Portfolio review & strategy presentation 3Q 2016 Tel: (619) 890-9575 | 928 Fort Stockton Dr. |Suite 207 | San Diego, CA 92103 | jeremy@jdpcap.com

1

FUND overview

²  Founded in 2011

²  Concentrated value strategy around companies in transition

²  Small-cap and mid-cap focus, US-centric

²  2 – 5 year time horizon per idea

²  Highly organized investment process

²  Long-biased, No leverage

3Q, 2016

2

Founder’s Background

Jeremy Deal: Managing Partner, Portfolio Manager

Business Experience

2011–Current Founder, JDP Capital Management LLC

2008–2011 Fundless private equity sponsor, industrial focus

2003–2008 Co-founder, Secure Wireless Inc., sold to Nortek (NASDAQ:NTK) in 2006

2002–2003 Co-founder, Energy Eye Inc., sold to Somfy SA (EPA:SO) in 2009

2000–2002 Honeywell International, Home Controls

Education

2000 B.S. Business Administration, U.S. International University, Cum Laude

3Q, 2016

3

PERFORMANCE as of 3Q 2016

3Q, 2016

Full Years Gross Net S&P 500 HFRI2

2012 15.30% 11.24% 16.00% 6.36%2013 37.76% 27.63% 32.39% 9.15%2014 37.10% 27.34% 13.68% 3.57%2015 -1.40% -3.22% 1.38% -0.85%

3Q 2016 9.29% 8.80% 3.85% 2.96%

2016 YTD 5.98% 4.48% 7.84% 4.19%

Since Inception 140.04% 90.75% 113.44% 24.19%Annualized 19.14% 13.79% 16.37% 4.43%

JDPI, LP Indexes

*Founded October 1, 2011

43Q, 2016

Por$olio Review

5

September 30, 2016

3Q, 2016

Holdings above 5% of assets

% AUM Company Ticker Market Cap Segment

24% ALJ Regional Holdings NASDAQ: ALJJ $160 million Micro Cap 30 194.0%

21% Carrols Restaurants NASDAQ: TAST $580 million Small Cap 28 84.0%

15% Liberty Broadband NASDAQ: LBRDA $13 billion Large Cap 17 27.2%

15% TerraForm Power NASDAQ: TERP $2 billion Mid Cap 6 39.1%

10% Bank of America "A" warrants NYSE: BAC.WS.A $700 million Small Cap 31 -23.6%

8% Others below 5% Undisclosed -- -- -- --

7% CASH -- -- -- -- --

*Gross,dividendadjusted

Months Owned

Performance Since Initiation*

6

Alj regional holdings

Summary •  Investment vehicle with outsized Net Operating Losses (NOLs) controlled by investor Jess Ravich

•  Strategy to absorb NOLs by acquiring high free cash flow, low capex orphaned businesses for low multiples of cash flow

•  Acquired Faneuil in Oct. 2013, Carpets N More in April 2014, and Phoenix Color in August 2015

•  Buffett-style approach to decentralized management and compensation for sub CEOs

•  JDP invested through a private transaction to finance the acquisition of Carpets N More

•  Uplisted to NASDAQ in 2Q 2016, broadened board of directors

Why it got cheap •  Underfollowed, microcap with zero investor relations

•  Targets corporate orphans in out-of-favor industries with high EBIT margins and little capex

•  Misunderstood impact of NOLs on post-acquisition cash flows and acceleration of debt repayment

•  Misunderstood uniqueness of management’s pedigree and ability to source proprietary deals

•  Highly unconventional acquisition strategy and approach to capital allocation

NASDAQ:

AljJ Micro cap

Initiated march 2014

JDP Cost $1.60/ share

3Q, 2016

194% Return since initiation

7

Aljj share price

3Q, 2016

3Q 2016 Performance

Source: S&P Capital IQ

-15.00%

-10.00%

-5.00%

0.00%

5.00%

10.00%

S&P 500 Index - Total Return Gross - USD (^SPYZ) - Index Value ALJ Regional Holdings, Inc. (NasdaqGM:ALJJ) - Share Pricing

