Political Realism and Human Interests

8/14/2019 Political Realism and Human Interests

1/34

Political Realism and Human Interests

Richard K. Ashley

International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2, Symposium in Honor of Hans J. Morgenthau.(Jun., 1981), pp. 204-236.

Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-8833%28198106%2925%3A2%3C204%3APRAHI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-L

International Studies Quarterlyis currently published by The International Studies Association.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available athttp://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtainedprior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content inthe JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained athttp://www.jstor.org/journals/isa.html.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission.

The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academicjournals and scholarly literature from around the world. The Archive is supported by libraries, scholarly societies, publishers,and foundations. It is an initiative of JSTOR, a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community takeadvantage of advances in technology. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

http://www.jstor.orgTue Dec 4 08:42:49 2007
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-8833%28198106%2925%3A2%3C204%3APRAHI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Lhttp://www.jstor.org/about/terms.htmlhttp://www.jstor.org/journals/isa.htmlhttp://www.jstor.org/journals/isa.htmlhttp://www.jstor.org/about/terms.htmlhttp://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-8833%28198106%2925%3A2%3C204%3APRAHI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-L


2/34


3/34

Ashley REALISM H U MA N INTERESTS 2 5pictures are f ar fr om idyllic . They are d raw n, thou gh , wi th s tarkclari ty. The pictures portray a poli t ically fragmented world ofpervasive insecurity, recurring violence, generalized expectationsof war, an d self-animating strategic logic against strategic logic.S o deeply ingrained is the associated H obb esian imagery, in fact ,that on e need no t sk how a realist will res po nd t o recent writingsthat resurrect Kantian themes of emergent holist ic imperativesin a world becom ing one. O ne knows the answ er. Realists willdecry as idealist ic, dangerous, or dangerously idealist ic thosepro gram s an d practices, as adv ocate d by ecological holists an dothers , that would t ranscend the fragmented world of powerpolitics.I t i s therefore som ething of a surprise to read the wo rds of Jo h nHerz, w ho proclaims that he is a realist , on the on e han d, an d w howarmly embraces themes more Kant ian th an Hobb es ian, on theother. Yes, I a m a real is t, H erz says, but I a m a global human ist ,too. Yes, I am a realist , he repeats, but in the face of mountingglobal thre ats that can no t f ind answ ers in th e fragme nted pol it icalord er of th e past , i t is the height of dan gero us idealism t o slavishlyseek guidance in the t im ew orn concepts of yesteryear 's realism.Th e existing givens of political reality hav e ch an ge d, no m atte rhow mu ch on e might wish that they ha d no t ; an d pol i tical real ismis n othin g if i t do es not base i ts argum ents o n the real facts, theexisting givens.

So arguing, Herz advances a posi tion th at dep arts radicallyfrom the imagery we usually associate with realism. He appealsfor a n att i tude of universalism. H e urges the surpassing ofna tion al interests by global interests in wo rld views. H e urgesth at states yield portio ns of their cherished sovereignty to

supranat ional agencies . In a l l of this and more, his argumentbespeaks a holist ic view th at is alm ost the anti thesis of the mo reatomistic world concep t ion o ne associates with realism.

Th e initial sense of surprise m anifests a d eeper dissonance-adiscomfort ing tension born of the fact that Herz 's argumentsstrain one's preu nde rstand ings of polit ical realism as a tradit ion .It is a tension th at can be resolved in ei ther of two ways. O ne wayis simply to deny Herz the s tatus of a tru e realist. W ith Kenn eth


4/34

2 6 I N T ER N A T IO N A L S T U D I E S Q U A R T E R L YTho mp son (1979), we can wonder if Herz has abando ned theessence of political realism. We can call him a plane taryhum anist or an anguished roman ticist. At the very least, wecan point out that Herz's realism is somehow blended with-orcontam inated by-liberal and uto pian ideals, thu s mak ing him avery strange kind of realist.A second way t o resolve the tension has m ore t o com men d it,however. It is to give Herz the benefit of the d o ub t, so to speak ,an d then , once don e, find in H erz's arg um en t a basis for reflectiveexam ination of o ur ow n prior understanding s of realism. Th is Iintend to do.

Herz's present arg um ent, I sub mit, is properly un dersto od onlyin the co ntext of its mak ing. Th e imm ediate context is a dialogueam on g realists, but the broa der con text, reflected an d sometimesdistorted in the dialogue, consists of society as a whole. Withinthis dialogue, Herz's present a rgum ent is only on e statem ent. Likeall such statements, i t contains gaps, and it n o do ub t expressessome misapprehensions abo ut the na ture of the dialogue an d thesocial order in which it occurs. Unlike many such statements,however, Herz 's argu m ent represents a n attem pt, n ot just to saysom ething ab ou t the world out there, bu t to bring th at worldreflectively t o bear right here on realism itself-its conce pts, itsknowledge claims, and even its modes of inquiry and g round ing.In revisiting realism, Herz inten ds to call to consciousness acom mitm ent to hu m an interests underlying realists ' attem pts tobuild knowledge; and, upon that basis, to urge upon realists acritical reexamination of cherished concepts in light of changedconditions. Accordingly, if one is to understand Herz's argu m ent,and especially what it implies for the development of the realisttradition, one must begin with an understanding of the realistdialogue to which it is addressed.In responding to Herz, then, my point of departure is anassessment of t he realist tra dit ion itself. M y assessment doe s no tregard realism as a finished, hom ogen eous tra ditio n d escribablesolely in term s of the essential conc epts an d claim s by which itknows the world. R athe r, apro po s of Herz's argu m ent, I try tolook deeper. I am concerned with the deeper relation between


5/34

A sh le y R E A L I S M , H U M A N I N T E R E S T S 207realist concepts, knowledge claims, and modes of inquiry andgrounding, on the o ne hand , and the world of social act ion tha trealism would inform , o n the other. H ere, at this deeper level, Iwill contend, realist scholarship is very far from being aninternally harmonious tradit ion. At this deeper level, realistscholarship in fact contains some genuine antinomies-somecritical tensions that make realism, at least potentially, a vital,open-ended tradit ion.More specifically, I will try to abstract out two opposedaspects of th e realist dialogue: wh at I shall call practical realisman d tech nical realism. Ea ch implicitly assume s a distinct relationbetween realist knowledge and human interests. Each is alsocom mit ted to a definite and corresponding m ode of inquiry andgrounding in i ts development and validation of concepts andarguments. These opposed aspects, I will argue, appear withvarying degrees of emp hasis am on g realist scholars, bu t they arepresen t in all realist sch olarship. I begin w ith a discussion of theseaspects and the relationship between them.

11 spects o the Realist DialogueIn orde r t o present these two aspects of realist scholarship Iwill rely o n a voca bulary which, al thou gh originating outside ofrealist scholarship, p erm its rem ark ably keen insight into som e ofthe issues raised by Herz. This vocabulary was developed by

Jiirgen H ab er m as (1971, 1975; see also 1974) in his att em pt toidentify some competing general orientations to the relationbetween knowledge, o n the one hand , a nd h um an in teres ts , on theother. H abermas 's a t tem pt in this regard starts fro m a posi tionwith which some realists would agree. Knowledge is not con-stituted objectively. It is no t const itute d as a universe of factswhose lawlike connectio n can be grasped descriptively (Ha ber-mas, 1971: 304). Th e illusion of objectivism m ust be replaced w iththe recognition th at knowledge is always consti tuted in reflectionof interests . The problem for Habermas is how to progress


6/34

2 8 I N T E R N A T I O N A L S T U D I E S Q U A R T E R L Ybeyond this position without reducing the relation betweenknowledge and interests to Mann heimian s implisms (M annh eim,1936).Recogn izing this pro blem , H ab erm as (197 1: 314) has provideda useful set of concep ts. H e has tried to identify thr ee "know ledge-constitutive interests" which, as general cognitive interests,delineate viewpoints from which the constitution of knowledgeis guided. Briefly defined, these are:

(1) The practical cogn itive interest This is a n interest in knowledgeas a basis for furthering mu tual, intersubjective und erstand ing. Itguides knowledge toward the development of "interpretationsthat make possible the orientations of action within commontraditions." The practical cognitive interest is the knowledge-constitutive interest of the historical and cultural sciences.(2) The technical cogn itive interest This is an in terest in knowledgeas a basis for extending control over objects in the subject'senv ironm ent (possibly including strategic dom inanc e over otherhum an beings). It guides knowledge to o btain "inform ation thatexpan ds powers of technical control." Th e technical cognitiveinterest is the knowledge-constitutive interest of the empiricai-analy tic sciences. It finds its forem ost ph ilosophical expressionin positivism (e.g., the Vienna Circle, Carnap, and Nagel) andcritical rationalism (e.g., Pop per, Lakatos, an d Albert). '(3) The emancipatory cognitive interest This is an interest insecuring freedom from "hypostatized forces" and conditions ofdistorted communication (e.g., ideology). It is rooted in thehuman capacities for the communicative exercise of reflective

reason in light of needs, knowledge, and rules; it guides knowl-edge to achieve human autonomy and self-understanding bybringing t o consciousness previously unapprehend ed determinantsof the hu m an species' "self-formative process." Th e emancipa toryinterest is the knowledge-guiding interest of all critically orientedsciences.

