by Max Weber, sees
legitimacy as a ‘precarious political achievement’ arising out of the constant struggle between
humans to rule each other (Lassman, 2000:88; Levi, 2009; Collingwood, 2006; Bellina,
2009). Weber argued that legitimacy was based on tradition, charisma, or ‘legality’. Tradition
involved the authority of the past which people accepted as timeless and enduring.
‘Charisma’ referred to the trust and devotion given to a person because of their particular
exceptional gifts and presence. ‘Legality’ refers to the belief in the authenticity of legal
statute, founded on what are accepted to be rationally developed rules (Lassman, 2000;
OECD, 2010). Further, Weber saw legitimacy as tied to the concept of the state as ‘a political
organisation ... (that) successfully claims a monopoly over the legitimate physical coercion
necessary for the implementation of its laws and decrees’ (Weber, 1945, cited Kalberg,
2008:222). Such a state is territorial, with the limits of its legitimacy set by its borders.
The legitimacy of states in this analysis is thus theoretically conferred on them by their
citizens, and gives them the right to participate in the international development structure as
donors or recipient states. The state can delegate its legitimacy to organisations and agencies
to carry out roles and activities which it clearly defines (Smyth, 2012). The legitimacy of that
body thus depends on the extent to which it carries out that limited role. The UN, World
Bank, IMF OECD-DAC and the bilateral aid agencies are examples of such bodies. INGOs
cannot claim such legitimacy and argue that their ‘place at the table’ is based on normative
principles (Steffek, 2010; Collingwood, 2006; Smyth, 2012). They base their claims on the
moral quality of their activities and goals, their role as representatives of the poor and
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marginalised and their ability to make the international aid system more credible and
transparent by their advocacy, scrutiny and their grassroots experience (Smyth, 2012; Vedder,
2007; Collingwood, 2006). These claims, however, can be challenged. Not all INGOs are
necessarily moral or principled in their goals; the basis of their representation of groups is not
substantiated by a democratic or election process; they are not always accountable or subject
to scrutiny and the constituency is often small or not clearly defined (Collingwood, 2006;
Smyth, 2012). While INGOs base their claims to participation in international development
on the fact that they bring more credibility and transparency to the system, they cannot claim
the empirical legitimacy of states and the bodies delegated by them to perform designated
roles and tasks. This gap is a crucial factor in relations between states, INGOs and donors.
The Politics of Non-State Providers of Services and the Question
of Legitimacy
In this section I discuss both donors and INGOs under the heading of non-state service
providers, in an assessment of whether the activities of these agencies threaten the legitimacy
of ‘weak’, ‘failing’ or ‘failed’ states receiving international development assistance. This has
been the subject of recent literature (OECD, 2010, 2008, 2005; World Bank, WDR, 2004)
which acknowledges the need for a strong state as the foundations for legitimacy and citizen
consent (World Bank, 2004, 1997; Fritz et al.2006; OECD, 2010; OECD, 2010, 2009, 2005;
Baird, 2010). The chief development priority in failed and weak states, it has been argued,
should therefore be to build the state and support its legitimacy (Baird, 2011; Bellina et al,
2009; OECD, 2009). In the eyes of citizens, such legitimacy is partly based on the capacity of
the state to provide public goods and services. If non-state providers take on this role, the
legitimacy of weak states could be undermined (OECD-DAC, 2009, 2008, 2005; Batley et
al., 2010; Mcloughlin, 2011). Building rapport between the state and non-state providers
depends on local conditions that are often marked by mutual suspicion and mistrust
(Mcloughlin, 2011; Brinkerhoff et al., 2012; Cammet et al., 2011). This may lead to a ‘two-
tier’ system of service provision which then questions the legitimacy of the national
government; McLean provides such an example with the education systems of sub-Saharan
African states (MacLean, 2011).
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While NSPs can increase the capacity of states to provide services, they can also hamper
the motivation of a state to generate its own income and develop its civil service and
regulatory capacity from domestic sources (Cammet et al., 2011; Nunberg et al., 2012).
Another risk is that many donors and INGOS prefer project-based funding which can give
elites greater opportunities for corruption and patronage and which, in turn, undermines the
legitimacy of the local state (Booth, 2005; Nunberg et al., 2012). Project-based funding can
also allow donors and INGOs to avoid engaging with political issues that might promote the
needs of pro-poor development (Cammet et al., 2011).
It is therefore argued that the adoption of NSP should be approached with caution,
considering carefully how it can best support the poor by improving state responsiveness,
capacity, legitimacy and cohesion (OECD, 2009; 2005; Mcloughlin, 2014). Critics of NSPs
argue that there is no established or predictable link between NSP service provision and the
strengthening of state legitimacy or capacity (Mcloughlin, 2014). Non-state providers may
need to choose between slowly developing their cooperation with the state or less patient
approaches using more immediate humanitarian intervention (OECD, 2010; 2009; 2005;
Baird, 2011).
Donor and INGO Engagement in Local Politics
While donors have expressed a greater interest in engaging with politics, commentators
argue that the basic assumptions of their programmes still limit real engagement between
politics and development (Duncan et al., 2012; Wild et al., 2011; Leftwich, 2007; Unsworth,
2009). This approach limits the variety of forms which power can take and the number of
sites in society where politics are played out (Hickey, 2009). As a result, donors and INGOs
fail to recognise or take seriously oppositional forces in the domestic environment, seeing
them as temporary rather than arising from deep-seated issues in social, political and
economic life (Hughes et al., 2012). PRSPs for example have been criticised as being
reluctant to challenge power relationships, seeming to believe that ‘poverty can be reduced
without changing anything’ (Hickey, 2008).
In fact, the ability of donors to change things without engaging in local power politics is
arguably limited. They have few disciplinary actions to enforce the accountability of elites
and, being outside the local political systems, have no legitimate place in traditional routes of
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accountability (Hickey, 2009; Hickey et al., 2008). On another level, commentators suggest
that the assumptions underlying donor and INGO attempts to include political analysis have
in fact limited their engagement with local polities (Williams et al., 2009; Hughes et al.,
2012). The focus on civil society in programmes such as the World Bank Social Risk
Management programme can sideline the role of political elites, reducing incentives to
engage with them (Hickey, 2009; Ahmed, 2008). The rational bureaucratic norms and view
of institutions underlying many donor programmes can lead to the assumption that non-
rational actors such as those in patronage politics will never act in the interests of the poor.
This reduces the incentive for donors and INGOs to engage with elites to develop pro-poor
policies, with the main engagement being efforts to control predation and corruption (Hickey,
2012). Even here, mainstream donor and INGO thinking tends to overlook the fact that
predation and rent-seeking are grounded in political processes and need to be dealt with at
that level (Hickey, 2012; Hughes et al., 2012). The technocratic perspective of good
governance and anti-corruption policy means that development agencies have little incentive
to develop a knowledge of local informal political realities and coalitions or build
relationships to work with political processes (Williams et al., 2009; Leftwich, 2010).
It is also argued that donor and INGO programmes which recognise the role of politics in
development, such as DFID’s Drivers of Change, can weaken the position of the poor
through their top-down approach, avoidance of political causes of poverty, focus on expert-
led Western solutions to policy-making and reluctance to engage with oppositional local
forces (Hickey, 2009). Perversely, the focus of these programmes on civil society removes
responsibility for change from political actors to the poor themselves, and can obscure the
activities of pro-poor politicians (Hickey, 2009; Ahmed, 2008). Commentators also express
concern that the focus on Western models can weaken traditional forms of social contracts,
which provide some sort of accountability for elites and legitimacy for the claims of the poor
(Hickey, 2009).
A concern identified by commentators is that mainstream development theory overlooks
the possible advantages of both donors and INGOs working actively with elites to identify
synergies and spaces for cooperation (Hossain et al., 2002). Evidence suggests that political
elites can and do respond to a wide range of incentives, including ideological, cultural and
moral values, personal or group loyalties, the need to be seen to be protecting the poor to
defuse threats that the poor might pose, and the desire to build national prestige (Hickey,
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2012; Hossain et al., 2002). Elites tend to understand poverty in a relational way, with some
research suggesting that their actions are influenced by their views of what causes poverty
(Hickey, 2012). In Pakistan and Mozambique, for example, the poor are seen more
sympathetically as victims of colonialism, while socialism and nation building have
positively influenced the response to the poor by elites in Lesotho (Hickey, 2012). These
incentives can enable donors and INGOs to be discerning in finding actors whose position
can provide synergies to be developed with patronage-based elites to cultivate pro-poor
policies (William et al., 2009). It has also been argued that patronage politics can and do play
positive roles in development, such as providing forms of safety net to the poor through
patronage links, which can be capitalised on (Hickey, 2012; Robbins et al., 2008).
Some commentators suggest that donors and INGOs have not engaged sufficiently with
the role of patronage and clientelism in local politics, seeing them as unacceptable (Robins et
al., 2008). Robins et al. argue that they are in fact key practices in many developing
countries, where everyone, from politicians to the poorest, depends on establishing strategic
relationships to survive (Robins et al., 2008). Dismissing patronage and clientelism as
unacceptable does not allow for the fact that in developing-country contexts they may work
better than more abstract democratic processes in giving access to vital resources (Robins et
al., 2008). Adopting too normative a position may neglect the opportunity to understand the
‘messiness’ of local dynamics and use it to enhance development (Robins et al., 2008).
Engagement with patronage-based elites is obviously a fraught strategy for donors and
INGOs, involving risks of co-option and manipulation. However, a number of commentators
argue that there are potential advantages to working with elites which aid agencies lack the
skills to exploit (Moore et al., 2002; Hickey, 2009). These skills include the ability to identify
the incentives and interests of elites, negotiate and develop the sufficient knowledge of
networks and relationships to move confidently, and identify actors whose interests can
support reform (Hughes et al., 2012). Thus, ‘opportunists’ among the elite, with a tactical
interest in reform to achieve other goals, may provide greater opportunities for negotiation
and synergy than an ‘idealistic’ reformer who is unwilling to compromise or accommodate. A
‘pragmatic’ reformer, however, may have long-term reformist goals but be prepared to
compromise with other actors for the sake of short-term gains (Hughes et al., 2012).
However, development actors need to be ‘as wise as serpents and innocent as doves’ as they
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negotiate the complexities of relating with actors prepared to use violence and who are skilled
in the informal rules of local politics (Duncan et al., 2012).
Thus, involvement with local political forces requires a sophisticated knowledge of local
incentives, coalitions, patronage structures and relationship-based power networks which
donors and INGOs have little incentive to acquire (Leftwich, 2007; Hughes et al., 2012). One
disincentive is the continuing weakness of political analysis in development theory and the
preference for a technocratic response to development (Unsworth, 2009; Moore et al., 2002).
Another factor is the reluctance of development agencies to challenge existing power
relations and particularly to face the risk that political engagement could lead to taking sides
(Hickey, 2008; Hout, 2012). INGOs and donors therefore are reluctant to become involved in
the struggle for power and resources at the local level or acquire the skills needed to do so
(Moore et al., 1999; Leftwich, 2011).
Conclusion
States, donors and INGOs coexist rather uneasily in the international aid system, with
their values and goals often sitting uncomfortably alongside each other despite an apparently
shared language. This literature review has focused on two ways of conceptualising their
relationships. First, there is the Tripartite Model which is strongly economic and technocratic
in its orientations and sees development progress as something involving universally relevant
approaches which depend largely on market forces. The World Bank and many Western
donor governments uphold this model and have required countries receiving development
assistance to follow neo-liberal principles in their approaches to growth and poverty
eradication. Despite the dominance of the Tripartite Model since the 1980s, there have been
growing doubts about it. Critics have repeatedly pointed to its lack of political analysis and its
failure to appreciate how local development needs to engage with the domestic culture,
historical, social concerns and other factors. A considerable literature has grown up across
donor, INGO and academic sources urging a shift away from the Tripartite Model to
something dynamic which recognises that the three actors promoting development are also
pursuing their own particular goals and strategies.
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Understanding the interactions between donors, INGOs and states has important
implications for development practice and outcomes. This thesis sets out to explore the
interactions between these three actors in the context on the UNTAC intervention in
Cambodia in 1991 and the decade following it, using the provision of disability services as
the focus for research. Service delivery to the poor provides a defined context for studying
the goals, strategies, motivations and capabilities of states, INGOs and donors, and the
outcomes of their actions. Most importantly, it provides insights into how the interactions of
states, donors and INGOs can shape outcomes for the poorest and most disadvantaged
members of society.
CHAPTER 4 – POLITICAL CULTURE IN CAMBODIA AT
UNTAC
Introduction
There has been growing pressure in the literature to develop frameworks, which use a
more empirical approach and incorporate the unique goals, strategies, motivations and
capabilities of actors in individual situations. In particular, a number of commentators have
drawn attention to what they see as the neglect in understanding of local political culture and
history.
The research project sets out to analyse the interactions between state, INGOs and donors
and compare the effectiveness of attempts in the literature to conceptualise them. As noted in
the previous chapter, a strand in the literature represents these interactions in the context of
the normative and predominantly economic model favoured by liberal economic theory. This
research project uses the provision of disability services in Cambodia from the UNTAC
intervention in 1991 to 2006 as the context for examining donor, INGO and state interactions,
with a focus on the history of the DAC from its establishment in 1996 to 2006 when it lost
USAID funding. UNTAC was the largest international intervention of its kind up to that point
(Curtis, 1996; Doyle, 1993).
This chapter examines the Cambodian political culture against which the intervention
took place, the historical, cultural and social factors that helped shape it, and the goals,
motivations, capabilities and strategies that it developed. It explores the influence of factors
on the political elite’s response to UNTAC, and how in turn UNTAC affected the political
environment. The implications for service provision of the political culture and its
interactions with UNTAC are considered throughout the chapter.
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Cambodia’s Political Culture
Background
Despite changes in styles of government and ideologies, Cambodian political culture has
continued to be dominated by the notion of political power as a ‘zero-sum game’, which
could have only one winner. The goal of political activity has been the acquisition of
personalised and centralised power by Cambodia’s leaders, with the conflation of the political
system and the state (Springer. 2013Un, 2006; Kimchoeun et al., 2007, Hughes et al, 2003;
Ear, 2013; Downie et al., 2001). Power was to be used by the holders to strengthen their own
position. Such a tradition, it is argued, has resulted in a political culture that encourages
obedience to rulers and authority, and tolerates authoritarian rule (Ear, 2005; Frewer, 2005;
Hughes, 2006; Peang-Meth, 1997). The political culture that emerges is dominated by the
pursuit of power as a ‘zero-sum game’ (Un, 2006; Chong, 2002; Downie at al., 2001; Ashley,
1998).
Strategies to achieve this primary goal ranged from the ruthless elimination or
suppression of rivals to attempting to use Buddhist and socialist traditions to gain legitimacy
and support (Kent, 2006). The key strategy, however, has been a system of patronage, which
draws in Cambodians from the top to the bottom of society, making the notions of dissent and
a loyal opposition impossible (Frewer, 2012; Ojendal et al., 2006; Kimchoeun et al.,2007;
Hughes et al., 2003). There were few mechanisms for sharing power, for this meant sharing
the most important source of resources for maintaining vital patronage and clientelist
networks (Ear, 2005; Ayres, 2000; Lao, 1998). This tradition of absolute and centralised
power for elites militated against the emergence of a government which felt a responsibility
to serve its citizens or to tolerate opposition (Ayres, 2003). The result for the Cambodian
people has included some of the world’s most brutal examples of a state visiting violence on
its own citizens and of international powers violating the sovereignty and rights of a country
and its citizens (Springer, 2010; Chandler, 1993, 1991).
Political ideologies and cultural and religious belief systems have been appropriated by
elites at various times with an ease, which is hard to understand without the realisation that
Cambodia’s political goals are about power, not ideologies (Frewer, 2013; Slocomb. 2006;
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Ayres, 2003; Chandler, 1993, 1991). The language and institutions of foreign political
ideologies such as communism, democracy and developmentalism have been colonised by
Cambodian elites to serve these traditional goals. They have become adept at interpreting and
using the ideologies and language of external powers in their construction of absolutist
regimes intolerant of opposition and with little or no sense of serving the ruled (Ayres, 2003;
Kent, 2006; Bit, 1991).
Cambodia’s political culture survived, and was arguably strengthened by, the period of
French colonisation (Ayres, 2003). Cambodia’s political tradition was hierarchical in its view
of society and the relationships between rulers and ruled. Power was the preserve of the
rulers, to be exercised absolutely, an end in itself, to be used to further entrench and extend
the power of those holding it (Ashley, 1998; Bit 1991). There was a ‘winner-take-all’
approach, with little room for the concept of a ‘loyal opposition’ or ‘agreeing to disagree’
(Downie et al., 2001). As a result the notion of mutual obligation between ruler and ruled was
limited with little space for those in power to be held accountable to those below them. An
INGO worker involved in human rights awareness-raising observed the difficulties the
political culture placed in the way of those wanting to hold authorities responsible for their
actions:
… although something is wrong, it’s not very often that people will do something
about it … if you do it in the wrong way in Cambodia, it causes problems … The
authorities will see it as a challenge to their authority. They then feel threatened, and
see it as some kind of criticism or disrespect because they’re not doing their job
properly. You’re complaining therefore I don’t like you. (Interview INGO5).
In this political and cultural environment, national leadership was equated with securing
and maintaining power (Hughes et al., 2003; Ayres, 2003).
Power and Patronage
Power was based on hierarchical networks of patronage and on the ruthless and often
violent removal of opponents (Pak et al., 2007; Ayres, 2000; Lao, 1998). Leaders’ decisions
were arbitrary and controlled by their personal interests (St. John, 2005; Jeldres, 1996).
Political power was maintained by a system that meant competitors for power needed access
to rewards for clients and support networks. Incumbents were at an advantage over their
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rivals, and had a strong incentive to hold onto power, making protection of parties or clans
more important than respect for the law (Jennar, 1994, cited in Roberts, 2002). In such a
political environment, mutual trust and cooperation between rivals was impossible to achieve
until one party or person had clearly achieved dominance. Any interventions which did not
understand this aspect of Cambodian political culture ran the risk of intensifying the stakes
for control of the institutions of government and the access to political rewards which they
offered (Pak et al., 2007; Roberts, 2002).
Appropriate political behaviour for weaker members of society was to make use of the
network of patronage and clientelism to find a powerful patron, and to make sure that such
alliances kept abreast of the changing political situation (Pak et al., 2007; Roberts, 2002).
Those lacking power had to be prepared to rapidly reposition themselves in changing power
configurations (French, 1994, cited in Downie et al., 2001). Ordinary Cambodians could not
easily survive outside these networks of power and loyalty, which extended from the top to
the bottom of society. Some observers suggest that this has resulted in a polarising of
Cambodian society, intensified by the Khmer Rouge experience, which made neutrality a
difficult concept for Cambodians to comprehend (Downie et al., 2001). An NGO worker
observed in 2004:
… This society is still a polarised society. If you’re not with me you’re against me.
You’re either with CPP or FUNCINPEC … You don’t often find a situation where
people can be neutral. They’re either friends or enemies. (Interview INGO5)
Beneath a smiling, acquiescent exterior, ordinary Cambodians have had to negotiate
stressful and complex political decisions, which demand a sophisticated understanding of an
ever-changing environment and which can have life-threatening consequences.
Buddhism and Power in Cambodia’s Political Culture
A recurring theme in analysis of Cambodia’s political history since independence has
been the influence of its Buddhist heritage (Kent, 2006; Slocomb, 2006). Some commentators
suggest that Buddhism has contributed to a desire to seek stability, equilibrium and neutrality
rather than change, leading to a preference for non-alignment in external affairs and duality in
domestic or economic affairs (Slocomb, 2006). Others have argued that Buddhism has
influenced Khmers to avoid open conflict (Peang-Meth, 1997). There is possibly a tendency
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for expatriate workers to interpret political passivity and fatalism as a response to
circumstances:
This is a society where people on the whole don’t complain and they accept their lot.
It’s part of the Buddhist (ethic) … (Interview INGO5)
Others, however, suggest that this may be too simplistic a view, and that apparent
passivity may mask politically astute behaviour, such as maintaining donor goodwill while
pursuing independent political goals:
There is an overriding Khmer tendency to say what is expected, not what may be true.
Often, Khmers from different political spectrums, brought together by foreign
sponsors, smile politely and courteously as Khmers usually do, and declare Bat, Ban,
(Yes, Can Do), only to duel behind closed doors, with ‘Awt Ban’ (Cannot Do).
(Peang-Meth, 1997, p. 294)
An INGO worker, too, suggested that this submission could be seen in a more nuanced
way as a survival mechanism:
I think it may be one of the coping mechanisms in a very repressive society ...
(Cambodians) are very good at saying ‘Yes’, and then doing what they wish, so the
appearance of compliance is more important than total compliance. So there are little
sabotages and little ‘Yes Ma’am, OK, you bet’, and then just doing, still managing to
show the respect and what’s necessary to keep order, but going on. (Interview
INGO2, 4)
However, others argue that at an even more fundamental level, religion and politics are
intertwined in the Cambodian worldview in that Buddhism influences the Cambodian
understanding of how a secure and ordered life is to be achieved (Kent, 2006). Cambodians
see the righteous ruler as their main hope of security. Such a ruler would not only possess the
qualities of kindness, compassion, sympathetic joy and equanimity, but also be able to ensure
the peace and prosperity of his people by balancing worldly authority with religious authority
through his obedience to the moral teachings of Buddhism (Kent, 2006). Many Cambodians
trace the source of their problems to the absence of just rulers, and doubt that a secular
democratic election will produce such leaders. Since the early 1990s, the revival of pagodas,
and the enthusiastic support of political leaders for building them, may be seen as an
indication that Buddhism still plays a role in ordinary Cambodians’ strategies for seeking
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justice, security and protection from elites. It suggests at least that elites see the appearance of
support for Buddhism as strategic in the struggle for power (Kent, 2006; Richmond et al.,
2007).
While rulers have tried to strengthen their legitimacy through appealing to Buddhist
traditions and concepts, Buddhism has offered little ideological support for the ruthless
acquisition and maintenance of power for the user’s benefit only (Kent, 2006). While being a
powerful person in Cambodia can be seen as evidence of virtue accumulated in previous
lives, it does not confer the moral legitimacy required for the Cambodian Buddhist concept of
the ‘just ruler’ (Kent, 2006).
Socialism and Power in Cambodia’s Political Culture
Socialism has been another recurring theme in what has passed for political ideology in
Cambodia. Socialism has been presented as the means to modernisation, promising
development, freedom, equality, equity and justice (Slocomb, 2006). Leaders have presented
their versions of socialism to be uniquely Cambodian, citing brovas day kinear, the practice
of mutual assistance by rural peasants (Slocomb, 2006). In fact, the practice was not
socialistic, with work scrupulously reciprocated. A more pragmatic reason for the choice of
socialism over liberal pluralist democracy may be that socialism gives elites an opening to
interfere in the private sector and the affairs of individuals (Slocomb, 2006).
King Sihanouk developed ‘Buddhist socialism’, a mixture of Buddhism and ‘Khmer
socialism’, which was to bring unity and modernisation to Cambodia (Slocomb, 2006). The
monarchy and the Buddhist religion were presented as the twin keys to unity and education,
the means to modernisation (Slocomb, 2006). The Khmer Rouge in their turn, while carrying
out their radical revolution in the name of socialism, also claimed that their version of
socialism was uniquely Khmer and owed nothing to outside sources (Chandler, 1993). To the
xenophobic leaders of the Khmer Rouge, socialism was the means to save the Khmer nation
from its many enemies.
However, despite the stated goals of Cambodia’s ‘socialist’ rulers, the experience for the
population was of power being centralised and held firmly in leaders’ hands. Sihanouk, while
presenting himself as the benevolent ‘father’ of his people, ruthlessly suppressed dissent from
both the right and the left. He saw the country as his personal possession and himself as the
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embodiment of the country. Dissent with him was therefore to declare oneself a traitor and an
enemy of Cambodia (Chandler, 1993). Under the Khmer Rouge, all power rested in the hands
of angkar padevat (the revolutionary organisation) with Pol Pot ultimately accumulating
power. In an echo of Sihanouk’s reign, disloyalty to angkar was disloyalty to Cambodia
(Chandler, 1993). For Cambodia’s population, the experience of ‘socialist’ leadership was
thus a painful one of power being concentrated into the control of a single ruler with almost
unlimited control over their lives.
The Angkor Heritage
A number of historians and commentators feel that Cambodia has been further ill served
by the influence of the Angkor legend bequeathed to them by the French (Chandler, 1993b;
Bit, 1991). When the French arrived in Cambodia in the nineteenth century, the monarchy
had been in decline for several centuries. In addition, the colonising power was eager to
increase its prestige as a base for its establishment of their ‘protectorate’ over the country.
The rediscovery of the massive ruins of Angkor Wat was used as proof of the greatness of
Cambodia’s past and the legitimacy this bestowed on the monarchy, and by extension on the
French. The notion of a great Angkorian past has, according to one scholar, given
Cambodians an inflated idea of the achievements and power of the past Khmer nation and
their own place in the world (Chandler, 1993b). By linking the monarchy with the
‘absolutism and hierarchy’ of the Angkorian era, the French revived and strengthened these
notions and, with them, associated perceptions of authority, patronage and power at a time
when they appeared to have been fading (Ayres, 2003). Further, the Angkorian legacy may
have made Cambodians resistant to external ideas, creating a ‘folie de grandeur’ that was
most famously expressed by Pol Pot’s declaration, ‘If our people can build Angkor, we can
build anything’ (Ayres, 2003, p. 2). The warrior heritage makes compromise difficult, having
as its core ‘the concept of one sun, one emperor, one nation in one universe’ (Peang-Meth,
1997, p. 294). Moreover, it could be used to silence opposition, or protest by Cambodians, to
the demands placed on them by their rulers. President Lon Nol, facing an increasingly
hopeless military situation, used the rhetoric of the Khmer heritage to rouse his outnumbered
and demoralised army:
[…]We are Khmers. Khmers are descendants of the warrior race, courageous in
struggle and never bowing down before their enemies. They sacrifice their life for the
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service of the nation. Khmers, fervently Buddhist ... must accomplish dignified acts of
the citizen who truly loves his country. (Slocomb, 2006, p. 382)
Impact of Geopolitics on Cambodia’s Political Culture
Tragically for Cambodia, its geopolitical position has magnified the potential instabilities
and injustices inherent in its political culture. Located between two powerful and hegemonic
neighbours, Thailand and Vietnam, Cambodia had for centuries struggled to retain its
frontiers, sovereignty and identity. These neighbours have invaded or annexed Cambodia,
used its territory and resources to fight their wars, dominated its foreign policy and meddled
in its internal politics. The Cold War increased the scale of this interference, as Cambodia
was drawn into the struggles of global powers over their regional strategic interests, and
found itself struggling to maintain itself as an independent, neutral and sovereign nation. The
1960s and early 1970s were marked by the increasingly tortuous and self-interested
manoeuvrings of Cambodia’s rulers as they sought to establish their own dominance and play
off the great powers against each other and their own internal enemies. In their turn, the great
powers exploited this struggle for their own interests (Shawcross, 1993). The notion of
building a Cambodian state whose external legitimacy was assured by the respect of
international powers became increasingly unrealistic, while internal legitimacy based on a
social contract between state and citizen was always sacrificed to the political and strategic
needs of the country’s rulers and powers external to itself.
People’s Republic of Kampuchea/State of Cambodia:
1979-1990
Background
After the Vietnamese armed forces drove out the Pol Pot leadership and its followers in
1979, they established the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), under the leadership of
the Khmer People’s Republican Party (KPRK). The Vietnamese exercised tight control
similar to the French presence in what was a neo-colonial regime (Chandler, personal
comment, 2012). The regime exercised near-total power despite the adoption of a
constitution, rights and freedoms but never managed to eliminate a number of opposition
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groups, including the remains of the Khmer Rouge operating out of the Thai border refugee
camps with international support (Peou, 2000; Chandler, 1993). In 1982, under pressure from
their international supporters, the three main opposition factions reluctantly combined to form
the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK). This began a civil war that
lasted until 1990, with neither side able to gain a decisive victory. By 1989, the PRK/SOC,
exhausted and with its two major international supporters withdrawing their support, began
seriously exploring peace plans and preparing for engagement with the wider international
community, moving towards a more open economy and renaming itself the State of
Cambodia (SOC), while the KPRP transformed itself into the Cambodian People’s Party
(CPP).
Goals of PRK/SOC
On taking control in 1979, the PRK faced the task of rebuilding a country whose basic
infrastructure and human resources had been devastated (Ayres, 2000; Mysliweic, 1988,). It
failed to win international recognition, however, with the Khmer Rouge continuing to hold
the UN seat and be recognised as the official government with the support of the US and
Chinese, who wished to punish Vietnam for its defiance of them. The PRK was consequently
seen as an illegitimate government by the UN, limiting its access to international resources
(see below) (Mysliweic, 1988). The PRK was unable to decisively counter the threats to its
territorial integrity from opposition factions supported by the US and China, while internally
some commentators argue its associations with the Vietnamese and the Khmer Rouge
compromised its legitimacy for many Cambodians (Peou, 2000; Ayres, 2000).
The PRK’s goals thus focused around establishing its territorial integrity, rebuilding the
country’s infrastructure, establishing a bureaucratic and military base, centralising power and
gaining both international and internal legitimacy (Peou, 2000). The desperate state of
Cambodia’s economy and infrastructure made the PRK reliant on international help, which
was limited to Vietnam and Russia. Gaining international legitimacy was an essential step if
the PRK/SOC was to gain access to international funding.
Strategies of PRK/SOC
National and International Legitimacy
Conscious of the need to improve its image internationally and win support domestically,
the PRK worked hard to establish its credentials. The regime realised that in the eyes of the
Cambodian population it was compromised by its Vietnamese associations and its socialist
background (Peou, 2000; Jeldres, 1993). Once the Vietnamese began their withdrawal in
1982, the KRPP took steps to distance themselves from the Vietnamese and introduce Khmer
elements into the government structure (Peou, 2000).
While officially socialist, the regime was pragmatic about not imposing hard-line
socialism and acknowledged the widespread apathy towards socialism among the mass of the
population (Vickery, 1983, cited in Ayres, 2000). To establish itself internationally as more
than a Vietnamese puppet government, the PRK set up the institutions of an independent
state. In 1981 it adopted a constitution and elected a National Assembly, re-established
ministries and began establishing a large bureaucracy which by the late 1980s numbered
200,000 to 215,000 (Peou, 2000). By the time of UNTAC the PRK had built up a loyal and
experienced military force.
Article 11 of the constitution stated that the goal of the national economy was the
constant improvement of the living standards of the people (Peou, 2000). Despite the
difficulties facing it, the PRK showed considerable commitment to this goal. Commentators
have described the regime’s policies in the early 1980s as ‘humane’ and ‘pragmatic’
(Vickery, 1983, cited in Chandler, 1993, p. 230). In the face of limited resources and a civil
war, they managed to introduce agricultural reforms, expand the medical and health sectors,
and rehabilitate some sectors of the economy (Curtis, 1993; Ayres, 2003).
In part, these steps were designed to win support from the Cambodian population and
recognition from the international community. How successful these strategies were is
uncertain. From an international perspective, the regime failed to gain legitimacy. UNTAC
officials tended to see the PRK/SOC as a Vietnamese puppet state with no legitimacy. Some
commentators, including an Australian Ambassador to Cambodia felt that the regime’s efforts
to rebuild the country had won support from much of the Cambodian population, particularly
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at rural and village level (Kevin, 2000). However, this support could also be attributed to the
regime’s firm control over the administration down to village level.
PRK Internal Goals and Strategies - Power and Politics
The PRK/SOC was not a radical break from traditional Cambodian political culture
despite its pre-1990 Communist status (Chandler, 1993). The KPRK was not strongly
ideological, and recognised that there was little enthusiasm for socialism in the country. Its
Vietnamese supporters also took a pragmatic approach, recognising that trying to establish a
rigorously socialist state would weaken any government they put in place (Gottesman, 2003).
They preferred to support leaders who could accumulate power and create strong power bases
to support the regime rather than ideologically correct leaders (Gottesman, 2003). Leaders
such as Hun Sen began the quiet accumulation of power through the time-honoured method
of patronage networks, which was to lay the foundation for the patterns of power in the 1990s
(Roberts, 2007).
Socialism was used to legitimise a political structure, which focused power on the
leaders of the KPRP despite the adoption of a constitution allowing for individual’s rights,
freedoms and interests (Peou, 2000). There were few mechanisms for conflict resolution in
the system, and elections were limited and infrequent. While the government was not guilty
of mass human rights abuses against its own people, there was no doubt that the individual
citizen was subordinate to state authority, and that the state was prepared to enforce this
subordination (Peou, 2000). Citizens were not allowed to establish political parties or to
challenge the ruling party, and the constitution of 1981 made it quite clear that the KPRP was
the force that had direct leadership of the PRK (Peou, 2000). The effective result was that the
KPRP and the state were synonymous, an echo of earlier regimes.
Even the constitution of 1989, which took pains to win credibility with the international
community by emphasising the SOC’s more liberal economic tendencies, made it clear that
political changes would be limited. Buddhism was confirmed as the state religion, but the
constitution reaffirmed the centrality of the KPRP/CPP and its identity with the state (Peou,
2000). Power was still centralised, with little room for opposition. The government, in a
hierarchical system based on that of Vietnam, controlled the appointment of officials from
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provincial governors, district and commune levels down to village leaders, giving the party
strong control at rural and village levels.
The tendency for power to be centralised and personalised continued during the
PRK/SOC period and was reflected in the stability of leadership. After 1984, Hun Sen
remained as Prime Minister until the arrival of UNTAC, and any party factionalism was kept
firmly under control until the declaration of the SOC. The powers of Hun Sen and other
leaders of the party were based on extensive systems of patronage and clientelism, with
positions in the bureaucracy being a common reward for loyalty and service (Gottesman,
2003; Roberts, 2007). While corruption did not reach the levels of the Sihanouk and Lon Nol
regimes, PRK cadres and high-ranking government officials enjoyed access to privileges,
including openings into business enterprises, superior housing, and cars (Chandler, 1993).
The support of the military was a vital factor in the pursuit and maintenance of power.
Thus, the nature of power and the strategies for achieving it in the PRK/SOC were a
continuation of Cambodian political tradition and laid the foundation for the political
landscape and culture of the post-UNTAC period. Power was not to be shared but to be used
by those who held it without criticism or opposition. Networks of patronage and clientelism
sustained the hold on power. The PRK/SOC also used a tight control of the administration
system to maintain a hold over all levels of Cambodian life, down to village level. Access to
resources to maintain these networks were crucial to maintaining and keeping that power.
PRK/SOC Strategies: Gaining Access to International Resources
The failure of the PRK to win recognition by the UN as the legitimate government of
Cambodia meant that UN development agencies were prohibited from operating in Cambodia
once the Emergency was declared over in 1982 (Mysliwiec, 1988; Chandler, 1993).
However, while aid was severely restricted, determined efforts by a number of INGOs and
UN relief agencies groups, working in collaboration with the Government, achieved some
alleviation of the suffering of the Cambodian people in the aftermath of the Pol Pot era
(Mysliwiec, 1998_Hughes et al., 2003). A Joint Mission of UNICEF and the ICRC
administered the relief effort (Hughes et al., 2003). It was funded by voluntary contribution
by members and activities were divided between programmes inside Cambodia, on the
borders with Thailand and within Thailand (Mysliewiec, 1988; Hughes et al., 2003) Agencies
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under the joint Mission included UNHCR, UNICEF, the UN Border Relief Operations and
World Food Programme. In addition to the UN activities, 27 INGOs form Australia, the US
and Europe were active in Cambodia (Mysliwiec, 1988). With about 40 STAFF working
mainly out of Phnom Penh, they contributed approximately $US10 million per year. Among
the largest were Cooperation for American Relief Everywhere (CARE), Catholic Relief
Services, (CRS), Church World Service (CWS) and Oxfam UK (ibid)
Bilateral laid was also forthcoming, but was limited. Most came from Vietnam, the
Soviet Union and Easter Europe, and the narrowness of the range made Cambodia vulnerable
to changes in donor policy or capacity. Mysliwiec estimates that these donors gave about
US$100 million a year, with the Soviet Union supplying about 80% of it (Mysliwiec, 1988).
