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Power'Elites and

State Building

Editedby

W o l% a n g R e in h a rd

Stadt- und Univarsitóte- biWioíhekBern

\9 9 6 / A 0 ^ ^ A 0

Biiropean Sdence Foundation

C LA R E N D O N PRESS 1996

CH APTER I

IntroductionPower Elites, State Servants, Ruling Classes, and the Growth of State Power

W oligangReinhaid

I.I The Growth o f State Power. The Facts and the Problem

D u rin g tiie past tibousandyears, from the high Middle Agés until the pre­sent àsf, the power and the institutions o f certain central governments in Europe have been grovwng continuous^ at the expense o f other autonomous holders o f

political power and at the expense o f the subjects. 'Hie final outcom e is the mod­em European pow er state, defined b y a continuous territory w ith a distinct bor­derline and jt^ complete external sovereignty, b y the m onopoly o f every kind o f

legitimate use offbrce, and b y a homogeneous mass ofsubjects each o f whom has

the same visits and duties.A t the beginning o f this process things w ere difkrent. In the beginning die

rulers o f states were but first am ong equals, am ong hundreds o f competing and m ore or less autonomous power-holders— in the caad som e tw enty or thirty kings or states had become monopolists ofpower, evetybody else being reduced to the status o f subject. In die beginning die audiority o f the ruler was sacred ^ d received its external legitimacy througji rdigion-r-in the end the state no longer needs the mythical figure o f a p ie r by the grace o f God, because it now derives legitimacy fiom die fictitious identity o f t i e stete -with its subjects. In the begui- nirig the ruler's task was limited to the maintenance o f justice and peace and he was not even the only oné engaged in diis— in the end the state daim s compet­ence over die whole reach ofhum an existence andin addition is able to extend this at its convenience, because the state in the m eantime has acquired the compet­ence to decide the limits o f its ow n competence. In the beginning the ruler had only personal servants and followers and no professionals to execute his will— in the end a large share o f the total population have becom e professional servants o f the state, as much as 14.6 per cent ofthe labourforce in W est Germ any in 1984.’ In

• Inf)Tr,utionsdiatst der deutschm Wirtschajl, 10. no. 19 (1984), 4-

the beginning the state held no exclusive command o f armed men— in tbe end states maintain gigantic armed forces and in the event o f war are able to mobilize their entire populations. In the beginningaprince had to live andfinance his activ­ities 'o f his own’, that is from the demesne— in the end the state diq»oses o f ihe lion s share o f the national product, up to about 50 per cent o f it in our own time. In the begiiming a subject did not expect much o f his ruler, be it for good or for evil— in the end (he administrative annihilation o f the subject by the state has become not a possibility, but a reality.*

W hen contemporaries began to take notice o f diis development, the history o f political ideas from the Middle Ages down to the nineteenth century became mainly a series o f intellectual reactions to this political change. Trying to m der- stand these new developments could result in attm pts to.Iegitimize them. But it could also lead to theoretical alternatives which more often than not corres­ponded to the interests o f tibe antagonists o f the growing state power, -vrfiether churches or estates, bourgeoisie or proletariat In the Middle Ages the autonomy o f princely authority had to be defended against Pope and Emperor. Later on, when even contemporaries cotild observe the convergence o f diferent ways o f state building,^ since the times o f MachiaveDi the state's 'right to growth*, in con­temporary terms 'reason o f state', became the key problem, at first its internal, then its external aspects. It was analysed and legitimized, but also criticized and

, opposed for religious reasons and by organized assemblies o f estates. When state

power had grown furiher, the theoretical foundations o f the state itself became the central objective. Since the time o f Thomas Hobbes 'modem' sdence has been used to justify state power. The subsequent promotion o f rationali^ b y the Enlightenment certainly promoted human liberty and self-determination but, by

a kind o f dialectical somersault, it also produced further growth o f state power, in theory through Rousseau’s philosophy ofidentity, in practice by the policy o f the so-called "Enlightened absolutism’. Even the French Revolution gave further impems to the growth o f state power when it rdeased the forces o f modem nationalism, to say nothing o f Hegel and Fichte, who dianged the Revolution’s ideas into a state philosophy for authoritarian Prussia.^

Traditionally, the existence o f this kind ofstate has been accepted as a matter o f course by French, German. Italian, and probably some other historiographies until recendy. Its development was treated as a kind o f natural growth with a self- evident teleology, which was never questioned. To ask about the 'invention o f the state' would have been regarded as ridiculous a question as one about the "inven­

tion o f sleep’— only to be asked by a man as stupid as Sancho Paaza..’ 'Sleep' and

a • Wo^gangReinhard

Dücher (1990). 638. > TiUy (1990), iFenske(i987). * Schiedcr(i973).2fi

'statE* did not liave to be invented, because they have always been there— state­lessness was as abnonnal as sleeplessness. As far as I know, the origins o f the mod­em state began to be seriously questioned only after World W ar II, on die one hand beatuse aqieriences with 'total' states had shaken confidence in the tradi­tional national power state and, on the other, because the creation ofinnumerable

new states inevitably led to the conclusion that the m odem, European, national state was not necessarüy the final outcome o f all world history but, rather, a unique product o f Europe’s world-wide success, die consequence o f its world­wide domination: and finally because, at the very m om ent o f this ultimate suc­cess, the m odem state started to lose parrs o f its sovereignty to new supranational organizations and alliances. Briefly, the growth o f state power during the medieval and modem periods o f European history which led to the m odem state was now no longer seen to be the self-evidentty- normal case, but a spedsi instance requiring explanation.