1. Ha berm as (197 1: 314). Hab erm as tends t o regard critical rationalism (e.g., Po ppe r)as part of the positivist tradition-something that Po ppe r strenuou sly denies. Whileacknowledging the differences which P op per emp hasizes, I will hereafter refer to criticalrationalism as pa rt of positivism. In this regar d, it is useful to con sult A do rn o et a1 (1969)and the exchange between Hans Albert and Habermas.


7/34

Ashley REA LISM , HUM AN INTER ESTS 209Fo r Ha berm as, these three cognitive interests are interests ofthe hum an species-they ar e a priori interests by which thehuman species organizes its experience. They find their a priori

basis , as interests, in the fact that hum ans a re bo th toolma kingand language-using animals. Humankind has a technical cogni-tive interest-an interest in the crea tion of knowledge enabling con -trol of objectified processes-because hu m an s must produce fro mnatu re what is needed for m aterial existence thr ou gh the manipu-latio n and con tro l of objects (Held 1980: 255; H ab erm as 1971,1975). H um an ki nd ha s a practical cognitive interest-an interestin maintaining communication-because hu m an s mu st com -mun icate with one an oth er throu gh the use of intersubjectivelyund erstoo d symbols within the con text of rule-governed institu-tions (He ld 1980: 255; H ab erm as 1971, 1975). A nd hum an kin dhas a n em anc ipato ry interest-an interest in the unrestrained,com munica tive exercise of reflective reason-because, am idstthe exigencies of man's struggle fo r self-preservation , onlyreflection on the self-formative process of the human speciesencourages consciousness of hitherto u nackno wledge d influenceson humans and thereby makes possible the autonomous, self-consc ious dev elopm en t of life (H ab er m as , 197 1: 21 1).2This vocabulary, together with the associated conceptualiza-tion, is essential to my attem pt t o identify the two m ain aspects ofthe realist dialogue. In particular, I will rely on the first two ofHabermas's three categories to define two aspects: practicalrealism and technical realism.O n the one h and, there is the aspect I am cal ling practicalrealism This is the realism of the H ans M org enth au wh o wri tes ofthe mo ral consensus of balan ce of pow er; wh o says, No studyof politics can be disinterested in the sense that it is abl e todivorce knowledge fro m action ; an d w ho ad op ts the historian's

2. Ha ber ma s (1971: 21 1). Fo r H abe rm as, it is im por tant to note, these three cognitiveinterests , though apprehendable a priori , are accorded a rather problematic quasi-transcenden tal status. For they arise from the actu al structures of hum an life. Inparticular, the emancipatory interest has a derivative status. Unlike the practical andtechnical interests, the e manc ipatory interest entails no immediate, necessary connectionof knowledge to an external interest in its utiliza tion (it is instead reflective reasongrasping its interest in reason); the act ual historical for m in which a n emancipatoryinterest finds expression, if it does, depends upon the stage of development in bothtechnical activity and conditions of symbolic interaction. See Habermas (1975: 176).


8/34

210 I N T E R N A T I O N A L S T U D I E S Q U A R T E R L Ypose in peering over the statesm an's shou lder, listening in o n hisconversations, and an ticipating his thou ghts (M orge ntha u, 1978:224, 23, 5). This asp ect of realism, pr act ical realism, is orie nted bya practical cognitive interest. It sees the aim of knowledge asprincipally the atta inm ent of possible consensus am on g acto rs inthe framework of a self-understanding derived from tradition(Habermas, 1971: 304) . I ts pr imary approach to inquiry andgrounding corresponds to that of the his tor ical and cul turalsciences. As elabora ted below, its a pp roa ch is hermeneutical.O n the other ha nd, there is the aspect I a m cal ling technicalrealism This is the realism of the H an s Mo rge nth au who writesthat politics, like society in gene ral, is governed by objectivelaws ; who aspires to scientific ; wh o invok es a prior theore ticalfram ew ork of interest defined as power ; an d w ho values thisfram ew ork because it imposes intellectual discipline up on theobse rver, infuses ra tion al o rde r into the subject matt er of politics,an d thus makes the theoretical und ersta nd ing of politics possible(Morgenthau 1978: 4-5). Technical realism is oriented by atechnical cognitive interest. It sees the aim of knowledge as thedevelopm ent of information-regarding universal laws an d theiroperation-that can exp and pow ers of technical con trol over a nobjectified environm ent. I ts app roac h to inquiry and g roun ding isreminiscent of positivisitic reconstructions of natural science.As I say, these two aspects, practical realism and technicalrealism, are abstractions. W ith ra re exceptions, it c ann ot be saidthat a given realist scholar wholly expresses one aspect andwholly denies the oth er. M org en tha u, in fact, is exem plary in thisregard, since both aspects appear in his work.Nevertheless, the tw o aspects are oppo sed in m any respects. T osee how this is so, how realists reconcile the tw o aspects, and wh atthis implies for possible developments in the realist dialogue, itis necessary t o look som ew hat m ore closely at these tw o aspects.

A PRACTICAL REALISMIn general, practic al realism stresses the uniquely hu m ancharacter of i ts subject matter. Human beings can converse,


9/34

A sh ley R E A L I S M , H U M A N I N T E R E S T S 2remember, know , expect , and at tac h meaning to themselves andtheir circumstances. Human beings can also miscommunicate,forget , misunderstand, falsely expect , and summon for th for-gotten experiences in ways th at lend novel layers of mea ning toseemingly similar circumstances. Human beings, in short , aresubjectivities.Thus, from the vantage poin t of practical realism, where thereare regularities in life-and where social relations are ordere d an dpredictable-this fact is no t totally reduc ible to th e op era tion ofsome eternal o r natural law. O n the contrar y, a regularized socialorder derives f rom a usual ly protracted and ard uou s (al thoughno t necessarily intentional) struggle to establish an d m aintain aconsensus of co-reflective self-understanding: a tradition.For practical realism, the principal social role of realistscholarship der ives f rom the fact that the t radi t ion that bindsparticipants within a common order is a fragile, often onlyimplicit set of relations. H um an beings are ever prone to forget orrepress aspects of their pasts, to mistake the ephemeral for theeternal, to become caught up in and falsely universalize theexperiences of the m om en t, and th us t o lose sight of (or even d oviolence to) th e co-reflectively sha red n orm s, e xpec tations, rights,and meanings built up under the weight of long-historicalexperience.Given this tendency, the tas k of practical realism is clear. It isalm ost tha t of a n agen t acting on behalf of history-or, rath er, o nbehalf of an historically established tradition. Practical realismstrives to exam ine history, to distil l a n unders tand ing of thepractical consensus, to co m m unic ate this disti lled u nde rstan dingto each and every participant, and thereby to situate all in atranshistorical normative-practical order.Practical realism thus serves a practical cognitive interest(Habermas: 1971 . The a im is to under take in terpre ta tions thatmake possible the orientation of action within a commontrad itio n. In th e practica l realist aspect, valid knowledge entails,not so much a n improved capaci ty to control one s objectenvironment , but an improved capaci ty to be and behave as aworthy member of one s traditio nal com mun ity, with i ts inter-subjective and consensually endorsed norms, r ights, meanings,


