Polybius, The Ebro Treaty, And the Gallic Invasion of 225 Bce

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

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POLYBIUS, THE EBRO TREATY, ANDTHE GALLIC INVASION OF 225 B.C.E.

A central idea in the work of Polybius is that from the 140th Olympiad onwardthe affairs of the Mediterranean world were indissolubly connected. This situation issaid to have emerged at the time of the Hannibalic War, the Social War in Greece, andthe War for Coele-Syria (at the conference in Naupactus in 217 b.c.e., to be precise).Polybius’ chapters on the Gallic invasion of 225 b.c.e., which deal not only withthe affairs of Italy, but also with those of Spain and Greece, foreshadow the inter-dependence of Mediterranean affairs. The impending invasion, Polybius writes, forcedRome to sign the Ebro treaty (2.13, 2.22), while the Gallic wars made Demetrius ofPharus think lightly of Roman power (3.16). Polybius does not acknowledge theGallic invasion as a true case of symploke, maybe partly because he did not see it asa situation in which the affairs in one part of the Mediterranean were truly interwovenwith those in all other parts of the world, but largely because he wanted to focus onthe relations between Greece and Rome.1

The first half of Polybius’ Book 2 contains the Gallic invasion, the second halfGreek events. The fact that Rome’s affairs were tied to the West as much as to theEast determines the structure of the first half of Book 2 (chaps. 1–36). In the West,the expansion of Barcid power in Spain is a continuous theme. Polybius treats thisdevelopment in three chapters, each dedicated to one of the three Barcid generals:chapter 2.1 concentrates on Hamilcar, 2.13 on Hasdrubal, and 2.36 on Hannibal. Thereare two large digressions in between: chapters 2.2–12, devoted to the First IllyrianWar, chapters 2.14–35, devoted to the Gauls. The digression on the Gauls culminatesin the invasion of 225 b.c.e.

2 This structure clearly reflects Polybius’ idea thatRoman affairs were tied to three outside forces: the Barcids in Spain, the Illyrians,and the Gauls. Events in one field influenced Roman policy in another.

1. The symploke is of course a Polybian construct; see Walbank 1985, 317–18. Polybius’ choice of theconference of Naupactus as the starting point of symploke (5.105.4–10) seems to be based largely on hisown predilections. As Walbank pointed out, Spain and northern Italy were less relevant to Polybius’ mainthemes (p. 320).

2. Bellen (1985) and Williams (2001) emphasize the element of terror in Rome’s relationship with theGauls. In his discussion of the events described in the Gallic digression, Bellen fails to notice the literaryand propagandistic motives in Polybius’ account, which he ascribes to the “eye-witness” (p. 11) FabiusPictor. Williams shows that the digression consists of a combination of Roman information, Greek thought,and Polybius’ own observation (pp. 60–66), but he misses the implications of Fabius Pictor’s role as Polybius’source for our interpretation of the Gallic digression (esp. pp. 164–70). Rosenberger (2003) reduces Ro-man terror of the Gauls to more plausible proportions.

I wish to thank John Rich and Simon Northwood for their valuable comments on an earlier version ofthis article. Translations of Polybius are from W. R. Paton’s Loeb translation, sometimes slightly adapted.

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Polybius’ main source on the Gallic wars was Fabius Pictor, a Roman senator andcontemporary of the events described, who wrote in Greek and partly, maybe evenprimarily, for a Greek audience.3 The purpose of the present article is to show that,even though Polybius did not slavishly follow his Roman predecessor, Pictor’s in-fluence is crucial for our understanding of Polybius’ account of Roman policy in the220s. I want to reject Polybius’—and, hence, also Fabius Pictor’s—claim that for manyyears a Gallic invasion had been hanging over the Romans’ heads like the sword ofDamocles, and that this threat hampered Roman policy toward the Barcids in Spain.At the same time, Polybius was right to declare that the invasion of the Gauls causedRome to conclude the Ebro Treaty.

A Prolonged Threat?

Rome had every reason to be aware of the constant threat of war in the north.Transalpine Gauls had invaded northern Italy on previous occasions, and Rome hadto reckon with this possibility at all times. For the years preceding 225 b.c.e., how-ever, Polybius presents a situation that goes much beyond general awareness ofGallic hostility. For several years, he claims, the threat of a massive invasion was soconcrete and imminent that it paralyzed Roman activity on all other fronts.

The Gallic invasion is part of a large section (2.14–2.35) on the Gauls and theirthreat to Rome and the peoples of Italy, culminating in the battle of Telamon in225 b.c.e. Polybius’ account of the wars of 225–222 b.c.e. is preceded by a brief his-tory of the Gallic occupation of the Po plain and their wars with neighbors and withRome (from 2.17 onward). Having been crushed on several occasions by Romanarmies, the Gauls kept quiet for forty-five years, but during the early 230s b.c.e., theCisalpine Gauls became eager for war again. The older generations, Polybius writes(2.21.2), who had witnessed the struggle against Rome, had died, and the youngergenerations had forgotten about the suffering and peril. In 237 b.c.e., Rome wasalarmed when Alpine Gauls arrived in the territory of the Boii. According to Polybius,the chiefs of the Boii had invited these Gauls as allies against Rome. Their subjectsdistrusted these northern neighbors, and hence fighting broke out between the new-comers and the Boii, while the latter killed their chiefs.4 The invasion came to naught.

In Polybius’ account the plans for a common invasion of Italy were revived when, in232 b.c.e., the Romans decided to distribute amongst their citizens land that had beentaken from the Senones some fifty years earlier.5 Polybius alleges that Flaminius’

3. Thus, Gelzer 1964, 51. On Pictor’s audience, see also Hampl 1972, 412–14, esp. 413 and n. 2 forearlier literature; recently, Northwood 2007. On Fabius Pictor as Polybius’ main source on the Gallic wars:Bellen 1985, 11; Eckstein 1987, 4. Brunt (1971, 185) points out that Pictor must have been Polybius’source for various figures on the Gallic strength, casualties, and captives. Officer in 225 b.c.e.: Eutr. Brev.3.5; Oros. 4.13.6; also Plin. HN 10.71. Verbrugghe 1980, 2161, 2163.