1.2 The Growth ofState Power: A New Explanatory Model

There is no lack o f contemporary political theories to explain this growth o f state power in Europe. Recentfy, Charles TiUy has arranged them in four groups according to the respective weig^it o f internal political development, foreign pol­icy, and economy. Some think that specific historical events and institutional

developments are decisive, for example, the grow th and change o f the armed forces according to W. H. MdMeill.* Paul Kennedy's great-power theory’’ has become extremely popular for obvious political reasons. He combines economic development with foreign policy. Unequal economic grovsrth produces favourable conditions for political growth until the priorities o f great-power policy lead to economically detrimental spending on armaments, initiating economic and political decline. The purely geopolitical approach o f a second group has become slightly outmoded, whereas a third group o f explanations, which considers the mode o f production as the outstanding ctor, is still popular. This is the basis o f Perry Anderson's diderential analysis ofEuxopean absolutism,' whereas Barring­ton Moore ejqjlains the varied natures o f twentieth-century regimes b y the dif­ferent development o f the agrarian sector in the respective countries.* World- system theorists, a fourth group, in particular Immanuel Wallerstein,'“ believe that the development o f the state is determined b y that country’s position in the capitalist w o r ld -^ e m originating in the sixteenth century. The standard objec­tion o f historians, that these are oversimplifications and therefore without much

‘ la). Kennedy (rpSy). * Anderson (1974).* MoL \i966). “ Wallerstein (1974-88).

í Power Elites and the Growth o f State Power ■ 3

eaqplanatoty value, is met by Stein Rokfcan's multifectorial paradigm." Tilfy him­self completes his former concept o f a cydical escalation o f coercive force and resource extraction propelled by vrarfere, insisting upon state coercion and urban capitalism as abasic alternative. But varying combinations ofboth produce diflfer- entmodes o f state building in history.“

However, the abundance o f theories leaves the process o f state formation still underdetermined, otherwise their number would not continue to grow! In m y opinion this dilemma can be solved by the simple means o f an eclectic synthesis. Several hypotheses can be combined and then arranged in a systematic order. Essentially, this methodological strategy appears self-evident, became a closer look at several theories o f state formation shows that operate on different levels o f abstraction and therefore do not try to explain ± e same aspects o f die general process o f political growth. On the other hand, it is well known that his­torical syntheses should combine explánations on diferent levels, in terms o f gen­eral laws o f human behaviour, social and cultural arrangements, statements o f singular causation, or simply o f fact.“ For both reasons I feel encouraged to pro­pose a distinction with three theoretical levels, thereby proceeding from the particular to the general:

I start from the micro-level of individuals and their groups and the respective pre­sentation of andiropolo^cal dieories, of theories of interaction and elite theories.To a large extent, we have to deal with intentional actions on this micro-leveL Therefore, many variables at diis level are not measurable and have for that reason been described as'not observable’.“

Then I shall proceed to the meso-level o f the political system, considered as a sec­tion of the sodety as a whole, widi die preferential partidpatíon of certain g r o i^ whidi therefore have to be studied particularly carefully on the micro-level. Here, on the meso-level, we come across so-called autonomous processes', defined as sequences of actions which have not been organized intentionally, but are gov­erned by a certain amount o f determinism. In original configurations of a more-or- . less contingent character, motives arise and actions are peifonned which, as a result of their unintentional consequences, reproduce the original configurations and therefore sustain the process. We were unable to identify such non-linear circular processes before the invention of cybernetics. Nevertheless, it would be a mittake to eqiect continuous self-reconstitution o f a system as the regular effect of such processes. Quite the opposite: they arc die most important agents o f change.”

4 • Wo^gang Reinhard

” Rokkan (1975); Flora (1981). " Tilly (1990)." Berkhofer (1969), 293-4. ” Wenan 978). 87.” Hoyningen-Huene(i983)- v

Fma%, at die macro-level I prefer to i^eak o f society and not ‘the sodal system*, because in my opinion sodely is not a dosed and homoeostatic unit, but a laige network of heterogeneous interaction. But because this network is less dense at its margins, we can still suppose that change in sode^ is possible without input from outside. However, this leaves us with theproblem of where to draw the borderlines of sodety or,, perhaps, o f 'sodeties',“ In the beginning probably the whole of Europe, in the sense of the sphere o f influence o f Latin Christianity, can be consid­ered one single sodety; in the end European sodeties correspond to national states. Segmentation o f sodety coinddes with state and nation building.

Success or feilure o f m y working concept depends on its ability to integrate sepa­rate theories o f three diflFerent levels into a single coherent three-level theory This, however, would for the first time create an interdependentpa ttern o f a plurality o f

operating &ctors instead o f a mere addition o f them, as happens in other cases •where historians approach complex problems.

