Political Reflection Magazine Vol. 3 | No. 2

STAGING THE MOTIONS

OF ‘RESPONSIBILITY TO

PROTECT’ IN SYRIA? BY PROF. ALPASLAN ÖZERDEM

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POLITICAL REFLECTION

VOL. 3 - NO. 2 MARCH APRIL MAY

2012 | “ADVANCING

DIVERSITY”

4 WORLD STORIES

5 NOTABLE QUOTES

6 MIDDLE EAST REVIEW

Staging the Motions of

‘Responsibility to Protect’

in Syria?

BY PROF. ALPASLAN ÖZERDEM

14 EURASIA REVIEW

Perfect Nuclear Storm

Waiting to Happen in

Russia’s Northwest Region

BY ASSOC. PROF. RICHARD

ROUSSEAU

22 COMMENTARY

U.S. Foreign Policy

and The Arab Spring

BY DR. H. AKIN ÜNVER

30 What is Wrong with

Politics of the Irrepresentable?

BY DIMITRIS RAPIDIS

34 Using the Device of a Treaty

to Control Corporations?

BY DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON

38 CAUCASUS REVIEW

From “Dublin to Baku”:

Future Scenarios on EU’s

policies towards Black Sea

Region

BY ZAUR SHIRIYEV

44 Azerbaijan and the Iran Crisis:

Stuck in the Middle

BY ALEX JACKSON

50 INTERVIEW

An Interview with

Dr Nicholas Osbaldiston

(Monash University)

BY DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON

56 EUROPE REVIEW

Cypriot Natural Gas

and the Eastern Mediterranean:

Between Crisis and Cooperation

BY ZENONAS TZIARRAS

60 MIDDLE EAST REVIEW

A “WMD-free” Middle East

is a Disarmed Israel even

Desirable for the Region?

BY EDVIN ARNBY-MACHATA

62 FILM REVIEW

Once Upon a Time in

Anatolia

BY ALAADDIN F. PAKSOY

66 EURASIA REVIEW

Russian Government's

"Selective" Anti-corruption

Campaign

in the Energy Sector

BY DR. ZURAB GARAKANIDZE

72 GLOBAL CITY ANALYSIS

BEIJING

“Humanistic city”

BY FATİH EREN

80 RECENT BOOKS

14

38

50

22

WORLD STORIES | BY AKSEL ERSOY

The Egyptian cabinet called an emergency meeting after 74 people were killed and hun-

dreds more injured in clashes between spectators from rival teams at a football match in

the Egyptian city of Port Said. There was also violence at a game in Cairo. The police came under sharp criticism for fail-

ing to stop the trouble.

Ma Ying-jeou was re-elected as Taiwan’s president, defeating Tsai Ing-wen, the country’s

first female presidential candidate, in a closely fought election. Mr Ma has worked to im-

prove Taiwan’s relationship with China and used his first term to strengthen the countries’ economic ties. His party, the

Kuomintang, also retained its control of the legislature.

A war of words erupted between David Cameron, the British prime minister, and Alex

Salmond, the first minister of Scotland. Mr Cameron said that Mr Salmond’s plan to hold

a referendum on Scottish independence should be held sooner rather than later, and that it should contain a simple in-

or-out question. Mr Salmond told him to butt out.

Concerns mounted over the state of democracy in Hungary as tens of thousands took to

the streets of Budapest to protest against a new constitution. Critics say the document

entrenches the power of the ruling Fidesz party at the expense of formerly independent institutions. European officials

said that they would not return to Hungary to resume financial-aid talks until the government withdraws a law that

increases state influence over the central bank.

Kim Jong Il, North Korea’s dictator since 1994, died on December 17th of a presumed

heart attack in one of his palaces, though the official version said he died of overwork on

a train. The nuclear-tipped regime quickly fell behind Kim’s third son, Kim Jong Un, thought to be in his late 20s. So,

too, did China, the North’s crucial ally. Kim Jong Un’s uncle, Jang Song Taek, may prove to be a powerful regent in the

hereditary dictatorship. Kim’s funeral was a Communist set piece of loyalty and emotion, though most North Koreans

remain wretched.

Pakistan rejected the findings of an investigation by the Pentagon into an American air

strike on the Afghan border in November that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers. The report

blamed “inadequate co-ordination” by American and Pakistani officers for the incident. But in a letter to the American

Congress, Pakistan said the episode “has raised suspicions in the rank and file of the Pakistan army that it was a pre-

meditated attack”.

A dozen bombs went off across Baghdad on December 22nd, a few days after the last

American troops left Iraq. Sectarian animosity rose again, with the prime minister, Nuri al

-Maliki, a Shia, saying that the country’s vice-president, Tariq al-Hashemi, a Sunni, had been charged with terrorism.

Saif al-Islam Qaddafi, the son and heir of Muammar Qaddafi, was caught in south-

ern Libya. So, separately, was the late dictator’s intelligence chief, Abdullah al-Senussi.

Both are wanted by the International Criminal Court, which has apparently agreed that they might face trial in Libya.

Spain’s general election was won by the opposition centre-right People’s Party, led by

Mariano Rajoy. The ruling Socialists suffered their worst rout at the polls since the return

of democracy to Spain in 1975. Mr Rajoy has an absolute majority, but will not take office for a month. Although he

promises austerity and reform, nervous markets sent Spanish bond yields higher.

02.02.2012 | Egypt

20.01.2012 | Taiwan

13.01.2012 | Scotland

05.01.2012 | Hungary

17.12.2011 | North Korea

28.12.2011 | Pakistan

24.11.2011 | Libya

22.12.2011 | Iraq

22.11.2011 | Spain

Com

pile

d b

y A

ksel

Ers

oy fr

om D

iffe

ren

t W

orld

New

s So

urc

es

POLITICAL REFLECTION | MARCH - APRIL - MAY 2012 4

Quotes Notable

Economic Crisis in the

member states of EU

induced the major pow-

er of the Union to take

several measurement. In

January, 2012, a summit

on the new EU treaty was negotiated. The

picture at the end of the submit, was best

described by French President Nicolas Sar-

kozy. He told French newspaper Le Monde

that he and German Chancellor Angela Mer-

kel 'did everything' to convince Britain to

join the new EU treaty, adding that 'there

are now clearly two Europes'.

By Rahman Dağ

In Palestinian-Israeli Conflict, both parties have

blamed their counterparts for the deadlock in peace

talks. These reciprocal accusations were followed by

a statement performed by US defence secretary Leon

Panetta, in a speech at a Brookings Institution forum

in Washington.

He first of all called Israel to "reach out and mend

fences" with Turkey, Egypt and other security part-

ners in the Middle East by exactly saying that “For

example, Israel can reach out and mend fences with

those who share an interest in regional stability countries like Turkey and Egypt, as

well as Jordan.”

In his speech, he also invited Israel to resume the peace negotiations with Palestini-

ans by articulating that “Just get to the damned table”.

In the last quarter of 2011, the US president, Barak

Obama declared that “after nearly nine years,

America’s war in Iraq will be over.” and in Decem-

ber, the US military forces left Iraq. Since three

months, unfortunate diplomatic tensions among

Iraqi groups and armed attacks in the region di-

rected the arrows towards neighbouring countries.

In an interview with Prof. Dr. Ahmet Davutoglu, the

Foreign Minister of Turkey replied the question of

that “Scenarios stating that there are an alignment

of Tehran-Damascus-Baghdad against Turkey are

put into words in certain areas. Do you think there

is polarizations in the region?.

His response was that “no such thing is in question....Unfortunately, there might be

groups who want to prepare a suitable ground for either denominational or regional

polarizations.... Let me say it clearly, there are some groups who want to launch a

cold war in the region. We are determined to prevent a regional cold war. ...”

The Greater Picture of the World Politics

On the one hand:

Following tightening Western sanctions, Iran threats the western states with the closing down the Strait of

Hormuz from which a fifth of the world’s oil supply passes through. Thereupon, the US sent its aircraft carri-

er, USS John C. Stennis and another carrier, the USS Abraham Lincoln, which were entered the Gulf. Vice

Adm. Mark Fox, commander of the 5th Fleet, states that the Navy has “built a wide range of potential op-

tions to give the president” and “ready today” to confront any hostile action by Tehran.

In addition, The UK Defence Secretary, Philip Hammond has said that an escalation of a dispute with Iran

could see Britain sending military reinforcements to the Gulf. Hereby, the UK has sent its HMS Daring De-

stroyer to the Strait of Hormuz.

On the other hand,

As a long-planned mission, Moscow is deploying warships at its base in the Syrian port of Tartus, which consists of three vessels led by

the heavy aircraft-carrying missile cruiser. Admiral Kravchenko stated that. “But today, no one talks about possible military clashes, since

an attack on any Russian ship would be regarded as a declaration of war with all the consequences.”

In addition, The destroyer Shahid Qandi and its supply vessel Kharg and one more warship have entered the Mediterranean Sea without

clearance of destination. Reuters quoted a source at the Suez Canal authority as saying the vessels might be en route to Syria. Navy chief

Admiral Habibollah Sayari stated that the mission was a show of might and a "message of peace and friendship".

WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION 5

In a conference on the

anniversary of establish-

ment of Mahabad Kurdish

Republic in Iran in 1945,

the president of Kurdistan

Regional Government, Mesut Barzani

states that “Today, realities revealed

that solution of Kurdish question has to

be in peaceful ways.... Every inch of Kurdi-

stan has its own features and all of them

have the right of deciding on their own

future.

O rganised by the Arab League and

attended by around 70 countries,

the Friends of Syria Conference in

Tunis on 24 February 2012 was prob-

ably one of the last chances for the resolution of the

Syrian crisis through diplomatic means or it may also

be argued that it was actually staged to appear in

that way. Both sides of the argument could come up

with strong justifications whether the Tunis confer-

ence was a genuine attempt to resolve the conflict in

Syria peacefully. In order to look at what is happen-

ing from a more objective perspective though, this

article will adopt the principles of ‘just war’ theory as

well as the criteria for Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

in its analysis of how the international response to

the Syrian crisis would likely to develop over the next

few months. In order to contextualise the Syrian case

in a wider humanitarian interventions landscape, the

analysis will focus on the two previous North Atlantic

Treaty Organization (NATO) interventions in Kosovo

(1999) and Libya (2011).

The political crisis of Syria which started around a

year ago is now turning into one of the bloodiest

chapters of the so called ‘Arab Spring’ with a death

toll of over 8,000 people. After the popular revolts

and regime changes in Tunisia and Egypt, the trans-

formation in Libya presented itself as a full blown

civil war from March to October 2011. The uprising in

Bahrain was crushed violently by the state with the

military intervention assistance of the neighbouring

Saudi Arabia and the political instability in Yemen

still continues. Therefore, since the end of the Libya

conflict with the capture of Muammar Gaddafi on

STAGING THE MOTIONS OF

‘RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT’

IN SYRIA?

MIDDLE EAST REVIEW | BY PROF. ALPASLAN ÖZERDEM*


20th October, Syria has been dominating the interna-

tional agenda with an increasing level of pressure

from the Western countries and their allies in

the region. The Tunis Conference was an important

episode in this process, as it clearly indicated that

the ‘friends’ of Syria led by the United States (US),

United Kingdom (UK), France and Turkey are in fact,

no longer prepared to talk to President Bashar

al-Assad of Syria and they would prefer to show a

clear sign of support to the Syrian opposition. The

Foreign Minister of Turkey, Ahmet Davutoğlu, when

he was asked the question of why the Syrian govern-

ment had not been invited to the Tunis Conference,

said that it was now time to make a distinction be-

tween ‘victims’ and ‘instigators of the violence’. The

same sentiment was then echoed by the Foreign

Secretary William Hague. In other words, the Tunis

conference underlined the gap between ‘friends’ of

Syria and ‘supporters’ of the Assad regime such as

Russia and China, which also did not take part at the

Conference.

The ‘supporters’ of Syria have so far managed to

block a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Reso-

lution on Syria. This would sound very familiar for the

students of international relations, as so many times

before the international community has been at such

an impasse, i.e. the 1999 Kosovo crisis, in deciding an

appropriate response strategy for the protection of

fundamental human rights in those countries affect-

ed by armed conflict and violence. As a veto by one

of UNSC permanent members (China, France, Russia,

UK and US) can block the process of passing a resolu-

tion, the following stages of international responses

to violent political crises often turn into an exercise of

circumventing such a diplomatic impasse in the UN

system. Consequently, in such contexts the issues of

legality and legitimacy often become fiercely debat-

ed issues. In the case of Libya for example, the UNSC

Resolution 1970 and particularly, Resolution 1973

were pivotal for preparing the ground for the NATO’s

military intervention as they asked to ‘establish and

enforce a no-fly zone over Libya’ and ‘employ all

means to protect civilians’. In other words, the mili-

tary intervention in Libya was ‘legal’ from an interna-

tional law perspective, which was not the case for the

Kosovo intervention as NATO undertook that inter-

vention without the permission of a UNSC resolution.

MIDDLE EAST REVIEW | BY PROF. ALPASLAN ÖZERDEM


Ahmet Davutoğlu William Hague

However, it was then argued that the military inter-

vention was legitimate, therefore necessary, because

of the humanitarian concerns to do with the well

being of Albanian Kosovars in the hands of Serbian

security forces. However, the legality aspect is only

one of the key issues for military humanitarian inter-

ventions and for a better understanding of the Tunis

Conference within the wider response process, it

would be necessary to consider other criteria for re-

voking R2P.

In brief, R2P is structured over the premise that

sovereignty is not only a privilege for states but also

responsibility that they need to face. For the

protection of lives, R2P sets out responsibilities

that states have to their own citizens as well as

responsibilities that all states and certain internation-

al institutions such as UN have as members of

the international community. In 2005, the Report by

the International Commission on Intervention and

State Sovereignty offered a set of six criteria that

should be considered for any form of military inter-

vention. First, there should be a ‘just cause’ for the

military intervention. In both Kosovo and Libya cases

this was a strong justification for the military re-

sponse. With the worsening humanitarian situation

in Syria, particularly in the city of Homs, the ‘friends’

of Syria would likely to argue that even without a

UNSC Resolution there is a legitimate ground for a

military intervention. In fact, if the humanitarian cri-

sis starts to turn into a major disaster with mass casu-

alties and displacement of civilians, then even Russia

and China might start to find it too difficult to justify

their position vis a vis their support to the Assad re-

gime.

The second criterion, which is the ‘right intention’ for

military interventions, may be the most difficult one

to justify and validate by the ‘friends’ of Syria. Within

the overall political complexities of the Middle East

and a number of other pressing security issues and

crises in the region such as the Iran’s nuclear capabili-

ties, protracted occupation of Palestine by Israel,

Kurdish independence aspirations in Iraq and Turkey,

and presence of a wide range of strong non-state

armed groups such as the Hezbollah in Lebanon

would always pose question marks on the issue of

intentions for such a military action. Both the ‘friends’

and ‘supporters’ of Syria have their own geo-political

and economic interests in the region, which would

bring their intentions into question, even if a possible

military intervention would have been undertaken

purely for humanitarian concerns. For example, in

the case of Libya, although the military assistance

was requested by the local rebel groups and there

were serious humanitarian concerns, there was also a

big question mark on whether the intervention

was actually for the country’s rich oil and gas re-

serves. Moreover, for opting to take no action in the

case of Bahrain while thousands of Shia civilians were

killed and tortured in the hands of security forces, but

becoming highly concerned for the well being of

civilians in Syria weakens the ‘friends’ of Syria’s argu-

ment further that their intentions are purely humani-

tarian. Even if that is the case then there is an

important question to do with double standards to

answer.

It could also be argued that the third criterion of a

military intervention needing to be the ‘final resort’ is

perhaps the main driver for diplomatic attempts be-

ing undertaken by the ‘friends’ of Syria. In other

words, if a military intervention against Syria is un-

dertaken without the permission of UNSC, then there

would be a strong argument for claiming that all

have been done to resolve the issue peacefully and

having exhausted all means of diplomacy, a military

intervention was the only option left to protect civil-

ians in Syria. The Tunis Conference demanded an

immediate ceasefire and humanitarian assessment,

and used the threat of sanctions as a possible lever-



In fact, if the humanitarian crisis starts to turn

into a major disaster with mass casualties and

displacement of civilians, then even Russia and

China might start to find it too difficult to justi-

fy their position vis a vis their support to the

Assad regime.

age against the Assad regime. The next Friends of

Syria Conference will be held in Istanbul in May, and

at that conference the tone of the threat is likely to

be much stronger. In fact, it would not be completely

unimaginable if the Istanbul Conference would

also serve the purpose of a final warning before

a military intervention. The international community

seems to have made a lip service to the ‘final

resort’ criterion in both Kosovo and Libya. At

the Rambouillet peace talks the demands on the

Milosevic’s regime in Serbia were so heavy handed

that there were serious question marks over the

international community’s sincerity to resolve the

Kosovo crisis peacefully. In the Libya case, there was

only a month between the two UNSC resolutions and

did not seem that the Western powers had much

interest in talking to Gaddafi, as they suddenly re-

membered that he was a dictator and killed his own

people for decades! Therefore, it would not be a total

surprise if this turns out to be the case with Syria too

and what is seen as a quest for finding a diplomatic

solution is probably no more than a grand staging

exercise for laying grounds for a military interven-

tion.

Undertaking a military intervention on the basis of a

decision made by a legitimate authority such as

UNSC is the fourth criterion. In the case of Kosovo

such a legal authority was missing, hence the argu-

ment of legitimacy formed the backbone of justifica-

tion for the military intervention. The Libya interven-

tion was based on two UNSC resolutions but the

backing of the Arab League was also imperative, es-

pecially for having a stronger moral support and jus-

tification. If ‘friends’ of Syria fail to pass a UNSC reso-

lution for a military action, which is the most likely

scenario, then the Arab League’s blessing and sup-

port for such an intervention would become particu-

larly important. At the Tunis Conference, Qatar which

has been playing a leading role in the Arab League

actions in recent years, particularly in the case of Lib-

ya, already suggested that the situation in Syria de-

mands the deployment of military means for the pro-

vision of humanitarian assistance. The future devel-

opments with the Syrian opposition would also have

some critical impacts on the issue of legitimate au-

thority. At the moment it is polarized and fractured.

Two of its main actors which are Syrian National

Council (led by Burhan Ghalioun) and Free Syrian

Army (led by Riyaad al-Assad and primarily support-

ed by Turkey) are calling for a military intervention.

Meanwhile, National Coordination Committee which

is formed by left wing and Kurdish parties calls for

the continuation of dialogue with the Assad regime

and did not participate to the Tunis Conference. In

fact, it was interesting to note that one of the key



points made by Burhan Ghalioun was a promise for

the recognition of Kurdish identity in the post-Assad

era.

The remaining two criteria which are the use of

‘proportional means’ and ‘reasonable prospects’

for meeting the humanitarian objectives of the

military intervention would likely to be of a less

concern for ‘friends’ of Syria for the time being.

However, as was the case with Kosovo and Libya, the

use of an air campaign, naval blockade and military

assistance to rebels are likely to be the main means

of a future military intervention in Syria. Therefore, it

would be likely that such a military intervention

would cause a high level of collateral damage in

terms of civilian lives and infrastructure. However,

having the support of internal opposition groups

would likely to reduce the pressure over this issue.

The neighbouring countries such as Turkey would

also likely to be generous and open in providing as-

sistance to Syrian refugees as a result of such a mili-

tary campaign.

Whether such a military intervention would bring an

end to the humanitarian crisis in Syria is the final

question to be considered here. The key issue with

this criterion is that the military intervention would

need to present a convincing case for achieving its

set objectives for the protection of civilians and deliv-

ery of humanitarian assistance. In other words, how

realistic is it that a military intervention in Syria

would bring the fighting to a halt and be able to deal

with the humanitarian protection of civilians? The

issue here is more than capability as it is important to

remember that such military interventions could

sometime worsen humanitarian crises further, as was

the case in Kosovo. After the NATO’s bombing started

in March 1999, hundreds of thousands of civilians

from Kosovo fled to the neighbouring countries of

Albania and Macedonia. Moreover, such a military

intervention could easily be entangled in the com-

plexity of local and regional politics. The regional

‘supporters’ of Syria such as Iran and Lebanon (the

Hezbollah) might also get involved in the conflict,

which would create huge regional and international

ramifications. Finally, how the exit strategy would

look like is another key consideration to be born in

mind by such a military intervention. In the case of

Libya, the intervention came to an end with the cap-

ture of Gaddafi and control of the country by the up-

rising leadership. If a similar scenario does not hap-

pen in Syria due to the complex ethnic, religious and

sectarian structures of the country and the way the

Ba’athist regime has kept a tight control over them

since 1960s, the post-Assad period could also turn

into an Iraq-type civil war.

In summary, there would be three possible scenarios

based on the assumption that the Syrian crisis could

only be resolved through fighting and intervention

that would be unfolding over the next few months.

First, the Syrian uprising would win the fighting

against the Assad regime without needing an

external military intervention. Second, ‘friends’

of Syria would manage to convince China and Russia

to pass a UNSC resolution to undertake a military

intervention (i.e. Libya). Third, the military

intervention is undertaken without the permission

of UNSC (i.e. Kosovo). As our preceding discussions

indicated each of these three scenarios would

mean significant differences for the above men-

tioned R2P criteria. A final possible scenario would

obviously be in terms of the Assad regime gaining a

full control of the country again and managing to

eradicate any justification for a military intervention

on humanitarian grounds. However, in relation to the

other three scenarios this looks like the least likely

one.

No te:

* A l pas l an Özerd em is Professor of Peacebuild-

ing at Coventry University.



The key issue with this criterion is that the mili-

tary intervention would need to present a con-

vincing case for achieving its set objectives for

the protection of civilians and delivery of hu-

manitarian assistance.

ISS

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Columbia International Affairs Online (CIAO)

Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ)

EBSCO Publishing Inc.

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Index Islamicus

International Bibliography of Book Reviews of

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International Bibliography of Periodical Litera-

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International Bibliography of the Social Scienc-

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International Relations and Security Network

(ISN)

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Research Papers in Economics (RePEc)

Social Sciences Information Space (SOCIONET)

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Academic Index

Bielefeld Academic Search Engine (BASE)

Columbia International Affairs Online (CIAO)

Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ)

EBSCO Publishing Inc.