10/34

212 I N T E RN A T I O N A L S T U D I E S Q U A RT E RL Ypurposes, and limitations on what the individual participants canbe and might become. Drawing out the nature of such aconsensus-including the langu age an d con cepts in which eventsfind mea ning and validation amo ng the parties-is a n essentialtask with practical import. It is essential to the integration ofsociety, the m aintenance of orde r, the m utuality of interaction,and the avoidance of severe, dislocating social conflict.This understanding of the practical interest of knowledge isclosely coupled with practical realism's approach to inquiry andgrounding. This a pp ro ac h is hermeneu tical. I t is reminiscent, notof natural science, but of the cultural sciences. Equating knowl-edge with understanding, not causal explanation, i ts relevantmetaphor is found in the interpretation of texts.3As in the interp retation of texts, the tas k of the interpreter is tolearn to speak no t just read, the languag e he would interp ret. Th einterpreter must become part of the world of the text-thesubjec t/ object trad ition being interpreted-and m ust learn to seeand generate s tatements about the world as i t does . Theinterpreter must become part of , and make his own, the samestream of life, including tho se indirectly com m unica ted experi-ences that represent the em pirical con text of that w hich the textdoes express. H e m ust strive for a deep, tot al consensus with thetext-thereby to establish genuine und erstan ding an d sharedexpectations as well as common linguistic skills.In so striving, thoug h, the interpreter retains a certain humilityin th e face of the final authority of the text, the traditio n he wouldunderstand . He knows that every interpretat ion has the s tatus of

a n hypothesis to be tested. Every inte rpr eta tion is tested, as itwere, insofar as it generates expectations for practice, includinglanguage, that can be gauged against actual practices in thereferent text. A disap pointm ent of expec tations signals the failureof interpretation and a need, therefore, to carry the dialogueforward in a way informing the interpreter 's own world. Aninterpreter whose expectations are persistently disappointedevidently has n ot becom e pa rt of the world he would interpre t. H ecan not speak its languag e an d would not be regarded as a worthy3 In my discussion of hermeneutics, I rely o n Ha ber ma s (1971, 1975, 1977); see alsoGadamier (1975).


11/34

Ashley REA LISM , HU MA N INTERESTS 213participant within it. Practically speaking, the interpreter wouldbe a failure in the world of the text. Only when the interpreter'sexp ectation s close on actu al practice can it be said-and thenalways provisionally-that the interprete r has succeeded, tha t theinterpreter has become a successful, suitable inhabitant of theworld of the subject /object text.F or practical realism, the pred om inan t approach-the con-sciously invok ed m eth od , if you will-is fo un d in just thishermeneutic att i tude. M orgenthau refers to this approach whenhe says that we

retrace and anticipate, as it were, the steps a statesman-past,present, or future-has tak en or will tak e o n the political scene.We lo ok over his shoulder w hen he w rites his dispatch es; we listenin on his conversations with other statesmen; we read andanticipate his very thoughts [Morgenthau, 1978: 51Being practical in intent and hermeneutic in approach, prac-tical realism is not and cannot be phrased in terms of anotherlanguage outside the realm of its text-analogue, the world of

traditional statesmanship. Practical realism does not have therelation to its text-the world of statesmanship-that na tura lscientif ic theory has to i ts object nature. I t cannot be tostatesmansh ip as a metalangu age (a n empirical content-free set ofrules of constitution) is to ordinary language (itself intertwinedwith, and at once reflecting and expressing, the real stuff ofexperience). Rather, for practical realism, explicans and expl icandum are of the same language system, and practical realismmu st express its concep ts, norm s, and knowledge claims in termsof the very language it interprets.I t follows that the terms and knowledge claims of practicalrealism m ust be meaningful and w arranted within the subjectivityof the object text itself, th at is, within the trad itio na l com mu nityof statesme n. If prop osed term s, concepts, an d knowledge claimsare not w arra nte d an d meaningful within just this frame-if theyar e not meaningful to statesmen-then they have no place inpractical realism. Obviously, they would express no aspect of anexisting or possible consensus among statesmen themselves.


12/34

214 I N T E R N A T I O N A L S T U D I E S Q U A R T E R L YIndeed, a t tempts to impose such al ien terms from one or an othe rf lank would threaten to overload or disrupt w hatever consensus ispossible within the existing language of traditiona l experience. Inorder to be adm itted a s terms o r statements of practical realism,such alien terms must f irst be shown to be meaningful andwarranted within the text, within the classical diplomatic lan-guage of traditional statesmanship.If this helps to explain why Politics m on g Nations is stillmust reading am on g foreign service officers, it also helps t oaccount for realists' att i tud es tow ard the operationalization ofconcepts, including their insistence up on the au ton om y of thepolit ical sphere. Rega rding concep ts of pow er an d natio nalinterest , for exam ple, realists would remind us tha t n o fixed,once-and-for-all operational definition is possible. The specificrecognized contents of these terms a t any m om ent depend up onthe polit ical and cultural environm ents, the polit ical andcultural context within which foreign policy is formulated(M orge ntha u 1978: 9). Th e tradition al com mun ity of statesmen isresponsible for supplying the specific empirical contents t o theseterms. It will do s o in a way reflecting the inte rna l history of thecom mu nity an d its internalized con text, no t som e set of laws andoperat ions external to and unrecognized by this community.Within the hermeneutic circle of practical realism, the intersub-jectivity of the traditional community of statesmen is the onlypossible standard of i tself . Read onto this world, the languagean d norm s of othe r traditions-say, econom ics, religion, law, orpositivistic so cial science-are me aningles s o r w orse unless theycan be rewritten, justified within, an d hence sub ordin ated t o thelanguage of the traditional community of statesmen.All of this suggests that p ractical realism does obey a system a-tically describable, internally consistent logic of development-aherme neutic logic articulated w ith a practical cognitive interest.None of this suggests, however, that the practical aspect ofrealism stands alone. Undiscussed in my description of thepractical aspect are many of the issues tha t on e would ex pect tosee raised in any reasonably complete description of politicalrealism. How, in the first place, do realists identify the true


13/34

A shley R E A L I S M , H U M A N I N T E R E S T S 2 5t radi t ion of s tatesman ship, as opposed to external practices, thatmerit their hermeneutic app roa ch to understanding? Ho w is thepolit ical sphere set off fro m other spheres? An d how d o realistsreconcile a pra ctical interest in intersubjective und erstan ding , onthe o ne ha nd , with the m utually objectifying instrumentalism ofpower polit ics, o n the other? These questions begin to findanswers in technical realism.

B TECHNIC L RE LISMAll realists a re technical realists, at least in pa rt, but it is in the

so-called mo dern realism of Ke nne th W altz th at technicalrealism finds its starkest approval. Waltz's position in realistscholarship is extreme. H e is first , fore m ost, and only a technicalrealist. H e is a scientific realist strip ped of all pra ctic alpretensions. As su ch , his w ork , especially his Th eo ry of irnternational Politics (1979), performs a valuable service for mypurposes. His work lays bare the cognitive interest and theassocia ted approach to inqui ry and grounding that are thehallmarks of the technical aspect of all realist scholarship.4Specifically, W altz spea ks fo r the technical aspect of all realistscholarship when he says that the unders tanding of theory doesnot accord with usage in much of traditional polit ical theory,which is concerned more with philosophical interpretation thanwith theor etical exp lanation (1979: 6). Theory is given adefinition corre spo ndin g to positivistic understandings of theoryin the natural sciences. A theory is understood to be a set ofstatements em bodying assumptions a nd explaining laws, wherelaws are repeatedly observed relations between variables of anobjectified reality. As Waltz (1979: 9-10) puts it:

By a theory the significance of the observed is made manifest. Atheory arranges phenomena so that they are seen as mutuallydependent; it connects otherwise disparate facts: it shows howchanges in some phenomena necessarily entail changes in others.4. In drawing upon Waltz, I almost totally ignore his theory per se, con centra tinginstead on his understanding of what theory is, how it is constructed, and its redeemingsocial utility. On Waltz's theory, see Ashley (1980b).


14/34

216 I N TE R N A T IO N A L S T U D I E S Q U A R T E R L YThe words recall Morgenthau's (1978: 3) claim that a theorybrings order an d m eaning to a mass of phen om ena whichwithout it would remain disconnected and unintelligible.