( Power Elites and the Grcnvth o f State Pcnver ■ 5

1.3 TTie Micro-Level: Dynasties and Power Elites

Starting from the micro-level, w e have first to assume that human beings act according to their interest— b eit by rational, pseudo-rational, orirrational choice— and that this interest has an elementary character and therefore needs no substan­tiation because it is self-ej^lanatoiy. It is directed towards the acquisition o f a larger share o f scarce goods. Scarce goods, however, should not be misinterpreted in a narrow materialistic sense. Thqr need not consist o f material wealth alone, but may include meaningful work— som ediing which has becom e scarce in oux sodety— or things like prestige or the pleasures o f sex and power. Often, material wealth can be used as a means to achieve these additional ends.

From such a point o f view the origins ofstate building look difierent, as Charles Tilly observed some years ago:

Atle^tibr tbe European ei^erience ofdie past few centuries, a portrait o f war makers and state makers as coerdvc and self-seeking entrepreneurs bears a iar greater resemblance to the Ëicts than do its chief alternatives: the idea o f a sodal contract, the idea o f an open mar­ket in which operators of armies and states offta: services to willing consumers, the idea of a sodety whose shared norms and expectations call forth a certain kind o f government.''

Using a biological metaphor, W H. M cNeill has found an even more caustic expression for these facts: as in biology micro- and macro-parasites exist at the expenseofotherIivmgbeings,liceontheonehaiid, beasts o fprey on the o± er,so mankind too has always been harassed b y micro- and macro-parasites— ^macro- parasites being human minorities vtdio live on the w ork o f others. As w e all know,

« iv..uin (1986), 13; Blockmans (1990). ” Tilty (1985). 169.

Üiis metaphor had been horribly abused b y racists long before McNeill -wrote. Nevertheless, it remains basically ambiguous and can dierefore be used not only to discriminate but also to expose & e regular exploitation by government. In the course o f cultural evolution the primitivE human parasitism o f irregular plunder has been replaced by the organized parasitism o f man’s rule over man.“ This sym­biosis between parasite and host m i^ t even produce benevolent effects for the

latter, quite contrary to the actors’ intentions.'Hie individual’s lust for power, however, cannot be realized in isolation but

only by interaction. Even under today’s conditions, when isolated individuals and their personal interests are considered to be the basic components o f sodety and politics,-communication and interaction acconîing to the laws o f the market are necessary for success. Those who want to be successful have to enjoy publicity and to know the rig^it people. In other words, whoever wants to sell her- or him­self, has to advertise’ to interest potential demand.

During those centuries o f European history which were decisive for state for­mation, sodety was not so much composed o f basic units o f isolated individuals, but rather ofsocial groups and networks, which integrated individuals for good or ill, espedally in politics. In spite (or perhaps because) o f his philosophy o f political identity, Rousseau already , observed diat the holders o f power in a state did not only develop their own interests, but also a specific group-consdousness based on these common interests.'* Therefore, they are inclined to use this power of the statie which they hold in the interests o f their own group first o f alL H ie same col­lective egoism drives diem to promote the growth o f state power and the devel­opment o f state institutions. O f course, services are rendered for the common good, but only because this gives the holding o f power by the ruling syndicate an

air o f legitimacy“These groups who, in their own interest, promoted the growth o f state power

more-or-less continuously for so many centuries, and had the means to do so suc­cessfully. are called 'power elites’ in diis book. In other words, we have to identify and study those individuals among the agents or servants o f the state and among sodety’s ruling classes, who were the really important promoters o f state power by using their position— formal or informal— in die service o f the state.

B u t since d ie abstract, 'tranq>ersonal’ notion o f ‘the state' originally had very limited currency, 'service ofthe state’ in reality often meant 'service o f a (tynasty’ . In most cases indeed the hard core o f successful promoters o f state power con­sisted o f a family, that is a dynasty. Dynasties created continuity o f interest, even i f

their individual members were unimportant figures. I f the opposite was the

6 ■ WoygangReinhard

'• McNem(i98o). ” Rousseau, Du kra,chsi,io.»JouveneI(rg45).

I much the better. This can be proved hy a cotinter-factual test, because a dynastic crisis often resulted in a crisis o f the state, which interrupted or even inverted the growth o f state pow er— as for example in France during the Wars o f Religion. States without dynasties, such as republics or elective ecclesiastical prin­cipalities, were likely to lose the fight for power when competing with dynasties. I f dynasties such as the Bourbons, the H ohenzollem , or the TVidors wanted to increase their control over the resources o f their respective coimtries. they had to eliminate, or at least to force back, the rival holders o f autonomous power dating

from the pre-state phase o f history, in order to establish tiieir own m onopoly o f power. This is the origin o f the state. Their rivals were first o f all other dynasties, that is, the families o f the higher nobility, and the Church.

On die other hand, the leading servants o f these dynasties in conflict constimted the new 'power elites'. 'They too made the growth o f state power their own cause, because this policy best advanced the interests o f their own group. Obviously, this has nothing to do with the acceptance or representation o f the central values o f society by those individuals. Power elites are not value-oriented in any other than a political sense. Neidier are they functional in the sense o f filling established official positions in a political system. Their functions and their values grow with them. They may have their origins in the upper strata o f the hierarchy ofwealth or prestige, or both. But often they come firom neither group, and it is their very ser­vice to the ruler and the state which lays die foundations o f iheir wealdi and pres­tige. They are certainly not die only elite in a sodety. Even i f some members ofthe economic, inteUecmal, religious, or other elites join them for particular reasons, these other elites still maintain their separate existence. Power elites arc the people who really matter in the political qrstem, espedally in die process o f state building,

and nothing more. In brief, they are a dynamic and -rariable group not to be defined in terms o f any elite theory but b y their interconnection with the growth o f state power and by their actual sodal interaction in the field o f politics.*'

During the sixteenth century, a decisive period o f German history, everywhere in die Empire councillors ofbourgeois origin with legal training played a strategic role.“ But in contrast to the dergy and nobility they were not traditional rivals o f the growing state power. As they owed all their status and power to the service o f princes, it was in their own interest to take a strong line in favour o f the further growth o f state power.