S&P +3.85%

ALJJ -6.00%

8

Aljj share price

3Q, 2016

Since IniIaIon: March 2014 – September 30, 2016

Source: S&P Capital IQ

-5.00%

0.00%

5.00%

10.00%

15.00%

20.00%

25.00%

Liberty Broadband Corporation (NasdaqGS:LBRD.K) - Share Pricing S&P 500 Index - Total Return Historical - 1988 - USD (^SPYZ) - Index Value

S&P +25.11%

ALJJ +194%

9

Carrols restaurants

Summary •  Largest Burger King franchisee with 737 US restaurants and right-of-first-refusal to acquire 1,000

•  Recapitalized in 2012 by Burger King Worldwide (BKW) as part of 3G Capital’s turnaround strategy, remains TAST’s largest shareholder with two board seats

•  Best-in-breed management team with exceptional operational skill and value creation record

•  Attractive long-term capital allocation opportunity to reimage older restaurants and consolidate mom-and-pop-owned locations

•  Classic roll-up arbitrage: 200 – 300 bps EBITDA margin expansion per acquisition driven by cost reductions and efficiencies

Why it got cheap

•  Underfollowed, misunderstood link to 3G Capital and the BKW turnaround

•  Misunderstood competitive advantage in scalability of outsized ROIC strategy

•  One-of-a-kind growth story rooted in consolidation of franchisee base vs. fast food trends

•  No public peer comps, often trades with perceived QSR macro data

•  Overlooked uniqueness of management skill and board composition

nasdaq:

tast small cap

Initiated June 2014

JDP Cost $7.25/ share

3Q, 2016

84% Return since initiation

10

TAST share price

3Q, 2016

3Q 2016 Performance

Source: S&P Capital IQ

-5.00%

0.00%

5.00%

10.00%

15.00%

20.00%

S&P 500 Index - Total Return Gross - USD (^SPYZ) - Index Value Carrols Restaurant Group, Inc. (NasdaqGS:TAST) - Dividend Adjusted Share Pricing

TAST +11.0%

S&P +3.85%

11

TAST share price

3Q, 2016

Since IniIaIon: June 2014 – September 30, 2016

Source: S&P Capital IQ

-50.00%

-30.00%

-10.00%

10.00%

30.00%

50.00%

70.00%

90.00%

110.00%

130.00%

150.00%

S&P 500 Index - Total Return Gross - USD (^SPYZ) - Index Value Carrols Restaurant Group, Inc. (NasdaqGS:TAST) - Dividend Adjusted Share Pricing

TAST +83.47%

S&P +18.21%

12

Liberty broadband

Summary •  John Malone controlled entity consisting of 20% interest in Charter Communications (NASDAQ: CHTR)

•  Trades for ~15% discount to underlying CHTR value (9/30/2016)

•  Malone-led merger of Charter Communications, Time Warner Cable, and Bright House Networks in Q2 2016

•  “New CHTR” platform became US cable/broadband consolidation powerhouse, new kid on the block

•  Significant upside and multi-year compounder qualities leveraging internet infrastructure growth, limited competition, declining capex, strong pricing power, and cash flow predictability and leveraged buybacks

Why it got cheap •  Perceived risk of TWC/Comcast merger approval

•  Less liquidity compared to direct ownership of CHTR

•  Perceived risk of continued NAV discount to underlying CHTR stock

•  Misunderstood growth opportunities through consolidation and balance sheet optimization in a low growth/mature industry

nasdaq:

lbrda Large cap

Initiated July 2015

JDP Cost $55/share

3Q, 2016

27.2% Return since initiation

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lbrda share price

3Q, 2016

3Q 2016 Performance

Source: S&P Capital IQ

-40.00%

-30.00%

-20.00%

-10.00%

0.00%

10.00%

20.00%

30.00%

40.00%

50.00%

60.00%

TerraForm Power, Inc. (NasdaqGS:TERP) - Dividend Adjusted Share Pricing S&P 500 Index - Total Return Gross - USD (^SPYZ) - Index Value

