THIRD DIVISION[ G.R. NO. 159048, October 11, 2005 ]

BENNY GO, PETITIONER, VS. ELIODORO BACARON, RESPONDENT.

FACTS:

Eliodoro BACARON conveyed a 15.3955-hectare parcel of land  in favor of Benny GO for P20,000.00. He however averred that prior to extending said loan to him, GO required him to execute a document purporting to be a Transfer of Rights but was told that the same would only be a formality as he could redeem the unregistered land the moment he pays the loan. BACARON remains in possession of the property even after the conclusion of the transaction and continued paying  the real property taxes subsequent to the alleged sale. About a year thereafter, BACARON, seeking to recover his property, went to GO to pay his alleged "loan" but the latter refused to receive the same and to return his property saying that the transaction between them was a sale and not a mortgage.

ISSUE:Whether the agreement entered into by the parties was one for equitable mortgage or for absolute sale.

HELD:

The instances in which a contract of sale is presumed to be an equitable mortgage are enumerated in Article 1602 of the Civil Code as follows:

Art. 1602. The contract shall be presumed to be an equitable mortgage, in any of the following cases:

(1) When the price of a sale with right to repurchase is unusually inadequate;(2) When the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise;(3) When upon or after the expiration of the right to repurchase another instrument extending the period of redemption or granting a new period is executed;(4) When the purchaser retains for himself a part of the purchase price;(5) When the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold;(6) In any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties is that the transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or the performance of any other obligation.

In any of the foregoing cases, any money, fruits, or other benefit to be received by the vendee as rent or otherwise shall be considered as interest which shall be subject to the usury laws.

Furthermore, Article 1604 of the Civil Code provides that the provisions of Article 1602 shall also apply to a contract purporting to be an absolute sale.

The present Contract, which purports to be an absolute deed of sale, should be deemed an equitable mortgage for the following reasons: (1) the consideration has been proven to be unusually inadequate; (2) the supposed vendor has

remained in possession of the property even after the execution of the instrument; and (3) the alleged seller has continued to pay the real estate taxes on the property.

 FELICIANO GAITERO and NELIA GAITERO, Petitioners, vs. GENEROSO ALMERIA and TERESITAALMERIA, Respondents.G.R. No. 181812 June 8, 2011

FACTS: By virtue of a relocation survey of the lot owned by the respondents Almeria spouses, it wasfound out that petitioner Feliciano Gaitero (Gaitero), who owned adjoining Lot 9960-A, intruded into the formers’ lot by as much as 737 sq m (the disputed area).When both parties failed to settle the dispute, Gaitero filed an action for recovery of possession against the Almerias before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court for the return of the possession of the disputed property plus damages. He claimed that he was the registered owner of the disputed property through succession. He further claimed that the survey was erroneous.

In their answer, Almerias alleged that they bought the lot by virtue of an Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate and Sale and it was Gaitero who unlawfully encroached on the disputed property. The MCTC held that the Almerias were entitled to the possession of the disputed area considering that it is included in the technical description of their registered title. Further, the MCTCheld that Gaitero acknowledged the true boundaries of his lot when it was subdivided. Indeed, the subdivision plan clearly shows that the disputed area is excluded from his lot.

On appeal, the RTC reversed the decision of the MCTC on the reason that laches prevented the Almerias from asserting their right over the same since it took them 15 years before they did so. On review, the CA reversed the RTC decision holding that that the Almerias owned the disputed area since, between a registered title and a verbal claim of ownership, the former must prevail.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Almerias are entitled to the possession of the disputed area as against Gaitero.

HELD: Yes.Between the Almerias’ registered title of ownership and Gaitero’s verbal claim to the same, the former’s title is far superior.

Since Gaitero was unable to prove that fraud attended the titling of thedisputed area, the Almerias’ right over the same became indefeasible and incontrovertible a year from registration. Possession is an essential attribute of ownership. Necessarily, whoever owns the property has the right to possess it.