EconLit

EconPapers

IDEAS

Index Islamicus

Infomine

International Bibliography of Book Reviews of Schor-

larly Literature in the Humanities and Social Sciences (IBR)

International Bibliography of Periodical Literature in

the Humanities and Social Sciences (IBZ)

International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)

International Relations and Security Network (ISN)

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Editor-in-Chief:

Ozgur TUFEKCI King’s College London, UK

Managing Editor:

Husrev TABAK University of Manchester, UK

Book Review Editor:

Kadri Kaan RENDA King’s College London, UK

Associate Editors:

Emel AKCALI, Dr. Central European University, Hungary | Mitat CELIKPALA, Assoc.Prof. Kadir Has University, Turkey

Bayram GUNGOR, Prof. Karadeniz Technical University, Turkey

Editorial Board:

Sener AKTURK, Dr. Harvard University, USA | William BAIN, Dr. Aberystwyth University, UK |Alexander BELLAMY, Prof. University of Queensland, Australia | Richard BELLAMY, Prof. University College London, UK | Andreas BIELER, Prof. University of Nottingham, UK | Pınar BILGIN, Assoc. Prof. Bilkent University, Turkey | Ken BOOTH, Prof. Aber-ystwyth University, UK | Stephen CHAN, Prof. SOAS, University of London, UK | Nazli CHOUCRI, Prof. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA | John M. DUNN, Prof. University of Cambridge, UK | Kevin DUNN, Prof. Hobart and William Smith Colleges, USA | Mine EDER, Prof. Bogazici University, Turkey | Ertan EFEGIL, Assoc. Prof. Sakarya Uni-versity, Turkey | Ayla GOL, Dr. Aberystwyth University, UK | Stefano GUZZINI, Prof. Uppsala Universitet, Sweden | Elif Ince HAFALIR, Assist. Prof. Carnegie Mellon University, USA | David HELD, Prof. London School of Economics, LSE, UK | Raymond HINNEBUSCH, Prof. University of St Andrews, UK | Naim KAPUCU, Assoc. Prof. University of Central Florida, USA | Fahri KARAKAYA, Prof. University of Massachusetts Dartmouth, USA | Abdulhamit KIRMIZI, Dr. SOAS, University of London, UK | Cécile LABORDE, Prof. University College London, UK | Ziya ONIS, Prof. Koc University, Turkey | Alp OZERDEM, Prof. Coventry University, UK | Oliver RICHMOND, Prof. University of St Andrews, UK | Ian TAYLOR, Prof. University of St Andrews, UK | Murat TUMAY, Dr. Selcuk University, Turkey | Talat ULUSSEVER, Assist. Prof. King Fahd University, Saudi Arabia | Ali WATSON, Prof. University of St Andrews, UK | Stefan WOLFF, Prof. Uni-versity of Birmingham, UK | Hakan YILMAZKUDAY, Assist. Prof. Temple University, USA |

International Advisory Board:

Yasemin AKBABA, Assist. Prof. Gettysburg College, USA | Mustafa AYDIN, Prof. Kadir Has University, Turkey | Ian BACHE, Prof. University of Sheffield, UK | Mark BASSIN, Prof. University of Birmingham, UK | Mehmet DEMIRBAG, Prof. University of Sheffield, UK | Can ERBIL, Assist. Prof. Brandeis University, USA | Stephen Van EVERA, Prof. Mas-sachusetts Institute of Technology, USA | John GLASSFORD, Assoc. Prof. Angelo State University, USA | Bulent GOKAY, Prof. Keele University, UK | Burak GURBUZ, Assoc. Prof. Galatasaray University, Turkey | Tony HERON, Dr. University of Sheffield, UK | John M. HOBSON, Prof. University of Sheffield, UK | Jamal HUSEIN, Assist. Prof. Angelo State University, USA | Murat S. KARA, Assoc. Prof. Angelo State University, USA | Michael KENNY, Prof. University of Sheffield, UK | Gamze G. KONA, Dr. Foreign Policy Analyst, Turkey | Scott LUCAS, Prof. University of Birmingham, UK | Christoph MEYER, Dr. King’s College London, UK | Kalypso NICOLAIDIS, Prof. University of Oxford, UK | Bill PARK, Mr. King’s College London, UK | Jenik RADON, Prof. Columbia University, USA | Ibrahim SIRKECI, Prof. Re-gent’s College London, UK | Claire THOMAS, Dr. University of Sheffield, UK | Brian WHITE, Prof. University of Sheffield, UK | M. Hakan YAVUZ, Assoc. Prof. University of Utah, USA | Birol YESILADA, Prof. Portland State Universi-ty, USA |

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T he large-scale nuclear disaster at

Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear

Power Plant has acted as a wakeup

call for the international community,

engendering deep reflection on the consequences of

using nuclear energy. The maintenance and servicing

of nuclear plants either currently in operation or un-

der construction, and the dismantling of those al-

ready decommissioned or on their way to being shut

down, are issues of heated debate, as are possible

future nuclear projects.

A crucial issue for European Union members, the

United States, China and the whole world, is how to

ensure appropriate maintenance practices and tech-

nology of Russia’s nuclear waste disposal sites, partic-

ularly those in the north west of the country. It is pre-

dicted that an accident involving nuclear infrastruc-

tures in that region could easily be more devastating

than that at Chernobyl in Ukraine in April 1986.

The North West Region, which includes the Mur-

mansk and Archangelsk Oblasts (provinces), the No-

vaya Zemlya Territory (Okrug) and the White, Barents

and Kara Seas, contains the largest concentration of

fissile, radioactive and nuclear materials for either

military or civilian application found anywhere on the

planet.

Ci vi l ian Nucle ar E ner gy f lee t

Polyarny Zori, a city on the outermost western edge

of the Murmansk Fjord, is the largest energy produc-

ing locality in the Murmansk Oblast. The city is home


PERFECT NUCLEAR STORM

WAITING TO HAPPEN IN

RUSSIA’S NORTHWEST REGION

EURASIA REVIEW | BY ASSOC. PROF. RICHARD ROUSSEAU*

to the Kola Power Plant (NPP-1), whose 4 PWRs

(pressurized water reactors) were built in two phases.

Phase 1 went online in 1973-74, with two reactors of

the VVER-440/230 type –Russia’s first generation of

PWR reactors using LEU (low-enriched uranium), with

an enrichment level ranging from 2 to 4.95%. Phase 2

came online in March 1981 and October 1984, with

the commissioning of the No. 3 and No. 4 reactors

of the improved VVER 440/213 type. Reactors of

the previous VVER-440/230 type (phase 1) were

designed to have an operational lifespan of 30 years

and scheduled to be decommissioned in 2003 and

2004 by the Russian Nuclear Energy State Corpora-

tion (Rosatom). However, the Russian government,

under a cloud of controversy, extended their

operational lifespan for 10 years in 2003, despite the

high number of accidents seen around that time1.

During the first two weeks of February 2011, for in-

stance, five out of Russia’s 32 operational reactors

had to be shut down for emergency repairs and at

least a dozen leaks of contaminated material were

recorded2.

These emergency repairs in the month of February, in

only eleven days, are sad testimony to the fact that

the Russian nuclear energy industry is in dire shape

and simply unfit to be operated with any degree of

reliability. As reactor equipment gets older its perfor-

mance is reduced, making it prone to cause more and

more incidents, especially given the apparently low

standard of maintenance, which is not undertaken

regularly anyway. Such a ticking time bomb not only

creates additional expenditures and destabilizes sup-

plies of energy but is a public health hazard waiting

to happen. If repairs are hastily performed in order to

bring power generation back on line, and the quality

of this work is substandard as a result of this time

pressure, more human errors and “glitches” are likely

to occur – and with increased frequency. After each

nuclear incident, the Russian nuclear authorities say

that nothing of significance transpired. However, in

its report on the Most Dangerous Reactors, released

in 1995, the U.S. Department of Energy ranked the

Kola Nuclear Power Plant as the most dangerous in

Russia3.

EURASIA REVIEW | BY ASSOC. PROF. RICHARD ROUSSEAU


The antiquated technology of the KPP-1 and rising

domestic energy demand in the region have prompt-

ed the Kremlin to build a new atomic complex,

the Kola Power Plant 2 (NPP-2), located eight kilome-

ters from NPP-14. The Ministry of Energy plans to in-

stall at NPP-2 four next-generation reactors (VVER-

620), a cross between the VVER-440 and KLT-40 mod-

els. The VVER-620 reactors represent the cutting

edge of Russian nuclear engineering. They are a new

generation of nuclear reactors designed during a

three-year joint project conducted by Russian Minis-

try of Atomic Energy and the German companies

Siemens and Gesellschaft fur Reaktorsicherheit

(Association for Plant and Reactor Safety). They oper-

ate as pressurized water reactors (PWR), using 90%

enriched uranium-235 fuel derived from marine

plants. Each of these medium-power reactors will

produce approximately 700 MWe of energy. The KPP-

2 should be operational by 2018\2019, which will

allow for the shutdown of the two old reactors of the

KPP-1 facility.

In addition to grave concerns over the old NPP-1, the

Murmansk Oblast is also confronted with the menace

of another potential nuclear accident of significant

amplitude and enormous environmental cost: The

icebreaker fleet stationed in the port of the city of

Murmansk.

Russia possesses six nuclear-powered civil icebreak-

ers (the “Yamal,” “Russia,” “Arktika,” “Taimyr,”

“Vaigach” and “Sovetsky Soyuz”) which are equipped

to carry out a range of operations5. Russia’s fleet

comprises two types of icebreakers: Sea-going-class

icebreakers, which can operate in high waves,

and shallow draught icebreakers, which can enter

rivers. A third type of icebreaker is basically a nuclear-

powered container ship. In total, 14 PWR reactors

of the KLT-40 type, loaded with HEU (90%), propel

these icebreakers. The Murmansk Shipping Company

(MSC) operated all these vessels until August

2008, when the fleet was handed over to the

Nuclear Energy State Corporation (Rosatom)6. The

federal state-owned unitary enterprise Atomflot,

based in Murmansk, has since been authorized to

run the nuclear-powered vessels and deal with radio-

active waste (RW), including its storage and pro-

cessing.

Finally, Rosatom owns five service and storage

vessels especially designed for dealing with radioac-

tive waste (RW) and spent nuclear fuel (SNF), and

stationed at the Atomflot base, only two kilometers

from residential districts. The service ships “Imandra”

and “Lotta” are used to store for six months – in

dry, water-cooled containers – spent fuel from

the Rosatom’s civil ice-breakers. Imandra and Lotta

can store 1,530 (i.e. fuel from six reactors) and 4,080

(i.e. fuel from 12 reactors) fuel assemblies respective-

ly. However, since 1992 both service ships have

been filled to capacity. Another problem is that just

over one third (35%) of the fuel assemblies stored

in Imandra and Lotta contain zirconium surrounding

the plutonium fuel. Such fuel assemblies cannot

be reprocessed. The vessel “Volodarsky” (1929, 96x15

m, 5,500 t) is used for keeping solid radioactive

waste (SRW) and has a storage area of 300 m3.

The tanker “Serebryanka” (1975, 102x12 m, 4,000 t)

is used for collecting liquid radioactive waste

(LRW) and its transmission to Atomflot. Finally, the

“Lepse,” a service vessel moored in a dockyard in the

Kola Bay near Murmansk, was built more than 70

years ago for the refueling of the first nuclear-

powered icebreaker, “Lenin,” and later for “Arktika”

and “Sibir,” the next generation of icebreakers. In

1988 it was retired from active use, although it still

contains two storage tanks for SNF materials from

icebreakers.

In July 2011 the Fincantieri shipyard, an Italian

firm, handed over to Atomflot the multipurpose con-



The city of Murmansk is the most important

strategic area in Russia’s North West territory.

Due to the warm North Atlantic drift, the city’s

ports and the southern half of the Barents Sea

remain completely ice-free all year round,

which makes them more easily navigable.

tainer ship Rossita, intended for shipments of SNF

and materials from dismantled nuclear submarines

from the Kola Peninsula and the White Sea – former

Russian Navy bases in North-West Russia – to Mur-

mansk7.

T he A ndree va Bay “Ce me tery” on t he No -

vay a Zemly a

The city of Murmansk is the most important strategic

area in Russia’s North West territory. Due to the warm

North Atlantic drift, the city’s ports and the southern

half of the Barents Sea remain completely ice-free all

year round, which makes them more easily naviga-

ble. Thanks to the influence of the Gulf Stream, the

Barents Sea does not freeze and the majestic fjords at

the entrance of the White Sea are also accessible year

round without difficulty. For these reasons the North-

ern Fleet, formerly known as the Soviet Fleet of the

Northern Seas, is the largest and most important of

the former Soviet fleets, and has ever increasing stra-

tegic importance for Russia.

Since the 1950s the Kola Peninsula has witnessed a

proliferation of shipyards, storage sites, decommis-

sioning complexes, facilities for reprocessing nuclear

materials and secret nuclear submarine bases. In the

Former Soviet Union (FSU), Semipalatinsk in Kazakh-

stan and Novaya Zemlya in the Arctic were the two

major fields for nuclear test explosions. Ninety three

percent of the total power of these explosions –

which were basically nuclear weapons tests – in the

FSU was registered on Novaya Zemlya and the Kara

Sea. These two areas were called by the Soviet au-

thorities the Northern Nuclear Test Range, an entity

established in 1954. In all, 132 nuclear tests – explo-

sions – were conducted on Novaya Zemlya between

1950 and October 24, 1990, including 88 atmospheric

(either close to the land or sea surface), 39 under-

ground and 3 underwater in the Kara Sea. The total

power of these explosions was 265 Megatons (Mt)8.

They included the tests of “Tsar Bomba,” the largest

hydrogen bomb ever detonated on October 30, 1961,

which had a force of 58 megatons or 58,000,000 tons

of TNT. In comparison, the atomic bomb dropped on

Hiroshima had a force of 20,000 tons of TNT. For

good measure, the seabed of the Kara Sea is estimat-

ed to contain about 11,000 sunken containers of radi-

oactive waste, a dozen dumped nuclear reactors and

an unknown number of defective nuclear-propelled

submarines.

Following the collapse of the Soviet system in De-

cember 1991 the Russian Federation inherited a little

less than 200 nuclear powered submarines. At that

time a significant number of these had been in use

for about 30 years. During the first half of the 1990s

the Kremlin decided to remove from active service all

the older submarines, i.e. about 140 vessels, as part

of downsizing the military budget. Over the follow-

ing decade Russian leaders made great efforts to

dismantle these rotting submarines and remove their

nuclear fuel. However in the last 20 years the Russian

Navy has been able to separate out and store the

reactor compartments of only a few dozen subma-

rines. At present all secured reactor compartments,

including whole submarines, are stored and tied up

in three traditional storage sites:

1) Andreeva Bay in the Zapadnaya Litsa fjord on the

Kola Peninsula. Reportedly, the site hosts 21,000

spent fuel rods, equivalent to approximately 90 nu-



clear reactors, as well as thousands of tons radioac-

tive liquid waste stored in decrepit stainless-steel

containers filled to capacity since the 1990s. Three

dozen of these containers are leaking radioactive

material.

2) Nerpichya Port, on the Zapadnaya Litsa’s

east coast.,The site is home to 6 SSBNs (Ship

Submersible Ballistic missile Nuclear [powered]

vessels), better known as Typhoon ballistic

missile submarines (of 25,000 tons), which still

have on board torpedo tubes designed to handle

and launch missiles. Each Typhoon has two

pressurized water reactors of the OK650b type

which use 20-45% enriched uranium-235 fuel. Each

vessel’s weapon system is composed of 20 submarine

-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) which can carry

10 Multiple Independently targetable Reentry

Vehicles (MIRV), each able to produce a yield of 21

kilotons.

3) Gremikha Base, east of the Kola Peninsula.

The second largest onshore storage facility for

the Russian Northern Fleet’s spent nuclear fuel,

Gremikha contains around 800 spent-fuel assemblies.

Reportedly, spent fuel from six liquid metal reactors

(LMR), with 90% HEU are stored at this site, the

largest for storing decommissioned submarines.

The spent fuel comes entirely from the deactivated

Alpha class submarines and, apparently, cannot

be reprocessed with today’s technology. LMRs

have to be treated more carefully because they

used higher enrichment levels, probably weapons-

grade uranium. The banks of the Gremikha base

serve as a “parking lot” for several old-generation

submarines now abandoned and in a dire state of

repair:

4 November class vessels, for a total of 8 VM-1

PWR loaded with 21% HEU;

1 Hotel Class vessel with 2 VM-A PWRs loaded

with 21% HEU;

8 Victor I\Victor II class vessels, for a total of 8

OK-300 VM-4 PWR with 21% HEU;

4 Victor III class vessels, for a total of 8 OK300

VM-4 PWR with 21% HEU.

All the mentioned cities, districts and military bases

on the Kola Peninsula and Novaya Zemlya have radi-

oactivity levels a thousand times higher than the

normal dose a human being can tolerate. Even three

to five kilometers away from these places levels of

radiation are hundreds of times above the normal

and represent extremely serious risks to human

health and the environment. Over the years entire

villages have been evacuated and their populations

relocated in urban centers nearby. In the 1980s about

30,000 people lived in the Gremikha region; however,

since the breakup of the Soviet Union the population

has decreased to about 10,000, due to economic

hardship and ongoing substantial reductions in the

Russian military program9. Some cities have been

closed to both foreigners and citizens of the Russian

Federation. Access to these is restricted to the mili-

tary or duly authorized technicians and workers.

Accide nt Risks a nd Co nser vatio n Pro gra ms

The volume of radioactive material on the Kola Pen-

insula is equivalent to about 150 nuclear reactors and

thousands of tons of depleted uranium and plutoni-

um. There are nine radioactive waste (RW) and spent

nuclear fuel (SNF) storage facilities. In addition many

shipyards, where civilian ships and military subma-

rines are built, assembled and repaired, are located

on the Kola Peninsula, particularly in Murmansk,

Severodvinsk (“Sevmash” and “Zvezdochka”) and

Polyarny. These shipyards are an integral segment of

the Russian Military Industrial Complex but also more

closely connected to the Northern Fleet. In addition

to the threat of radioactive pollution, the level of

“conventional” pollution is also very high in that re-

gion, principally due to airborne chemical pollution

from the mining, steel and metallurgical industries.



...cities, districts and military bases on the Ko-

la Peninsula and Novaya Zemlya have radioac-

tivity levels a thousand times higher than the

normal dose a human being can tolerate.

Unfortunately Russia has a historically dismal record

of nuclear accidents and has never adequately

demonstrated a capacity to cope efficiently and ef-

fectively with environmental emergencies. The risks

of accidents on the Kola Peninsula are considerable

and these could directly affect the Arctic and Scandi-

navian countries. The next radioactive toxic cloud

formed on the Kola Peninsula might easily drift over

Central Europe and the northern coast of Canada and

even reach the United States.

The dreadful consequences of such an accident

would be disastrous for Russia’s future economic

development. Moreover, it would inflict enormous

damage, not only on humans and the environment,

but also on the reputation of a country which has

made its civilian nuclear power industry the spear-

head of its export and technology development. In

spite of the many irregularities and deficiencies in the

nuclear reactor technology, Russian reactors are still

in great demand on the international market.

In 2006 Rosatom announced that it wants nuclear

produced energy to account for about one forth

(23%) of the country’s total energy production, and

approximately one third (32%) of European Russia,

by 202010. To achieve this objective, the focus will be

placed on the development of fast neutron reactors

(FNRs), the Generation IV component of Rosatom’s

future nuclear energy policy. FNRs use uranium 238

(U-238) as fuel instead of the uranium 235 (U-235)

commonly used by conventional reactors, such as

PWRs. The 880 MWe capacity BN-800, a FNR reactor

expected to enter into operation in 2014, offers, ac-

cording to Rosatom, “natural radiation safety in all

credible accidents caused by internal or external im-

pacts, including sabotage, with no need for people

evacuation.”11

Conceptually, the refueling process for these reactors

is more cost-efficient and simple to operate. They use

only about 1 or 2% of the natural or depleted urani-

um required by a comparable PWR reactor (http://

www.nikiet.ru/eng/structure/mr-innovative/

brest.html). FNRs will permit Russia to produce more

civilian energy with less fissile material and this ad-

vantage will allow for the further use of the depleted

uranium now stockpiled as a result of the disman-

tling of nuclear submarines

and warheads under the

“new” START (Strategic Arms

Reduction Treaty) agreement

between the Russia and the

United States. This transfor-

mation is part of the Mega-

ton to Megawatts Program

as first initiated by the two

nuclear superpowers in 1993,

which aimed to kill “two

birds with one stone,” i.e. to

both proceed with disarma-

ment and bring down the

consumption and global

price of non-renewable ura-

nium, a resource now on the

verge of being monopolized

by China12. However, the U.S.

-Russian agreement will ex-

pire in 2013 and will have to

be renegotiated.



Economies made by introducing FNRs have been

earmarked for the military. The plan is to replace Rus-

sia’s Soviet-era nuclear submarines (the Typhoon

class) with SSN (Ship Submersible Nuclear) Yasen-

class attack submarines, also known as the Graney

class and Severodvinsk class, by 2014. These new

SSNs are also considered as a crucial tool for Russia

to capture new arms markets. For instance, Russia is

waiting for the Indian Maritime Force (IMF) to exer-

cise its right to enforce the Indo-Russian agreement

on the lease of a new Akula II class submarine, the

SSN Nerpa. This 2005 deal is worth an estimated $1.8

billion to Russia. After some problems with the reac-

tor cooling system, the Russia international News

Agency (RIA Novosti) quoted a Russian Navy Staff

admiral as saying, on March 16, 2011, that Russia will

deliver the Nerpa to India by the end of this year.13

Since the 1990s the Kremlin has not paid much atten-

tion to the situation at the Kola Peninsula. The only

initiatives of significance taking place are the trilat-

eral agreements with Norway and the United States,

known as the “Murmansk Initiatives,” signed in 1996,

and still in force. These agreements set up a fund to

“improve the capability of the Russian Federation to

comply with the requirements of the London Con-

vention that prohibit ocean dumping of low-level

liquid radioactive waste (LLRW)” and increase the

pace of the construction of centers for the decommis-

sioning of nuclear submarines.14 All in all, the invest-

ment of several tens of millions of dollars still has not

consistently improved the situation to an acceptable

level. In Murmansk, the site for refining and disposal

of Liquid Radioactive Waste (LRW) has been working

for many years now and it is still involved in cleaning

up what remains of the former floating technological

base “Lepse.”

The aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear power plant

catastrophe in Japan resulted in the evacuation of all

residents living within a 20 km radius of the Japanese

nuclear plant, which is located in the city of Daichi. In

late April 2011, the United States, Australia and South

Korea, for their part, urged their citizens to move

from areas within 80 km of the crippled plant, an

evacuation zone which was substantially larger than

the one mandated by the Japanese government. The

disaster has been recognized as a perfect storm with

the meltdown of three Japanese nuclear reactors,

each involving approximately 300 tons of uranium.

The event came as a surprise to many industry ex-

perts since it took place in such a technologically ad-

vanced country, especially one that is on the cutting

edge in nuclear and earthquake mitigation engineer-

ing.

Considering the huge amount of spent fuel and de-

pleted nuclear materials present on the Kola Peninsu-

la, the poor state of maintenance on land-based stor-

age sites, the decrepit infrastructure for the safe

transport of spent fuel from naval bases and the ag-

ing technology and increased possibilities for human

errors, the possible occurrence of an accident with

even far more negative outcomes than the one that

took place in Japan is not a far-fetched scenario.

Based on recent problems experienced at the Kola

Power Plant (NPP-1), the situation on the ground

should be monitored closely by the world’s leading

countries and, particularly, by major European ener-

gy companies, as the nuclear reactors currently oper-

ational in Europe are very similar to those found in

the KPP-1 plant and throughout the former USSR.

Despite the constant warnings of environmental

NGOs and European governments, the Kremlin con-

tinues to invest colossal sums in the development of

a new generation of nuclear energy production and

associated technology – as well as new in drilling and

mining projects – thus further aggravating the envi-



...agreements set up a fund to “improve the ca-

pability of the Russian Federation to comply

with the requirements of the London Conven-

tion that prohibit ocean dumping of low-level

liquid radioactive waste (LLRW)” and increase

the pace of the construction of centers for the

decommissioning of nuclear submarines.

ronmental situation. Consequently, many Russian

regions and neighboring countries are exposed to

the danger of uncontrolled nuclear energy chain re-

actions. Finally, in light of the new battle for Arctic oil

fields, the Russian government is motivated to reju-

venate its nuclear programs and to rebuild its nuclear

icebreaker fleet. When all things are considered, it is

clear that the Kola Peninsula – and the world as a

whole – will continue to be at high risk for many

years to come.

No tes :

* Dr . R ic hard Rouss eau is Associate Professor

and Chairman of the Department of Political Science

and International Relations at Khazar University in

Baku, Azerbaijan. He teaches on Russian politics, Eur-

asian geopolitics, international political economy and

globalization.

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RF: Test Operation. WM’02 Conference, Tucson, AZ.

Retrieved from: http://www.wmsym.org/

archives/2002/Proceedings/17/597.pdf



http://130.226.56.153/rispubl/nks/nks-138.pdf

http://bellona.org/articles/articles_2011/scram_stats

http://bellona.org/articles/articles_2011/scram_stats

http://www.nytimes.com/1995/07/23/world/us-lists-10-soviet-built-nuclear-reactors-as-high-risks.html



http://www.powertecrussia.com/blog/rosatom-next-generation-nuclear-power-plants/



http://www.iaea.org/inis/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/30/018/30018740.pdf



http://www.bellona.org/articles/articles_2008/atomflot_torosatom



http://www.rosatom.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosatom/rosatomsite.eng/about/activities/nuclear_icebreakers/



http://www-ns.iaea.org/downloads/rw/waste-safety/north-test-site-final.pdf



http://bellona.org/filearchive/fil_The_Arctic_Nuclear_Challenge.pdf



http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf45.html

http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf45.html

http://www.spbaep.ru/wps/wcm/connect/spb_aep/site/resources/259d3d0047429ed6b0a1b086442d90bd/BN-800_2011_EN.pdf




http://cisac.stanford.edu/publications/the_fallacy_of_the_megatons_to_megawatts_program/




http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/01/us-russia-india-submarine-idUSTRE76013F20110701



http://www.wmsym.org/archives/2002/Proceedings/17/597.pdf

http://www.wmsym.org/archives/2002/Proceedings/17/597.pdf

A s the uncertainty of the Arab Spring

continues, the debate on the future of

the movement and the U.S. role in it

grows into a colorful debate. As a part

of this policy debate I was recently asked to review

Foreign Policy Association’s Great Decisions episode

on the Arab Spring, featuring columnist Mona Elta-

hawy and Shadi Hamid, director of research at the

Brookings Doha Center and also featuring comments

from key foreign policy heavyweights like Madeleine

Albright, General Michael Hayden, Robert Malley and

Carl Gershman.1

The debate in the episode is in many ways a small-

scale projection of the overall U.S. policy debate on

the current and prospective U.S. role in the Arab

Spring. It focused on the issues of U.S. military help,

danger of militancy, and the Arab Spring view to-

wards Israel and the United States. This article will

focus on three of the most under-studies aspects of

the U.S. role in the Arab Spring: American policy and

the academic debate, the paradigm of ‘doing’ in U.S.

foreign policy and the question of overlap between

American domestic and foreign policies.