The growing importance o f Roman law fits well into the sodal strategy o f this group. W hen law becomes a systematized disdpline“ it also becomes

j Pofwer Elites and the Growth o f State Power ■ 7

Bottomore (1976). 1-18; Reinhard (1979): Batori and Weyrauch (198z), 210; Herzog (igsz).

“ Press (rpa ^ Kroeschell (1983).

8 • Wo^angReinhard

an individual has either to know or to learn on pain o f exclusion from political power; Those members o f the nobility who wanted to remain within the inner d rd e o f power-holders could do nothing better than study law. Knowledge o f law became a guarantee o f the monopoly ofpower, because even 'today's laws are produced by a self-sustaining caste o f experts, who prove their r i^ t to eadst by cre­ating such complicated arrangements o f legal matter that only t h ^ themselves are able to understand, apply and comment upon what they have created’. This

is a German law professor's view o f the situation at the end o f the twentieth century.”

Professionalization, however, is only one o f the strategies which power elites used to establish their coherence and contimui^, and perhaps not even the most important. It was not only in sixteendi-century Germany that true family net­works were the strongest source o f support o f the new system o f government. Pierre Goubert once said o f the leading d id e o f the Prendi twilase de robe: A t the highest level, everybody is a relatrve’.” But consanguinity and affinity widi sixty or more femilies o f the group is onfy the basis ofthe system. More imj^rtantiy, diese networks operate in such a way that members o f certain families are automati- calfypteferred when top poradons are to be filled. From 1680 to 1700 the closest cir­cle o f ministers around Louis XIV o f Ranee consisted, with one exception, exciusivEly o f members o f the femily clans o f Colbert and Lelfellier-Louvois. However, for safety's sake, even these rival clans were connectedby affinity. After all, the greatJean-Baptiste Colbert obtained his first position in the central admin­istration because an uncle o f his had married a sister o f the seoretaiy o f state, Michel LeTellier.“

Besides natural consanguinity the artificial relationship o f afBnity was o f cen­tral importance for these informal networks; in addidon the 'group patriotism' o f people o f common origin and in particular the omnq>resent patron-dient rela­tionship. 'nransformations were possible: a fellow countryman could become first a client and then a son-in-law. Informal networks o f this kind were, and still are, always important where power elites recruit new members, because they make a remarkable contribution to their coherence. N ot only do blood relations owe loyalty to each other, but patrons can expect the same allegiance from those

“ 'Die heutigen Gesetze sind Produkte eines sich selbst nährenden Eq»cttenstandes, der seine Existenzberechtigung dadurch beweist, er komplizierte Gebilde erzeugt, die dann nur er selbst verstehen, anwenden und kommentieren kann’: F. Haft, 'Der Dschungel um uns: Müssen Gesetze so kompMert seinT, Süddeutsche Zeitung. 4-5 Feb. 1984.

** 'Au plus hautniveau, toutle monde estparent'; Goubä P73), 52.« Weis (1968). 180.

clients have been coopted into the power elite through the patron s inter-

yenúon.”Duringihe early m odem period, eqjedaDy in the seventeenth century, the still

laigely informal structure o f power elites produced the extraordinary phenom­enon o f the 'fevourite first minister' with Richelieu in Rrance and Olivares in Spain as particularly remarkable cases, but found almost everywhere in Europe at one time or die other. Based on a personal, sometimes even sentimental, relationship

o f confidence with the ruler, one member o f the power elite monopolized power to the extent o f almost becoming the alter ego o f the prince. But the enormous amount o f patronage accumulated in this outstandingposition had to be used in the service o f the ruler. H ie 'fevourite first minister' usually held high office, but this vras not the source o f his power; 'first minister' should still be translated as 'first servant o f the king’ and not as "head o f the government'.

Power Elites anã the Growth o f State Power ■ 9

1,4 TheMeso-Level; W ar and State Servants

Obviously the growth o f state power started firom the micro-level, where dynas­ties andpower elites worked in their own interest for an expansion o f the state and o f its institutions. But h ow could such far-reaching change be enforced on the meso-level o f the political system? Even when this aim was pursued with all poss­ible determination, both partners not onty had to cope with the well-known iner­tia o f established institutions, but also with the active resistance o f opposing interests. The abiKty ofpower elites to exploit war, religion, and patriotism for the purpose o f eapanding their power then becomes decisive.