The largest single Western donor country was Australia, which gave US$3.9 million in 1985-
96 and worked hard to bring about a political solution to the Cambodian situation
(Mysliwiec, 1998). By 1989 non-Soviet bloc aid was 15% of the emergency relief level
(Hughes et al, 2003:7)
The wretched state of Cambodia’s infrastructure and economy limited resources
available to the PRK from within the country, and probably was a reason for the
comparatively low levels of corruption compared to the post-UNTAC era (Chandler, 1993).
Domestic resources had been eroded by conflict and the extraordinary destruction of the DK
period, and the PRK’s external aid amounted to only 15% of that received after UNTAC
(Hughes et al., 2003). By 1989, the only sources of aid, Vietnam and the USSR, could no
longer maintain even this level of support. The PRK, despite some progress, was still far from
achieving acceptable living standards for the country or resolving the civil war, and was
struggling to pay its civil servants’ salaries. The bureaucracy, though large, had very limited
technical capacity and was poorly regulated and inefficient, with most appointments based on
political patronage.
The PRK saw engagement with the wider international community as essential to gaining
access to funds in the face of its financial crisis. It prepared for this step by changing its
political institutions and economic structure, renaming itself the State of Cambodia and
drawing up a new constitution, while the KPRK changed its name to the Cambodian People’s
Party (CPP). The changes represented a shift in state policy to a more open economy with
greater rights to individuals to own property, a key prerequisite for a greater role for the
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private sector (Ayres, 2003). The government also reluctantly began to pursue peace talks,
recognising that a negotiated peace would be necessary for it to gain international aid and
funding. Ultimately, these strategies achieved the goal of access to considerable international
resources to Cambodia. However, traditional views around the nature and acquisition of
power meant that a large portion of these funds were to be diverted to pursue political
survival and dominance rather than the rehabilitation of Cambodia for which donors had
intended it.
UNTAC and Cambodia’s Political Culture
Background
In 1991, after prolonged negotiations between Cambodia’s warring factions, an
agreement was reached whereby they reluctantly agreed to form a specially constructed
quadripartite body, the Supreme National Council (SNC). The SNC was to be ‘the unique
legitimate body and source of authority … in which the sovereignty, independence and unity
of Cambodia are enshrined’ (UN document A/45/472-S/21689, cited in Curtis, 1993, p. 8).
With its formation, peace negotiations were concluded with the signing of the Agreements on
a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict in Paris on 23 October
1991. The agreements invited the UN to establish the United Nations Transitional Authority
in Cambodia (UNTAC) (United Nations and Cambodia, 1991-1995).
UNTAC was unprecedented in the UN’s history, involving a budget of over two billion
dollars, and a force of 16,000 regular troops, 3,000 police officers, 3,000 civilian officials,
and thousands of locally recruited Khmer staff (Roberts, 2002; Curtis, 1998). It was faced
with the mammoth task of creating a ‘neutral political environment’ for elections and
conducting ‘free and fair’ elections which would establish a power sharing government,
establish a cease-fire, disarm and demobilise the warring factions, repatriate the over 300,000
refugees and begin mine-clearing. In addition, they were to establish law and order, protect
‘human rights and fundamental freedoms’, meet humanitarian needs, rebuild essential
infrastructure and services, train Cambodians to take over these tasks and coordinate donor
assistance. To achieve this UNTAC was given a time limit of eighteen months (Ratner, 1997;
Curtis, 1993).
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UNTAC and Cambodian Political Culture
Cambodia’s political culture responded and adapted to UNTAC’s presence and actions to
achieve its traditional goals. UNTAC’s failure to control the incumbent political party and the
decision that the two main parties should share power in government intensified the battle
between elites by introducing the concept of a legitimate opposition. The introduction of
large amounts of international funding provided a new and modern supply of resources into
the competition for power. Certainly, after UNTAC, the level of competition, corruption and
the co-option of the bureaucracy for political purposes increased, with resources and
commitment to service delivery declining as the political competition dominated the goals
and motivation of the political elites and diverted international funds to meet local political
goals.
The difficulties for UNTAC were compounded by the fact that, partly due to Cambodia’s
international isolation since the time of the Khmer Rouge, little was understood of the goals
and strategies of the KPR/SOC’s political leadership (Gottesman, 2003). These often
conflicted with the values and assumptions of the liberal democracy, which UNTAC was
charged with establishing (Hughes, 2001). Central to the elites’ goals was the concept of
power as highly personalised and centralised, indivisible, intolerant of dissent or opposition
and with little accountability by those who held power (Pak et al., 2007). This left little room
for the concepts of a social contract, power sharing and a loyal opposition that are basic to
democracy. Nor were there mechanisms for a willing transfer of power, for to lose power was
to lose everything. In particular, it meant the loss of the means to sustain the loyalty of the
clients and supporters who made it possible to hold power. It was not a culture in which
Western public administration concepts such as ‘accountability’ and ‘good governance’ could
readily take root (Pak et al., 2007).
UNTAC Goals and Strategies
UNTAC enjoyed mixed success, a fact that was to have profound implications for
Cambodia’s political culture and the nature of the state that developed. On the one hand, it
successfully repatriated over 300,000 refugees and involved over 90% of the population in
elections which were deemed ‘free and fair’ by the international community (Doyle, 1996). A
constitution and a framework of liberal democratic institutions were established, and
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Cambodia’s international isolation ended, opening up the opportunity for the return of aid,
UN agencies and INGOs. The peace process offered hope of some stability and recovery
from the years of war and social and economic turmoil (Doyle, 1996; Curtis, 1993).
A number of critical failures, however, overshadowed these successes. Economic growth
was limited to the area around Phnom Penh, with little penetration of the rural areas (Hughes
et al., 2003). Despite the success in running ‘free and fair’ elections, UNTAC failed to
establish a ‘neutral political environment’ leading up to the election, or to control the CPP
(Hughes et al., 2003; Un, 2005). Instead, Cambodia during this period was gripped by ‘fear
and insecurity’ and political violence, primarily instigated by the CPP (Ledgerwood, 1996;
Curtis, 1993). Intimidation, human rights abuses and violence against citizens and political
opponents became commonplace as the CPP in particular fought to gain as much advantage
as possible before the election (Hughes, 2003a). The violence, which was almost exclusively
perpetrated by the CPP and Khmer Rouge, took place against a background of impunity for
the powerful and ‘scorn’ for the rule of law (Peou, 2000). There was no clear focus for state
authority, as the fiction of the SNC became increasingly transparent and UNTAC seemed
unwilling or incapable of controlling the CPP (Ratner, 1997). The acquisition of power
became the goal for the political parties at the expense of establishing a functioning state able
to supply its citizens with political and social goods such as security, the rule of law, health,
and education.
These developments were in part due to UNTAC’s inability to enforce an effective
cease-fire or to canton and demobilise the Khmer Rouge and SOC forces (Curtis, 1993).
UNTAC had no mandate to enforce compliance except through diplomacy and persuasion,
and thus was impotent in the face of political and military rivals who were operating in a
context still dominated by the notion of political power as a ‘zero-sum game’ (Richmond et
al., 2007). UNTAC and its international supporters have been criticised for their lack of
understanding of the realities of Cambodia’s political culture and history and the fragility of
the factions’ commitment to the Peace Agreements (Richmond et al., 2007; St. John, 2005;
Downie et al., 2001). The Cambodian leaders had signed under duress from their
international backers and had no real intention of putting their differences to one side (Ratner,
1997). The agreements had more to do with the needs of the international community and
Cambodia’s Cold War sponsors. The wider international community wanted a solution to
their awkward recognition of the odious Khmer Rouge as the legitimate government of
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Cambodia (Shawcross, 1994; Curtis, 1998). Attempts to exclude the Khmer Rouge
altogether, however, were opposed by China. At the same time there was increasing moral
pressure to end the international embargo on aid to a country that had endured such trauma
and suffering, while Russia and Vietnam wanted to extricate themselves from their
unsustainable support of Cambodia.
To achieve this tangled mix of interests and goals, UNTAC was expected to lay the
groundwork of a liberal society by the imposition of elections and a measure of power-
sharing and liberal reforms in the market and society (Richmond et al., 2007). The strategy
was based on the Kissinger dictum that the most effective way of settling civil war is to make
contestants govern jointly (Roberts, 2002). In reality, the Cambodian view of power did not
allow for such a concept. For Hun Sen and the CPP, power was to be accumulated, not
shared, and opponents were to be overthrown, not reformed (St. John, 2005).
UNTAC and Its Impact on Cambodian Political Culture
The 1991 elections saw 90% of the population turn out to vote, and were declared free
and fair by the international community. The royalist party National United Front for an
Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) gained a narrow
victory over the CPP. The result, although close, was remarkable in that it represented the
first time in Cambodia’s history that the majority of the population voted against the status
quo, suggesting that many ordinary Cambodians were prepared to express their opposition to
the CPP. However, basing power on popular legitimacy has not been part of Cambodia’s
political heritage (Ojendal et al., 2006). The CPP refused to accept the results and it became
apparent that nobody could govern Cambodia without their consent and cooperation (Un,
2010). They controlled all the bases of power, including the bureaucracy, military, and police,
and had a stranglehold on the rural areas through the village council system established
during the PRK/SOC period (Hughes, 2003; Ledgerwood, 1996). The election could give
legitimacy expressed through the ballot box to FUNCINPEC, but it could not give the party
the capacity or the power base to govern. It was clear that the CPP were not prepared to
follow the rules of liberal democracy or relinquish power without being forced to.
UNTAC bowed to the political realities and brokered a power-sharing agreement
whereby the FUNCINPEC leader, Prince Ranariddh, and Hun Sen, the CPP leader, were
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appointed joint prime ministers. The power-sharing arrangement extended down through the
bureaucracy, with two ministers, two under-secretaries of state and so on down to the lowest
levels for each ministry, with the same matching at provincial levels. On 21 September 1993,
the Constituent Assembly signed the new constitution, reinstating Sihanouk to the throne as a
constitutional monarch and establishing the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC).
UNTAC, its mission completed, withdrew by the final weeks of 1993 and the RGC began its
work.
Thus from the beginning it was clear that the holding of free and fair elections did not
mean the establishment of a liberal democracy. UNTAC has been criticised for its failure to
understand the nature of Cambodia’s political heritage and culture, and its assumptions about
the universality and transferability of liberal democracy (Richmond et al., 2007). It is argued
that this failure contributed to a further decade of political instability and the reinforcement of
the violent nature of the struggle for power, while the liberal institutions sat uneasily and
unconvincingly over traditional political behaviour and structures (Richmond et al., 2007).
An INGO worker gave examples of the almost parallel universes, which existed between
international agents of change and local power brokers, down to language and concepts used:
An example is the word ‘delegation’ … the Khmer word is not delegation. It basically
means ‘abdication.’ ’Hand over’. Gone …. So the UNDP, the World Bank, they’ve
been having wonderful discussions for ten years at the level of Deputy Prime
Minister, and he does not understand what delegation means. … He thanked me for
trying to explain what that person that’s been talking to him for all this time meant.
(Interview INGO5)
Similarly, while UNTAC saw the establishment of liberal institutions, they were not deeply
entrenched:
Cambodia in theory has laws. The problem is enforcement and the fact that there’s a
climate of impunity … The constitution ... covers gender and disability and social
benefits but a lot of it is theory. The ministers are supposed to be accountable to the
National Assembly. They seldom go. So there is theory and there is practice.
(Interview INGO5)
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The Impact of UNTAC on Domestic Political Goals
UNTAC’s achievement of conducting free and fair elections was undermined by the
goals and strategies of Cambodian political culture. The election and its unsustainable
assumption of a ‘loyal opposition’ if anything deepened the divide between the parties and set
the stage for a fight for survival which was to distract the leaders from the task of governing
until one had emerged a clear victor. State power was seen as an avenue, offering the leaders
sources of revenue, international recognition and assistance and the ability to reward and
recruit supporters (McCargo, 2005; Curtis, 1998). This made the stakes of the election so
high that it was impossible for the loser to accept defeat, for to do so would be to accept
political and possibly personal extinction. Commentators suggested that that UNTAC merely
changed the medium for hostility from war to elections (Roberts, 2001; Richmond et al.,
2007). However, this change in itself increased the pressures on existing political parties,
focusing their energies on winning votes rather than strengthening democratic processes
(Hughes, 2001). In a political environment of absolutism and intolerance of opposition, the
power-sharing arrangement led to the strengthening of traditional political practices
(McCargo, 2005; Roberts, 2002; St. John, 2005). An INGO worker engaged in building civil
society felt those traditional views of leadership and power still held in 2004 despite elections
and democratic structures. Criticism was not tolerated and power was for the benefit of the
leader, not the led:
The word ‘leader’ in Khmer doesn’t exist. The nearest equivalent in English would convey
‘consumer’ ... Leaders tend to take and people expect to give and this is why wealth tends to
percolate up in Cambodia. From the time a child is born they have to give to people above
them. (Interview INGO5)
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Another interviewee observed that the political culture continued to be intolerant of
criticism and opposition, despite the supposed existence of a liberal democracy and diversity
of opinion:
It’s just that, as the culture before was oppressive, it continues to be hierarchical and
oppressive ... and doesn’t encourage open discussion, questioning, wondering, all
those things … especially for folks at the lower end of the pile. (Interview INGO2)
The heart of the political struggle after UNTAC was, as before, access to the means for
rewarding the clients and dependents (Ear, 2005; Hughes, 2001). Key prizes were access to
the civil service, local to provincial administration structures and military, which gave the
power to appoint supporters to positions, which provided the opportunity to generate income.
Incumbents had an obvious advantage, while those not in power were cut off from access to
the resources needed to win it. As an INGO worker observed, it was all or nothing for the
political players:
If you’re not in government you’re out of government, you can’t make money. You
can’t change things. (Interview INGO5)
UNTAC’s failure to take control of the key ministries of finance, defence, foreign affairs,
public security and information from the CPP, despite its clear mandate to do so, revealed the
strength and depth of the CPP’s hold on the institutions of government (Hughes, 2006;
Peang-Meth, 1997). UNTAC left control of the most senior portfolios in CPP hands and civil
servants continued to answer to CPP officials rather than FUNCINPEC ministers (McCargo,
2005). FUNCINPEC ministers, civil servants and provincial officials were disadvantaged by
their lack of experience in administration and relatively poorly developed patronage
networks, whereas the CPP had had eleven years’ experience of government to build power
structures.
By 1993, FUNCINPEC ministers were complaining that they had little influence against
CPP officials even in the ministries allocated to them (Jeldres, 1993). An INGO interviewee
observed that FUNCINPEC’s powerlessness continued down through all levels of the
administration:
Although half the provinces … were supposed to be FUNCINPEC-led, almost to a
man those FUNCINPEC governors are weak with very strong CPP deputies and the
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same pattern goes right down through districts and now to the communes. (Interview
INGO5)
The CPP had a number of strategies for controlling non-CPP ministries, including
diverting disbursement of funding through the Ministry of Finance in favour of CPP
ministries:
So you’ll find for example that education and health has never got more than 70-60%
of their disbursements, whereas a CPP ministry, Ministry of Interior, sometimes have
200% of the real allocation of money, not the one that you put in your plan every
year. (Interview INGO5)
The CPP also used the power-sharing arrangement to their advantage, placing strong
CPP Secretaries of State with FUNCINPEC ministers, setting up artificial QUANGOS to
divert funds and control the flow of funding through the Council of Ministers (Jeldres, 1993).
Post-UNTAC Strategies to Achieve Political Goals
The goals of the elites were primarily concerned with their own survival and
advancement, not the development and well-being of Cambodia (Lilja, 2010; Cock, 2010;
Hughes, 2001). With the establishment of the electoral system by UNTAC, these goals
focused around acquiring resources and securing enough votes to gain power (Hughes, 2006,
2001). Control of the state and its institutions became central, giving access to international
donor funds and domestic natural resources, command of the security forces to suppress
opposition and opportunities for patronage (Cook, 2010). By the elections of 1998, the CPP
under Hun Sen had established itself as the dominant ruling elite.
Hun Sen had achieved this dominance through a number of strategies, including
consolidating control over the security forces and gradually recentralising power through the
establishment of special state agencies controlling natural resources such as forestry and
petroleum, bringing them and the resources they controlled more directly under prime
ministerial control (Cock, 2010; Hendrickson, 2005). He also personalised power, through
the manipulation of Cambodian traditions of gift giving and the presentation of the rebuilding
of Cambodia’s infrastructure as his personal gift (Hughes, 2006). Opposition, and potential
opposition, including the monarchy and the Buddhist clergy, were weakened or eliminated,
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and the existing party networks used to enforce the CPP’s dominance in the rural areas,
which comprised 80% of the electorate (Cock, 2010; Springer, 2010; Un, 2006).
Control of the state was thus a central goal for Cambodia’s political elites. It ensured the
ability to use the security forces against opponents, access to international funding and
domestic resources and support for patronage networks through office giving. One outcome
was that the elites had a strong vested interest in keeping the state viable. The inefficiency of
state institutions resulting from patrimonialism and state interference threatened this, while
the collapse of state institutions would jeopardise their extraction of domestic resources. Even
more seriously, however, it would threaten access to international funding, a vital component
of the ruling elites’ strategies to gain and keep power.
Dependence on foreign support has been a part of the Cambodian political dynamic since
independence, with no regime, with the possible exception of Pol Pot’s, being self-sufficient
(Cock, 2010). The UNTAC intervention and the transfer of political contest from the military
to the electoral sphere demanded new strategies of the political strongmen, with gaining votes
becoming central to winning and keeping power (Springer, 2010; Ear, 2013). UNTAC also
provided the means of solving the problem, with huge amounts of foreign funding entering
the country, increasing the opportunity for corruption, misappropriation and the accumulation
of wealth by those in power (Hughes & Conway, 2003; Hughes, 2001). While the changes
and reforms, which accompanied this funding, could have undermined Hun Sen and the CPP,
the latter became adept at manipulating the external pressures of donors (Cock, 2010;
Hughes, 2001). International funding gave local actors the space and resources to respond to
the threats facing them in ways which were profoundly undemocratic but rational (Hughes,
2003). These resources were used to maintain power bases and keep the state functioning at a
sufficient level to keep donors happy. Elections and limited freedom of expression were
allowed, but any real opposition, especially in the CPP’s rural heartland, was ruthlessly
suppressed (Ear, 2013; Un, 2006; Springer, 2010; Hughes, 2003). The elites learnt how to
play Western donors against each other, taking advantage of their lack of coordination and
their pressure to disburse funds, delaying reforms and patiently waiting out pressures to fulfil
promises, and timing reform announcements to coincide with donor meetings (Cock, 2010).
Hun Sen and the CPP in particular has been able to use the language of democracy, pluralism
and reform to the international community to ensure a continued supply of international
funding, while maintaining a relentless grip on power at the domestic level.
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Post-UNTAC Political Culture and Service Delivery
One of the chief motives driving the UNTAC intervention had been concern over the
humanitarian situation of Cambodia’s population, including lack of basic services (Curtis,
1993). Despite the large financial commitment by the international community, it was to be
some time before any improvement in service delivery was seen. Political culture in
Cambodia by its nature saw resources moving from the poor towards those more powerful
(Kimchoeun et al., 2007; Hughes et al., 2003). There was actually some overlap in the
attitudes and explanations of poverty among donors, INGOs and the state, with a tendency to
see the solutions as the injections of resources from outside (Hughes et al., 2003).
Government officials often saw poverty as due to weakness, ignorance or lack of initiative of
the poor, with government involvement in solutions limited by its lack of capacity (Hughes et
al., 2003). The solution, they argued, lay in more training and resources, and higher salaries
for the civil service. Implicitly, this involved greater injections of resources by international
donors into the bureaucracy, a solution at odds with donor policy of reducing public spending
and the size of the bureaucracy (World Bank, 1994, 1992).
At the highest levels, however, the lack of interest in social service delivery lay in the
fact that policy was driven by the political needs of the elites to gain power and retain it (Un,
2006). Traditionally power did not draw its legitimacy from a social contract, but the
acquisition of resources for patronage (Ojendal, 2006). Ministries that could attract
international funding or access to the exploitation of natural resources had the most influence
on the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers, and attracted the most support. Defence,
for example, did very well, a reflection of a long history of military patronage systems and
the crucial need of the political leaders to have military support (Hendrickson, 2005; Meas,
2000; Curtis, 1998). The official government expenditure on defence and security through the
Ministries of Defence and the Interior was officially nearly one-third of the national budget,
but the actual figure was closer to 40% to 50% over most of the 1990s (Hughes et al., 2003).
One official admitted that he had been ordered to ‘give the military a blank cheque’ (Peou,
2000, pp. 240-241). Agriculture, on the other hand, represented only 7.8% of the 1994 budget
(Peou, 2000, pp. 240-241). As donor funding went to building infrastructure and the private
sector, ministries such as the Ministries of Trade, Transport and Finance grew in influence
and wealth, as did the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing which controlled access
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to lucrative natural resources (Calavan et al., 2004; Hughes et al., 2003). Ministries providing
frontline services, such as health and education, offered smaller opportunities for the
extraction of resources, and consequently found themselves on the edge of political and
policy influence (Hughes et al., 2003). This relative obscurity, however, had the advantage of
less scrutiny from powerful figures if the ministry wanted to implement pro-poor policies,
with the result that some, such as the Ministry of Health, were seen as more pro-poor and
innovative (Hughes et al., 2003). These political dynamics had profound effects on the
bureaucracy and the provision of basic services.
The Cambodian Bureaucracy Post-UNTAC
By 1992, the bureaucracy under the PRK/SOC had grown to the point where 85% of the
$US20 million budget went on civil service salaries (Peou, 2000). While it was seriously
under-resourced and lacking training and capacity, considerable achievements had been made
during the PRK/SOC period (Kevin, 2000; Peou, 2000). An INGO worker in the disability
sector felt that there was at least a sense of accountability and commitment in the ministry
and workers in the field during this period. Commenting on one of their workers who had
been with the ministry pre-UNTAC, she said:
He knows all the handicapped people in the district, so as a member of the Ministry
of Social Affairs, he’s been out visiting all these handicapped, so they really wanted
something to happen for them. That’s my belief. (Interview INGO1)
During the period of the PRK, party leaders, and particularly Hun Sen, had quietly begun
to build their power bases through patronage networks in the different ministry bureaucracies
(Gottesman, 2003). These power networks were not based on ideology but on personal
dependence on the chief patrons, with the patron’s power depending on his ability to provide
rewards from the lowest level cadres up (Gottesman, 2003). UNTAC had failed to address the
issues of these networks or the resulting politicisation and corruption within the civil service.
UN officials, often inexperienced themselves in governmental administration, had been
concerned with achieving a good rapport with local officials. Consequently they were
reluctant to challenge questionable behaviour, and SOC officials, while interacting well with
their UN counterparts, increasingly ignored them (Ratner, 1997).
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The period after UNTAC saw an increase in corruption in the civil service, largely due to
an increase in the resources available through international aid. There was also a drop in
morale, a continued lack of training, skill building and resources and the loss of more skilled
bureaucrats to other sectors (Curtis, 1998). Despite rehabilitation being one of its goals,
UNTAC itself did relatively little to build capacity or repair infrastructure beyond its own
requirements (Curtis, 1993). This left the new government with the same problems the SOC
had faced, but without the expected help. Although the international community pledged
$US800 million in 1992, most of this was designated to come into effect after the transition
process, and was tied to longer-term development projects. As a result, the government was
desperately short of resources for urgent rehabilitation in health, education, sanitation and
water and infrastructure. At the same time, the power-sharing agreement meant a massive
increase in the size of the bureaucracy, which stretched inadequate resources of the
government even further (Curtis, 1998).
UNTAC was a demoralising experience for the civil service, who were replaced and
bypassed by the well-equipped UN staff (Godfrey et al, 2000; Kiman, 1995). The situation
was exacerbated by the huge differences in the salaries of UN personnel and UN-paid local
staff and state-sector salaries, with locally hired UNTAC staff earning 15 times more than
most Cambodians, including civil servants (Curtis, 1993). Civil service morale and capacity
was further weakened by the recruitment of most of the trained or experienced Khmer civil
servants by UNTAC and, later, INGOs, a move which gave them higher salaries and some
independence from the CPP. After enjoying these conditions, civil servants returning to
government service found it difficult to re-adjust to the lower salaries and resources.
Shortage of funds and the CPP’s control of the Ministry of Finance and ability to divert
funds to its own ministries meant that salaries in some ministries, particularly service delivery
ministries, were often months in arrears, compounding the pressures on civil servants to
supplement their salaries by ‘special fees’ or ‘moonlighting:
If only they had a decent salary some of them would be effective, but they have to
make extra money. (Interview INGO5)
Low salaries affected the morale of civil servants and their ability to function. One
interviewee, an ex-civil servant, described the frustrations of trying to run a committee with
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government staff who were rarely present, at the same time recognising the difficulties of
civil servants’ positions:
They convene a meeting and nobody comes for the meeting. There is no follow-up, no
real action taken … They can come in the morning and not come in the evening.
Often, only the Secretary-General comes, alone. And how can you enforce the staff
for working if you are the Secretary-General? You cannot dismiss the staff. The
minister doesn’t have the right to dismiss. And you cannot complain because the
salary is very low. (Interview DAC2)
Lack of professional training limited the ability of civil servants to perform their duties,
with a 1992 World Bank study describing social sector staff as poorly qualified and lacking
in competence and personnel management capability (Curtis, 1993b). INGO staff made
similar observations:
One of the big issues about the government generally speaking is that people don’t
really know how to manage work. They’ve just got to do this little bit and that little
bit but making a plan and following it, that’s just piecemeal. And then there’s lots of
paper-shuffling. There were very few (trainings). (Interview DAC1)
Further, the planning mechanisms left by UNTAC were foreign concepts and practices,
which were frequently unconnected with the goals, strategies, practices and timeframes of the
Cambodians (Downie et al., 2001).
Some commentators felt that the reluctance of civil servants to make decisions, take
action or plan was partly a cultural reluctance, partly a legacy of the traumas and uncertainty
of the previous thirty years, but that it did not indicate an inability to plan (Downie et al.,
2001). Training of local staff could have led to a more stable and effective bureaucracy
(Doyle, 1996; Jeldres, 1993). UNTAC has been criticised for its failure to use the period of
its administration to build capacity in the civil services, which one commentator suggests
would have encouraged commitment and goodwill among civil servants as well as
competence:
If the UN had provided training to the Cambodians who staffed the five UN-run
ministries, it would have won the hearts of Cambodians who have always shown a
tremendous willingness to learn new skills. (Jeldres, 1993, p. 108)
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The CPP, with its stronger resource base, was able to steadily push FUNCINPEC out of
the prosperous ministries and establish dominance over the civil service through networks of
loyalty and patronage (McCargo, 2005). The strategic importance of control of the
bureaucracy resulted in the politicisation of the civil service and the establishment of
patronage hierarchies through the administration:
There are no civil servants in Cambodia. They are all political appointments. Right
down to the local level. There is no neutral civil servant here, so even down to the
guard, (they) will have a line of patronage that is partly political, but is probably
more to do with family. (Interview INGO5)
The development of a professional, neutral civil service standing outside politics or party
influence and with primary loyalty to the state became almost impossible. It was a battle that
one observer felt no one in the civil service could win:
In Khmer you can only be loyal or disloyal ... That’s one of the reasons why
corruption is regarded as normal because it’s OK if I’m taking from you to give to my
boss - that’s part of the system. (Interview INGO5)
In return for this loyalty, clients were protected, despite incompetence or pressure from
expatriate donors.
Competition for funding between ministries, most of it international aid, dominated
government policy. An adviser to the Ministry of Social Affairs, Labour, Veterans and Youth
(MOSALVY) recalled how strategic concerns over accessing funds rather than the needs of
government and service provision controlled policy. Working in adoption, she saw the
possibility of raising funds through charging fees. The ministry, however, was not enthused:
(The ministry) said ‘No’, if we set fees the money goes to the Ministry of Finance and
then we won’t get anything ... to pay for the orphanages and things like that.
(Interview DAC1)
Civil servants’ wages were low, but appointments were eagerly sought because they gave
the opportunity to extract favours or demand funds for services to which the recipient was
entitled. INGO workers described the frustration of trying to achieve goals without offending
powerful people or compromising their own standards:
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The general director of MOSALVY wants us to give a job to his nephew. Of course he
didn’t broach the subject directly but his assistant called my number two to say I’m
under strong pressure from my boss. He wants a job for his nephew. Well, of course, I
say fine, he can apply. (Interview DAC1)
By 2005, one estimate put the amount lost from government funds every year at
$US300-500 million, which was roughly equal to that received through donor assistance
(USAID, 2005, cited in Richmond et al., 2007, p. 38). Corruption occurred at all levels of the
bureaucracy, ranging from selling high-level posts (promotion to a senior police post
typically cost $US500-1,000) to payments for services and favours (McCargo, 2005). The
impact on government services was severe.
Post-UNTAC Bureaucracy and Service Provision
The corruption in the bureaucracy and the diversion of resources from service delivery to
the needs of the political rivals undermined what services were being provided and hindered
the development of new ones (Ear, 2005; Godfrey et al., 2000). The culture of expecting
rewards for any service done and using even minor positions of power for personal profit and
payment extended down to those at ground level, seriously compromising the availability of
services for the poor. Fundamental services such as health were in theory available free to
poor people, but in practice, fees were demanded before treatment. Stories of the harsh reality
of life for those without resources were common. One example was given by an INGO
worker:
The poorest people should get free treatment. The doctors and nurses will not treat
the patient unless the money is put upfront. I came across a case … a woman in
labour desperately needed to have a caesarean. The husband was sent back to the
village to get $200 for the operation. It took him three days to get the money by which
time both the mother and child were dead. (Interview INGO5)
Understandably, people lost trust in public services, further undermining the morale and
ability to attract funding and political support of service delivery ministries.
People still often spend a lot of money on traditional healers before they even enter
the government health service because they basically think that the government
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health service is not going to help them, that it is going to cost too much and the other
things that they hear. (Interview INGO4)
Within the civil service, and within certain ministries, there were still people willing to
cite poverty reduction as a policy objective (Hughes et al., 2003). A number of NGO
interviewees were quick to point out that there were people with talent and commitment in
the public service, but the hierarchy and demands from political patrons stifled them:
I mean there are people who have good ideas, some. People who wish things were
better, but not the hierarchy. It just doesn’t really allow that. And then also a lot of
the government effort is a dual system where money is always floating upwards.
(Interview INGO)
The low salaries resulting from the CPP’s control of funds through the Ministry of
Finance, and the general shortage of international funding for social service ministries, also
meant that potentially good workers were forced to become part of the culture of ‘fees’ and
‘gifts’ in return for services:
There are certainly within government and even within MOSALVY some good people.
They’re not all bad, there are good people. (Interview INGO5)
A long-time INGO worker working with the bureaucracy argued that if one were to
accept the complexity of the partnership, avoid being too judgemental, try to understand the
pressures under which individuals worked and be prepared to look for and support motivated
people, there were real possibilities of good partnerships:
In government you have interested people and they are just trying to survive
eventually but they are genuinely interested and some people are not. Some people
are always thinking – how can I make money out of it. You have to sort of find out
within that forest, how to make your track … That’s why it’s a bit difficult to say
black or white. (Interview INGO3)
The civil service, then, while poorly paid and trained, demoralised, caught up in
corruption and patronage, under-resourced and failing badly in its task of delivering services,
particularly to poor people, was not monolithic (Hughes et al., 2003). However, those
‘interested’ civil servants faced a complex and difficult situation. The patronage system and
the strictly controlled hierarchies it produced, with loyalty going first to the patron, reduced
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initiative and commitment to what should have been the primary tasks of the bureaucracy,
including service provision (Hughes et al., 2003; Kimchoeun, 2007). The power struggle
between Cambodia’s elites weakened and demoralised the civil service leading to paralysis in
the bureaucracy as CPP and FUNCINPEC fought for control of resources for their political
struggle (Ear, 2005; Hughes, 2006; McCargo, 2005). Corruption, patronage and clientelism
increased, civil servants were distracted from their proper role by their patrons’ needs, and
the delivery of public services deteriorated.
Conclusion
Cambodia’s political culture at the time of UNTAC was a strongly entrenched one,
profoundly different to the values and assumptions of the liberal democracy that the UNTAC
mission was charged to establish. Dominating political behaviour was the traditional notion
of political power as a ‘zero-sum game’ with no mechanisms for sharing power or notions of
dissent and a loyal opposition. Power was to be used by the holder to strengthen his own
position, not in the interests of those over whom he exercises power. This power was
maintained by a system of patronage, which drew in Cambodians from all levels of society,
politicising and polarising it. The necessity to maintain networks of dependents demanded
that those seeking power have access to resources for rewards and the means to deny their
opponents such resources.
Against this background, Western powers set out to establish a liberal democracy with
what they presumed were universally acceptable institutions such as human rights, the rule of
law, transparency and a free market. Post-UNTAC political culture involved a continuation of
traditional Cambodian practices and behaviour, thinly overlaid with a layer of liberal
democracy, which legitimated the intervention of foreign international powers and
organisations, and the imposition of unfamiliar and often incomprehensible external norms.
Indeed, the assumption that an election and the establishment of liberal institutions would
resolve the competition for power strengthened the ferocity of the struggle for power within
Cambodian political culture. A change was the introduction of international funding as a
modern source of resources for patronage and power. The bureaucracy, already under-
resourced and poorly skilled, was further weakened by corruption and political patronage as
rival parties attempted to use it to strengthen their positions and gain resources.
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The political culture was thus not one which provided fertile ground for service provision
to the poor, although there were some synergies. The PRK/SOC’s theoretically Communist
basis did seem to have had a level of commitment to service provision, and may have left
some legacy of that. More potent was the need of elites for a functioning state to ensure
international funding, which made at least some service provision strategically valuable.
However, these only became significant if they played a part in the political struggle to win
power and keep it.
The UNTAC intervention and donors’ activities in the following years were strongly
committed to poverty reduction and the relief of the country’s humanitarian situation as well
as other goals. Service provision for the poor was one measure of how effectively these goals
were achieved. Donors were well resourced and generously funded, and had technical and
theoretical expertise; however, despite the resources and expertise available to donors,
Cambodia’s political culture was able to exert an extensive influence on donor policy
outcomes and achieve its own goals.
CHAPTER 5 – THE DISABILITY SECTOR IN CAMBODIA
1990-2006
Introduction
The chapter begins with a discussion of the issues around the definition of disability and
the implications of this for relations between the government and INGOs in the sector and
decisions around the type of services that developed. It follows with a survey of the nature
and incidence of disability in Cambodia during the period and the needs of persons with
disability. This leads into an examination of the disability sector in Cambodia in the period
1991 to 2004, exploring the role of the government, donors and INGOs and their goals,
motivations, strategies and capacities.
The chapter concludes that the model adopted for the provision of disability services in
Cambodia was strongly influenced by major donors’ policy of using the private sector, in this
case with a heavy reliance on INGOs for actual service provision, with the government acting
as ‘manager’ and ‘director’ of policy and coordination. Donor practice and policy were based
on the dominant development theory which was strongly influenced by neoliberal economic
theory. This theory tended to a ‘one size fits all’ with little allowance for the local goals and
motivations of the ministry and INGOs. The ministry struggled to fulfill its role of manager
due to weak capacity and the pressure of its political goals to access resources to maintain
some influence and sustain patronage networks. INGOs, despite their confidence that they
were essential to disability service provision, were aware that they lacked the capacity to
meet the needs of the disability sector unaided. Their reluctance to cooperate with either
government or each other due to their individualism, differing ideologies and competition
over funding further compromised their capacity as service deliverers. This led to perverse
and unexpected outcomes when donor, INGO and government policy and strategies
interacted in the domain of implementation. The resulting system of service delivery for
persons with disability was uncoordinated, inadequate and poorly reflected the needs of
persons with disability and the actual incidence and nature of disability in Cambodia.