Pr edict ing t he Ar ab Spr ing: U.S. p ol icy a nd

t he ac ademic deb at e

The widespread policy and media narrative of the

Arab Spring is that the movement has been a sur-

prise; emerging completely out of the blue, catching

every political player flatfooted. ‘Even the regimes

and administrations that were targeted by the Arab

Spring movements couldn’t see it coming’2 – or so it

is argued.

While this shock is somewhat understandable among

the regimes of the Middle East whose administra-

tions never really established rigorous ‘academia-

watch’ departments that follow the academic litera-

ture and debate, I can’t really contextualize the sur-

prise in the American executive branch circles as al-

most every branch have one or more academia-

watch programs staffed by quite capable analysts.

My curiosity grows even further as it was Gary Fuller,

a former CIA political analyst who wrote about the

danger of the Middle East ‘youth bulge’ back in 1989

and its possible dangers to regime stability, as well as

U.S. Middle East policy3. The youth bulge literature

grew in the 1990s, highlighting statistical correla-

tions between nations with youth bulge de-

mographics and the likelihood of socio-economic

discontent. Further studies by political scientists like

Jack Goldstone,4 Gunnar Heinsohn5 and more recent-

ly Richard Cincotta – Christian Mesquida6 reinforced


U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

AND THE ARAB SPRING

COMMENTARY | BY DR. H. AKIN ÜNVER*

Fuller’s observations. But the most critical warning

was given by perhaps one of the most read books of

its genre, Roger Owen and Şevket Pamuk’s work on

Middle East economics, whose concluding chapter

argued that based on the MENA region population

growth statistics in the 1990s, the region had to

maintain a minimum of %7 economic growth. Other-

wise, authors warned, the region would fall to youth

bulge demonstrations by 2010.7

Furthermore, the assumption that the Middle East

youth bulge would create such a domino effect was

one of the hypotheses behind the 2003 War in Iraq.

Bernard Lewis for example8, was aware of the repeat-

ed warnings by Middle Eastern demographics experts

and argued that it was the duty of the United States

to knock the first domino by invading Iraq. In a ro-

manticist Wilsonian spirit, it was argued that the

presence of a large U.S. force intended to overthrow

perhaps the most hated dictator in the region would

inspire the Arabs to rise and overthrow their dictators

as well and create a region-wide movement like the

Third Wave democracy movements in Eastern Eu-

rope. However, due to the way in which the U.S. en-

tered the war in Iraq and handled the conflict ended

up delaying this domino effect, effectively causing

people to rally around their dictators against a possi-

ble American invasion, strengthening the position of

the very dictators the United States sought to re-

move.9

However, despite the existence of a substantial litera-

ture that warned American policy-makers about the

Arab Spring as much as two decades ago (including

forecasts commissioned by the intelligence service)

Washington appeared unable to make sense of what

was happening in the region or what to do about it.

This raises serious questions over the executive

branch’s handling of academic information and fore-

casts.

I recall from the International Studies Association

(ISA) annual conference of 2010, that a group of sen-

ior analysts from various government agencies were

COMMENTARY | BY DR. H. AKIN ÜNVER

23

Lenin

POLITICAL REFLECTION | MARCH - APRIL - MAY 2012

boasting how closely foreign policy and intelligence

programs were following ‘all that’s going on in the

literature’, in response to an inquiry from the audi-

ence questioning the government’s rationale of ig-

noring the academia’s warnings before the war in

Iraq. Just about a month after the conference Mo-

hamed Bouazizi’s act of self-immolation started the

Arab Spring. Ever since the American administration

has been scrambling – with mixed results – to situate

itself with regard to the movement, still not convinc-

ing those who think the government organs are fol-

lowing the academic literature – at best – preferen-

tially.

U. S. forei gn p ol icy and t he ‘ par adigm o f

doi ng’

Go to Google and search for the query: ‘What should

the United States do?’ – you will end up with thou-

sands of issues and agenda topics on which some

expert is ‘urging’ the United States to do something

about. Carry on with the search adding a random

country each time; you’d probably be surprised to see

that American decision-makers are called on to act in

some way on almost every country in the world and

every global issue.

Although many American foreign policy profession-

als don’t like ‘the E-word’, feeling an urge to act in a

large volume of area, including literally the other side

of the world, is one of the main characteristics of an

imperial consciousness.10 I don’t necessarily say this

in a pejorative way: projecting an imperial conscious-

ness is not the same as being an empire. Yet cost-

benefit calculations don’t travel far with ‘normal’

states; their security concerns are geographically

close.11 The ability to make these calculations global-

ly is the mark of imperial ambition and capabilities.

Therefore as long as the ‘what should we do?’ para-

digm remains integral to American foreign policy-

making and ‘not doing’ is often associated with disin-

terest or isolation, we can’t not talk about U.S. foreign

policy form a non-imperial perspective. A hegemon

can be benign or malignant and therefore an imperi-

al foreign policy consciousness should not readily be

understood in terms of global domination, but the

hegemon’s perception of itself (and the following

policy discourse about its intentions) will usually re-

flect benignity.12 Furthermore, the hegemon’s for-

eign policy behavior and how this behavior is per-

ceived by the international system often change over

an extended period of time. Therefore, while talking

about ‘what the U.S. should do’ about an internation-

al event (in our case, the Arab Spring) it would per-

haps be a better idea to direct our inquiry not to-

wards what the U.S. should do, but rather towards

which U.S. we are talking about.

Think about two cases; the Gulf War of 1990-91 and

the Iraq War of 2003-11. Both have been important

cases of American military action and both instances

take place literally on the other side of the world.

Although the target of two military interventions is

the same, there are in fact two very different kinds of

American presence in each instance. The Gulf War

coincided with the end of the Cold War whose victor

was the West, led by the United States. Having pre-

vailed in this protracted conflict, the United States

had managed to force the USSR into bankruptcy,

without coming into direct military confrontation

and such American leadership – coupled with the

fact that the ever-imminent threat of a nuclear war

was now over – rendered the benign hegemon im-

age of the United States credible. The size of the U.S.

economy, its living standards, democratic credentials,

multi-ethnic, religious, linguistic character and its

level of social freedoms dwarfed the considerable

majority of the world. On top of all this, the United

States still refrained from a multilateral intervention



A hegemon can be benign or malignant and

therefore an imperial foreign policy conscious-

ness should not readily be understood in terms

of global domination, but the hegemon’s per-

ception of itself (and the following policy dis-

course about its intentions) will usually reflect

benignity.

to attack Iraq and scrambled to build a global coali-

tion, even including its Cold War nemesis: Russia.

Furthermore, the move against Iraq was decided in-

stitutionally, through consensus reached within

NATO and UN. Let’s then consider 2003. In 2003 we

have an administration that is still coping with the

post-traumatic stress of 9/11. Instead of following a

uniting discourse, the administration did not refrain

from polarizing the global public opinion by intro-

ducing the “with us, or against us” doctrine. Further-

more, in a very clumsy political move, the Bush ad-

ministration had defined Iran within the ‘axis of evil’

even though U.S.-Iranian relations were going

through a delicate process of détente under the Pres-

idencies of Bill Clinton and Mohammad Khatami and

the streets of Tehran were filled with mourners who

showed support for the U.S. after 9/11. The bullying

rhetoric of the Bush administration, not only towards

the ‘axis of evil’, but also towards U.S. allies who were

unconvinced about the American justifications for a

war in Iraq further isolated the administration. Then

by using deliberately inaccurate intelligence to make

the case for a war and then, deciding to bypass NATO

and the UN to launch an attack on Saddam with a

poorly assembled coalition that fell apart very soon

all added to the process that took the United States

from a considerably powerful and prestigious posi-

tion and dragged it into a mud of international isola-

tion and opposition, reversing its image as a benign

hegemon. Additionally, as the war went on, growing

number of torture cases, frequency of illegal combat

methods and mounting civilian deaths, ended up

rendering the U.S. flag to represent the exact oppo-

site of what it represented in 1991 in the Middle East.

More importantly, 9/11 succeeded perhaps, in the

sense that it forced the United States to drift off from

its declared core values and what it came to repre-

sent. Using the war on terrorism as a pretext for re-

ducing civil liberties, such as media censorship relat-

ed to Iraq and Afghanistan war, the NSA electronic

surveillance program, DARPA’s ‘Total Information

Awareness’, lack of judicial oversight concern over

the National Security Letters, Section 505 of the USA

Patriot Act which enabled FBI to demand records

without prior court approval, as well as the Protect

America Act of 2007 – all added up to this drift from

core values.

Perhaps the American public isn’t really aware how

closely foreign countries, institutions and organiza-

tions follow U.S. politics. This is also true in the Mid-

dle East. Even so-called anti-American groups and


25 POLITICAL REFLECTION | MARCH - APRIL - MAY 2012

organizations follow American media; after all anti-

Americanism paradoxically takes its power from its

narrative of the United States. Yet, American policy-

makers must take note of this shift: foundations of

American foreign policy and its global influence rests

not in what the United States does; it rests in what

the United States is. If the United States distances

itself from the fundamentals of its social and political

identity, a great divergence emerges between its

domestic and foreign policies. For a successful for-

eign policy, all countries – but especially the

hegemon – must maintain considerable overlap be-

tween its domestic and foreign policy ideals and

practice.

D om estic - f orei gn pol icy o ver l ap

Therefore, when we return back to the question

“what should the U.S. do” with regard to the Arab

Spring, the only level-headed answer becomes: it

should demonstrate the same domestic political

standards that it advocates in its foreign policy. This

is even more relevant and important with regard to

the Arab Spring, which is essentially a call for democ-

racy, liberties and better economic distribution.

There is absolutely nothing the United States can ‘do’

– as in policy – to expedite, ease or form this move-

ment. The best it can do, would be to become the

inspiration it used to be for these kinds of move-

ments – and if I were pressed to point to one issue on

which the U.S. can become such an inspiration, I

would highlight the question of financial recovery. As

long as the United States deals with a serious finan-

cial crisis, with visible side effects of unemployment

and increasing homelessness, its inspiration to the

Arab Spring will be limited. While the Obama admin-

istration has taken steps towards tackling these is-

sues, we can’t really talk about an American inspira-

tion until the U.S. fully recovers from this recession.

On the same note, no amount of policy ‘doing’ will

improve the credibility of the United States as a role

model as long as movements like Occupy Wall Street

attract so much popular support and there is so much

anger in the United States towards income inequality

and poor redistribution of wealth. After all, this is also

what the Arab Spring is about. If anything, it will in-

crease the solidarity between the Arab Spring and

Occupy Wall Street movements, but that doesn’t im-

ply anything for U.S. foreign policy. More worrisome,

U.S. foreign policy discourse against the violent sup-

pression of the Arab Spring demonstrations simply

become invalid when the Arab youth watches the

NYPD’s heavy handed tactics of suppression of Occu-

py Wall Street demonstrators or read the blogs de-

scribing in detail, how the UC Davis campus police

pepper sprayed the passive demonstrators on cam-

pus or go on YouTube and watch videos of police

brutality directed towards Occupy Oakland protes-

tors. As Arab feminists and gender equality activists

see the Capitol Hill hearing on contraception featur-

ing an all-male panel of experts in which women are

deliberately prevented from testifying, as the Arab

youth, attracted to the opportunities of the United

States read about the austere Arizona law on immi-

gration or the NYPD’s Muslim surveillance program

or as the Arab politicians examining the U.S. electoral

system read about the Supreme Court rule rejecting a

ban on corporate political spending, effectively in-

creasing the penetration of the big oil companies,

Wall Street banks and health insurance companies

into the electoral system, the question of why the

United States has lost so much influence in foreign

affairs in the last few years and why it currently is not

an inspiration to the Arab Spring become quote obvi-

ous.

Yes, Twitter, Facebook and YouTube became a part of

the Middle Eastern revolutions. Some over-excited

Western analysts even dubbed the Arab Spring a

‘Twitter Revolution’ perhaps unaware of the fact that

the mobilization of these revolutions took place pri-



American policy-makers must take note of this

shift: foundations of American foreign policy

and its global influence rests not in what the

United States does; it rests in what the United

States is.

marily in the traditional public spaces of the Middle

East: the mosque and the coffee house. However, as

much as the West reaches out into the Middle East

through online media, so can the Middle East reach

into the United States and follow its daily workings

through these media outlets. Just like the

‘information revolution’ nullified state control on

information and propaganda in the Middle East, it

also opened up a parallel window for the Middle East,

into the everyday life in the United States, independ-

ent of the American foreign policy discourse of what

the United States is. And as a result, the United States

domestic politics have become a function of its for-

eign policy image perhaps more than ever. Globaliza-

tion and online media is a double-edged sword – and

we all have heard the overused truism ‘U.S. foreign

policy begins at home, in domestic politics’. But what

is it that we call ‘home’? Is this home the launching

pad of a malignant empire, domestically reflecting

the same mistrust, greed and fleeting calculations

that the same empire pursues in its foreign policy, or,

is this home a working example of a human ideal – a

new way of life and interacting with the social, politi-

cal and economic environment?

The United States will most probably emerge from its

current crisis by re-creating itself along an updated

version of its ideals. But how it does so and what this

new identity will imply will be the only honest an-

swer one can ever give to any questions arising from

the post-Arab Spring U.S. foreign policy.

No tes :

* D r . Ünve r is the Ertegün Lecturer of Near Eastern

Studies at Princeton University.

1. To watch this episode, please refer to the aut-

hor’s review of the episode on the FPA Blogs:

<http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/02/28/

review-fpa-great-decisions-arab-spring/>

2. On this, see ‘The Arab Spring and Why Nobody

Saw it Coming?’ Reinsurance Magazine. June

24, 2011. <http://

www.reinsurancemagazine.com/articles/arab-

spring-and-why-nobody-saw-it-coming>

3. A more accessible 1995 version is: Gary Fuller.

"The Demographic Backdrop to Ethnic Conflict:

A Geographic Overwiew," in: CIA (Ed.): The

Challenge of Ethnic Conflict to National and

International Order in the 1990s (Washington

1995), p. 151-154

4. Goldstone, Jack A. (1991). Revolution and Re-

bellion in the Early Modern World. Berkeley:

University of California Press.

5. Gunnar Heinsohn. ‘Vielleicht unser ganzes Leb-

en lang: Youth bulges und die Zukunft des Ter-

rorkrieges’, in Die Zeit Online. February 7, 2002

6. Richard P. Cincotta and Christian G. Mesquida.

‘Authoritarianism as a Form of Sustained Low-

Intensity Civil Conflict: Does Age Structure Pro-

vide Insights into the Democratic Transition?’.

Paper submitted at the Population Association

of America 2007 Annual Meeting, Princeton.

7. Roger Owen and Sevket Pamuk (1999) A Histo-

ry of Middle East Eocnomic in the Twentieth

Century. Harvard University Press. pp. 229-35

8. O’Reilly is quoted in Matt Corley. ‘Rove: a win

after more years in Iraq will rally the Muslim

world to us’. Think Progress. March 21, 2008

<http://thinkprogress.org/

politics/2008/03/21/20720/rove-iraq-oreilly/>

9. On this, see: Marvin Baker Schaffer. ‘The Iraq

Experience and Domino Theory Revisited’ Joint

Force Quarterly, issue 57, 2nd quarter 2010. Na-

tional Defense University. <http://

www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-57/

schaffer.pdf>

10. On this topic, see: G. John Ikenberry. ‘America’s

Imperial Ambition’ Foreign Affairs. September/

October 2002. Council on Foreign Relations.

<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/

articles/58245/g-john-ikenberry/americas-

imperial-ambition>

11. This is the main hypothesis of the regional se-

curity complex theory (RSCT); on this, see: Barry

Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers:

The Structure of International Security, Cam-

bridge University Press 2003.

12. For a discussion of benign and malignant he-

gemony in international relations, see: Benja-

min Miller. States, Nations and Great Powers:

The sources of regional war and peace. Cam-

bridge University Press.



Joürnal of Global Analysis endeavoürs to become the foremost international forüm for academics, researchers and policy makers to share their knowledge and experience in the disciplines of polit-ical science, international relations, economics, sociology, international law, political history, and hüman geography.

Joürnal of Global Analysis is an interdisciplinary refereed e-joürnal, edited by a groüp of interna-tional scholars indicated in the Editorial Board and International Advisory Board. The joürnal is püblished at its own web site http://www.cesran.org/globalanalysis. Joürnal of Global Analy-sis welcomes sübmissions of articles from related persons involved in the scope of the joürnal as well as summary reports of conferences and lecture series held in social sciences.

Prospective aüthors shoüld sübmit 4.000 - 15.000 articles for consideration in Microsoft Word-compatible format. For more complete descriptions and sübmission instrüctions, please access the Editorial Güidelines and Style Güidelines pages at the CESRAN website: http://www.cesran.org/globalanalysis. Contribütors are ürged to read CESRAN’s aüthor güidelines and style güidelines carefülly before sübmitting articles. Articles sübmissions shoüld be sent in electronic format to:

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Publication Date: Winter issüe — Janüary 01

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Joürnal of Global Analysis endeavoürs to become the foremost international forüm for academics, researchers and policy makers to share their knowledge and experience in the disciplines of polit-ical science, international relations, economics, sociology, international law, political history, and hüman geography.

Joürnal of Global Analysis is an interdisciplinary refereed e-joürnal, edited by a groüp of interna-tional scholars indicated in the Editorial Board and International Advisory Board. The joürnal is püblished at its own web site http://www.cesran.org/globalanalysis. Joürnal of Global Analy-sis welcomes sübmissions of articles from related persons involved in the scope of the joürnal as well as summary reports of conferences and lecture series held in social sciences.

Prospective aüthors shoüld sübmit 4.000 - 15.000 articles for consideration in Microsoft Word-compatible format. For more complete descriptions and sübmission instrüctions, please access the Editorial Güidelines and Style Güidelines pages at the CESRAN website: http://www.cesran.org/globalanalysis. Contribütors are ürged to read CESRAN’s aüthor güidelines and style güidelines carefülly before sübmitting articles. Articles sübmissions shoüld be sent in electronic format to:

Ozgur TUFEKCI - Editor-in-Chief - [email protected]

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Publication Date: Winter issüe — Janüary 01

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By CESRAN

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Security Policy, Switzerland | Dr William Lume, South Bank University, UK | Dr Roger Mac Ginty, St Andrews' Universi-

ty, UK | Mr Rae Mac Grath, Save the Children UK Somalia | Prof. Mansoob Murshed, ISS, The Netherlands | Dr Wale

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www.cesran.org/jcts

T he Journal of Conflict Transfor-

mation and Security (JCTS) pro-

vides a platform to analyse conflict

transformation as the processes

for managing change in a non-violent way to

produce equitable outcomes for all parties that

are sustainable. Security is understood as encap-

sulating a wide range of human security con-

cerns that can be tackled by both ‘hard’ and

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not only covers such security sector reform is-

sues as restructuring security apparatus, reinte-

gration of ex-combatants, clearance of explosive

remnants of war and cross-border management,

but also the protection of human rights, justice,

rule of law and governance.

I t is a common belief in political essays

and academic papers that politics have

been trapped into a new circle of voting

seeking. The well-founded political labels

of left-wing and right-wing, as well as the euphe-

mism of the political center are all deeply affected by

the lack of a mind-blowing yet active and alive public

policy discourse. People are generally dissatisfied by

decision-makers all over the world, from the United

States to China, and from South Africa to Belgium.

The fundamental concern behind this trend is how

people can be expressed when it comes to vote in

electoral process.

Since the worldwide economic crisis was triggered in

the United States (US) with the collapse of Lehmann

Brothers in 2008, and since then taking a contagious

dimension affecting Europe, people have started to

ponder upon the political decisions ahead. The grow-

ing mass of people having trouble in choosing how

political leadership should be reacting for addressing

all kinds of social and economic issues is consistently

calling for a new model of political action and deci-

sion-making that underpins obsolete mechanisms,

figures, and politics. The problem here is that though

citizens demand a new social contract, political con-

ditions vary from case to case. And the implementa-

tion of a common model of political representation is

hard to be dealing with this. We will briefly compare

three completely different case studies to answer our

question topic.

In authoritarian regimes in the Maghreb region we

saw the Arab Spring to rise as a unitary revolutionary

model of protest against absolutism and political

barbarism. People demonstrated massively, occupy-

ing the streets, clashing with riot police and militia,

demanding a new constitutional model that would

bring democracy and the right to vote freely. The fall

of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt was achieved after days of

street riots and what was lately achieved was a tran-

sitional government run by militants in order to pave

new electoral process. A couple of weeks ago Tahrir

Square was once again broadcasted in world media

as the required revolution and democratic transition

was badly processed. Still, Egyptians can’t have what

they fought for.

In the US, the Occupy Wall Street movement

was formed as a reacting response to a new

social threat pertaining US economy: excessive

unemployment and corporate corruption. Waves

of people were gathered all across the American

cities to protest against capitalism and its derivatives.


WHAT IS WRONG WITH

POLITICS OF THE IRREPRESENTABLE?

COMMENTARY | BY DIMITRIS RAPIDIS*

The composition of these mass gatherings was

widely varied from blue-collar workers to unem-

ployed and from fired professionals to youngsters

carrying a bike. Social class biases were omitted

and all people manifested against the economic

mindset of the US political and economic leadership.

Despite the extent of the movement, nothing

has been yet achieved but tens of arrests have

been registered to police departments. Imagination

and ideas are flourishing, but concrete actions are

missing.

Greece has been constantly covered by world media

since 2009 due to its economic turmoil hitting the

Eurozone. Bailout plans, loan agreements, firm state-

ments about the sake of the Eurozone and the Greek

economy have been extensively articulated two years

now from any official mouth. Social rage and unrest

are infiltrated in the country, riots and clashes are

outnumbered, poverty is exceeding its historical peak

since the 1950s, and decision-makers have trouble in

dealing with social unrest. Reforms are waved and

there is no convincing plan to escape the crisis. Still,

people gathered in the streets are prone to organize

strikes but less willing and capable to depict how

they want to move ahead.

These three case studies have been triggered from

different departing points having though a common

feature: the need of changing the current political

conditions and bringing about significant transfor-

mations in economic and social policy. This demand

is growing irrelevantly this last year comparing to the

reforms undertaken by the governments. Though

hard to explain why people cannot pass from the

visualization of the reality they want to the reality

they face, it is important to underline that this global

movement of change is taking a more persistent and

mature character and shape.

In all three case studies people are not satisfied with

the existing spectrum of political parties they can

choose amid when it comes to voting. The major is-

sue widening the decision gap is the lack of fresh

political leaders and ideas that would inspire people.

And history demonstrates that when people do not

have an alternative, they resort to violence and out-

rageous behavior which is often blind and fierce.

As political leaderships cannot follow the demands of

the electorate what we could expect would be a con-

stant discontent and a collective psychological pessi-

mism that would easily cater the existing system of

political decision-making. Here applies the well-

founded notion of recycling voting which is literally

the inclination of the public to vote again and again

the same representatives and political parties of the

establishment they deplore in shortage of any other

reliable solution. This socio-psychological trend ends

up to the recycling of the same wasted political ideas

and figures otherwise considered as failed.

