Political liberalism and asymmetrical rights for minority...

Political Liberalism and Asymmetrical Rights for Minority Comprehensive Doctrines*

Mitch Avila

1. Introduction

Given limited resources to adequately address such pressing global issues as widespread poverty and the pandemics of AIDS and malaria, why are rights for minority religions worth special attention? One conclusion of this paper is that respect for minority religious rights is a central and unavoidable element in any effective scheme of reasonable cooperation between nations and that as such we cannot avoid addressing questions of rights for religious minorities in the context of international cooperation. Respect for the rights of minority religions, protection of their practices, and toleration of their heterogeneity are central to the task of creating global justice and peace. Because the question of rights for minority religions is irreducibly international, our investigation turns immediately to the question of what differing peoples,~ each with their unique histories and traditions, can reasonably expect from one another as cooperating members of a world community. I will argue that liberal democracies carry different and more extensive burdens for the respect of the rights of religious minorities than do non-liberal nations. I call this claim the Asymmetry Thesis and aim to show how clarifying our respective duties and responsibilities toward religious faiths and practices can contribute to improved international relations.

1.1 A Rawlsian Framework

My argument, especially in Sections Two and Three, follows the account of international relations set out by John RaMs in his book, The Law of Peoples (LP). Despite the widespread high regard for RaMs' domestic political theory, his theory of international justice has been widely criticized. While Beitz may regard LP as "among Rawls's most important works in political theory and among the really constructive contributions to international thought of our time, ''2 overall the recep- tion has been critical. For our purposes, two of these criticisms are significant. The first is the apparent accommodation of non-liberal peoples. A key feature of LP is the respect afforded non-liberal peoples (what Rawls calls "decent" peoples) by liberal peoples. Some critics, Thomas Pogge in particular, have argued that this

4 Human Rights Review, January-March 2004

respect is an unwarranted accommodation which requires liberals to compromise their own considered political convictions. 3 Others criticize LP for not characteriz- ing the right to democratic representation as a fundamental fight for all peoples and for not requiring decent, non-liberal peoples to extend equal freedoms and equality to all persons. 4 Second, there is the question of intra-state conflict. While Rawls recognizes the value of international relations between states, little or no consideration is given to the legitimate interest one state may have in the internal affairs of other states. Allen Buchanan argues that the emphasis Rawls places on the autonomy of states (or peoples) leaves his theory bereft of principles that would guide our response to intra-state conflicts, especially between competing groups such as religious factions and ethnic groups. 5

I hope to show convincingly that these two objections fail, showing that a Law of Peoples does not require liberal peoples to compromise their most considered political views and that it provides a convincing and pragmatic framework for addressing intra-state group conflicts. Political liberalism is particularly useful in help- ing liberal peoples, consistent with their own principles, to clarify how they should conceive of the rights of religious minorities, both domestically and internationally.

2. Religious Rights and Political Liberalism

2.1 Comprehensive Doctrines and Liberal Peoples

My defense of political liberalism as an adequate theoretical basis for a Law of Peoples begins by analyzing the most basic concepts, especially the notions of "comprehensive doctrine" and "reasonableness." These terms are key to political liberalism but were largely left in the background of LP. Returning to them, however, clarifies the distinction between "liberal peoples" and "decent peoples" as well as the nature of the relationship between them.

To begin, religious beliefs and practices are, from the point of view of political liberalism, conceptualized as "comprehensive doctrines. ''6 Comprehensive doctrines include such belief systems as philosophical or religious worldviews which typically include commitments to metaphysical descriptions of reality and complimentary moral and religious beliefs. For our purposes, all religions are comprehensive doctrines, as are varieties of atheism and humanism, philosophical systems such as Taoism, and quasi-religious practices such as Falun Gong. Alternatively, skeptical or agnostic belief systems are also considered comprehensive doctrines. Admit- tedly, this is an ideal model of a comprehensive doctrine, one not necessarily repre- sentative of actual belief practices. 7 Still, whether or not a comprehensive doctrine is either "comprehensive" or a "doctrine" is irrelevant from the point of view of political liberalism since it is outside the proper purview of political liberalism to make such judgments. Rather, it is "charitably assumed" that individual conceptions of the good are part of fully developed comprehensive doctrines. That said, it is reasonable to assume that insofar as persons hold religious and philosophical

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beliefs that are neither "comprehensive" nor "doctrines," they also hold more liberal attitudes.