As Waltz also makes clear, theory in this sense does not arisethro ug h a one-sided process of induc tion fr om facts or everydaypractice. Th ere is no expe ctation th at theo retical knowledge willnecessarily find expression n reality-in so m e alrea dy existingtradition, for example. Rather, theory is seen to exist ( inPo pp erian language) in an oth er world (Po pp er, 1972), a worlddistinct fro m the reality it explains. Th eory is detached fro mpractice and cannot be made identical to i t . Nor can theory be

reduced to the language of practice, for, as Waltz (1979: 7, 11)stresses, theoretical notions have no meaning outside of thetheory in which they appear. M org ent hau (1978: 8) would haveagreed. It is n o argu m ent against the theo ry presented here, hewrote, that actu al foreign policy ca nn ot live up to it.Ho w, then, is theory generated? O n this question m ost realistsare vague. Waltz shows us why: Within the technical aspect ofrealism, as in positivist reconstructions of science, the back-gro un d intersubjective understand ings th at go into the makin g oftheory are not to be systematically interpreted or criticized. Theposition is reminiscent of Karl Popper's (1935) fas cin atio n withbold conjectures. How are [theories] made? Waltz asks . Crea-tively, he answ ers. Th e con struc tion of a theo ry comes only whena brilliant in tuition flashes, a creative idea emerges. I t is all verymysterious. One can not say how the intui t ion comes an d howthe idea is born (W altz, 1979: 9).

Indeed , on e is no t even allowed to ask. The subjective processof theo ry constru ction , rendered my sterious, is bracketed a n d setbeyond the scope of rational inquiry and crit icism. There is noallowance for questioning the back groun d intersubjective under-standings th at perm it the theorist to arrive at just this brilliantintuition, the back groun d language of experience thro ug h whichhis creative idea is com mu nicable to others, or the back groun dintersubjective understand ings that permit the theorist an d othersto agree o n the facts in need of explaining. N or is there allowan cefor questioning the dependence of these background under-


15/34

A sh le y R E A L I S M , H U M A N I N T E R E S T S 2 7standings on evolving historical conditions tha t might be beyondthe fra m e of consciousn ess. The theo ry, if it is to be regarded asanything more than the personally meaningful nonsense of alunatic, depends upon such intersubjective preunderstandings.Yet as Waltz's w ork so clearly illustrates, realists disallow criticalinterpretations of these intersubjective processes even as theydepend upon them.This bracketing, which secures the technical-theoretical basisof realist sch olarsh ip against system atic interpre tive criticism, isaffected in several ways. Perhaps the foremost way, mostprono unce d in Morge nthau's w ork but abse nt from W altz's , is toinvoke a metaphysical system as an unassailable defense oftheory. Thus, the Niebuhrian metaphysics of fallen man-manwith a will-to-powerw-enters realism , not as the necessarykernel of theory, bu t as a n hypostatized defense for the assertiontha t the struggle for power is universal in t ime an d space a nd isa n und enia ble fact of experience, (N iebu hr, 1940, 1953; M or-genthau, 1978: 36). As Morgenthau well recognized, however,this me taphysical d efense is not a rational defense of theo ry. I t isantirationalistic.Th e rationa l justification of technical realism's theo ry, asWaltz stresses, is found in terms of its usefulness. Here, though,usefulness does not refer to a theory's capacity to sustain apractical consensus of mutual understanding. Instead, the use-fulness of the ore tical exp lana tion resides in its capacities to orientpurposive rational attempts to exert control over an objectifiedreality. W altz (1979: 6) is very straig htforw ard o n the point. Theurge to explain, he says, is no t bor n of idle curiosity alon e. It isproduced also by the desire to control, or at least to know ifcontrol is possible.A theory , W altz indicates, goes beyon d knowledge of theregularity of associations e m bo died in laws. A theory tells uswhy a particular association holds so th at we might be inform edas to whether we can exercise co ntro l an d how we might goab ou t doing so. P u t differently, a theory provides an explan a-tion of relations between me ans an d end s an d thereby fulfills thepurposive-rational interest in behaving efficiently in working


16/34

218 I N T E RN A T I O N A L S T U D I E S Q U A R T E R L Ywith [objective] forces, no t again st them, to use M orge nthau 's(1978: 3) wor ds. H ere in is tech nical realism's ra tio na l justificationof theory: a purposive-rational justification. Herein, also, is itsknowledge-constitutive interest: a technical cognitive interestAs lon g as theo ry dem onstrab ly serves this technical cognitiveinterest, it is considered valid f ro m the van tage p oin t of technicalrealism. T he q uestion then becomes: H ow c an a theory's util ity asa n instrum ent fo r ap pre he nd ing reality be tested? The test bywhich a theory may be judged, according to M orge ntha u (1978:3), is not a priori an d abstract but emp irical and pragmatic. Atheory must meet a dua l test , a n emp irical and logical one :

Do the facts as they actually are lend themselves to the interpreta-tion the theory has put upon them , and do conclusions at whichthe theory arrives follow with logical necessity from its premises?In short, is the theory consistent with the facts and within itself?Waltz accords with this view, sharpens it, and draws out itsdistinctively positivistic ch ar ac te r. As W altz (1979: 13- 16) unde r-

stands the testing of theory, it involves the logical deduction oftestable hypotheses and the subjecting of these hyp otheses to avariety of distinct and demanding experimental and observa-tional tests under conditions where perturbing variables can becontrolled or eliminated.5 For Waltz, as for Morgenthau, thetesting of theory is a ma tter of imitating control op eratio ns andobserving results: Th e theory shou ld be a logical system that cangenerate reliable expectations as t o the results of certain co ntroloperations; accordingly, t o the extent th at the theory's expecta-tions co rrespo nd with actu al historical results where the con tro lconditions con tem plated by the theory obta in, the theory is saidto f ind corroborat ion. T o the extent that expectat ions generatedby theory do not correspond with actual historical results , thetheory's wo rth as a n hypostatized basis for the exercise of controlover a n objectified reality is called in to qu estion. If it flunk s thequality con trol tests, then it is a n inad equ ate an d unreliable

5. Waltz (1979: 13-16). Waltz l ter considers other possible tests: confirmatory testsand comparisons cross similarly and differently structured domains.


17/34

A sh le y R E A L I S M , H U M A N I N T E R E S T S 2 9instrument, an d it is said to be falsified-presuming of course thata more reliable instrument is available.The theory itself is expressed in different ways by differentrealists. But at base, I think, there is a co m m on kernel t o allrealist form ulations. Crudely sum marized, the kernel may be saidto s t a r t f rom an impossibility theorem, which all realists take tobe ax iom atic and therefore in need of no defense: There exists noactual or im m an en t universal consensus that will or can o r a longtime satisfy th e real and em erging wants an d needs of all statesand peoples. In m ore M orgenthau ian (1978: 179) language, theworld is seen to be made up of a multiplicity of units whoseinterests are antagonistically poised, with the result that universalm ora l principles can never be fully realized in practice. F ro m thisimpossibility theorem all else follows :

From it follows the expectation that policies, practices, andmovem ents aim ing or tending to w ard the universal realization ofsome particular norms or interests must at some point reach athreshold beyond which the satisfaction of some participants'wants and needs comes only at the expense of others.From this, in turn, follows the expectation that when programsand practices reach beyond this threshold, participants can nolonger comm unicatively interact to serve their mu tual needs andwants, but can only act o n an d use one anothe r as m ere things to bemanipulated, controlled, deflected, or balanced.F ro m this follows the expectation tha t intern ational relations isinherently a competitive realm, w ith com petition centering, not onabso lute ends, but o n relative means-on the instrum ents andagencies of mutual control. Competition over means is, so tospeak, the m ain anim ating force of inter natio nal political develop-ment. Although som e states and statesmen might fail to enter therace, they are destined to soo ner or later fall by the wayside ofhistory.F ro m this, finally, follows the belief th at pow er is an interest, atonce basic, universal, and historically unsurpas sable. Inesc apably,whether they acknowledge it or not, all states and statesmen-indeed, all people-are pote ntially the objects of pow er. As theyare, they have an objectively necessary interest in powe r. Intere st,necessity, and power are soldered into one: raison d ktat.