Therefore the answer to our question topic would not

be that easy as politics of the irrepresentable are

formed through different aspects of political and

cognitive behavior. As an introductory step people

should start thinking collectively and share ideas

freely. Both social media and public gatherings can

contribute. The next step is the immersion of leaders

through massive movements as it was used to be in

the 18th and 19th century. Leaders bred inside these

movements and outside the mechanisms of political

parties. I firmly believe that we are moving to the

right direction.

No te:

* Dimitr is Rapidis , MSc., Political Analyst & Asso-

ciate to the Greek Politics Specialist Group (GPSG) in

the UK.

COMMENTARY | BY DIMITRIS RAPIDIS


About the

CESRAN | Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis

The CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS (CESRAN) is a private, non-political, non-profit, internet-based

organization of scholars who are interested in world politics, and enthusiastic about contributing to the field of inter-

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is carried out in a globalizing world. To this end, the CESRAN aims at establishing and maintaining close contact with

and between politicians, bureaucrats, business people, and academics that would lead to the development of better

policies.

We invite anyone who shares these interests to become a member and participate in our activities.

Email: [email protected]

Members of the Executive Board of CESRAN:

Özgür TÜFEKÇİ, Chairman (King’s College London, UK)

Alper Tolga BULUT, Vice-Chairman (University of Houston, USA)

Kadri Kaan RENDA, Vice-Chairman (King’s College London, UK)

Aksel ERSOY, Member (University of Birmingham, UK)

Ali Onur ÖZÇELİK, Member (University of Sheffield, UK)

Hüsrev TABAK, Member (University of Manchester, UK)

Abdullah UZUN, Member (Karadeniz Technical University, Turkey)

Members of the Council of CESRAN:

Prof. Mark BASSIN (Södertörn University, Sweden)

Prof. Bülent GÖKAY (Keele University, UK)

Dr. Ayla Göl (Aberystwyth University, UK)

Prof. Bayram GÜNGÖR (Karadeniz Technical University, Turkey)

Prof. Alp ÖZERDEM (Coventry University, UK)

Mr Bill PARK (King’s College London, UK)

Prof. İbrahim SİRKECİ (Regent’s College, UK)

Prof. Birol YEŞİLADA (Portland State University, USA)

WWW.CESRAN.ORG

[email protected]

http://www.gees.bham.ac.uk/staff/bassinm.shtml

http://www.keele.ac.uk/depts/spire/staff/gokay/index.htm

http://www.ebslondon.ac.uk/courses/postgraduate/postgraduate_staff_profiles/dr_ibrahim_sirkeci.aspx

http://web.pdx.edu/~yesilada/

I n today's modern democracies, corpora-

tions wield significant influence over our

lives, as well as over our governments. In

the wake of the global financial crisis, it is

evident that corporate interests are not always

aligned with the public interest. Furthermore, there

are few incentives for companies to adhere to this

objective. This issue was raised last November in Mel-

bourne at the Democratising Governance symposium

organised by the Centre for Citizenship and Globali-

sation housed by Deakin University. In his presenta-

tion, Dr Hans Lofgren brought up the issue of democ-

ratising transnational pharmaceutical corporations.

That of course relates strongly to the arguments

made by Robert Dahl for example over fifty years

ago: controlling corporations and ‘giant’ companies

(in the words of Hans Blokland) was a striking feature

of the USA’s New Deal and lead the political land-

scape as a top issue before and well into the 2nd Euro-

pean War (circa 1930s to 40s). This led me to ask

about not only the feasibility of such an endeavour,

but also about democratising other corporations,

such as banks.

To offer one striking example, the Reserve Bank of

Australia recently defied market expectations by

keeping interest rates on hold, leaving the cash rate

unchanged at 4.25%. But there are concerns that the

‘Big Four’ banks will announce an interest rate move

independent of the RBA's decision – which most

have done. ANZ announced its interest rate decision,

and banking analyst Brett Le Mesurier even noted

that a rate increase would be a possibility. While

banks would justify lifting rates in order to prop up


USING THE DEVICE OF A TREATY

TO CONTROL CORPORATIONS?

COMMENTARY | BY DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON*

http://www.deakin.edu.au/arts-ed/ccg/

http://www.deakin.edu.au/arts-ed/ccg/

http://www.smh.com.au/money/borrowing/banks-in-precarious-position-on-rates-20120208-1ranr.html

http://www.theage.com.au/national/reserve-holds-rates-banks-may-lift-theirs-20120207-1r5jh.html

profits amid a slump in loan growth, a rate rise would

undoubtedly hit mortgage holders the hardest. The

only way for consumers to voice their disapproval is

to switch lenders or tell their governments that the

citizens will control corporations.

In this light, it is easy to see that corporations such

as banks are central to "the people". I think that

several individuals, if not all those participating at

the symposium, would agree that because of their

influence on our livelihood, we should bring them

under our control. Indeed, I will argue that it is us -

the people - that must come to decide how much

profit a bank for example can make on its services;

how much a pharmaceutical corporation can charge

for its medicines; how a corporation is to be punished

for breaching our laws; and many other pressing

questions. As touched upon above, this argument is

by no means original: it has been voiced by many

thinkers over time and space within Europe, North

America, and as we go later into the 20th century,

almost all other major regions. This, I think, is be-

cause what people are seeking is a maximization of

the ‘good’ and the minimization of the ‘bad’ as part

of a broad normative understanding of the Good

Society.

In banking corporations, the most numerous workers

are typically paid the least with shareholders,

board members and other elitist stakeholders

earning gigantic salaries. To many, this situation

does not ‘seem fair’ – and I would agree. Although

it would be hard to take this next point past the

realm of personal choice, it would be good to consid-

er. I reason that individuals, like athletes in certain

sports, should have a salary cap. Corporations, I think,

should too have a salary cap. And, of course, a series

of referenda should be the tool used to agree on the

level of the cap and what to do with the surplus of

capital.

I’d like to offer two reasons for this. Firstly, as Profes-

sor John Keane argued at the symposium late last

year, democracy needs an ethos - a driving character

COMMENTARY | BY DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON


- for it to function. Without knowing the reason, why

bother trying to figure out who the citizenry are;

what powers we have and how we can use them;

what we consider to be equality; how we think laws

should be made and enforced; how we want to

choose our leaders; and how we want to communi-

cate? This ethos for most democracies is the need

and want to keep power to account; to control our

destinies and protect ourselves from the violence and

damages that emanate from autocratic systems. I

think a dramatic economic disparity (especially in

societies where market trumps politics – again draw-

ing from Blokland here) between aggregates in the

citizenry is a form of autocracy: the haves typically

control and the havenots typically abide. And this

leads us to the second reason for bringing corpora-

tions to account: they can do us great harm. Think of

the recent global financial crisis, of Greece’s and pos-

sibly Portugal’s damaged economies, or of mega-

projects going bad, such as dams and bridges.

Corporations have killed people with their follies,

mistakes, and disconnect from democracies. They

have maimed workers. They make people suffer by

offering irresponsible loans, taking away houses built

on false promises, forcing poor and sick people to

prostitution to pay for their medicines. They humili-

ate people and debase many of us because of the

important services they provide.

I’m neither anti-corporatist nor anti-capitalist, and

this general argument is certainly not ‘true’ across

the board. There is a great deal to admire in these

systems such as their innovation, the growth of cor-

porate social responsibility, technological drive, and

socio-cultural impacts: think of the loved and hated

‘Apple revolution’ in certain societies around the

world. But we need to better monitor these powerful

bodies to keep them from stepping on us when try-

ing to get their work done or trying to make their

profits. As Calvinist political theorist Johannes Althu-

sius would probably have argued, a corporation that

inflicts damage on other citizens - such as having an

arm severed in an industrial accident due to poor

safety practices or over-work - results in both the

literal loss of an arm and also the metaphorical loss

on one individual's ‘full’ productivity in our body poli-

tic.

The major question is: how do we do this? If we want

corporations held to account and punished for their

transgressions; if we want to determine their profit

margins; if we want them to bring us the ‘good’ with-

out so much of the ‘bad’; where do we exercise our

sovereignty for this to happen? These are tough

questions. And these, like others, will come to chal-

lenge societies in the future. It is important to view

this discussion as not one of nationalising corpora-

tions: it is different. Here we are trying to think of

monitoring, constraining the ‘bad’, and maximizing

the ‘good’ of these bodies – a technique I would say

in the same spirit as the New Deal. One easy and of-

ten overlooked method is to push for much greater

enforcement of existing corporate laws. It won’t do

us much good if we continue to create laws if those

already existing are not rigorously enforced.

A good resource to draw from are existing

'democratic' bank governance structures commonly

used by cooperative banking models. These are often

labelled credit unions, mutual savings banks, con-

sumers' cooperatives, and labour banks. These insti-

tutions often promote an internal voting structure

whereby members cast a vote for what is often a vol-

unteer board of directors. Savings and loans rates are

typically higher and lower (respectively) for members

when compared to rates offered by 'big banks'. Mem-

bers too are typically the shareholders. A number of

these institutions are also purported to have higher



Corporations … make people suffer by offer-

ing irresponsible loans, taking away houses

built on false promises, forcing poor and sick

people to prostitution to pay for their medi-

cines. They humiliate people and debase

many of us because of the important services

they provide.

customer satisfaction and support local community

initiatives. Indeed, this begs the question of why

more individuals are not switching to 'democratic'

banks which is something that warrants further criti-

cal research. Although these institutions are often

not perfect and have numerous critiques levelled at

them, the fact that members can change the model is

nearly miraculous given the weakness of the custom-

er in relation to corporate banks.

If joining a co-op is not your "thing", one recommen-

dation is that we seek to make "treaties" with our

governments. Like indigenous peoples creating trea-

ties to establish and protect their rights, we, as dem-

ocratic citizenries, need develop a widely agreed

upon document with only a few simple demands,

recommendations, criticisms, or policy recommenda-

tions for our representatives to take and work on.

And this is a key point: we must work with represent-

atives that are elected rather than against them for

this project to have any political reality. Just look to

the Occupy movements - it is easy to see that the

major criticism levelled at them (from both those

with hopes for change and those critical of the move-

ment) is the lack of coherent demands. At this stage,

Occupy is a protest movement at risk of fizzling out,

or going in circles like the revolts that worried parts

of Europe in 1848. In that climate, representatives

will try to deliver bits and pieces of change to ap-

pease rather than make strides towards robust pro-

gress in policy.

To be clear, such a treaty would not be about

“nationalizing” anything. It is just adding another

layer of democracy into areas of business that have

the capacity to do peoples great harm. Let’s give a

treaty a try and honour our indigenous colleagues by

borrowing their political method to bring these im-

portant but dangerous corporations under democrat-

ic control.

A key step in this process would be to present to a

specific demos a pithy discussion: namely, how are

banks for example to behave in our polity? Obviously

this would be done best by the current government

but the media, non-governmental organizations,

multinationals, or other civil society movements

could present a large enough swathe of opinions to

start an albeit skewed discussion. As talk ensues and

consensus forms over three to four widely agreed-

with demands, the government could take legislative

action or a non-governmental body could present a

white paper for the government to adopt.

That discussion above, one riddled with problems of

which the largest is probably the ‘triumph of the

will’ (or the actual serious adoption of such a treaty

by a government), leads to a different stage of

thought. If banks for example are constrained by

such a treaty, what in effect could that lead to? In-

deed, as mentioned above, even if such a treaty were

to exist, without robust enforcement of corporate

law it might as well be meaningless. Unfortunately,

public law seems to suffer endemically from a lack of

enforcement in most polities throughout the globe.

But, if corporate law were enforced and a treaty exist-

ed, we could expect (depending on what the de-

mands of the treaty are) that banks would give us

more interest on savings, less interest on loans, and

possibly make it much harder to give us loans. The

bulk of bank employees could also gain a greater

share of profits boosting their salaries and ‘fat cat’

CEOs could have salary caps. The list of possibilities

seems endless. It would be good to end this explora-

tory discussion with a question: how can a corpora-

tion justify an ‘obscene’ profit whilst employees are

under-payed, customers are given a ‘raw deal’, and

the communities stores are found in gain no palpable

benefit?

No tes :

* Dr . Jea n -P aul G ag no n is a social and political

theorist with a Ph.D. in political science. He complet-

ed his doctorate at the Queensland University of

Technology under the aegis of Australia’s prestigious

Endeavour Award.

** I would like to especially thank The Conversation’s

Gillian Terzis for her generous discussions with me.

They were instrumental to the making of this argu-

ment.



T he Black Sea region (BS) — geo-

graphically defined as the land and

seascape between the Balkans and

the Caucasus and current politically

located within the Wider Europe strategy from

“Dublin to Baku” — has attained new significance in

the wake of the accession of Romania and Bulgaria to

the EU in 2007. The Black Sea is now in part an inter-

nal sea of the EU. What is remarkable about the Black

Sea region1 at present is that despite the numerous

territorial disputes and historical mutual distrust,

despite the ongoing armed conflict among the re-

gional states, the region has managed to sustain a

limbo of war and peace. While the regions surround-

ing the Black Sea were rapidly integrated into the EU,

improvements made within the BS states have lead

policy makers to say that it is now time for the EU to

engage more deeply with the affairs of the BS area. In

less than two decades, the European Union has

pushed its eastern frontier from Berlin to the Black

Sea, and this geopolitical shift opens up new oppor-

tunities, as well as new challenges. However, from a

current standpoint, it is easy to locate the weak ele-

ments of the EU’s policy towards the BS area.

The Black Sea countries’ regional cooperation and

further engagement was not high on their agenda

due to the conflicts between states, especially within

and beyond the South Caucasus countries. Interest-

ingly, post-Soviet era transformation of the European

Union and the conflicts in the Black Sea countries

happened at more or less the same time; however

the institutionally weak EU failed to respond to the

challenges. During the first decade after the collapse

of the Soviet Union, the EU was confronted with very

high expectations with regard to its capacities; there

was a gap between what these countries were hop-

ing for and what the EU or its member countries were

providing. The EU strategy towards the region and

the regional states was not based on a unified ap-


FROM “DUBLIN TO BAKU”:

FUTURE SCENARIOS ON EU’S POLICIES

TOWARDS BLACK SEA REGION

CAUCASUS REVIEW | BY ZAUR SHIRIYEV*

proach agreed amongst member states. One im-

portant factor here was the naming of the region. At

this point, the countries of the South Caucasus –

Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia - saw the “strategic

Black Sea region” as the gateway to Europe, but did

not consider themselves to be part of it. During this

time, despite heightened interest in the area, the

region’s real priorities and needs were in fact largely

ignored by the EU, owing to its lack of institutional

capacity. Thus the region’s security issues and the

attendant conflict resolution processes were mainly

handled by the OSCE (in the case of the Armenia-

Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict) and the Unit-

ed Nation (for the South Ossetia and Abkhazia con-

flicts). Until 2005, there was no attempt by the EU to

address Moldova’s Transnistria conflict.2

The accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the EU in

2007 led to the EU’s increased involvement in the

area. This was based on the ENP, the EU’s basic blue-

print for its activity in the region, and the Black Sea

Synergy document, which in 2007 became the most

concrete indicator of the EU’s interest in the area.

Slow development by partner states and the failure

on the part of some countries to achieve ENP objec-

tives frustrated the EU, and this situation promoted

the mistaken notion that EU membership was not

something to which the Black Sea states tended to

aspire.

The deep frustration with past EU policies was

brought to the fore by the August 2008 war, which

also raised exponentially the perceived urgency of

the EU’s contribution to conflict resolution in the

Eastern Neighborhood. Thus the EU launched the

Eastern Partnership in May 2009, and held the Prague

Summit. From the outset, several political as well as

technical challenges have bedeviled the EaP. The

Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership

Summit is silent on the specifics of conflict resolution.

It emphasizes only “the need for their earliest peace-

ful settlement on the basis of principles and norms of

international law”.3 Two years have passed since the

Prague Summit, but little tangible progress that has

been observed. One area in which it is both possible

and plausible to achieve concrete practical result in

the short-term is visa facilitation between partner

countries.

In light of the aforementioned summary of what EU

has done in the region, it is possible to imagine both

a “pessimistic” and an “optimistic” scenario for near

future.

A pessimistic or worst -case scenario of the BS

region’s political development

The worst-case scenario can be defined as “the status

quo” scenario, where existing conflicts remain in sta-

sis, and countries are motivated by the logic of zero-

sum games. This “no war no peace” situation repre-

sents additional elements for the transformation of

the Eastern borders of the Black Sea area- the South

Caucasus in a volatile and unstable region; the 2008

August War, showed once more how the intractable

and fragile “status quo” has many friends, in contra-

diction to sociological “friend-enemy” discourse. In

this case, only enemies of the “status quo” situation

can be winners of a game which is still being played

on the basis of zero-sum principles. This worst case

scenario sees external actors increasing their stake in

the control of the region. In this scenario, the EU and

NATO are losing their appeal for regional countries,

especially for young independent countries like Geor-

gia, for whom the post-2008 “not stopping Russia”

seriously damaged the standing of EU. As a result,

CAUCASUS REVIEW | BY ZAUR SHIRIYEV


the Black Sea area is becoming a playground for Rus-

sia; with its illegal recognition of Abkhazia’s inde-

pendence and the Sevastopol agreement in Ukraine,

Moscow sees the BS region as, a post-Soviet, new-

Russia area. Indeed, in this case the real losers are the

societies and countries in the region, which are una-

ble to reap the economic and political benefits that

the region holds. At this point, it is important to men-

tion the power dynamic that has developed through

regional conflicts. The 2008 Russian-Georgian war

showed that “frozen conflicts” have become a clash

or power struggle between Moscow and the West,

rather than a regional conflict between the countries

directly involved. Thus, the struggle to gain control of

this strategically important region paved the way the

war in South Ossetia by improving Western influence

in Georgia, and attempting to counter balance the

resurgence of the Russian power.

Key issues regarding the Worst Case scenario

Threat to democratic political transition process

Ukraine and Georgia, countries that changed their

autocratic regimes for democratic ones through revo-

lution, are now experiencing a reversal of democratic

reforms, along within the entire Post-Soviet area and

Black Sea Region. The combination of the “hard

power” dynamic, the failure of democracy, increased

militarization of states, and disrespect for human

rights have served to create an environment condu-

cive to the rise of new conflicts. In conflict zones, hos-

tilities are resumed and develop into ‘hot conflicts’.

This also jeopardizes the regional energy infrastruc-

ture and the energy security crucial to future EU de-

velopment plans.

The protection of status quo is against EU inter-

ests

In this region, conflict resolution is troubled by un-

willingness to engage constructively in a meaningful

peace-building process. While there exist official

structures for conflict settlement (OSCE Minsk Group,

UN, etc), they remain empty promises in these drawn

out and futile negotiating processes. However, in the

long run, [if] this “no war, no peace” situation in the

region is maintained with neither bilateral/

multilateral peace agreements nor a negotiated set-

tlement, [then] the relative stability and the fragile

cease-fires between Armenia and Azerbaijan on one

hand, and Georgia and Russia on the other, are

threatened. These ‘empty structures’ have operated

in the South Caucasus up until now. However, as

mentioned, in the long-term this pattern may

change, were conflicts to arise between big regional

powers that would entrap the South Caucasian

states, specifically via the confrontations by external

actors, or if the existing conflicts between the South

Caucasian states were to escalate.

Russia develops more leverage in the neighbourhood

via political and economic mechanisms that have

enable it to consolidate control over the region,

namely through diplomatic measures (unilateral

recognition of self proclaimed states) and military

action (Russian-Georgian conflict). The “Reset” policy

with the US and the “special relationship” with Ger-

many have been other determining factors. Addition-

ally, the counter ideology of Islamic fundamentalism

present in the North Caucasus has spill-over effects

across the entire Black Sea Region, contributing to

conditions for increased instability and fundamental-

ism in the South Caucasus.

Turkey has become an emerging regional power, but

as seen in 90’s, seems more representative of the EU,

less so of NATO. Turkey becomes inward-looking and

re-orients its national policies, forging partnerships in

the East (Russia, Iran). In this respect, in the short

term, Turkish accession to EU seems an important

factor. Yet in some ways Turkey remains at the mercy



The 2008 Russian-Georgian war showed that

“frozen conflicts” have become a clash or pow-

er struggle between Moscow and the West, ra-

ther than a regional conflict between the coun-

tries directly involved.

of other states’ foreign policies, with the EU demand-

ing further reforms, only to continually reject Turkish

membership, and Turkey’s dependence on Russian

energy limiting its room to maneuver in the Cauca-

sus/Black Sea region. The reluctance of EU leaders to

support Turkish accession and the EU’s involvement

in regional matters compounds Turkish acrimony

toward the West.

At the regional level, the increasingly non-democratic

attitudes and geopolitical situation create conducive

conditions for the development of this worst case

scenario. Moreover, countries are locked in zero-sum

logic dynamics, preventing regional cooperation and

the establishment of a meaningful conflict resolution

process. The increased militarization of states con-

tributes to a security dilemma at the regional level,

and external actors drastically limit the possibilities of

democratic development. Engaging with the Black

Sea as a region – as opposed to engaging only with

specific countries – is nevertheless problematic for

the EU, as the soft power tools it favours are ineffec-

tive in a region where ‘hard security’ is what works.

The EU’s strategic dilemma: Is the South Cauca-

sus part of the Black Sea area, or separate re-

gion?

Under the EU’s current policy, the Black Sea region

includes the South Caucasus. In the South Caucasus,

Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia are uncertain

about this geographical dimension of EU policy, in

the sense that they are not sure whether they consid-

er themselves to be part of the BS region. After 2008,

the EU added the South Caucasus countries to its

new “Eastern Partnership” initiative. At the same

time, the European Parliament resolution of May 20th

2010, “on the need for an EU strategy for the South

Caucasus”, stressed that “frozen conflicts are an im-

pediment to the economic and social development



and hinder the improvement of the standard of living

of the South Caucasus region as well as the full devel-

opment of the Eastern Partnership of the ENP; where-

as a peaceful resolution of the conflicts is essential for

stability in the EU Neighbourhood”.4 Unfortunately,

the South Caucasus countries are still waiting for a

significant step in the direction of the resolution of

these conflicts; however, interestingly enough, the

EU adopted a new resolution on January 20th of this

year, called “EU Strategy in the Black Sea Region”5 in

terms of strategy, having two resolutions issued by a

single body, the EU, creates confusion over the entire

Wider Black Sea Region. First of all, is the South Cau-

casus part of the Black Sea Strategy? If yes, why is the

latest resolution limited to cooperation, without

looking more deeply into the region’s problems. Sec-

ondly, the EU’s Black Sea Strategy stresses the im-

portance of the resolution of regional conflicts and

describes the occupation of South Ossetia and Ab-

khazia as a real threat, but there is no discussion of

the other and more important conflict, the Nagorno-

Karabakh conflict. These disparities create uncertain-

ty and diminish faith in the EU and EU institutions.

An optimistic or best-case scenario of political

development in the BS region

The best case scenario is an integrated Black Sea re-

gion with strong and effective linkages with the EU.

Key regional actors, like Russia and Turkey (as an EU

member - important for this scenario) participate

fully and constructively in regional cooperation. A

sustainable process for the resolution of conflicts is in

place, and monitored and guaranteed by internation-

al organizations. These national developments facili-

tate the gradual integration of the area, and at the

same time support its stronger inclusion in the com-

mon European space. A key external stabilizing factor

is the role of the EU and its ability to take decisive

leadership in terms of its foreign policy on the Black

Sea Region. EU and NATO memberships, or a clear

path leading to future memberships, are offered to

interested and qualifying ENP countries in the region.

The dimension of the Black Sea region within the EU’s

neighborhood policies fills an obvious gap in the EU’s

vision for a wider Europe. The EU is moving towards a

degree of commonality in its approaches to each of

the three enclosed seas of its periphery — the Baltic,

the Mediterranean and now the Black Sea. While the

political profiles of these maritime regions are of

course very different, they give rise to many of the

same policy challenges. In this sense, the Black Sea

could fit broadly into the pattern of the EU’s regional-

ism already established in successful cases

(Mediterranean, Balkan Stability); however but it still

has to be determined whether to play the whole EU

initiative through the preexisting BSEC organization,

and how agreement might be reached with Russia

and Turkey as the major players. In light of the 2011

“Arab Spring”, the strategic importance of the Black

Sea to the U.S. has grown in relation to challenges in

the broader Middle East. This could give new impetus

to EU-US common polices towards the region. As

mentioned before, the reset of US-Russia relations

has caused many problems in terms of the US’s nar-

rowing strategic vision for the post-Soviet space as a

whole. The developments in the Middle East could

drive a new and enhanced US foreign policy for the

Black Sea and South Caucasus. This scenario is part of

the optimistic vision for 2020. It may be that Turkey’s

role will be important in developing the EU’s strategy

for the region. Since Turkey is a pivotal actor in the

Black Sea region, future relations with Turkey are

intimately connected to the region’s future. Ankara’s

views on broader regional cooperation will have a

powerful impact on EU perspectives, but EU leaders

must explain to their countries just how important

Turkey’s accession to EU is. Without a clear promise

to Ankara, the EU’s game-playing will damage and

limit its potential role in the Black Sea region.