This notion of a comprehensive doctrine serves to further define the concept of a "liberal people." On Rawls' view, a liberal people is defined as a people without a comprehensive doctrine. This is a key point and one that critics of LP fail to give sufficient weight. Rawls is clear that a "liberal soc ie ty . . , does n o t . . , have a comprehensive conception of the good" (p. 34). 8 Indeed, were societies to govern themselves according to a comprehensive doctrine, they would by definition be illiberal peoples. Of course, individual persons and groups within a liberal people do possess comprehensive doctrines and typically regard holding their respective comprehensive doctrines as central to their conception of human flourishing. But insofar as a people is the legitimizing ground for the exercise of state authority, a liberal people does not turn to any particular comprehensive doctrine as the basis for its civic and political institutions. Rather, liberal peoples regard it as unreasonable to create a political culture, including conceptions of political rights and justice, by appealing to comprehensive doctrines. Liberal people are "reasonable," then, insofar as they offer fair terms of cooperation for other citizens that do not rely upon any particular comprehensive doctrine and accept such otters from other citizens when offered under the same terms.

Note that some varieties of liberalism, such as Mill's, can be considered comprehensive doctrines. In this case, a politically liberal state regards comprehensive liberalism in the same way as it regards other comprehensive conceptions of the good. A politically liberal people recognize that it violates the constraint of reciprocity to appeal to comprehensive liberalism, especially given the fact of reasonable pluralism. Various doctrines associated with classic liberalism are, from the point of view of political liberalism, moral doctrines and as such they "fall outside the domain of the political" (p. 148). Importantly, the difference between political liberalism and comprehensive liberalism is the difference between Rawls' A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism. Rawls observes at the end of "The Idea of Pub- lic Reason Revisited" that in his A Theory <~['Justice, "iustice as fairness is presented there as a comprehensive liberal doctrine" which he now regards as "contradict[ing] the fact of reasonable pluralism and hence Political Liberalism regards that society as impossible" (p. 179).

2.2 Liberal Peoples and Religious Liberty

Supposing a liberal people is possible, how would a liberal people characterize religious liberty? Citizens of a liberal people regard each other as free and equal, and extend to one another fair terms of cooperation "even at the cost of their own interests in particular situations" (p. 136). As such, "While no one is expected to put his or her religious or nonreligious doctrine in danger, we must each give up forever the hope of changing the constitution so as to establish our religion's hegemony, or of qualifying our obligations so as to ensure its influence and success" (p.


150). Neither can citizens utilize the power of the state to disadvantage competing comprehensive doctrines. Thus it is reasonable to extend the widest array of liberties and protections to the practice of religion insofar as those protections are avail- able to all.

Of greater interest is the relationship between a liberal people and unreasonable comprehensive doctrines. Persons who hold unreasonable doctrines regard it as permissible to use state authority and power to advance their own interest, that is, they do not offer other citizens fair terms of cooperation and do not value reciprocity. What religious rights and liberties do these unreasonable groups and individuals possess? Liberal peoples do not domestically distinguish between reasonable and unreasonable doctrines and thus extend the same liberties to all persons. There is not one set of rights and liberties for reasonable comprehensive doctrines and another for unreasonable ones. As such, unreasonable comprehensive doctrines benefit from the same rights and liberties offered reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Put differently, there are no restrictions on unreasonable doctrines that are not also legal restrictions on reasonable doctrines.

3. Decent Peoples

3.1 Decent Peoples and Comprehensive Doctrines

Not all people are liberal peoples. Just as all comprehensive doctrines are not reasonable, so too we cannot realistically expect all peoples to be liberal. Inasmuch as the problem of reasonable pluralism within a state is a limiting consideration for political liberalism, the same problem reappears on the international stage. The pertinent question for international relations is the question of the extent to which liberal peoples can cooperate and maintain profitable, peaceful relations with non- liberal peoples since "if all societies were required to be liberal, then the idea of political liberalism would fail to express due toleration for other acceptable ways � 9 of ordering society" (p. 59). This might appear initially to beg the question of what ways of ordering society are "acceptable," but Rawls is, I think, relying on the (admittedly not-sufficiently-explicated) view that the external affairs of peoples mirror the internal affairs of peoples, in particular their attitudes toward and tolerance of unreasonable comprehensive doctrines. I return to this point in the final section of the paper.