Once more, war was the fetiher o f all things. In its decisive phase o f growth the m odem state is a war state, which expands its administration and taxation mainly in order to be able to wage war. 'This fact is closely connected w ith the enforce­ment o f an internal and external monopoly o f violence. Ultimately, only states wage war. Private wars, such as vendettas or feuds, noble or popular revolts (which had only limited legal justification, but for a long time were nevertheless considered legitimate) were no longer possible under the new overmighty war and police state. But the obvious decrease o f everyday small-scale violence thanks to the state had to be paid for b y an increase o f violence in the service o f the state, espedally o f -wars. Sorokin's index o f war intensity rises from the fifteenth to the si2Cteenth to the seventeenth century fi-om 311 to 732 to 5.193;“ the niunber o f sol­diers grew tenfold between 1500 and 1800, whereas popidation numbers just doubled."

Rein- (1979)- " Aho (1981). 195. " Parker (1988), 24-

The pre-existingrivahy ofBuropean princes inevitabfygrew with theirpower, because it became essential for them to outstrip tie ir neighbours, or better, to grow at their expense, and to protect themselves against comparable objectives on the part o f their neighbours. For all this, they needed money, in ever-increasing quantities. Costs rose because o f the ambitions o f rivals to outdo each other with laiger and larger armed forces on the one hand, and because ofcspensive military innovations on the other. We do not know whether the improvements in the late medieval and early m odem art o f war were produced in response to political demand, or whether tihey had erogenous causes such as social change. We do know that they were extremely e^ensrvE.

The beginning was not a consequence o fth e development o f firearms but o f the new Swiss infantry tactics o f the massive square o f pikemen. These new soldiers were m uch cheaper individually, compared to armoiured knights, but

many more o f them were necessary and as mercenaries thqr had to be paid reg- ularty. W hen, in the early seventeenth century, firearms finally became essen­tial, more flexible tactics were required, for which, however, careful training and improved discipline were preconditions. Thus, the permanent soldiers o f the standing army o f the state evenmally replaced the mercenaries hired od hoc by a military enterpriser for a limited purpose and time. Costs rose stíU further as a result.

A t first, however, firearms bad been less important in batde than in siege war- fiire. As early as c.1500 the comparatively higjb. and thin walls ofmedieval fortresses could no longer resist the new artillery. They had to be replaced by massive, deep structures with semicircular or triangular bastions instead o f towers, once again a very e3g>ensive affair. In addition, because these fortresses were harder to storm, siege warfare became technically more sophisticated andlastedlonger, as did wars in general. Aprince now needed a deep p\irse to wage war at all.”

In theory, the efficient defence o f avery large territory enjoyed the optimalpro- portion o f frontier length to surfece area, population, and resources. But since early m odem communications and administrative stmctures were inadequate, the optimal size o f an early m odem state was much smaller at that period than later."'

The relation between peacetime expenditure and the costs o f war was almost ridiculous, espedally in the beginning. In the middle o f the fourteenth century the annual ordinary expenses o f the republic o f Florence amounted to about 40,000

fiarini. By contrast, the war against the Pope in 1378 costa.5 million, the three wars against the Visconti o f Milan 7-5 million, the conquest o f Pisa 4.5 million.“ It

10 • Wo^angReinhard

’» Redlich (1964- 5); Parker (1988). ’ • Bean (197»' J (1986), 138.” Molho (1971). 9-ai. \

became a fundamental problem o f European history that rival powers started ambitious m odem policies Tvith an inadequate and old-fashioned financial infra- stmcture. In consequence, peace sometimes became inevitable during the six­teenth century because both sides were iînandaüy exhausted. Normalfy, war was

financed by credit, because only in this way could large amounts o f monqr be mobilized quickly. Thus a symbiosis o f state and capital became necessary. But iiTrimately everything depended on the regular levy o f higher and higher taxes. Originally, this was not possible without the consent o f the taxpayer. Therefore, the financial needs o f m odem monarchies at least temporarily strengthened the position o f the assemblies o f estates, their strongest rivals. On the otherhand, the new 'tax state* needed an apparatus o f extraction and enforcement, wiiich also became larger and more eigpensive. Thus, a circular development was set in motion: rising extraction o f resources and grow iag apparatus o f enforcement escalated until the growth o f state power, which had been initiated by war, became an irreversible autonomous process.”

Whetherthestate'sexpenses, w hichhadtobepaidforbyitssubjects, and there­fore the levying o f taxes, can simply be interpreted as a kind of'protection money’ to be evaluated b y cost-benefit analysis, as Frederic Lane, the historian o f the mercantile republic o f Venice, once suggested, appears doubtful. According to Charles Tüfy, more often than not growing states, like m odem protection racket­eers, enforced 'protection' and payments for it without demand on the part o f the •buyers'."

As a consequence, the additional legitimacy o f state power became necessary, or at least useful, when there was political growth. A t this point, religion and ideo­lo gy have a part to play. The absolutist su te was far firom neutral in religious mat­ters, in contrast to what was formerfy daim ed by historians. It was overtfy intolerant and quite correcdy considered this intolerance one o f the foundations o f its strength. This was a result o f the Protestant Reformation, ibr until then the Church had tended to be an important autonomous rival o f growing state power. But with Martin Ludier the traditional apparatus ofptpfessional mediators o f sal­vation and the religious foundations as a means to salvation became superfluous. Both the ecclesiastical estate itself and Church property along w ith it lost their right to exist autonomously In addition, the new 'confessional’ Churches, which were competing strongly with each odier and often had to figjit for their very exis­tence, needed the protection o f secular powers. In this respect, as in others, the Catholic Church differed little from the Protestant ones. As a result, the respective Churches were subdued and governed by die state. In the extreme case o f some German principalities the Church finally looked just like any other branch ofstat^

” Tmy(i975). «TiïïydpSs).