18/34

22 INTERNATIONAL STUD IES QUARTERLY

This, I think , is a fair ren diti on of the techn ical realist theorykernel. Up on it , all other facets of theory are built. Attempts toassay the elements of natio nal power, atte m pts to identify theinevitable laws of balance of power, an d atte m pts to deduce theexpected consequences of various control operations, such asdivide an d rulev-all build up on the theory kernel.Theory formulated in technical realism thus concerns itselfwith the category of objective necessity, not the more subjectivecategories of contingency and choice, norms, and values. Tech-nical realism does no t assert, however, th at intern ation al politicscan be fully accounted for in terms of objective laws. As

M org enth au (1978: xi) wrote, No thing I have read or learned inrecent years has dissuaded me from my conviction that thetheoretical un dersta ndin g of intern ation al politics is possible onlywithin relatively na rrow limits. W altz (1979: 68) puts it in mo repro saic terms: The behavior of states an d statesmen isindeterminate. Technical realist theo ry thu s does not try topredict, nor to explain, the policies and behaviors of individualstates and statesmen. It concerns itself, instead, with generaltendencies and potentialities and the likelihoods of differentsystemic outcomes under various conditions. That is why, asW altz indicates, technical realist theory is ha rd to test. B ut tha t isalso why technical realism leaves room for practical realism.The point to be stressed, though, is that technical realism'scognitive interest, its associated methodology of inquiry andgrounding, and the theory it produces and validates are all incom plete ac cord . A s to its technical cognitive interest, technicalrealism:

-would constitute knowledge in order to exp and powers oftechnical co ntro l over a n objectified reality.-would conceive of intern ation al politics in term s of som e fixedstru ctur e of being which channels objective forces and constrainsoutcomes attending alternative programs, policies, and designs.-would gauge knowledge in terms of a purpo sive-rational criterion:

the enhancement of the efficiency of means.


19/34

A sh le y R E A L I S M , H U M A N I N T E R E S T S 22

As to its approach to inquiry and grounding, technical realism:-would bracket an d set aside question s of ascertaining truth and

falsity of knowledge claims and concep ts, emp hasizing instead thegauging of a theory's adequ acy as an hypostatized basis for con troloperations . (As Waltz (1979: 117) phrases the m atter: Onecan no t legitimately ask if [theoretical] assum ptions a re true or false,but only if they are useful. )

-would treat as mysterious-and suspe nd beyo nd the reach ofcritical interpretation-the (historically dep end ent) intersubjectiveunderstandings that allow the theorist to conceive of the worldjust so.-would test and validate theory throug h the imitation of con troloperations on historical experience.

As to its theory, technical realism produces a theory wherein:-participants' interests are best defined in term s of the categ ory ofobjective necessity.-participants d o no t reflect on ultimate or universal values ornorms-or on the historical contingency of their wa nts andneeds-but instead concen trate on the efficiency of m eans ofcontrol .-participants m easu re success by the success of co nt ro l ope ration sover an objectified reality.

Now here m ore clearly t ha n in technical realism is the un derlyingidentity or raison d'e'tat and raison de science positive displayed.

C. T H E R E L A T IO N B E T W E E N T E C H N I C A LR E A L IS M A N D P R A C T IC A L R E A L I S MBy now it should be clear that the two abstracted aspects aresharply opposed. Practical realism's approach is interpretive. Apractical tradition of statesm en is the real subject who se language

of experience the interpreter tries to make his own. Technical


20/34

222 I N T E R N A T I O N A L STUDIES Q U A R T E R L Yrealism, by contra st, is positivistic. Th eory captures objectiveforces that exist beyond history, an d statesm en within history areamong the objects of those forces. Clearly, neither of the twoaspects can fully do m inate realist scholarship withou t denying aplace to the other. Yet each is a part of realism. How is thisopposition reconciled?So m e hints as to the answer to this question have already beenprovided. F or one thing, technical realism assumes that interna-tiona l political behavior is inde term inate. Alth ou gh the objectiveforces an d tendencies disclosed in technical-realist theo ry na rrowthe latitude of effective action and limit the consequencesattending policies and practices, they are not understood toexactly determine behavior or the immediate motives andsubjective understanding s behind behavio r. As a result, one maysay that th ere is room for practical a ction: Practical realism ha spart ial autonomy.For another thing, technical realism, with its positivisiticinclinations, puts itself outside of the hermeneutic circle ofpractical realism. A s I have ind icat ed , techn ical realism disallowsinterpretation of the intersubjective preund erstandings a n d lan-guage of experience by which technical realism ( I ) recognizesintersubjectively accessible facts and lawful regularities, (2)intuits concepts capab le of organizing this intersubjectivelyaccessible experience, and then 3) communicates its concepts,explanations, and associated m eanings. I n so doing, it establishestechnical realism s tota l au ton om y of practical herm eneutics.Still, a m ore definite statemen t o n the relationship between thetwo aspects is required. Ideally such a statement would bebuttressed by a substantial review of realist literatures tocorroborate and illustrate the relationship proposed. Here,tho ug h, I ca n only propo se a relationship and assert th at a carefulreading of realist writings6 wou ld substa ntiate my p rop ositio ns.The relationship I propose has two parts.

6. See, for example, Aron (1966), C a r r (1946), Kennan (1966), Kissinger (1964),Morgenthau (1978), Schuman (1969), Wight (1946), and Wolfers (1962).


21/34

A sh le y R E A L I S M , H U M A N I N T E R E S T S 3F i r st , t h e t h e o r y p r o d u c e d b y t e c h n i c a l re a li sm c o n s t ra i n s

p ra c t i c a l r e a li s m by i de n ti fy ing t h e t rue t r a d i t ion w o r t hy o fi n t e rp r e t a ti o n a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g . I n p a r ti c ul a r:

Technical realism's theory orients practical realism to regard aspart of the 'true trad ition' th ose states, statesm en, an d policies tha trecognize the limits of any universal consensus, that are conse-quently co nscious of their own a nd others' interests in power, andthat therefore seek to establish m utual und erstanding respectingthe limits beyond which man becomes the mere object of ma n. S ooriente d, practical realism regard s participants in this true tradi-tion-for exam ple, M etternich fo r Kissinger (1964) an d Ha y forKennan (1957)-as the real subjects whose actions are to beinterpre ted, with whom the realist can 'converse,' an d from w homthe realist can learn.

A m o n g par t i c ipa n t s in th i s t rue t rad i tion9 ' - tha t is , a s pa r t i c i-pa n t s i n t h i s t rue t r a d i t ion r e l a t e t o on e a no t he r-pow e r c a n ber e g ar d ed a s pr ctic l m a t t e r :

Am ong participan ts in the 'true tradition' power is not reducible toa m atter of mutually directed instrume ntal action. It is instead anessential part of the practical language of experience by whichparticipa nts sustain consciousness of their mu tua l dependence ona common order (such as Morgenthau's notion of the 'moralconsensus' of balance of power). Among participants, powerbecomes a m atter of instrum ental actio n (such as threats of forceand use of force) only insofar as its limited exercise is sometimesnecessary to clarify empirically strengths of commitment, in-terests, and relative capabilities that cannot be consensuallyascertained through verbal interaction alone; but even here, theinstrumental use of power, one participant against another, isessentially a communicative enterprise intended to adjust orclarify, not overturn, the intersubjective consensual understand-ing by which the 'true tradition' sustains its common order.H ow e ve r , i t mus t be s t r es s e d t h a t pow e r is a p r a c ti c a l m a t t e r

a m o n g p a r t ic i p a n ts i n t h e t r u e t r a d it i o n o n l y b e c a u s e t h eyc o m m o n l y r e co g n iz e t h e i r s h a r e d i nt er e st i n u si n g p o w e r t oi n s t rume n t a l l y r e s t r a i n o r r e p re s s p ro g ra m s , p r a c t ic e s , a n d


22/34

224 I N T E R N A T I O N A L S T U D I E S Q U A R T E R L Ymove men t s t ha t be t ray , a re ou t s ide o f, bu t i n an y case t h rea t enthe t rue t rad i t ion . T ha t is to say , t echnica l rea lism 's the ory no tonly identi f ies the t rue t radi t ion of pract ical real ism but alsodis tinguishes it f r o m i ts opposi te:

Statesmen, policies, movements, and developments which striveor tend toward some universal consensus surpassing powerpolitics are understood to e outside of and in opposition to the'true tradition.' As such, they are regarded a s o jectvied 'forces' or'tendencies' which (like nineteenth century German nationalismfor both Metternich and Kissinger) cannot be understood orinterpreted but which nonetheless threaten the one true order ofthe 'true tradition.' They are regarded as objective forces ortendencies tha t can only be checked, deflected, or pitted one againstthe o ther throu gh the coordinated instrum ental actions of the 'truetradition.'