The dimension of the Black Sea region within

the EU’s neighborhood policies fills an obvious

gap in the EU’s vision for a wider Europe. The

EU is moving towards a degree of commonality

in its approaches to each of the three enclosed

seas of its periphery — the Baltic, the Mediter-

ranean and now the Black Sea.

These scenarios leave a lot of room for inter-

pretation and allow for some out-of-the-box

thinking.

Conclusion/Findings:

According to the findings regarding several of these

security interests, the EU is faced with a growing di-

lemma: how to engage with the region and pursue

its security interests without simultaneously chal-

lenging those of Russia, especially considering the

direction Russia’s policies toward the region have

taken over the last few years.

Furthermore, the Eastern Partnership does not

promise to alter EU-Russia relations. The EaP was met

with relative indifference by Russia, which has been

excluded from the initiative, even though the pro-

posal emphasized the potential need for third party

involvement, supposedly meaning Russia. However,

it is not clear how the EU would envision Russian in-

volvement.

The EU’s engagement in the Black Sea region with

regard to boosting energy security cannot be de-

tached from the resolution of the region’s conflicts,

which constitutes a key precondition for the consoli-

dation of stability and sound state building processes

in the area. These processes are in turn linked to a

further challenge to Russian interests, namely the

integration of the Black Sea states within European

and Transatlantic institutions.

The long-term strategy within the European Union’s

Black Sea policy is most significant, in the light of

the expected expansion of this great northern

power towards the south and the east. If the EU

is able to tempt Ukraine and neighboring Moldova

into its ever-widening maw, then, added to Roma-

nia’s and Bulgaria’s existing EU memberships, this

would give the EU possession of the whole of the

western and much of the northern shores of the

Black Sea. Thais would pave the way for further east-

ward progression into Georgia and Azerbaijan, and

from there to the strategic Caspian Sea, bordering oil

-rich Iran.

One of the undeniable facts is that the EU’s leverage

is limited by the fact that there is no common

political view within the organization regarding

the South Caucasus and entire Black Sea region’s

security problems. Peace processes in the South

Caucasus need more active EU engagement. For

example, in the Balkans, the peace process and

implementation of peace agreements was signifi-

cantly enhanced by the prospect of EU membership

perspective. It is therefore important to develop a

similar strategic vision for the Black Sea countries,

especially toward the South Caucasus. This would

make it easier for their leaders to persuade the public

of the need to compromise. These are undoubtedly

the key obstacles to the successful implementation of

any EU strategy to “assist the transformation of the

Black Sea into a region of sustainable peace, stability

and prosperity and to fully use its potential to

contribute to the peaceful solution of the conflicts in

the region by combining its soft power with a firm

approach.”

Notes:

* Zaur Shiriyev is foreign policy analyst at the Cen-

ter for Strategic Studies in Baku, Azerbaijan.

1. The Black Sea region is defined as the

area covered by the eleven states

participating in the Black Sea Economic Coop-

eration Project (BSEC) – Albania, Armenia,

Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldo-

va, Romania, the Russian Federation, Turkey

and Ukraine.

2. Since October 2005 - talks in the so-called 5+2

format (Moldova, Transnistria, OSCE, Russia,

Ukraine plus the EU and the USA as observers)

were launched

3. European Council. Joint Declarations of the

Prague Eastern Partnership Summit,

4. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/

LexUriServ.do?

uri=OJ:C:2011:161E:0136:0147:EN:PDF

5. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/

getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-2010

-0378&language=EN



http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2011:161E:0136:0147:EN:PDF



http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-2010-0378&language=EN




AZERBAIJAN AND THE IRAN CRISIS:

STUCK IN THE MIDDLE

CAUCASUS REVIEW | BY ALEX JACKSON*

T he crisis between Iran and the West-

ern powers continues to escalate.

Sanctions, wargames, and the ‘covert

war’ being conducted against the

Iranian nuclear programme has heightened tensions

and raised the risk of a regionally destabilising war.

Most analysis has focused on the implications of the

crisis for the Persian Gulf and the Arab world. Ten-

sions between the US-armed Gulf Arab states and

Iran has led to the conflict’s regional dimension being

framed in ethnic and religious terms: of Sunni Arabs

versus Shi’ite Persians (with a proxy version being

fought in Syria).

But this is a one-dimensional view, which sees Iran

solely as a Middle Eastern power. Iran’s northern

neighbours – the Caucasus and Central Asian states –

are neglected in most analyses of the current and

future dynamics of the crisis. However, these states,

particularly Azerbaijan, are a crucial part of Iran’s

security landscape and will be increasingly important

as the stand-off deepens.

Iran in the Caucasus

In short, Iran’s policy towards the Caucasus is one of

realpolitik, overlaying centuries of competition with

the Turkish and Russian empires. The Caucasus

formed a buffer zone between the three empires,

and different parts of the region changed hands

many times over the centuries.

Today, the relationship with Georgia is the most dis-

tant. There are cordial ties between Tbilisi and Teh-

ran, but geography, a lack of shared interests, and

broader geopolitical issues (Russian hostility towards

Georgia; Western hostility towards Iran) have pre-

vented them from building a deeper relationship.

Based on the mischaracterisation that Iran is an irra-

tional theocracy, one would expect poor relations

with staunchly Christian Armenia. However the two

sides have a strong alliance dominated by economic

and strategic considerations. Armenia needs Iran as

an outlet to the world, owing to the Turkish and Azeri

blockades, whilst Iran supports Armenia as a counter-

weight to Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh con-

flict.

Relations with Azerbaijan are the most complex and

contradictory. Although there are religious and eth-

nic links between the two, Iran’s Azeri population

(around one-fifth of its total population) is viewed

with some suspicion in Tehran. Calls for greater au-

tonomy have occasionally boiled over into irreden-

tism and demands for unification with Azerbaijan:

the border between Iran and then-Soviet Azerbaijan

was demarcated for political reasons, dividing the

Azeris in two.

Aside from concerns about separatism, Iran is wary of

Azerbaijan’s secularism, its ties with Israel, and its

geopolitical orientation: pro-Turkish and, to a degree,

pro-Western. Azerbaijan is seen as a potential fifth

column for Western penetration into Iran’s northern

borders. Similarly, support for Armenia in Nagorno-

Karabakh (whilst professing a balanced approach) is

intended to maintain the status quo in the conflict,

reducing the danger of Western meddling as part of a

peace settlement. At the root of all Iran’s Caucasus

policies is the aim of limiting Western involvement in

the region.

Azerbaijan – Stuck in the Middle

The most important Caucasus state in Iran’s current

stand-off with the West is Azerbaijan. Its proximity

and ethno-religious ties to Iran, combined with its

good ties with the West, have led Western policy-

makers to try and enlist Baku as an ally against Teh-

ran. Equally, Iran has grown increasingly hostile to-

wards its northern neighbour and is widely believed

to be seeking to undermine it as a warning.

Azerbaijan’s approach to the issue is informed by its

strategic doctrine, approved in 2007, which empha-

sises a “multidimensional and balanced foreign poli-

cy” and specifically notes that Azerbaijan “attaches

great importance to the development of comprehen-

sive relations with neighbouring countries”1. Euro-

Atlantic integration is listed as a priority, but – criti-

cally - not at the expense of relations with other

countries. In a pointed reference to Iran, the doctrine

also notes that improving relations with neighbours

is important “for eliminating threats emanating from

separatism, ethnic, political and religious extrem-

ism”.

Azerbaijan has, by prioritising this ‘multi-vector di-

plomacy’, sought to avoid becoming caught in the

South Caucasus’s complex geopolitical power strug-

gles. The case of Georgia, which antagonised Russia

to the point of war, is a salutary lesson for policymak-

ers in Baku. Building good relations with all states

will prevent Azerbaijan from becoming a victim of

‘great game’ geopolitics, and enable it to focus on its

main foreign-policy aim of restoring its territorial

integrity.

However despite this commitment to multi-vector

diplomacy, relations with Iran have been strained,

and have deteriorated recently. This concerning

trend has both internal and external causes which

often overlap.

Internal Pressures

Internally, the two states engage in mutual accusa-

tions over support for ethnic and religious trouble-

makers. Tehran often accuses Baku of fomenting se-

cessionists among the huge Iranian Azeri population;

CAUCASUS REVIEW | BY ALEX JACKSON


Azerbaijan, for its part, routinely criticises Iran’s sup-

port for hardline Shia movements on Azerbaijani soil

– it regularly accuses Tehran of providing financial

and ideological support to groups such as the

banned Islamic Party of Azerbaijan.

These often boil over into tit-for-tat recriminations:

for instance, Iranian criticisms of Azerbaijan recently

led MPs from Azerbaijan’ ruling party to propose re-

naming the country ‘North Azerbaijan’, on the basis

that the south of Azerbaijan was ‘occupied territory’.

An accusation by Iran that Azerbaijan was facilitating

Israel’s assassinations of Iranian scientists was angrily

denied by Baku, which said that the claim was

“slander”.

Fundamentally this is a deep-rooted clash between

national ideologies – of secularism against theocracy

and of ethnic solidarity against national solidarity.

The lines are not clear cut: the government in Baku is

happy to tolerate Shia Islam, nominally followed by

85% of its population as long as it is government-

authorised, for instance. And in Iran, most ethnic

Azeris are deeply integrated to the extent that the

fact that the Supreme Leader is ethnically Azeri is

entirely unremarkable.

There are two other ‘internal’ drivers of tension: the

Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and

Armenia, and the status of the Caspian Sea. Azerbai-

jan and Iran dispute the exact boundary line between

their respective sectors of the Caspian: although this

has not prevented drilling by both sides, it has occa-

sionally led to confrontation.

The conflict over Karabakh is an extremely conten-

tious issue. Iran has a close strategic and economic

alliance with Armenia, even though on paper Iran’s

revolutionary Islamist theocracy and staunchly Chris-

tian Armenia have little in common.

Iranian support for Armenia has two goals: firstly, it

gives Tehran regional influence and essentially turns

Iran into a patron of Armenia. Secondly, it helps to

preserve the status quo in the Nagorno-Karabakh

conflict by giving Armenia an economic and political

lifeline, without which it may be forced to withdraw

from Nagorno-Karabakh.

This could have two effects for Iran: emboldening

ethnic Azeri separatists in Iran, and creating instabil-

ity which would be used as a pretext to deploy Euro-

pean or US peacekeeping forces on Iran’s bor-

ders. Although Iran pays lip service to the concept of

Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, Baku is often irritat-

ed by its neighbour’s open support for Armenia.

Without outside influence, these internal drivers of

tension would be manageable – but the intensifica-

tion of the crisis over the Iranian nuclear programme

exerts considerable pressure on the local relationship

between Iran and Azerbaijan.

External Pressures

The external pressures on the Iran-Azerbaijan rela-

tionship are all based on Western-led attempts to

stop Iranian’s alleged nuclear weapons programme,

as well as its support for militant groups in the Mid-

dle East and elsewhere which work against Western

and US interests. Iran’s biggest fear is encirclement

and invasion. Its northern perimeter is the area with

the lightest US military footprint out of all the sur-

rounding regions, and Iran intends to keep it that

way.

Since the start of the US-led ‘war on terror’ in 2001,

Washington has been actively courting the Caucasus

as a bulwark of its global anti-terrorist strategy. The

region has hosted some militant groups in its own

right (although these have been minor threats) but



The external pressures on the Iran-Azerbaijan

relationship are all based on Western-led at-

tempts to stop Iranian’s alleged nuclear weap-

ons programme, as well as its support for mili-

tant groups in the Middle East and elsewhere

which work against Western and US interests.

its real significance is geographic: it lies on the ap-

proach route to Afghanistan, and is adjacent to Iran.

Therefore US efforts to court Azerbaijan in the past

decade have been largely based on these considera-

tions (as well as the unrelated issue of energy securi-

ty). The Bush Administration pushed Azerbaijan hard

on basing rights around the middle of the last dec-

ade, with then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld

visiting Baku to discuss the issue.

Azerbaijan has staunchly refused to host US forces or

bases, and has explicitly said that it would strongly

oppose attempts to use its territory to attack Iran.

However it does welcome upgrades to its airports

and greater military cooperation. In exchange it has

become one of the key nodes of the Northern Distri-

bution Network taking supplies to and from Afghani-

stan.

Cooperation with Israel is even more significant and

potentially risky. Azerbaijan has built up warm rela-

tions with the Jewish state since independence: it has

benefited from extensive military-technical coopera-

tion (including Israeli drones) and technological

know-how. To an extent the relationship mirrored

Israel-Turkey relations, and indeed Turkey served as a

kind of ‘gateway’ to Azerbaijan for Israeli policymak-

ers and businesses in the 1990s.

In return Israel has gained a rare commercial and

diplomatic foothold in the Muslim world, as well as a

vital geostrategic outpost against Iran. There are per-

sistent rumours that Azerbaijan is being used as a

base for espionage by Israeli and US (as well as Irani-

an) intelligence agencies. Israel reportedly operates

listening posts near the Iranian border; and according

to a report by the Times of London in February 2012,

the US has also built surveillance facilities in Azerbai-

jan. One Azerbaijani analyst compares Azerbaijan to

Casablanca in World War Two: “it is at the centre of

the spying”.

The presence of Western intelligence agencies, and

the warm relationship which Baku has with the US

and Israel, has led to serious concern in Iran and con-

tributed to a serious deterioration in the relationship

between Azerbaijan and Iran. As the crisis escalated

in 2011, relations hit a new low.

One dominant theme has been Iranian criticism of

Azerbaijan’s secular regime and supposedly

‘anti-Islamic’ activities. At the end of 2010 a partial

ban on the hijab in Azerbaijan’s public schools

provoked anger among Iranian clerics; this sparked

the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan, viewed by some as

an Iranian proxy, to call for the overthrow of the re-

gime. Notably, the IPA said that the government of

Ilham Aliyev would “face even bigger tragedies so

long as the government is fully under the control of

the Zionists”.

In August the head of Iran’s armed forces echoed this

line, linking the ‘meddling of the Zionists’ in Azerbai-

jan’s policy to a “people’s awakening” which he said

would rise up against the government. This came



Donald Rumsfeld

during a summer of tension, with ethnic Azeris pro-

testing in northern Iran and a deadly shooting inci-

dent on their border.

Most dramatically, in January 2012 Azerbaijan an-

nounced the arrest of three men on suspicion of

planning to assassinate Israeli diplomats and Jewish

figures in Baku. The government publicly announced

that the Iranian intelligence services were closely

involved in the plot, supplying weapons and funding

and even choosing the location of the weapons

cache.

This is not the first time Iranian agents have been

accused of plotting terrorism in Azerbaijan: there

have been a number of reported plots by Iranian and

Hezbollah cells to bomb Western embassies, oil com-

panies, and even the Russian-operated Qabala radar

station.

These plots are apparently a response to the assassi-

nation of Iranian nuclear scientists, allegedly by Isra-

el. And even criticisms of Azerbaijan’s secular system

are, to an extent, proxy criticisms of its ‘pro-Israel’

stance. Secularism and ‘support for Zionism’ are al-

most always linked in semi-official statements.

Where will the pressure lead?

Mounting pressure between Iran and the West is

putting Azerbaijan’s valued multi-vector foreign poli-

cy in a difficult position. As Turkey has found, main-

taining good ties with all regional players is easy

when times are good, but tough when regional geo-

politics becomes confrontational.

Azerbaijan’s temporary membership of the UN Secu-

rity Council was a diplomatic victory, but it also puts

the country in a difficult position. The situation in Iran

is likely to come before the Security Council again

within the next two years: Baku will be forced to

choose between further alienating Tehran or stand-

ing against the wider international community.

Iranian claims that Baku is assisting Israel’s Mossad in

its campaign against Iran led to bitter public recrimi-

nations in February 2012, illustrating the tensions

which the ‘spy war’ can provoke. Further covert ac-

tion by Israel or the US inside Iran further damage

ties between Baku and Tehran, and could also in-

crease the risks of reprisals from Iranian spies on

Azerbaijan’s soil.

A dangerous situation could emerge in which Baku

became the site of a proxy war, unable – despite

public protestations - to prevent Western and Iranian

intelligence agencies from working against each oth-

er and using Azerbaijan as a battleground.

A successful plot by Iranian agents on Azerbaijani soil

would force Baku to respond. Lacking the capability

or will to actively strike Tehran, this could mean

greater coordination with Israel and the US, although

permitting US forces to openly deploy at military

facilities would be a step too far. After all, Azerbaijan

still has Russia to consider when it makes its geo-

strategic choices.

Moscow has been vocally warning of the regional

instability which a war between the West and Iran. To

an extent this is intended to frighten regional states

into opposing military action, although Russian offi-

cials have overstated the danger. For instance, it is by

no means clear that targeted airstrikes against Irani-

an nuclear facilities would create huge refugee flows

into Azerbaijan, particularly as few of Iran’s nuclear

facilities are located near Azerbaijan.

The main risk for Baku from a war between the West

and Iran is not refugees, but losing its carefully nur-

tured multi-dimensional foreign policy. As noted,



As Turkey has found, maintaining good ties

with all regional players is easy when times

are good, but tough when regional geopolitics

becomes confrontational.

Azerbaijan is cautious about full integration into Euro

-Atlantic structures, and has avoided explicit

alignment with the West: the Azerbaijani govern-

ment saw what happened to Georgia in 2008 after it

enthusiastically threw its lot in with the West and has

no desire to suffer the same fate. Balancing between

regional players is the essence of Azerbaijan’s foreign

policy.

For many years Baku has been able to maintain this

balance, working with Iran whilst also cooperating

closely with its arch-rivals. But with the crisis coming

to a head, it is unclear whether this balance can hold.

If a war is launched against Iran and Azerbaijan is

seen – rightly or wrongly – as assisting the West,

there are a number of concerning developments

which could occur:

‘Proxy war’ on Azerbaijani soil. Iran has threatened to

retaliate against the West around the globe, and as

noted, Azerbaijan would be a likely battleground for

Iranian intelligence agents. Bombings and assassina-

tions of key Western targets could be expected.

Backing of hardline Shia groups in Azerbaijan. Azer-

baijan’s Shia movements are small and have shown

no appetite for violence, but they have concerned

the government in Baku. Iran would be likely to in-

crease its financial and ideological support for Shia

movements which are opposed to the government –

this would be facilitated by widespread anger among

practicing Muslims over the attack on Iran.

Iranian military activity in the Caspian. Although Iran

would likely stop short of a direct attack, as this

would risk triggering Russian or Turkish intervention,

it may use its Caspian fleet to threaten Azerbaijan’s

energy facilities and try to scare off investors. Denia-

ble terrorist attacks against energy infrastructure are

also possible.

Crackdown on Iranian Azeris. In a bid to forestall any

separatist movement (autonomous or provoked),

Tehran is likely to tighten security in ethnic Azeri are-

as near the border with Azerbaijan. This could flare

up into clashes which would provoke a verbal re-

sponse from Baku, worsening relations further.

Increased support for Armenia. Iran would be likely

to reinforce its alliance with Armenia as a counter-

weight to Azerbaijan and as a rare friend in the re-

gion. Although in the short term Tehran’s focus

would be on countering Israel and the US, in the long

-term we could expect a public reorientation away

from Iran’s nominally ‘balanced’ attitude towards

Nagorno-Karabakh, towards clear favouring of Arme-

nia.

Trade and border restrictions. Border security would

probably be increased, hampering the ability of trad-

ers to cross back and forth; this could cause tensions

and clashes. Iran might also take other steps to curb

trade with Azerbaijan, although it would be unlikely

to suspend gas imports, which are vital for fuelling its

northwest.

Perceived Azerbaijani complicity in a war against

Iran, even if Baku played a passive role, could set off

an unpredictable chain of events.

Preventing this will require astute statecraft on the

part of the Azerbaijani government, including a loud

and public commitment to a diplomatic solution, a

categorical public refusal to allow Azerbaijan’s soil to

be used against Iran, and the enlistment of Russian

backing in the event of any Iranian retaliatory action.

The coming crisis will put Azerbaijan’s foreign policy

through one of its most challenging tests since inde-

pendence.

Notes:

* Alex Jackson is a political risk analyst at Menas

Associates in London, focusing on the Caspian re-

gion. He also writes independently on politics, securi-

ty and energy in the wider Caspian region. This article

does not necessarily reflect the views of his employ-

ers.

1. National Security Concept of the Republic of

Azerbaijan 23 May 2007. Available at: http://

merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/

Azerbaijan2007.pdf



http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/Azerbaijan2007.pdf



Jean-Paul Gagnon: What is ‘seachange’ and where in

the world is this happening?

Nicholas Osbaldiston: This is an important question

and one that deserves teasing out. For one, the phe-

nomenon of seachange involves a type of urban and

suburban escapism. In particular, it’s the movement

of people, across a number of countries in mainly the

developed world, who have become disaffected with

the environment they live in within the confines of

the metropolis into regions traditionally left behind

in the progress of modernisation. Now the funda-

mentals of the movement were once aligned to other

collective attempts at alternative styles of consump-

tion and lifestyle, such as voluntary simplicity (Elgin

1981), downshifting (Schor 1998; Hamilton 2003) and

some of the slow movements (Parkins and Craig

2006). Seachange was not just a physical shift but

also an individual shift in ideas, values and concep-

tions about the ‘good life’. Often people who under-

took a seachange completely transformed careers,

consumption habits and social relations. For instance,

I have talked through my years researching the topic

to people who were once high flyers (career-wise) in

major capital cities that in their new regional location

started cafes, restaurants, boutiques, life-coaching

and bed and breakfast accommodation. The transfor-

mation was very much attuned to this idea of

‘seachanging’ one’s entire life through geographical

location.

As the movement has grown older however, these

foundations have been lost through a process of mar-

keting and mass public interest. Nowadays, at least

here in Australia, you often hear of people perform-

ing a ‘seachange’ but it is understood as simply a

shift towards the coast; hence why researchers and

real estate specialists now refer to the movement

towards the country/bush as ‘treechange’. The move-

ment was never merely about an escape from the city


AN INTERVIEW WITH

DR NICHOLAS OSBALDISTON

(MONASH UNIVERSITY)

INTERVIEW | BY DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON*

to the beach to live the lap of luxury. It was originally

designated as a genuine attempt to recover some-

thing lost in the messy social world we embrace in

urban/suburban social life. Furthermore, it was never

something entertained solely by the middle classes.

However now, it would seem that seachange is pre-

dominantly a middle class phenomenon. This is evi-

dent in the work of Michaela Benson (2012)

(amongst others) who wrote an exquisite ethno-

graphic account of what the Europeans call ‘lifestyle

migration’ in her book The British in rural France: Life-

style migration and the ongoing search for a better way

of life.

JPG: What are the major political implications of this

shift?

NO: This is more difficult to answer because there are

really in my view two effects of seachange upon the

political landscape. Firstly, there is the broader cul-

tural disaffection with consumption from which the

movement was first instigated. The ideas here are

not too distinct from downshifting, voluntary sim-

plicity, slow food, slow cities and simple living. It is

founded upon not just a disdain for city/suburban life

(though that is a major component of it), but also a

cultural narrative that speaks to a popular rhetoric of

‘there must be something more to life than this’. In

particular, there is a narrative that threads through

these movements including the first forms of

seachanging which makes the argument that a con-

sumption focussed lifestyle is one that does not lead

to happiness and success. Rather, consumption prac-

tices need to be altered either through food, place,

services and travel in order to capture something

more meaningful that feeds directly into one’s sense

of self. I argue in my forthcoming book Seeking Au-

thenticity in Place, Culture and Self that such transfor-

mation is really an exercise in self-authentication; a

process by which the individual can remove them-

selves from those things which he/she deem to be

profaning the self to those activities and environ-

ments which enhance the self. Politically speaking,

when collectives begin to resist the pull of mass con-

sumerism, this creates a potential for a more ethical

and environmentally sustainable future. Indeed oth-

ers have argued this point such as Kate Soper’s

(2007) ‘alternative hedonism’ arguments and Wendy

Parkins and Geoffrey Craig’s (2006) book Slow Living.