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Disability in Cambodia 1990-2004
The Definition of Disability
The lack of a universally agreed definition of disability has been one of the major
difficulties in gathering statistics on disability in Cambodia and even globally (Mackinlay,
2004; Elwan, 1999). The definition and classifications of disability vary between reports,
making it difficult to compare statistics (Mackinlay, 2004; Thomas, 2003). Distinctions
between impairment, disability and handicap vary, and the social and medical models of
disability provide differing conceptual frameworks while the notions of disability vary from
culture to culture depending on norms of activity (UNESCAP, 2002; UPIAS, 1976; Elwan,
1999). In 2002 WHO described disability as:
… a complex phenomenon that is both a problem at the level of the person’s body,
and a complex and primarily social phenomenon. Disability is an interaction between
the features of the person and features of the overall context in which the person
lives, but some aspects of disability are almost entirely internal to the person, while
another aspect is almost entirely external. (WHO, 2002)
The description emphasises that disability is an issue that involves both the physical
impairment of an individual and the ability and willingness of a society to construct a
physical, legal, social and institutional environment, which enables all persons with disability
to participate fully. It therefore places responsibility on the society to remove barriers to the
inclusion of persons with disability rather than seeing persons with disability as the ones with
the problem (Thomas, 2003). This view of disability was enshrined in the 2008 UN
Declaration of the Rights of Persons with Disability, which in its preamble recognises:
… disability as an evolving concept and that disability results from the interaction
between persons with impairments and attitudinal and environmental barriers that
hinders their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others.
(UN, 2008)
While this view of disability was increasingly informing policy and practice at the level
of global organisations, the Cambodian government continued to be influenced by its history
of viewing disability as a physical and personal phenomenon. The SOC had limited the
concept to war veterans with a physical impairment caused by conflict (Interview DAC2;
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Interview INGO2). The first official definition of disability was developed in 1996 with the
beginning of the drafting of a law on the ‘Rights of People with Disabilities’ (Thomas, 2003).
A person with disability was defined as:
... any citizen who lacks any physical organ or capacity or suffers any mental
impairment, which causes decent restriction on his/her daily life or activities such as
loss of limbs, quadriplegia, visual or hearing impairment or mental handicap etc., and
obtains a certified document issued by the Ministry of Health. (Draft Law, 2000,
article 2, cited in Thomas, 2003, p. 26)
Unlike the WHO definition, this defined disability as a state determined by an official
decision and validated by a document issued for a circumscribed list of physical impairments
declared by the government to be a ‘disability’ (Draft Law, 2000, article 2, cited in Thomas,
2003, p. 26). The concept of society having a responsibility to create an environment that
enabled those with a physical impairment to participate without experiencing discrimination
or barriers was very far removed from this view.
Incidence of Disability in Cambodia 1990-2004
Persons with disability are disproportionately represented among the poorest in society,
sharing the same battles for basic human rights as their able-bodied peers but with even fewer
resources and greater obstacles. This makes them one of the most vulnerable among already
vulnerable groups (World Disability Report, 2012). Persons with disability are among the
groups most at risk of being failed by market-oriented policies, making the provision of
services for them an area that needs to involve donors, INGOs and government.
For a number of reasons, reliable statistics on disability in Cambodia are limited
(MSALVA, 1996; Mackinlay, 2004; ILO, 2003). Disability was not included in the national
census of Cambodia until 2003, and earlier figures were based on relatively few sources, the
most important of which were two government publications from 1996 and 1999 (Mackinlay,
2004; MOSALVY, 1999, 1996). Many of the statistics and information collected in
Cambodia were not standardised or coordinated and were based on small-scale samples (ILO,
2003). Nevertheless, they do supply some valuable insights into the extent, nature and causes
of disability in Cambodia, the needs of persons with disability and their own perceptions of
their needs.
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The 2003 Socio-Economic Survey (SES) put the number of persons with disability at
170,000 or 1.5% of the population, whereas the 1999 UN Disabled Persons Survey found that
1.4 million or 15% of the population had a disability (MoP/NIS, 2003; United Nations and
Disabled Persons Survey, 1999, cited in ADB, 2002, p. 4). The differences may have been
due to variations in the definition of disability and methods of gathering data, but they reflect
how unreliable and patchy disability statistics were. Nevertheless, enough evidence emerges
to suggest that persons with disability represented a larger sector of the population than in
most other countries (UNESCAP, 2002; Interview INGO3).
Thus, enough information exists to indicate that, for a number of years, Cambodia had
one of the highest number of persons with disability per capita in the world (Connelly, 2009;
UNESCAP/CDPF, 2003; Interview INGO3). The high disability rate has been variously
attributed to Cambodia’s prolonged experience of war, the resulting destruction of national
infrastructure and breakdown of basic services, the presence of millions of landmines and the
absolute poverty of the majority of its citizens (Semple, 1999; UNESCAP/CDPF, 2003;
ADB, 2002).
Disability by Classification in Cambodia
One of the main difficulties in collecting reliable statistics was overcome in 2001, when
the government and disability INGOs agreed to a common classification system based on
functions. However, even with this breakthrough, large gaps still existed. Statistics focused
on physical impairments, reflecting the government’s view of disability as physical
impairment related to conflict, a perception that was reinforced by many disability INGOs
which had come from a background of responding to physical disability. There was little
awareness of other non-physical disabilities, such as intellectual and learning disability,
reflected in statistics which already existed (Table 5.1; Thomas, 2005). While an informal
WHO estimate suggested that there were two million Cambodians suffering mental illness
and depression in 20011, there was little recognition of the needs in this area. A frustrated
worker from an INGO specialising in mental health remarked scathingly in 2004 that you
could ‘forget intellectual disability or mental health services’ in Cambodia (Interview
1 In an article in the The Cambodia Daily, 25th September 2001, WHO estimated that there were two million
Cambodians suffering mental illness and depression, but there are no details of what this figure is based on
(WHO; 2001).
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INGO2). The lack of data on mental health and intellectual disability reflected this neglect
(see Table 4.1).
Table 4.1 Disabled people in Cambodia by type of impairment
* Taken from database project which is now called Cambodia Mine/UXO Victim Information System of Handicap International
Sources: Thomas, 2005, p. 20; ILO, 2004.
A number of misconceptions skewed responses in policy and hindered the most effective
use of limited resources. The most significant of these was the prevailing view that mine
activity was the major cause of disability in Cambodia. Cambodia certainly was one of the
most intensively mined countries in the world, with an estimated eight to ten million
landmines and 3,000 square kilometres of agricultural land estimated to be mined in 2000
(Mackinlay, 2004; Hewett et al., 2001). Landmines are designed to maim rather than kill,
thus creating a burden for the community, and statistics such as one person in 235 in
Cambodia with a missing limb bear out the effectiveness of the strategy (Stover et al., 1991,
cited in Hewitt et al., 2001; Heng et al., 2001). In 2001, with an estimated 36,000 to 40,000
Type of
Disability Year
Number of persons
with disability Sources
Physical Disabilities * 2001 200,000–300,000 CDPO, 2001, cited ILO, 2004
Landmines 2001 40,000 to 50,000 CDPO, 2001, cited ILO, 2004
Polio 2002 60,000 CDPO, 2001, cited ILO, 2004
Hearing Impairment 2001
2004
120,000 deaf
300,000
(130,000 profoundly deaf)
CDPO, 2001, cited ILO, 2004
Deaf Development Programme
(DDP)/Krousar Thmey, 2004
Blindness 2001
2004
132,000 blind and visually
impaired
144,000
(108,000 50+ years,
28,000 15-50 years,
8,000 under 15)
CDPO, 2001, cited ILO, 2004
Association of the Blind in
Cambodia (ABC), 2004
139
mine amputees in Cambodia, Cambodia had the highest number of mine amputees per capita
of population in the world (Hewitt et al., 2001).
While these were tragic and emotive statistics, they distracted from the reality that mine
injuries were not the largest category of disability in Cambodia (see Table 5.1). The 1997
Socio-Economic Survey of Cambodia recorded accidents, illness, infectious diseases and
congenital factors as greater causes of disability than landmines (see Appendix 6, Table 3).
These were based in social and economic issues, such as poor health services, inadequate
maternal and antenatal care, food insecurity and dangerous working and living conditions, all
of which pre-dated the war and period of conflict (CCC, 2006; JICA, 2002a; UNESCAP,
1999).
After disease and congenital factors, accidents were the greatest cause of disability in
Cambodia. Most of these were linked to the everyday life of Cambodians, working in
hazardous occupations and unsafe conditions and reliant on kerosene and open fires for
cooking and light (Appendix 6, Table 2; Thomas, 2005; JICA, 2002a). Even Cambodia’s
technological advances have had their cost; with road accidents accounting for a third of
accidents causing injury and death by 2002 (see Appendix 6, Table 2). The picture was
similar for children, with a 1996 report indicating that between 1986 and 1994 the most
common disabilities among children were paralysis due to polio, deafness, blindness, cerebral
palsy and intellectual and developmental disability (MSALVA Task Force, 1996). In 1999,
an SES analysis found that disease and congenital factors were the most significant causes of
childhood disability, with disease accounting for by far the greatest proportion (Appendix 6,
Table 3).
Gender seems to have influenced vulnerability to differing types of disability, which may
reflect the impact of cultural, social and occupational factors (Appendix 6, Table 1). Men
seem to have endured the most direct injuries from conflict and mine incidents, while the
risks of disability from congenital causes, illness and disease were higher for women. This
may reflect a reluctance to spend money on health care for girl children and women, while
men’s work as soldiers and farmers exposed them to injury from mines and warfare.
Thus while landmines and landmine-related disability caught the attention of
international donors and INGOs, most disability in Cambodia was related to poverty and the
risks it brought in a country where access to health services, housing and clean water were
140
poor, work was unsafe and hard, transport to medical facilities limited and disabling diseases
such as polio and measles were endemic.
Poverty and Disability
A baseline poverty profile constructed by the World Bank in 1999 found that 39% of the
population were below the poverty line (World Bank, Nov 1999). Poverty increased the
incidence of disability through its impact on access to basic services such as housing, water
and power2. Lack of access to prenatal and health services are linked to a high level of
difficult deliveries, a significant causal factor in impairments (Mackinlay, 2004). Poor people
in Cambodia were significantly less likely to access immunisation against disabling diseases
or medical rehabilitative treatment for congenital or disease-related impairment, exposing
them to high risks of preventable disability (World Bank, 1999; ADB, 2002). For example, in
1997 it was estimated that 80% of the blindness in Cambodia was related to cataracts, vitamin
A deficiency, measles, and accidents, all of which either could be prevented or treated
(Interview INGO3). The poor were also more likely to be exposed to disability through
dangerous and unhealthy work conditions (Thomas, 2005; JICA, 2002a).
At an even more fundamental level, poverty resulted in high rates of under-nourishment
and anaemia in birth-age mothers, and wasting and stunting of children in Cambodia, all of
which are causally linked with disability (CCC, 2006; Thomas, 2005). Health care in the
countryside was inadequate and poor people had difficulty accessing it due to cost and
distance (World Bank, 2002, 1999). Compared to other developing countries, Cambodia
started from a low baseline, with no nationwide network of primary health centres in 1999
(World Bank, 1999). Only one-third of Cambodians lived within a two-hour walk to a public
health centre in 1997 (World Bank, 1997). Low wages for health workers in the public sector
drove staff to practice privately or charge ‘informal fees’, pushing up costs for patients, a
trend which had the greatest impact on the poor (World Bank, 1999). As a result, health care
expenditure by households tended to be high but with poor health outcomes. An INGO health
worker in the disability sector in 2004 believed that people had little faith in the government
2 In 2001 a World Bank poverty profile of Cambodia reported that only 2% of the rural population had access
to safe water in 1997, while lack of access to power meant that 75.2% of the population used kerosene as the
main source of light and firewood as the main fuel for cooking (JBIL, 2001). All of these factors increased
the risk of disabling disease and accidents.
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health service due to its reputation as expensive and was ‘not going to help them’. They
preferred to turn to traditional medicine first, often spending ‘a lot of money’ before entering
the government system (Interview INGO4).
In overview, Cambodia, with one of the highest per capita rates of disability in the world,
had attracted great international interest and sympathy around the tragedy of mine-related
disability. However, the issues which caused most disability in Cambodia were to do with
poverty, the lack of provision of basic services such as health, water and sanitation, road
safety, preventable illness and disease, malnutrition and workplace safety (CCC, 2006).
These issues had their origin in the social, economic and political environment of Cambodia,
requiring a response at that level.
Needs of Persons with Disability in Cambodia
People with disability have been recognised as a vulnerable group in policy statements
from the Cambodian government, World Bank, USAID and other major donors and INGOs
since the early 1990s (World Bank, 2003, 2002; ILO, 2004; ADB/FIT, 2002; UNESCAP,
2003; USAID, 2008a, 2005, 2002). Their disability exacerbated the difficulties which they
shared with all poor people increasing the odds against them in the battle to achieve rights as
basic as food, shelter, livelihood, and even survival (JICA, 2002; ILO, 2004). Apart from the
physical, mental or emotional difficulties arising directly from disability there is some
evidence that cultural and social attitudes in Cambodia may have increased their
marginalisation (DAC/JICA, 2001; Gartrell, 2010). However, other research indicates that
social and cultural attitudes are more complex, with many Cambodians reporting that their
overwhelming responses to someone with disability are ‘pity’ or ‘wanting to help’, attitudes
based in Buddhist values (Thomas, 2003, p. 28; Mackinlay, 2004). Nevertheless, it does seem
that a person with disability’s well-being is to some extent vulnerable to the attitudes of the
family and community (Gartell, 2010).
Even with support from family and community, the limited research available suggests
that the life circumstances of persons with disability are more difficult than those of their
able-bodied family or neighbours. A small survey, in 2000, by Jesuit Services (JS) of persons
with disability in a rural area indicated that nearly three-quarters of the sample had no house
or shelter, two-thirds had insufficient food, two-thirds had no job, and half had no land;
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effectively meaning that they had no means of livelihood (Coughlan, 2000, cited in Heng et
al., 2001, p. 10). A number of surveys done by the UN, the International Campaign to Ban
Landmines (ICBL) and JS suggest that persons with disability’s own priorities and
perceptions of important needs focus around access to such basic human rights as shelter,
food and water, basic health and education services and the means to earn a living (Appendix
2, Table 4). Meeting those needs is even more difficult for persons with disability than for
other poor people, with the real risk of disability locking them and their families into a cycle
of disability and poverty (CCC, 2006).
Access to general education and medical services are also more difficult for persons with
disability and their families. The survey cited above, for example, found that nearly half the
children of persons with disability did not go to school (Coughlan, 2000, cited in Heng et al.,
2001, p. 10). Often their parents’ poverty meant that they could not afford to pay teachers or
buy uniforms, locking their children out of the education system and exposing them in turn
into greater risk of poverty and marginalisation (Heng et al., 2001). Medical care is also a
pressing concern for persons with disability, who tend to have greater medical needs than the
general population and are at greater risk of becoming caught in a cycle of illness and poverty
(DAC/JICA, 2001). The lack of low-cost and geographically accessible quality primary
health care exposed them and their families to either crippling debt or illness and dependency
(Thomas, 2005). One INGO informant described the cycle, explaining how a person, having
incurred heavy debts from the cost of an amputation or medical treatment, often faced loss of
livelihood as well:
Now they've got an artificial leg and they don't know how to plough the rice field and
they've got nothing left. (Interview INGO4)
It was estimated in 2001 that only a fifth of persons with disability in Cambodia were in
a ‘satisfactory economic situation’ with sufficient skills to guarantee long-term food security
(Heng et al., 2001, p. 15; Thomas, 2005). Persons with disability themselves placed a high
priority on the ability to earn a living and wanted to gain vocational training and skills
(Thomas, 2005). However, a 1996 report found that only 11 vocational training programs
were operating, all run by INGOs under Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with
MSALVA, and that their effectiveness was compromised by several factors, including
geographical access and the suitability of the skills taught (MSALVA Task Force, 1996).
143
Anecdotal evidence suggested that, even with training, persons with disability found gaining
employment difficult (ADB/FIT, 2002). Most graduates needed access to credit to become
viable, but micro-credit was frequently inappropriate for very poor people and commercial
lenders often did not ‘trust’ persons with disability (Heng et al., 2001; Gartrell, 2010). Social
and cultural attitudes, including assumptions that they were not strong enough to work or had
impaired intellectual and nervous functions, could also act as barriers to persons with
disability gaining even unskilled employment despite vocational training (JICA, 2002;
Gartrell, 2010).
However, while the priorities of persons with disability seemed to be on meeting basic
human rights, disability organisations tended to focus on higher-level needs, such as
accessibility, medical care, mobility aids, psychological and social care, physical
rehabilitation and data collection. In part, the types of services these organisations were
equipped to provide may have influenced this, resulting in a type of self-fulfilling prophecy
where organisations’ perceptions of their target groups’ needs were shaped by the
organisations’ own strengths and purposes. As a result, the one area which was ‘fairly well-
covered’ in Cambodia was physical rehabilitation and mobility aids for those with mobility
impairments which persons with disability themselves prioritised below access to shelter,
food, work, education and medical care (DAC/JICA, 2001). Physical rehabilitation, including
the provision of rehabilitation centres, wheelchairs, crutches and prosthetic and orthotic
devices, had been the main activities of disability INGOs from their arrival in the country in
the early 1990s. As early as 1996, the MSALVA Task Force report described the geographic
distribution of the Prosthetic and Orthotic (P & O) workshops as ‘good’ (MSALVA, 1996, p.
15). By 2001, at least four-fifths of persons with disability had access to physical
rehabilitation, including prosthetics (DAC/JICA, 2001). There was certainly a feeling among
some of the longer-term workers that there was a problem of over-supply driven by INGO’s
rather than persons with disabilities needs (Interview INGO1).
The picture was much bleaker in the areas of specialised education services for children
with a disability (CWD), general education and medical services, livelihood training and
employment for persons with disability. The DAC/JICA Report in 2001 indicated that the
existing supply of appropriate education met the needs of only a fraction of children with
disabilities in Cambodia (DAC/JICA, 2001). There was only one school for the deaf
operating, and no sign language had been developed (Krousar Thmey, cited in ILO, 2004, see
144
Table 5.1). Those suffering a psychiatric, intellectual or emotional disability were particularly
marginalised (Interview INGO2). Furthermore, these services, provided solely by INGOs,
were concentrated in urban areas, and catered ‘almost exclusively’ for children with physical
disabilities and sensory impairment (ILO, 2002, p. 11).
Disability Sector in Cambodia 1994-2004
The Government Disability Sector
At a number of levels, the RGC has accepted moral responsibility for its citizens with
disability. The constitution confirms the equality of all citizens before the law and Article 74
of the 1993 constitution states that ‘the state shall assist the disabled and families of
combatants who sacrificed their lives for the nation’ (ILO, 2003). Cambodia is a signatory to
all the key binding UN human rights treaties, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Disabled
Persons, the World Program of Action Concerning Disabled Persons (UN Resolution 37/52,
1982) and the UN Standard Rules on the Equalisation of Opportunity for Disabled Persons,
December 1993 (Thomas, 2005; ADB/FIT, 2000). At a regional level, Cambodia became a
signatory of the UN-ESCAP Decade of Disabled Persons 1993-2003 and committed itself to
the extension decade 2003-2012 (Mackinlay, 2004). This technically commits the RGC to
implement the Agenda for Action of the UN-ESCAP Decade and its goals of establishing an
inclusive, barrier-free and rights-based society for people with disability in the Asian and
Pacific region.
While apparently supportive of the rights of persons with disability in Cambodia and
committed to creating a society which gave them equality and access to the same
opportunities as all citizens, the RGC’s actual implementation of these policies was limited.
The government attributed this to its lack of resources and the continuing impact of conflict
and isolation (Heng et al., 2001). While this was no doubt a factor, the reality was that the
RGC directed few resources towards the agencies responsible for implementing the
international and regional commitments in disability policy (Interview INGO4).
By its nature, disability crosses sectors and ministerial areas of responsibility, and there
was disagreement between agencies within and external to Cambodia over which ministry
should take responsibility for disability (Mackinlay, 2004). The RGC elected to place
disability under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Social Affairs, Labour, Veterans and Youth
145
Rehabilitation (MOSALVY). This was in part historical. The SOC had seen disability affairs
as limited to veterans disabled by conflict so it was logical that MOSALVY’s predecessor,
the Ministry of Social Affairs, Labour and Veterans’ Affairs (MSALVA), should take over
responsibility for disability issues under its Veterans’ Affairs mandate. It was understandable
that the RGC should continue this tradition (Interview DAC2; Interview MIN 1).
The principles and goals of the international and regional documents of which Cambodia
is a signatory theoretically shaped the ministry’s role and activities in disability issues. Thus,
the ministry was officially responsible for supporting legislation for equal opportunities,
strengthening national coordination of disability, including people with disability in
achieving the Millennium Development Goals, strengthening national capacity for data
collection and analysis of disability statistics, implementing early intervention in all areas and
working towards disability-inclusiveness in infrastructure and services (Mackinlay, 2004). In
2002, MOSALVY indicated that its strategic approach involved consultation with
stakeholders, overall policy development, legislation, compliance, monitoring and evaluation,
and very limited service delivery (ADB, 2002).
Within MOSALVY, disability fell under the jurisdiction of the Department of
Rehabilitation within the Directorate of Social Affairs, Youth and Rehabilitation (Mackinlay,
2004). In 2004 the department had six bureaus and units focused around rehabilitation and
welfare3 (Mackinlay, 2004). The department’s roles were mainly around coordination and
liaison with ministries, INGOs and international organisations in developing a programme
based on the UN-ESCAP Decade of Disabled Persons Agenda for Action and other
international agreements to which Cambodia was a signatory (Mackinlay, 2004). The
Disability Action Council was seen as a key player in the coordination and liaison process.
Following the principles outlined in the 1994 World Bank’s plan for the rehabilitation
and reconstruction of Cambodia, MOSALVY took the role of manager and controller of
disability service provision in Cambodia, while actual delivery was carried out by private
agencies such as INGOs (World Bank, 1994, 1992; MSALVA, 1996). While apparently
readily accepting this model, MOSALVY was less than enthusiastic with what seemed a
3 These bureaus were the Physical Rehabilitation Bureau, the Vocational Training for Disabled Persons
Bureau, the Community-based Rehabilitation Bureau, the Employment and Disabled Development Bureau,
the Rehabilitation Centre and Workshop and the Vocational Training for Disabled Persons Centre
(Mackinlay, 2004).
146
transfer of influence and power to external agencies (MSALVA, 1996; Interview MIN1,
2004; Interview DAC1). However, in 1996 government, INGO and donor sources all
recognised that the INGO sector was responsible for virtually all service delivery for persons
with disability in Cambodia, with the exception of a government orphanage with some
children with disability and a couple of facilities for veterans with disability (Interview
DAC1; Interview DAC2; Interview DNR1; MSALVA Task Force, 1996, p. ii).
Donors in the Disability Sector
Donor policy strongly shaped the model of disability service provision in Cambodia after
UNTAC, through the influence of key donors such as the World Bank, IMF and USAID. The
goals of these policies were to develop a market-based economy, with a strong private sector
driving growth, the government maintaining a limited role and private agencies instead of
government ministries delivering services (World Bank, 1994, 1992; USAID, 2005, 2002,
1994; Mysliwiec, 2004; USAID, 2005, 1994). It was recognised that the market was likely to
fail some ‘vulnerable’ groups, including persons with disability, and that some allowance
needed to be made for them until increasing economic prosperity met their needs through
philanthropy or greater family income (USAID, 2005, 1994; Interview DNR1). Such
provision should be based on the private sector rather than government, with INGOs strongly
preferred as the providers (Lanjouw et al., 1999; Interview DNR1, 6). Donor funding thus
bypassed social ministries and focused on ministries such as finance and commerce which
were seen as central to the task of rebuilding Cambodia’s infrastructure and economic
institutions (Hughes et al., 2003).
For many large donors such as the World Bank and USAID, disability was ‘not a focus’
(Interview DNR1). Their goals concentrated on economic reform and the development of a
market-based economy and strong private sector to bring about long-term solutions to
poverty and social problems (World Bank, 1994, 1992; USAID, 2005, 1994; Interview
DNR1). In the disability sector, it became government and donor policy after 1994 that,
because of the government’s lack of capacity, INGOs should provide disability services for
the indefinite future as a ‘matter of principle’ while the government acted as manager, policy
maker and coordinator (World Bank, 1994; Interview INGO2, 8; MSALVA Task Force,
1996; Mysliwiec, 2004). In 2004, a USAID-Cambodia official described the agency’s ideal
for disability services as a ‘tripartite’ responsibility. Private actors, he believed, should drive
147
economic growth, with private insurance supplying security, supplemented by government.
INGOs would ‘pick up those who fell through the cracks’, with philanthropy increasing as
prosperity rose (Interview DNR1, 8). He cited a disability centre owned by MOSALVY but
run by an INGO and maintained by USAID, as an example of successful tripartite practice.
Along with USAID-Cambodia’s commitment to a strong role for INGOs and local NGOs, the
agency also saw a need to build up government capacity, particularly in policy building, and
saw a role for the Cambodian government in the care of some vulnerable groups such as
veterans (Interview DNR1).
The interests of donor governments as well as the needs of Cambodia also drove donor
practice and policy (Lanjouw et al., 1999; JICA, 200b). As early as 1996, in a joint
MSALVA and INGO report on disability in Cambodia, the Secretary of State pointedly
commented on the need for better statistics so that decisions could be based ‘on accurate
information rather than pure donor interests’ (MSALVA Task Force, 1996, p. ii). Despite the
apparent dominance of donors favouring market-based economic growth as the model for
development, INGOs in the disability sector complained of a lack of coordination among
donors, resulting in part from the diversity of country interests (Lanjouw et al., 1999; JICA,
2002b). A long-term INGO worker expressed concern that donors tended to focus on a single
issue based on their own priorities rather than local considerations (Interview INGO3).
A relevant example in the disability sector was the decision by the US Congress to
prohibit all support to Hun Sen’s government except for some humanitarian aid after the coup
of 1997 (USAID-Cambodia, 2008). The isolation of the Hun Sen government from funding
was designed to emphasise the USA’s commitment to the democratic process and refusal to
support violent access to power (USAID-Cambodia, 2008). An indirect result for the
disability sector was that the US had to strengthen US reliance on INGOs to implement
policy for service delivery and maintain contact with government activities (Interview DNR1,
2). This was only one example of how the interaction of donor policies and strategies with the
political culture of Cambodia and the INGO culture could result in unforeseen and often
perverse outcomes for the effective delivery of disability services.
148
INGOs in the Disability Sector
Size and Composition of INGO Disability Sector
In contrast to donor and government priorities, disability interests were strongly
represented in the INGO sector. Thirty five of an estimated total of 150 INGOs and
‘International Organisations’ in Cambodia in 1996, or about a quarter of the total, were
connected with disability (Interview INGO3; Interview MIN1e, 1996, p. v; MSALVA, 1996,
p. ii).4 The period after the Paris Agreements saw an exponential growth in INGO numbers
with the flow of international funding and increase of international interest in Cambodia
(Interview INGO1; Curtis, 1998). Up until 1990, JRS and UNHCR had been almost the only
bodies working in disability rehabilitation (Interview INGO1). One long-term worker
commented that the ballooning of INGO numbers was typical of post-conflict or emergency
situations, with INGOs ‘flooding in’ when a country became ‘flavour of the month’
(Interview DAC1). The comparatively large representation of disability INGOs can be related
to the high profile given to mine-related disability and the public interest and the funding it
generated.
By 1996 however, despite the number of disability INGOs, the services provided to
persons with disability were poorly coordinated, often not directed to the needs identified by
persons with disability themselves and unequally distributed (MSALVA, 1996). While three
new sub-sectors—visual impairments, community-based services and CWD—emerged, the
sector was still predominantly concerned with vocational skill training and prosthetics, with
desperate shortages in other areas (MSALVA, 1996, p. xxii). Similar criticisms were still
being made in 2002 (JICAa, 2002). The reasons for this can be linked to the nature of INGOs
themselves as well as the low priority disability had with both donors and government
(Interview DAC2; Interview DNR1; Interview DAC1; Curtis, 1998).
4 There were very few local NGOs in Cambodia at this time due to the political risks (Interview DAC1, 8).
149
INGOs’ Goals, Motivations, Capacity and Strategies in Service
Provision
There was general agreement among INGOs, donors and ministry that INGOs were the
service providers in the country, were providing good quality services, and that this would be
the situation for the foreseeable future (Interview DAC1; Interview INGO2; Interview
MIN1e). However, many INGO personnel felt that the needs in the sector were ‘huge’ and
that they were far from being able to meet them (Interview DAC1). Furthermore, there were
problems in provision, which arose from the nature of INGOs themselves. Gaps occurred
geographically and in the types and quality of services supplied. There was an over-emphasis
on prosthetics and orthotics while few services were available for mental illness, intellectual
disability, multiple disability, and children with disability (MSALVA Task Force, 1996;
Interview INGO2; Interview INGO4). This emphasis on physical rehabilitation was in part
due to the focus of most of the early disability INGOs on physical rehabilitation, prosthetics
and orthotics, the international focus on mines and mine-related disability, and the
government’s own policy focus on veterans with disabilities (Interview DAC2; Interview
INGO4). By 2004, there was little change, with the provision of prosthetics and orthotics at
‘saturation point’, according to INGO sources (Interview INGO1; Interview INGO2). One
exasperated INGO worker pointed to the anomaly of the continued importation of prosthetics
and establishment of new workshops in a situation of over-supply:
There's absolutely no reason for the legs or wheelchairs to come from outside anymore. There
are buckets of them being made here. (Interview INGO2)
Even within the strongest sector, physical rehabilitation, service provision was poorly
coordinated and often badly adapted to persons with disabilities needs, with distribution of P
& O workshops ‘spotty’, amputations performed badly and poorly fitting prostheses resulting
in persons with disability abandoning them (Interview INGO2, 13). A long-term INGO
worker described how lack of information and communication led to over-supply in some
areas and exploitation of services by clients acquiring numerous prosthetic limbs from
different agencies and re-selling them (Interview INGO1).
150
One of the issues making coordination difficult was the lack of uniformity in INGOs’
policies and practices, including technology, values and philosophy:
Lots of squabbling ... between NGOs, their whole philosophy affected what the
product was. So Handicap International was appropriate technology and less-
expensive-wooden-leg-folks, and VI was the aluminium leg and then ICRC5 got the
plastic component ... and I don’t know where it is now frankly. (Interview INGO2)6
These issues of sustainability, cost, quality and appropriateness came from INGOs’
deeply held core values, making it hard for them to negotiate or compromise with each other
to provide a uniform service. There was criticism, too, that INGOs’ philosophies and
established skills led them to deal only with persons with disabilities needs with which they
felt confident. An INGO informant reflected that organisations like Veterans International
(VI), Handicap International and Cambodia Trust, which had historically focused on physical
aids and rehabilitation, took ‘quite a while’ to see beyond enabling a client to be mobile to the
‘big picture of a person within their community’ (Interview INGO4).
INGOs defensiveness of their territory and fields of expertise could also frustrate
coordination. A key interviewee described the pettiness and often blinkered attitude of
INGOs:
We don’t want Veterans International to go there because we want to go there and
so-and-so’s there and they’re not doing a very good job, their prosthetics and
orthotics isn’t really right ... oh come on, guys! (Interview DAC1)
Competition for funding also reduced consultation and coordination. NGOs ‘live on
funding’ and were ‘dependent’ on external sources, as one INGO leader observed (Interview
INGO3). This helped bias services towards mine victims and prosthetics and orthotics,
reflecting the priorities of donors and international perceptions rather than the actual
incidence and causes of disability in Cambodia. International donors, an INGO interviewee
felt, saw disability as ‘landmine stuff’ and were prone to move on to more high-profile areas,
such as Afghanistan, taking funding with them (Interview INGO4). Donor funding was also
vulnerable to changes in donor policy, with at least one INGO manager feeling that the move
5 International Committee of the Red Cross
6 See also DAC/JICA, 2001, p. 27
151
from ‘emergency’ to ‘rehabilitation’ mode had diminished funds for INGOs (Interview
INGO3). As Cambodia’s international attraction to donors declined, even the larger INGOs
were feeling the pressure of finding funding by 2004, increasing competition between them
(Interview INGO5).
A number of informants expressed concern at what they saw as INGOs’ reliance on
donor funding re-shaping their priorities and activities (Interview INGO5; Interview DAC1).
Many INGOs had come in as relief organisations and dependence on donor funding and the
need to meet donor criteria had distracted them from grappling with the transition from relief
to development or engaging with issues of long-term sustainability and planning (Interview
INGO5). One interviewee felt that this resulted in INGOs which saw themselves as relief
organisation withdrawing according to their own timelines and donor funding rather than the
reality of the local situation:
We’ve been here five years; they should be on their feet now, let's get out’. That still
prevails. (Interview DAC1)
The diverse and independent nature of the INGO community was often cited as one of its
strengths, but it also contributed to many of the weaknesses in disability services provision in
Cambodia. INGOs’ independence and aversion to external control also affected relations with
their ‘manager’, MOSALVY. They saw little need to develop policy and theory around the
role of government and their own relationships with it, preferring to ‘get on with the job’
(Interview DAC1).
The Relations of INGOs with the Ministry
Although INGOs were technically supposed to have an agreement with the ministry,
only 17 of the 35 disability INGOs in 1996 actually did, indicating both the government’s
inability to regulate and INGOs’ perception of government as irrelevant (MSALVA Task
Force, 1996, p. xxii; Interview DAC1). Many INGOs elected to bypass the government
altogether and ‘do their own thing’ (Interview DAC1). While some INGOs, particularly the
longer-term ones such as Jesuits Services, had good contacts with the ministry, a number of
interviewees felt that many INGOs were ‘reluctant’ to think about policies of how to relate to
the government. One summed up their attitude as:
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What do we want this for? We’re doing it (providing services). (Interview DAC1)
This contributed to individual and ‘ad hoc’ activities, with agencies ‘just launching in’
without consultation or research (Interview DAC1). A civil servant gave the example of one
province with two training centres, and another with only one, with the training provided
being inappropriate to the trainees’ situations (Interview DAC2).
Most INGOs felt that they were the basis for service provision in the absence of a viable
state alternative, and would ‘always’ be present:
In Cambodia, particularly in the disabilities, (INGOs) are the service providers and if
they weren't there, there wouldn't be any services. (Interview DAC1)
Nevertheless, attitudes about the government’s appropriate role varied, influenced by the
cultural backgrounds of INGO personnel. Those from European or Commonwealth
backgrounds expressed a preference for a public system and doubted that the INGO sector
could adequately meet needs (Interview INGO3). One interviewee, while conceding that his
national background made him a ‘strong defender’ of the public system, believed that leaving
service provision to the private sector without government investment and oversight left it
vulnerable to ‘interest groups’ (Interview INGO3). US interviewees, on the other hand,
argued that the private sector as the service provider ‘worked well’ in the USA, with a
mixture of private insurance, limited government provision and charities to ‘pick up those
who slip through the cracks’ (Interview INGO2, 48; Interview DNR1). However, even INGO
workers from this background expressed reservations about the practicality of the ‘World
Bank’ model in Cambodia, questioning whether the private sector would ever be able to
provide the resources to maintain a private social service system (Interview INGO2;
Interview INGO3). One informant’s doubts revolved around the fragility of the ‘artificial’
Cambodian economy with its dependence on foreign funding, and questioned whether it
would ever reach the level of prosperity required for the ‘World Bank’ model to work:
The charity-based system might work in America, but not Cambodia. (Interview
INGO3)
Another INGO interviewee, although personally favouring a private system, expressed
the view that Cambodia’s French colonial experience meant that the government would
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always be expected to play a monitoring and regulating role (Interview INGO2). Such a
scenario meant that strengthening government capacity had to be included as part of policy.