LBRDA +18.11%

S&P +3.25%

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lbrda share price

3Q, 2016

Since IniIaIon: July 2015 – September 30, 2016

Source: S&P Capital IQ

-25.00%

-20.00%

-15.00%

-10.00%

-5.00%

0.00%

5.00%

10.00%

15.00%

20.00%

S&P 500 Index - Total Return Gross - USD (^SPYZ) - Index Value Liberty Broadband Corporation (NasdaqGS:LBRD.K) - Share Pricing

LBRDA +27.56%

S&P +3.26%

15

Terraform power

Summary •  Large, high quality collection of wind and solar power projects, mostly US

•  “YieldCo” set up by parent Sun Edison (NASDAQ: SUNE) to purchase completed power projects

•  Collection of hard assets under 15 to 20-year contracts with major utilities to supply power

•  Parent company Sun Edison (NASDAQ: SUNE) filed bankruptcy in early 2016

•  Valuable “IDRs”, TERP equity, and management contracts are key value for SUNE bondholders

•  Dividend suspended with SUNE bankruptcy, stock price collapse below liquidation value

•  Enormous platform and growth value

Why it got cheap •  Fear that TERP gets dragged into bankruptcy with parent Sun Edison

•  Dividend temporarily suspended

•  Uncertainty as to who will take over TERP management from Sun Edison

•  Analyst coverage suspended, traditional investors cannot owe the stock

•  SEC earnings reports temporarily suspended, lack of update-to-date financials

•  Requires specialized research to understand

NASDAQ:

TERP Mid cap

Initiated April 2016

JDP Cost $10/ share

3Q, 2016

39% Return since initiation

16

TERP share price

3Q, 2016

3Q 2016 Performance

Source: S&P Capital IQ

-5.00%

0.00%

5.00%

10.00%

15.00%

20.00%

25.00%

30.00%

35.00%

40.00%

TerraForm Power, Inc. (NasdaqGS:TERP) - Dividend Adjusted Share Pricing S&P 500 Index - Total Return Gross - USD (^SPYZ) - Index Value

TERP +27.61%

S&P +3.25%

17

TERP share price

3Q, 2016

Since IniIaIon: April 2016 – September 30, 2016

Source: S&P Capital IQ

-40.00%

-30.00%

-20.00%

-10.00%

0.00%

10.00%

20.00%

30.00%

40.00%

50.00%

60.00%

TerraForm Power, Inc. (NasdaqGS:TERP) - Dividend Adjusted Share Pricing S&P 500 Index - Total Return Gross - USD (^SPYZ) - Index Value

TERP +39.01%

S&P +4.14%

18

Bank of America

Summary •  TARP-era government warrants with a $13.30 strike in January 2019

•  Reasonable price target of $12 per warrant by expiration, 100% upside for JDP

•  Second largest bank in the US, $2.1 trillion in assets, leveraged to the US economy

•  Widely recognized American brand with pent-up earning power

•  Predictable, low risk ~8% tangible book value growth in a low interest rate environment

•  Enormous competitive advantage over smaller banks in technology advancement and scale

Why it got cheap

•  Perceived as unable to earn a competitive return due to regulatory restrictions

•  Investor fatigue: cheapest large bank stock despite settlement of crisis-era legal issues and successful restructuring

•  Low interest rates

nasdaq:

Bac.wS.A Small cap

Initiated February 2015

JDP Cost $6.05/warrant

3Q, 2016

-24% Return since initiation

19

BAC.WS.A warrant price

3Q, 2016

3Q 2016 Performance

Source: JDP internal

BAC.WS.A +32.75%

S&P +3.85%

Chart unavailable

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BAC.WS.A warrant price

3Q, 2016

Since IniIaIon: February 2015 – September 30, 2016

Source: JDP internal

BAC.WS.A -23.63%

S&P +8.57%

Chart unavailable

213Q, 2016

Strategy

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Mission statement

3Q, 2016

A focused por$olio of high quality mispriced stocks, combined

with a mulI-year outlook, should beat the indexes over Ime—

with less risk.