4. Feig Vishnia (1996, 18) wrongly infers from the Boian people’s opposition to the alliance with Trans-alpine Gauls that they desired to keep peace with Rome. The people may have wanted war with Rome, butwithout inviting potentially dangerous allies.

5. Eckstein (1987, 10–11) argues that Flaminius’ viritane distribution of land in itself reflects Romanfear of the Gauls and the desire to strengthen the region. Unlike Latin colonies, however, which wereusually manned by veterans who were settled in or near fortified towns, viritane land distribution was notsuited for a defensive purpose. It involved citizens who were not necessarily assidui, and viritane settlerslacked a stronghold around which to gather in times of war; thus Brunt 1971, 393. The viritane distributionin the ager Gallicus should not be confused with the Latin colonies of Placentia and Cremona, manned by6,000 settlers each, which were founded in order to control Rome’s position in the Po plain. On the militarycharacter of Roman colonization, see Salmon 1969, 24.

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measure convinced the neighboring Insubres and Boii that Rome intended the ex-termination of all Gauls (2.21.9). The Cisalpine peoples concluded an allianceand again sent envoys to the northern Gauls to invite them to make war on Rome.Polybius, stressing that the thought of masses of warlike Gauls streaming acrossthe Alps struck absolute terror into the hearts of Romans and allies alike, informs usthat preparations for war started in Italy long before the Gaesatae actually invaded(2.22.7–8). He continues by claiming that Rome’s fear of a Gallic invasion lay be-hind Rome’s policy toward the Carthaginians in Spain, leading to the Ebro treaty.Polybius’ narrative implies that the preparations were conducted before the treaty withHasdrubal. The image is one of a prolonged threat of war, terror in Italy, and franticpreparation. Nevertheless, Polybius again emphasizes that when the Gaesatae finallycrossed the Alps, terror struck Rome, and he again mentions the preparation under-taken by Rome and its allies (2.23.9–10):

All their subjects in general were commanded to supply lists of men able to bear arms,as they wished to know their total forces. Of grain, missiles, and other war materialthey had laid in such a supply as no one could remember to have been collected on anyprevious occasion.

Polybius emphasizes the threat of the invasion to such a degree that it distorts hisaccount of Roman policy in these years. The mention of Roman preparation twicestrengthens the impression of a continuous threat. Are we really to believe that whenthe news of a Gallic invasion—which the Romans had been expecting for years—arrived in Rome, the authorities out of terror mobilized yet more troops, broughttogether yet more stores? How is it possible that the Romans were expecting a mas-sive invasion of warlike Transalpine Gauls in alliance with the Boii and Insubres,and were still surprised when this invasion finally materialized?6 The contradictionmust cast doubts either on the prolonged threat and long-term preparations duringthe preceding years, or on the surprise and emergency measures in 225 b.c.e.

The Human Sacrifice of 228 b.c.e.

Some scholars see the burial alive of a Celtic couple and a Greek couple in 228 b.c.e.

as a sure sign of the degree of alarm caused by the threat of an invasion of Trans-alpine Gauls.7 This issue is too complex to examine fully in this context, but wemust address it briefly in order to establish whether it actually confirms the accountof Polybius (who in fact does not mention the affair). Two such burials were to followin Roman history: in 216 b.c.e. and in 114/3 b.c.e. As C. Cichorius has shown, allthree cases were preceded by a scandal involving the Vestal Virgins. Therefore heconcluded that the sacrifices were the response prescribed by the Sibylline Books insuch cases, which would mean that the burial of 228 b.c.e. had nothing to do withthe Gallic invasion.8 However, A. Eckstein has pointed out that the human sacrificescannot be fully explained by the offences committed by the Vestal Virgins. He arguesthat both in 216 and 114/3 b.c.e., the pax deorum was thought to have been disturbed,and therefore the Roman state was threatened with imminent danger. The Sibylline

6. Walbank (1957, 196) notes: “The details of Roman preparations do not suggest that they were caughtby surprise.”

7. Bellen 1985, 12; Eckstein 1987, 13; Feig Vishnia 1996, 22. More careful, Gelzer 1964, 75.8. Cichorius 1922, 12–20.


Books ordered human sacrifices to avert the danger. In other words, it is the dangerthreatening the res publica that is averted by the human sacrifice, not the offence ofthe Vestal Virgins that is to be expiated.9 In 228 b.c.e. it was the threat of the Gaulsthat was to be averted with a human sacrifice.

H. Bellen emphasizes the element of panic as a result of Roman defeats.10 How-ever, the correlation between such events and the burial alive of Greeks and Gaulsis rather weak. The sacrifices of 216 and 114/3 b.c.e. are related to the catastropheof Cannae and the Roman defeat at the hands of the Scordisci in 114 b.c.e. The latterevent was hardly disastrous and certainly did not result in any immediate threat toItaly. On the other hand, human sacrifices are conspicuously missing, for examplewhen both Scipios died in battle in Spain (212 b.c.e.), or in the aftermath of suchlost battles as against the Gallic Salassi in 143 b.c.e. and against the Cimbri at Arausioin 105 b.c.e. Moreover, religious unrest in times of war did not necessarily result inhuman sacrifices. During the final stages of the Hannibalic War it was perceivedthat “stones regularly rained from the sky,” resulting in religious anxiety. When theSibylline Books were consulted, the ruling was found that, if the enemy had broughtwar into Italy, he could be defeated by bringing the Mater Idaea from Pessinus toRome (Livy 29.10.4). As we all know, this was done, apparently with good results.The point is that defeat, war, or even religious turmoil only rarely resulted in humansacrifice.

Hence the Vestal Virgins play a crucial role after all. However, Eckstein arguesthat the sacrifice of 228 b.c.e. had no relationship at all to the preceding crisis in-volving a Vestal Virgin, because the scandal should be dated at least one and a halfyears earlier.11 In view of the uncertain chronology of this period, this seems a weakargument. Most importantly, we know too little of the matter to establish a maxi-mum time lag between such events. In both of the other cases, it was an offence ofthe Vestal Virgins against divine law that triggered the human sacrifice. Between216 and 114/3 b.c.e. no other scandals involving Vestal Virgins are known. In fact,as far as our knowledge reaches, scandals involving Vestal Virgins and human sac-rifices of Greeks and Gauls occur only in these three cases.12 It seems too great acoincidence to deny a similar causal relationship in 228 b.c.e. Does it really meanmuch (as Eckstein argues) that the sources on the burial of 228 b.c.e. do not mentionthe scandal concerning the Vestal Virgins? Apart from a short mention in Plutarch(Marc. 3.3–4) and Orosius (4.13.3), the most detailed evidence is offered in a frag-ment and excerpts from Cassius Dio. In view of later developments, it does not proveanything that these scraps of information lost the element of the Vestal Virgins andfocused on the external threat.