This , then , i s the f ir s t par t o f the re la t ionship between the tw oaspects . Technical real is t theory constrains pract ical real ism by(1) ident ifying a t rue tradi t ion fo r wh ich pow er is a pract icalm a t t e r a n d (2) dis t inguishing i t f rom opposing universal is t icdes igns , movem ents , o r tendencies w hich ar e t ak en to representobjec ti fi ed a n d threa ten in g ex ternali t ies .

Th e second pa r t o f the re la t ionship is th i s. As c i rcumscr ibed bythe hypostat ized prior theory of technical real ism, the her-men eut ic ci rcle of pract ical real ism can only conf i rm , bu t nevercall in to q ues t ion , the p ract ical jus t i f icat ion of the theo ry i tsel f: atheory that ident i f ies interes t and power. Specif ical ly:

The theory constrains practical realist hermeneutics such thatprogram s, practices, conditions, and movem ents tha t aim towardor imply a possible universal consensus cannot call into questionthe theory that presupposes the impossibility of such a consensus.It does so by constraining practical realism to regard suchpractices and developments (1) as beyond the pa le of hermeneuticunderstanding, (2) as objectified and irratio nal forces and tenden-cies that threaten to shatter or overwhelm the one true order ofthe 'true tradition,' and hence, 3) as forces and tendencieswhich participants in the 'true tradition' have an urgent, comm on,and practical interest in collectively recognizing and restrainingthrough the coordinated use of power.


23/34

Ashley R E A L IS M H U M A N I N T ER E S T S 225In short, thanks to the constraint imposed by prior technicaltheory, the very empirical developments that might seem toinvalidate the theory's essential impossibility theorem are re-corded in practical realism as threatening developments thatjustify the imm ediate practical relevance of the theory built up onthat theorem.Taken together, these two parts come to one point: technicalrealism provides th e au ton om ou s scientific-technological base ofrealism's partially autonomous practical superstructure. Thetechnical base, oriented by a technical cognitive interest in contr ol,remains auto no m ou s and im mu ne to criticism in light of practicaldevelopments as long as those who would and can exert controlfind guidance in the theo ry th at the base provides. As long as atleast some powers find guidance in the theory, grasp objectiveforces identified in it, a nd , wielding these forces, bend o thers tothe system within which th eir o wn success is assur ed, the technicalthe ore tica l base of realism prov es itself in its ow n terms. A nd it ismade all the m ore secure in that p ractical realism, co nstrained bythe theory , works tow ard the universalization of a superstructuraltrue traditio n in which ( I ) the questioning of the base isdisallowed, and (2) opposing programs, developments, an d no r-ma tive systems-those th at imply the possibility of a universalconsensus surpa ssing power politics-are themselves regarded asirrational objects of power.This, in very stylized form, is the realist dialogue, a kind ofdialogue that is echoed in many a m ale-dom inant marriage. Theworking male, the technical side, is ever do m ina nt an d operatesin the realm of necessity. Th e depen den t female, the practicalside, is asked to m aintain an d adju st the intersubjective under-standings, values, and ethics of the whole family in accord withthe demand s and op portunities emerging from the man's world.S o ad justed, she an d the wh ole family are likely t o join with themale in regarding the world in a man ner consistent with the male'snecessities of finding em plo ym en t, pleasing his boss, com pe tingwith other employees, advancin g a career, and s o on . Seldom , ifever, does she da re to criticize o r advise the m an on his condu ct inthe ou tside world. A nd on those rare occassions when the femalebecomes conscious of and complains about the limits of her and


24/34

6 INTERNATIONAL STUDIE S QUARTERLYthe family's existence imp osed by the do m in an t male-when shebecomes aw are of an d com plains a bo ut opp ortuni t ies forgone, acareer unfulfilled, friends left be hind, an d children ignored-sheknows w hat answ er she will hear. "Be rationa l, wo m an Don't beso idealistic. Mine is the w orld of necessity. Sh oul d I ch ang e myways, our whole world would tumble down."

III. John Herz s ContributionEnter J o h n Herz, who brings som ething novel to the dialoguejust described. In reading Herz's substantial writ ings producedover nearly fo ur decades-from his splendid Political Realismand Political Idealism through his bet ter known International

Politics in the A tom ic Ag e to his most recent writings-onediscovers a strong thread of continuity. It is not, to be sure, athread reflecting a subl ime certainty a bo ut so m e anchoring kernelof realist tru th. Instead, the thread is fou nd in Herz's commend abledetermination to anchor realism, above all , in reflective reason(Herz, 1951, 1959, 1976).T he essence of Herz's uniqu e app ro ac h to realism is fou nd in acritical tension that he associates with the essence of man as asocial being. It is an antinomy (somewhat reminiscent of an"idealized" Fr eu d) between ego and com m unity, power a nd pity.I t is a n ant inom y between the social ly s i tuated urge to c ontro l andsu bo rdi na te one's enviro nm ent, possibly including other people,on the one hand, and the urge to submerge and find the largermeaning of oneself in one's environment and one's community,o n the oth er. It is an an tino m y between "parts" an d "wholes"-between th e particular subject wh o would m ak e the whole worldthe object of his interests an d the in dividu al whose interests,beliefs, an d se lf-unders tandings a re inescapab ly the objects of theworld in which he acts (see especially Herz, 1951).Exactly this antino my anim ates Herz's writings. I n his view,the contradiction is to be found "out there" in the reali ty thatrealists would study. The tensions he envisions between thecitizen and the "rational" state or between "national interests"an d "global interests" are cases in point . Im porta nt ly , thou gh,


25/34

Ashley / R E A L I SM , H U M A N I N T E R ES T S 7Herz also sees the con tradictio n right here, as the org an on ofreason in realist scholarship. Even as realists would seek tocapture a n object reality in their con cepts an d knowledgeclaims to aid in control l ing an environment or sustaining apractical co nsen sus, realists have a n interest in reflective reasonfor its ow n sa ke. R ealism m ust ever see itself, its conce pts, an d itsclaims as at least poten tially the captive objects of som e real an devolving conditions yet to be understood.T he distinguishing fe atu re of Herz's realism, the n, is th e dept hof his commitment to an em ncip tory cognit ive interest asdefined above: An interest in securing freedom fr om u nackno wl-edged constraints, relations of domination, and conditions ofdistorted comm unicat ion and unders tanding that deny hum ansthe capacity to make their future through full will and con-sciousness. Herz's, in s ho rt , is an interest in reason as such. I t is aninterest in exercising reflective reason to dissolve limits on theself-conscious deve lopm ent of life an d thereby resto re to m en andwomen a true awareness of their place in history and theircapacit ies t o ma ke the future.Accordingly, while Herz can recognize that knowledge has abasis in interests, he ca nno t accord final, unc onte stab le validity tonorm s, conce pts, an d know ledge claims solely because they serve(or are consistent with) the practical and technical interests inunderstanding and control that society consciously recognizesan d endo rses. Fo r He rz, neither the technical-strategic interest inmastering a n objectified environment nor the practical interest insustaining consensual order is a sufficient interest basis for thejustification of know ledge. Neither is sufficient because neitherresponds to the hum an interest in auton om y, and nei ther makesuse of the essential hu m an cap acity by which au ton om y may beachiev ed: self-reflection. Both leave unqu estioned -and beyo ndthe force of reason-those yet to be ap pre he nd ed historica lprocesses that sha pe participants' self-un derstan dings , includingtheir understandings of the immediate interests they call uponknowledge t o serve.This position o n Herz's pa rt is w ha t dictates his hab it ofquestioning assu m ption s, of reexam ining periodically ideasand concepts. S o habi tuated, H erz understan ds that being a