Spouses Dolores Medin and Moises Berna vs. Nelly L. Romero Valdellon, and Spouses Cipriano Villanueva and Rufina Panganiban

 The complaint alleges that  petitioners are the owners  of a parcel of land in Hagonoy, Bulacan purchased (April 1967)for P800Defendants are family friends of the petitioners, and were allowed to remain in the premises  and to construct their residential house subject to the condition that defendants will return unto the plaintiffs the premises upon demand, this info

was amended to state that they defendants will return to the plaintiffs the premises in 1969; On demand, defendants refused to surrender the property in question. Thus, plaintiffs had to institute action praying that defendants be ordered: (1) to vacate the premises  and surrender the said property; (2) to pay plaintiffs P500 as incidental expenses ; and, (3) to pay P100a month from the filing of this action to the time they surrender its possession to the plaintiffs.CFI dismissed the complaint because of another case pending between the same parties over  the same  property (Land Registration Case). MR was denied.

ISSUE:Will the pendency of a landregistration case bar the institution of anaction for the recovery of possession?

HELD:The nature of this case is one forRECOVERY OF POSSESSION brought beforethe CFI by the alleged owners of a piece of land against the defendants who were supposed to have unlawfully continued  inpossession since 1969 when they weresupposed to return it to plaintiffs, plusdamages. The defendants withheld possession from the plaintiffs since 1969, more than the one year period contemplated in unlawful detainer cases at the time the complaint was filed in1973.Not all cases of dispossession are covered by Rule 70 of the Rules of Court (Forcible Entry and Unlawful  Detainer cases)

Because whenever the owner of property is dispossessed by any other means than those mentioned in the said rule, he may initiateand maintain a plenary action to recover possession in the Court of First Instance, and it is not necessary for him to wait until the expiration of one year before commencing such action. It may also be brought after the expiration of said period of one year, if no action had been initiated for forcible entry and detainer during that time in the inferior court. ACCIONPUBLICIANA must be instituted in the CFI.

RE CFI’s ACTION:The respondent court's action in dismissing this case is precipitate, there is sufficient merit  in petitioners' contention that the rights sought to been forced and the reliefs prayed (recovery of possession and damages) are entirely separate and distinct from that sought in L. R.C.

Case.It is a fundamental principle in the lawgoverning UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASES(including recovery of possession cases) that a mere plea of title or ownership over the disputed land by the defendant cannot be used as a sound legal basis for dismissing an action for recovery of possession because an action for recovery of possession can be maintained even against the very owner of the property. In this case, there is not even a plea of title on the part of private respondents over the disputed property but a mere allegation that there is another action for registration of title to that land the possession of which is being recovered by petitioners in the Civil Case. An action for recovery of possession is totally distinct and different from an action for recovery of title or ownership. In fact, a judgment rendered in a case of recovery of possession is conclusive only on the question of possession and NOT THAT OFOWNERSHIP. It does not in any way bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building. Thus, the Civil Case was arbitrarily and erroneously dismissed on the basis of the alleged pendency of another action, because while identity of parties may be established in both cases, there is no identity of cause of action or of rights asserted and relief prayed for, so that judgment which may be rendered in one case would not necessarily result in res judicata for the other case.RE CONSOLIDATION OF CIVIL AND LANDCASES: No sufficient reason for any of the parties in this case to object to the consolidation of the trial of both cases, since the evidence that may be presented by the parties involving possession and ownership of the disputed parcel of land may facilitate an expeditious termination of both cases. The evidence involving the issues of possession and ownership over the same land must be related and its presentation before one court of justice  would redound to a speedy disposition of this litigation. WHEREFORE, the respondent court's orders are hereby declared null and void and set aside; the complaint and amended complaint in Civil Case  revived; both the respondent Judge and the Presiding Judge, Branch VI, of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, being directed to consolidate the trial of L. R. C. No.2814 and Civil Case No. 4353-M in one branch of that court.