The relationship between the invasion in 225 b.c.e. and the sacrifice in 228 b.c.e.

is hardly as straightforward as it may seem. The few sources available tell us that aSibylline oracle warned the Romans to be aware of the Gauls when lightning struck

9. Eckstein 1982, 71–75.10. Bellen 1985, 12; cf. Staples 1998, 134: “. . . background of intense emotional upheaval. . . .” In con-

trast, Rosenberger (2003, 369) warns us not to overemphasize the role of hysterical masses in these events.11. Eckstein 1982, 75–77. Hence, Bellen completely ignores the affair concerning the Vestal Virgins.

Cichorius (1922, 17) rightly observed that it would not matter if the punishment of the Vestal Virgin wereto be dated to 229 b.c.e.

12. Cichorius 1922, 16; Staples 1998, 134.

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near the temple of Apollo. When that happened, the danger was to be averted by theburial alive of a Celtic couple and a Greek couple (Dio, frag. 50). Zonaras (8.19)mentions a prophecy that warned against the city falling into Gallic or Greek hands.He explains the burial alive of a Greek and Gallic pair as to make the prophecy appearto have come true, thereby neutralizing its danger.13 Plutarch situates the event inthe context of the general fear of the Gauls in this period, while Orosius reverses therelationship: the Romans were punished for their human sacrifice by the subsequentwars they had to fight against the Gauls. The sources on the sacrifice actually implythat the Romans had no knowledge yet of an invasion that was looming in the nearfuture. Moreover, the burial alive of the unfortunate Gauls and Greeks had obviouslynot taken away the danger, or, if we are to believe Polybius, Roman alarm. It islikely that the relationship between the human sacrifice in 228 b.c.e. and the Gallicinvasion in 225 b.c.e. was imagined after 225 b.c.e., and encouraged by the fact thattwo of the human victims sacrificed in 228 b.c.e. were Gauls. Nevertheless, our sourcesfor the human sacrifice of 228 b.c.e. do not mention the invasion of the Gaesatae in225 b.c.e. If the Romans had been aware of the preparations for a massive invasion(as Polybius tells us) and conducted human sacrifices to ward off the danger, whydoes none of our sources say so?

In sum, a reading of the affair according to which Roman terror in the face of anexpected Gallic invasion caused the human sacrifice in 228 b.c.e. depends on thea priori assumption that Polybius’ prolonged threat is correct. The affair is no inde-pendent evidence of this. When one takes into account the parallel events in 216 and114/3 b.c.e., it is more likely that a scandal surrounding the Vestal Virgins causedunrest and the feeling that some danger threatened Rome. This threat may have in-volved the Gauls, but that is far from certain. At best, one can claim that the sacrificeof 228 b.c.e. confirms the Roman fear of the Gauls in this period, but it does notconfirm the veracity of Polybius’ account.

Roman Policy Prior to 225 b.c.e.

Scholars have often expressed doubts concerning Polybius’ account of the Gallicinvasion of 225 b.c.e. One line of argument is to point out inconsistencies and un-likelihoods in Polybius’ account of Roman policy in these years, and to suggest thatevents make more sense if the Gallic threat is reduced to realistic proportions.14

Such reasoning depends rather on one’s belief in the soundness of Roman policy,since it can be countered by assuming that Rome operated inconsistently and unwiselyduring these years. However, it might still be useful to look briefly at the campaignsthat Rome undertook—and failed to undertake—during these years.

If Rome had feared a life-and-death struggle against the Gauls since 232 b.c.e.,it is hard to explain why both consuls were sent to wage war in Illyria in 229 b.c.e.

15

13. Cf. Bellen 1985, 13–14.14. Harris (1985, 198) concluded that the state of alarm in Rome has been greatly exaggerated.15. Some might want to counter this argument by pointing out that Rome started the Second Illyrian War

precisely when expecting trouble with Hannibal. It is indeed likely that in 219 b.c.e. the Romans wouldhave decided otherwise if they had known what was about to happen. The crucial difference, however, isthat in 219 b.c.e. the Romans expected to fight the war against Carthage in Spain and/or Africa (as shownby the assignments of the next consuls), while in 229 b.c.e. they are supposed to have expected a massiveinvasion into Italy itself.


There was no urgency involved in the campaign, which, according to Polybius, wasthe result of the arrogance and aggressiveness of Queen Teuta. War with the Illyriansmight have been unavoidable at some point, but not in 229 b.c.e.

16 The Illyrians hadbeen in the habit of plundering vessels sailing from Italy for a long time, Polybius(2.8.2–3) writes, but the Romans had turned a deaf ear to the complaints. In 230 b.c.e.,however, the Illyrians had killed many Italian traders, and when a number of personsapproached the senate concerning this matter, it responded by sending two envoysto investigate the affair. War was still not inevitable until Queen Teuta, arrogant andoverbearing, took offence at the words of one of the Roman envoys and had himkilled on the way back. Now war was declared, a massive force was shipped acrossthe Adriatic, and in 229 b.c.e. the Illyrian kingdom of Queen Teuta was quickly de-feated. Whatever the truth of this account,17 the declaration of war is more easilyunderstood if the danger of a terrifying invasion of Gauls was not hanging over theirheads. One cannot argue that the Romans intended to eliminate the one foe beforeturning to the other, since the Illyrians had not been threatening the Romans in theirrear (although they were undoubtedly harassing commercial shipping). Instead, theRoman campaign of 229 b.c.e. might easily have involved them in a war on twofronts, if the Gauls had invaded before Rome defeated the Illyrians.