What is a decent people? A decent people is one that although not a liberal people (typically in virtue of their particular history), nonetheless has sufficient respects for human rights and international protocols that robust cooperation between decent peoples and liberal peoples is possible. According to Rawls, decent peoples meet several criteria. "First, the society does not have aggressive aims, and it recognizes that it must gain its legitimate ends through diplomacy and trade and other ways of peace" (p. 64). Second, they extend fundamental human rights, including rights to life, liberty, and formal equality to all of their members and regard all

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persons as moral citizens, capable of carrying out moral duties and responsibilities. Finally, decent peoples have an operative legal system and a judiciary that is committed to the rule of law.

For our purposes, the key difference between liberal and a decent peoples is their relationships to comprehensive doctrmes: liberal peoples not only do not have comprehensive doctrines, they do not appeal to comprehensive doctrines as the basis for state authority and legitimacy; decent peoples, on the other hand, share, on the whole, comprehensive doctrines and use that comprehensive doctrine to conceptu- alize and legitimize state authority. For example, an Islamic state, assuming that it met the criteria set out above, would be a decent people insofar as Islamic peoples share a comprehensive doctrine and appeal to that comprehensive doctrine when defending the state.

This distinction between a liberal people and decent people--their respective relationships to a comprehensive doctrine--is unfortunately obscured by Rawls. Careful attention shows, however, that were it not for a unique historical relationship to a particular comprehensive doctrine, a decent people would be evaluated according to the degree to which they were a liberal people. Any people without a comprehensive doctrine is expected to be liberal and cannot merely claim to be decent. Here my account builds on the one that Rawls gives. Beitz summarizes Rawls as setting out two conditions for a decent people: (1) that they do not have aggressive aims and respect the independence of other societies and (2) that they have a developed sense of justice? These criteria fail, however, to say what, if anything, is distinctive about a decent sociely. At most these are necessary conditions, but not sufficient. On my view a society is decent only if it meets these two conditions and (3) has a unique historical relationship to a comprehensive doctrine or religious faith. This view is implicit in LP, bul not emphasized sufficiently.

3.2 Identi~'ing Religious Liberties

How are the rights of religious minorities within a decent society to be conceptu- aIized and identified? This topic takes up Section Yoar of this paper. Note here tha~ it is not enough to say that a society is decent insofar as it respects "human rights." We wish to identify exactly what rights those are and how in practice they are to be identified.

Here again, unfortunately, LP is insufficiently clear. Rawls specifies eight principles of justice that are to hold between "free and democratic peoples" initially and eventually between liberal and decent peoples (p. 37). Included among these principles is principle 6, "Peoples are to honor human rights." There are two problems here. First, it is unclear how any of these eight principles are arrived upon. In Chapter One, Rawls introduces a second-level original position (the one between peoples as opposed to the first-level original position in A Theory of Justice between individuals in a single society) that includes only "free and democratic peoples." We are not told, however, why the representatives would choose these


particular principles, only that they would find it reasonable to endorse these eight principles. This problem is exacerbated since apparently the second-level original position is a two-stage process. In Chapter Two in Section 8.4, Rawts asserts that representatives of decent peoples "in an appropriate original position adopt the same eight principles" (p. 69). But again, why would they do this? Why would decent peoples adopt the same principles as liberal peoples, principles we might initially assume would be more stringent than those decent peoples would adopt themselves? And why would liberal peoples adopt principles that are so weak that decent peoples would readily adopt them? Failure to answer these questions has led to the charge that LP unwarrantedly accommodates non-liberal peoples. A second problem concerns the principles themselves, especially principle 6, "Peoples are to honor human rights." It is singularly unhelpful to state that peoples are to honor human rights, but fail to specify what those rights are or more importantly to sketch a procedure by which they might be determined. The central problem of international relations is not whether or not human rights are to be honored, but what claims to a right count as a legitimate right.

Fortunately, while the LP is obscure at key points, political liberalism readily has the resources to answer these questions. Those resources are the fundamental ideas of reasonableness and reciprocity, concepts that are, on my reconstruction, central to the identity of a liberal people as politically liberal. There is no need, as Rawls does, to introduce a two-level second-tier original position. Rather liberal peoples need only refer to their own politically defining ideals of reasonableness and reciprocity to reach defensible conclusions.