26/34

228 I N T E R N A T I O N A L S T U D I E S Q U A R T E R L Ycommitted realist means being a critical nonrealist at the sametime. In a dvanc ing realist norm s, concepts , and argum ents , Herzsenses, one must also step outside of realism to exam inecritically th e possibly cha ng ing cond itions-the politicom ilitary,technological, social, en viro nm en tal conditions-amidst whichrealist norms are worthy (or not), realist concepts are valid (ornot), and realist arguments are warranted (or not).Thus, Herz has contr ibuted what have become some of themost central concepts of realist scholarship: the concepts of thesecurity dilemma and impenetrabili ty, to nam e two. But thusalso, Herz insists th at these and othe r realist concepts cann ot beviewed as both parent and child of themselves. They cannotfinally validate themselves. Instead, one must persistently andsystematically examine the implications of technological, social,an d eco nom ic change, n ot just for state-to-state relations per se,but also for the validity of the very concepts framing realists 'views of th e wor ld. Herz's whole career-especially in itsemp hasis on the implications of the evolving means of destruc-tion''-attests to th e seriousness he attach es t o this imp erative(Herz 1959, 1976).As Herz's emancipatory interest in reason leads him evertow ard a reflective pose, however, he is exposed t o the charge tha the moves on a p ath tow ard a kind of idealism. It is no t, to be sure,the idealism of Ang lo-A merican legalists an d moralists. It is akind of idealism having a deeper l ineage traceable to GermanIdealism, p erhaps Hegel mo re th an K an t. I t is a kind of idealismthat strains always fo r the u ltimate, th e absolu te, the universallygood and true. As a result ( to assemble an d app ly some familiarcriticisms again st this form of idealism), H erz ca n be charge d withleaping to an abstract plane of argume nt that ( I ) is no longerintegrated into history (Ho rkhe ime r, 1974);(2) is dep rived of th ecritical, falsifying force of conventionally endorsed sense-basedevidence (Popper, 1961); 3) is detached fro m sensuous hum anactivity (M ar x , 1970); (4) denies itself all pra ctical relevance,becoming method as impotence (Perry An derso n, 1976); and(5) becomes a da nge rous , uncorrectable force when, up on finallyclosing up on the absolute, it reasserts itself o n the plane ofpractical activity (Po ppe r, 1961; M orge ntha u, 1978; C ar r, 1946;Marx, 1970).


27/34

A sh le y R E A L I S M , H U M A N I N T E R E S T S 229T o exa min e closely Herz's present piece is t o see th a t he is no tunaware of such possible criticisms. He is conscious of thedangers associated w ith the position he is taking. R ath er th anretreat in the face of these dangers, though, Herz tr ies todialectically transcend them. Far from ascending to a world ofpure reason, leaving the practical and technical interests ofrealism behind, Herz tries to dialectically recombine theseinterests and the associated approac hes to inquiry and ground ingin a way that wou ld ca rry the realist dialogue forw ard in response

to historical change.His discursive strategy in this regard is, I think , noth ing shortof brilliant.' It is a two-sided stra teg y, eac h side dire cted aga ins tone of realism's tw o aspects. Firs t, He rz tries to shift th e plane ofgrou ndin g fo r practical realist hermeneutics away from a tradi-tion al consensus of statesmanship-a true tradition with itsassociated concepts embodied in the now globalized facticity ofstate, nation, an d n ationa l interestw-and tow ard a n antici-pated universal consensus that is realizable in principle-aconsensus that f inds i ts justif ication, above all , through unre-strained reason. Although his intent in this respect may not beimm ediately ap pa ren t, this side of Herz's strategy is implicit in hisattempt to demonstrate that realist concepts f ind differentmeanings as viewed from different historical, political, andeconom ic vantage p oints. M uc h of the wo rld, he is saying, stan dsoutsid e of an d actively que stions the true tradition of practica lrealist hermen eutics. H ow can this be so? H ow , he asks, can werealists rationally defend a nd justify ou r tradition al concepts an dclaims to a world that daily attests to their lack of universalmeaning?Suc h a justif ication, Herz know s, cann ot be presented in termsof the trad ition al langu age of experience of the true tradition ,for t he lang uage itself is in que stion. T o justify rationa lly theirtraditional concepts and claims, realists must appeal to experi-

7. In my opinion, Herz 's two-part s t rategy, tho ugh bri l l iant in concep tion, is not aswell executed as i t might be. In part this is because Herz 's present argument is quasi-auto biog raph ical, no t a systematic critique of realism, its limita tions, and its potentialities.My own arguments in Sect ion I1 have been meant to provide this kind of systematictreatment against which the signif icance of Herz 's s tatements should become clear . Inlarger part , though, the problem is that the thorough execution of Herz 's s t rategy issomethin g tha t n o single article can be ex pected to accom plish. See especial ly f ootn ote 8,below.


28/34


29/34

A shley R E A L I S M , H U M A N I N T E R E S T S 231benefit in every o ther way fro m the protracted polit ical fragmen-tation of the world. When the survival of the human species isseen to be at stake, even those whose first concern is to maintaincon trol over oth ers might be willing to adm it a need to get con trolof themselves. Even they would want to widen the hermeneuticcircle of practical realism to embrace the whole of internationalsociety. An d even they might hope th at in the exp and ed dialogue,technical realism and its impossibility theorem would be provenwrong.8T ak en together, the two sides of this discursive strategy are, asI say, bril l iant in conception. Herz's argument amounts to atransfo rma tional critique intend ed, no t to deny o r replace realism,but to find in the realist dialogue the basis for a new synthesisap rop os of historical change an d em ergent conditions. The newsynthesis he envisions is one in which immediate technicalinterests in control no longer subordinate practical under-standing, an d bo th no longer join in excluding as mere idealismthe universalistic orientation of reflective reason. In the newsynthesis, technical, practical, and emancipatory interests arecoextensive. They are joined as on e.

8. This part of Herz's strategy is crucial , and thanks to his introduction of thisargum ent in the realist dialogue, we can see at once how much the classic realist conceptionof power politics depend s upon : (1) the ability of technological optimists to beat dow nholistic limits to grow th argum ents, (2) the ability of nuclear str tegists to convincinglyassert that a nuclear war can be survived an d won by at least som e participants, and (3)the faintly Darw inian sentiment that , to paraph rase Churchil l , when people starve theywon't have the go od grace to starve equally but will be at war with one an othe r over the lastmorsels.To fully execute his strategy, Herz must somehow surmount all of these positions.Here he merely sserts tha t a triad of threa ts pu ts the survival of the species in jeop ardyso long as the world is politically ordered according to classic realist concepts. Goingbeyon d this bald assertion would require a major project. S pecifically, I think th at the fullmak ing of his arg um ent requires his attem pt to analyze the insecurity-perp etuating statessystem as a now deeply institutionalized but still problematic social relation: one whoseemergence, reproduction, and possible passing can be explained in terms of its realhistorical connections with social, economic, and natural environmental aspects of thehum an life process, including asymmetrical relat ions of dom ination an d sub ordinatio n.Only in this way would it become possible to systematically corr obo rate his assertions tothe effect that n ow em ergent conditions thre aten the structure of hum an life in ways thatoverwhelm the states system's capacities to adapt. However, doing this requires thedevelopment of a framew ork in which interconnection s between insecurity politics, on theone h and, an d relations of production, reproduction, a nd exchange amidst environmentallimits, on the oth er, are set fort h. See Ashley (1980a, 1980b).