We may conclude that the Gallic invasion makes no appearance in Polybius’ accountof the Illyrian War of 229 b.c.e. because no such threat as yet existed. It is possible,of course, that Polybius’ chronology is wrong and that the threat of a Gallic invasionappeared after 229 b.c.e. M. Gelzer argued that the Boii and Insubres felt threatenednot so much by Flaminius’ law of 232 b.c.e. but by its implementation in subsequentyears.18 While this argument permits us to explain Rome’s eagerness to engage inwar in Illyria and even to allow both consuls to leave Italy, it still requires us to de-viate from Polybius’ account.

Even more surprising is Roman lethargy in Italy in these years. A crucial elementof Polybius’ account is that Rome had somehow learned that the Insubres and Boiihad invited their Transalpine brethren to cross the Alps. Had Rome indeed known ofthis coalition, it would obviously have been the safest strategy to attack the CisalpineGauls before they were joined by their Transalpine allies. The Boii and Insubresbeing defeated, the Gaesatae might have given up the plan of an invasion, and even ifthey did not, such a Roman initiative would have weakened the Gauls and diminishedthe danger that the Roman troops faced. However, Polybius mentions not one minoraction against the Gauls in the years leading up to the invasion of 225 b.c.e. Surely

16. Cf. Feig Vishnia 1996, 20: “. . . reasons why Rome decided to act precisely at that specific point intime remain enigmatic.”

17. According to Gelzer (1964, 66), Polybius’ account of the First Illyrian War is based on Fabius Pictor.Appian has a different version, in which the Romans never reached the court of Queen Teuta, but he agreeson the death of the envoy. Derow (2003 51–52) favors this version; see also Derow 1973, 118–34. Gruen(1984, 360–67) also criticizes Polybius’ account and rather sees the gradual expansion of Illyrian powerand ambition as the main cause of the war, which does not alter my point. The same goes for Badian, whoargues (1964, 3–10) that the senate began to see Illyria as a growing threat. Harris 1985, 195–97, makesmuch of Rome’s wish to protect commercial interests in the Adriatic and believes that, when the Romans’hands were free elsewhere, they took the first opportunity to engage in war in Illyria.

18. Gelzer 1964, 74; likewise Eckstein 1987, 11–12.

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it is special pleading to assume that the Roman consuls failed to convince the Romansenate of the advantages of a Roman strike.

Troop Deployment in 225 b.c.e.

Polybius’ account of the events and measures of that year provides another argumentconfirming the conclusion that at the start of 225 b.c.e. the Romans were not yet awareof any danger. Various elements in Polybius’ chronology of the events of 225 b.c.e.

suit the idea of a surprise invasion better than they do the supposed protracted threat.From the deployment of troops (Polybius 2.24), we may gather that at the start of theconsular year two legions were stationed in Sicily and Tarentum. The consul C. Atiliushad gone with his army to Sardinia before the news of the crossing of the Alps arrived(Polybius 2.23.6). We do not know where the other consul, L. Aemilius, was stationedat the beginning of the year; apparently not at Ariminum, because that was wherehe was sent when the news arrived in Rome that the Gaesatae had crossed the Alps(2.23.5). At that time, Rome took various other measures. First, it was only at thisstage that ambassadors were sent to the Veneti and Cenomani, who allied themselvesto Rome (2.23.2). Second, a praetor was sent to Etruria (2.23.5). Third, an army ofSabines and Etruscans was sent to the Etruscan border, apparently under the com-mand of the previously mentioned praetor (2.24.6). So it was only when Rome heardof the invasion of the Gaesatae that both routes southwards from Cisalpine Gaul(near Ariminum and in Etruria) were blocked. Fourth, armies were mobilized and listsof men able to bear arms requested from the allies (2.23.8–9). Fifth, an army of Um-brians and Sarsinates was sent to the Gallic frontier to join the Veneti and Cenomani(2.24.7).

The next stage in Polybius’ chronology is the Gallic invasion into Etruria. Themobilization of the Etruscans and Sabines was apparently not completed by thattime, because Polybius says that the Gauls entered Etruria without opposition (2.25.1).It was only when the Gauls advanced in the direction of Rome that they were metby the Sabines and Etruscans (2.25.3). This is confirmed by Polybius’ claim thatAemilius’ army, which had left Ariminum when the news reached him that theGauls had entered Etruria, joined the Sabines and Etruscans just after the Gauls haddefeated them and the latter were in serious trouble (these were not real Romanlegions—2.26.1). At this point, the Gauls decided to turn northwards (2.26.7). Ontheir way back to Cisalpine Gaul, they met the army of the other consul, C. Atilius,who had recently landed at Pisa (2.27.1–2). Polybius does not say when Atilius’ armyhad left Sardinia, but it was probably soon after the news had reached Sardinia of theGaesatae’s crossing of the Alps. In short, it was only when the Gaesatae crossedthe Alps that Rome began to mobilize a huge army and focused its attention on theGauls. Moreover, despite Polybius’ emphasis on preparation, no army was ready tomeet the Gauls when they entered Etruria; lists of men able to bear arms were notyet available; and no embassy had yet been sent to the Cenomani and Veneti.

In sum, Roman policy makes most sense if we reject Polybius’ claims that since232 b.c.e. the Romans had been expecting the Gallic invasion of 225 b.c.e., andif we do not believe that the Romans were so aware of this threat that it actuallyparalyzed them for many years. Polybius (probably following his main source) ex-aggerated the Gallic threat to such a degree as to constitute an outright falsehood.


Gaius Flaminius

The long-term threat plays an important role in two ways: first, it is related to theRoman policy regarding Spain and, second, it allows Gaius Flaminius to be made re-sponsible for the invasion. Polybius explicitly blames the revival of hostilities on thepolitician who was responsible for the distribution of the ager Gallicus (2.21.8):

Gaius Flaminius was the originator of this popular policy, which we must pronounce tohave been, one may say, the first step in the demoralisation of the populace, as well asthe cause of the war with the Gauls that followed.

According to Polybius, Rome’s hands were tied by the expectation of having to wardoff barbarian masses, and this gave the Carthaginians a free hand to expand theircontrol of Spain, since it was the Gallic threat that urged Rome to conclude theinfamous treaty with Hasdrubal in 226 b.c.e. (2.22.9–11):

This movement of the Gauls contributed in no small measure to the rapid and unimpededsubjugation of Spain by the Carthaginians, for the Romans . . . were compelled to neglectthe affairs of Spain until they had dealt with the Gauls. They therefore secured them-selves against the Carthaginians by the treaty with Hasdrubal . . . and threw their wholeeffort into the struggle with their enemies in Italy.

