Dangerous climate here and now: Do our indicators let us perceive the signals? The 2003 heat wave in France.

Marc Poumadère & Claire.Mays@gmail.com

It’s happening. We need to notice. “Intense, frequent and long heatwaves caused by human activity” “The speed at which they are increasing could not have occurred naturally. [We observe] significant increases across almost every region where there is sufficient data. This pattern is consistent only under a climate that is altered by us.” “While regional cooling trends in heatwaves can still occur under (the current amount of) human influence, warming trends are still far more likely. This means that shorter time periods in the near future are likely to have sharp increases in heatwaves.” OCF CC Blog entry 2015-06-22 Dr Sarah Perkins, U. New South Wales Poster : P-1118-06

Fifteen thousand persons died in the French episode of heat wave in August 2003, during the hottest summer in Europe since 1500. Yet it took months or years for this count to be recognized. Total surmortality for that summer in France: 19490 persons.

The heat wave dangers resulted from the intricate association of natural and social factors.

Unusually high temperatures, sustained over days and nights, combined with socioeconomic vulnerability and

social attenuation of hazards – a multi-form inability of individuals and institutions to recognize that people were dying of the heat.

The French experience confirmed research establishing that heat waves are a major mortal risk, number one among so-called natural hazards in postindustrial societies. Yet France in 2003 had no policy in place, as if dangerous climate were restricted to a distant or

uncertain future of climate change, or to preindustrial countries. We analyze the heat wave’s profile as a strongly attenuated risk in the French context, as well as the causes and the effects of its sudden

shift into amplification. Existing institutionalized indicators can mask or reveal the dangers of climate change. Improving indicators might be a significant lever in bringing about more sustainable behaviors.

Poumadère, M., Mays, C., Le Mer, S. & Blong, R. (2005) The 2003 Heat Wave in France: Dangerous Climate Change Here and Now. Risk Analysis, 25: 1483–1494.

“Americans who were unconcerned about climate change as it wreaked havoc around the world are beginning to worry, now that global warming is affecting the appearance of their lawns.” [HUMOR – Borowitz Report, April 5, 2015]

. ”The 2003 heat wave triggered with

stupendous speed a public health

catastrophe for which our country

clearly was not prepared… At the peak

of the crisis, French societal response

overall was late, insufficient, ill-adapted

and disorganized… For the people, the

[Aug.] deathtoll of 14,802 victims was a

shock, a tragedy, and a huge suprise.” (FRENCH SENATE, 3-2-04, Létard et al.)

So, how do we notice?

« How could such a catastrophe develop ‘under the radar’, in a country that is over-administrated, densely

networked with services, with empowered local deciders and a particularly efficient decentralized

governance institution (prefectures) whose roots go deep in our history? » (FRENCH SENATE ob.cit.)

Social psychological risk factors: Attenuation and amplification Kasperson et al., 1988; Pidgeon , Kasperson & Slovic (eds), 2003

Social attenuation Reasons why ‘no one saw it happening’

A ‘natural’ rather than technological risk Heat waves perceived as a ‘normal’ part of summer Rejected social characteristics of the most vulnerable

groups (elderly, isolated, sick, poor): heat waves are ‘silent and invisible killers of silenced and invisible people’

(Kline, 2002, A social autopsy of disaster in Chicago. U. Chicago Press.)

Reluctance of French administration to share quantified information

French people profess high levels of trust in experts and fatalism towards health risks (Slovic et al., 2000)

Before 2003, it was rare for attending doctors to attribute the primary cause of death as stemming from heat wave effects. No category, no counting…

Aug 2003: First, attenuation of perception Limiting the official dissemination of death numbers

Alerts by overwhelmed hospital emergency personnel were caricatured as corporatist claims

Official counts of fatalities lagged behind alarming reports from undertakers Unprecedented numbers: undertakers could not

store the bodies in usual places, central food markets and refrigerated trucks were requisitioned

Rationalization: ‘Harvest effect’ ‘Those who died would have died just a bit later…’ (disproved by statistical analysis as of 2006)

Then, amplification When the catastrophe became evident, blame was placed upon ‘others’ (even by the President)

…Summer absence of medical personnel, French societal values regarding responsibility for elders, government reduction of working week…

Shift in media coverage of usual summer events From forest fires and inconvenienced vacationers, to human casualties in astonishing numbers

Highly negative public perception of heat wave and subsequent government response

Socio-cognitive perceptual issues Inadequate mindset (unready to perceive

unfamiliar pattern) Inadequate focus of attention Inadequate data monitoring Noisy context Unusual data Unusual geographical pattern An unusual killer Scientific gap - officials , physicians not fully aware

that heat itself killed; tendency to focus on notion that patients’ pre-existing illnesses were merely aggravated by heat.

Lagadec, P. (2004). Understanding the French 2003 heat wave experience: Beyond the heat, a multi-layered challenge. Journal of

Contingencies and Crisis management, 12.

A here-and-now experience of Dangerous Climate Lessons were learned and France (like other countries)

installed a ‘Plan Canicule’: levels of alert and procedures

Epidemiology and monitoring took a methodological step forward. (Daily death counts, aggregating several countries, can help to reveal the phenomenon in real time; Robine, 2007.)

‘Europe jumped on the climate change policy bandwagon’. (Schneider, 2009)

For the larger picture – and for our common future under climate change:

The 2003 heat wave catastrophe in France (and Europe) demonstrated that:

Dangers exist even where governments are unable to imagine them

Where we lack previous experience (social memory) with as yet unknown risks, we can entirely miss perceiving what is happening

Today, some scientists and governments claim that useful environmental indicators of climate change cannot be constructed. However, the French 2003 here & now experience shows it’s an urgent task… So that we can all see what is happening & act before it’s too late.