PowerEUtesandthe Growth o f State Power ■ i i

adzninistraition. Theological difierences were much less important than political

12 • Wolfgang Reinhard (

For the growth o f state power the acquisition o f control over Church govern­ment implied three comparative advantages. First, the extension o f the political monopoly ofthe state over the field ofone o f its strongest former rivals, and in par­ticular over that rival's property In Hesse, during the 1530s, secularized Church property provided 20 to 30 per cent o f the prince's income, the sum total o f taxes onty 20 per cent.”

Nest, there was the question o f the reinforcement o f national or territorial identity. W hen sodety was still not split up completely into autonomous subsys­tems such as 'religion', 'politics', 'econom y, 'private life', and so on, as is the case today, a fondamental agreement about religion was essential for every commun­ity. This became particularly obvious when defence against rival nei^^bours was necessary. Such was the case o f Sweden, when in the late sixteenth century Swedish political identity was in danger because o f die impending succession o f the Catholic king o f Poland. In defence, die Swedes stressed their Lutheran iden­tity Similarly, England became t ie pre-eminently Protestant and Spain the pre- eminendy Catholic nation, while in Germany Bavaria was the supremely Catholic and Brandenburg-Prussia the supremely Protestant Land.

Finally, religious unification and discipline made a contribution to the general political levelling o f subjects, towards a m odem equality not so much o f rights as ofdieirloss. Religioncouldsetthepaceforpolitics. Wherepurelypoliticalexpan- sion o f state power had to reckon with smbbora resistance, measures w hidi were legitimate from the viewpoint o f the subjects' eternal salvation could more easily

be enforced. Thus by esublishing control indirecdy, the 'confessional' state ocai-

pied the very consdences o f the subjects to make them tiie agents o f their own submission."'

This 'confessional’ period o f European history, which lasted fiom about 1530 until about 1730, was followed by a more secularized phase. 'Enli^tened abso­lutism' used the ideology o f public welfare to legitimate the ei^ansion o f its power. But this argument was not universally self-evident. W ith the French Re­volution things became di&rent, when once again mass emotions (which had greater appeal to the masses than did public welfare) could be mobilized. Con­trary to expectations, the Revolution gave a further impetus to the growingpower o f the state by releasing the forces ofnationalism. The revolutionary wars were to prove to vdiat extent men were w illingto die for their nation. For the holders o f .

state power diis amounted to an additional opportunity for resource extraction. Looking back, Alexis de Tocquevillc drew a parallel w ith the confessional age

” Krüger (1980), 295- ” Reinhard (1 >,276.

when he stated that two forces only can co-ordinate human actions emotionally: religion and patriotism.”

An expansion o f personnel and instimtíons was simultaneously üistrument and eflFett o f diis process, in brief the growth o f bureaucracy, defined as adminis­tration by full-time salaried and professional officials, organized hierarchically, with regular procedures and formalized record-keeping.” The establishment o f large numbers o f state servants below the level o f power elites was. however, not only a question o f warfere and resource extraction. This was impossible in an illit­erate SOdetyj the servants o f the Church, where literacy had been preserved, were therefore the first biireaucrats o f Europe and produced remarkable members o f the earfypowcr elites too. In addition, the political unit had to be stable and above a minimum size, and an urban sea o r with a developed middle dass was probably also indispensable.

Nov/here in Europe, not even in Prussia, did a fully developed professional dvil service existbeibre the end o f the eighteenth century. Many administrators were still considered the personal servants o f their monarch and in a sense the same was true ofm any subordiaate offidals w ho were appointed by their superiors and not the state, entering and leaving state service with them. Many offices were still a spedcs ofproperty, to be acquired, eaqjloited, and disposed oflike other kinds, and with hereditary or semi-hereditary tenure. Total remuneration b y fixed salaries from the state was as exceptional as adequate provision for pensioned retirement. Many officials depended on a combination o f payments from the public purse, perquisites in money or in kind, fees and gratuities from members o f the public -v^o needed their services, and, finally the plunder o f public resources and the acceptance o f bribes over and above gratuities and presents. Technical qualifica­

tion and ability were less important for appointment, promotion, and dismissal

than birth, wealth, and above all family connections and patronage. W here entrance examinations existed, they entailed onfy minimum requirements; open competitive examinations were not introduced before the eighteenth century. Here some countries, notably Bavaria and Prussia, were ahead o f others, but developments were also uneven between different branches o f administration, revenue and military departments tending to be more advanced than royal house­holds and law courts.

Prance had a laiger number o f offidals employed by the Crown, whereas in a igland part-time service without central remuneration was more widespread. The rigidity ofthe French system was dosety connected with the venahty o f office

Power Elites and the Growth o f State Power ■ 13

” De Tocqueville, De hi démocratie en Amérique, ed. B. Nolla (Paris. 1990). i. 77- " Max Webers definition in the words of Aylmer (1979); the next six paragraphs follow

Aylmer, sometim' ' ‘terally.