This means that Flaminius’ catastrophic policy prevented Rome from making atimely and adequate response to the Punic threat growing in Spain. The exaggera-tion of the prolonged threat of a Gallic invasion is thus indissolubly connected to thediscrediting of Gaius Flaminius, whose policy of land distribution is presented as theultimate cause of Roman paralysis. According to Polybius, however, Gallic hostilitytoward Rome had already flared up in the early 230s. An additional explanation forthe bellicosity of the Boii and Insubres is therefore not needed. Nobody could seriouslyhave argued that without Flaminius’ distribution of land there would have been peaceon the Celtic front. Hence, blaming the hostility of the Boii and Insubres on Flaminius’measure and connecting this to the invasion of the Gaesatae in 225 b.c.e. merely servesto undermine this statesman’s reputation.

This is not the only instance of hostility toward Gaius Flaminius in the contextof the Gallic wars. Flaminius was elected consul for the year 223 b.c.e., togetherwith Publius Furius, which would be rather surprising if he had been responsible forthe danger under which Rome had suffered for the past years.19 During their consul-ship the army under the command of Flaminius and Furius fought a battle against theInsubres, which was won by the Romans, but—so Polybius alleges—not thanks tothe generalship of Flaminius. While Flaminius made a blunder that nearly cost theRomans the victory, it was the tribunes who saved the day (2.33.1, 6–8). Flaminiuswas made magister equitum in 221 b.c.e. and censor in 220 b.c.e., which hardly fits

19. According to Livy 21.63.7; Plut. Marc. 4.3; Zon. 8.20, the election of Flaminius and his colleaguewas annulled and the consuls summoned home. Both, however, chose to ignore the senate’s dispatch andengaged in battle. Despite the brevity of Polybius’ account, his other accusations against Flaminius make itunlikely that he would have ignored such an important issue, if he had known about it. It rather shows anincreasing anti-Flaminian trend among Roman sources; contra Eckstein (1987, 16), who sees the story as “notimplausible.” Concerning the tradition on Flaminius’ flouting of religious traditions, see Rosenstein 1990,58, 77–78.

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the tradition, already visible in Polybius, that depicts him as a populist demagogueand an incompetent general.20 Finally, the Roman tradition would also hold Flaminiusresponsible for the disaster at Trasimene in 217 b.c.e., where his eagerness and care-lessness allegedly caused him to fall into the trap set by Hannibal. One may wonderwhy the Roman electorate had chosen him consul again, and that at a time of mili-tary crisis, when it should have been clear that during his last military command hisstupidity had almost cost them a victory.

Hostility toward Flaminius is clearly present from the start in the Gallic sectionof Polybius. The condemnation of Flaminius had started before Polybius wrote hishistories, and this also applies to the link between the Roman politician and the in-vasion of 225 b.c.e. We may conclude that the distorted depiction of Roman foreignpolicy in the account of Polybius and the damaging role of Flaminius therein is mostlikely to have originated in the work of Fabius Pictor.21

Polybius and the Ebro Treaty

Not only is Flaminius’ land distribution blamed for everything, but the Gallic in-vasion has also become a major threat to the Romans, hanging over their heads anddominating their policy for years. Many scholars have adhered to this picture, butothers have expressed doubts, particularly about the claim that the threat of the Gallicinvasion prevented the Romans from stopping the Barcid expansion and forced themto conclude the Ebro treaty.

Polybius informs us twice that the Gallic threat directly led to the Ebro treaty. Wehave already seen Polybius’ statement in 2.22, that is, in the section of his work deal-ing with the Gauls and the invasion of 225 b.c.e. However, he had made this con-nection even more forcefully earlier in the same book. In chapter 2.13, after dealingwith the Illyrian War in 2.2–12, he turns to Spain, where Hasdrubal had succeededHamilcar in the winter of 229/8 b.c.e. and had made great progress in strengtheningthe Carthaginian position, not least by founding Carthago Nova. The Romans fullyrealized the threat emerging in Spain, Polybius claims, but their hands were tied.Since this passage constitutes Polybius’ main statement on Roman policy in theseyears toward the Barcids in Spain and on the Ebro treaty, it is worth quoting in full(2.13.3–7):

The Romans, seeing that Hasdrubal was in a fair way to create a larger and more formidableempire than Carthage formerly possessed, resolved to begin to occupy themselves withSpanish affairs. Finding that they had hitherto been asleep and had allowed Carthage tobuild up a powerful dominion, they tried, as far as possible, to make up for lost time.For the present they did not venture to impose orders on Carthage, or to go to war with her,because the threat of a Celtic invasion was hanging over them, the attack being indeedexpected from day to day. They decided, then, to mollify and conciliate Hasdrubal in

20. Champion 2004, 201: “Polybius represents C. Flaminius as another demagogic politician.” OnFlaminius’ career, see Develin 1979, 273–76.

21. Gelzer (1964, 76–77) points to the consistency of the defamation of Flaminius in Polybius’ Books 2and 3, deriving from Fabius Pictor. Walbank 1957, 193: “the hostility of his senatorial opponents trans-mitted through Fabius Pictor.” Harris (1985, 198) and Eckstein (1987, 11–12) agree that the hostile tra-dition derives from contemporary political enemies. On senatorial support for Flaminius’ agrarian law, FeigVishnia 1996, 32–34; cf. Bung 1950, 15, 157–58.


the first place, and then to attack the Celts and decide the issue by arms, for they thoughtthat as long as they had these Celts threatening their frontier, not only would they neverbe master of Italy, but they would not even be safe in Rome itself. Accordingly, afterhaving sent envoys to Hasdrubal and made a treaty, in which no mention was made ofthe rest of Spain, but the Carthaginians engaged not to cross the Ebro in arms, they atonce entered on the struggle against the Italian Celts.

His long section on the Gauls (2.14–35) follows immediately, thus amplifying theconnection between Roman policy concerning Spain and the Gallic threat.