The experience of INGOs with the ministry did not encourage their confidence in
MOSALVY’s ability to provide services or fill its designated role of manager, policy maker
and coordinator of service provision. Interviewees gave examples of obstructive and venal
practices and the barriers these posed to working with the ministry. One INGO worker
described how a senior MOSALVY official applied pressure indirectly for a position for a
relation with his INGO (Interview INGO5). An ex-civil servant felt that the ministry would
often deliberately prolong the bureaucratic process for obtaining visas or clearance for
equipment (Interview DAC2). Both he and a key INGO informant, however, believed that
this had more to do with issues of prestige and a desire to assert some authority over INGOs
whose resources and influence ‘threatened’ ministry officials (Interview DAC2; Interview
DAC1). Others, however, argued that INGOs should examine the ethics of their own
behaviour. The practice of INGOs supplementing the salaries of civil servants seconded from
MOSALVY in order to attract and keep them, for instance, was criticised as moving from
recognition of their professional skills to bribery to attract the most skilled workers:
You have corruption on one side, then you have supplemented salaries on the other side.
(Interview INGO3)
INGOs’ also found the ministry’s technical and management shortcomings another
reason for avoiding involvement with MOSALVY. Lack of basic information, such as details
of the agencies providing services, and weak capacity for financial planning made
coordination, budgeting, and planning difficult (MSALVA Task Force, 1996, p. 32). Many
INGOs saw the ministry as irrelevant to their primary and urgent task of providing services to
persons with disability (Interview DAC1). INGOs complained about the lack of motivation
and accountability of many civil servants, particularly those at higher levels who were likely
to be political appointees due to the politicisation of the bureaucracy (Interview INGO3). One
informant spoke of the frustration of dealing with a bureaucracy where civil servants were
apparently immovable regardless of performance. She gave the example of a senior civil
servant who was simply ‘moved around’ despite a long history of obstruction and acting as a
‘cork’ to change (Interview INGO2). Another, however, saw the picture as more complex,
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and that there was value in engaging with motivated civil servants to encourage them and
build their capacity:
In government you have genuine people and they are just trying to survive but some
people are always, ’How can I make money out of it?’ That’s why it’s a bit difficult to
say black or white. (Interview INGO3)
For the most part, however, INGOs preferred to follow their own agenda and priorities,
seeing their goals as urgent and the ministry as offering little help in meeting them.
Ironically, despite its resentment of INGO independence and INGOs’ complaints of the
difficulties of working with it, the ministry’s own goals as well as its lack of capacity led to it
encouraging INGOs and placing little restraint on their activities (Interview DAC1; Interview
INGO2). The ministry needed INGO resources, and INGO workers described how this made
it reluctant to limit any INGO proposals or activities:
The minister can do anything he likes. He can say yes if these people give me a
million dollars they can have 50 million leg shops here if they like. (Interview
INGO1)
As a result, a long-term worker described it as ‘easy’ to work with the ministry compared
to governments like Vietnam, where the government insisted on much greater central control
(Interview INGO1). The minister might suggest where INGOs worked but in the end, rather
than lose an INGO:
… (I)f somebody was dead set on going here, that's where they went. (Interview
INGO2)
Thus as long as there was benefit for the ministry in encouraging them INGOs could
operate with a good deal of freedom. The relationship, however, was an uneasy one with
mistrust, disrespect, profoundly different philosophies of power and service provision and
quite different goals underlying the apparent mutual benefits. The service provisions that
resulted were not predominantly responding to the actual needs of persons with disability and
contributed to the development of a system, which was uncoordinated, poorly tailored to the
needs of persons with disability in Cambodia and lacked future planning.
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The Government and the Disability Sector
In many ways, the actions of MOSALVY in the disability sector reflected the wider
political culture after UNTAC and the elections. The ministry was beset by a lack of capacity
and resources, the distractions of political infighting and the need to produce enough results
to keep donors and political leaders happy. MOSALVY recognised its lack of capacity and
dependence on INGOs for disability services and accepted, with apparent enthusiasm, donor
recommendations that INGOs should be the service providers with the government’s role
being that of manager (Interview MIN1e). At the same time it had a strong sense of its
position and was reluctant to cede all control of the planning and policy process to expatriate
organisations (MSALVA Task Force, 1996).
MOSALVY’s Culture – Patronage and Power
MOSALVY was described by an INGO worker as a ‘mix of orphans, social action and
veterans left over from the war’ (Interview INGO2). For a number of reasons it was regarded
as a ‘weak’ and ‘unimportant’ ministry by the political hierarchy (Interview DNR1; Interview
DAC1). The complex interaction between Cambodia’s political culture, donor policy and
INGO goals and strategies after UNTAC had resulted in the growth of patronage and
clientelism through Cambodia’s political and bureaucratic institutions (Hughes, 2006; Meas,
2000; Pak et al., 2007). Political leaders focused on ministries that could provide resources
for patronage networks (Hughes et al., 2003). The power a ministry was able to exercise was
linked to its ability to access resources for patronage and the personal influence of their
ministers with the Prime Minister (Hughes et al., 2003). In this, not all ministries were born
equal and MOSALVY was definitely a poor cousin.
While rent-seeking and patronage had been part of the political scene for a long time,
commentators suggest that during the 1990s the culture of corruption in state organisations
developed beyond rational purposes of gaining wealth or maintaining loyalty to having an
‘irrational’ life of its own (Hughes et al., 2003). Under the SOC, salaries and rations had been
the main source of remuneration for state officials. However, after UNTAC they disappeared
and rent-seeking, based largely on overseas funding, including aid and assistance, replaced
them (Hughes et al., 2003). The funding and policy priorities of the major donors meant that
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ministries such as public works, commerce, and economy and finance enjoyed the greatest
increase in donor funding (Interview DAC2, 6). At the same time, ministries in charge of
natural resources gained wealth and power through their control of access to Cambodia’s
timber, gems and mineral reserves (Curtis, 1998; Pak et al., 2007). This gave these ministries
a fundamental advantage over those responsible for service delivery, whose access to rent
seeking opportunities was limited to small scale ‘fees’ and ‘costs’ from clients extracted by
thousands of frontline civil servants which were difficult to organise (Hughes et al., 2003;
Hughes, 2003).
Service ministries consequently found it difficult to win influence with the top echelons
of the political elite and struggled to obtain even budgetary allocation and releases (Interview
DAC2; Interview INGO4). INGO workers recounted how ministries like health waited
months for salaries and budgeted disbursements from the Ministry of Finance (Interview
INGO4; Interview INGO5). Ministry of Health senior staff complained that ‘no-one cares
about this ministry, unlike interior or defence’ (quoted in Hughes et al., 2003, p. 36). For the
government, social affairs and welfare were even lower down the pecking order than health.
An ex-civil servant saw this as a direct result of the focus on economic reform (Interview
DAC2).
Other factors contributed to MOSALVY’s lack of influence in the political ministerial
hierarchy and the lack of political interest in disability services. There was no tradition of
government responsibility for the welfare of persons with disability and their families, or
indeed in welfare provision for vulnerable groups generally (Interview DAC2; Interview
INGO2). As a civil servant interviewee pointed out: ‘Cambodians consequently did not have
high expectations of government action in these areas, reducing pressure on political elites to
be seen to be active’ (Interview DAC2). The division of ministries and departments between
the two major parties further reduced the political importance of disability services, for while
MOSALVY was a CPP ministry, the Secretary of State responsible for disability was
FUNCINPEC, reducing her access to influence (Interview DNR1). As a result, disability was
a vulnerable area in an already vulnerable ministry.
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MOSALVY and Disability Services: Goals and Motives
Historically, MOSALVY’s responsibility for disability had come through the
government policy that disability was limited to veterans who had been disabled through
conflict (Interview INGO2, Interview DAC2). Even in this core area, however, government
activity was described by a donor informant as ‘limited’ (Interview DNR1). Disability
services were confined to a small pension and some medical services for veterans. The view
of disability was a medical rather than social one, with the Veterans Affairs Department
‘staffed by nurses’ and ministry policy limited to the provision of prosthetics and orthotics to
war victims and mine victims (Interview INGO2,). This policy in turn both shaped and was
reinforced by the emphasis and activities of disability INGOs entering the country.
In a 2004 interview, a senior bureaucrat in MOSALVY gave Cambodia’s long history of
war as the reason for the government’s commitment to persons with disability (Interview
MIN1). However, many donor and INGO observers believed that MOSALVY was motivated
more by political considerations than the rights or needs of those with disabilities. Apart from
the pension for veterans with disability, it was assumed that the persons with disability
themselves or their families rather than the state were responsible for their welfare. It was
certainly not seen as a human rights issue (Interview DAC2). A donor informant perceived
the government ‘round-up’ of ‘unsightly’ persons with disability from the streets into
detention centres during festivals as an indication that its main concern was ‘maintaining
social order not social responsibility’ (Interview DNR1). The population’s low expectations
of government responsibility for persons with disability meant that there was little public
pressure on the government for disability services to be a priority.
MOSALVY’s political weakness and its need to access patronage resources rather than
its commitment to the well-being of persons with disability were the dominant forces shaping
its goals and motives. This helps make sense of some apparently contradictory behaviour,
including its ambivalent attitude to INGO involvement. On the one hand, the ministry was
eager to keep some control on service provision. This was part of what one INGO observer
described as the exercise of ‘just self-serving’ power (Interview INGO2). She described the
ministry as a dual system, with money ‘always floating upwards’ in one system while it
maintained a pretence of carrying out its legitimate roles in a parallel system (Interview
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INGO2). Another INGO worker expressed the view that what services there were had
become a ‘complete continuation of patronage’ (Interview INGO5). An administrative
structure for disability services did exist, extending from the Ministry of the Interior through
provincial and district governors to commune and village chiefs (Interview INGO5).
However, payments and pensions were often presented as handouts by politicians or parties
(Hughes, 2006, 2003; Interview INGO5). The CPP’s grip on local and rural politics meant
that they dominated these payments, with recipients seeing them as CPP ‘handouts’ rather
than their right as citizens (Interview INGO5). Few ordinary people would have challenged
the political reality that those with power could use it for their own advantage, accepting that
‘power is the ability to do something even against the law’ (Interview DAC2).
The need for resources for patronage was thus a strong incentive for MOSALVY to
maintain responsibility for the provision of as many services and pensions as it could
because, as one INGO worker observed:
... (T)hat’s how they do their favours, that’s how they stay in power. (Interview
INGO2)
Somewhat perversely, to achieve its goals the ministry needed access to resources
offered by INGOs and donors, making it apparently receptive to donor policy and the use of
INGOs for service provision (MSALVA, 1996). However, the inherent contradictions in
goals were to provide an unstable base for the development of a functional disability service
system.
MOSALVY Capacity and Limitations
MOSALVY, like all Cambodian ministries and institutions, lacked even the most basic of
resources, including office equipment, vehicles and phones when the country opened up to
international actors in the early 1990s. An international adviser interviewee was confronted
by the contrast between the ministry and the well-equipped INGO she worked for in 1992
(Interview DAC1). MOSALVY was frank about its lack of human and material resources and
its inability to provide more than minimal disability services without help from INGOs
(MSALVA Task Force, 1996). INGO interviewees agreed that without their presence there
would have been virtually no service provision (Interview INGO2). By 2004, the situation
had not altered greatly, with a senior MOSALVY bureaucrat adamant that the strategy for
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disability services, which the ministry was in the process of preparing, would rely on INGOs
as the fundamental agents in service provision (Interview MIN1). However, while
MOSALVY had apparently readily adopted the donor policy of INGOs acting as service
providers, it strongly defended its role as ‘manager’, responsible for setting guidelines,
policymaking, coordinating and controlling INGOs as service providers (MSALVA Task
Force, 1996; Interview MIN1e).
Stresses developed in the relationship as INGOs increasingly challenged the ministry’s
capacity to fulfil these roles (Interview INGO3; Interview INGO2). One INGO interviewee
described the ministry’s view of policy as ‘empty words’ and policymaking as a pointless
exercise to ‘get donors off our backs’ (Interview INGO2). A civil servant portrayed the
government policymaking process as ‘just sitting in the office with a few people’, ‘isolated’
from the realities of service provision and with no consultation (Interview DAC2). He
claimed that the results, presented as ‘faits accomplis’, were usually ineffective, lacking
resources for their implementation, unconnected with the ‘real situation’ and indeed with
nobody really intending them to be implemented (Interview DAC2). Such policy as did exist
had not developed much beyond the SOC commitment to pensions for veterans, with an
INGO worker describing it as ‘post-war helping (veterans)’ (Interview INGO2). A senior
MOSALVY bureaucrat with responsibility for disability, in a 2004 interview, conceded that
there was an ‘ad hoc’ approach to policy, with the ‘urgent’ problems claiming priority, but
blamed this on lack of resources (Interview MIN1).
A major limiting factor in the ministry’s capacity to manage the sector was the quality of
bureaucrats available. Ministry staff were criticised by INGO personnel as lacking
management skills, doing things in a ‘piecemeal’ way and ‘paper-shuffling’ (Interview
INGO2). INGOs believed that the ministry lacked financial management capacity,
transparency, and the ability to analyse the cost-effectiveness of programmes and make long-
term plans for services (MSALVA Task Force, 1996). They saw the ministry hierarchy as
‘rigid’ and ‘stifling’, preventing innovation or creativity (Interview INGO2; Interview
INGO3). Vertical integration within ministries and horizontal integration across ministries
was weak, due partly to poor communication resulting from the cultural reluctance of
subordinates to speak out to superiors (Hughes, 2003). Its cross-ministry nature, involving as
it did legal, technical and sectoral issues, made disability particularly vulnerable to these
issues (Interview INGO3).
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The situation was made more difficult by the pressures imposed on civil servants by
inadequate salaries, the demands of their political masters, and the lack of resources available
to them. An INGO informant suggested that as a result many had little interest in putting any
‘dynamism’ into the sector (Interview INGO3). However, some INGO informants were quick
to acknowledge that there were civil servants with ‘good ideas’ (Interview INGO2; Interview
INGO3). Most were middle-level Cambodian bureaucrats who had received training, either in
the Eastern Bloc during the 1980s or through Western donor scholarships and training
programmes during the 1990s, who were often much more technically competent than their
ministers and secretaries of state (Hughes at al., 2003). However, their policy influence was
limited by the lack of internal debate and structures by which permanent civil servants could
advise senior level political appointees and the cultural reluctance to challenge leaders
(Interview INGO3).
The Pol Pot regime’s deliberate purge of educated and trained people was often blamed for
the government’s shortage of trained personnel and Cambodia’s ongoing poverty (Interview
INGO3). However, while Cambodia’s traumatic past had left a legacy of a shortage of human
and material resources, it is argued that this was often used by the government as a
rationalisation to divert attention from the activities of politicians, which were draining
resources from the system (Hughes, 2003). In particular, the siphoning of state resources to
the military was tactfully ignored, avoiding the risk of losing the support of the military
power structure on which political and bureaucratic power depended (Curtis, 1998). The Pol
Pot heritage gave ministry and government personnel grounds to appeal to donors for more
training, staff and resources as a solution to Cambodia’s development issues, and avoid the
embarrassing issue of government resources to politically important allies (Meas, 2000; Peou,
2000; Curtis, 1998: MSALVA Task Force, 1996).
MOSALVY as Manager - Capacity and Strategies
As discussed earlier, MOSALVY, despite its limited capacity, was strongly motivated to
maintain responsibility for service provision (INGO2). A senior MOSALVY bureaucrat, in
an interview in 2004, argued that the specialised nature of INGOs’ activities made it
necessary to have the ministry as manager (Interview MIN1). However, MOSALVY’s
reasons for maintaining its role in disability were more to do with its need to access the
funding and services, which INGOs offered, rather than the needs of persons with disability.
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This dependence on INGOs made it difficult for the ministry to control their activities in the
sector. As one INGO interviewee observed:
In social affairs if (a ministry) hasn't got any money well, we’ll tolerate you
(INGOs)… if you’ve got anything to offer, go for it. (Interview DAC1)
While INGOs welcomed the freedom, there was concern that the failure of the ministry
to monitor and say ‘no’ to INGOs was resulting in ‘not so good or pretty bad INGOs’
operating in the sector (Interview INGO2).
For its part, the ministry grew increasingly resentful of what it saw as INGOs’ dismissive
attitude towards it, and of the INGO sector’s superior resources. An INGO worker observed
with some concern that the ministry was ‘threatened’ by technically and financially well-
resourced INGOs (Interview DAC1). The gap in resources created a sense of insecurity and
inferiority, leading to an increasing tendency for MOSALVY to assert authority through
obstructionism and reluctance to consult (Interview DAC1; Interview DAC2). Civil servants
for their part criticised INGOs as self-serving and self-interested, arguing that they ran
‘useless’ activities and were only concerned with creating funding to maintain their own jobs
(Interview DAC2). The ministry deeply resented the channelling of donor funding to INGOs,
with bureaucrats arguing that:
[…] with even half the resources we would do the same thing better than you
(INGOs). (Interview DAC2)
Instead, they now lacked ‘all resources’ (Interview DAC2). The recruitment of more
competent ministry staff by INGOs as part of partnership arrangements also increased
tensions between INGOs and the Ministry (Interview INGO2).
The failure of the ministry to fulfil its designated roles of coordinating and directing
INGOs arose in the context of a political environment which had in part been created by
donor strategies and priorities and their intersection with local politics (Lanjouw et al., 1999).
Donor bypassing of MOSALVY in favour of economic ministries and INGOs for funding
made the ministry vulnerable to political marginalisation and therefore more anxious to
obtain any available. Perversely, this weakened the incentive to control INGO activity but at
the same time soured relations between the two ‘partners’. These factors compounded the low
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capacity, which already undermined MOSALVY’s ability and incentive to direct and guide
policy, and at the same time encouraged patronage and corruption within the ministry.
Conclusion
The data that exists on disability in Cambodia from the 1990s to the early 2000s shows a
country with one of the highest rates of disability per capita during that period.
Internationally, the high profile given to landmines and their tragic impact on the civilian
population had linked disability in Cambodia with mine-related injuries, resulting in an
unbalanced understanding of the nature of disability in the country. Most disability was in
fact caused by other factors related to the high level of poverty in the country, particularly in
rural areas, and the lack of infrastructure and services.
The model for disability services which was developed in Cambodia was strongly
influenced by the development policy of large donors such as the World Bank, IMF and
USAID. The goals focused on an economic solution to the development of Cambodia, with
the emphasis on developing a free market economy and strong private sector. As a result,
donor funding was directed to the ministries most closely linked to economic management
and reform. Ideologically, donors favoured private agents, under the management of the
government, as service providers for vulnerable groups, such as persons with disability.
INGOs in particular were preferred as service providers by large donors, who saw them as
values-based, independent, experienced and philanthropic. Funding was diverted away from
services ministries to INGOs for service provision.
MOSALVY, the ministry responsible for the management of disability service provision,
had little choice but to accept donor policy with apparent enthusiasm. However, their
response was guided more by their political needs and goals. Provision of welfare had not
been a strong part of political tradition in Cambodia, so there was little expectation by the
population or the political elite of service provision. However, economic reform and the
move away from the government for service provision had left MOSALVY with few sources
of funding to maintain its political influence and provide incomes for civil servants. INGOs
presented one of the few possibilities available for accessing resources, making MOSALVY
reluctant to limit or direct their activities. At the same time, tensions between the two
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‘partners’ grew. MOSALVY increasingly resented what it saw as INGOs lack of respect and
usurpation of its role, as well as the diversion of donor funding towards them, while INGOs
became increasingly critical of the ministry’s lack of capacity and initiative grew.
In general, the INGO sector saw themselves as essential to the provision of disability
services in the country and well-equipped for the task due to their humanitarian and
philanthropic nature and their experience, skill and independence. However, in many ways
this confidence was associated with a lack of self-reflection which led to serious issues
developing in the provision of disability services. The individuality and independence of the
different INGOs, their sense that the needs facing them needed urgent action and their
reluctance to compromise core values meant that they were impatient with barriers to ‘getting
on with the job’ and reluctant to consult with donors, ministry and each other. Many INGOs
were traditionally suspicious of working closely with government, and issues around the
ministry’s lack of capacity and culture of corruption strengthened these suspicions. The fact
that INGOs were often in competition with each other for donor funding also reduced their
willingness to consult, share information with each other or accept coordination. Unforeseen
outcomes included an unbalanced emphasis on mine injuries and physical rehabilitation and
the comparative neglect of services for other disabilities and needs identified by persons with
disability themselves. Within the INGO community, concern grew that reliance on donor
funding meant that issues of sustainability and planning for the future were neglected,
including the role of the ministry. There was also unease that core values and practices were
being compromised by dependence on donor funds.
The interaction of this complex mix of goals, motivations, capacities and strategies led to
the development of an uncoordinated system of service delivery poorly matched to the actual
needs of persons with disability. A number of those working in the system recognised the
problems and were concerned to find solutions. This concern led some INGO workers to take
the initiative in a creative attempt to resolve the tensions between INGO, donor and ministry
goals, motivation, capacities and strategies and provide a system of service delivery that met
persons with disability needs more effectively. However, the story of this response was in its
turn shaped by the interaction between INGOs, donors’ and ministry goals, strategies,
motivations and capabilities.
CHAPTER 6 – THE ROLE OF INGOS, STATE AND DONORS
IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DISABILITY ACTION
COUNCIL
Introduction
Interactions between donors, INGOs and the government had contributed to weaknesses
in the disability sector. Donor and government focus on economic reform meant that
relatively low priority was given to social issues, including disability. The ministry, which
was responsible for disability policy development and coordination, was distracted by its
need to acquire resources for political goals and survival and at the same time meet donor
requirements. The preference for INGOs as the main suppliers of service provision, and the
lack of ministry capacity and interest, resulted in a lack of coordination of services
geographically and by service type; poor communication between INGOs and between
INGOs and the ministry; while dependence on donor funding undermined planning for
sustainability in the sector and re-shaped INGO behaviour and priorities. Service provision
did not reflect the actual causes and demography of disability in Cambodia, being more
strongly driven by donor and INGO perceptions and interests.
The previous chapters have given a broad picture of the development environment in
Cambodia post-UNTAC and during the 1990s, and the interaction of state, INGOs and
donors within that. The study then narrowed down to the disability sector. This chapter will
focus on the history of a particular organisation, the Disability Action Council, established in
1997 by a group of INGO agents as a creative response to issues in the sector. Part of its
creativity was a commitment to involvement with government, INGOs, donors and local
DPOs and NGOs. The philosophy and vision of the founders drew strongly from INGO
traditions of development as an organic, open-ended process involving beneficiaries. To
enable involvement with the ministry and INGOs the DAC adopted the status of a ‘semi-
autonomous’ organisation, operating under MOSALVY regulation but not legally a
government institution. Virtually all its funding for the first six years came from a USAID
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grant. It was thus drawn into close relations with a powerful donor and the ministry as well as
INGOs and persons with disability.
The aim of this chapter is to construct the history of the main events in the history of the
DAC from its first origins in the MOSALVA Task Force Report of 1996 to 2006 when
USAID announced that it would cease funding. In particular, it traces the impact of INGOs,
the ministry and the main donor on this history, and on the nature of the DAC by examining
their goals and expectations concerning the DAC, their capacities and the strategies available
to them to achieve their goals.
The history of the DAC allows us the explore the institution as a unique situation but also
one that gives the opportunity to magnify the details of interactions of the three actors and
examine them in fine detail from a ‘bottom-up’ rather than ‘top-down’ and broad-scale
perspective. Such a fine-grained history can feed back into and inform the broader theories of
the nature of INGO, state and donor interactions and their impact on development outcomes.
The DAC: Establishment, Structure and Role, 1997
Establishment of the Disability Action Council
In September 1995 MSALVA, MOSALVY’s precursor, following a series of informal
discussions with a number of influential INGOs and expatriate advisers in the disability
sector, initiated a joint ministry-INGO process to develop a ‘common strategy’ for the
development of programs, services and policies for and with persons with disability (DAC,
2000, p. 6). An INGO-ministry task force was established, composed of personnel from
MOSALVA, INGOs and DPOs and with funding of $US45,000 provided by the INGOs, with
the task of reporting to the government and INGOs on the disability sector (MOSALVA Task
Force, 1996). The report, presented in October 1996, included 14 Guiding Principles and a
detailed plan of action with 135 recommendations for the sector (MOSALVA Task Force,
1996). The report was seen as a working document for the national plan for disability
strategies (MOSALVA Task Force, 1996).
One of the task force’s key recommendations was that a new body be established with
the specific mandate of implementing the plans. The task force had put considerable thought
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into the nature of this body and recommended that it be composed of a mix of representatives
from the sub-sector and from the ministry, a technical adviser and representatives from
Cambodian DPOs (MOSALVA Task Force, 1996, p. 48). The ministry accepted the report
and its recommendations and a core group of INGOs and expatriate advisers began the
process of establishing the body. A disability coordinating committee was set up, but the
legal structure of the body was not defined until 1997 when the Disability Action Council
was established as a ‘semi-autonomous national coordinating body’1 under the leadership of
MOSALVY (DAC Annual Report 2000, 1998-1999; Forsythe et al., 2006). Its ‘semi-
autonomous’ status was seen as crucial to allow the body to be independent of the
government but at the same time gain legitimacy by being within the ministry (Interview
DAC1). However, the DAC continued to operate without a legal basis until October 1999,
when its status was finally formalised under Ministerial Prakas No. 757/MSALVA2
(MOSALVY, 1999; Interview INGO3; see Appendix 3). The delay was largely due to the
hiatus in government activities following Hun Sen’s violent ousting of Ranariddh in 1997
(Interview DAC2). The Prakas defined the structure of the DAC, established its ‘semi-
autonomous’ nature and set up a secretariat to provide administrative and technical support
(see Appendix 3). The Director of the Secretariat, Helen Pitt, a key player in the process, had
the task of establishing the DAC and Secretariat, recruiting staff and building the capacity of
a Cambodian director to succeed her.
Role and Organisational Structure of DAC in 1997
Under the Prakas, the DAC was to act as a professional advisory body to government,
policymakers and key INGOs on ‘all issues affecting the well-being of people with
disabilities’ (MOSALVY, 1999, Article 3; Appendix 3). It was also to be a national focal
point on disability matters, and facilitate the development of the national disability program
recommended by the task force (MOSALVY, 1999, Article 3; Appendix 3).
1 Semi-autonomous: partially self-governing: or, having the powers of self-government within a larger
organisation or structure from the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition,
2000: Houghton Mifflin Company (cited in Forsythe et al., 2006, p. 1)
2 Prakas is a Khmer word meaning Proclamation and used by the government to mean an order or regulation
issued by a minister (Ministerial Order), as distinct from a piece of legislation or law passed by the
parliament (ILO, 2007, p. 2; UNESCAP, 2004, p. 4).
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In its reports from 1998 to 2001, the DAC defined its role as bringing together
government, non-government, business, religious and local communities and persons with
disability to develop and implement a Cambodian Plan of Action for the Disability and
Rehabilitation Sector (DAC, 2002a, b, c, 2001, 2000). Its ten goals and nine objectives were
wide-ranging and echoed those of the Prakas, giving the DAC a central place in planning and
implementing a national disability plan, coordinating and linking organisations in the sector,
facilitating information-sharing and research, as well as advising ministry and other bodies
involved with disability (DAC, 2000; DAC Annual Report, 1999). Recurrent themes included
the role of the DAC as a ‘forum’ for debate and consensus, and a means of improving
coordination, minimising duplication and ensuring services and research were based on the
needs of persons with disability (DAC, 2000, pp. 8-9; Interview DAC1).
The DAC was structured to work through a system of committees, covering the main
issues in the sector and made up of INGO personnel and ‘relevant ministries’ (see Figure 6.1;
Appendix 5). The role of the committees was to allow cross-fertilisation of ideas and
experiences across the sector and between INGOs, ministry and persons with disability
(DAC, 2000). This was to provide administrative and technical support for the executive
board, committees and working groups, coordinating and initiating programs and networking
and negotiating between the affiliated organisations. It was also involved in developing the
MOSALVY national strategy for disability issues (DAC, 2000).
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Figure 5.1 DAC Organisational Structure 1999 (Source: DAC Annual Report
September 1998-September 1999, p. 8)
The DAC’s nature as a semi-autonomous body was frequently tested over the issues
around its legal status. The Prakas was similar to a ministerial regulation in the Australian
system, and could be overruled by a ministerial sub-decree or Royal Decree. The fragility of
this legal basis was to draw the DAC, however unwillingly, into the political realm and the
struggle for resources (see below ‘CMAA and DAC’).
Funding and Relations with Donors
After an initial struggle for finance, in 1998, the DAC obtained a US Congressional grant
channelled through Leahy War Veterans’ Fund (LWVF) and administered by USAID-
Cambodia. The relationship between the DAC and USAID, however, developed into a rather
fraught one. While the USAID re-committed to funding the DAC from 2002 to 2005, with an
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extension until May 2006, it only did so after an evaluation and assessment process in 1998
which recommended extensive reform and restructuring (Horvath et al., 2001; Horvath,
1998). A subsequent evaluation in 2006, while commending the DAC’s work, strongly
recommended that USAID not continue to be the main funder (Forsythe et al., 2006). The
reasons for USAID’s decisions are discussed at length later, but by 2009 USAID was no
longer a funder, with AusAID and UNICEF in partnership with MOSALVY and the Special
Education Office (SEO) providing the bulk of the funding (DAC, 2010).
INDOs, States and Donors in the Development of the DAC
While the concept of the DAC originated in a creative interaction between a small group
of INGO-related personnel, the development of the body was shaped by the ideological,
political and policy goals and roles of the wider INGO community, the ministry, and donors
and the interactions around them. INGO expectations of the DAC reflected the diversity of
their sector, ranging from the deep commitment and enthusiasm of the founders for the DAC
for what they saw as a visionary new response and model for dealing with issues in the
disability sector to uneasiness among other INGOs over potential conflicts of interest and
interference. The main donor, USAID, saw the DAC in the context of its own role of
achieving US regional goals of strengthening democracy, market-based economies and the
private sector, including ‘civil society’. The ministry’s expectations were shaped by the need
to access funding and by its concern to protect its authority and control. The interplay of
these often conflicting expectations was to shape the legal basis of the DAC, the functions,
structure and roles it was to take, its relationship to other actors in the sector and its impact on
service provision.
The DAC and the INGO Community
Founding INGOs’ Concepts and Expectations of the DAC
The main INGOs involved in the founding of the DAC were: Handicap International-
Belgium (HI-B), Veterans International (VI), Cambodia Trust (CT), American Red Cross
(ARC) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (Interview INGO3). Helen
Pitt, an Australian with Save the Children Fund (SCF) based in MOSALVY, was to become
the key figure motivating and energizing the process. INGO concerns focused around the
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gaps in service delivery, the lack of communication and coordination between INGOs, and
the lack of long-term planning within the INGO sector (Interview DAC1; Interview INGO3).
They also felt that the ministry would not be able to provide services, planning and policy
direction for the foreseeable future, leaving INGOs as the only feasible alternative (Interview
DAC1). These INGOs continued to provide the core INGO support as the DAC was
established, and their vision for the body helped shape the goals and roles defined in the
legislation.
The INGOs involved in the founding of the DAC had put considerable thought into the
organisation’s concept in a process that generated a great deal of camaraderie and creativity
(Interview DAC1). Based on her time in Eritrea, DAC1 felt strongly that, in a situation of a
poorly resourced government, a large number of INGOs and heavy reliance on donor
funding, the DAC should act as a coordinating body but in a ‘persuasive’ rather than
‘confrontationist’ way (Interview DAC1). It was not to be a regulating body:
I think our major, major objective was to be able to get a sense of a consensus … to
bring people together and look at the issues collectively. (Interview DAC1)
For DAC1, the key to the coordination of so many diverse bodies lay in allowing
interpersonal relationships and ‘cross-fertilisation’ to build communication and trust
(Interview DAC1). The DAC was to be a forum to share information, build relationships and
networks and develop policies through these informal means (Interview DAC1). The
committees were seen as the key to this strategy (Interview DAC1). Coordination was to be
achieved through indirect means such as the establishment of a centre where new INGOs
could consult with each other about their future activities (Interview INGO2; Interview
INGO3). The key was to achieve coordination by ‘pooling information’ and making it
available rather than by heavy-handed direction (Interview INGO3).
The reluctance to avoid a strong regulating role was grounded in a number of factors.
First, it was recognised that ‘no-one wanted to be regulated’, especially by another non-
government body (Interview INGO2). More significant, however, was the issue that if the
DAC were to maintain its ‘semi-autonomous’ status vis-a-vis the government, it could not
have the legal authority to act as a regulator. The initiators felt strongly that the ministry
should be the regulator while the DAC’s role should be to build up the ministry’s regulatory
capacity (Interview INGO3). Although many donors, including USAID, envisaged civil
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society playing the role of ‘watchdog’ on government activities, DAC founders were wary of
this given the risks involved in threatening government interests. As one INGO interviewee
succinctly observed:
If you are a watchdog and you come down strong you get evicted. (Interview DAC1)
The founders of the DAC were concerned by the lack of coordination in advocacy and
saw a role for the DAC in ‘presenting a more united front’ for the sector, enabling it to
negotiate more effectively with the government and donors (Interview DAC1). The DAC
founders saw their role as building the ministry’s capacity to deal with donors, seeing it as
disadvantaged by its reliance on their funding:
The government … wasn’t strong enough to advocate to your World Banks on their
own because as Hun Sen summed it up, ‘We can't say no to the donors’. (Interview
DAC1)
At the INGO level, the DAC founders felt that the organisation could act as a ‘lead
advocate coordinator’ for issues that were too big for individual INGOs, such as disability
legislation and disability public awareness campaigns (Interview INGO2).
The originators of the DAC saw building capacity at all levels of the sector, from highly
placed ministry officials and civil servants to INGO personnel and local DPOs, as one of its
key roles (Interview INGO2). At ministry level, building the ability of civil servants to handle
administrative and reporting tasks, relate confidently with expatriates and donors and manage
information was seen as key (Interview DAC1; Interview INGO3; Interview INGO2).
According to one interviewee, the goal was that:
… ideally the DAC would dissolve and the government would do that job. (Interview
INGO2)
The process of capacity building was envisaged as an informal one, based on
relationship-building, participation in committees and processes and the encouragement of
experienced personnel:
… and hoping the government sort of picks up something ... by association. (Interview
INGO2)
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It was a method that contrasted sharply with donor approaches to capacity building,
which focused on importing foreign expertise to achieve quick results by creating PIUs and
parallel systems within the government and boosting INGO capacity (Curtis, 1998). At the
INGO level, the DAC planned to build capacity by improving the technical knowledge and
skills of INGOs and achieving greater uniformity in techniques (Interview INGO3).
The founders, particularly Pitt, saw the DAC as having wider significance than a
mechanism to address issues in the Cambodian disability sector. She felt that its principles,
structures, systems and mechanisms could be a model for other social service sectors, such as
children’s welfare and sex workers (Interview DAC1). The principles drew on the concept of
development as a people-focused, evolutionary process, allowing space and time for mistakes
and experiments and giving rise to solutions arising from the people involved rather than
imposed from above according to time lines and objectives determined by donors (Interview
DAC1). It was ‘a very open-ended concept’ which had developed in response to the ‘post-
conflict’ environment of Cambodia (Interview DAC1, 27). DAC1 argued that, in an
environment where capacity was limited, putting strict objectives on local actors could put
them under ‘incredible pressure’ (Interview DAC1, 34). It was hoped the DAC would be a
model of how open-endedness and flexibility could produce responses shaped by and
appropriate to the unique circumstances in which development was taking place.