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Introduction

²  Companies in transition

²  Industry and business strategy shifts

²  Repurposing of legacy assets to higher productivity

²  Transformative M&A and recapitalizations

²  Regulatory change

²  Dislocated balance sheets

3Q, 2016

We are a value fund with experIse around:

Source of low-risk, high-return scenarios in all market condiIons

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Uncertainty creates opportunity

²  Occasional opportunity to buy high quality assets at distressed prices

²  “Sell first, wait and see” market mentality can cause widespread overreaction

²  Multi-year outlook allows us to take action when most can’t

3Q, 2016

Focused on misunderstood company-specific fundamentals

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making the cut

ü  Base-layer earnings protected by a sustainable competitive advantage

ü  Outsized value creation opportunity without risk to core earnings

ü  Free growth, downside protected by fundamentals

ü  Path to emerge from a depressed valuation to long-runway compounder

ü  100%+ upside potential within 2 to 5 years

3Q, 2016

We are looking for the following:

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Margin of safety

3Q, 2016

Focusing on diamonds in the rough ²  Fundamental value dislocated from stock price

²  Long runway to redeploy capital in core business with attractive returns

²  Sustainable competitive advantage and pricing power

²  Industry tailwinds/Light at the end of the tunnel

²  Financial leverage appropriate for the business

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Scenarios

²  Material transition progress not yet visible in earnings

²  Profitability masked by a former strategy, divested asset, or leverage

²  Active unearthing of hidden assets: real estate, JVs, high-growth subsidiaries

²  Misunderstood legal: rights of first refusals, distribution agreements, patents/IP

²  Overstated liabilities

3Q, 2016

Searching for value beyond tradiIonal screening

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Endless opportunity

Category Size Companies % of Market

Large Cap $5b+ 862 10%

Mid Cap $1b–$5b 1,478 16%

Small Cap $250m–$1b 1,723 20%

Micro Cap $1m–$250m 4,689 54%

3Q, 2016

8,752 U.S. domiciled public companies over $1M 90%

Percentage of market that is Micro, Small and Mid-cap

Source: Capital IQ

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Smaller funds have the advantage

3Q, 2016

Large funds crammed into 10% of public equiIes due to size

Small funds can access 100% of the opportunity set

303Q, 2016

Process

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Approach

3Q, 2016

We view process as: The generaIon, filtering, and managing of informaIon to support our strategy.

32

process outline

1.  Idea generation

2.  Selection and allocation

3.  Managing an investment

4.  Exiting an investment

3Q, 2016

Key Steps

33

Process outline

²  Experience gained from past investments helps quickly filter:

²  52-week lows, hated sectors or stocks, multi-quarter/year underperformance

²  Routine SEC filing searches for:

²  Buybacks, Capital raises, M&A anything, Spin-offs, Insider buys/sells, Quarterly holdings of like-minded funds, Activist-related notifications, etc.

²  Proprietary screening around changes in:

²  Gross margins, Sales, Capital expenditures, Debt structure/Balance sheet, Cash flows, Returns on capital, etc.

²  Newspapers, business journals/magazines, value-oriented publications and blogs

3Q, 2016

1.  Idea generaIon

34

Process outline

²  Generally new capital is allocated to current positions

²  New positions must be viewed as materially lower-risk and higher return than the holding(s) or cash being replaced

²  Single company research can take 1 – 6 months, usually we pass

²  Maintain and follow a wide pipeline of “wish list” and “fringe” ideas

²  Portfolio diversified among industries

²  Concentrated on best ideas: 8 – 12 stocks

²  Cash balance 5% - 10%, no leverage

3Q, 2016

2.  SelecIon and allocaIon

35

Process outline

²  Balance between long-term patience and close monitoring

²  Build and maintain information funnel around competitors and industry

²  10-K’s, 10-Q’s, 8-K’s, conference calls, management presentations, industry news/publications