“There is something defective about Polybius’ explanation of Roman policy,” onescholar has remarked; “What is introduced as if it were an energetic intervention byRome turns out to be a policy of appeasement.”22 Moreover, why stir the Barcids ata time when the Romans had other things on their mind? The Ebro treaty does notmake sense, if it was merely intended to avoid hostilities with the Barcids whilethe Gallic invasion hung over their heads. Surely it would have been better to leaveHasdrubal alone than force him to agree to a demarcation line. The Ebro treatysolved little, while Roman demands might have annoyed the Barcids at a time mostinopportune for Rome.23

Should we assume that Polybius followed the apologetic tradition that he foundin Fabius Pictor rather uncritically here? There is good reason to doubt this. Polybius(3.8.1–9.5) explicitly discredits Fabius Pictor as a source on the events prior to theHannibalic War. According to the Greek historian, Pictor gave a biased and pro-Roman account of the events leading to the Second Punic War. Moreover, Polybiusinforms us that, according to Pictor, Hasdrubal had attempted a failed coup at Carthage,and that both Hasdrubal and Hannibal had ruled Spain “without paying any attentionto the Carthaginian senate” (3.8). Polybius rejects this idea as ridiculous, and it playsno role in his account.24 Moreover, Polybius warns his readers not to be too im-pressed by “the authority of the author’s name” (3.9) and by the fact that he was aRoman senator and a contemporary of Hannibal: “My personal opinion is that weshould not treat his authority lightly, but equally should not regard it as final” (3.9.5).25

Polybius did not unquestioningly rely on Fabius Pictor, but compared his work topro-Roman and pro-Carthaginian sources on Roman-Carthaginian relations prior tothe Second Punic War. While Pictor was an important source on the events of theseyears, Polybius by no means followed him naively.26

Before discussing some previous theories and analyzing the events surroundingthe Ebro treaty, one should stress that the treaty is not securely dated. Precisely be-cause Polybius relates it to the Gallic threat, it is usually dated to 226 b.c.e. or early

22. Sumner 1967, 218; cf. Errington 1970, 37.23. Bender 1997, 89: The Romans “besänftigen den karthagischen Feldherrn nicht, wie Polybius sich

ausdrückt, sondern bedrängten ihn”; similar, Hoyos 2003, 81.24. Rich (1996, 13) rightly says that “Fabius’ view may have been more nuanced” than Polybius

claims, but that does not alter the point; cf. Ridley 2000, 20–21. Mantel (1991, 51) believes Fabius’ claimto be true, referring to Hellenistic parallels of “private Raubkriege.” However, Hoyos (1994, esp. 257–59)has shown that the Barcids acted in agreement with the government in Carthage; cf. Hoyos 2003, 75–78.

25. See also Eckstein 1994, 48.26. In addition, Polybius rejects the justification of Rome’s annexation of Sardinia in 237 b.c.e. by

Carthaginian wrongdoings as false. Ameling (2001, 120–23) suggests that Polybius found this pro-Romanversion of events in the work of Fabius Pictor.

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225 b.c.e.27 Moreover, it is sometimes disputed that the treaty contained only one

clause, which forbade the Carthaginians to cross the river in arms and thus in effectlimited their position to the region south of the Ebro.28 It is indeed possible that in2.13 Polybius merely gives us the one clause—dealing with Spain—that is relevant tohis point, which does not exclude clauses not dealing with Spain. However, this doesnot seem to be the case with his survey of Roman-Carthaginian treaties in Book 3.When Polybius mentions the treaty with Hasdrubal, he refers to it as the treaty, agree-ing that “the Carthaginians are not to cross the Ebro in arms” (3.27.9). This leavesno doubt that he regarded this as the main, if not sole, content of the treaty. In anycase, there is no basis for the assumption that the treaty had contained a clause bindingRome in Spain.29 Finally, there is nothing odd about the fact that Rome concludeda treaty with Hasdrubal rather than with the government in Carthage. Carthaginiangenerals customarily engaged in diplomacy with foreign states and concluded treatieson their own authority—Hannibal’s treaty with Philip of Macedon being a good casein point.30

The Gallic Invasion and the Ebro Treaty

Many scholars have assumed that Rome concluded the Ebro treaty in order toprevent Carthaginian troops from joining the Gallic attack on Italy.31 However, thistheory may readily be dismissed, since this is not what Polybius says, and there isno plausibility in the assumption that the Romans were already considering the pos-sibility of a Carthaginian invasion of Italy by the northern route.32 Polybius surelymeant that Rome wanted to avoid a war on two fronts, therefore avoiding a confron-tation with Carthage while readying itself for the fight against the Gauls.

R. M. Errington thought he had solved the puzzle of the Ebro treaty by arguingthat the Romans were, in fact, not interested at all in the Barcids or in Spain. It wasrather Massilia—long-standing and loyal ally of Rome—that was worried about theCarthaginian threat to her colonies. Exploiting the impending Gallic invasion andpointing to the danger of a coalition with Hasdrubal, Massilia managed to wake thesenate from its apathy—but only just. The result was the half-hearted understanding(not a real treaty) by two disinterested parties that the Carthaginians would not crossthe Ebro in arms. Hasdrubal did not mind, since his troops were still far from thisriver. Rome did not really care, but Massilia was satisfied.33 Errington’s ingeniousreconstruction fails to convince, however, on two fronts. First of all, it flies in theface of the most important evidence we have. Polybius writes that Rome was worriedand therefore intervened. Massilia is not mentioned at this stage. Secondly, it ignores

27. Errington 1970, 34; Richardson 1986, 21; Rich 1996, 23.28. Badian (1988, 162–64) argues that the treaty may have contained clauses not dealing with Spain,

the content of which is unknown; cf. Rich 1996, 20–21. One clause: Errington 1970, 34–36; Richardson1986, 24–28; Bringmann 2001, 369.

29. Likewise, Eckstein 1984, 57–58; Bender 1997, 89–90. Serrati (2006, 131) assumes instead that thetreaty demarcated the spheres of influence of the two powers.