3.3 Theoretical Constraints

Let us return to the question at hand. Our task is to specify how the rights and liberties of religious minorities in a decent society can be delineated. In doing so, we must not lose sight of the fact that what distinguishes a decent society from a liberal society is precisely the relationship of a decent society to its particular comprehensive doctrine. Because it is this relationship between a decent people and its comprehensive doctrine that makes a decent people a non-liberal people, we cannot simply adopt wholesale our conception of religious rights developed within a liberal society. Moreover, if the respect and cooperation between a liberal people and a decent people is going to be authentic, then the relationship will by necessity be marked by taking proper account of the singular difference between them, that is their respective relationships to comprehensive doctrines. On the one hand, then, it is unreasonable of liberal peoples to expect decent peoples to protect the same rights and liberties of minority comprehensive doctrines and religions as liberal peoples do. But, on the other hand, neither can liberal peoples simply ignore concerns and questions which they, from their point of view, regard not only as basic and fundamental, but also as singularly important.

To illustrate the problem, consider this example. Islamic peoples are potentially

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decent peoples and historically considered, a number of Islamic states qualify as decent peoples. It is also the case that there have always existed minority religious movements within Islamic peoples, most notably Christians and Jews, but also Hin- dus and adherents of Baha'i. Our investigation centers around the question of what rights and liberties Islamic peoples, if they are to be decent peoples, are expected to extend to these religious minorities. A liberal people cannot at the same time hold that a decent people's relation to its comprehensive doctrine is acceptable and at the same time hold that a decent people cannot enact social and legal measures that are the embodiment of its comprehensive doctrine. But neither can they ignore their principled commitment to rights and equality. What then can a liberal people expect of a decent Islamic people? What human rights must an Islamic people extend to religious minorities if it is to be characterized as decent by a liberal people?

Before answering this question, let me first correct a misconception of this project. It is not my aim to provide reasons that both liberal and decent people will find convincing. Instead, I am here only appealing to liberal peoples and making no claim per se as to the adequacy of this argument for decent peoples. But my argument is not unreasonable. Why not? Because the criteria of reasonableness are ones that by definition appeal only to liberal peoples. Reciprocity is the standard that governs liberal peoples and defines reasonableness, but reciprocity does not necessarily characterize the relationship between liberal and decent peoples, since for liberal peoples reciprocity means to make claims without reference to one's comprehensive doctrine and this is precisely the distinction between liberal and decent peoples. Of course, a liberal people is not unreasonable toward a decent people. The point is rather that the standards of reasonableness are internal to a liberal people and not defined by or as dialogue between liberal and non-liberal peoples. A liberal people need answer only to its own standards of reasonableness.l~ If they do and they have an adequately developed notion of reasonableness, then they are thereby reasonable--and are so quite independently of whether non-liberal peoples regard them as such. None of this implies that dialogue and discourse with non- liberal peoples is pointless or useless--obviously not since I undertaken that very project--but only that the question of what minority rights a decent people must extend to minority religions is not determined by dialogue or bargaining. This is something that a liberal people must determine for itself.

As for whether or not decent peoples will accept these principles, this is a need- less worry. Critics of Rawls too quickly ignore the fact that the criteria of decency are criteria that liberal peoples determine. Liberal peoples are not bound by pre- existing obligations toward decent peoples, as if "decent" were a rigid designator that specified a class of peoples existing independent of and prior to our political reflection. Rather liberal peoples set the criteria by which they decide which non- liberal societies deserve their full cooperation and then designate these peoples as "decent." As for why a non-liberal would accept these principles, again this is a pointless concern. Part of what defines a people as a decent people is its relation to its comprehensive doctrine. It can only be then that they accept these principles


according to their comprehensive doctrine. Thus both liberal peoples and decent peoples agree to the same conception of international rights and duties and do so for principled reasons, albeit from different principles. Liberal peoples act from political principles, while decent peoples act from comprehensive or moral principles.

4. Asymmetrical Rights

4.1 Decent People and Reasonable Comprehensive Doctrines

How then is a liberal people to determine the basic religious freedoms it regards as the minimum expectations for decent peoples? Put differently: What rights and liberties can a liberal people reasonably expect a decent people to protect and de- fend? My answer to this question illustrates what I call the "Asymmetry Thesis." The Asymmetry Thesis holds that liberal peoples may, in accordance with their own principles, accept restrictions on the rights of minority religions by decent peoples, restrictions which, if instituted among liberal peoples, would otherwise be regarded as unreasonable and unacceptable. As such, the rights of religious minorities in decent societies and liberal societies are asymmetrical insofar as a people can be regarded as decent even though if these same religious liberties were to characterize liberal societies they would be regarded as inadequate. Most importantly, this asymmetry is principled and is not a modus vivendi. In effect, we have one standard, but two outcomes--one for ourselves as liberal peoples and another for decent peoples.