■which reached its most extreme form in France, the Papal States, and Castile, but ■was present in most countries o f Europe. Like the •widespread practice o f tax- ferming, ■venality o f office depended on the Temuneration o f state officials by tiie public via fees and was a part o f a regressive redistribution system ■which as a rule made the rich richer and die poor poorer. In this context it could be used by the state as an additional source o f revenue or even as a part o f the sjrstem o f public credit.’ *

firom the Middle Ages to the seventeeotii century many instimtions were orga­nized on ihe collegiate principle vrith a group o f officials sharing reqionsibilities, remimeration, and privileges. But during the early m odem period a parallel hier­archy o f individual commissions developed, the commissary first being tempo­rary and extraordinary, and later becoming a regular official, but •without any appropriation o f office. The French intendant o f the seventeenth century in this respect became a model for other countries, Spanish America included, as did the Prussian administration ofthe eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Perhaps the clearest long-term change between the twelfth and the seven­teenth centuries was the going 'out o f court* o f the central instimtions ofgovern­ment which became distinct from the personal household o f the monarch. However, ■very often this process included the creation o f new, and initially infor­mal, inner rings to replace those which had become too large and impersonal to allow effective policy-making and the quick carrying out o f decisions. Right from die beginning up to the present day, political and administrative instimtions grow according to the principle o f concentric waves moving away from die centre o f pow et

From the viewpoint o f sodal history, this growth o f administrative instimtions and their personnel created a distinct bureaucratic class below the power elite but ■with its own characteristic relation to the ruling classes o f society

14 ■ WolfgangReit^rd

1.5 The Macro-Level: Societies and Ruling Classes

*ftuling classes' can be defined in Karl Marx's sense as die owners o f the means o f production or at least tiie holders o f economic power in a given sodety. In medieval and early m odem Europe, however, this position was to a large extent based on sodo-political status and not ce ■versa. Feudal lordship over land, espe­cially ■when combined with noble birth, was an cvenbetter qualification for mem­bership o f the ruling dass than ■wealth o f bourgeois origin. Therefore, Gaetano Mosca's theory o f general antagonism between rulers and ruled, which is present

in any sodety, appears to be more appropriate in our cas' * W ith a certain over-

simplificarioii w e might claim that earlier European ruling classes did not rule because thqr were rich, but were rich because they ruled. They decided what was the common good, and their consent was necessary for the successful political action ofpower elites.

Obviou^y, power elites used certain societal situations to start and maintain political grow di and to find widespread sodal consent for it. Such action in their own interest had only to look as i f it were initiated for the sake o f the com ­m on good. This might, or m ight not, have been the case, but it was suffident that both elites and people were predisposed to believe it. Political cynidsm

was less com m on in earlier periods o f history than it is today, in our post­modern period.

Modem experience makes us suspect that the growth o f state power by exten­sion o f state activities was a kind o f crisis management during long-lastingphases o f economic depression. Roland Mousnier has suggested this for the period o f die so-called 'crisis o f the seventeendi century'/* For obvious reasons political theor­ies of'absolutism' tended to be pessimistic." There was also already a connection between accderated sute activity and the explosion o f poverty in som e countries in the sixteenth century.^ However, additional symptoms o f political growth are to be found in the 1500s, althou^Ji it is generally considered a boom period. Obvi- oudy, prosperity does at least not block the grovwh o f state power.

But is it reasonable, therefore, to connect die grow th o f state power with the rise o f capitalismi Perhaps war alone was not die fedier o f capitalism, as Werner Sombart bdieved.'” but rather the state waging war? O r did the rise o f die modern state occur in die interest o f the ascendancy o f the bourgeoisie? According to Perry Anderson, however, the absolutist state served to defend the rule o f the nobility against the e3q>ansion o f capitalism. W hen m oney and market economies began to destroy pre-market sodo-economic rdadons, the concentration o f power and ejqjloitation at die higherlevd o f the state became necessary to protect feudalism. Some sections o f the nobility m i^ t suffer, but on the whole the new state became a kind o f aggregate feudal lord serving the interests o f die nobility as the dass diat still ruled."

But die group intaest o f power elites, which was essential on the micro-level, need not necessarily be identified with the dass interests o f dther nobility or bour­geoisie. Even for Immanuel Wallerstein, the managers o f state power and die bureaucracy became arbiters between the conflicting dass raterests o f aristocrats and capitalists." On die odierjhand, as earty as the sixteenth century capitalism was

Mousnier (1954). " Birdey (1990).■“ Bo/ 75);Uppendahl(i978). Sombart(i9i7).342.

'dcrson (1974)- ■“ Wallerstein (1974-B8).

Power Elites and the Growth o f State Power ■ 15

indeed allied with the state by common interests, such as the capitalists' roles as suppliers and creditors, especially for war. or their need for eatemal and internal protection for their business. But this European capitalism, already operating internationally, and the state were all but identical, for the simple reason that there was more than just one state in Europe. Therefore, the holders o f political power in this part o fth e world were never able to establish complete control over the economy According to E. L. Jones, this quasi-natural resttiction o f predatory appropriation by power elites became the essential precondition for continuous

economic growth in the W est/' In addition, political plurality comespoflds to diat division o f labour which has become the key concept in Wallerstein’s European 'world-system', where the centre, the periphery, and the semjperipheiy have dif­ferent economic fimctions and adopt specific sodal and political organizational patterns accordin^y.^

Geographical and historical plurality is indeed the distinctive characteristic o f western Europe. According to Stein Rokkan, there are seven basic geohlstorical conditions which influenced the development o f political entities in Europe.® However, rfie feet that they arc important for the growth o f state power does not imply that they are all and always in favour o f it; sometimes the opposite was the case.