30. Thus, Walbank 1957, 169–70; Hoyos 1994, 254–56.31. Gelzer 1964, 84; Walbank 1957, 170; Eckstein 1984, 61; Bellen 1985, 16; Richardson 1986, 27;

Mantel 1991, 71; Bringmann 2001, 370–71.32. Thus, Rich 1996, 22; Bender 1997, 89.33. Errington 1970, 39–41; cf. Feig Vishnia 1996, 19; Serrati 2006, 130–31.


(as we shall see shortly) some of the evidence for Roman-Carthaginian relations priorto the treaty.

Another course taken by modern scholars is to deny any causal relationship betweenthe Ebro treaty and the invasion of the Gauls.34 J. Rich, for instance, concluded: “Itmay well be that there was no causal connection at all between the treaty and theGallic threat.”35 In his view, Polybius is right when he claims that the Carthaginians’progress in Spain under Hasdrubal, especially his founding of Carthago Nova, urgedthe Romans to intervene. The Ebro treaty gave them sufficient assurance, since itblocked the Barcid progress northwards. Roman concern with Carthage at this time,he adds, is reflected in “the decision, made in or around 227, to increase the number ofpraetors from two to four to provide commanders for Sicily and Sardinia, especiallyif, as seems to me likely, it was only then that the Romans decided to maintain a per-manent force in each island.”36

P. Bender draws a similar picture, also denying a connection between the treatyand the invasion, which he regards as a surprise attack of looting Gauls. Aroused byHasdrubal’s founding of a city at a strategic location and unaware of the impendinginvasion of the Gaesatae, the Romans sent an embassy to forbid Hasdrubal to crossthe Ebro in arms. The decision to appoint two praetors annually to take command ofthe troops in Sardinia and Sicily reflects the raised tension of the time.37 Again, thetreaty fully satisfied Roman intentions.

The main problem with the reconstruction of events by Rich and Bender is thatit still does not make much sense of the Ebro treaty. If the Romans were worried byHasdrubal’s policies and his founding of Carthago Nova, the Ebro treaty solvedlittle, since it has been shown that the territory controlled by the Carthaginians wasfar from the Ebro. Not even Hannibal had conquered and secured the region southof the Ebro when he decided to march against Rome.38 In fact, he only crossed theEbro in arms—and thus violated the treaty—after the Second Punic War was unavoid-able. In my opinion, Rich and Bender throw out Polybius’ claim that the Gallic in-vasion was instrumental in the signing of the Ebro treaty without good reason.

Let us reconsider the evidence that we have. Apart from Polybius 2.13, two morepieces of information shed light on Roman-Carthaginian relations in these years. Richand Bender are absolutely right in drawing attention in this context to the Romanmeasures concerning Sicily and Sardinia. Two new praetorships were created in oraround 227 b.c.e. and assigned to the provinces of Sicily and Sardinia.39 (The firstpraetor on Sicily was Flaminius.) Roman troops were probably stationed on bothislands at the same time. Such a move must have strained relations with Carthage.

34. We may ignore those theories that suppose that the river Iber did not mean the Ebro. All attempts toidentify it with another river lack evidence; see, for instance, Richardson 1986, 26–27; Rich 1996, 10–11.

35. Rich 1996, 23. Likewise, Bender 1997, 93–94: Polybius saw the Gallic threat as the ideal explana-tion for Roman apathy toward the Barcids.

36. Rich 1996, 23–24.37. Bender 1997, 96–97.38. Sumner 1967, 208–15.39. Brennan (2000, 91) notes that Livy Per. 20 excludes the possibility that the two new posts of praetor

were created in 229 b.c.e., “leaving each of the years down through 225 b.c.e. as possibilities.” Cf. Rich(1996, 23–24), who opts for 227 or somewhat later.

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Or perhaps the causal relationship is the other way around: Rome took thesemeasures in response to a chilling of Roman-Carthaginian relations. Whatevercaused it, it does fit nicely Polybius’ statement about Roman worries and energeticRoman intervention.

Moreover, the deployment of troops shows that at the start of the year 225 b.c.e.

Rome was focused on a military threat in the south and west. The provinces of theconsuls and the location of their troops in 225 b.c.e. do not support the idea thatRome was waiting for a grand-scale war in the north in this year. Only at a later stagewas one consul sent with two legions and 15,000 allies to the north, to Ariminum.The other consul had been sent to Sardinia with an army of equal strength. More-over, two legions had been stationed in Sicily and Tarentum. We should note that whenRome was readying herself for war with Carthage in 218 b.c.e., Roman troops werestationed in Sicily, Sardinia, and Tarentum as well.40 The other armies mentioned byPolybius, fighting in the north or stationed in Rome, were raised at a later stage. Theincreased strength of the legions assigned to the consuls shows that Rome was onthe alert in this year. Normally legions were 4,000 strong, as Polybius regularly tellsus and as also the legions in Sicily and Tarentum were, but on this occasion legionsof 5,200 men were assigned to the consuls. The shipment of the legions to Pisaimmediately when the news arrived that the Gaesatae had crossed the Alps seems toindicate that no actual fighting occurred on Sardinia. As far as we can tell, the legionsstationed in Sicily and Tarentum did not budge during the entire crisis of 225 b.c.e.

Saguntum

If we assume that the Roman connection with Saguntum started before the Ebrotreaty, all pieces of the puzzle fall into place. Unfortunately, Polybius (3.30.1) israther vague about the date of Rome’s agreement with Saguntum. He merely saysthat “it is a fact beyond dispute that the Saguntines had placed themselves under theprotection of Rome many years before Hannibal’s time,” that is, before Hannibalsucceeded Hasdrubal in 221 b.c.e. Many scholars have argued that the alliance pre-ceded the Ebro treaty,41 but Rich concludes that the connection must be dated afterthe treaty. He writes: “This is the implication of Polybius’ statement that it was onlyat the time of the treaty that the Romans ‘set about taking a hand in the affairs ofSpain’ (2.13.3).”42 However, this conclusion is not warranted. Polybius does not statethat the Ebro treaty was the first intervention of Rome in Spanish affairs. He saysonly that the Romans began to intervene in Spanish affairs at the time of the Ebrotreaty.