30/34

232 I N T E RN A T I ON A L S T U D I E S Q U A R T E R L YIV Implications for the Realist Dialogue

To say that Herz's contribution to the realist dialogue is animp ortan t on e is a gross understatement. T o say tha t his strategy,brilliant in conce ption, succeeds in wha t it tries to d o is ano the rmatter. Herz's aim is to tug realism toward a new synthesiscentering o n his universalized realist concepts. W hethe r o r no t histugging succeeds in budging other realists depends, not entirelyon his arg um ent , but also o n the realists who hear i t . In m akinghis argu m ent, He rz necessarily assumes that my characterizationof the t w o aspects of realism in Sec tion I1 is wro ng, at least in part.He necessarily assumes that for other realists, as for himself,reason is no t reducible to technica l realism's pu rposive rationality.H e m ust assum e this, for if m y characterization is correct, thenthe realists to w hom he addresses his argu m ent are incapable ofrespo ndin g w ith an y degree of self-reflectivity t o arg um en ts suchas Herz's. They will not bu dge a t all.Th e realism presented in my c haracterization is robu st againstcrit icisms such as Herz's. Perh aps the m ost obv ious reason, fromwhat I have said so far, is that the technical base of realism isautonomous of the practical superstructure, with the result thatcriticisms lodged solely at the superstructural level of practicalexperience will generally be regard ed as un w arra nte d by realists.They will miss the point . F o r example, consider an argum ent tothe effect th a t realism falters because its conc epts a re ou t of kilterwith a w orld full of Islamic movem ents, multinational c orpo ra-tions, stateless terrorists, and other transnational forces. Orconsider the argument that real ism is inadequate because theclassic language of power politics fails to be responsive toimperatives for collaboration emerging with mo untin g economicinterde pen denc e, increasing prosp ects of global tragedies of thecommons, and so on . Such arguments are unwarranted , evensilly, in realist eyes. They are unwarranted because, from avantage point framed by the technical realist base, such argu-ments m erely point ou t objective technical prob lems, external tothe true tradition, which tha t trad ition , an d it alone , can wrestlewi th an d t ry to manage.If my characterization is accurate, then for realism, the onlyadmissible criticisms ar e thos e lodged at the level of the technical


31/34

A shley R E A L I S M , H U M A N I N T E R E S T S 33base, and here realism's robustness against criticism is all them ore plain. Th ree points-all dealin g with technical realism'scognitive interest an d positivistic outlook-need to be ma de.

First, given techn ical realism's technical cognitive interest, theonly admissible standard of criticism is means-ends rationality.At this level, the reflective examination of intersubjective pre-understandings is disallowed, and th e onus is thr ow n back o n thecr it ic to show oth of two thing s: ( I ) that th e theory developed atthe technical level does not enhance the efficiency of controloperations, nd (2) that there exists ab'better theo ry which wouldenhance the efficiency of control operations. In other words, thecritic must beat technical realism at its own game.Second, technical realism, like positivist science in general, isprepared to pass judgm ent on only one kind of end: Again, theenhancement of the efficiency of means. Like positivist science,technical realism conceives of itself as value neu tral and tries no tat all to establish an objective basis for values, ethics, and en ds. Inso doing, though, it implicitly sanctions a particular kind ofethics: a decisionistic ethics based only o n the individu al actor'spersonal commitment, belief, or faith. As a result , technicalrealism is totally imm une t o crit icisms tha t would po int ou t tha t aworld ordered according to realist concepts is incapable ofrealizing global ends or humanistic values. As far as technicalrealism is co ncerned, no ne exist; an d altho ugh individual realistsmight have their own personal commitment to some ethicalsystem, such a com mitm ent is only a p ersonal on e. I t introducesno tension wh atsoever into their unders tand ing of objectivelaws.9

9. To be clear, realism do es admit conside ration of norm s, ethics, and mores , but theseenter realism solely at the superstructural practical level, and their entry is not accou ntedfor by the technical theoretical base. Instead, for M org enth au as for most realists, thesenorm s, ethics, an d m ores enter realism as exogenou s, a d hoc terms which are of concern,not so much because of their contents, per se, but because of their functions: aslimitations on power. Still, precisely because these norms, ethics, and mo res originateoutside of the theoretic al base, realism provides n o objective basis for assessing theirhistorical dependence, ideological distort ions, a n d /o r truth content. W hether or not oneagrees or disagrees with these norms, ethics, and mores remains purely a matter ofpersonal choice.


32/34


33/34

A shley R E A L I S M , H U M A N I N T E R E S T S 235Again, to say that realism is robust against criticism in theseways is to say that my presentation of the base-superstructurerelation between technical and practical aspects is an accuratecharacterization. I t is also, in an i m po rta nt sense, to insult realistsby suggesting that, at the base of it all, there is no oppositionbetween scientific man an d power politics. Red ucing reasonto purposive rationality, gauging action solely in terms of theefficiency of means , an d one-sidedly con centratin g on the is,realists are scientific men. F o r the late Ha ns M orge ntha u, suchan assertion would have to be denied (1965).Its denial, thou gh , is a ma tter of actu al scholarly practice, notdeclaratory policy, and a way of measuring that practice isprovided by Herz's present piece. As I have said, Herz wants tobelieve and mu st believe tha t there is m or e to realism th an mycharacterization suggests. His argument appeals to realists tobreak ou t of the confines of purp osive ration ality, exercise theiressentially human reflective capacities, and transcend the tech-nical interest in control. He believes that realism is capable ofdoing so. W hether or no t realism is in fact capable of living up t oHerz's und erstand ing of its poten tial is a n empirica l que stion. It isa question that only realists, in the quality of their responses toHerz's contribution, can answer.

Date of receipt of final manuscript: 8 1

R E F E R E N C E SAD OR NO , T . W. et al . (1969) Th e Positivis t Dispute in Germ an Sociology (G. Adey andD. Grisby, trans.). London: Heinemann.AN DE RS ON , P. (1976) Considerations o n Western Marxism . Londo n: New Left Books.ARON, R. (1966) Peace and War. New York: Doubleday.A S H L E Y R . K. (1980a) Th e Political Econom y of W ar an d Peace: Th e Sino-Soviet-

American Triangle and the M odern Security Problematique. Lond on: Frances Pinter.(1980b) Balance of power as a political econ om ic regime I: critiq uing th e con ceptof ana rchi c structure. Presented at the 1980 meetings of the American Po liticalScience Association, Washington, D.C.

CARR, E. H. (1946) The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939. London: Macmillan.GADAMER, H. G. (1975) Truth and Method (G. Bardin and J Comming, trans.).

London: Sheed and W ard.


34/34

236 INTER NATION AL STUD IES QUARTERLYGIDDENS, A. (1974) Positivism and Sociology. London: Heinemann.HA BE RM AS , J. (1977) A review of Gadamer's Truth and Method, in F. Dallmayr

and T. A. McCarthy (eds.) Understanding of Social Inquiry. Notre Dame, IN:University Press.(1975) A postsc ript to Knowledge and Hu ma n Interests, in Philosophy of theSocial Sciences 3.(1974) Theory and Practice (J. Viertel, trans.). London: Heinemann.(1971) Knowledge an d H um an Interests J Shapiro, trans.). London: Heinemann.

HELD, D. (1980) Introduction to Critical Theory. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.HE RZ , J. H . (1976) The National State and the Crisis of W orld Politics. New York:

David McKay.(1959) Intern ation al Politics in the Atomic Age. New Y ork: Colum bia Univ. Press.(195 1) Political Realism an d Political Idealism. Chic ago: Univ. of Chicago Press.

HORKHEIMER, M. (1974) Eclipse of Reason. New York: Oxford Univ. Press.KENNAN, G. F. (1957) American Diplomacy, 1900-1950. New York: Mentor.(1966) Realities of American Foreign Policy. New York: Norton.KI SS IN GE R , H. A. (1964) A World Restored. New York: Grossett Dun lap.M AN NH EI M , K. (1936) Ideology an d Utopia (L. Wirt h and E. Shills, trans. ). New

York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.M AR X, K. (1970) Theses on Feuerbach, appe ndix to K. M arx and F. Engels (eds.)The German Ideology. New York: International.MORGENTHAU, H. J. (1978) Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power andPeace. Fifth edition. New York: Knopf.(1965) Scientific Man vs. Power Politics. New York: Phoenix.(1951) In Defense of the National Interest. New York: Knopf.NIEBUHR, R. (1953) Christian Realism and Political Problems. New York: Scribners.(1940) Christianity and Power Politics. New Y ork: Scribners.PO PP E R , K. R. (1972) On the theory of objective mind, an d Epistemology without

a knowing subject, in Objective Knowledge. Lo ndo n: Ox for d Univ. Press.(1961) The Pove rty of Historicism. New York: Ha rpe r Row .(1935) The Logic of D~scovery.New York: Basic Books.

SC H U M A N , F. (1969) Internati onal Politics. Fo urt h ed. New York: McGraw-H111.TH OM PS O N, K. W. (1979) Review of Jo hn H. Herz, in The National State and theCrisis of W orld Politic s, Am eri. Po l. Sci. Rev. 73, 3: 941-942.WALTZ, K. W. (1979) Theory of In terna tiona l Politics. Reading, MA : Addison-Wesley.WIGHT, M. (1946) Power Politics. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.WOLFERS, A. (1962) Discord and Collaboration. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.

Political Realism and Human Interests

Documents

Transcript of Political Realism and Human Interests