'Wewed from the perspective o f the entire Eurasian land mass die European 'peninsula'is ratherremote and has, compared w idi other parts, an extremely var­ied surface and coastline. Europe was therefore less exposed to continental expan­sion from Asia. On the other hand, the preconditions for expansion overseas were extretndy fevourable in some parts o f Europe. For all these reasons large land empires did not succeed in this part o f the world, whereas compedtion between several medium-sized powers seemed quite natural. This became the origin o f that continuous power rivahy, which made political growth necessary or at least attractive.

All participants, however, could always fell back on the common institutional heritage o f Latin Christianity.” The phrase 'common political culture' could also be used because the behaviour o f western power elites vras indeed formed by this political and cultural tradition.

The widespread Germanic tradition o f autonomous noble rule tended to be opposed to state building. In contrast, many achievements o f the former Roman empire were ready to be taken up by the growing state power. From the b i ^ Middle Ages, when transpersonal concepts o f the state were applied to other

potentates besides the Pope and the Emperor, legal arguments could be used to

16 • W o^angRdnkard (

'Jones(1981). ■" Wallerstein(1974-88). ■” Rokkan(1975)-Hassinger (1959). pp. xiv-xv.

legitimate the absolute power o f the prince, which was to play such a crucial role in state building.

Roman law, however, could be employed in pow er politics almost at wiU. In Germ anyitservedthe Empire and the Church, as w ell as tibe purposes ofterritor-

ialprinc^alities or even dties.’ * Equally ambiguous for the growth o f the state viras the Roman doctrine o f unlimited private property, because it not only favoured economic growth, but also checked fiscal eq>ansion.

Since antiquity the autonomous d ty has been a special feature o f western his­

tory, but one which has also had ambiguous consequences for the process o f state

building. The densety populated central urban belt o f Europe which developed at an early period and extended from the Netherlands to northern Italy did not become the starting-point o f the m odem power state— quite thè opposite. In the Netherlands, the German imperial cities, Svsdtzerland, and northern Italy republi­can alternatives flourished, and were not to lose the contest with the principalities

until the sixteenth or even the seventeendi century. In addition, as w e have already observed, rising capitalism and the rising state had some, but by no means all interests in common. But it would be a mistake to suppose that there was a clear- cut contrast between nobility, feudalism, expanding monarchies, and authoritar­ian regimes on the one hand, and bourgeoisie, capitalism, peaceful republics, and dvil liberties on.the other. In some countries, such as lirance and some German principalities, cities played an important role in state building. And the state builders knew how to use the urban econom y o f independent cities too, as the cases o f Augsburg or Genova demonstrate. In their domestic policies urban republics were far from democratic and egalitarian, quite the opposite. In the dis­ciplining ofits subjects the city could serve as a m odel for the state.

hi die long run, however, most o f the resources necessary for the growth o f the state had to be extracted from rural production. This applies even to the income from indirect taxation and customs. Therefore, the relationship o f the state with the ruling dass, that is the feudal lords as the first redpients o f land rent, became politically as essential as the extent to which the rural econom y had been inte­grated into the market. Some landlords mig^t live on a subsistence econom y but a state power could not, because it had continually to raise its share o f the resources e x a c te d . This rising share provoked resistance, not only from peasants but also from feudal lords. Consequent^, the rise o f state power was for a long time accompanied by popular revolts, m ore often dian not w idi the partidpation o f the nobility.

As abeady mentioned, the Church dianged its political role over time. For cen­turies. it had been the teacher o f the state, not only in ideology, but espedally

Power Elites and the Growth o f State Power ■ 17

" KroescheU (1983), 288.

■wiiere instimtions were con cern ei Papal power served as a model for ’abso­lutism’. But after the Reformation it changed into an obedient instrument o f con­trol and resource extraction.

But long before that the Chuirh had provided western Europe with the her­itage o f antiquity Latin became the common medium ofBuropean culture and deeply influenced the thinlcing and ihe languages o f Europe. Europe became per­manently bilingual. The intellec tual and political consequences o f this develop­ment have only recently become an object o f research.”

i 8 • Woygang Reinhard (

1.6 Conclusion: The Rules ofBuropean Politiail Growth

Historically, in spite o f recent imitations elsevihere, the m odem state is a uniquely European phenomenon, originating m the geohistorical plurality o f rival povrars in Europe. Dynasties allied with power elites used this conjuncture to increase their power, mainly in their own interest. The particular conditions o f the cultural and political tradition ofEurope on the one hand, and ofthe developing rural and urban economy on the other, provided the necessary means, but thqr also oeated spedRc obstacles. The continuous increase o f resource extraction by the state, which became possible and necessary because o f wars between die competing powers, was decisive for its success. ’This process o f growth was twice assisted by an ideological impetuis, first by confessionalism, later by nationalism. Only recendy the identity o f rulers and ruled, created by state ideology and culminat- ingm the doctrine ofthe sovereignty o f the people, has been unmasked as a fiction and questioned. W e are less sure than our fediers that the interest o f the power elites is also the interest o f the people as a whole.

" Reinhard (1987b).