At Polybius 3.14.9–10, Hannibal kept his hands off Saguntum, “wishing not togive the Romans any overt pretext for war until he had secured all the rest of the

40. Polybius 3.75.4.41. Sumner (1967, 214–15) thinks that 231 or 226 b.c.e. are likely dates. According to frag. 48 of Cassius

Dio, an embassy visited Hamilcar in Spain in 231. However, Cassius Dio has several events concerningRoman-Carthaginian relations that are clearly unhistoric. There is no reason to assume that this fragment ismore trustworthy. Moreover, Polybius explicitly says that the first time the Romans intervened in Spain wasunder Hasdrubal. Dio’s frag. 48, offering no reason to distrust Polybius’ claim, is probably false. Thus,Errington 1970, 32–34; Mantel 1991, 69–70; otherwise, Gelzer 1964, 84; Richardson 1986, 21; Serrati 2006,130, 133.

42. Rich 1996, 25; likewise, Richardson 1986, 22.


country, following the suggestions and advice of his father, Hamilcar.” Eckstein sug-gested a new reading of this passage, according to which Hamilcar had already warnedHannibal to keep his hands off Saguntum, which would mean that Rome’s special re-lationship with this Spanish town already existed during Hamilcar’s lifetime.43 How-ever, there is no reason to prefer this reading to the usual one, according to whichHamilcar merely warned Hannibal not to provoke the Romans into war before hehad taken possession of the rest of the country. Moreover, Eckstein’s interpretationis in direct conflict with Polybius’ statement concerning the timing of Roman interestin Spain.

Rome’s motive for establishing friendly relations with a Spanish town may givesome indication of the date. Rome clearly started its relationship with Saguntum inorder to hamper Barcid expansion in Spain, and the city was located very well to do so.Being nearly 150 kilometers south of the Ebro, it was reasonably close to Carthaginian-controlled territory. Moreover, its position on the coast blocked Carthaginian sea-routesnorthwards. Hence, when Hasdrubal’s successes caused Rome to take an interest inSpain, as Polybius writes, establishing connections to Saguntum was a clear signaland a strategically sound move. Such an action would hardly make sense after theEbro treaty, as later events clearly show. Rome took little interest in Saguntum in theyears after the Ebro treaty. It is hard to escape the impression that from the Ebrotreaty until the succession of Hannibal, Rome had turned its back on Spain, includ-ing its “befriended state” Saguntum.44 During the years 225–222 b.c.e. Rome wasfighting against the Gauls, and having pacified Cisalpine Gaul, the senate chose towage war in Illyria. Even Hannibal’s attack on Saguntum did not stir Rome into rapidaction. It was late in the day—too late for Saguntum—that Rome finally decided totake a tough stance on Spain.

Conclusion

Hence, in my opinion, Rome was ready for war in 225 b.c.e., but against Carthagerather than against the Gauls. Worried by Hasdrubal’s successes, in particular by hisfounding of Carthago Nova, the senate had gained a footing in Spain by establishingconnections with Saguntum, and had secured the Roman position in Sardinia andSicily by stationing troops there under the command of praetors. Because of their newand aggressive policy, the threat of war was in the air at the start of 225 b.c.e., andtherefore we find troops stationed in Sardinia, Sicily, and Tarentum at the time. Butthen news of the impending invasion of the Gaesatae caused surprise and alarm. Thehostility of the Boii and Insubres had been a known fact, but the invasion meant thatRome faced a more dangerous foe in the north than they had expected. The senatedecided to mollify Hasdrubal, and in such a situation, when the Romans were forcedto take a step back, the Ebro treaty makes sense. Neither party was eager for war, andtherefore each was willing to meet the other halfway.45 The Ebro Treaty was caused

43. Eckstein 1984, 53–56.44. Sumner 1967, 236: “The revival of active Roman interest in Spanish affairs was as late as 220.”

Errington (1970, 46–53) agrees on the Romans’ lack of interest until 220 b.c.e., and even then, he argues,they were not prepared to go to war for Saguntum. Richardson (1986, 29) concludes that it was not the fateof Saguntum that drove Rome to war, but the expansion of Hannibal’s power.

45. Eckstein (1984, 60) also notes that “Hasdrubal can hardly have looked upon the Ebro prohibition . . .as involving a serious impairment of any likely activity on his part”; similarly already Gelzer 1964, 84.


by the emergence of an unexpected enemy and should therefore be dated in the sameyear as (and at some time before) the battle of Telamon. Three years later, havingdefeated the Gauls and with its hands free, Rome had reason to accept the treaty assatisfying, since the Barcids had not made much progress to the north. It was onlyafter Hannibal succeeded Hasdrubal in command that mutual distrust flared up again.

In short, Polybius draws a false picture of events leading up to the war in 225 b.c.e.

The Gauls were not aroused by the land distribution instigated by Gaius Flaminius.Rome was not suffering during seven years under the constant threat of a massiveGallic invasion. Roman policy toward Carthage was indeed hampered by their fearof the Gauls, but this was a short-term response rather than a long-term threat.

The purpose of the manipulation of facts was probably to explain the failure ofRome to respond adequately to the growth of Punic power in Spain. Some modernscholars have put the blame for this distortion entirely on Polybius, in particular onhis very strong beliefs about the Barcid threat toward Rome and the inevitability ofa second Roman-Punic war. It is supposed that our Greek author needed an expla-nation for the apparent Roman inertness during these years, which he found in theGallic threat. However, not only Polybius needed to explain the course of events.The Romans too needed to justify their disregard for what in later years must havelooked like clear signs of Punic aggression. The city of Saguntum, which had reliedon Roman fides, had been sacked by Hannibal, while the Roman senators had merelyused words to protect it from destruction. Roman justification, not only regardingthe Kriegsschuldfrage, but also regarding the policy of the senate toward BarcidSpain, already colored Fabius Pictor’s biased account of Roman policy. The un-timely threat of a massive Gallic invasion, it was claimed, had obstructed Rome’spolicies concerning Spain. And after that, Rome had needed to secure its rear first,leading to the Second Illyrian War.46 Last but not least, the fable of the prolongedGallic threat was tied to the defamation of Flaminius.

Paul Erdkamp

Vrije UniversiteitBrussel

46. Walbank (1957, 324) and Eckstein (1994) see this as a justified claim.

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Polybius, The Ebro Treaty, And the Gallic Invasion of 225 Bce

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