A key to this process was flexibility over objectives and timelines and allowing people to
question and learn from experience rather than feeling they had failed if they did not meet
deadlines (Interview DAC1). This, she felt, should be seen as a success rather than a failure
in development terms (Interview DAC1). Pitt acknowledged that this view was radically
different from those of donors such as USAID, whose focus was very much on measurable
outcomes and timelines (Interview DAC1). However, she felt that, despite problems, the
DAC’s approach had seen significant achievements in building capacity, confidence and
information-sharing between the government, INGO and donor sectors, and in influencing
policy:
I think the positives probably outweigh the negatives. It provided opportunities for
influencing policy … for cross-fertilisation … (and) building up the capacity of
national people. (Interview DAC1)
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Rather than providing a rigid model for coordination and interaction between INGOs,
donors and state, DAC1 saw the DAC as an opportunity to open up a dynamic between the
players which would lead to an organic development process based on input from people
involved at all levels of disability (Interview DAC1). Such a model would be strongly rooted
in principles of development championed by INGOs, open-ended, responsive to changing
circumstances and the views of stakeholders, empowering local actors and providing the
opportunity to reflect and grow without pressure to meet objectives imposed by outsiders.
INGO Concepts and Expectations of the DAC
While the principles behind DAC1’s view of development would have resonated with
most INGOs operating in the country, the INGO community’s responses to the DAC were
varied. While most INGOs involved with disability had become affiliated members of the
DAC by the 1998-99 Annual Report they provided only 8% of the total funding in 2000, with
most of this coming from core INGOs (DAC, 2001b; DAC, 2000). The diversity and
independence of INGOs created a degree of competition with the DAC, suspicion about the
motives behind it, and a reluctance to accept leadership from within the INGO sector. The
DAC’s proposed role of policymaking and a slow, organic growth of capacity building and
planning did not sit easily with many INGOs’ goals of meeting urgent humanitarian needs as
speedily as possible. Tensions also arose over the DAC’s direct involvement in service
delivery, which drew criticism of unfair competition for funding and of the DAC being ‘used’
by some INGOs and individuals (Horvath, 1998). In sum, the responses by INGOs to the
DAC reflected the same issues which had contributed to the problems leading to its
formation.
One of the most positive aspects of the process leading up to the establishment of the
DAC had been the sense of excitement, creativity and comradeship among those involved
(Interview DAC1). However, it also created a sense of ‘them’ and ‘us’ among other INGOs
and a lack of ownership for a process which many saw as restricted to a few key players:
To me it was initiated from the centre by expatriate workers who were working inside
the ministry. (Interview INGO1,)
The interviewee, from a long established INGO, described her organisation as ‘not
opposed ... but not enthusiastic supporters’ of the DAC (Interview INGO1). She had felt a
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‘sense of detachment’ from the process, only being called into meetings to give reports or
receiving reports which she had difficulty responding to because of pressures of work
(Interview INGO1). One of the key founders, reflecting on the relationships with INGOs, felt
that while the progress of the first two or three years had been very satisfying overall, the
tasks of setting up structures and systems and struggling to define what a semi-autonomous
body looked like may have led to a lack of focus and failure to engage the INGO community,
particularly newcomers (Interview DAC1).
Some long-serving INGO’s workers observed that the DAC process had ‘felt bad’ to
them and the ministry because it had not taken existing structures for coordination and
capacity building sufficiently into account (Interview INGO2). These structures included
regular meetings with the ministry which had pre-dated UNTAC as well as INGO-initiated
coordination bodies such as MEDiCAM and EDUCAM (Interview INGO1). An INGO
interviewee from the period made the observation that these ‘existing bodies’ could have
been strengthened rather than ‘implanting something new’ (Interview INGO1). There was
concern that the better-resourced DAC had weakened ministry confidence rather than build it
(Interview INGO2), and that it was duplicating and undermining work already being done,
however imperfectly (Interview INGO1).
There was criticism that the DAC ‘just can’t say no’ to the many interests involved in it,
an interesting echo of Hun Sen’s comment about his inability to day ‘no’ to donors (quoted
Horvath et al., 2001, p. 4). Some INGO personnel gave the perceived focus of the committees
on planning as an example of how the DAC was caught between donor and INGO
expectations (INGO1). DAC1 and the original founders had seen the role of the committees
in terms of the DAC being an open-ended catalysing agency, bringing the various actors
together to allow the development of networks and relationships where coordination,
planning and capacity building could occur in an evolutionary and reflexive way. The
committees were to provide ‘forums’ for the interchange of technical and professional
information as well as wider disability issues (Interview DAC1). The 1998 donor report,
however, saw the role of the committees as a bureaucratic link between the ministry and
INGOs, planning the implementation of the task force recommendations, passing them up to
the secretariat and council for approval and then back to the implementers (Horvath, 1998, p.
12). Many INGO expectations of the committees seem to have centred on technical and
practical support and coordination, and there was frustration with the focus on planning:
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I think a number of the NGOs were keen to learn from others, to share resources …
but it may be for them it was too focused on policy and writing their annual plan or
their objectives. They tended to write and rewrite and rewrite those things. (Interview
INGO1)
The DAC committee facilitators were described as ineffective (Interview INGO1), and
by the 2001 LVWF/USAID report the DAC was reviewing a number of its committees
(Horvath et al., 2001).
Another INGO worker felt that the initial commitment by INGOs to the DAC had been
based on perceived benefits, and that this commitment faded rapidly once these expectations
were not met (Interview INGO2). INGOs increasingly felt that involvement with the DAC
offered them little advantage and added another unrewarding layer to their workloads:
You wanted support but in some ways it was the bane of your life to try and pester
somebody on your team to go to a meeting for the sake of it. You knew it wasn't doing
anything. (Interview INGO1)
There was criticism that the ‘inner group … who'd been involved from the beginning’
did not understand the situation of other INGOs, leading to alienation and loss of INGO
support for the DAC. As one experienced INGO worker expressed:
How they see it may differ from some small INGO who hasn't been so involved.
(Interview INGO1)
INGOs had a strong sense of egalitarianism and independence and tended to see each
other as competition (Horvath, 2001). An INGO interviewee felt that many INGOs felt that
some of the core DAC INGOs saw it as ‘their instrument’ in ‘getting back some say’ after
problems in dealing with the ministry (Interview INGO1). The USAID/LWVF report directed
particular specific criticism towards HI-B and CT for using the DAC to forward their own
agenda (Horvath, 1998).
Interactions between INGOs and DAC
While there was general agreement in the INGO community that improved cooperation
between each other was necessary, INGOs were wary about the role the DAC might play in
regulating and controlling them, and reluctant to give that role to a peer organisation which
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had no legal authority to enforce cooperation and did not seem to offer advantages in
fundraising (Interview INGO2). The ARC program for Community-Based Rehabilitation
(CBR), for persons with disability, for example, had been developed separately from the
relevant DAC sub-committee and had still gained USAID funding (Horvath, 1998).
INGOs began avoiding the DAC and dealing directly with the ministry, while support
and attendance for the committees and INGO support in terms of resources and funding
dwindled (Interview INGO2; Interview INGO1; Horvath et al., 2001). A 2001 donor report
was scathing about the lack of support and the partisan approach of individual INGOs,
accusing them of ‘simply using it for their own purposes and failing to support its
development (Horvath et al., 2001, p. v). The same report noted the tendency for INGOs to
define the role of the DAC according to their own reference points, resulting in a situation
where ‘there seem to be as many DACs as there are members’ (Horvath, 2001, p. 2; Horvath
et al., pp. 1- 2, 15).
Those who had worked hardest to establish the DAC also expressed the view that some
INGOs had only used it when it suited them. A key founder argued that the initiators had
deliberately ‘stepped back’ to allow ownership among the INGO community, only to see
other INGOs ‘just take advantage’ of it (Warren, L., Country Director, Cambodia
Rehabilitation Program, VI, quoted in Horvath et al., 2001, p. 3). Such tensions, which made
it difficult to create the mutual trust and energy which had been one of the visions of the
founders of the DAC, could often crystalize around individuals and their roles.
Development work often means that INGO personnel from very different organisations,
backgrounds and cultures work in close proximity in highly charged situations, which can
lead to strained relationships or issues becoming personalised. DAC1, as an innovative,
experienced and energetic development worker, was spoken of highly by most interviewees
(Interview INGO3; Interview INGO2). However, for reasons which one interviewer
suggested would never be ‘totally understood’, a great deal of the acrimony around issues
connected with the DAC also came to focus around her (Interview INGO2). These issues
included direct service provision by the DAC itself and complaints about her personal
interaction style and undue influence from some INGOs.
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The issue of direct service provision by the DAC became, as DAC1 ruefully observed, a
‘hot potato’ (Interview DAC1), with the debate becoming increasingly intense and personal
and culminating in official complaints by INGOs to USAID, the donor:
I don't think any of us will ever be able to get to the actual root of the matter … and
things started to get icky. I think the (new) head of HI … maybe went to USAID and
said ‘I don't like what's happening’ … which led to the (1998) assessment. Then
unfortunately, there was gossip. (INGO2)
The DAC charter had made provision for the body to ‘implement’ some service
provision as well as coordinate (Interview DAC1; Horvath, 1998, p. 12). DAC founders
argued that this was included ‘just in case’ to cover situations where an obvious need was
seen but not being met, but there was no intention that it be a major role because of the
danger of ‘mixing interests’ (Interview INGO3). Despite this, the DAC did move into service
provision, often at DAC1’s initiative and with funding which she raised independently. This
arose partly from the tension for the founding INGO workers between the need to create
sustainable systems and the pressure to respond to urgent humanitarian needs (Interview
INGO2). DAC1 was resourceful and initiative in finding resources and this aroused some
resentment among INGOs (Interview INGO2). Many saw it as a conflict of interest that the
agency ostensibly responsible for coordinating and facilitating should also be competing with
them for funds and presumably diverting resources from coordination to services provision
(Interview INGO2).
In response to the complaints from INGOs, USAID/LWVF carried out an assessment in
1998 (Horvath, 1998). The report commended DAC1’s role in establishing the DAC, but was
very critical of her relationships within the INGO community, describing her as ‘not being
liked or respected universally’ and ‘stepping on some INGO toes’ (Horvath, 1998, p. 12). The
report recommended that she would not make an appropriate executive director of the DAC
(Horvath, 1998, p. 12). DAC1 at the time was making a phased withdrawal from the DAC
while a Cambodian took over as director, but she felt that the finding hastened the process
and made it too abrupt (Interview DAC1). Although she continued as an adviser, it was
obviously a difficult end to what had been a stimulating and rewarding period (Interview
INGO2).
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The causes of the tensions between DAC1 and other INGO personnel are not uncommon
in INGO environments. DAC1 reflected on possible causes:
I think that some of the INGOs felt that I had too much of an influence and to some
degree that’s probably right. Hopefully it was more of a positive than a negative.
(Interview DAC1)
It was not surprising that INGOs would react to a strong and influential actor, especially
when expectations over the DAC were not met or individual INGOs felt excluded by an
‘inner group’. An INGO interviewee suggested that where progress was frustrated by
problems, criticism often focused on individuals when people were looking for an
explanation:
They start seeing things that make them wonder what's going on. (Interview INGO2)
DAC1 herself felt the high turnover in INGO personnel was a contributing factor, with
new arrivals reluctant or lacking the time to learn from more experienced workers:
It’s new people coming in and not knowing the history … I don’t think they quite
knew what we were there for. (Interview DAC1)
She suggested that this made relationship building and the growth of shared knowledge
among INGO personnel difficult, and slowed the development of long-term planning and
cooperation within the INGO community (Interview DAC1).
It is perhaps not surprising that the activism and initiative shown by the founders of the
DAC, qualities valued by INGOs, were also the cause of friction. Despite the tensions,
though, the stakeholders of the DAC, including INGOs, USAID and the ministry, continued
to see a role for the body (Horvath et al., 2001; Forsythe et al., 2006). However, expectations
of what this role should be differed widely among INGOs, fuelling a lack of ownership,
suspicion over the DAC’s activities and complaints that, while adding to their already heavy
workload, the body was not providing them with the services they wanted (Horvath et al.,
2001; Interview INGO1).
The conflict in expectations may have reflected a lack of communication, the open-
endedness of the DAC’s stated goals, the issue of the high turnover of staff or simply the
diversity of INGO needs and expectations of the DAC. INGOs were criticised in a 2001
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donor report for failing to have developed overall strategic approaches to their roles in the
DAC, limiting their involvement to only those areas or issues where they were directly
involved (Horvath et al., 2001). However, such an outcome was in many ways to be expected
given the independent nature of INGOs and their focus on ‘getting things done’. As one
INGO interviewee summed up:
There wouldn’t be a bunch of INGOs who are going to agree 100%. (Interview
INGO2)
DAC and the Government
The DAC’s Concept of the Government’s Role
Bringing INGOs and the ministry into a relationship with one another was one of the
DAC’s key goals (Interview DAC1; Interview INGO3). The founders felt that INGOs’
reluctance to recognise the role and even existence of government was one of the main causes
of the lack of coordination in service delivery:
We're doing it to get that thought across … the government is here, they do have to
take some responsibility, they have to be involved and working together. Most
(INGOs) have not thought about those things. (Interview DAC1)
The DAC founders were emphatic that the government was responsible for policy and
regulation (Interview DAC1; Interview INGO3). The DAC’s semi-autonomous status was
seen as a critical strategy in maintaining the difficult balance of supporting the government’s
role and authority and winning its trust while preserving the DAC’s independence (Interview
DAC1). On the one hand, DAC1 felt strongly that it was vital to involve the government,
which could easily feel threatened by organisations set up by better funded and equipped
‘outsiders’ (Interview DAC1). However, at the same time the founders were concerned that
corruption and political interference could turn the DAC into an ‘inactive and self-serving’
body if the ministry had control (Interview INGO2; Interview INGO3). DAC1’s experience
with the dysfunctional National Council for Children, funded by UNICEF and staffed by
Ministry of Education staff, had convinced her that such a model would not function
(Interview INGO3). The struggle to find an appropriate legal structure became an ongoing
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and only partially successful one that tested the extent to which an external body is limited by
a government’s authority to define the political space in which it may operate.
The founding group agreed with donors and the ministry that the latter was not the
appropriate body to provide services, partly because of its lack of capacity for the foreseeable
future and partly for ideological reasons (Interview INGO2). However, they also felt that the
disability sector should recognise that the government was responsible for policy and
regulation (Interview INGO3; DAC, 2002). The DAC was to work collaboratively with
ministry officials to help build ministry capacity in these areas, with the long-term goal of the
government ultimately taking responsibility for the DAC, although no timeline was given
(Interview INGO2).
The founders also felt that an official relationship with the ministry would strengthen the
DAC’s legitimacy and enable it to play a national role in coordination and policy
development (Interview INGO3). It was considered that the ministry would be suspicious of
any coordinating body in which it was not involved, seriously compromising any chance of
success. However, the founders, while keen to be within the ministry, were also convinced by
previous experiences3 that to leave it as a purely government body would open it to
corruption, apathy and lack of capacity, preventing its development as a ‘live body’
(Interview INGO3; Interview DAC1; Interview INGO2). One INGO interviewee stated
baldly that:
… if we left it to the government it would be a mess. (Interview INGO2)
The semi-autonomous status, which a number of people saw as a QANGO, was designed
to try to resolve these tensions. In the event, it highlighted the means available to even the
‘weakest’ government to pursue its goals. In the case of the DAC, these revolved around the
government’s control over the legal status of any organisation in Cambodia and the extent of
the political and legal space in which the body could operate.
The Ministry Goals and Expectations of the DAC
Ministry interviewees and documents were open about the ministry’s limited capacity
and officially acknowledged its dependence on INGOs in service delivery and coordination:
3 The National Council for Children, see above.
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We cannot give up the NGOs because NGOs and international organisations are the
ones who work for the government. (Interview Her Excellency, 3)
Although INGOs had made the first move in approaching the ministry over the task
force, it was presented as a ministry initiative in the report (MSALVA Task Force, 1996, p.
ii). The ministry enthusiastically supported the implementation of the recommendations,
including the DAC (Sisovan et al., Heng et al., 2001); acknowledging its dependence on
INGOs for ‘organisation’ and ‘planning’ to ‘help disability’ (Interview Her Excellency, 5).
However, ministry support was limited to the provision of premises, water and power
(Horvath, 1998, p. 14), and it resisted repeated recommendations from USAID to take more
responsibility (Horvath et al., 2001; Forsythe et al., 2006).
The ministry was also clear about its own status as the body that set guidelines and had
ultimate responsibility for the welfare of persons with disability (Interview Her Excellency,
3; MSALVA Task Force, 1996, p. ii). The DAC was presented as an organisation serving the
needs of the ministry, gathering information and acting as a link between ministry and
INGOs (Interview Her Excellency, 3). In part, this may have been due to cultural and
political sensitivities about maintaining appearances of control, but at another level the
minister was stating a very real truth that the DAC, as an organisation with expatriate
representatives on its board, was dependent on government permission to exist.
Ministry attitudes towards the DAC were more complex than official support suggested.
There were some indications that the ministry was unhappy with the process, seeing it as a
large, well-funded expatriate initiative displacing structures already in place in the ministry
(Interview INGO2). An INGO interviewee suggested that the ministry would have felt that it
had little choice but to accept:
… because they don't really realise that they can prevent us from doing things.
(Interview INGO2)
Another long-term INGO worker felt that even senior ministry officials were unsure of
what was happening and sought help from INGO staff outside the DAC to understand the
process (Interview INGO1). One factor was the language barrier, with few Cambodian senior
staff understanding English:
… so they don’t know half the time what’s going on. (Interview INGO1)
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Some interviewees suggested that a cultural reluctance to exclude, and a lack of capacity
to understand all the issues involved, might have influenced the ministry’s support (Interview
INGO2; Interview INGO1). However, the ministry’s official support for the DAC has also to
be put in the context of its comparatively low status in the political hierarchy, its consequent
shortage of resources and its need to maintain all the goodwill it could with powerful political
players and donors (Interview DAC2). Many interviewees saw the issue of resources as a key
factor. Although interviewees questioned the extent to which the ministry understood what
was happening, they suggested that it had seen that the task force and DAC process had
generated funds and were motivated to support the process:
… people were saying ‘Hey, the money's coming so whatever you want to write,
Helen, you go right ahead and write that’. There's the poverty thing and the greed
thing but really people didn't have money at that time. (Interview INGO2)
The DAC personnel were aware of the pressures on the ministry, and were realistic about
the motives for the support. DAC1 reflected on the ‘total support’ they received from the
ministry as being ‘pretty normal and natural’ given the duress under which the ministry
operated:
(The Minister) would just say ‘Yes’ to everything, virtually, because he knew that the
ministry wasn’t going to get anywhere and anything that is likely to get some kudos
for him and get things, then ‘Yes’. There’s nothing to lose and everything to gain.
(Interview DAC1)
The ministry badly needed to raise its profile in an environment where social affairs
attracted little political or donor interest or funding. It also needed to satisfy donor
requirements for results, or at least generate some activity (Interview DAC1; Interview
INGO3). For example, the DAC offered the chance to respond to the UNESCAP proposal
that governments set up a department to help coordination of disability services, satisfying
donor requirements that it be active in human rights (Interview Her Excellency, 5). It also
gave welcome international status to the ministry and minister at conferences and in reports,
with the semi-autonomous status of the DAC allowing it to be presented as a ministry
initiative (Interview DAC2, 2005a, b; JICA, 2002; JICA/DAC, 2001). An INGO interviewee
observed that appearances by the minister with a Cambodian DAC staff member at
international conferences allowed MOSALVY to ‘pick up a bit of reflected glory’ (Interview
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INGO2). This not only strengthened its legitimacy with donors but also helped in the struggle
for influence with powerful political figures (Interview INGO2). A former bureaucrat
suggested that the DAC was also used by the ministry to serve powerful figures who wanted
information on activities within Cambodia. The DAC gave the ministry the capacity to
‘monitor’ INGOs’ work, not for quality ‘… but to find something to say to the Prime
Minister’ (Interview DAC2).
Interactions between DAC and the Ministry
Despite the apparent ‘total support’ (Interview DAC1) from the ministry for the DAC,
the pursuit of differing goals inevitably resulted in tensions and points of conflict. As long as
the ministry and the DAC founders were achieving their separate goals, it could be argued
some synergy and progress in development goals were achieved. When conflict occurred,
however, it was often the poorly resourced ministry which could exercise most power against
a body whose legal existence derived from a ministerial regulation. As an INGO interviewee
observed, the DAC’s ability to control MOSALVY’s activities was limited:
The minister can do anything he likes. He can say, ‘Yes, if these people give me a
million dollars they can have 50 million leg shops here if they like. (Interview
INGO1)
Predictably, a key conflict was over the control of activities which generated resources
for the patronage systems on which the ministry and government operated. Access to
resources meant that the ministry was unlikely to relinquish control of disability services
(Interview INGO2). Its very lack of resources gave it the motivation to fight hard for what it
could get. Strategies available included its legal standing as the only body able to make
legislation in the areas of disability, its understanding of the Cambodian political
environment, donors and INGOs and their motivations and its skill in exploiting the
opportunities these presented. As one INGO interviewee commented:
They understand about politics very much better (than we do). (Interview INGO2)
The Legal Status of the DAC
The ministry, under the Council of Ministers, was the body which defined the legal space
in which the DAC could operate, giving it considerable power to shape it according to the
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political needs of the government and ministry. The DAC’s history showed how real this
power was.
A key element of the DAC had been its use of the semi-autonomous status as a means of
gaining legitimacy by operating under the umbrella of the ministry while still staying out of
full control of the ministry. A great deal of thought had gone into its legal status. Although
the DAC was established in 1997, it operated in a ‘legal never-land’ (INGO2) for eighteen
months before an agreement over the legislation was reached (Interview DAC2). The issue
revolved around the level of protection the DAC legislation should get. The ministry wanted
legal status at the level of ministerial sub-decree or even Royal Decree, which would have
given it a high level of protection but put it under the control of the ministry, giving the
ministry access to positions and funding (Interview DAC2). As a former bureaucrat
explained:
(The minister) wanted that because he was looking for funding. If funding is provided
to the DAC and it’s run by the government then the government should be … the
institute director and government staff should be working at the DAC. (Interview
DAC2)
However, the Council of Ministers could not issue a ministerial sub-decree to a body
whose statutes required the presence of expatriates on its board, as the DAC’s did. This
would give non-citizens the right to make decisions over the budget and activities of a
government body, a clearly illegal situation. For their part, the DAC board refused to accept
government staff who had not been selected on merit and insisted that the board should
include representatives from international organisations (Interview DAC2). The stalemate
dragged on for eighteen months, until civil servants were able to persuade the minister that a
Ministerial Prakas offered better prospects for access to funding, counter-intuitive as this
might sound:
I think a group of people tried to explain to them that USAID or funders are not
interested to fund the government. By having the DAC autonomous we open the door
for donor (funding)… And then … the minister understood and he signed the Prakas.
(Interview DAC2)
Access to funding was the key factor in the minister’s final decision on the legal position
of the DAC. The ministerial sub-decree offered direct control of funding, but the reality was
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that after the events of 1997 few donors would give funding directly to a government body.
The Prakas gave the ministry less control of the DAC, but allowed donor funding to the DAC
as a ‘semi-autonomous body’. The minister made the pragmatic decision that possible access
to some funding was better than full access to none.
The minister signed the Prakas on Organisation of Disability Action Committee (DAC)
No. 308 MOSALVY in 1999 (See Appendix 3). The Prakas could be over-ruled by the more
powerful Royal Decrees and ministerial sub-decrees, making it vulnerable to political
patronage and influence. This concerned a number of INGO interviewees, one of whom
pointed out that in the Cambodian environment where there was ‘always another direct or
indirect political agenda’ it was very easy for an organisation to become politicised and
caught up with patronage (Interview INGO5). He gave the Cambodia Red Cross and its
‘close association’ with Hun Sen’s wife as an example (Interview INGO5). However, the
DAC was caught in a dilemma, as the higher protection of a decree or sub-decree would
mean greater ministerial control and vulnerability to ministry interests.
The CMAA and the DAC: The Limits of Legitimacy
The questions around the DAC’s vulnerability were soon to be put to the test. On 4th
September 2001 the Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA) was
established by Royal Decree to regulate mine action and victim assistance. The head of
CMAA, Sam Sotha, had been head of the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC), the
national agency responsible for mine action activities in Cambodia. He had left after
objections from funders about corruption, and Hun Sen had created a position for him as
mines adviser (Interview INGO2). The CMAA was thus already highly politicised and close
to Hun Sen and the DAC became alarmed about the greater legal and political strength of the
CMAA’s position and the threat of being drawn deeper into the political struggle for funds
(DAC, 2001b). The Royal Decree would give the CMAA a broad scope of authority and a
stronger legal base than the DAC. In its 2000 Annual Report the DAC noted that the wide
powers given to the CMAA could cause overlap with the DAC’s role and threaten its status
and functions, particularly around control of victim assistance and its associated access to
funding. The DAC and other INGOs lobbied intensively to keep the DAC’s role in victim
assistance separate from the CMAA (DAC, 2001b; Interview DAC2). At a symposium, the
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CMAA reassured the DAC about its intentions and it was agreed that the CMAA’s Royal
Decree would include the amendment:
CMAA shall delegate the coordinating responsibility on victim assistance to
MOSALVY and DAC through recognition of the Prakas No. 308/MOSALVY.
(DAC, 2001b, p. 26)
However, the DAC’s legitimacy after the establishment of the CMAA was even more
fragile, deriving from one article in the sub-decree for the establishment of the CMAA, a
body that stood very close to the Prime Minister (Interview DAC2). A DAC worker and
former civil servant was concerned that the core legal status for the DAC rested on a Prakas,
giving it no legal protection or independent legitimacy. The interviewee pointed out that this
left scope for problems ‘further along the line’ (Interview DAC2). The concerns centred on
the control over victim assistance funding which had attracted the attention of the more
powerful and politicised CMAA.
The concerns were fully justified. By 2004, the head of the CMAA had personally
approached DAC senior staff over control of victim assistance (Interview DAC2), and some
form of new agreement was reached. An INGO worker and board member expressed her
concerns:
Unfortunately I think X has just given (mine victims’ assistance) to CMAA this last
week so it's a bit worrying. There's no money yet so it's irrelevant right now, but if
money comes in it will be a very different story. (Interview INGO2)
Funding and access to money were the touchstones which could attract the attention of
political actors within and outside the ministry. To stand completely outside the political
arena was to run the risk of being irrelevant. To become involved meant engaging with
powerful actors skilled in the political, economic and cultural environment who could not
afford to lose (Interview INGO2). These players could ultimately determine the political and
legal space in which the DAC, dependent on the government for the rights to operate in the
country, could operate.
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Funding and USAID Support: 1997-2004
USAID in Cambodia
The US was one of the main architects of the 1991 Peace Accords and actively pursued a
generous aid programme to the country to implement them (USAID, 2002, 1994). The
USAID Mission was re-opened in 1992 (USAID, 1994, p. 2). However, the ousting of First
Prime Minister Prince Ranariddh in July 1997 resulted in the US suspending two-thirds of its
$US37 million programme, (USAID, 1994, p. 2; 2005). From 1997, USAID’s activities were
bound by a congressional restriction against direct assistance to the central government.
Exceptions were effected on a case-by-case basis through annual aid appropriations bills
approved by US Congress, a process called earmarking (Interview DNR1).
By 2001, the situation had improved to the point where USAID began to develop a three-
year Interim Strategy Plan for 2002-2005, followed by another for the three years after
October 2005 (USAID, 2008, 2005, 2001). In 2005, USAID was the second largest bilateral
donor to Cambodia, with funding levels of over $US55 million providing 10% of the
estimated $US500 million total donor assistance (USAID, 2008a).
USAID-Cambodia Policy Priorities and Strategies
USAID’s goals are shaped by its mandate to implement the USA’s foreign policy
objectives in Cambodia, which in turn were determined by its regional goals. The USA saw a
stable, prosperous and democratic Cambodia as strengthening cooperation and economic
growth in the region and aiding the spread of democracy and political stability (USAID,
2005). USAID policy goals therefore focused around the establishment and stabilisation of a
democratic and prosperous government and nation (USAID; 2005, 2002, 1994). In the early
1990s, its goals were to help ensure the survival of the new government, which the US saw as
crucial to its interests in the region (USAID, 1994). Economic and political stability were to
be achieved through transforming its centralist economy to a market-oriented one with a
strong private sector (USAID, 1994, p. iv).
USAID’s policy was built on the three objectives of strengthening political pluralism and
good governance, supporting broad-based economic growth, and meeting targeted basic
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human needs. By 1994, the USAID-Cambodia Mission felt that it could move from
humanitarian to longer-term, ‘post-crisis transition’ programmes (USAID, 1994, p. iv). The
emphasis shifted to building democratic governance and strengthening service delivery of
basic health and education. Most of its activity was directed to capacity building within the
relevant areas of government, road rehabilitation, education, maternal health and family
planning and basic human needs, especially for vulnerable groups (USAID, 1994, pp. iv-v).
A key element of the programme was the use of INGOs as the agents for addressing human
needs, with vulnerable groups being targeted (USAID, 1994).
USAID’s 1994-97 Assistance Strategy considered that the lack of government capacity
made the usual bilateral policy of contracting through the government impossible. Instead, its
programme would be implemented totally through direct USAID grants and contracts, with
INGOs playing the lead role (USAID, 1994). USAID would manage oversight of INGO
partners.
The reasons for choosing INGOs over government, direct USAID management or private
expatriate contractors lay in their perceived technical competence, commitment and proven
operational capacity in Cambodia. They were also considered more cost-effective than the
alternatives (USAID, 1994). USAID felt that INGOs had already successfully played the
leading role in humanitarian and emergency relief, working at provincial, district and grass
roots levels, and excelled in small community development settings (USAID, 1994, pp. 84-
85). It felt that their work demonstrated a high commitment to beneficiaries, an ability to
establish trust with target groups and to harness organisational and technical resources to
implement operations quickly (USAID, 1994, pp. 84-85). In some circumstances, they had
been able to substitute for the government in providing basic services (USAID, 1994, pp. 84-
85).
By 2002, USAID had shifted from relief and immediate needs to longer-term strategies
(USAID, 2002). The USAID’s 2002-2005 Interim Strategy and 2005 Strategy Statement
focused on strengthening democratic practices and human rights, global health issues and
education (USAID, 2005; USAID, 2000, p. i). Its strategies included improving service
delivery and using INGOs as agents of delivery. Humanitarian services, such as the LWVF’s
work with persons with disability, continued as an indication of USAID’s commitment to
vulnerable groups (USAID, 2002).
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USAID’s strategy of involving INGOs went beyond the short-term to using Cambodia as
a test case for a model of post-crisis assistance based on INGOs during a transition period
(USAID, 2002, pp. 22, 85). This strategy saw INGOs laying the groundwork for the future
delivery of basic services through a focus on training, sustainability, and developing
replicable models for service delivery (USAID, 2002, pp. 22, 84). The strategy recognised
possible weaknesses of INGOs, including their individualism and lack of uniformity, citing
the ‘plethora of models’ in prosthetic technologies as an example (USAID, 2002, 86). USAID
was also concerned by the potential for problems with coordination and cooperation, the role
of INGOs’ out-of country parent organisations in choosing beneficiary communities and
projects with little internal consultation and by INGOs’ reliance on expatriate staff’ (USAID,
2002, p. 86). Despite these caveats, USAID saw INGOs as strongly qualified to deliver
assistance in the short-term and to lay the groundwork for future service delivery. USAID
saw its own role as working to strengthen coordination and cooperation in the INGO
community, developing indigenous NGOs and selected government departments and
increasing government and INGO partnership.
By the 2002-2005 Interim Strategy, USAID strategy was more focused than in 1994 and
included a wider range of stakeholders, including government. While INGOs were still seen
as important components of the health, human rights and education programmes, some
concern was expressed that using them could be destabilising, increasing people’s
expectations beyond the government’s ability to meet them (USAID, 2002, pp. C2-2). The
2005-2008 Strategy, however, still saw USAID’s policy as one of almost exclusive reliance
on INGOs, local NGO and private voluntary organisations (PVOs) for service delivery. At
the same time, USAID was working to improve coordination and linkages across activities
among donors and the government (USAID, 2005). However, the mission’s ability to work
with government was still limited by congress, increasing its reliance on INGOs for policy
implementation.
USAID and Disability
From its re-establishment as a mission in 1992, USAID’S humanitarian work had been
focused primarily on those affected by war. This had by default involved it in disability
activities through its support for a Vietnam Veterans of America (VVA) programme
supplying orthotics, prosthetics, mobility aids and technical training for persons with
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disability (USAID, 2008a). This and the DAC were seen as complementary activities to the
USAID’s main strategic objectives in Cambodia, which were providing services but also
building the capacity of local NGOs (USAID, 2002). While maintaining the two
programmes, the mission did not see disability as a major priority in 2004 (Interview DNR1).
By 2005, its strategy had changed to mainstreaming disability in all programmes rather than
running specific programmes (USAID, 2005).
USAID’s Role in the DAC
As we have seen, the DAC began with little funding, with DAC1 setting up a small
office, hiring two or three staff and beginning the task of developing a framework for
coordination (Interview INGO3, 3). HI-Belgium, ARC VI, ICRC and CT formed an informal
core of support for the fledgling organisation (Interview INGO3; Interview DAC1). By the
time the first Annual Report was published in 1998-99, the DAC had acquired 80 affiliate
organisations, including ministries, INGOs, local DPOs, embassies and UN bodies (DAC,
2000, pp. 38-40). However, while the core INGOs provided some in-kind support, including
staff, the DAC had to live ‘day by day’ for funding through 1997, depending heavily on the
resourcefulness of key individuals and INGOs to find ‘scraps’ (Interview INGO2; Forsythe et
al., 2006).
As a result of determined networking by DAC1, the head of CT and others in the core
group, a grant of $US500,000 over three years was obtained from LWVF. Due to the
embargo on aid to the RGC at the time, the funding was ‘earmarked’ by US Congress and
then channelled through USAID. HI had to act as intermediary as the DAC was not registered
as an INGO (Interview DAC1). The grant, which became available in September 1998, freed
the organisation from the burden of proposal-writing and seeking funds, enabling it to make a
‘quantum leap’ from a ‘hand to mouth’ existence to a stable organisation (DAC, 2000).
During the period of the 1998-1999 Annual Report, the secretariat employed three expatriate
staff, nine national staff and five expatriate volunteers, all selected on merit (DAC, 2000).
The DAC offered a number of areas of congruency with USAID strategy and policy. It
was designed to strengthen INGOs’ provision of services and represented a long-term
commitment by some INGOs to developing a system of service delivery based on non-
government providers (Interview DNR1). It was also committed to capacity building at
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government, INGO and national levels through training, information sharing and
involvement, and it was concerned with human rights for persons with disability (USAID,
1994; Interview DNR1). The opportunity to fund the DAC came at a strategic time in the
USAID’s involvement in Cambodia, with the US Congress cutting its programme in
Cambodia by two-thirds in 1997. In this environment, DAC offered a number of advantages.
It was inexpensive, with a budget of $US500,000 over three years out of a total USAID
budget of $US50 million per annum (Interview DNR1), and it seemed to offer a means of
strengthening the development of a private sector system of service delivery and capacity
building by increasing civil society coordination and oversight in the sector (Interview
DNR1). The DAC also gave USAID an indirect link with the ministry (Interview DNR1).
A USAID official pointed out that USAID had not had a great deal of control over the
selection of the DAC as a project (Interview DNR1). DAC1, the first DAC director, felt that
this was reflected in a low level of ownership and interest, with USAID offering little
guidance or information. For example, despite repeated requests the agency had ‘never once’
provided the framework for monitoring and evaluation (Interview DAC1). This lack of
interest was reflected in USAID reports questioning support of the DAC (Horvath, 1998,
p.13; 2001, p. v). As the relationship progressed, both parties found gaps between the DAC’s
ideology and role and USAID’s philosophy and strategy.