In both instances, the theoretical position is that

through alternative practices of consumption, indi-

viduals themselves can in fact choose lifestyle and

consumption options that are more sustainable in

the long term while also enhancing their own sense

of self. Martin Ryle and Kate Soper for instance dis-

cuss this in an upcoming chapter in the edited book

The Culture of the Slow (Osbaldiston, in press) where-

by they contend that the relatively fresh reuptake of

bicycle transportation provides the State with the

opportunity to reduce traffic pollution, congestion

and other issues while also delivering a pleasurable

experience for the individual. The same tenets poten-

tially apply to slow food, slow travel, slow cities and

INTERVIEW | BY DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON


even seachange wherein people are able to experi-

ence more distinct pleasures than what are found in

the general malaise of everyday life.

However as I noted earlier, the original motivation of

seachange has been lost in part to a relatively subtle

commodification. Now what we have across the

world is a significant issue at the local political level

that was once really unheard of in country and

beachside townships. That is the influx of relatively

wealthy individuals who have entered and trans-

formed places through development and consumer

practices. Across the ‘developed nations’ this has

become a real issue in places of high environmental

amenity. In particular, the major issue is that of

housing. Relatively speaking, those escaping the city

are generally on higher incomes and have more

substantial wealth to expend on housing within

new regions. Subsequently, what you see is town-

ships that become dotted with expensive looking

homes coupled with a high price tag. This then has

a real impact upon the local market where the

demand for more residential property inflates land

values and housing costs. Local municipalities and

councils across these areas struggle to cope with this

at times, for good reason. Increased values means

increased capital for these local governments. Politi-

cally, it’s a bitter and sweet scenario. On one hand

the influx of wealth means more capital for local

works and services. But the poisoned chalice is the

potential for a more divided community and an

emerging gap between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have

nots’. This is a very real problem that researchers

such as Laurence Moss (2006) continue to grapple

with today.

So politically, there are two areas of concern within

the seachange phenomenon that speak more broad-

ly to the growth of alternative consumptions. We

might add also a question of whose authenticity is it

anyway? Urban sociologist Sharon Zukin (2010) for

instance does a great job in highlighting that in the

pursuit of ‘supposed’ authentic practices, other mi-

nority and lower class groups and their lifestyle pur-

suits are overwhelmed by the middle classes. Classic

examples of this occur frequently in the metropolises

where old areas which at times hold cheap housing

are gentrified in the name of ‘rejuvenation’ creating

chic and fresh housing that is expensive and ends up

accommodating only those with significant incomes.

Amongst these new communities you start to see

things like food and clothing markets emerge as peo-

ple seek traditional produce and handmade goods.

The critique that Zukin (2008) makes in this regard is

that these places often then become hives of con-

sumer activity, such as SoHo in New York City which

may from the outside appear as ‘authentic’ spaces,

but inherently do so by excluding other activities and

groups from the place. I would contend that within

seachange we might begin to see such practices

emerge within certain communities. Politically, this is

class distinction enacted through the notion of

‘authenticity’.

JPG: What then of local resistance to seachange and

community backlash of what you’ve described here

above? Is there evidence of this happening?

NO: There are several examples of this occurring

throughout the world. I can speak quickly on some of

the things we have seen here in Australia though.

Firstly, it is quite clear that there is a certain re-

sistance to the seachangers period in many of these

towns. Raymond Williams’ (1973) work on the City

and the Country here remains a powerful account of

the disjuncture between the two regions in my view.

While seachangers seek to discover something ‘real’

in regards to community – which is perceived not to

exist in the city – they often find that their ‘new’

communities aren’t as welcoming as they hoped. In

fact, I have heard stories of people feeling as if they

still are not accepted as part of the community years

after their move. They remain the ‘stranger’ to use



Now what we have across the world is a signifi-

cant issue at the local political level that was

once really unheard of in country and beach-

side townships.

that famous Simmelian essay. So there is a real re-

sistance first of all to the cultural narrative, if you like,

of a country town that has its arms perpetually open

to new visitors and migrants.

The second more politically minded sort of resistance

emerges in the form of organised collectives against

the progress of places. What I mean here is a real

disdain for forms of development that for these peo-

ple appear ‘out of place’. This relates more now to the

influx of newer forms of ‘seachange’ rather than the

original movers. First generation seachangers for

example are often those behind the formation of

such resistances towards those developments that

are designed to attract the wealthy – potentially

even those seeking a nice second home to escape to

occasionally for the weekend. Across Australia we

have seen this pop-up frequently. Movements like

‘Save Hastings Point’, ‘Save Bells Beach’ and the Ku-

randa Envirocare group are created with the purpose

to protect not just environments but just as im-

portantly, the ‘local feel’ or aesthetic. Quite often

these groups use the internet and social networking

sites to draw national and international attention to

their plight. The resistance is local though, and di-

rected mainly at local councils who are charged with

planning responsibility.

The third resistance that we at times see is that of a

clash of cultures of sorts. In particular, we have seen

some instances of where groups founded by

seachangers clash with local desires for economic

advancement. In one case in Kuranda for instance, a

local environmental group that was formed and pre-

dominantly run by seachangers clashed openly with

local business owners over proposed development of

housing in the area. The organised political group

wanted to preserve certain sections of the natural

surrounds as it fed into their ‘sense of place’ while

also being home to certain endangered species.

However, local business owners and other residents

of the community were concerned that the denial of

this development would mean a missed opportunity

for local jobs and increased wealth for their area. In

this respect, there is a real clash over what intergen-

erational equity is and how it should be approached.

JPG: What of the prospect of re-sacralising urban

spaces? Is there a need to do so in your view in rela-

tion to what the seachangers are looking for?



World Trade Memorial in New York City

NO: That’s a good question and one that I think we

should be mindful of. Richard Sennett’s work over

the years has been cautious in my mind of suggest-

ing that the city will always remain inherently harm-

ful to the human condition. Indeed the city can be

the hub of cultural activity and home for the cultural

omnivore – though I imagine others might disagree.

This might need however significant transformation

in the way in which urban planning approaches

relatively mundane issues. Sennett thinks we need

to be more creative in the ways in which we use

our resources in planning cityscapes and surrounding

locations. I think we really need to rethink our

suburbs as I will get to in a moment. Subsequently,

I’m cautious to recount tales of the city as the

profane as an absolute. My work into seachange

merely states that people within this phenomenon

generally view the city as such. Subsequently, I

think it is wrong to suggest that urban spaces are

inherently not sacred. It is true that most urban

spaces are no doubt quite mundane, but within

each of our major metropolises across the world,

there are those areas that invoke a special type

of feeling within people who near them. From

the relatively recent World Trade Memorial in New

York City to the grand churches of London, there are

spaces that hold special narratives in the minds of

many. From this viewpoint, we cannot suggest that

the city is totally devoid of specialness already. In

regards to seachange though, one thing that I have

not explored more is the possibility that the rejection

of the city for the country is potentially more correct-

ly put as the rejection of the homogenised suburbia

for the country. In private communication Charles

Lindholm from Boston University suggested that to

me and I have since wondered if the urban sprawl

into the suburbs has created a feeling of disdain for

suburbia. Think about it for a moment: how distinct

are the suburbs that surround cities? Not very in my

view. Sure we have distinction in style of housing but

that often relates more to class than aesthetic distinc-

tiveness. In most suburbs you can almost guarantee

that you will have a shopping mall (and they get big-

ger and bigger as George Ritzer (2010) has described

for years in his work into the spectacles of consump-

tion), the obligatory park on the street corner, the

schools, the video stores, the sport grounds and so

on.

But what we also see with that is increased local

traffic congestion, increased pollution (both noise

and physical) and an increased social reservedness

to our neighbours and communities in general

(something that Simmel (1991[1903]) was acutely

aware of over 100 years ago).Whereas while the

city also has these issues, it continues, I would

imagine, exciting people through the distinct

opportunities for divergent cultural activities that

can be found therein. I think in some regards it’s

not so much the city places that need rejuvenation

for seachangers, but it’s the suburban lifestyle.

From that perspective, maybe we should be

better off talking about a ‘great suburban escape’

rather than a ‘great urban escape’. Politically

speaking, this needs to be enacted at the local level

from the ‘ground’ up rather than top down from the

State.

Notes:

* Dr. Jean-Paul Gagnon is a social and political

theorist with a Ph.D. in political science. He complet-

ed his doctorate at the Queensland University of

Technology under the aegis of Australia’s prestigious

Endeavour Award.

** Dr Nicholas Osbaldiston is a Lecturer of Sociolo-

gy at Monash University, Australia. He joined the

School of Applied Media and Social Sciences in 2012.

Prior to this he worked for the University of Mel-

bourne in the School of Resource Management and

Geography as a postdoctoral research fellow on an

ARC Linkage Project investigating equitable out-

comes to climate change adaptation along the Gipps-

land East coastline.

Nick is a co-convenor of the Australian Cultural

Sociology Thematic Group and is also a member

of The Australian Sociological Association executive.

He is currently the co-editor of Nexus (the newsletter

of The Australian Sociological Association) and the

general article editor of the journal Social Alterna-

tives.



Journal of Conflict Transformation and Security (JCTS) is for academics, policy makers and practi-tioners to engage in discussions on a wide range of peace, conflict and human security related is-sues in a multidisciplinary forum with contributions from political science, security studies, interna-tional relations, development studies, post-conflict reconstruction studies, economics, sociology, international law, political history, and human geography.

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CYPRIOT NATURAL GAS

AND THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN:

BETWEEN CRISIS AND COOPERATION

EUROPE REVIEW | BY ZENONAS TZIARRAS*

N atural resources have long been

the cause of both development

and conflict. Of course, in resource-

abundant countries natural re-

sources have, more often than not, caused conflict

rather than development. However, the same cannot

be said for third countries, often colonial powers,

which exploited such resources abroad for their own

development. This is one of the reasons why natural

resources have been often referred to as a “curse”; an

additional reason is the implications that the exist-

ence of natural resources has for the management of

the economy (e.g. high prices, low exports, etc.).1

Cyprus has itself effectively acquired the status of a

resource-abundant country when recently, on what

was called “an historic” day, the President of the Re-

public Demetris Christofias announced that the Block

12 of the Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)

“contained an estimated 5 to 8 trillion cubic feet (tcf)

of natural gas”.2 As “the second-largest hydrocarbon

discovery in Europe in more than a decade”,3 the

Cypriot natural gas paves the way for not only local

but also regional development and cooperation.

However, there is always the flip side of the coin and

that is the international rivalry that may be triggered

due to the alteration of the regional balance of power

as a result of this and other developments. Below I

briefly examine the features of the limited crisis sur-

rounding the Cypriot natural gas and the Eastern

Mediterranean more generally, as well as the features

of a potential international cooperation at the re-

gional and trans-regional level. The goal is to deter-

mine whether bilateral disputes could be bridged,

given the political and geopolitical realities at hand,

to the end of avoiding a crisis escalation in the East-

ern Mediterranean.

The Features of the Crisis

The drillings for the discovery of natural gas by the

Republic of Cyprus in late September, 2011, came in

the midst of greater regional instability as, for exam-

ple, the Arab revolts were in progress, the Turkish-

Israeli relations were in decline, and the Kurdish at-

tacks in Turkey were increasing. Furthermore, the

EUROPE REVIEW | BY ZENONAS TZIARRAS

long-standing Cyprus problem is an essential compo-

nent of this crisis as Turkey, according to its Foreign

Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, considers the internation-

ally unrecognized (apart from Turkey) “Turkish Re-

public of Northern Cyprus” (TRNC) as “a state of

whom..[it] is the protector”, and adds that it “assume

[s] an aggressive attitude if a country attempts to

unilaterally use…[its] natural resources”.4 It is within

this context that Turkey justified its threats for naval

action against Cyprus, the initiation of gas explora-

tions close to Cyprus’ drilling area, as well as the de-

limitation of its continental shelf with TRNC.5

Turkey’s actions had multiple implications. Among

other things, the European Union (EU) called Turkey

to refrain from threatening Cyprus, Russia sent sub-

marines to patrol Cyprus waters, and Greece and Cy-

prus signed cooperation agreements with Israel.6 The

latter created an axis which deepened the crisis in

Turkish-Israeli relations thus also adding to the

changes in the regional balance of power.7 Moreover,

Cyprus’ natural gas reserves, coupled with Israel’s

recently (2010) discovered natural gas,8 could prove a

very important alternative for the future energy secu-

rity of the EU, and Europe more generally. That would

in turn mean that Turkey’s long-term geopolitical

goal of becoming a regional power and energy hub

between production and consumption (East and

West) is threatened.9 From that perspective it is no

surprise that Turkey attempted to coerce the Repub-

lic of Cyprus to keep it from starting the drillings.

Further, the complexity of the regional geopolitical

disputes extends to the matter of the delimitation of

the EEZs between the states of the Eastern Mediterra-

nean. Although Cyprus for example delimitated its

EEZ with Israel, it has not done so with Turkey or

Greece, while Lebanon and Egypt have not yet rati-

fied their bilateral agreements with Cyprus. Greece

and Turkey, on the other hand, have been facing a

long-standing dispute over the Aegean Sea, while

Turkey – unlike other states of the region - has not

ratified the Law of the Sea Treaty of 1982. Despite the

fact that the question of maritime boarders in the

Eastern Mediterranean is not a new one, it acquires

new significance due to the newfound energy re-

sources and the ones that are to be found, most

probably offshore Egypt, Greece, Lebanon, and Syria.

In a sense, the problem has now become much more

difficult to solve because the concerned states have

much more to loose from any concessions; for exam-

ple, the delimitation of the EEZs between Greece,

Turkey, Cyprus, and Egypt is a particularly sensitive

issue which illustrates this point well. In this light,

and in light of the general regional instability and

changing balance of power, an escalation of the crisis

could only be avoided if a middle ground is found, a

way of cooperation, which would perhaps have the

Cypriot natural gas as its focal point.

The Features of Cooperation

If the Cypriot natural gas were to play a role in re-

gional cooperation then the first

problem that needs to be ad-

dressed is the Cyprus problem.

A proper solution could of

course take time and there are

only too many aspects that the

two sides need to consider. At

the same time the problem is

clearly bi-communal as much as

it is an international one. More-

over, the Cyprus problem has

been a serious obstacle in Tur-

key’s EU accession process.

Therefore, for the sake of the

two communities, the two


countries, and also the greater region, perhaps there

are certain mutual concessions that both the Repub-

lic of Cyprus and Turkey could make in order to over-

come the deadlock, even before a full solution to the

problem is reached.

In that respect it would be interesting to see for ex-

ample the Republic of Cyprus accepting a direct trade

arrangement between the Turkish-Cypriots and the

EU while on the other hand Turkey recognizing the

Republic of Cyprus. Such a development would have

a chain reaction of positive effects both for the future

of the resolution of the Cyprus problem and, of

course, for Turkey’s EU accession process. In that case

there could also be found a certain model for manag-

ing the Cypriot natural gas; one that would be bene-

ficiary for both the communities of Cyprus, and Tur-

key as well. Nevertheless, such a scenario is rather

ambitious and not very likely given the complex po-

litical realities in both Turkey and Cyprus.

Unsurprisingly, yet unfortunately, any cooperation

plans or initiatives, at least for the time being, are

primarily shaped by the dynamics of the pre-existing

disputes that caused the crisis, and not by the will-

ingness to bridge any differences for common bene-

fit. Indeed, Greece, Israel, and Cyprus seem to be co-

operating closely with long-term potentials for the

exploitation of their natural resources. On the other

hand, Turkey could not afford to remain indifferent.

Interestingly, Popovici estimates that due to the in-

creasing energy needs and the broader geopolitical

realities Turkey “will be motivated to be involved in

these developments, both as a potential customer,

and – perhaps – as a transit country”.10 It is maybe

true that Turkey’s cooperation with Israel would

probably be more feasible than with Cyprus; yet, in

order for that to happen there has to be a significant

improvement in the relations between Ankara and

Tel Aviv. Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that the

Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yildiz stated that Tur-

key “will not allow Israel to export natural gas to Eu-

rope through Turkish territory”.11 In terms of Turkey’s

stance on Israel, it seems that, at least for now, a rap-

prochement is rather unlikely firstly because that

would upset the Arab world, and secondly because

the demand for Israel’s apology about the Gaza flotil-

la insistent has become a matter of principle.12

Looking Ahead: From Crisis to Cooperation?

It is evident that the current geopolitical conditions

in the Eastern Mediterranean do not favor coopera-

tion among actors with pre-existing differences. To

say that the situation will pass from crisis to coopera-

tion is at least naively ambitious. The domestic politi-

cal particularities and complexities of each country,

as well as the rest of their foreign relations, hinder

real regional and trans-regional cooperation. What is

more, geopolitical rivalries, like the one between

Turkey and Greece over the Aegean, have acquired a

new dimension due to the possibilities that the natu-

ral findings open.

Overall, as seen, it would be very difficult for natural

gas to bridge any bilateral disputes in the Eastern

Mediterranean. Before something like that could be

achieved, other fundamental – mostly long-standing

- political problems have to be resolved. Cyprus is a

key example to understanding this reality. The is-

land’s geopolitical and geostrategic location has

been a subject of interest for decades. Provided a

peaceful and crisis-free region, as well as a resolved

Cyprus problem, Cyprus could have well been the

ideal energy hub, bridging the energy needs of the

Middle East, North Africa, and Europe, in cooperation

of course with other countries like Turkey, Greece,

Israel, and Egypt.

Despite all the unfavorable conditions and geopoliti-

cal complications, the regional developments are

rapid and no one knows what the future holds; after

all, the greater region of the Middle East has a long

history of unpredictability. Having said that, the



It is maybe true that Turkey’s cooperation with

Israel would probably be more feasible than

with Cyprus; yet, in order for that to happen

there has to be a significant improvement in

the relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv.



countries of the Eastern Mediterranean should keep

in mind the various benefits that would stem from

their cooperation, and that they are there for them to

exploit, once they decide that resolving their prob-

lems is in everyone’s best interest.

Notes:

* Zenonas Tziarras is a PhD Candidate in Politics &

International Studies at the University of Warwick,

UK, and a Junior Research Scholar at Strategy Inter-

national, Greece.

1. Sachs, D. J. and Warner, M. A., “Natural Re-

sources and Economic Development: The Curse

of Natural Resources”, European Economic Re-

view, Vol. 45, 2001, pp.827, 827-838.

2. Tomich, Z. J., “‘An historic day for Cyprus’”, Cy-

prus Mail, 29 December 2011, at http://

www.cyprus-mail.com/gas/historic-day-

cyprus/20111229 [Accessed 06/02/2012].

3. Tomich, Z. J., “Cyprus’ Bright Energy Future”,

Cyprus Mail, 28 January 2012, at http://

www.cyprus-mail.com/cyprus/cyprus-bright-

energy-future/20120128 [Accessed 06/02/2012].

4. Editorial, “US supports revenue-sharing agree-

ment in Cyprus for natural gas”, Today’s Zaman,

at http://www.todayszaman.com/

newsDetail_getNewsById.action?

newsId=258364 [Accessed 06/02/2012].

5. Barber, C., “Turkey threatens naval action over

Cyprus drilling”, Famagusta Gazette, 06 Septem-

ber 2011, at http://famagusta-gazette.com/

turkey-threatens-naval-action-over-cyprus-

drilling-p12883-69.htm [Accessed 06/02/2012];

Burch, J., “UPDATE 2-Turkish ship explores near

Cypriot gas rig-official “, Reuters, 27 September

2011, at http://www.reuters.com/

article/2011/09/27/turkey-cyprus-exploration-

idUSL5E7KR2O620110927 [Accessed

07/02/2012]; Editorial, “US supports revenue-

sharing agreement in Cyprus for natural gas”.

6. Pawlak, J., “EU tells Turkey not to threaten Cy-

prus”, Reuters, 09 September 2011, at http://

uk.reuters.com/article/2011/09/09/eu-turkey-

idUKLDE7880CI20110909 [Accessed

06/02/2011]; Fenwick, S., “Russia sends Nuclear

Subs to Patrol Cyprus Waters – Report”, Cy-

prusNewsReport.Com, 25/08/2011, at http://

www.cyprusnewsreport.com/?q=node/4540

[Accessed 06/02/2012]; Editorial, “Greece, Israel

sign pact on security cooperation”, JTA, 05 Sep-

tember 2011, at http://www.jta.org/news/

article/2011/09/05/3089230/greece-israel-sign-

security-cooperation-agreement [Accessed

06/02/2012]; Editorial, “Cyprus and Israel sign

agreements and memorandum”, Famagusta

Gazette, 03 November 2011, at http://famagusta

-gazette.com/cyprus-and-israel-sign-

agreements-and-memorandum-p13401-69.htm

[Accessed 06/02/2012].

7. Apart from the changing Turkish-Israeli rela-

tions, the regional balance of power is also af-

fected by the withdrawal of the American troops

from Iraq, as well as by domestic changes and

developments in post-“Arab Spring” countries

like Egypt and Syria.

8. Noble Energy, “Noble Energy Announces Signifi-

cant Discovery at Leviathan Offshore Israel”,

Noble Energy Inc., 29 December 2010, at http://

investors.nobleenergyinc.com/

releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=539152 [Accessed

06/02/2012].

9. Popovici, V., “The Levantine Basin: A Mediterra-

nean Hydrocarbon Saga Begins for Greece, Tur-

key, Cyprus and Israel”, Balkanalysis.com, 13

January 2012, at http://www.balkanalysis.com/

energy-sector/2012/01/13/the-levantine-basin-

a-mediterranean-hydrocarbon-saga-begins-for-

greece-turkey-cyprus-and-israel/ [Accessed

07/02/2012].

10. Popovici, V., “The Levantine Basin: A Mediterra-

nean Hydrocarbon Saga Begins for Greece, Tur-

key, Cyprus and Israel”.

11. Editorial, “’Israel needs Turkey for gas transit’”,

PressTV, 05 November 2011, at http://

www.presstv.ir/detail/208450.html [Accessed

07/02/2012].

12. Editorial, “Thousands commemorate anniversary

of Gaza flotilla incident”, Today’s Zaman, 31 May

2011, at http://www.todayszaman.com/news-

245702-thousands-commemorate-anniversary-

of-gaza-flotilla-incident.html [Accessed

07/02/2012].

http://www.cyprus-mail.com/gas/historic-day-cyprus/20111229



http://www.cyprus-mail.com/cyprus/cyprus-bright-energy-future/20120128



http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=258364



http://famagusta-gazette.com/turkey-threatens-naval-action-over-cyprus-drilling-p12883-69.htm



http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/27/turkey-cyprus-exploration-idUSL5E7KR2O620110927



http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/09/09/eu-turkey-idUKLDE7880CI20110909



http://www.cyprusnewsreport.com/?q=node/4540

http://www.cyprusnewsreport.com/?q=node/4540

http://www.jta.org/news/article/2011/09/05/3089230/greece-israel-sign-security-cooperation-agreement



http://famagusta-gazette.com/cyprus-and-israel-sign-agreements-and-memorandum-p13401-69.htm



http://investors.nobleenergyinc.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=539152



http://www.balkanalysis.com/energy-sector/2012/01/13/the-levantine-basin-a-mediterranean-hydrocarbon-saga-begins-for-greece-turkey-cyprus-and-israel/




http://www.presstv.ir/detail/208450.html

http://www.presstv.ir/detail/208450.html

http://www.todayszaman.com/news-245702-thousands-commemorate-anniversary-of-gaza-flotilla-incident.html




A “WMD-FREE” MIDDLE EAST IS A DISARMED ISRAEL EVEN DESIRABLE FOR THE REGION?

MIDDLE EAST REVIEW | BY EDVIN ARNBY-MACHATA*

W hile the preparations for next

year’s UN conference on a Middle

East Nuclear & WMD Free Zone

are underway, commentators are

already expressing pessimism as to the possibility of

such a zone being established. Even those supporting

the conference expect no easy gains, and see it as the

start of a long and arduous process. This pessimism is

unfortunately well founded: the historical record for

broad regional co-operation on security is rather

bleak and in spite of relatively high levels of econom-

ic development, the region has seen several bloody

wars. One important argument in favour of a WMD

free zone is that these conflicts then would not be

capable of escalating into even more disastrous nu-

clear war.