²  Develop industry contacts for insight: executives, customers, suppliers, service providers, fringe operators

²  Continuous re-evaluation of each investment thesis and risk/return profile

3Q, 2016

3.  Managing an investment

36

Process outline

²  Decision to sell is valuation driven, not volatility driven

²  Common reasons to sell:

²  Rich valuation that overstates earnings potential

²  Discovery of a much lower risk, higher return idea

²  Material mistake in our thesis, research, or valuation

²  Eroded competitive advantage that impacts future cash flows

²  Tax consequences are considered

3Q, 2016

4.  ExiIng an investment

373Q, 2016

Infrastructure

38

contacts

3Q, 2016

Fund Administrator Yulish & Associates Joshua Sack, Partner 2 Turquoise Way San Francisco CA 94131 (415) 641-4246

Tax/Audit Spicer Jeffries LLP Bob Yurglich, Partner 5251 S. Quebec St., Suite 200 Greenwood Village CO 80111 (303) 753-1959

LP Bank/Gatekeeper City NaIonal Bank Ron Garcia 100 Montgomery St., Suite 100 San Francisco CA 94104 (415) 576-2407

Legal Brill & Associates Eric Brill, Esq. 235 Montgomery St., 17th Floor San Francisco CA 94104 (415) 954-4474

Compliance

Gordian Compliance JusIn Schleifer 150 Spear St., No. 825 San Francisco CA 94105 (415) 762-2845

Broker/Clearing

InteracIve Brokers John Cracrak, InsItuIonal Sales 8 Greenwich Office Park Greenwich CT 06831 (203) 618-5971

Jeremy Deal Managing Partner

Seth Lowry Senior Analyst 928 Fort Stockton Drive, Suite 207 San Diego, CA 92103 (619) 890-9575 jeremy@jdpcap.com seth@jdpcap.com

Tel: (619) 890-9575 | 928 Fort Stockton Drive | Suite 207 | San Diego, CA 92103 | jeremy@jdpcapitalmanagement.com

40

disclaimer

This presentaIon does not contain all the informaIon that is material to a prospecIve investor in J. Deal Partnership I, L.P. (the “Fund”).

ConfidenDality; Not to be disseminated – The informaIon set forth in this presentaIon is being furnished on a confidenIal basis to the recipient and does not consItute an offer, solicitaIon or recommendaIon to sell or an offer to buy any securiIes, investment products or investment advisory services. Such an offer may only be made to qualified investors by means of delivery of a confidenIal private placement memorandum or other similar materials that contain a descripIon of material terms relaIng to such investment. The informaIon published and the opinions expressed herein are provided for informaIonal purposes only. This presentaIon is confidenIal and has been prepared solely for the informaIon of the intended recipient and may not be reproduced, distributed or used for any other purpose. ReproducIon and distribuIon of this presentaIon may consItute a violaIon of federal or state securiIes laws.

No tax or legal advice – Nothing contained herein consItutes financial, legal, tax, or other advice. The Fund makes no representaIon that the informaIon and opinions expressed herein are accurate, complete or current. The informaIon contained herein is current as of the date hereof, but may become outdated or subsequently may change.

RISKS – An investment in the Fund is speculaIve due to a variety of risks and consideraIons as detailed in the ConfidenIal Private Placement Memorandum of the Fund and this presentaIon is qualified in its enIrety by the more complete informaIon contained therein and in the related subscripIon materials.

Facts & opinions – Although the statements of facts in this presentaIon have been obtained and are based upon sources, JDP Capital Management, LLC (“JDPCM”), the general partner of the Fund believes to be reliable, JDPCM does not guarantee their accuracy and any such informaIon may be incomplete or condensed. All opinions and esImates included in this report consItute JDPCM’s judgment as of the date of this presentaIon and are subject to change without noIce

No RecommendaDon – The menIon of or reference to specific strategies or instruments in this presentaIon should not be interpreted as a recommendaIon or opinion that you should make any purchase or sale or parIcipate in any transacIon.

3Q, 2016