USAID was disappointed by the slow development of a stable service delivery system,
and blamed it in part on the high INGO turnover (Interview DNR1). A USAID official felt
that the DAC had not been effective in putting strong long-term planning in place to counter
this trend and in building policies on government involvement and financial planning
(Interview DNR1). USAID was also critical of the lack of measurable outcomes and a long-
term vision, which the agency felt left the DAC vulnerable to ‘ad hoc’ responses to requests
(Interview DNR1).
A USAID/LWVF assessment of the DAC, carried out in response to INGO complaints to
USAID about the leadership style of the DAC and its involvement in direst service provision,
expressed a number of reservations about the council (Horvath, 1998). Particular concerns
were raised by USAID over the control and ownership of the DAC. The board of eleven was
chaired by the MOSALVY Secretary of State and included representatives from MOSALVY,
Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (MOEYS), the Ministry of Health (MOH), INGOs,
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and local DPOs. However, the 1998 assessment forcibly expressed donor concerns over what
they saw as the undue influence of some INGOs and expatriates in the organisation’s
operations (Horvath, 1998). The assessment cited discord among INGO members and a lack
of consensus on a vision or strategic plans and goals for the future (Horvath, 1998). The
appointment of voluntary expatriate advisers, including DAC1, was criticised as interfering
with the elected nature of the board. The 1998 assessment also felt that there was insufficient
commitment to ‘Cambodianisation’, criticising the limited use of Khmer and inadequate
planning to nationalise the DAC (Horvath, 1998, p. 14). The lack of a strategic plan with
time-related targets and benchmarks, taken with the other issues, left the assessment
questioning whether the DAC had developed the means or the credibility to coordinate other
actors in the disability sector (Horvath, 1998).
In 2001, USAID conducted an assessment of the DAC in response to an application from
the council to the LWVY/USAID for another three-year funding cycle (Horvath et al., 2001).
It was even more critical than the 1998 report, advising that funding should not continue until
the DAC had made significant changes (Horvath et al., 2001). It targeted the DAC’s failure to
develop as an institution and suggested that future USAID funding be made conditional on
the organisation diversifying its funding base, encouraging members to contribute more,
exploring fees-for-service and identifying alternative donors (Horvath et al., 2001). The
assessment again criticised the DAC’s vulnerability to distraction by interested partners and
the lack of consensus about its goals and mission. It recommended that the DAC develop a
strategic development plan, with defined and measurable goals and benchmarks. Ownership,
governance, membership and leadership needed to be clearly delineated, and reporting
mechanisms put in place which would harmonise with USAID’s reporting systems. In
defence, DAC officials argued that the council had not failed in its reporting obligations, they
criticised USAID’s reporting format as quantitative rather than qualitative (Interview DAC1;
Horvath et al., 2001). The report also raised the issue of advisers, with a recommendation that
the DAC develop an exit strategy for DAC1 and that TA support by USAID/LWVF be
provided instead (Interview DAC1; Horvath et al., 2001).
USAID’s strategy for the DAC’s relationship with the government was a major shift
from the original vision of the DAC’s founders. The 2001 assessment expressed concern that
most INGOs saw the DAC as owned by the ministry, a view shared by the ministry itself
(Horvath et al., 2001). The assessment acknowledged DAC1’s original vision of a symbiotic,
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mutually advantageous relationship with the ministry, but its own ideological position was
that ‘independent organisations’ and government would inevitably take different paths and
roles. It was for instance, fundamental to its view that in a democratic Cambodia INGOs and
local NGOs would play an assertive and independent role apart from government, providing
balances and checks on government activity (Horvath et al., 2001). USAID saw the DAC as
the outcome of a temporary crisis which had brought government and INGOs together.
However, the organisation now had to accept that its role was passing as the topography of
disability service provision changed and different sectors realigned. If the DAC was to
survive, it had to find a role in the new environment (Horvath et al., 2001).
Funding was renewed, but on condition that the DAC find alternative sources of funding,
define its role more clearly and undertake extensive restructuring (Horvath et al., 2001).
USAID recommended that the DAC’s goals be revised with its role tied more tightly to
developing the National Plan of Action on Disability and Rehabilitation of 1996, and its
functions be limited to preparing a Plan of Action based on the 1996 task force and UN-
ESCAP documents. This plan should focus on building up national capacity and the inclusion
of disability needs into government ministries’ and civil society planning and building the
capacity of DAC affiliates (DAC, 2002).
The 2001 assessment and subsequent consultancies in 2003 generated a major upheaval
as the DAC worked hard to meet the recommendations, restructuring the board and preparing
a strategic plan based around the USAID requirements (DAC, 2001, 2002b). Changes
included the restructuring of the DAC and its board with the appointment of a steering
committee to oversee the process (DAC, 2002b; Forsythe et al., 2006, p. 2). The vision was
revised to focus on persons with disability’s human rights and equal opportunities, while the
new mission statement stated that the DAC’s priority would be developing members’
capacity to advance these rights and opportunities (DAC, 2001, p. 15; DAC, 2000, p. 7). This
harmonised with USAID’s human rights agenda, but meant a shift in the DAC’s nature from
the original vision of an open-ended body to a tighter organisational structure with more
focused goals compatible with USAID and donor reporting and management frameworks.
The new governing board was a response to USAID concern over greater government
involvement and ownership of the DAC, a higher level of ‘Cambodianisation’, links with
local DPOs and persons with disability and inclusion of the business community. One of the
INGO members of the steering committee reflected somewhat ironically on the challenges of
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meeting USAID requirements for the board and her misgivings as to whether this would
necessarily produce a functioning body:
Damn, we did a good job. Doesn't that look good? Disabilities, people with no
disabilities, men, women, Cambodians, foreigners, government and non-government,
all in this nice mix. Whether they work or not, I don't know. (Interview INGO2)
USAID concerns were in part a response to the perceived bias of the previous board
towards certain INGOs and expatriates, but they also raised questions of the degree of
genuine ownership of its new role and structure the DAC would feel over a model which had
been imposed by a donor. Another long-term INGO representative on the steering committee
expressed his concern about donors being ‘too proactive’. He argued that their role needed to
be ‘limited’ because of their tendency to focus on ‘their single agenda’ which often ignored
the local knowledge and experience of government and INGOs (Interview INGO3).
The reforms made the organisation more ‘user-friendly’ to donors, with the DAC making
a strong commitment to focus on the priorities generated by its new vision and mission
(DAC, 2001). Reporting was to follow structures compatible with donor systems, using
benchmarks, measurable outcomes, performance targets, timelines, and key performance
indicators, while the DAC began to develop alternative sources of funding (DAC, 2001).
Most importantly, the DAC committed to withdraw from direct programme implementation
and to resist pressures from members and ministry to become involved in service provision in
the future (DAC, 2001).
While the DAC kept USAID funding for 2002-2005, a subsequent USAID assessment in
2006, while commending the DAC’s progress, repeated the concerns over its continuing lack
of funding (Forsythe et al., 2006). The assessment described DAC leadership, financial
sustainability, and staff management systems as weak and criticised it as still being
vulnerable to distraction from its core mission, in part because its semi-autonomous status
made it vulnerable to pressures from members and ministries (DAC, 2001). While the DAC
had moved towards greater ‘Cambodianisation’, linkages with persons with disability still
needed strengthening. The assessment also felt that the DAC had not allowed for
improvements in the government’s capacity to coordinate and deliver services in the medium
to long-term and planned for possible change (DAC, 2001). Finally, the DAC was still not
self-funding. While acknowledging that there was widespread agreement in the disability
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sector that there was a role for the DAC, the assessment made it clear that USAID funding
would not continue for long (DAC, 2001). In part, this was because USAID had stepped back
from disability involvement but there also seemed a sense that long-term commitment to
funding the DAC was not consistent with the USAID preference for rapid outcomes and
short-term cycles (Interview DNR1).
The DAC was able to find other donors and continue. By 2009 AusAID was the main
donor with smaller amounts from HI-F, UNICEF through MOEYS and the Special Education
Office and members fees (DAC, 2010). However, one of the key founders expressed her
concern that the process had involved moving away from the original open-ended, flexible
organisation which saw ‘processes as (being as) important as the outcomes’ with the focus on
relationship-building and ‘bringing people together’ (Interview DAC1). While
acknowledging that by their nature these processes were difficult to measure or even set goals
for, she felt that the shift to more technological, managerial systems, quantifiable outcomes
and short timelines for projects could compromise the values which INGOs saw as being at
the core of their contribution and uniqueness:
(Now) we’re in this mode of this ‘management by objective’ but … I think the NGOs
have got to be very careful. (Interview DAC1)
While the original concept of the DAC had raised issues of accountability and lack of
direction, the changes to a more managerial, technocratic organisation brought with them the
risks of inflexibility and conformity to externally imposed priorities and procedures.
USAID had seen the DAC as compatible with its support for small government and the
growth of civil society. However, USAID’s goals, strategies and values of measurable, rapid
outcomes and strong managerial and planning systems created tensions with the DAC’s
original philosophy. Eventually these tensions were resolved through changes which moved
the DAC from its original INGO roots to a greater conformity with the values and style of its
main donor.
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Conclusion
The chapter has followed the history of the DAC from its establishment in 1997—as a
response to issues in service provision in the disability sector which had their roots in part in
the interactions of donors, INGOs and ministry—to the point where its relationship with its
first donor, USAID-Cambodia, finished. The institution was largely inspired by a small group
of INGO personnel and reflected INGO values of open-endedness, participant involvement
and creativity. These men and women saw its role as a forum for everyone in the disability
sector, bringing people together to exchange information, build capacity, coordinate activities
informally and build relationships. In order to involve all actors, including the ministry, it
was established as a ‘semi-autonomous’ body, not an INGO, bringing it loosely under the
auspices of the ministry but not under its direct administration. As a body with expatriates on
its board, however, it could only have a limited legal space in which to operate and had to
rely on ministerial endorsement for legitimacy.
The DAC had set out to be a focus for involvement of ministry, INGOs and donors in the
disability sector. However, over the period covered by this chapter, the DAC moved from the
open-ended, relationship-oriented nature envisioned by its founders to a more technocratic,
managerial organisation compatible with donor requirements, focused on quantifiable
outcomes, deadlines and implementing policy around donor priorities of human rights and
equal opportunity for persons with disability. Further, its political legitimacy had been
weakened by changes to the legislation it rested on, and its responsibility for victims’ funding
taken by a political organisation. These changes were in part the result of the differing goals
and expectations of the DAC by donors, INGOs and the ministry. Despite its origins in INGO
personnel and its INGO values, issues around INGO independence, competition and mutual
suspicion undermined ownership of the DAC by the wider INGO community. Indeed, the
fact that the DAC had been initiated by a group of INGOs raised suspicions among others
about this group’s agenda. The wider INGO community failed to agree about the role of the
DAC or even if it had one, and personal suspicions and ill feeling developed. These
undermined the ability of the DAC to speak with authority for the whole community with
donors or the ministry or to encourage INGOs to cooperate and coordinate. It also made the
DAC more vulnerable to pressure from donors and the ministry.
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The DAC’s original role involved a close relationship with the ministry, acting as an
‘adviser’ for the government and loosely connected to it through legislation. The ministry,
while jealous of its authority, saw potential advantages in the DAC, including increasing its
ability to meet donor requirements to work for human rights and raising their profile in the
competitive political environment. The DAC attracted international attention in disability
circles, raising the ministry’s credibility and profile. More importantly, it offered the
possibility of access to funding, and it was in this area that conflict became open and the
ministry exercised its prerogative as the locus of legitimate political authority to reshape the
DAC to fit its own goals better.
The DAC’s main funder, USAID-Cambodia, also brought pressure to bear on the
organisation to achieve its own goals and expectations. It had seen the DAC as a way of
advancing its civil society agenda and its policy of encouraging INGOs rather than
government to provide services. Tensions arose over the DAC’s open-ended approach,
differences over managerial and organisational philosophies and practice, and
incompatibilities in reporting and project cycles, with USAID-Cambodia requiring a more
qualitative approach with clear objectives, measurable outcomes and shorter time-frames.
Over the period of the study, USAID-Cambodia was able to use its position as a donor to
bring about such changes in the DAC making it more compatible with its own values.
Thus the thought and planning which had gone into the DAC to draw the main actors in
the disability sector together in an open-ended way to find solutions to the issues facing the
sector, the organisation found itself shaped by the interactions of donor, ministry and INGO
goals and expectation with its own. Its history provide us with insights into how these
interactions can shape the development process and divert the development process to
achieve goals and assume activities which may be far from the intentions of those
undertaking them. It highlights, too, the need for those committed to the well-being of the
most vulnerable in a society to understand the dynamics behind these interactions if they are
to achieve development outcomes which will benefit their constituency. The next chapter
explores these dynamics and their implications for policy and practice in Cambodia in more
depth.
CHAPTER 7 – POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE
CAMBODIAN DISABILITY SECTOR 1990-2006
Introduction
The previous chapters have explored the history of the interaction of states, donors and
INGOs in the disability sector of Cambodia, using the history of the DAC to give focus and
detail. The study finds that significant disparities emerged between the goals of donors and
INGOs and the outcomes of their policies, while the Ministry was surprisingly successful in
achieving its key objectives. Drawing on the material in the preceding chapters, this chapter
explores these gaps and how the interaction of the three actors within the domestic
environment of Cambodia contributed to them. It concludes that the failure of two of these
actors, namely the donors and INGOs, to recognise the political dimension of development in
Cambodia put them at a disadvantage compared to the more politically aware Ministry. This
generated gaps between their policy goals and outcomes. It was their disposition that made it
difficult for them to detect and deal with the complexity of issues and circumstances that they
confronted, rather than any obstacles put before them by the Cambodian state or their
competition with each other.
The review of the literature in Chapter 3 identified three main issues. The first was the
influence of neoliberal theory in development, even after the importance of the state had re-
emerged. The second was the role of the Tripartite Model in shaping interactions between
states, donors and INGOs. The third point was that the dominance of the Tripartite Model
resulted in an apolitical approach that neglected a wide range of non-political factors. This
consequently gave rise to poor decision-making. In this chapter I assess how chapter 3 relates
to the empirical findings of chapters, 4, 5 and 6 and how these relate to these three main
observations.
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1. The Influence of Neoliberal Theory in the Cambodian
Disability Sector
The development policy environment of the Cambodian disability sector was strongly
influenced by neoliberal theory through the policy of large donors, particularly the IFIs, as
seen in chapter 4. Success was assessed by external agencies using the criterion of how well
policy contributed to the goals of creating conditions where states, donors and INGOs could
best fulfil their ideal roles in achieving economic growth through a market-based economy
and vibrant private sector (World Bank, 1994; Horvath, 2001, 1998; Forsythe, 2006). The
emphasis on economic and technocratic reform meant that after an initial focus on
humanitarian objectives, health, education and social services were relegated to a lower-
priority position than market-friendly reform (Interview DNR1; World Bank 1994, 1992;
USAID-Cambodia, 2005, 1994; see Table 6.1 below).
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Table 6.1: Summary of Planned Public Investment Program, 1994-96 (millions of
US dollars)
Activities
identified
by donors
Year 1994 Year 1995 Year 1996
To
tal
1994
-19
96
Exte
rna
l IN
GO
To
tal
Off
icia
l a
id
Bu
dg
et t
ota
l
Exte
rna
l IN
GO
To
tal
Off
icia
l a
id
Bu
dg
et t
ota
l
Exte
rna
l IN
GO
To
tal
Off
icia
l a
id
Bu
dg
et t
ota
l
Rural
Development
22.9 20.0 42.9 1.6 44.5 7.0 6.0 13.4 0.8 14.2 6.4 6.0 12.4 0.6 13.0 71.7
Transport 60.3 0.0 60.3 1.0 61.3 61.3 0.0 61.3 1.5 62.8 19.2 0.0 19.2 0.8 20.0 144.1
Energy 17.2 0.0 17.2 0.7 17.9 27.8 0.0 27.8 1.3 29.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.5 2.5 49.5
Water Supply 8.1 0.0 8.1 0.8 8.9 12.7 0.0 12.7 0.7 13.4 9.0 0.0 9.0 0.7 9.7 32.0
Health 32.2 4.2 56.2 0.0 56.2 24.2 8.4 32.6 0.5 25.9 7.5 2.4 9.9 0.0 9.9 98.7
Education 18.0 12.9 30.9 0.2 31.1 12.9 12.5 25.4 0.5 25.9 10.4 12.4 22.8 0.4 23.2 80.2
Total 158.5 7.1 215.6 4.3 219.9 145.9 27.3 173.2 4.8 178.0 52.5. 20.8 73.3 5.0. 78.3 476.2
Note: Budget represents estimates of costs incurred by government.
+It should be emphasised that the size, composition and trends of donor activity reflected in this table should be viewed as
patterns resulting from project identification up to 1st December 1993, often in the context of a rapidly changing country
situation.
Source: World Bank, 1994.
It was thought that increasing prosperity would allow people to provide for themselves
while philanthropy would provide for those whom the market had failed. As illustrated in
Figure 7.1, INGOs were seen as the natural agents to take responsibility for those who fell
through the cracks, as they combined the benefits of being philanthropic with the efficiency
of being voluntary, private sector operators (World Bank, 1994, 1992; USAID, 2005;
MSALVA, 1996: Interview DNR 1; Interview DAC1).
Ministry involvement and influence were to be limited to the minimum needed for the
administration to avoid the inefficiencies, corruption and rent-seeking associated with
government. Donor policies about the Ministry focused on reducing the size of MOSALVY
and its direct role in service provision (World Bank, 1994, 1992; MSALVA, 1996). Freed
from the burden of excessive government bureaucracy and corruption, international donors
such as the World bank and USAID thought that INGOs would be able to provide services
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responding directly, economically and efficiently to the needs of ‘clients’ (World Bank, 1994,
1992; USAID, 2005).
Figure 6.1 Ideal State-Donor-INGO interactions in disability sector in Cambodia
under tripartite model
Ironically, despite donor and INGO pressure, as we saw in chapters 3, 4 and 5 and as
discussed later in this chapter, gaps between donor and INGO policy and outcomes appeared.
Donor pressure was unable to prevent the size of bureaucracies, including that of
MOSALVY, from growing (Interview INGO2; InterviewDAC1). Chapters 3, 4 and 5
demonstrate that the disability service system which developed was poorly coordinated, left
large gaps in the types of services and geographical areas covered and lacked sustainability.
These problems had developed as a result of the insensitivity of the Tripartite Model to many
of the political, cultural and social goals, motivations and strategies that defined the sector.
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2 The Tripartite Model and Interactions between States, Donors
and INGOs
2.1 The Tripartite Model and the Role of MOSALVY
The second major point that emerged from the literature review in Chapter 3 was the
powerful influence of the Tripartite Model on thinking and planning for development
assistance. This affected the capacities of MOSALVY in numerous ways. The already under-
resourced Ministry was weakened in the political arena by the donor policy of directing funds
to the economic and financial ministries, which reduced the political importance of welfare
ministries such as the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Women’s Affairs (Interview
INGO4; Interview INGO2; Hughes et al., 2003). Although MOSALYV was controlled by the
dominant CPP (see Chapters 4 and 5), it lacked influence in the party because of its restricted
access to resources. As shown in Chapters 4 and 5, the disability area was particularly
vulnerable because of the lack of a tradition of social responsibility for people with disability
and because neo-liberal donors saw it as an area best managed by philanthropy. Chapters 4
and 5 demonstrated how this increased pressure on MOSALVY to seek alternative funding
and influence through access to international funds compelled MOSLAVY to maintain
patronage networks within the bureaucracy and party hierarchy (Curtis, 1998; INGO2;
INGO3; INGO5). This led to increased corruption, despite MOSALVY’s assurances to the
World Bank and other donors of its commitment to reducing corruption and the number of its
civil service employees (Chapter 4 and 5; Interview INGO1; Interview INGO5; Interview
INGO2).
The donors also failed to appreciate that MOSALVY was far from being a passive actor
but rather, had its own goals and, despite its apparent weaknesses, its own means of achieving
them (Hendrickson, 2001b; Interview DAC2; Interview INGO5). Its primary aim, as seen in
chapters 3, 4 and 5, was to maintain its influence in the area of party politics and keep donors
‘off our backs’ (INGO2). Its apparently enthusiastic acceptance of the DAC and its
willingness to use INGOs needs to be understood in terms of these goals (MSALVA, 1996).
INGOs and the DAC were potential sources of resources and prestige (DAC1; INGO5;
INGO1). However, the assumptions of the Tripartite Model did not allow for the underlying
resentment in MOSALVY of donor control and the behaviour of INGOs.
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2.2 The Tripartite Model and the Role of Donors
The donor sector in Cambodia, while not homogenous, appeared to have been well
placed to achieve its goals, given their control over funding and the continuing dependence of
the RGC on external aid. As late as 1998, aid to Cambodia still stood at 1.34 times greater
than all other government revenue and 2.26 times tax revenue, making the country one of the
most aid-dependent in the world (Godfrey et al., 2002). Ministries and officials felt that they
‘could not say “no” to donors’ (Interview INGO2, Interview DAC1). The World Bank and
IMF had strong international support from their member nations and enjoyed considerable
freedom in deciding and implementing their policies. In addition, they had the apparent
acquiescence of the Cambodian government (Ear, 2013, 1997; Godfrey et al., 2002).
Despite the advantages of financial clout, however, donor activity in the disability sector
failed to achieve its goals on a number of levels. Chapter 5 demonstrated how the service
delivery system which emerged was uncoordinated, often driven by funding incentives and
the priorities of donors and INGOs rather than the actual causes or distribution of disability in
Cambodia (JICA, 2001; Mackinlay, 2004; Interview DAC1; Interview DAC2; Interview
INGO1). Donor policies also resulted in the weakening of MOSALVY and a consequent
decrease in its efficiency and commitment and an increase in its focus on accessing resources
to maintain its influence in party politics, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 (INGO1; DAC2;
DAC1 INGO5). The impact of neoliberal policy on INGOs was equally perverse, as seen in
chapters 4 and 5. While such policies increased the number and resources of INGOs in the
disability sector, they also undermined many of the values which neoliberal policies believed
would make them into effective service providers. Furthermore, as the events recounted in
chapters 4 and 5 show, neoliberal policy overlooked the wider political dimension. Using
highly independent and individual agencies, in the belief that these would provide a
coordinated service beyond the reach of state intervention, proved unsuccessful. Further
conclusions about the INGOs are addressed in the next section.
2.3 The Tripartite Model and the Role of INGOs
Many INGO goals and values seemed congruent with those of the Tripartite Model and
neoliberal theory. In chapters 4 and 5 it was seen that INGOs saw themselves as the main
suppliers of disability services in Cambodia (Interview DAC1; Interview INGO2; Interview
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INGO3). Often the INGOs appeared to assume the moral high ground. INGOs tended to base
their legitimacy on their independence from external influences, their ‘downward’
accountability and their ‘special’ relationship with beneficiaries, which, they believed,
ensured that they were best placed to respond to the needs of persons with disabilities
(Chapter 5 and 6; Hulme et al.1997; Lewis, 2009; Vedder et al., 2007; Nelson, 2006;
Interview DAC1; Interview INGO2).
However, the need for funding also drove INGO behaviour and put pressure on their
traditional values. While most INGOs received a significant amount of support from the
public in their home countries, during the 1990s they became increasingly dependent on
funding from large multilateral and bilateral donors (Interview INGO3; Interview INGO 1;
Curtis 1998). This trend increasingly faced INGOs with difficult choices when seeking
resources. For most INGOs it was difficult to refuse resources but it was recognised by many
that these had an impact on their methods of operating. In chapter 3 INGO interviewees
expressed concern at the increasing managerialism of INGOs as a result of donor funding
(INGO2; INGO3), yet the alternative was to forgo much-needed resources. Many INGOs
were ill equipped to navigate these problematic waters (Chapter 5 and 6).
Ironically, these values also accounted for some of the problems, particularly the issues
around coordination and cooperation, which weakened the efficiency of the disability sector.
The Tripartite Model had failed to predict or take account of the fact that independent,
competitive agencies such as the many INGOs that were operating in Cambodia, could
behave in political ways, even when they thought that they were neutral.
By undervaluing the importance of working with the Cambodian state, neoliberal policy
undermined the incentives and opportunities that might have existed to develop relationships
with the state, an engagement that could have increased the capacity of MOSALVY. Such an
engagement might have helped build a more sustainable system of service delivery which
could have continued if and when INGOs left Cambodia. Instead, using INGOs for service
provision has been known to weaken the legitimacy of fragile states and that is what
happened in the Cambodian case (Fritz et al, 2007; Whaites, 2000; Larbi, 1999). Case studies
from Africa and Bangladesh suggest that the use of INGOs and the drawing on technical
assistance to replace government agency has demoralised and diminished the capacities of
government services, reduced the state’s political legitimacy, lowered citizen’s expectations
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of their governments, and also reduced the state’s accountability to the public (Wood, 1997;
Mkandawire, 2002; Matenga, 2001).
As discussed in chapter 5 and appendix 3, those staff who had worked for a long time in
particular INGOs confirmed the accuracy of the above observations (interview INGO1;
interview INGO2). They suggested that before the arrival of UNTAC, MOSALVY, although
under-equipped had been accountable to the central government which because of its socialist
base felt that its legitimacy was linked to service provision (Interview INGO1). With the
arrival of UNTAC and the subsequent elections and influx of aid, this interviewee believed
that service provision had become secondary to a new and wider power struggle between the
Ministry and central government (INGO1). At one level, INGO provision enabled the
Cambodian government to step back from some of its responsibilities. On the other hand, this
also undermined its legitimacy as the provider of services and reduced the Ministry’s chances
of accessing central government resources and building capacity (InterviewINGO1; Interview
DAC1; Interview INGO2; Interview INGO3).
2.4 The Tripartite Model and the Impact on Service Delivery
In chapters 4 and 5 we saw that neoliberal theory in the Cambodian context anticipated
that state, donors and INGOs would work together to implement a system of disability
services delivered by agents who would be relatively free of the inefficiencies and corruption
associated with government interference (Interview DAC1; Interview DNR1). These chapters
also discussed the shared belief of donors and INGOs that the values-based nature of INGOs
and their putative grass-roots links with persons with disabilities would enable a more
responsive and effective system attuned to the needs of the beneficiary group (World Bank,
1994, 1999; MSALVA, 1996; DAC, 3002; JICA, 2002a; JICA-DAC, 2001). The neo-liberal
based system would also encourage the growth of civil society and the capacity of the
bureaucracy through training and using local employees and volunteers. MOSALVY
officially endorsed donor policy and acknowledged the essential role of INGOs in disability
service provision. However, its own interests and preoccupations were ultimately more
concerned with the continued survival of the Ministry and powerful individuals in it within
the wider political struggle in Cambodia. This was something that neither the donors nor
INGOs had predicted or understood.
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As a result, the outcomes for disability service provision were disappointing. It was
argued in in chapter 3 that a view of development which depoliticises development has the
effect of limiting the desired results of development strategies. The evidence in chapters 4
and 5 supports this understanding of the situation in the Cambodian disability sector, with
donor policy miscalculating and underestimating the goals and political skills of the Ministry
and the political impact (despite their denial of it) of the INGOs. Chapters 4 and 5
demonstrated that MOSALVY, on the other hand, was very aware that the disability sector,
like most settings in Cambodia, was a site of political contestation between those who had
resources and those who wanted them (Interview DAC2 Interview INGO 5; Interview DAC1;
Interview INGO1 This gave the Ministry, despite their financial constraints, a considerable
advantage in their struggle with INGOs, as the frustration of INGO actors mentioned in these
chapters demonstrates. Examples of the determination of the Ministry to protect its position
included the continued employment of incompetent officials, time-wasting concerns with
bureaucratic procedures and nepotism (INGO2; INGO4; DAC1; DAC2).
Chapters 4 and 5 explain how the Ministry was able to access funding, avoid meeting
donor and INGO requests and manage the number of INGOs operating in the country, to
meet its own needs for resources. The behaviour of INGOs militated against cooperation and
coordination with each other or with the Ministry in the delivery of services to the intended
beneficiaries (Horvath, 1998; Interview INGO1; Interview DAC1). At the same time, as was
seen by the example of the DAC and in chapter 5, INGOs’ desire to expand their activities
drew them to seek funding from donors, and this, in turn, limited their independence and
flexibility.
2.5 The DAC: A Response to Neoliberal Weaknesses
Chapter 6 analysed the establishment of DAC as a response to the issues around state,
donor and INGO interactions and their negative impact on the disability sector (Interview
DAC1; Interview INGO2; Interview INGO3). However, despite a great deal of thought being
put into its structure and aims, it was beset by the same issues to which it was itself a
response. These issues had their origin in the impact of the Tripartite Model on disability
services in Cambodia. That model remained firmly in place, and was never questioned by
donors or INGOs.
207
DAC’s INGO founders saw the DAC as a way to incorporate their values of organic and
consultative development into the domestic Cambodian disability sector (Interview DAC1;
Interview INGO2; Interview INGO3). Donors welcomed it as a civil society response to these
problems and an alternative to government regulation and control (DNR1). However, INGOs
proved reluctant to accept it as a coordinating body and saw it as a new competitor for
funding. The resulting clashes between organisations and personalities undermined
cooperation (Horvath et al, 2001; Horvath, 1998; Interview DAC1; Interview INGO1). Donor
funding requirements also resulted in the DAC moving away from its original open-ended
approach to a more technocratic and managerial style (Interview DAC1; Interview INGO2).
The Ministry officially welcomed it in the beginning as potentially providing possibilities for
funding, prestige and increased influence within the political parties but remained suspicious
and resentful of the new organisation (Interview DAC2; Interview DAC2’Interivew INGO2).
As discussed in chapter 6, relations between the two remained tense over the issue of the
control of aid funding and MOSALVY used its legal and political powers to push its own
interests (Interview DAC2; Interview INGO2).
4. Development as a Political Process in the Cambodian Disability
Sector
The third point that emerged from the literature review in Chapter 3 allowed me to
appreciate the dire impact that resulted from donors and INGOs ignoring the politics of
development in Cambodia. Many of the donors and INGOs tended to see politics as an
autonomous activity limited to political elites and separate from them and from the
development process, a position discussed in Chapter 3 (Hickey, 2008a; Hout, 2012; Ear,
2013; Lilja, 2010) They were consequently reluctant to engage in such activities (Interview
DAC1; Interview INGO5; Interview DNR1). As the critique of neo-liberalism discussed in
chapter 3 shows, development is essentially a political process, with politics understood as
‘all the activities of conflict, negotiation and decision about the use, production and
distribution of resources’ (Leftwich, 2006:3) This takes in a wider area of interaction than the
narrow view of ‘politics’ which limits it to political elites and parties. Thus it includes the
activities of all actors who had a stake in developing the disability support system in
Cambodia, namely the donors, INGOs, bureaucrats, elites and politicians.
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In Cambodian society in the 1990s, as discussed in chapter 3, these activities took place
in an environment where power was personalised and maintained through patronage systems
linked to individuals – a system that permeated almost all of Cambodian society (Hughes et
al., 2012; Un, 2011, 2007; INGO5; INGO2). In this climate, the focus of donors and INGOs
on economics, managerialism and technocratic approaches seriously undermined their ability
to develop and implement their policies (Hughes et al., 2012; Ear, 2013, 2007). This had a
profound impact on the outcomes of donor and INGO policies.
Donors and INGOs needed to be aware of how the struggle for resources and influence
played out at all levels of society in Cambodia’s highly personalised and patrimonial system
(Hughes, et al., 2003; Curtis, 1998; Hughes et al., 2012). Lacking such awareness resulted in
many counterproductive policies (Frewer, 2013; Ear, 2013, 2007). Chapters 3 and 4
demonstrate how donor policies increased Ministry resistance, exacerbated the pressures on
MOSALVY to prioritise resource-seeking, undermined capacity building in the Ministry and
reduced the ability of donors to form linkages and synergies through relationships with the
Ministry (Curtis, 1998; Interview DAC2; Interview INGO5). At the same time, donors and
INGOs underestimated the ability of Ministry heads and staff to circumvent strategies that the
donors had insisted on – for example, conditionality and donor control of funding allocations
(Ear, 2013; Un, 2007, 2005; Hendrickson, 2001).
Donors ascribed what they saw to supposedly irrational Cambodian behaviour all the
while failing to see that the state and politicians were locked into informal and patronage-
based politics that could have supported pro-poor policy and reform (Hickey, 2012: Hughes
et al., 2012; Hughes et al., 2003). A number of commentators have argued that synergies are
possible between patronage-based politics and pro-poor policies even if such networks are
opportunistic and driven by individuals promoting their own personal interests (Hughes et al.,
2012; Hughes et al., 2003). MOSALVY, for example, supported the DAC because it gave it
an opportunity to satisfy the desire of its political superiors in the CPP to gain information on
INGO activities, as well as providing possible resources (Interview DAC2; Interview DAC2;
Interview INGO2). Such synergies, however, were more fortuitous than the result of donors
and INGOs deliberately seeking them out (Interview INGO1; Interview INGO5). There can
be no doubt that service delivery offered opportunities to members of political parties and the
Ministry to strengthen their image as powerful patrons; (Interview INGO5; Hughes, 2006,
2003). Unfortunately, donors and INGOs did not understand this and so lost an opportunity to
209
build up the prestige of MOSALVY via its patronage networks, something that would have
rendered their aid programs in the disability sector more effective.
As discussed in Chapter 4, Cambodia’s political culture could have been used more
skilfully by donors and INGOs, but many of these external agents lacked the skills for this.
Nor did they understand the Cambodian context sufficiently to identify where and how to
build alliances with Ministry officials, CPP or FUNCINPEC members in order to achieve
pro-poor outcomes (DAC1; INGO1 Hughes et al., 2012). Donors who saw themselves as
apolitical found it difficult to accept that effective development required them to be involved
in pre-existing political struggles and that the rules of engagement were largely determined
by local culture, tradition, politicians and bureaucrats (Hughes et al., 2012; Hughes, 2002;
Hickey, 2012; Unsworth, 2009). Succeeding in such a robust environment demanded a
sophisticated understanding of the incentives, personalities, alliances, language, traditions
and rules of the local political framework.
The failure of donors to understand the personalised and relational nature of Cambodia’s
political culture meant that practices which they saw as purely economic and technocratic
aroused suspicion and resentment in their relations with the Ministry (INGO5; DAC1).
MOSALVY deeply resented the imbalance in resources and training which resulted from
technical aid and were offended by what they felt was a lack of respect shown to them by
donors (Interview DAC1; Interview INGO1; Interview DAC2). In chapters 4 and 5, I cited an
ex-civil servant who described how Ministry officials were insulted by being bypassed by
expatriate experts (Interview DAC2). For Cambodians the insult arose not only from what
they perceived to be misguided development priorities but also from being treated as inferior
‘colonials’ who were not trusted by foreign donors and INGOs.
The lack of appreciation of MOSALVY’s position and its political imperatives led
donors and INGOs to underestimate the desperation of MOSALVY for funds and influence
and its resourcefulness in achieving its goals despite the obstacles (Gellman, 2010; Frewer,
2013). INGO4; Interview INGO3). The Ministry’s political nous gave it an advantage in
frustrating donor attempts to enforce compliance in the limited manner that the donors had
defined with reference to the Tripartite Model (INGO2; INGO5).
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Conclusion
My main conclusion from the evidence is that the Tripartite Model had a very damaging
impact on donor policies and attitudes towards giving aid to Cambodia. This model, driven
by neo-liberalism, as discussed in chapter 3, blinded donors to the local political pressures,
cultures and expectations that constrained the functioning of MOSALVY at all levels. To a
large degree, the inappropriate assumptions of the donors meant that their goals could not be
realised.
Similarly, the assumption of the Tripartite Model that the nature of INGOs made them
eminently suitable to provide services under the management of the Ministry, overlooked the
cultural, political and financial character of the INGOs, all of which worked against their
suitability in Cambodian conditions (Chapter 3).