To show this, consider that it would be unreasonable to expect decent peoples to extend religious rights and protections to unreasonable groups. By unreasonable groups, I mean groups that hold comprehensive doctrines, whether religious or philosophical, who as part of their comprehensive doctrine aim to have state authority and power advance the cause of their comprehensive doctrine. A comprehensive doctrine is unreasonable in the same way in both decent and liberal societies: in both cases adherents are unreasonable because they intend that their comprehensive doctrine govern society's major institutions. A decent people cannot be reasonably expected to tolerate religious practices that are themselves unreasonable--to expect otherwise would be to ignore the special relationship a decent people has to its comprehensive doctrine.

On the other hand, it is not unreasonable that a decent people protect and support religious liberties for reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Here again, a reasonable comprehensive doctrine has the same relationship to the state for both decent and liberal peoples in that reasonable doctrines do not regard it as reasonable to advance their aims through legal means and by appeal to state power. However, in the case of reasonable comprehensive doctrines within decent peoples, they are willing to accept the alliance between a decent people and its comprehensive doctrine, even though they foreswear any aim to establish such an alliance themselves. Put differently, a reasonable comprehensive doctrine has the same relationship to a

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decent people that a liberal people has to a decent people, but from the inside, not from the outside.

My argument is that decent people must extend religious rights and liberties to reasonable comprehensive doctrines--and only to reasonable doctrines. Notice several things about this claim. First, it is asymmetrical in that while a liberal people must extend the same rights and liberties to both unreasonable and reasonable religions, a decent people need only extend rights and liberties to reasonable religious doctrines. Each society has different burdens: a liberal people must accept the burden of tolerating potentially disruptive and destabilizing unreasonable doctrines, while a decent people must accept the burden of fairly distinguishing between reasonable and unreasonable views. Second, in holding decent peoples to a lower standard than that to which they would hold themselves, liberal peoples are not themselves accepting a modus vivendi. Rather, because they believe that it is unrealistic to expect all peoples to be liberal peoples and because they value toleration, they do not assume in advance that cooperation is possible with only liberal peoples-- even though they earnestly believe that decent peoples should also be liberal peoples. Third, the Asymmetry Thesis is not a form of moral relativism. The Asymmetry Thesis concerns what it is reasonable to expect of decent peoples. In holding that Asymmetry Thesis l have not thereby committed myself to the further claim that, rationally considered (from within the comprehensive philosophical system I regard as true), a decent society ought not to adopt a more robust conception of religious rights. Reasonableness, not rationality, is the coin of the realm of liberal political theory and so the Asymmetry Thesis asks only what it is reasonable to expect of decent peoples. Appeals to rationality in this context amount to appeals to comprehensive doctrines and are thereby unreasonable.

One objection might be put like this: "You characterize a decent people as hav- ing a particular relation to a comprehensive doctrine, a doctrine that is by definition unreasonable. Call this the majority comprehensive doctrine. Despite the fact that the majority comprehensive doctrine is unreasonable, it is afforded certain privi- leges, such as being the basis for state authority. However, other unreasonable minority comprehensive doctrines are treated differently, although they are unreasonable in the same way: both majority and minority comprehensive doctrines wish to use state power to advance their own interests. But what is the basis for the unequal treatment? They are both unreasonable in the same way, so why should the fact that one holds political power, perhaps for historically accidental reasons, be the basis for treating it differently?"

To respond, consider first that from the point of view of a liberal people, they are not being treated differently. Liberal peoples believe that neither the majority nor the minority comprehensive doctrine should be the basis for state authority. Liberal peoples believe decent peoples should be liberal. Given however that this is unrealistic, the question becomes what, if any, standards of behavior would a liberal people insist that a decent people meet in order to be afforded an equal status in a system of cooperative international agreements. These are standards that apply only to the


majority comprehensive doctrine. These standards do not apply to minority doctrines insofar as they do not wield political authority.