At the centre of Middle Eastern conflicts is that be-

tween Palestine and Israel, which feeds into all the

others in various ways. The treatment of ordinary

Palestinians, the regular assassinations of their lead-

ers and continuing construction of illegal settlements

provoke popular resentment throughout the region

and the world as a whole. These sentiments are dealt

with, and used, by regional powers in various ways.

Iran supports and funds Hamas and Hezbollah, while

Turkey wins ‘hearts and minds’ by championing the

Palestinian cause and standing up against Israel, no-

tably through the recent Gaza-convoys. As the de-

cline of secular Arab nationalism centred on the indi-

vidual states continues and the pan-Islam movement

grows, these connections will grow stronger rather

than weaker.

While Israel has no moral grounds to deny democrat-

ic regimes in Egypt, Libya and beyond, it does have

legitimate security interests that may appear to be at

stake. Israel has been at war with several of its Arab

neighbours in the past, and remains immensely un-

popular with the region’s populations. Taken togeth-

er, Egypt, Jordan and Syria have more than 900.000

troops, compared to Israel’s 176.000. Granted that

the US is ensuring Israel’s “Qualitative Military Edge”

over its neighbours by the nature of its arms deals,

this is still a potentially overwhelming imbalance of

power, presently moderated by Israel’s monopoly on

nuclear weapons. What then would be the likely con-

sequences if Israel were to abolish their WMDs?

It is certainly not a given that this disarmament,

and populist democratic regimes in the region,

would precipitate an invasion or even a limited

incursion into Israel or Palestine, but this is neverthe-

less an eventuality Israeli policy-makers would

MIDDLE EAST REVIEW | BY EDVIN ARNBY-MACHATA


do their utmost to prevent. Considering Israel’s

increasingly strained relationship with the US, it

is unlikely that they could obtain more favourable

arms deals than those they already have, so they

would be obliged to increase their conventional forc-

es, reversing the current trend to reduce the defence

budget.

However, as Israel is already one of the most milita-

rized countries in the world (10 per cent of the popu-

lation are either on active duty or in the reserves, and

they spend more than 6 per cent of GDP on their

armed forces) there is a limit to how much they can

rearm conventionally without doing harm to its

economy. Even with a military build-up, Israel’s mili-

tary position would be severely weakened. To have a

chance of winning, or even surviving, they may be

forced to strike pre-emptively in the case of a crisis –

like in the 6-day war.

Leaving potential risks aside, it is important to con-

sider what exactly is the purpose of a WMD-free

zone. The issue of nuclear weapons is not the cause

of the region’s conflicts; neither are they serious ob-

stacles to resolving the underlying sources of the con-

flicts. They are merely symptoms that have gotten a

too prominent place in the discourse. The doctrine of

Mutually Assured Destruction was not the cause of

the Cold War; rather it was the symptom of a great

mistrust between two different cultural, political and

economic systems that both claimed the virtue of

universality.

The “great power” rivalry between Iran and the US is

similar in some ways to the rivalry between the US

and the USSR, with the obvious great difference in

balance of power, which Tehran may have an interest

in adjusting by acquiring WMDs. The conflict be-

tween Israel and Palestine is that of land ownership.

Israel’s possession of WMDs has no direct bearing on

this conflict, as it could not use them on Palestinian

targets without killing as many of its own citizens.

Israel’s WMDs has a regional effect, deterring its

neighbours from trying to solve the conflict over the

land by violent means – which they have attempted

to do in the past several times.

Is it really realistic to ask a strong, but still militarily

vulnerable and isolated state to renounce its posses-

sion of nuclear weapons when the central conflict in

question remains unresolved, and thus the security of

the state is not yet fully consolidated? This a question

that applies not only to Israel, but also to Iran (if they

are indeed aiming to produce WMDs).

A WMD free zone will only be a reality when key

stakeholders find that these weapons are superfluous

in providing security. Basically, Israel and Iran need to

feel safe in the long term. This can only happen if the

underlying conflicts are solved. Talking of a Middle

East free from WMDs is starting at the wrong end.

However, it is still of great importance to recognize

the importance to preventing nuclear proliferation

and to roll back the deployment of WMDs globally.

The main point in support of next year’s conference is

the same as for non-proliferation or abolition gener-

ally: WMDs are inherently indiscriminate in causing

destruction, they leave deadly radiation for many

years and they may have global climatic consequenc-

es. The more there are of them, the likelier it is that

some will malfunction or fall into the wrong hands.

Nevertheless, establishing a WMD-free zone in the

Middle East, however morally desirable, would not

stop militants from acquiring weapons from other

sources, and it would do little to compel the current

nine WMD-states to abolish their arsenals (which by

the lowest estimates still outnumber middle eastern

stockpiles 25 times). In the move towards a world

without nuclear weapons, there are many steps that

can and need to be taken on a global level. An obvi-

ous one that could be the next step is to designate

the use of all types of WMDs as crimes against hu-

manity. Campaigning for something so basic, intui-

tively foolproof and relatively uncomplicated politi-

cally is the right place to start.

Note:

* Edvin Arnby-Machata is a postgraduate student

in Conflict & Development Studies at the School of

Oriental & African Studies, University of London, and

a fellow of The Student Initiative.

T urkish auteur Nuri Bilge Ceylan’s last

movie Bir Zamanlar Anadolu’da (Once

Upon a Time in Anatolia) is a story of a

murder and the officers’ efforts to find

the place where the victim was buried. The story was

based on the 12 hours of the event happened in

Keskin, a small town of Kirikkale, in Central Anatolia

Region of Turkey. The co-authors of the script were

partly inspired by a true story. In an interview con-

ducted with the director, Ceylan said that one of the

co-writers had worked as a doctor in the town where

the movie took place. So, the story benefited a lot

from the doctor’s memoirs concerning the murder

while some conversations was built on quotes from

Anton Chekhov (Proimakis, 2011).

The Turkish-Bosnian production takes 150 minutes

and it can be categorised as a thriller. Unlike Ceylan’s

general tendency in casting, Turkish celebrities

Yılmaz Erdoğan and Taner Birsel play two of the lead-

ing roles in the movie. Erdoğan’s skill contributes a

lot to the movie as it can be argued that nobody

could have acted the local commissar of this movie as

good as him. Similarly, Taner Birsel gives a perfect

performance as usual. Murderer, Fırat Köksal, might

be seen as the most arguable character. He confessed

that he was the murderer but he played the innocent

in the whole story. That is why while watching the

movie, you feel a meaningless sympathy for him.

Ercan Kesal played a mayor candidate in Ceylan’s

previous movie Three Monkeys. This time, Kesal plays

the Mukhtar of the village and his speech to the offic-

ers can beam you up to the heart of Anatolian villag-

es. Including the Mukhtar’s, several conversations of

the movie reveal the hypocrisy and selfishness of

Anatolian men. The characters, especially the prose-

cutor and the commissar do not care about others’

problems as they are only focused on their simple

personal life.

It can be argued that this is a very realist movie in

terms of its characters, script, conversations, and cov-

ering a relatively short period of time for a movie. The

only surrealist example might be the scene when the


ONCE UPON A TIME IN ANATOLIA

FILM REVIEW | BY ALAADDIN F. PAKSOY*

Every single frame of this movie can be a picture on your wall if you cannot afford to pay for

a Caravaggio or Rembrandt painting.

Once Upon a Time in Anatolia (2011)

Original Title: Bir Zamanlar Anadolu’da

Director: Nuri Bilge Ceylan

Starring: Yılmaz Erdoğan, Taner Birsel, Fırat Köksal, Muham-

met Uzuner, Ercan Kesal

Language: Turkish

“Quarterly news-Magazine”

CALL FOR CONTRIBUTION

Political Reflection

welcomes contributions

from scholars, students, and professionals

in all aspects of international relations, politics, and political economy.

Articles submitted should be original contributions and should not be under consideration for any other publication at

the same time.

Articles for the Magazine should be submitted via email to the following addresses:

[email protected] ; [email protected]

Author’s name, title and full address with a brief biographical note should be typed on a separate sheet.

Authors are encouraged to submit their manuscripts by electronic means as Word format attachments in Times New

Roman and 1,5 space. 12 font should be used within text while 10 font should be preferred for footnotes.

The minimum length for Articles is 1000 words.

Quotations should be placed within double quotation marks (“……”). Quotations larger than four lines should be indent-

ed at left margin and single-spaced. Use footnotes (not endnotes). Dates should be in the form 3 November 1996; 1995-

1998; and 1990s.

Foreign language text should always be italicized, even when lengthy. American spelling is accepted but spelling practice

should be consistent throughout the article.

If a submitted article is selected for publication, its copyright will be transferred to Centre for Strategic Research

and Analysis (CESRAN). Published papers can be cited by giving the necessary bibliographical information. For re-

publication of any article in full-text permission must be sought from the editors.

Authors bear responsibility for their contributions. Statements of fact or opinion appearing in Political Reflection

Magazine are solely those of the authors and do not imply endorsement by the Magazine or the CESRAN.

Submissions whether they are published or not are not returned.

murderer sees the victim in front of the window in

Mukhtar’s house. Concerning this scene, Ceylan’s

comments contribute to the movie’s realist character.

He said that it was the murderer’s dream and dreams

were part of real life (Proimakis, 2011). Yet the mov-

ie’s realist spirit does not demolish its visual aesthet-

ic. Although Ceylan’s visual materials are remarkably

restricted in the steppe landscape and darkness of

the night, he successfully employs the rolling apples,

flying leaves, and the light coming from cars and the

train in his visual representation of the story. It can

even be argued that every single frame of this movie

can be a picture on your wall if you cannot afford to

pay for a Caravaggio or Rembrandt painting. In par-

ticular, the establishing shot in front of the auto-tyre

repair shop resembles a painting. This is Ceylan’s

creativity of transforming ordinary places into aes-

thetic frames.

The Grand Prix and the inadequate interest in

Turkey

The movie won the Grand Prix at the 2011 Cannes

Film Festival but Ceylan could not gain the same suc-

cess at Turkish movie theatres. It is clear that Ceylan

puts his art first and is not very interested in what the

general audience wants to watch. However, there is

an interesting contradiction comes to my mind when

I look at Ceylan’s international success and his hum-

ble fame in his own country. Although Ceylan’s narra-

tives consist of Anatolian stories, his movies only get

attention from a remarkably restricted group of Turk-

ish society. Therefore, the issue should not be related

to what his movies tell us but how they tell. At this

point, one can argue that an average Turkish audi-

ence grows up with the fast cuts of American movies

and the banal story telling of Turkish soap operas.

Thus, influenced by the famous Russian director An-

drei Arsenyevich Tarkovsky, Nuri Bilge Ceylan’s mov-

ies’ speed, editing, camera angles, and the visual

materials are too unfamiliar for an average audience

in Turkey.

All in all, even though the movie is very successful, I

still have question marks in my mind. First of all, I

wonder how much of the conversations can be fully

understood by the non-Turkish audience. The charac-

ters are remarkably local as the conversations are so.

The second question is Ceylan’s style in producing his

movies. We are getting more used to his style in eve-

ry new movie. Can Ceylan transcend himself in the

following projects? Or is he going to continue to be

attached to his own tradition. After watching this

spectacular film, I started to worry if Bir Zamanlar

Anadolu’da is going to be his peak in his career.

Notes:

* Alaaddin F. Paksoy is a Doctoral Researcher at the

University of Sheffiled.

1. Aslanyürek, Semir (2011) “Bir Zamanlar

Anadolu’da veya 'Bir Ülkenin Otopsisi'”. Sol

Portal. Accessed on: 15-02-12. http://

haber.sol.org.tr/kultur-sanat/bir-zamanlar-

anadolu-da-veya-bir-ulkenin-otopsisi-haberi-

46922

2. Proimakis, Joseph (2011) "Maybe this is a

Turkish western". Cineuropa. Accessed on: 15-

02-12. http://cineuropa.org/2011/it.aspx?

t=interview&lang=en&documentID=204434

FILM REVIEW | BY ALAADDIN F. PAKSOY



“Quarterly news-Magazine”

CALL FOR CONTRIBUTION

Political Reflection

welcomes contributions

from scholars, students, and professionals

in all aspects of international relations, politics, and political economy.

Articles submitted should be original contributions and should not be under consideration for any other publication at

the same time.

Articles for the Magazine should be submitted via email to the following addresses:

[email protected] ; [email protected]

Author’s name, title and full address with a brief biographical note should be typed on a separate sheet.

Authors are encouraged to submit their manuscripts by electronic means as Word format attachments in Times New

Roman and 1,5 space. 12 font should be used within text while 10 font should be preferred for footnotes.

The minimum length for Articles is 1000 words.

Quotations should be placed within double quotation marks (“……”). Quotations larger than four lines should be indent-

ed at left margin and single-spaced. Use footnotes (not endnotes). Dates should be in the form 3 November 1996; 1995-

1998; and 1990s.

Foreign language text should always be italicized, even when lengthy. American spelling is accepted but spelling practice

should be consistent throughout the article.

If a submitted article is selected for publication, its copyright will be transferred to Centre for Strategic Research

and Analysis (CESRAN). Published papers can be cited by giving the necessary bibliographical information. For re-

publication of any article in full-text permission must be sought from the editors.

Authors bear responsibility for their contributions. Statements of fact or opinion appearing in Political Reflection

Magazine are solely those of the authors and do not imply endorsement by the Magazine or the CESRAN.

Submissions whether they are published or not are not returned.

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At a session of the Russian Governmental Commis-

sion on the Electric Energy Development, Putin has

attacked upon management of the state-run energy

companies, with affiliated private firms, as a rule,

which have deduced state assets from the country.

However, many experts believe that "small fries" will

suffer, and Putin's "elite" remains untouched, i.e.

"struggle" isn't directed against powerful elite cor-

ruption.

In the Russian media this campaign is widely dis-

cussed at an average and a lowest level of the energy

sector, on the one hand, but with another — there is

no information on high level "elite". Statements of

officials are considered as an element of the pre-

election company.

The Russian energy market not trusts in a reality of

anti-corruption campaign. Managers of state-run

energy companies try their best to move from the

state-run firms to the private companies, established

earlier

According to many experts, the Russian energy-

market also not so trusts in a fight against corruption

reality, statements of officials are faster considered as

an element of the pre-election company. The sound-

ed data don't make impression of serious investiga-

tion. On the other hand, Vladimir Putin has generat-

ed new risks in sector — resignations will lead to

delay of consideration of fundamental questions,

such as updating of investment programs and devel-

opment of tariff decisions.

From the beginning of this year the expert communi-

ty smartly discussed the information that five key

persons in the Russian power have received new po-

sitions during the last days of 2011: Sergey Ivanov –


RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT'S "SELECTIVE"

ANTI-CORRUPTION CAMPAIGN

IN THE ENERGY SECTOR

EURASIA REVIEW | BY DR. ZURAB GARAKANIDZE*

B y the end of 2011 Russian Prime-Minister V. Putin has begun campaign for

fight against corruption in the Russian energy sector. Experts underline, that

recent anti-corruption “struggle” in Russia will be prolonged for two -three

months period, and will probably, "victoriously to be come to the end” just by

the Russian presidential election, i.e. by the early March 2012.

in the Kremlin, Sergey Naryshkin – in the Duma,

Dmitry Rogozin (defense) with Vladyslav Surkov

(modernization) – in the government, and Igor

Sergun – in the Military Intelligence. But for some

reasons all have missed the fact that in a heat of

fighting against corruption in the energy sector, initi-

ated by the prime minister on the threshold of

March's presidential election in the Russian Federa-

tion, changes haven't concerned tops of this most

opaque branch of the Russian government. It re-

minds badly staged pre-election PR...

No news good news

Despite the sharp criticism of energy sector from V.

Putin, the minister S. Shmatko with his "command",

and the first "energy" vice-premiers – V. Zubkov and

I.Sechin, remained on their own places. Moreover,

one of the "energy-heavyweights" of Russian govern-

ment, - V. Zubkov even "has put on promotion", -

after December 4, 2011 parliamentary elections of

the Russian Federation, premier V. Putin has present-

ed him a few new spheres of supervision. The prime-

minister has charged, apart from his usual functions,

also to supervise issues of social security, public

health services, culture and building of accessible

habitation, in addition.

The above-stated proves our assumptions of clan

character the relation in the Russian energy sector,

stated by us in the summer of last year. Then we

wrote, that begun form March of last year president

D. Medvedev's order to withdraw of state-officials

from boards of directors of the state-run companies

had «campainian character» and the Putin's "elite"

"was raised" in the state-run companies (see News-

BaseFSUOGM 2011; Issues 638, 639, 640). Igor Sechin,

for example, the first vice premier-minister, supervi-

sor the oil-gas extracting industry, long time was the

chairman of the board of directors of state-run oil

EURASIA REVIEW | BY DR. ZURAB GARAKANIDZE


Vladimir Putin

company NK "Rosneft". In the time of Putin's presi-

dential power the state-run energy companies be-

came great strength of economy at expense of op-

pression of the private business.

And it occurs when as in infringement of president D.

Medvedev's March 2011 order, about incompatibility

of political and economic positions, the first vice

premier-minister V. Zubkov continues to remain on a

position of the chairman of board of directors of the

biggest state-run company in the country, the energy

-giant "Gazprom". According to the decree of the

President of Russian Federation V. Zubkov, by Octo-

ber, 1st of last year, should leave board of directors.

Above mentioned means, that the Putin's “elite” of

the Russian energy sector remains untouched...

“Closer circle” remains untouched

According to the former advisor of Russian prime-

minister, Mr. A. Illarionov, Putin divides his “closer

circle” on two categories: one is the "economic

group", with which he discusses economic problems,

and the second – "businessmen", with which he car-

ries out control of property and the finances in the

country. The unique person entering within both

these categories, is Igor Sechin, Putin's irreplaceable

adherent.

According to experts, Putin's clan supervises an as-

sets in 4,5 trillion Russian Rubles that makes 10-15%

of the country GDP. Corruption money turnover

equals to three hundred billion dollars that is equal

to one quarter of the GDP.

Moreover, web-site Wikileaks wrote, that V. Putin

also is involved in the corruption schemes himself.

For example, American diplomats named the

company RosUkrEnergo as a "suspicious" and an

"opaque". Ex-Ukrainian president V. Yushchenko

"...hasn't excluded that the idea of creation

RosUkrEnergo in 2002 could belong to president

Kuchma”. V. Yushchenko named co-owners

RosUkrEnergo of Putin and the present president of

Russia, and then the former head of administration

Dmitry Medvedev.

Mr. A. Illarionov says that after displacement from his

positions the then chief of Presidential Administra-

tion A. Voloshin, the then prime-minister M. Kasya-

nov and the JSC "RAO UES” (Russian United Energy

Systems) liquidation, Putin's "people in uniforms"

have completely replaced Yeltsin's clan.

Employees from the KGB (former Soviet Security Ser-

vice), SVR (Russian Intelligence), GRU (Russian Mili-

tary Intelligence), the Ministry of Internal Affairs,

have been appointed to positions, - they have occu-

pied 42.3% of all staff of the government. Approxi-

mately 25,6% of high level decision makers are made

by officials and businessmen from St.-Petersburg,

Putin's motherland. About 78% of leading political

posts in Presidential Administration, both chambers

of Parliament and in all law-enforcement authorities

are occupied with the persons connected with Secu-

rity Services. Putin's close friends, not known before,

- G. Timchenko, Y. Kovalchuk and brothers Roten-

bergs became billionaires, when Putin was the Presi-

dent of Russia. The main shareholder of bank "Russia"

Y. Kovalchuk supervises the largest assets of the

country, pension fund GASFUND, insurance company

SOGAZ and media holding of Gazprom-media. Now

the position of the deputy minister of Internal Affairs

is occupied with Oleg Safonov, Valery Golubev is the

deputy general director of "Gazprom", and the De-

partment of Economic Security supervises Eugenie

Shkolov. All three these men are former officers of

the KGB and Putin's old friends.

In "heat" of today's anticorruption struggle the Minis-

try of Energy demands from the energy companies of

data on heads and deputies, members of their fami-

lies and relatives. However the Prime-minister cares



According to the former advisor of Russian

prime-minister, Mr. A. Illarionov, Putin divides

his “closer circle” on two categories: one is the

"economic group", with which he discusses eco-

nomic problems, and the second –

"businessmen", with which he carries out con-

trol of property and the finances in the country.

not only of friends, but also their families and rela-

tives. Borys Kovalchuk, Yury Kovalchuk's son has

been appointed as a head of department of national

projects of the government at first, and then as a

managing director of the state-run INTER RAO

(former RAO UES), - certainly nobody will touch him...

Just about "practice" of replacement of officials on

economic posts by the family members, we specified

in aforementioned publications, - in the summer of

last year (see NewsBaseFSUOGM 2011; Issues 639).

Extreme audit

In a consequence of such a clan control, according to

reports of the Transparency International (TI), the

business climate became less transparent and more

corrupted within the Russian energy sector last years.

As a result, by estimations of the TI for 2011, in the

list of the countries on corruption level, Russia is

143rd among the investigated 183 states in the

world. Also it is the country, where following the re-

sults of 2011, the companies of oil and gas sector

earned only as a dividends more than 300 bln rubles

(10 bln dollars), not including different budgetary

and other taxes and payments that almost twice

more than year before. But because of the all-round

Russian corruption, it is not clear in whose pockets

settle these profits.

From the above-stated is clear that main anticorrup-

tion "struggles" occur at a of average and lowest level

of energy sector, where this struggle is in a heat. So,

the Prime-minister of the Russian Federation Vladi-

mir Putin has held on December 19th, 2011 at a ses-

sion of the Russian governmental Commission on the

Electric Energy Development on which has subjected

to criticism work of the companies of sector, having

suggested them to prepare personnel decisions.

As a result, like in a criminal community, mentioned

on a session by the Prime-minister, - Dmitry

Ponomarev, the chairman of the board of noncom-

mercial partnership of “Market's Council” and

“Administrator of the Electricity Traiding System”,

also Yury Zheljabovsky, top-manager of the of Feder-

al Electricity Network's (FEN) branch company -

“Trunk Electric Networks (TEN) of Urals" have de-

clared about leaving from the position, also Holding

MRSK, the "Tjumenenergo", and FEN. The manage-

ment of "Gazprom" has dismissed three top-

managers: the vice-president of board Alexander

Ananenkov, the chiefs of departments - Victor Ilyush-

in and Olga Pavlova.

There is strange, but director of the TEN has declared,

that he doesn't want to admit influence of his charg-

es on reputation of the company (?!). The first deputy

of board chairman of the FEN Alexander Bobrov has

explained the resignation by importance of the na-

tion's decision, because he works in a state-run com-

pany (?!)...

To the head of “Market Council" Dmitry Ponomarev

Putin incriminated being of the head of “Moscow

Electricity Stock Exchange" (is engaged in wholesale

resale of the electricity) and communication with JSC



Sergey Shmatko

"RusPower". In turn, of "market Council" assured that

charges don't represent the facts, but the govern-

mental commission has made the decision on

Ponomarev's resignation nevertheless.

The Minister of Energy of Russia Sergey Shmatko has

declared in the end of December that concerning

these managers criminal investigation will be made.

Moreover, Ministry of Energy of Russian Federation

has transferred in law enforcement bodies materials

following the results of check of heads of the state-

run energy companies, and “... even it is raised a

number of criminal cases”, - Vice-premier Igor Sechin

has informed on topic literally in a week after meet-

ing with the Prime-minister Vladimir Putin. Sechin

has noticed that additional audit, by which results

have been dismissed a number of managers, has

been conducted. Besides, as he said, audit of data

concerning other largest infrastructural companies,

such, as "Transneft" are initiated.

It is interesting, how the Russian investigators, could

for one pre-NewYear's week, have audited and raised

“... a number of criminal cases”, on such huge compa-

ny, for example, as is a holding MRSK, with a total

capitalization in 5.96 billion dollars, on the Moscow

Interbank Stock Exchange, for December 23rd, 2011?