The failure of donors and INGOs to appreciate the political context of economic
development in Cambodia led to a situation in which these external agencies found
themselves undermining rather than supporting the legitimacy of the Cambodian state. The
Tripartite Model failed in its goal of establishing a robust, sustainable system to serve people
with disability in Cambodia. Failure may be ascribed in large part to its focus on economic
factors to the neglect of political, social and cultural factors that might have been used to
build up the long-term capacities of the central government and MOSALVY.
In this thesis, the story of the DAC has been used as a microcosm of the conflicting
goals, strategies and motivations at work in the wider disability sector. By closely analysing a
new institution specifically created to solve the problems involved in delivering development
assistance to the disabled people in Cambodia, I was able to better appreciate how neo-liberal
values and the Tripartite Model survived into the ‘new environment’ and turned that reform
process into a new battleground between the Central Government, MOSALVY, the donors
and INGOs.
CHAPTER 8 – CONCLUSION
Introduction
In this concluding chapter I return to the research questions asked at the start of this
thesis and in response to these draw together the conclusions that arise from the empirical
chapters.
For nearly seventy years states, donors and INGO shave laboured to improve human
economic and social wellbeing in developing countries through the aid system which
emerged after World War II. The interactions between the three key agents have not been
extensively studied, leaving a gap in the understanding of the ‘development project’, one of
the most significant global undertakings of the late twentieth century. This study has sought
to deepen our understanding of these interactions and their impact on development outcomes.
Much of the literature on the topic reflects mainstream theory, which views development
as an economic, technocratic and technical process with principles that can be applied
universally. Such perspectives perceive such ‘apolitical’ and ‘acultural’ processes to be
neutral. This view seeks to find and implement the ‘correct’ policies which will achieve
economic growth and consequent prosperity as the key to raising human wellbeing in
developing countries. However, there have been increasing calls in the literature for political
analysis in development theory, including an appreciation of politics in the interactions
between states, donors and INGOs if effective development is to be achieved. Protagonists of
this view argue that development is at heart a political process and calls for skills and
knowledge which can enable actors to negotiate its murky and often dangerous waters.
Failure to understand and come to terms with this dimension of development may well lead
to the shipwreck of the whole enterprise of promoting growth and pro-poor policies.
The research in this thesis was sited in the context of these tensions. It has explored the
interactions between the state, donors and INGOs in the disability sector in Cambodia
between 1991 and 2006, the factors shaping these interactions and their impact on service
provision in the sector by answering the following questions:
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What can a case study of the disability sector in Cambodia tell us about interactions
between states, donors and INGOs?
What were the goals, capabilities, motivation and strategies of the state, donors and
INGOs in the development of Cambodia’s disability sector?
How did these factors shape the interaction between the state, donors and INGOs?
What was the effect of the interaction between the state, donors and INGOs on
development in the Cambodian disability sector?
Analysis of the findings to these questions demonstrated clearly that in the context and
period studied, donors and INGOs were hampered by their weak understanding of the
political dimension of their activities and their reluctance and lack of skills to engage with the
state. The state however, was politically astute and able to exploit the weaknesses of donors
and INGOs to promote its own goals at the expense of the external agencies. For the intended
beneficiaries of development in the sector (people with disabilities, their families and
communities) the outcomes were often felt as poorly organised and inappropriate service
provision and in many cases the lack of any service provision at all.
The implications of these findings for development research, policy and practice
challenge much of conventional development theory and practice. They support the view that
development is a political process, concerned with improving the access of poor people to
power and resources. Accepting the comprehensive definition of politics by Leftwich (see
discussion in Chapter 7), means acknowledging that development is embedded at all levels of
a society’s political culture and environment, from the everyday players to elite powerbrokers
(Leftwich, 2006:3). Further, it ties development to the local situation, rather than seeing it as
a process subject to universally applicable principles. This is a deeply radical view of
development which presents practitioners with challenges to the existing theoretical
underpinnings of their policies and practices.
If the implications of the research are accepted, they strengthen the need for states,
donors and INGOs to build their political analysis and skills and be prepared to acknowledge
and understand their own behaviour as political agents. My research has indicated the
directions in which greater research is needed if these three actors are to engage more
effectively with each other and other local stakeholders. Better understandings are needed for
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how to build strategies to overcome donor and INGO reluctance to become involved in the
political sphere, how to strengthen the political skills of the actors (including negotiation and
compromise) and how to construct better theories about the nature and role of the state in
development. These all offer exciting new possibilities for research into such ‘wicked’
problems as the patrimonial state and working in ‘weak’ states. Most importantly, they hold
the promise of more fruitful (albeit some more dangerous) interactions between states, donors
and INGOs, as well as the hope that through such interactions the poorest and most
vulnerable people may be better served by the aid system. A recent study of the political
culture and patronage systems of Cambodia was completed by Scopis in the form of a
doctoral thesis called ‘Cambodia’s String Economy’ (Scopis, 2011). However, owing to the
highly sensitive nature of the topic this thesis is still not accessible to doctoral students and so
I could not benefit by reading it. However, the very fact that the author insisted on limited
access to the thesis demonstrates the long distance that must still be travelled if we are to
openly recognise the need to study and understand the political culture of modern Cambodia.
That understanding and the call for open research must come in the first instance from both
the Cambodian state and the external agencies discussed in this thesis.
Empirical Findings
The main empirical findings of the research are summarised within the respective
empirical chapters, Chapter 5, ‘The Disability Sector in Cambodia 1990-2004’ and Chapter 6
‘The Role of INGOs, State and Donors in the Development of the Disability Action Council’.
This section synthesizes these findings to answer the four main research questions.
Question 1: what does a case study of the disability sector in Cambodia tell us about
interactions between states, donors and INGOs?
The relations between states, donors and INGOs in the disability sector drew attention to
important questions about country ownership and the legitimacy of the state in development.
The nature of neoliberal policy at that time gave the state a very limited role and used INGOs
extensively for the provision of services. Subsequent commentary has argued convincingly
that a strong state whose legitimacy is accepted by its citizens is a key ingredient for effective
development (WDR, 1997; Baird 2010; Harriss, 2014; Keeley, 2014). The Paris Declaration
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articulated the need for country ownership in development with each country being
responsible for its own destiny (de Haan, 2009; Bigsten et al., 2014; Nunnenkamp et al.,
2013).
The experience of the Cambodian disability programmes demonstrated the dangers of a
development process that by-passed the state. Others have argued that developing states like
Cambodia are hybrid states, caught between complex levels of legitimacy (OECD, 2010;
Leftwich, 2009; Hughes et al, 2003). This was true in Cambodia, where it was answerable to
the international community through powerful donors whose approach to poverty alleviation
was largely based on liberal democratic values. To a considerable extent, the Cambodian
state had to accept these in order to be recognised and treated as a legitimate state
internationally. At the same time, the traditional political culture, as we saw in chapter 3, was
still very powerful and required the state to meet old and familiar obligations of patronage
and clientelism (Lilja, 2010).
The Western view of the state saw it as deriving legitimacy from, among other things, its
ability to supply the needs of its citizens. I argue that the policy of using INGOs, and the by-
passing of the state that this entailed, contributed to the lack of ownership by the state in
programmes that provided for the needs of people with disability (Cammet et al., 2011;
Nunberg et al., 2012). Further, it pushed the state to use alternative, traditional sources of
legitimacy, with the results described in chapter 5 and 6.
These outcomes can be attributed in part to the lack of insight into the motivations and
strategies of the newly emerging, post-colonial state by many of the donors and INGOs. The
‘political naivety’ that international actors have exhibited about the nature of the choices
facing recipient governments has been commented on in the literature (Booth, 2012; Roberts,
2009; Winter, 2012). The story of the DAC and the Cambodian Disability sector, as
discussed in the empirical chapters of this thesis, support these criticisms of the neo-liberal
model.
Question 2: What were the goals, capabilities, motivation and strategies of the state,
donors and INGOs in the development of the Cambodian disability sector?
The main donors, particularly the IFIs, based their policy decisions on economic theory
which promoted the establishment of a free market economy governed by a liberal
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democracy as the way to maximise human wellbeing in a community. With control over the
largest stream of funding going into Cambodia, and powerful instruments such as
conditionality and technical advice to implement their programmes, donors felt confident of
achieving these goals. Ministries which were seen as relevant to this goal, such as those
responsible for finance, infrastructure and primary and secondary production, received the
lion’s share of resources (see Chapters 3 and 4 and Appendix 4). Disability, which was seen
as a social and welfare issue, was not a high priority, as it was assumed that increasing
prosperity would ultimately bring solutions. It was, however, seen as a problem that merited
the provision of some services. Donors saw the private sector as the most efficient means of
providing these and turned to INGOs as the right kind of private, voluntary agents to take up
the role. The Government, which was viewed with suspicion by donors as incompetent,
bureaucratic and inefficient, was limited to the role of manager, and the bulk of funding was
directed to INGOs. In by-passing the Cambodian state, the donors weakened rather than
promoted the development of a stronger state capable of handling questions of long term
assistance to the disabled and poor.
INGOs, by contrast, saw their first goal and priority to be meeting humanitarian needs,
improving human well-being and representing the interests of the poorest and most
vulnerable groups in the community. They were confident that, in a country with what
seemed to them as lacking any infrastructure for service provision, they were indispensable
and would continue to be so for a long time. However, their focus on the task was
complicated by the need to acquire resources, their own diverse ideologies and values and
their responsibility to other stakeholders such as donors, supporters and home governments.
The search for funding increasingly centred on donors, with most INGOs welcoming donor
input into their programmes as an opportunity to build their already considerable capacity to
meet the needs of their target groups. While this did indeed follow, many within and without
the INGO community felt that it was at the cost of many of the characteristics which made
them distinctive and enabled them to reach the poor effectively. The evidence shows that the
independence of INGOs and their pride in their unique natures led to their reluctance to
coordinate, cooperate, share resources and knowledge or relate to the state which, despite its
weaknesses, was the notional manager.
The Royal Government of Cambodia at first sight appeared to be deeply disadvantaged
in comparison with donors and INGOs. It seemed the weaker partner because it had few
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resources, was deeply divided and at the centre of a bitter and unforgiving struggle for total
power by the two main factions. However, the unrelenting nature of the struggle for power by
the political elites who made up the state gave them a strong motivation and clear goals and
alternatives- victory and survival, or defeat and loss of all power. Along with this strong
motivation went a keen understanding of Cambodian patronage politics and how it could be
played. State actors had a canny grasp of the weapons that were to hand. The latter included
their control of the bureaucracy, military and grassroots politics, their control of patronage
networks and the state’s place as the ultimate lawmaker in Cambodia. With these weapons,
the political factions (see chapter 3 for a discussion of these) worked towards their goals of
survival by cementing their power bases. This included enlarging patronage networks by
increasing the size of bureaucracies, diverting aid funding to service these networks and
maintaining as much prestige and control as they could. Their armoury also included a very
astute understanding of what drove INGOs and donors and how this could be used by elites to
achieve their own goals.
Question 3: How did these factors shape the interactions between the state, donors and
INGOs in the Cambodian disability sector from 1991 to 2006?
At first sight, the most important factor shaping interactions between state, donors and
INGOs was the apparent power imbalance in favour of donors and to a lesser extent INGOs.
Donors enjoyed control of aid funding on which the Government was dependent and INGOs
increasingly relied. INGOs were well resourced, often influential in their home countries,
experienced in development and aid work, highly motivated and confident. The state
appeared to outsiders to be demoralised, impoverished and with little choice other than to
accept donor and INGO input on the latter's terms.
However, interactions between the protagonists were more complex than this would
suggest. Donors’ influence was most successfully exercised in their relations with INGOs.
Both donors and INGOs saw the relationship as synergistic. However, INGOs’ need for
resources and their commitment to what they saw as a moral imperative to respond to human
suffering led to significant changes in their behaviour. Most adopted managerial structures
based on donor requirements, and moved to shorter and fixed-term project cycles. Many felt
that there was also a move away from traditional INGO values towards those of donors,
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seeing development as based on economic and ‘top-down’ reform rather than the
involvement of people from a grass-roots perspective.
The state, as represented by MOSALVY, proved more resilient in achieving its goals and
defending itself from donor control, largely because of its clear-eyed understanding of the
political realities of the situation and its ability to exploit them. The Ministry was led by
people who were well aware of the urgent need to acquire resources and were able to frustrate
donor pressure and influence with a range of strategies. These included displays of
enthusiastic acceptance of donor policy followed by ‘stalling’, delaying tactics, diversion of
funds, playing off donors against each other and the use of its legislative powers to protect its
interests and access resources. Donors and INGOs, while frustrated by the Ministry, often
found themselves powerless to bring about change. The Ministry’s refusal to control or
rationalise the number of disability INGOs entering the country was only one example of the
negative impact of such short term opportunism.
Interactions between the state, donors and INGOs were thus strongly influenced by the
ability of the Ministry to exploit and capitalise on the difficulty donors faced in enforcing
their programmes and the weaknesses of INGOs. These included the reluctance of INGOs to
coordinate and cooperate with each other, their reluctance to engage with the state and their
ultimate reliance as non-citizens on the state’s acceptance of their presence. In turn, the
Ministry’s success came from its awareness and recognition of the political dimension of
these interactions and its skill in navigating it. The focus of donors on economic and
technocratic solutions and INGO confidence in their own altruism and knowledge prevented
them detecting and responding to the political aspects of their interactions. This made them
vulnerable to manipulation and exploitation.
Question 4: What was the effect of the interactions between the state, donors and
INGOs on development in the Cambodian disability sector?
Despite clear policy goals on the part of donors to provide an effective, efficient system
of service delivery for people with disability through the use of private agents such as INGOs
while limiting the Ministry to the role of manager, interactions between the three sets of
actors resulted in an uncoordinated, inefficient and unsustainable system. INGOs proved
reluctant to coordinate and cooperate, principally choosing their activities on the basis of their
own priorities rather than the actual disability environment of Cambodia. They were reluctant
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to work with the ministry or accept a central coordinating body. INGOs increasing
conformity to donor requirements and structures compromised some of the original qualities
of these ‘independent, neutral’ agents (such as their ‘bottom-up’ approach) and undermined
their legitimacy. Instead, service delivery became based on a project approach and three-year
donor funding cycles.
Most important of all, the ministry felt little ownership of disability service delivery,
partly because it felt bypassed by donor and INGO policies and partly by the increase in
political pressure on them to conform to the reforms that the donors were demanding. It
focused with comparative success on resisting donor pressure to reform and taking advantage
of the funding opportunities to support its own political ends. As one of the weakest
ministries in Cambodia, MOSALVY felt it had little choice but to do this in a fight for its
own survival. As a result, the disability service system was detached from local requirements
and authorities, dependent on external funding and providers, and was uncoordinated and
unequally distributed throughout the country.
My findings reveal how the interactions between the state, donors and INGOs in the
provision of disability services contributed to a dysfunctional system which badly failed those
most in need of its successful functioning. This dysfunction resulted in part from the perverse
outcomes of what donors and INGOs saw as the congruence between their goals and
strategies but which caused INGOs to move from their traditional methods and roles to a
more market-based model. Even more significant was the impact of the gap between donors
and INGOs grasp of the political dimension of their activities and that of the government
which was able to use its political awareness and skills to out-manoeuvre its partners and
achieve its own goals. The findings thus challenge many of the assumptions underlying
mainstream development theory and policy and support those areas of the literature which
argue for the importance of political analysis and open up new areas for research and the
development of more appropriate theories.
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Theoretical Implications
Chapter 3 reviewed the state of theory around conceptualising the aid system and the
interactions between donors, INGOs and states within it. It found that, while the view of
development as an economic, technocratic process dominates much of the discourse, there are
strong calls for this dominance to be challenged. In particular, commentators have pointed to
the weakness of political analysis in development theory and the need to deepen a more
robust understanding of politics in development (Hickey, 2012; Leftwich, 2008). This study
supports their case for revisiting the dominant theoretical framework in order to improve
development outcomes for vulnerable groups. It finds that the model’s failings in meeting the
needs of people with disability in Cambodia between 1991 and 2006 were due largely to its
inability to understand and respond to the political environment and processes in which it was
operating and the impact of these on the development process.
The implications for development theory suggest that at its core development is political
in its nature and played out in the context of local factors which are largely beyond the
control of donors and INGOs. This shifts the development process from an economic,
technocratic practice to an untidy and uncertain engagement with unpredictable forces and
actors. If this is the case, it demands that practitioners launch into an uncertain and messy
journey to alter power balances and negotiate compromises between conflicting goals and
motivations.
These findings are consistent with those researchers who call for greater attention to
political analysis and the need to understand the uniqueness of local situations and their
influence on development outcomes (See Chapter 3 and Leftwich, 2008, Wright et al., 2010,
Hickey 2012, Hout, 2012; Hulme et al, 1997). The findings support the view that
development’s central concern of increasing the access of the poor and vulnerable to power
and resources makes it an essentially political process (Hickey & Leftwich, 2008, 2005).
Development is seen as a dynamic and unpredictable process which is the outcome of
political, social, cultural and historical factors interacting to achieve unique results in
different environments (Baird, 2010; Grindle, 2007, 2004).
The counterpoint to this support for a political view of development is the familiar theory
of development defined mainly as an economic process where ‘one size fits all’ (World Bank,
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2004a, 1997; Burnside et al., 2000). The experience of providing services to a vulnerable
group in Cambodia demonstrated the limitations of such an approach and its failure to
achieve its goals. Local and political actors and conditions proved to be the crucial factors in
determining outcomes in the sector. Of even greater concern was the extent to which the
commitment to the view of development as an economic-technocratic process prevented
donors and INGOs from understanding events around them and responding appropriately.
The research in this thesis thus supports the benefit of a critical treatment of many
assumptions which still have considerable influence in development theory despite the
increased acceptance of the principles of the Paris Declaration. My findings support the
importance of the state and of country ownership if development is to take root in a
developing country and encourage donors and INGOs to move from economic and
technocratic models of development to ones which take the legitimacy of state seriously.
Changing models and understandings are not always comfortable prospects for donors and
INGOs but new approaches need to be devised if these agencies are to meet their
commitments to those unable to take part directly in this discourse.
Policy Implications
This study provides empirical findings that demonstrate that in Cambodia from 1991 to
2006 disability service provision based on the tripartite model was inefficient, unsustainable,
uncoordinated and subject to manipulation by the state for its own political ends and
competition. The findings and analysis support the view that these issues arose from the
failure of the tripartite model to engage with political analysis and the unique nature of each
development situation and the importance of human agency (See chapter 7 and Hickey, 2009;
Leftwich et al., 2011; Leftwich, 2010). Such findings have important implications for theory
underlying development policy and practice and, logically, the policies and practices
themselves.
Perhaps the most significant policy to be reviewed is that of favouring private sector
actors, and specifically INGOs, as service providers in developing countries. This policy has
resulted in a global blossoming of INGOs as funding to them has increased and their role in
donor policy expanded. However, the findings of this research reflect concerns in the wider
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literature about the appropriateness of these developments (Werker et al., 2008; Brinkerhoff
et al., 2012). These range from disquiet over INGOs’ ability to bring about improvements in
the lives of disadvantaged people to their potentially damaging impact on the capacity of
states to connect with their citizens, strengthen the social contract and create viable social
welfare systems. This research bears out these concerns as well as criticisms of INGOs’ cost-
effectiveness, accountability and efficiency as primary service providers (Mayhew, 2005;
Tvedt, 2006). Such misgivings extend to the impact on INGOs themselves of embracing this
role as many have moved increasingly to a modus operandi and ideology based on economic
and technocratic views of development (Ossewarde et al., 2008; Cammet et al., 2011).
The research also provides an-insight into the impact of well-established donor policy
and practices in implementing development in poor countries. Emphasis on economic reform
and the establishment of a free market economy overlooked the dynamics of local politics
and resulted in social welfare ministries resorting to the diversion of aid funding, more
corruption and persistent nepotism in their quest for resources. A focus on technocratic
solutions such as the provision of technical assistance adversely affected the building of
capacity in the bureaucracy and undermined the ministry’s sense of ownership. Donor
preference for short -cycle projects reinforced these outcomes.
Most critically, donors’ avoidance of the state and their and INGOs’ insistence on their
own apolitical nature have poorly served the cause of development in Cambodia. There is
good evidence from the research findings that this view allowed elite actors to pursue their
own quest for resources without being engaged or challenged by those who were theoretically
working for the interests of the poor and marginalised. The perceptions that donors and
INGOs had of themselves as standing outside of local politics handicapped their ability to
reflect on their own behaviour and the effectiveness of their strategies. Without realising it,
INGOs indulged in overtly political behaviour such as competition for funding without
recognising the inconsistency of their actions. Donors also, despite their superior
international standing and financial clout, failed to realise how easily elites were able to
circumvent or frustrate attempts to hold them accountable for funding supplied to them. The
view of development as an apolitical process left them partially blind in what was a contest
that demanded that all their faculties and senses be bent to the task at hand.
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Such changes are not easy for donors and INGOs. They may challenge deeply-held
views of their own character and role and the nature of development and generate robust
debate. The apolitical nature of donors and INGOs and the extent to which the latter have
adopted the values of the donors are particularly contentious areas. Such debate should
recognise that the roles and nature of INGOs and donors have not been static and that
historically they have been prepared to engage more closely with the political. A greater
willingness to explore their own identities and to understand the political, social and cultural
environments in which they work is not so much an embracing of novel and radical measures
as a return to values and methods from which they have moved. Donors, for example, viewed
the state as central to the allocation of resources and the guidance of development in their
countries up until the ‘70s (See Chapter 3 and Hjertholm et al., 2000). Individual INGOs
have long and varied histories of engagement with the state with most significant change
usually occurring in conjunction with political programmes in developmentalist states (Mitlin
et al., 2006). This history offers INGOs resources for exploring what has and has not worked
in the past. Donors and INGOs thus need not see this debate as a threat to their identity and
roles but as new opportunities to be self-reflective and to build on their past experience and
history.
The research suggests that such reflection is not a secondary optional activity but is
central if donors and INGOs are to be effective in implementing pro-poor policies. Further, it
should generate a greater focus by donors and INGOs on developing the skills and capacity to
engage helpfully with the state and political actors. These skills include the ability to
recognise what drives holders of power and how power is negotiated and held in countries of
operation (Williams et al., 2012). Donors and INGOs need to strengthen their mapping of
power relationships at the country level and their grasp of the politics of local institutions if
they are to be able to identify forces which can capture and threaten pro-poor policies
(Leftwich, 2007; Carlson 2005). Deepening their analysis and understanding at this level will
enhance donors’ and INGOs’ ability to recognise key moments to support or withdraw from
political actors and action (Mitlin et al, 2007). It can be argued that INGOs in particular are
well-placed to carry out such analysis, with relationships from the spanning grass roots to
international levels.
As well as calling for donors and INGOs to strengthen political analysis and knowledge
of the countries in which they are working, the research challenges them to develop skills that
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can help to negotiate the ‘messiness’ of interactions with political actors (Robins et al.2008).
These include bargaining, negotiation and compromise, all of which presuppose an
acceptance of the need for trade-offs and priorities (Leftwich, 2007; Grindle, 2004). Such
abilities do not come readily to donors and INGOs who have traditionally seen their role as
being above giving any concessions to recipients of aid (Hout, 2012). Commentators argue
that if they are to effectively engage with political actors such as the state they will need to
examine the barriers which prevent them developing these skills.
The research poses challenges to policies which have dominated much of development
practice as discussed in Chapter 3. Instead, it supports a view of development as centrally
concerned with the redistribution of power and resources. Such an understanding places the
state at the heart of such contestation as the institution which holds final say over who
legitimately exercises power and how they do so. Donors and INGOs must take the state
seriously, as well as understand their own natures as political agents. To do this, they have to
strengthen their analysis and knowledge of politics, culture and history in the countries in
which they are operating and develop skills and strategies which at the moment appear to be
alien to them. It is argued, however that they will need to move into unfamiliar territory if
they are to carry out the mandate which they claim to have.
Recommendations for future research
The implications for development theory and policy as well as the literature indicate a
number of areas where research is necessary if states, donors and INGOs are to move into
this new territory. Much of this research is about the political nature of development and the
need to strengthen more relevant theories and foster development practices which incorporate
such new approaches. My study also confirms the value of research which is based on small-
scale, detailed enquiry at the grass-roots level and supports the call for more such
investigation.
The impact on outcomes in the disability sector of donors’ and INGOs’ poor theorisation
of the influence of politics and of local conditions on development highlights the needs for
deeper forms of political, cultural, historical and geographical analysis at the country level
(Hickey, 2012). Such analysis offers the potential of capturing the politics of reaching the
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poorest groups by understanding how power is negotiated in the context of everyday life,
including how elites enlist the support of the poor (Robins et al., 2008). As discussed above,
this means conceptualising development as a form of contest in which donors and INGOs
may have to take sides (Hughes et al., 2011). Further, this contest needs to be seen as based
in the local context with each situation offering its own unique problems and opportunities
(Mcloughlin, 2011). Developing stronger theory in this area means moving from familiar
constructs built on an economic view of development applicable to a more localised and
political analysis of environments which do not conform to the values of democracy, the free
market and neo-liberalism (Hughes et al., 2011).
One of the most challenging of these environments for donors and INGOs is the
patrimonial state, but it is one that demands their engagement if they are to achieve lasting
change for poor and vulnerable groups. It should not be assumed that those who hold power
in such states are necessarily against pro-poor policies. Elites may already be involved with
the poorest through patronage networks and wish to extend the social contract with them
(Hickey, 2012). Elites do not only act for their own advantage, depending on their values and
their understanding of the causes of poverty. There is evidence that contemporary elites are
more likely to be pro-poor than nineteenth century elites (Hossain et al., 2002). Political
analysis can recognise areas of convergence and synergy between elites and development
actors and identify the kinds of elite likely to be pro-poor and the policies they prefer. Such
engagement requires robust research by donors and INGOs into the nature of patrimonial
politics as well as a nuanced understanding of local elites and how power is structured and
negotiated in each situation.
Such developments call for quantitative empirical research based on detailed case studies
of the specific politics, geography, culture and history of the local situation (Mcloughlin,
2011). This represents a considerable shift from the qualitative, broad brush economic studies
which have dominated development under the influence of neoliberal theory (Carlson et al.,
2005). Donors and INGOs may well be reluctant to change away from such simple and
universalistic approaches and promote research into strategies that encourage them to develop
stronger political awareness and skills (Leftwich, 2011). Yet this is precisely what is needed.
Academic researchers are well placed to initiate such fine-grained and local research studies
and present the findings in a manner which challenges and attracts all the stakeholders
involved in development assistance. Such research would enable the deeper forms of political
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analysis and contextual understanding necessary for engagement with elites and states and for
donors and INGOs to reflect on their own natures and roles in development.
This reflection calls for greater analysis of the role of non-state actors in social welfare
and a stronger theorisation of the state and its place in development (Brinkerhoff et al., 2012).
The dominance of an economic view has meant that the problematic aspects of service
delivery by INGOs have not been addressed as rigorously as needed. The consequences of
this are hardest on vulnerable groups who are most dependent on such services. Research into
service delivery by INGOs should include analysis of their political nature, their culture and
their relationships with each other, the state and donors in the context of the specific
situations in which they work. Such research will enable greater understanding of the impact
of INGOs involvement in social welfare on themselves, the state and the dynamics of power
in the country rather than imposing global values on local and unique sites.
Conclusion
The story of the DAC acts as a microcosm of the conflicting and synergistic goals,
strategies and motivations at work in the wider disability sector. This microcosm
demonstrates the dominance of neoliberal theory on disability service delivery in Cambodia,
the impact of that policy on interactions between states, donors and INGOs and the weakness
of the Model stemming from its failure to engage with the political environment it
confronted.
The result of the weakness of the Tripartite Model was a discouraging gap between
policies and the expected outcomes from the system based on INGOs acting as service
providers. Rather than fulfilling donor expectations of private sector providers being more
efficient, the system was poorly coordinated and left many geographical areas and disability
types without services. The competition for donor funding saw INGOs increasingly moving
away from their traditional values and methods towards those of donors. Their qualities of
independence and individuality undermined cooperation and coordination with each other.
The Ministry, while putatively the manager of disability services, resented its treatment by
INGOs and financial pressures from the donors and felt increasingly alienated from a system
of disbursement it had helped to create. While welcoming the reduced accountability and
226
expectations from citizens made possible by INGO service provision and donor support for it,
MOSALVY feared a loss of prestige and control and access to resources. However, the
Ministry also demonstrated that it had the skills and resources to defend its interests and
achieve its goals.
A significant factor in the gaps between donor and INGO policies and outcomes was
their lack of understanding or recognition of the political dimension of development in
Cambodia. As argued in the empirical chapters and above, engaging in development means
engaging in political behaviour at some level. This is a risky undertaking, requiring robust
analysis and more complex theories, highly developed political skills and a sophisticated
knowledge of the personalities, networks, goals, strategies, incentives and dangers of the
political environment. It also means accepting that the state holds ultimate responsibility for
meeting the needs of its citizens and is also the ultimate authority within its own territory,
principles confirmed by the Paris Declaration but clearly not taken sufficiently seriously by
donors or INGOs. Consequently, INGOs and donors need to develop new attitudes and
theories about the role of state in development and how they can relate to it and encourage
pro-poor policies in a manner that supports the legitimacy of states perceived to be weak and
ailing by the international community.
This research was undertaken with the goal of answering at least some of the questions
arising from my experience of development in West Africa. Despite heroic efforts,
development in that environment so often failed people whose courage and resilience
deserved much better. I hope that this work will help lead to a deeper understanding of the
nature of that most slippery of concepts, development, and that this will in some way benefit
those who each day must engage with the politics of poverty in their everyday life achieve the
basics of survival and a life with some dignity.
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APPENDIX 2 – CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX
The contents of Appendix 2 have been removed to preserve the confidentiality of the
interviewees and to honour guarantees of anonymity offered by the researcher at the time of
the interviews.
In accordance with the ethics protocols of Monash University, the thesis examiners and
thesis supervisors, for the sole purpose of evaluating the work, had access to all materials on
which the thesis was based, including notes of interviews and recorded conversations.
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287
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APPENDIX 4 – UNTAC AND CAMBODIA’S POLITICAL
CULTURE
Background
In 1991, after prolonged negotiations between Cambodia’s warring factions, an
agreement was reached whereby they reluctantly agreed to form a specially constructed
quadripartite body, the Supreme National Council (SNC). The SNC was to be ‘the unique
legitimate body and source of authority … in which the sovereignty, independence and unity
of Cambodia are enshrined’ (UN document A/45/472-S/21689, cited in Curtis, 1993, p. 8).
With its formation, peace negotiations were concluded with the signing of the Agreements on
a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict in Paris on 23 October
1991. The agreements invited the UN to establish the United Nations Transitional Authority
in Cambodia (UNTAC) (United Nations and Cambodia, 1991-1995).
UNTAC was unprecedented in the UN’s history, involving a budget of over two billion
dollars, and a force of 16,000 regular troops, 3,000 police officers, 3,000 civilian officials,
and thousands of locally recruited Khmer staff (Roberts, 2002; Curtis, 1998). It was faced
with the mammoth task of creating a ‘neutral political environment’ for elections and
conducting ‘free and fair’ elections which would establish a power sharing government,
establish a cease-fire, disarm and demobilise the warring factions, repatriate the over 300,000
refugees and begin mine-clearing. In addition, they were to establish law and order, protect
‘human rights and fundamental freedoms’, meet humanitarian needs, rebuild essential
infrastructure and services, train Cambodians to take over these tasks and coordinate donor
assistance. To achieve this UNTAC was given a time limit of eighteen months (Ratner, 1997;
Curtis, 1993).
UNTAC and Cambodian Political Culture
Cambodia’s political culture responded and adapted to UNTAC’s presence and actions to
achieve its traditional goals. UNTAC’s failure to control the incumbent political party and the
decision that the two main parties should share power in government intensified the battle
300
between elites by introducing the concept of a legitimate opposition. The introduction of
large amounts of international funding provided a new and modern supply of resources into
the competition for power. Certainly, after UNTAC, the level of competition, corruption and
the co-option of the bureaucracy for political purposes increased, with resources and
commitment to service delivery declining as the political competition dominated the goals
and motivation of the political elites and diverted international funds to meet local political
goals.
UNTAC’s difficulties were compounded by the fact that, partly due to Cambodia’s
international isolation since the time of the Khmer Rouge, little was understood of the goals
and strategies of the KPR/SOC’s political leadership (Gottesman, 2003). These often
conflicted with the values and assumptions of the liberal democracy which UNTAC was
charged with establishing (Hughes, 2001). Central to the elites’ goals was the concept of
power as highly personalised and centralised, indivisible, intolerant of dissent or opposition
and with little accountability by those who held power (Pak et al., 2007). This left little room
for the concepts of a social contract, power sharing and a loyal opposition that are basic to
democracy. Nor were there mechanisms for a willing transfer of power, for to lose power was
to lose everything. In particular, it meant the loss of the means to sustain the loyalty of the
clients and supporters who made it possible to hold power. It was not a culture in which
Western public administration concepts such as ‘accountability’ and ‘good governance’ could
readily take root (Pak et al., 2007).
UNTAC Goals and Strategies
UNTAC’s success was mixed, a fact that was to have profound implications for
Cambodia’s political culture and the nature of the state that developed. On the one hand, it
successfully repatriated over 300,000 refugees and involved over 90% of the population in
elections which were deemed ‘free and fair’ by the international community (Doyle, 1996). A
constitution and a framework of liberal democratic institutions were established, and
Cambodia’s international isolation ended, opening up the opportunity for the return of aid,
UN agencies and INGOs. The peace process offered hope of some stability and recovery
from the years of war and social and economic turmoil (Doyle, 1996; Curtis, 1993).
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A number of critical failures, however, overshadowed these successes. Economic growth
was limited to the area around Phnom Penh, with little penetration of the rural areas (Hughes
et al., 2003). Despite the success in running ‘free and fair’ elections, UNTAC failed to
establish a ‘neutral political environment’ leading up to the election, or to control the CPP
(Hughes et al., 2003; Un, 2005). Instead, Cambodia during this period was gripped by ‘fear
and insecurity’ and political violence, primarily instigated by the CPP (Ledgerwood, 1996;
Curtis, 1993). Intimidation, human rights abuses and violence against citizens and political
opponents became commonplace as the CPP in particular fought to gain as much advantage
as possible before the election (Hughes, 2003a). The violence, which was almost exclusively
perpetrated by the CPP and Khmer Rouge, took place against a background of impunity for
the powerful and ‘scorn’ for the rule of law (Peou, 2000). There was no clear focus for state
authority, as the fiction of the SNC became increasingly transparent and UNTAC seemed
unwilling or incapable of controlling the CPP (Ratner, 1997). The acquisition of power
became the goal for the political parties at the expense of establishing a functioning state able
to supply its citizens with political and social goods such as security, the rule of law, health,
and education.
These developments were in part due to UNTAC’s inability to enforce an effective
cease-fire or to canton and demobilise the Khmer Rouge and SOC forces (Curtis, 1993).
UNTAC had no mandate to enforce compliance except through diplomacy and persuasion,
and thus was impotent in the face of political and military rivals who were operating in a
context still dominated by the notion of political power as a ‘zero-sum game’ (Richmond et
al., 2007). UNTAC and its international supporters have been criticised for their lack of
understanding of the realities of Cambodia’s political culture and history and the fragility of
the factions’ commitment to the Peace Agreements (Richmond et al., 2007; St. John, 2005;
Downie et al., 2001). The Cambodian leaders had signed under duress from their
international backers and had no real intention of putting their differences to one side (Ratner,
1997). The agreements had more to do with the needs of the international community and
Cambodia’s Cold War sponsors. The wider international community wanted a solution to
their awkward recognition of the odious Khmer Rouge as the legitimate government of
Cambodia (Shawcross, 1994; Curtis, 1998). Attempts to exclude the Khmer Rouge
altogether, however, were opposed by China. At the same time there was increasing moral
pressure to end the international embargo on aid to a country that had endured such trauma
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and suffering, while Russia and Vietnam wanted to extricate themselves from their
unsustainable support of Cambodia.