Second, political theorizing is always--or ought to be--limited by what it is realistically utopian to conceive could be the case. The task is to construct an ideal, theoretical model that on the one hand produces substantive normative results and on the other hand fits the actual world sufficiently to be applicable. In this case, the concepts of decent people and majority/minority comprehensive doctrines are particular useful and in fact reconcile our theory to the actual world. Consider the Islamic Republic of Iran. Here the model fits relatively well. It is not difficult to see that the Iranian government is the state apparatus of the citizens of Iran, that the population of Iran has a unique relationship to a comprehensive doctrine (Islam), and that there are minority comprehensive doctrines within Iran, including Chris- tianity, Judaism, Zoroastrianism, and Baha'i, some of which are reasonable. It is also not difficult to use this model to produce substantive normative conclusions regarding the people of Iran, as I do in the final section of this paper, showing that Iran fails to be a decent people because of its treatment of minority religions and showing what demonstrative steps they should take to rectify this situation.

4.2 Characteristics of Reasonable Comprehensive Doctrines

What would a reasonable comprehensive doctrine within a decent people look like? Put differently, to which comprehensive doctrines must decent people extend religious protections and freedoms? (Note that the distinction between reasonable unreasonable doctrines does not arise for liberal peoples because they extend the same rights and liberties to both reasonable and unreasonable doctrines.) Five characteristics define a religion or doctrine as "reasonable within a decent society." Reasonable comprehensive doctrines

(1) accept the relationship between a decent people and its comprehensive doctrine; (2) distinguish between what is private and what is public; (3) support human rights for all persons; (4) recognize and respect the value of voluntary association; and (5) distinguish what is permissible from what is obligatory.

First, from a political point of view, a reasonable comprehensive doctrine accepts the status quo relationship between a decent people and its comprehensive doctrine. This is because they are realistically utopian and regard it as unrealistic to expect substantial change. In this way, they take the same attitude toward a decent people as a liberal people does. One implication of this attitude can be seen by considering the question of political free speech. In a decent society, all persons have a right to free speech, that is, as moral persons. Any person may use his or her free speech to advocate for a change in the political system of a decent people, as long as they do not resort to mechanisms of violence. However, for reasonable comprehensive doctrines and religions, these groups do not advocate for changes

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in the political system that call for replacing the state's comprehensive doctrine with their own comprehensive doctrine. For example, if a Hindu minority among an Islamic people were to advocate for a Hindu state, that would be unreasonable, just as it would be for any other religious group. On the other hand, a reasonable comprehensive doctrine may advocate for a liberal state because to do so is not to advocate for any comprehensive doctrine per se. Notice also that advocating for a liberal state is not the same thing as advocating for contemporary forms of Western social norms insofar as these norms reflect comprehensive rather than political liberalism.

Second, reasonable comprehensive doctrines adapt a classic liberal strategy by accepting a public/private dichotomy. Classic liberalism accepts the legitimacy and practice of comprehensive doctrines within a private realm separate from the public sphere. Although this distinction is often artificially drawn and has been rightfully criticized, a reasonable comprehensive doctrine within a decent people is interested in securing for itself a private sphere within which to practice its religious doctrines. Being realistic, reasonable comprehensive doctrines accept their minority status, both legally and socially. In return they expect sufficient private space within which to practice their religious faith. This means, not only freedom within a domestic sphere, but also the ability to meet together and practice their religion openly without fear of retaliation or harm.

Third, reasonable comprehensive doctrines support human rights, including religious rights, for all persons. A decent people then has no reason to fear the social or cultural ascendancy or growth in numbers of a reasonable doctrine. In the event that this occurs, there would be no threat to the identity of a decent people and their relation to their comprehensive doctrine.

Fourth, in part because of their commitments to human rights in a broad sense, reasonable doctrines and religions recognize and respect the value of voluntariness and set up structures that allow for the meaningful exercise of voluntary association and exit rights. This requires, for example, that individuals not be born into a particular faith and children who are raised in a religious setting be given the op- portunity either to affirm or exit that faith. Those who do exit, either upon reaching adulthood or for other reasons, will be able to do so without fear of retaliation. As such, certain religious practices, such as shunning, would be impermissible by this criterion.

Finally, a reasonable comprehensive doctrine will possess a developed sense of a distinction between what is permissible and what is obligatory. Accordingly, some religious practices will be regarded as obligatory, while others are merely permit- ted. That such distinctions are possible is abundantly evident from the variety of religious practices and their peaceful coexistence in major world cities. This peaceful coexistence is made possible in part because of the distinction between what is permissible and what is obligatory, allowing the sharing of a common background culture. Note that adherents of a reasonable comprehensive doctrine can reasoia- ably expect to be afforded significant rights to practice what they regard as obliga-


tory. This includes important leeway in matters of conscience, such as the right to not participate in rituals or activities associated with the dominate comprehensive doctrine. Here a decent people allows adherents of minority reasonable religions not only to be excused from certain rituals or requirements, but also affords them the right to practice religious rituals that are central to their comprehensive doctrine.