Anti-corruption barometer

As a result, securities of FEN and MRSK, whose heads

more often than others appeared in performance

of the Prime-minister for last weeks of 2011,

have fallen in price on 9 and 4%, and their capitalisa-

tion has decreased on 36 bln and 4 bln rubles corre-

spondingly. Perhaps, recession directly was not con-

nected with "Putin's campaign”, partly it's depends

on a big volatility of all energy-market, - analyst

Deutsche Bank Dmitry Bulgakov believes. On the

other hand, the steadfast attention of the authorities

to sector, frightens investors. «These personnel

changes – not a sign of movement towards liberalisa-

tion», – were underlined in interview to the Voice of

America by Edward Lukas, one of the editors of

The Economist, the author of the book "The new

“cold war ”.

As a proof to these words we can add that in «a fight

against corruption heat» in the Russian energy sec-

tor, in January, 2012 the government of the Russian

Federation has made decision to transfer to the larg-

est Russian oil company of JSC NK "Rosneft" (which is

considered under control to the state and personally

to V. Putin), three fields on an out-of-competition

basis. The corresponding order is placed, in the end

of December of last year, in a databank of federal

standard and administrative documents. According

to these official documents, "Rosneft" has received an

investigation and extraction exclusive right under the

combined license on “Central-barents”, “Perseevsky”

and “Fedynsky” fields. This direct infringement of the

antimonopoly law of Russia.

From state-run sector to private

In the Russian media there were data that the former

top-managers of the then Russian JSC RAO UES An-

drey Rappoport and Alexander Chistjakov have ap-

peared as a co-owners of oil company Ruspetro. Two

businessmen possess 48% of shares in Ruspetro, 29%

owns the management, 18% - private investors and

5% - the “Capital Savings Bank". Ruspetro can be

estimated in 1-1.2 billion dollars. The basic assets of

the Ruspetro - three deposits in Khanty-Mansiysk

autonomous region. It possesses East-Inginsky, Pot-

tynsko-Inginsky and Poljanovsky deposits. Cumula-

tive reconnoitered reserves of the Ruspetro are esti-

mated in 2.1 billion barrels of oil. Company extraction

makes about 4.5 thousand barrels a day. Half of bar-

rels of oil goes for export.

Rappoport and Chistjakov have left state-run energy

sector in 2008 after they have provided “warm plac-

es” in the Ruspetro. Rappoport began career in Alpha

-Bank then in the late nineties worked as the vice-

president of the YUKOS. In the then RAO UES he has

passed in 1998 and has held a position of the deputy



“...These personnel changes – not a sign of

movement towards liberalization”

Edward Lukas

of the head of company - Anatoly Chubays. After be-

ginning of the reforms Rappoport has headed the

FEN. From 2002 his deputy was Chistjakov who su-

pervised investment activity of the then RAO UES

before.

Here is another example. Planned sale of the airport

"Domodedovo" – perhaps represents a reaction to

the attention of the prime minister of Russia raised

recently to a problem of the offshore companies and

their owners. It is known that owners of

"Domodedovo" (whose persons remain till now a

riddle) have charged to investment bank Goldman

Sachs search for the Russian airport buyer. That is the

reflexion of long opposition of proprietors of the air-

port and the government. As a result, owners simply

want to secure themselves and to deduce from under

blow.

But on the other hand, V. Putin's interests, for exam-

ple, to the energy-company "Surgutneftegaz” are

well-known. And in whose pocket go billions of

"Surgutneftegaz" still is a big question, because the

largest shareholders of the company are not known.

In the reporting of this company, 8.1% of shares be-

long to a private pension fund "Surgutneftegaz", and

91.9% - to another shareholders (http://top.rbc.ru/

economics/15/12/2011/629986.shtml). Read - to the

Prime minister of the Russian Federation. That is why

sale of the airport "Domodedovo" it is actual from a

view of transparency, and "Surgutneftegaz" — isn't.

To avoid such an unclear situation Russian parlia-

ment adopted changes in the Civil Code. According

to changes, all companies are obliged to present

names of all owners to the contractors. But the way

out was found from this situation too. The First Vice-

premier I. Sechin has allowed to state-run companies

not to learn the information on owners of the clients.

Besides, to suppliers and contractors from among the

public sector, working with state companies, have

allowed not to give the information on shareholders,

whose share doesn't exceed five percent.

Here is one more example. Igor Sechin has declared

that he is ready to work on the project of

amalgamation of the "Zarubezhnefti" and the

"Transneft" for the subsequent privatization of the

joined company. Though Sechin, as he said, has

specified in some possible obstacles which can arise

at merge of the companies. In particular, Sechin has

underlined that "Zarubezhneft" has extracting assets,

and "Transneft" isn't engaged in extraction.

But earlier, in the beginning of January, 2012 the

Russian newspaper "Kommersant", referring to

unnamed sources in the government wrote, that

Sechin has offered the prime minister of Russia V.

Putin to postpone privatization of some state

companies, including "Transneft" and

"Zarubezhnefti". It was informed that Sechin

considers sale of assets of "Transneft" economically

inefficient, and privatization of "Zarubezhneft" in

general suggests to refuse. According to the vice-

premier, problem which are carried out by

"Zarubezhneft", it will be impossible to transfer to

commercial structure. What's happen in two weeks?

It's clear, like in the above mentioned case with

Rappoport and Chistjakov, - the way out was found,...

Undoubtedly, such a "selective" anti-corruption

testify to «confused reaction» of V. Putin taken by

surprise in the sizes and the nature of national

protests. Edward Lukas believes that the Putin's in-

ternal circle, actually ... is a command of absolutely

unpopular people in Russia, each of them is in own

way unloved the people and even the antihero. The

Putin's popularity served some kind of indemnifica-

tion of unpopularity of its environment and was used

as very comfortable roof by the whole mode. But

suddenly his ratings have started to fall sharply, peo-

ple support not seems such firm any more, and Putin

personally now is in very much difficult situation.

Certainly, this is the essence of initiated by Putin anti-

corruption company in the Russian energy sector.

Probably V. Putin entirely won't cut down the

"energy-tree" on which himself and his "elite" sit till

today.

Note:

* Dr. Zurab Garakanidze is an author in News Base

E-magazine.



I n this volume, Beijing which is the capital

city of the most populous country of the

world has been examined in detail from a

globalisation perspective.

Beijing is located at the north of China. With its 19

million population, it is the second largest city of the

country. Beijing is one of the four cities which the

national government (Communist Party of China)

controls directly in China. It is the political, cultural

and educational centre of the country as well as a

rich, well-developed and vibrant city.

Before focusing on Beijing specifically, let’s first look

at the globalisation and liberalisation adventure of

China.


BEIJING

“HUMANISTIC CITY”

GLOBAL CITY ANALYSIS | BY FATIH EREN*

National Emblem of People’s Republic of China

China, which was involved in the United Nations (UN)

in 1971, started its market-based economic reforms

in 1978. The national government followed a mixed

economy model (i.e. a mixture of the planned econo-

my and the market economy) which was titled

‘market socialism’. After this date, economic reforms,

capital formation and structural changes were carried

on progressively and systematically by the govern-

ment. Five-year development plans for the country

and twenty-year master plans for Chinese cities were

prepared; these plans were applied strictly. Particu-

larly, master plans played a role to promote Chinese

cities connecting with the global urban system, and

supporting infrastructure for the development of the

world's factory (Chaolin, et.al., 2010). China decided

to be a member of many formal and informal inter-

national associations in this process such as World

Trade Organisation (WTO), Asia-Pacific Economic

Cooperation (APEC), BRICS, The Shanghai Coopera-

tion Organisation, G-20 and The Chinese-funded Afri-

ca Union (AU). As a result of all these efforts, the

country became modernized; it has been integrated

GLOBAL CITY ANALYSIS | BY FATIH EREN


with the world economic system and its economy

grew dramatically.

China was considered as ‘the factory of the world’

exactly after 1992 by global capitalists. Because of

cheap land prices and labor market, open technology

and product markets, many global companies estab-

lished their manufacturing factories at the south-east

coastal region of the country. Almost every kind of

commodity (for example electronics, textiles, electric

equipment, garment, leather products, metal prod-

ucts, transport equipment, chemicals, machinery,

plastics) started to be produced for the world in the

factories of China in the 1990s and the 2000s.

Foreign direct investment inflows increased regularly

during the globalisation process in the country. In

2010, $105.7 million foreign direct capital entered in

China where it was only $46.4 million in 2004. Global

investors especially came from Hong Kong, Thailand,

Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Japan and United

States to China in the last 30 years (Ali and Guo,

2005).

In addition to global investors, foreign tourists have

also showed huge attention to the country in recent

years. In 2010, China attracted about 56 million tour-

ists and became the world’s third-biggest tourist at-

traction centre in 2010. Four million of these tourists

visited Beijing; the Beijing International Airport be-

came the Asia’s busiest and the world’s second-

busiest airport in use. International sport organisa-

tions and trade fairs which China hosted (such as 4th

World Conference on Women in 1995, 3rd China In-

ternational Logistics Expo in 2007, Olympic Games

2008, 16th Asian Games in 2010, 26th World University

Games in 2011, Canton Fairs, Chongqing High-Tech

Fairs, China International Military-Civilian Scientific

Expos and so on) played a key role in the increase of

the global concern with the country.



Beijing’s Urban Sprawl

Most of international articles regarding China mostly

talk about possible impacts which ‘Superpower Chi-

na’ will make to the world’s political and economic

system in the near future. Some journalists and schol-

ars assert that China is an uncontrollable power

which can be a threat for the world. Well, this issue

may be argued but in addition to the impact of Su-

perpower China on the world’s economic and politi-

cal system, the impact of 30-year globalisation pro-

cess on China should also be discussed. It could be

said that China gained huge economic advantage in

its globalisation process but it also gained some dis-

advantages in social, spatial and environmental

terms. Summarizing the negative impacts of the

globalisation process on China:

Due to the rapid industrialization process, 103 million

Chinese migrated from rural areas to urban areas

between 1990 and 2005 in China (McKinsey report,

March 2009). The number of urbanists, whose count-

ed 172 million in 1978, rose to 577 million in 2005. It

is predicted that this number will get over 1 billion in

2025. This means that the 64% of the country’s total

population will be living in cities (McKinsey report,

March 2009); so the first negative impact is the

breakdown of the urban-rural balance in the country.

Regarding this issue, dependant on the urban sprawl

phenomenon, it is calculated that the size of the ara-

ble land will drop the 7% of the country’s total area in

2025 (Wired, 2008). This means that the country can

be dependant to other countries in terms of food

production and provision in the future; food prices

are increasing rapidly today (the National Statistics

Bureau, 2009).

The second negative impact is the air and water

pollution. China’s air, lakes and rivers were polluted

very much as a result of intensive and regular indus-

trial and agricultural wastes in solid, liquid and

gas forms. According to World Bank 2007 Report,

an estimated 350.000-400.000 people died prema-

turely from outdoor air pollution in the country up

to now. More importantly, the 90% of Chinese cities’

underground water is contaminated today so finding

clean drinkable water in the country can be a

big problem in the next years (Asia Water Project,

2007).

The third negative impact is the spatial inequality.

Urbanisation, which was seen the positive factor of

economic development in the globalisation process,

increased spatial inequalities significantly in the

country. On one hand, very rich people who consti-

tute the 10% of the country’s total population are

living at the west and south regions of China today.

On the other hand, many Chinese are living without

benefiting from the economic growth and prosperity

of the country at the inner regions (Gajwani, et.al.,

2006).

It should be stated that the national government

is aware of the country’s all problems related to

the globalisation and industrialisation processes.

In the national development plans which were

prepared after the 2000s, it was strongly stressed

that the government will attach much more

importance to social and environmental develop-

ment issues together with economic development

issues in the country. In this context, the government

worked for sustaining the economic growth while

recovering ecology, living and production spaces in

the last 10 years. Again, the government invested

very much in renewable energy technologies. The

government also targeted to transform the Chinese

industrial society into knowledge society in these

plans.


Pollution in Beijing


The international society offers some criticisms to the

national government’s applications in China. Main

criticisms are made about democracy, human rights

and freedom issues. The government is gradually

closing to a more moderate line in many fields but it

still carries an authoritarian treatment with heavy

restrictions on some issues such as: ‘freedom of

speech, freedom of the press, the right to a fair trial,

freedom of religion, universal suffrage and property

rights’.

The impact of global concern for Beijing: Analy-

sis

Beijing is going on the way of developing into an

international knowledge city in the context of the

government’s knowledge society vision. The number

of universities, science and technology parks and

industrial investment clusters which are mainly fo-

cused on aerospace, logistics, air transport, IT, tele-

communication, science and high technology, auto-

motive, chemicals, construction, natural resources

and mining issues is increasing in the city (For exam-

ple, Tianzhu Airport Industrial Zone, Beijing Auto

Industry Cluster, Beijing Changping Xiaotangshan

Industrial Park, Zhongguancun Science and Technol-

ogy Park, Beijing Fangshan Industrial Park, Beijing

University of Chemical Technology, Tongzhou Indus-

try Cluster, Peking University, Tsinghua University,

Renmin University and Beijing Normal University and

so on). Today, there is more than 80 regular higher

education institutions and more than 120 science

and technology research parks in Beijing. The Beijing

Investment Promotion Bureau is showing huge inter-

national efforts to attract foreign investors into these

institutions and parks to make them built, developed

and managed in the best way. Again, the national

government is planning to employ many foreign

researchers/experts in these excellence centres.

It should be noted that every year, many internation-

al activities (seminars, exhibitions, technology cours-

es, fairs and conferences) in science and technology

fields are organized in the city. These universities,

parks and clusters will attract many local and foreign

highly-skilled and highly-educated people to the city

for living and working purposes. Therefore, the num-

ber of foreigners on Beijing streets will increase in the

next years. From now on, the Beijing Municipality

started to create recreational areas for current and

prospective expats with high-life standards ( For ex-

ample, Dayangshan National Forest Park, Hot Spring

recreation centre, Nine-dragon amusement park,

Beijing Changping International Exhibition and Con-

ference Centre and so on). Accordingly, in the context

of the city’s internationalization vision, living stand-

ards and urban infrastructure/ service quality will rise

significantly in the near future.

A matter should be stressed at this point. Beijing will

be a more liveable city in the future; but for whom?

The answer of this question is important because

most of Beijingers who are living in the city today

have no chance to find a position for themselves in

the city’s future planned socio-economic structure.

Beijing is developing into an inappropriate place for

the people (peasants) who are living at suburbs. The

question is: ‘Will these people be forced to migrate to

another city in the context of ‘the municipality’s in-

ternationalisation efforts’ or ‘Will they be employed

in a way in city’s suitable sectors such as tourism or

agriculture?’

From a point of view, looking at applied strict re-

striction policies against urban population growth

and at governmental efforts to attract new skilled

labour into the city, it should be said that Beijingers

may be under a gentrification threat in the next



The Beijing University of Technology Gymnasium

years. From another point of view, Beijingers may not

be subject to a gentrification threat. First reason, the

municipality supports agricultural activities which are

conducted at urban suburbs via varied programs

such as Cities Farming for the Future Programme

(RUAF-CFF). The municipality considers that urban

farming can be a good caution against the country’s

future food scarcity problem as well as it can be a

good way to increase tourism in the city through

agro-tourism or recreational agriculture. Second rea-

son, there is also a possibility that the city will not be

able to provide enough comfortable and free envi-

ronment for highly-skilled and highly-educated for-

eigners to live and work; because some problems,

which can not be solved easily in the short-run, exist

in Beijing (for example, urban crowds, unfriendly

local people against foreigners, poor democracy,

human rights and freedom, dust storms coming from

the Gobi Desert). These chronic problems may fail the

government’s highly-skilled foreign labour attraction

policy.

In the context of the Greater Beijing Plan 2004-2020,

the Beijing Municipality takes some measures to

solve urban problems which emerged during the 30-

year globalisation process. First, industrial areas

which are located in inner city areas are moved out of

the city. Second, the current "one centre" layout

model is changed with a "multi-centre" one. Third, a

green belt (western ecological belt) and a develop-

ment belt (eastern development belt) are designed in

the city to stop urban sprawl. Fourth, with regard to

the desertification problem which threats Beijing,

deforestation efforts are carried on regularly to keep

the city green. Fifth, clean drinkable water is brought

from South to the North for Beijingers. Final, to de-

centralize urban population and to ensure regional

spatial development in a balanced way, new satellite

towns are developed in the city. These satellite towns

are planned and designed as sustainable, liveable

and energy-efficient places. Most probably, all these

effective initiatives/applications will reduce the city’s

current urban problems in the future.

The control of Beijing’s property market is shifting

from public sector to private sector, today. Property

prices and rents are increased regularly by property

market players. The municipality is now following

strict policies to reduce property prices and rents (e.g.

purchase quota, property tax, subsidy housing and

financing restriction polices). It should be empha-

sized here that Beijing’s urban land mostly belong to

the municipality as a monopoly. Using this ad-

vantage, the municipality brought a limitation to

land prices. Thanks to these policies and the munici-

pality’s monopoly power, the prices and rents have

been placed partly under control in the city (Beijing

Property Market Watch, July 2011).

The municipality is forced to open more urban lands

for new developments due to the huge need for new

residential and commercial units and to the corrup-

tion factor in the public sector. Year to year, available

urban public land stock is diminishing. Considering

that the national government will carry on deregula-

tions and liberal reforms regarding the country’s

property market in the next years, it should be said

that the monopoly power and authority of the mu-

nicipality over the urban land will be lost gradually in

the future while the power and authority of private

sector on the urban land will be increased. Property

prices and rents will then not be placed under control

easily in the future.

All investors are buying the city’s properties and

lands for commercial purposes, not to build units for

themselves to live and work in. In other words, their



Urban Farming in

the Suburbs

main purpose is to make profit from the

transaction of the city’s commodities in the

short or long run. These investors expect al-

ways an increase on property prices and rents

to gain more profit. It is a possibility that

powerful property market actors will connive

at speculations to grow the Beijing property

market; because they need always commer-

cial actions to survive. Therefore, it is inevita-

ble that property prices and rents will in-

crease gradually in Beijing; so property

booms and busts may emerge in the city’s

property market in the future. Boom and

busts may be seen as a good profit oppor-

tunity for global investors however property

busts are bad for Beijingers who are not homeown-

ers. In line with this, the municipality should work

hard for increasing homeownership in the city before

the property market actors was empowered signifi-

cantly and before they placed the market under their

own control. In this way, Beijingers may be affected

less seriously from future sectorial crisis.

Beijing is opening to the world rapidly and it is devel-

oping into an international cultural centre. A beauti-

ful socio-cultural environment is created which will

attract global visitors into the city. The number of

modern cultural activity areas such as Grand National

Theatre, China Central Television Headquarters, Capi-

tal Museum, National Museum, National Stadium,

National Gymnasium ve National Swimming Centre is

increasing. When the city’s historical city centre

which includes very valuable world heritages like The

Great Wall of China, Forbidden City, Summer Palace

and Temple of Heaven has been renovated, the city

will be a more attractive place for tourists. Foreign

visitors will probably change the socio-cultural struc-

ture of the Beijing society. Increasing interactions

between local people and foreigners will change the

established mind-set of Beijingers, that is ‘us versus

them’. This means that Beijingers will start to show

more interest, amity and respect to other people who

are out of their personal social network.

In conclusion, very successful urban planning policies

and practices have been performed in the city by the

Beijing Municipality recently. If the city governors

embrace a democracy culture, show more respect to

citizens’ human rights and provide freedoms, Beijing

can be a good and an inspiring model for the world’s

other metropolitan cities. I would like to complete

my essay with the words of Confucius: ‘Do not im-

pose on others what you yourself do not desire’.

Notes:

* Fatih Eren is a Doctoral Researcher at the Universi-

ty of Sheffield.

1. Ali, S. and Guo, W., 2005. Determinants of FDI

in China. Journal of Global Business and Tech-

nology, 1(2).

2. Gajwani, K., Kanbur, R. and Zhang, X., Decem-

ber 2006. Comparing the evolution of spatial

inequality in China and India, DSGD Discussion

Paper No.44: International Food Policy Rese-

arch Institute (IFPRI).

3. Mag., W., 2008. Climate Change-the Chinese

Challenge. Science Journal .

4. McKinsey, March 2009. Preparing for China's

urban billion Project,

5. A. W., 2007. In Deep Water: Ecological Destruc-

tion of China’s Water Resources

6. Watch, B. P. M., July 2011. China Property In-

vestment Report, s.l.: My Decker Capital.

7. Xiaohui, Y. et al., 2010. China’s master planning

system in transition: case study of Beijing, 46th

ISOCARP Congress.



Beijing’s Rich Culture

Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin

By Timothy Snyder

The first thing that II World War reminds us is the Nazis brutal actions against

civilians especially to the Jewish community. But Hitler and his ruthless soldiers

were not the only actor that massacred innocent people before and during the II

World War. At this time in order to have a rapid industrialization Stalin forced

millions of people to leave their homes and starve to death. In his historical book

Bloodlands, Timothy Snyder from Yale University evaluates Hitler’s and Stalin’s

inhumane actions in Poland, Ukraine, the Baltic region and Belarus in a compara-

tive way. With examining massacres of two leaders together he gives a different

view for II World War. By doing that he successfully reminds us many innocent

people lost their lives not only by the hand of Nazis but also by the hand of Sovi-

ets.

Russia's Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Fall of the Wall

By Jonathan Haslam

Even though the Cold War was the product of the relations between the two

super powers of the time, we generally read this period within a Western per-

spective. This happens since the Western archives are more robust and open

than the Russian sources. Evaluating the Cold War mostly through Western

sources gives us only one side of the whole story. With his book Russia’s Cold

War, Jonathan Haslam successfully fills this gap and enables us to discover the

dark side of the Cold War. In this book he evaluates the Soviets foreign policy

from establishment of the communist regime to the end of it. By using not only

public records but also the private documents he gives a perfect resource to un-

derstand both Soviet foreign policy and decision making.

RECENT BOOKS


The Unfinished Revolution: Making Sense of the Communist Past in Cen-

tral-Eastern Europe

By James Mark

Historical memory -- both the collective memory of a society and an individual’s

memory -- matters everywhere, but never more so than in communities where

sorting out the past bears directly on navigating a turbulent present. Such has

been the case in the former socialist societies of central and eastern Europe.

Mark systematically explores the past as processed in the present in countries

from the Baltics to Romania. Not surprisingly, in these places the history of the

communist period is mediated by political agendas and individual self-interest.

He focuses on both the macro level (competing political parties, history commis-

sions, institutes of national memory, and physical memorials) and the individual

level (oral histories reconstructed from personal interviews). Both categories are

largely organized around ex-Communists and anticommunists, who, after the

early muddled period of transition, have come to hold very different views of the

fall of communism in 1989.

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/author/timothy-snyder

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/author/jonathan-haslam

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/author/james-mark

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The UN and the Arab-Israeli Conflict

American Hegemony and UN Intervention since 1947

By Danilo Di Mauro

As one of the most controversial and long standing issues, the Arab-Israel conflict

still has high priority in the international agenda. Danilo Di Mauro, in his book

The UN and the Arab-Israel Conflict, evaluates the role of the UN within this im-

portant issue. He uses empirical evidences in a historical perspective and shows

how the UN has intervened this conflict. He successfully demonstrate that the

UN’s role and view had changed in different phases of the conflict. He underlines

that the UN was an instrument of the superpowers to prevent the conflict to

spread through the world.

The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers

By Richard Mcgregor

Even though every day liberal economy expands its borders and weakens

state’s power, there are still countries in which a very strong centralized system

holds the absolute power. China is one and obviously the strongest of these

closed systems. When we consider the economic growth and the political

structure of China, we meet a complicated question that how a single party con-

trols this huge economy. In his book The Party, Richard McGregor answers this

question by demonstrating that the party has a very strict control over three

areas: information, military and the country wide organizations related to the

party.


U nders ta nding Ce ntral A sia

P ol i t ics and C o ntes ted Tr ans for ma tio ns

By Sally N. Cummings

Since Soviet collapse, the independent republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajiki-

stan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have faced tremendous political, economic,

and security challenges. Focusing on these five republics, this textbook analyzes

the contending understandings of the politics of the past, present and future

transformations of Central Asia, including its place in international security and

world politics. Analysing the transformation that independence has brought and

tracing the geography, history, culture, identity, institutions and economics of Cen-

tral Asia, it locates ‘the political’ in the region.

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/author/richard-mcgregor

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