To achieve this tangled mix of interests and goals, UNTAC was expected to lay the
groundwork of a liberal society by the imposition of elections and a measure of power-
sharing and liberal reforms in the market and society (Richmond et al., 2007). The strategy
was based on the Kissinger dictum that the most effective way of settling civil war is to make
contestants govern jointly (Roberts, 2002). In reality, the Cambodian view of power did not
allow for such a concept. For Hun Sen and the CPP, power was to be accumulated, not
shared, and opponents were to be overthrown, not reformed (St. John, 2005).
UNTAC and Its Impact on Cambodian Political Culture
The 1991 elections saw 90% of the population turn out to vote, and were declared free
and fair by the international community. The royalist party National United Front for an
Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) gained a narrow
victory over the CPP. The result, although close, was remarkable in that it represented the
first time in Cambodia’s history that the majority of the population voted against the status
quo, suggesting that many ordinary Cambodians were prepared to express their opposition to
the CPP. However, basing power on popular legitimacy has not been part of Cambodia’s
political heritage (Ojendal et al., 2006). The CPP refused to accept the results and it became
apparent that nobody could govern Cambodia without their consent and cooperation (Un,
2010). They controlled all the bases of power, including the bureaucracy, military, and police,
and had a stranglehold on the rural areas through the village council system established
during the PRK/SOC period (Hughes, 2003; Ledgerwood, 1996). The election could give
legitimacy expressed through the ballot box to FUNCINPEC, but it could not give the party
the capacity or the power base to govern. It was clear that the CPP were not prepared to
follow the rules of liberal democracy or relinquish power without being forced to.
UNTAC bowed to the political realities and brokered a power-sharing agreement
whereby the FUNCINPEC leader, Prince Ranariddh, and Hun Sen, the CPP leader, were
appointed joint prime ministers. The power-sharing arrangement extended down through the
bureaucracy, with two ministers, two under-secretaries of state and so on down to the lowest
levels for each ministry, with the same matching at provincial levels. On 21 September 1993,
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the Constituent Assembly signed the new constitution, reinstating Sihanouk to the throne as a
constitutional monarch and establishing the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC).
UNTAC, its mission completed, withdrew by the final weeks of 1993 and the RGC began its
work.
Thus from the beginning it was clear that the holding of free and fair elections did not
mean the establishment of a liberal democracy. UNTAC has been criticised for its failure to
understand the nature of Cambodia’s political heritage and culture, and its assumptions about
the universality and transferability of liberal democracy (Richmond et al., 2007). It is argued
that this failure contributed to a further decade of political instability and the reinforcement of
the violent nature of the struggle for power, while the liberal institutions sat uneasily and
unconvincingly over traditional political behaviour and structures (Richmond et al., 2007).
An INGO worker gave examples of the almost parallel universes which existed between
international agents of change and local power brokers, down to language and concepts used:
An example is the word ‘delegation’ … the Khmer word is not delegation. It basically
means ‘abdication.’ ’Hand over’. Gone …. So the UNDP, the World Bank, they’ve
been having wonderful discussions for ten years at the level of Deputy Prime
Minister, and he does not understand what delegation means. … He thanked me for
trying to explain what that person that’s been talking to him for all this time meant.
(Interview INGO5)
Similarly, while UNTAC saw the establishment of liberal institutions, they were not deeply
entrenched:
Cambodia in theory has laws. The problem is enforcement and the fact that there’s a
climate of impunity … The constitution ... covers gender and disability and social
benefits but a lot of it is theory. The ministers are supposed to be accountable to the
National Assembly. They seldom go. So there is theory and there is practice.
(Interview INGO5)
The Impact of UNTAC on Domestic Political Goals
UNTAC’s achievement of conducting free and fair elections was undermined by the
goals and strategies of Cambodian political culture. The election and its unsustainable
assumption of a ‘loyal opposition’ if anything deepened the divide between the parties and set
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the stage for a fight for survival which was to distract the leaders from the task of governing
until one had emerged a clear victor. State power was seen as an avenue, offering the leaders
sources of revenue, international recognition and assistance and the ability to reward and
recruit supporters (Curtis, 1998). This made the stakes of the election so high that it was
impossible for the loser to accept defeat, for to do so would be to accept political and possibly
personal extinction. Commentators suggested that that UNTAC merely changed the medium
for hostility from war to elections (Roberts, 2001; Richmond et al., 2007). However, this
change in itself increased the pressures on existing political parties, focusing their energies on
winning votes rather than strengthening democratic processes (Hughes, 2001). In a political
environment of absolutism and intolerance of opposition, the power-sharing arrangement led
to the strengthening of traditional political practices (Roberts, 2002; St. John, 2005). An
INGO worker engaged in building civil society felt those traditional views of leadership and
power still held in 2004 despite elections and democratic structures. Criticism was not
tolerated and power was for the benefit of the leader, not the led:
The word ‘leader’ in Khmer doesn’t exist. The nearest equivalent in English would
convey ‘consumer’ ... Leaders tend to take and people expect to give and this is why
wealth tends to percolate up in Cambodia. From the time a child is born they have to
give to people above them. (Interview INGO5)
Another interviewee observed that the political culture continued to be intolerant of
criticism and opposition, despite the supposed existence of a liberal democracy and diversity
of opinion:
It’s just that, as the culture before was oppressive, it continues to be hierarchical and
oppressive ... and doesn’t encourage open discussion, questioning, wondering, all
those things … especially for folks at the lower end of the pile. (Interview INGO2)
The heart of the political struggle after UNTAC was, as before, access to the means for
rewarding the clients and dependents (Hughes, 2001). Key prizes were access to the civil
service, local to provincial administration structures and military. This gave the power to
appoint supporters to positions where they could access income and resources. Incumbents
had an obvious advantage, while those not in power were cut off from access to the resources
needed to win it. As an INGO worker observed, it was all or nothing for the political players:
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If you’re not in government you’re out of government, you can’t make money. You
can’t change things. (Interview INGO5)
UNTAC’s failure to take control of the key ministries of finance, defence, foreign affairs,
public security and information from the CPP, despite its clear mandate to do so, revealed the
strength and depth of the CPP’s hold on the institutions of government (Peang-Meth, 1997).
UNTAC left control of the most senior portfolios in CPP hands and civil servants continued
to answer to CPP officials rather than FUNCINPEC ministers (McCargo, 2005).
FUNCINPEC ministers, civil servants and provincial officials were disadvantaged by their
lack of experience in administration and relatively poorly developed patronage networks,
whereas the CPP had had eleven years’ experience of government to build power structures.
By 1993, FUNCINPEC ministers were complaining that they had little influence against
CPP officials even in the ministries allocated to them (Jeldres, 1993). An INGO interviewee
observed that FUNCINPEC’s powerlessness continued down through all levels of the
administration:
Although half the provinces … were supposed to be FUNCINPEC-led, almost to a
man those FUNCINPEC governors are weak with very strong CPP deputies and the
same pattern goes right down through districts and now to the communes. (Interview
INGO5)
The CPP had a number of strategies for controlling non-CPP ministries, including
diverting disbursement of funding through the Ministry of Finance in favour of CPP
ministries:
So you’ll find for example that education and health has never got more than 70-60%
of their disbursements, whereas a CPP ministry, Ministry of Interior, sometimes have
200% of the real allocation of money, not the one that you put in your plan every
year. (Interview INGO5)
The CPP also used the power-sharing arrangement to their advantage, placing strong
CPP Secretaries of State with FUNCINPEC ministers, setting up artificial QUANGOS to
divert funds and control the flow of funding through the Council of Ministers (Jeldres, 1993).
Post-UNTAC Strategies to Achieve Political Goals
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The goals of the elites were primarily concerned with their own survival and
advancement, not the development and well-being of Cambodia (Cock, 2010; Hughes, 2001).
With the establishment of the electoral system by UNTAC, these goals focused around
acquiring resources and securing enough votes to gain power (Hughes, 2006, 2001). Control
of the state and its institutions became central, giving access to international donor funds and
domestic natural resources, command of the security forces to suppress opposition and
opportunities for patronage (Cook, 2010). By the elections of 1998, the CPP under Hun Sen
had established itself as the dominant ruling elite.
Hun Sen had achieved this dominance through a number of strategies, including
consolidating control over the security forces and gradually recentralising power through the
establishment of special state agencies controlling natural resources such as forestry and
petroleum, bringing them and the resources they controlled more directly under prime
ministerial control (Cock, 2010). He also personalised power, through the manipulation of
Cambodian traditions of gift giving and the presentation of the rebuilding of Cambodia’s
infrastructure as his personal gift (Hughes, 2006). Opposition, and potential opposition,
including the monarchy and the Buddhist clergy, were weakened or eliminated, and the
existing party networks used to enforce the CPP’s dominance in the rural areas, which
comprised 80% of the electorate (Cock, 2010).
Control of the state was thus a central goal for Cambodia’s political elites. It ensured the
ability to use the security forces against opponents, access to international funding and
domestic resources and support for patronage networks through office giving. One outcome
was that the elites had a strong vested interest in keeping the state viable. The inefficiency of
state institutions resulting from patrimonialism and state interference threatened this, while
the collapse of state institutions would jeopardise their extraction of domestic resources. Even
more seriously, however, it would threaten access to international funding, a vital component
of the ruling elites’ strategies to gain and keep power.
Dependence on foreign support has been a part of the Cambodian political dynamic since
independence, with no regime, with the possible exception of Pol Pot’s, being self-sufficient
(Cock, 2010). The UNTAC intervention and the transfer of political contest from the military
to the electoral sphere demanded new strategies of the political strongmen, with gaining votes
becoming central to winning and keeping power. UNTAC also provided the means of solving
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the problem, with huge amounts of foreign funding entering the country, increasing the
opportunity for corruption, misappropriation and the accumulation of wealth by those in
power (Hughes & Conway, 2003; Hughes, 2001).). While the changes and reforms which
accompanied this funding could have undermined Hun Sen and the CPP, the latter became
adept at manipulating the external pressures of donors (Cock, 2010; Hughes, 2001).
International funding gave local actors the space and resources to respond to the threats
facing them in ways which were profoundly undemocratic but rational (Hughes, 2003). These
resources were used to maintain power bases and keep the state functioning at a sufficient
level to keep donors happy. Elections and limited freedom of expression were allowed, but
any real opposition, especially in the CPP’s rural heartland, was ruthlessly suppressed
(Hughes, 2003). The elites learnt how to play Western donors against each other, taking
advantage of their lack of coordination and their pressure to disburse funds, delaying reforms
and patiently waiting out pressures to fulfil promises, and timing reform announcements to
coincide with donor meetings (Cock, 2010). Hun Sen and the CPP in particular has been able
to use the language of democracy, pluralism and reform to the international community to
ensure a continued supply of international funding, while maintaining a relentless grip on
power at the domestic level.
Post-UNTAC Political Culture and Service Delivery
One of the chief motives driving the UNTAC intervention had been concern over the
humanitarian situation of Cambodia’s population, including lack of basic services (Curtis,
1993). Despite the large financial commitment by the international community, it was to be
some time before any improvement in service delivery was seen. Political culture in
Cambodia by its nature saw resources moving from the poor towards those more powerful
(Hughes et al., 2003). There was actually some overlap in the attitudes and explanations of
poverty among donors, INGOs and the state, with a tendency to see the solutions as the
injections of resources from outside (Hughes et al., 2003). Government officials often saw
poverty as due to weakness, ignorance or lack of initiative of the poor, with government
involvement in solutions limited by its lack of capacity (Hughes et al., 2003). The solution,
they argued, lay in more training and resources, and higher salaries for the civil service.
Implicitly, this involved greater injections of resources by international donors into the
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bureaucracy, a solution at odds with donor policy of reducing public spending and the size of
the bureaucracy.
At the highest levels, however, the lack of interest in social service delivery lay in the
fact that policy was driven by the political needs of the elites to gain power and retain it.
Traditionally power did not draw its legitimacy from a social contract, but the acquisition of
resources for patronage (Ojendal, 2006). Ministries that could attract international funding or
access to the exploitation of natural resources had the most influence on the Prime Minister
and the Council of Ministers, and attracted the most support. Defence, for example, did very
well, a reflection of a long history of military patronage systems and the crucial need of the
political leaders to have military support (Meas, 2000; Curtis, 1998). The official government
expenditure on defence and security through the Ministries of Defence and the Interior was
officially nearly one-third of the national budget, but the actual figure was closer to 40% to
50% over most of the 1990s (Hughes et al., 2003). One official admitted that he had been
ordered to ‘give the military a blank cheque’ (Peou, 2000, pp. 240-241). Agriculture, on the
other hand, represented only 7.8% of the 1994 budget (Peou, 2000, pp. 240-241). As donor
funding went to building infrastructure and the private sector, ministries such as the
Ministries of Trade, Transport and Finance grew in influence and wealth, as did the Ministry
of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing which controlled access to lucrative natural resources
(Calavan at al., 2004; Hughes et al., 2003). Ministries providing frontline services, such as
health and education, offered smaller opportunities for the extraction of resources, and
consequently found themselves on the edge of political and policy influence (Hughes et al.,
2003). This relative obscurity, however, had the advantage of less scrutiny from powerful
figures if the ministry wanted to implement pro-poor policies, with the result that some, such
as the Ministry of Health, were seen as more pro-poor and innovative (Hughes et al., 2003).
These political dynamics had profound effects on the bureaucracy and the provision of basic
services.
The Cambodian Bureaucracy Post-UNTAC
By 1992, the bureaucracy under the PRK/SOC had grown to the point where 85% of the
$US20 million budget went on civil service salaries (Peou, 2000). While it was seriously
under-resourced and lacking training and capacity, considerable achievements had been made
during the PRK/SOC period (Kevin, 2000; Peou, 2000). An INGO worker in the disability
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sector felt that there was at least a sense of accountability and commitment in the ministry
and workers in the field during this period. Commenting on one of their workers who had
been with the ministry pre-UNTAC, she said:
He knows all the handicapped people in the district, so as a member of the Ministry
of Social Affairs, he’s been out visiting all these handicapped, so they really wanted
something to happen for them. That’s my belief. (Interview INGO1)
During the period of the PRK, party leaders, and particularly Hun Sen, had quietly begun
to build their power bases through patronage networks in the different ministry bureaucracies
(Gottesman, 2003). These power networks were not based on ideology but on personal
dependence on the chief patrons, with the patron’s power depending on his ability to provide
rewards from the lowest level cadres up (Gottesman, 2003). UNTAC had failed to address the
issues of these networks or the resulting politicisation and corruption within the civil service.
UN officials, often inexperienced themselves in governmental administration, had been
concerned with achieving a good rapport with local officials. Consequently they were
reluctant to challenge questionable behaviour, and SOC officials, while interacting well with
their UN counterparts, increasingly ignored them (Ratner, 1997).
The period after UNTAC saw an increase in corruption in the civil service, largely due to
an increase in the resources available through international aid. It also saw a drop in morale, a
continued lack of training, skill building and resources and the loss of more skilled
bureaucrats to other sectors (Curtis, 1998). Despite rehabilitation being one of its goals,
UNTAC itself did relatively little to build capacity or repair infrastructure beyond its own
requirements (Curtis, 1993). This left the new government with the same problems the SOC
had faced, but without the expected help. Although the international community pledged
$US800 million in 1992, most of this was designated to come into effect after the transition
process, and was tied to longer-term development projects. As a result, the government was
desperately short of resources for urgent rehabilitation in health, education, sanitation and
water and infrastructure. At the same time, the power-sharing agreement meant a massive
increase in the size of the bureaucracy, which stretched its inadequate resources even further
(Curtis, 1998).
UNTAC was a demoralising experience for the civil service, who were replaced and
bypassed by the well-equipped UN staff. The situation was exacerbated by the huge
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differences in the salaries of UN and UN-paid local staff and state-sector salaries, with
locally hired UNTAC staff earning 15 times more than most Cambodians, including civil
servants (Curtis, 1993). Civil service morale and capacity was further weakened by the
recruitment of most of the trained or experienced Khmer civil servants by UNTAC and, later,
INGOs, a move which gave them higher salaries and some independence from the CPP. After
enjoying these conditions, civil servants returning to government service found it difficult to
re-adjust to the lower salaries and resources.
Shortage of funds and the CPP’s control of the Ministry of Finance and ability to divert
funds to its own ministries meant that salaries in some ministries, particularly service delivery
ministries, were often months in arrears, compounding the pressures on civil servants to
supplement their salaries by ‘special fees’ or ‘moonlighting:
If only they had a decent salary some of them would be effective, but they have to
make extra money. (Interview INGO5)
Low salaries affected civil servants morale and ability to function. One interviewee, an
ex-civil servant, described the frustrations of trying to run a council with government staff
who were rarely present, at the same time recognising the difficulties of civil servants’
positions:
They convene a meeting and nobody comes for the meeting. There is no follow-up, no
real action taken … They can come in the morning and not come in the evening.
Often, only the Secretary-General comes, alone. And how can you enforce the staff
for working if you are the Secretary-General? You cannot dismiss the staff. The
minister doesn’t have the right to dismiss. And you cannot complain because the
salary is very low. (Interview DAC2)
Lack of professional training limited the ability of civil servants to perform their duties,
with a 1992 World Bank study describing social sector staff as poorly qualified and lacking
in competence and personnel management capability (Curtis, 1993b). INGO staff made
similar observations:
One of the big issues about the government generally speaking is that people don’t
really know how to manage work. They’ve just got to do this little bit and that little
bit but making a plan and following it, that’s just piecemeal. And then there’s lots of
paper-shuffling. There were very few (trainings). (Interview DAC1)
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Further, the planning mechanisms left by UNTAC were foreign concepts and practices
which were frequently unconnected with the goals, strategies, practices and timeframes of the
Cambodians (Downie et al., 2001).
Some commentators felt that the reluctance of civil servants to make decisions, take
action or plan was partly a cultural reluctance, partly a legacy of the traumas and uncertainty
of the previous thirty years, but that it did not indicate an inability to plan (Downie et al.,
2001). Training of local staff could have led to a more stable and effective bureaucracy
(Doyle, 1996; Jeldres, 1993). UNTAC has been criticised for its failure to use the period of
its administration to build capacity in the civil services, which one commentator argued
would have encouraged commitment and goodwill among civil servants as well as
competence:
If the UN had provided training to the Cambodians who staffed the five UN-run
ministries, it would have won the hearts of Cambodians who have always shown a
tremendous willingness to learn new skills. (Jeldres, 1993, p. 108)
The CPP, with its stronger resource base, was able to steadily push FUNCINPEC out of
the prosperous ministries and establish dominance over the civil service through networks of
loyalty and patronage. The strategic importance of control of the bureaucracy resulted in the
politicisation of the civil service and the establishment of patronage hierarchies through the
administration:
There are no civil servants in Cambodia. They are all political appointments. Right
down to the local level. There is no neutral civil servant here, so even down to the
guard, (they) will have a line of patronage that is partly political, but is probably
more to do with family. (Interview INGO5)
The development of a professional, neutral civil service standing outside politics or party
influence and with primary loyalty to the state became almost impossible. It was a battle that
one observer felt no one in the civil service could win:
In Khmer you can only be loyal or disloyal ... That’s one of the reasons why
corruption is regarded as normal because it’s OK if I’m taking from you to give to my
boss - that’s part of the system. (Interview INGO5)
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In return for this loyalty, clients were protected, despite incompetence or pressure from
expatriate donors.
Competition for funding between ministries, most of it international aid, dominated
government policy. An adviser to the Ministry of Social Affairs, Labour, Veterans and Youth
(MOSALVY) recalled how strategic concerns over accessing funds rather than the needs of
government and service provision controlled policy. Working in adoption, she saw the
possibility of raising funds through charging fees. The ministry, however, was not enthused:
(The ministry) said ‘No’, if we set fees the money goes to the Ministry of Finance and
then we won’t get anything ... to pay for the orphanages and things like that.
(Interview DAC1)
Civil servants’ wages were low, but appointments were eagerly sought because they gave
the opportunity to extract favours or ‘cream off’ funds for services to which the recipient was
entitled. INGO workers described the frustration of trying to achieve goals without offending
powerful people or compromising their own standards:
The general director of MOSALVY wants us to give a job to his nephew. Of course he
didn’t broach the subject directly but his assistant called my number two to say I’m
under strong pressure from my boss. He wants a job for his nephew. Well, of course, I
say fine, he can apply. (Interview DAC1)
By 2005, one estimate put the amount lost from government funds every year at
$US300-500 million, which was roughly equal to that received through donor assistance
(USAID, 2005, cited in Richmond et al., 2007, p. 38). Corruption occurred at all levels of the
bureaucracy, ranging from selling high-level posts (promotion to a senior police post
typically cost $US500-1,000) to payments for services and favours (McCargo, 2005). The
impact on government services was profound.
Post-UNTAC Bureaucracy and Service Provision
The corruption in the bureaucracy and the diversion of resources from service delivery to
the needs of the political rivals undermined what services were being provided and hindered
the development of new ones. The culture of expecting rewards for any service done and
using even minor positions of power for personal profit and payment extended down to those
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at ground level, seriously compromising the availability of services for the poor. Fundamental
services such as health were in theory available free to poor people, but in practice, fees were
demanded before treatment. Stories of the harsh reality of life for those without resources
were common. One example was given by an INGO worker:
The poorest people should get free treatment. The doctors and nurses will not treat
the patient unless the money is put upfront. I came across a case … a woman in
labour desperately needed to have a caesarean. The husband was sent back to the
village to get $200 for the operation. It took him three days to get the money by which
time both the mother and child were dead. (Interview INGO5)
Understandably, people lost trust in public services further undermining its morale and ability
to attract funding and political support:
People still often spend a lot of money on traditional healers before they even enter
the government health service because they basically think that the government
health service is not going to help them, that it is going to cost too much and the other
things that they hear. (Interview INGO4)
Within the civil service, and within certain ministries, there were still people willing to
cite poverty reduction as a policy objective (Hughes et al., 2003). A number of NGO
interviewees were quick to point out that there were people with talent and commitment in
the public service, but the hierarchy and demands from political patrons stifled them:
I mean there are people who have good ideas, some. People who wish things were
better, but not the hierarchy. It just doesn’t really allow that. And then also a lot of
the government effort is a dual system where money is always floating upwards.
(Interview INGO)
The low salaries resulting from the CPP’s control of funds through the Ministry of
Finance, and the general shortage of international funding for social service ministries, also
meant that potentially good workers were forced to become part of the culture of ‘fees’ and
‘gifts’ in return for services:
There are certainly within government and even within MOSALVY some good people.
They’re not all bad, there are good people. (Interview INGO5)
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A long-time INGO worker working with the bureaucracy argued that if one was to accept
the complexity of the partnership, they should avoid being too judgemental, try to understand
the pressures under which individuals worked and be prepared to look for and support
motivated people, there were real possibilities of good partnerships:
In government you have interested people and they are just trying to survive
eventually but they are genuinely interested and some people are not. Some people
are always thinking – how can I make money out of it. You have to sort of find out
within that forest, how to make your track … That’s why it’s a bit difficult to say
black or white. (Interview INGO3)
The civil service, then, while poorly paid and trained, demoralised, caught up in
corruption and patronage, under-resourced and failing badly in its task of delivering services,
particularly to poor people, was not monolithic (Hughes et al., 2003). However, those
‘interested’ civil servants faced a complex and difficult situation. The patronage system and
the strictly controlled hierarchies it produced, with loyalty going first to the patron, reduced
initiative and commitment to what should have been the primary tasks of the bureaucracy,
including service provision. The power struggle between Cambodia’s elites weakened and
demoralised the civil service leading to paralysis in the bureaucracy as CPP and
FUNCINPEC fought for control of resources for their political struggle. Corruption,
patronage and clientelism increased, civil servants were distracted from their proper role by
their patrons’ needs, and the delivery of public services deteriorated.
Conclusion
Cambodia’s political culture at the time of UNTAC was a strongly entrenched one,
profoundly different to the values and assumptions of the liberal democracy that the UNTAC
mission was charged to establish. Dominating political behaviour was the traditional notion
of political power as a ‘zero-sum game’ with no mechanisms for sharing power or notions of
dissent and a loyal opposition. Power was to be used by the holder to strengthen his own
position, not in the interests of those over whom he exercises power. This power was
maintained by a system of patronage which drew in Cambodians from all levels of society,
politicising and polarising it. The necessity to maintain networks of dependents demanded
315
that those seeking power have access to resources for rewards and the means to deny their
opponents such resources.
Against this background, Western powers set out to establish a liberal democracy with
what they presumed were universally acceptable institutions such as human rights, the rule of
law, transparency and a free market. Post-UNTAC political culture involved a continuation of
traditional Cambodian practices and behaviour, thinly overlaid with a layer of liberal
democracy which legitimated the intervention of foreign international powers and
organisations, and the imposition of unfamiliar and often incomprehensible external norms.
Indeed, the assumption that an election and the establishment of liberal institutions would
resolve the competition for power strengthened the ferocity of the struggle for power within
Cambodian political culture. A change was the introduction of international funding as a
modern source of resources for patronage and power. The bureaucracy, already under-
resourced and poorly skilled, was further weakened by corruption and political patronage as
rival parties attempted to use it to strengthen their positions and gain resources.
The political culture was thus not one which provided fertile ground for service provision
to the poor, although there were some synergies. The PRK/SOC’s theoretically Communist
basis does seem to have had a level of commitment to service provision, and may have left
some legacy of that. More potent was the need of elites for a functioning state to ensure
international funding, which made at least some service provision strategically valuable.
However, these only became significant if they played a part in the political struggle to win
power and keep it.
The UNTAC intervention and donors’ activities in the following years were strongly
committed to poverty reduction and the relief of the country’s humanitarian situation as well
as other goals. Service provision for the poor was one measure of how effectively these goals
were achieved. Donors were well resourced and generously funded, and had technical and
theoretical expertise; however, despite the resources and expertise available to donors,
Cambodia’s political culture was able to exert an extensive influence on donor policy
outcomes and achieve its own goals.
APPENDIX 5 – PLEDGES AND DISBURSEMENTS OF
EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE TO CAMBODIA 1992-1995
Pledges and Disbursements by Bilateral Donors 1992-1995 (in thousands USD)
Bilateral Donors Total Pledges
1992-95
Total Disbursements
1992-95
Japan 321,400 395,854
United States 244,800 154,685
France 208,570 88,478
Sweden 67,500 54,851
Denmark 61,000 18,971
Germany 57,024 30,823
United Kingdom 48,600 26,913
Netherlands 42,000 42,668
Canada 26,557 18,849
Russian Federation 10,400 12,200
Belgium 8,329 541
Thailand 1,200 147
Other bilateral donors 122,637 64,390
Totals 1,311,826 966,669
Source: Council for the Development of Cambodia (CDC)/United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 1995 from
McAndrew, 1996:3
Note inconsistencies with Table 3:1: Source CDC/CRDB Development Cooperation Report (1998/1999) updated October 1999,
cited Godfrey. et al., 2000:17
APPENDIX 6 – DATA ON DISABILITY IN CAMBODIA
Table 1: Persons with Disabilities Classified by Cause and Gender
Source Ministry of Planning/National Institute of Statistics, SES of Cambodia 1997cited JICA: 2002:5, 6)
Cause Female Male
Accident 12% 14%
Illness/Disease 35% 28%
Mine accident/explosion 2% 11%
War/conflict 2% 18%
Congenital 34% 20%
Other 9% 4%
Not stated 6% 5%
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Table 2: Types of Accidents Causing Injury and Death (2002)
Cause of Accident Percentage
Road Accident 33%
Fall from building or tree 13%
Accidents with guns 5%
Landmine accidents 3%
Drownings 3%
Severe burning 2%
Poisoning from chemicals 2%
Other causes 32%
(Source; Ministry of Planning/ National Institute of Statistics (2002) cited Mackinlay, L.,
2004:22
319
Table 3: Causes of Children’s Disabilities in Cambodia 1999
Source: Ministry of Planning/National Institute of Statistics, SES of Cambodia 1999)
Cause % of children with disabilities
Disease 66%
Congenital 27%
Domestic Accidents 5%
Mine Accidents 2%
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Table 4: Perceptions of the Needs of the Disabled in Cambodia
according to Key Organisations
Landmine Victims United Nations ICBL Basic Human
Rights
Shelter
Food
Access to Water
Access to school
Primary health
Services
Income-generation
opportunities
Mine-free
environment
Land titles
Access to prosthetics
Access to
roads/buildings
Social standing
Mine/disability
awareness
Accessibility
Education
Employment
Income maintenance
and social services
Family life and
personal integrity
Culture
Recreation and Sports
Religion
Emergency medical
care
Continuing medical
care
Physical
rehabilitation
Psychological/social
services
Employment and
economic integration
Legislation and public
awareness
Data collection
Access
Food
Shelter
Health
Education
A group of disabled people who work and study with JS, including Tun Chandarith, the ICBL Ambassador,
reflected on their living conditions in mine-affected villages and came up with these needs, Jesuit Services 2000
(Source: Heng at al, 2001:11)
APPENDIX 7 – PRAKAS ON ORGANIZATION OF DISABILITY
ACTION COUNCIL (DAC)
Ministerial Declaration on the DAC
The following is the text of the Ministerial Declaration ("Prakas") of Cambodia's Ministry of
Social Affairs, Labor, Vocational Training and Youth Rehabilitation (MOSALVY). This
document formalizes the status of the Disability Action Council as a semi-autonomous
national coordinating body for the disability and rehabilitation sector in Cambodia.
Kingdom of Cambodia
Nation Religion King
Ministry of Social Affairs, Labor,
Vocational Training, and Youth Rehabilitation
No. 308 MOSALVY
Phnom Penh, 26.10.99
PRAKAS
On Organization of Disability Action Council (DAC)
Minister of Social Affairs, Labor, Vocational Training and Youth Rehabilitation
– Having seen the Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia
– Having seen Royal Decree No. ns/grt/1198/72 dated on 30th of November, 1993 on
creation of the Royal Government of Cambodia
– Having seen the Royal Law No. 02/ns/94 dated 20th of July, 1994 which was declared for
use of the law on organization and operation of the Council of Ministers
– Having seen the Royal Decree No. ns/rgt/0699/06 dated on 17th of June, 1999 which was
declared for use of the law on organization of the Ministry of Social Affairs, Labor,
Vocational Training and Youth Rehabilitation
– Having seen the appointment letter of representative from Ministry of Education, Youth
and Sport, No. 370 MOEYS, dated on 9th of February, 1999
– Having seen the appointment letter of representative from Ministry of Health, No. 12
MOH, dated on 10th of February, 1999
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– With reference to the cooperation between the Ministry of Social Affairs, Labor,
Vocational Training and Youth Rehabilitation, Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport, and
Ministry of Health
– With reference to the ESCAP Proclamation on "Full Participation and Equality of Disabled
Persons in the Asian and Pacific Region" which the Royal Government of Cambodia is a
signatory
– With reference to the Task Force Report: A National Strategy for MSALVA and NGO's of
the Rehabilitation Sector on Disability Issues and the Rehabilitation and Integration of
Disabled People in Cambodia, October 1996
– With reference to the Disability Action Council's Statutes
– With reference to the request of the Disability Action Committee
DAC Annual Report, Sep. 98 - Sep. 99 - 33 -
DECIDED
Article 1
The Disability Action Council (DAC) - a permanent semi-autonomous body shall be
organized to replace the Disability Action Committee, which its mandate has been finished.
Article 2
The DAC's Executive Board shall consist of not less than nine and not more than eleven
members for a period of three years. It is made up of five representatives of the Government
of Cambodia, three representatives who are disabled persons from local MOSALVY
registered NGOs, which are involved in disability activities, and other three representatives of
international MOSALVY registered NGOs, which are involved in activities relating to
disability.
The current composition and tenure of members of the Executive Board refer to Annex 1
attached to these papers.
Article 3
The DAC will act in a professional advisory capacity in relation to government, policy-
makers and key NGO representatives on all issues affecting the wellbeing of people with
disabilities. It also serves as a national focal point on disability matters to facilitate the
continuous evolution of a comprehensive national approach to rehabilitation, equalization of
opportunities and prevention of disabilities.
Article 4. The DAC's Executive Board has the following responsibilities:
– To advise on policies regarding the development and support of services with and for
disabled people.
– To advise on programs and budgets for the implementation of the Program of Action.
– To decide on all matters and activities undertaken within the scope of the DAC's statutes.
323
Article 5
The Chairperson shall preside at all meetings of the Board or in his / her absence the Deputy
Chairperson shall preside. In the absence of Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson, a member
elected by the members present from among their number shall preside.
A question proposed at any meeting of the Board shall be determined by a simple majority of
the members present and voting and where there is an equality of votes, the person presiding
at the meeting shall have a second or casting vote.
Article 6
A member, who cannot attend the meeting, is entitled to appoint a person representing him /
her to the meeting but the appointee does not have voting rights. However, the member
should have his / her proxy vote. The Chairperson should be informed in writing at least one
week in advance.
Members who will be absent for three consecutive meetings will be asked to reconfirm their
interest. They may be replaced at their requestor by a majority vote of the Board members.
Article 7
The Executive Board will meet once in two months to discuss and solve matters, raised by
Technical and Specialized Committees and DAC Secretariat, and to provide directly or
through the Secretariat guidance, direction, supervision and decision.
DAC Annual Report, Sep. 98 - Sep. 99 - 34 -
Article 8
The Executive Board is entitled to appoint an Executive Director of the DAC Secretariat to
be overall responsible for the Secretariat execution and management, and to monitor and
evaluate the work of the DAC Secretariat.
All technical work shall be organized and implemented by the DAC Technical and
Specialized Committees, and DAC Affiliated Organizations.
Article 9
The Disability Action Council is entitled to use its own seal.
Article 10
All previous decisions, which shall be contrary of this declaration, shall be annulled.
Article 11
Members of the DAC's Executive Board as stated in Annex 1 of the Article 2 shall carry
effectively out the content of this declaration from the day when it shall have been signed.
(Signed and Sealed)
Ith Sam Heng (Minister)
CC:
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– Council of Ministers
– Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport
– Ministry of Health
– Affiliated international and National Organization
– Departments under MOSALVY supervision
– Member of the DAC's Executive Board
– File-Chronicle
********************
DAC Annual Report, Sep. 98 - Sep. 99 - 35 -
325
2. Annex 2
Composition and Tenure of DAC Executive Board Members
Ministry of Social Affairs, Labor, Vocational Training, and Youth Rehabilitation
Prakas No. 308 MOSALVY
Phnom Penh, 26.10.99
The composition and tenure of members of the current DAC's Executive Board includes:
1. H.E. Prak Chantha, Secretary of State, MOSALVY, Chairperson
2. Mr. Carson Hart, Country Representative CT/CSPO, Deputy Chairperson
3. H.E. Hem Samkol, Under Secretary of State, MOEYS, Member
4. H.E. Seng Hak Srun, Under Secretary of State, MOH, Member
5. Mr. Keo Kim Thon, Deputy Director, Rehab Department, MOSALVY, Member
6. Mr. Heang Veasna, Deputy Director, Public Relation, MOSALVY, Member
7. Mr. Yi Veasna, Executive Director, NCDP, Member
8. Mr. Son Song Hak, Executive director, CDPO, Member
9. Ms. So Chamroeun, Disabled Women Representative, CDPO, Member
10. Mr. Sum Sambo, Representative, HI, Member
11. Mr. Kike Figaredo, Representative, JS, Member
Non-voting members include: Dr. Khoun Eng Mony and Mr. Uk Man
DAC Annual Report, Sep. 98 - Sep. 99 - 35 -
http://www.dac.org.kh/publications/download/DAC-Annual-Report-1999-Eng.pdf
Resource accessed: Monash University, 12.07.04