This requirement might be thought to pose irresolvable hard cases. For example, what of religions that wish to practice rituals that are otherwise forbidden by a decent people? Consider three examples: polygamy, the so-called "genital circumcision" of females, and the ritual use of drugs. In the case of polygamy, suppose an otherwise reasonable comprehensive doctrine regards polygamy (or polyandry) as a permissible practice, but not as obligatory. If a decent people considers polygamy to be impermissible, then reasonable doctrines will not demand the right to polygamy. The example of what is sometimes called genital circumcision can be handled differently, by appeal to basic conceptions of human rights and voluntary association. Such practices would be impermissible insofar as they violate basic human rights (i.e., if women are denied control over their bodies) and to the extent that such procedures are performed on infants, girls, or young women who cannot reasonably be considered able to consent voluntarily. On the other hand, if adult women who possess substantive exit rights choose to accept such procedures, they cannot be prohibited from doing so, no matter how repugnant their actions may be. As for the ritual use of drugs, the question is to what extent such a practice is obligatory or permissible. If it is central to religious practice and worship, then a decent people will allow it. ~ Reasonable religions will accept the regulation of such practices, for example, control of the substance through limited means of ac- cess and will, in part because they distinguish between public culture and private practice, accept the limited practice within a private sphere.

4.3 Two Objections Considered

Before continuing, let me consider two objections. First, it might be objected that my account does not protect unreasonable comprehensive doctrines. This objection fails because practitioners of unreasonable comprehensive doctrines and religions are protected by human rights, which includes rights of speech and due process of law. But human rights and religious rights are not necessarily coexten- sive, insofar as religious rights concern the rights of groups, while human rights address persons as individual members of a society. A decent people will protect the human rights of all persons, including the human rights of those who otherwise ascribe to unreasonable religious views.

A second objection would argue that I have in affect required reasonable religions to be liberal comprehensive doctrines, that is, that my characterization of what qualifies a doctrine as reasonable requires that that doctrine understand itself as a liberal doctrine--which would be self-contradictory for a political liberal such

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as myself to hold. In response, my position is that religions must be reasonable, not liberal. The distinction is captured well by Rawls in his essay "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited." Rawls asks "How it is pos s ib l e . . , for those of f a i t h . . , to endorse a constitutional regime even when their comprehensive doctrines may not prosper under it, and indeed may decline?" (p. 150-151). Rawls replies that that answer depends upon accepting that there are no other ways to "fairly" guarantee liberties for "its adherents consistent with equal liberties" for other citizens. For example, "a religious doctrine may say that such are the limits God sets to our liberty." That succinct statement--"such are the limits God sets"---captures well how various religions do in fact understand their relationship to social orders that do not conform to their particular conception of the world, that is, they regard it is part of the divine order of things that humanity approach religion voluntarily and that doctrines are understood by faith, not reason.

Indeed, many religions in Western states can be readily regarded as "reasonable," although they are not thereby "liberal." Consider this example. Some adherents of Native American religion use peyote as part of their religious practice. Because peyote is otherwise an illegal drug, Native Americans have petitioned the courts to be exempt from these laws on the basis of religious freedom. Their efforts have been widely supported by religious groups, including most Christian denomi- nations, throughout the United States, despite the fact that (1) the vast majority of these groups would otherwise condemn the use of peyote, even ritually, and (2) these religious groups could hardly be characterized as being "liberal." Indeed, after the U.S. Supreme Court in 1990 curtailed Native American rights to use peyote in Oregon v s . Smith, 12 a wide array of religious groups lobbied Congress success- fully to pass the Religious Freedom Act in 1993, legislation that protected the ritual use of peyote. These groups were "reasonable" then, insofar as they expected the state to extend "fair terms of cooperation" to all groups and did not seek to advance their own comprehensive doctrines.

4.4 Reevaluating the Law of Peoples

I began this paper by noting two criticisms of the LP, both of which can now be dismissed. First, there is no reason to suppose that politically liberal peoples are "accommodating" non-liberal, decent peoples. Rather I have shown that liberal peoples can, consistent with their own principles, cooperate with decent peoples. Admittedly, Rawls' account does not adequately specify the way in which this cooperation is principled, but once we are careful to define the difference between a liberal and a decent people in terms of their relationship to their comprehensive doctrines, it is readily apparent that liberal people act from their political values of reciprocity and reasonableness. Second, there is also no basis to claim that the Law of Peoples cannot address intra-state group conflicts, a charge made by Buchanan. On the contrary, I have specified a rather robust set of criteria which liberal peoples can use to determine how they will respond to conflicts between competing reli-


gious groups. These criteria can be used to measure the adequacy of a decent people's treatment of minority comprehensive doctrines and to gauge an appropriate response.

5. Religious Rights and International Cooperation

5.1 The Congruency of Internal and External Attitudes

In the final section of this paper, I want to apply this model to the current international situation. I will contend that a number of pressing contemporary international problems are due in part to the failure of potentially liberal peoples to be sufficiently liberal and for potentially decent peoples to be adequately decent--and furthermore that progress in international affairs depends upon our peoples becom- ing more liberal and more decent respectively.

My argument depends on what I call the "congruency" of internal and external relations between peoples and doctrines. A relation is congruent to another relation if both relations express the same motivating attitude of one party toward another. Here the parties include representatives of both peoples and comprehensive doctrines within peoples. By this definition, there are two pairs of congruent relations. First, for liberal peoples, the same motivating attitude is expressed in

(I a) the relationship of a politically liberal people toward comprehensive doctrines within its own society; and in

(lb) the relationship of a politically liberal people toward a decent people.

Second, decent peoples also have a single motivating attitude which is expressed in

(2a) the relationship of a decent people toward reasonable comprehensive doctrines within its own society, and in

(2b) the relationship of a decent people toward a politically liberal people.

Note several things about these relations. First, they are directional, that is, Rela- tion (1 b) is the relation of a liberal people to a decent people and not vice versa. Second, a distinction is made between comprehensive doctrines in (1 a) and reasonable comprehensive doctrines in (2a). This is because a liberal people has the same relation to all comprehensive doctrines, whether or not they are reasonable, while a decent people, I have been arguing, has a different relation to unreasonable as opposed to reasonable doctrines. Third, each pair of congruent relationships includes one external, international relationship and one internal, intra-state relationship. Fourth, the relationships are meant to represent possible relations from the point of view of a liberal people. We continue to be concerned here with the question of what a liberal people can reasonable expect of non-liberal peoples and put aside for the time being the complimentary question of how decent peoples, from their comprehensive doctrine, will view these matters.

Why are (la) and (lb) congruent? Because each case concerns the relationship

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of the reasonable to the not fully reasonable, a relationship marked primarily by tolerance and pragmatism and motivated by the norm of reciprocity. Put differently, the attitude and position a liberal people take toward comprehensive doctrines is the same attitude and position a liberal people take toward decent peoples insofar as what defines a decent people is its adherence to a comprehensive doctrine. As such Relation (la) is congruent to Relation (lb) because they are motivated by the same principle.

The congruency of Relation (1 a) to (1 b)--that they share a common principle-- answers the objection that what Rawls proposes in LP is a modus vivendi. Pogge, for example, questions whether or not Rawls accommodates decent peoples because of historical fact or because of moral principle. If it is not moral principle, then he asks, "Why should we liberals accord equal respect to those who run a decent hierarchical regime abroad, if we do not accord equal respect to those who want to run such a regime in the USA o r U K ? ''13 The answer is that we regard decent societies the same way we regard unreasonable comprehensive doctrines. We extend fair terms of cooperation despite the fact that decent peoples and unreasonable comprehensive doctrines do not value reciprocity. To do so is part of what it means to be a liberal people. What is at stake is not whether or not we will cooperate with such groups, but the minimum qualifications for such groups to be toler- ated. In both cases, as long as a decent people or an unreasonable group upholds basic human rights (in practice, even if they do not espouse these rights in theory), then we extend to them the same terms of cooperation we extend liberal peoples and reasonable comprehensive doctrines respectively.

As for Relations (2a) and (2b), these relations are congruent because seen from the position of the liberal people, a decent people's attitude and position toward reasonable minority comprehensive doctrines matches the attitude and position that decent people take toward the liberal people. A liberal people expects that a decent people will regard it and approach it in a manner similar to how a decent people treats reasonable minority religions living within its borders.

5.2 From Religious Rights to International Cooperation

How does this discussion illuminate international affairs? Consider the nations of the United States and of Iran. In each case, the failure to be liberal and decent peoples respectively is a failure not only of an internal and domestic nature, but is also a failure that unfortunately determines the character of our international relations.

Consider the United States. Contemporary society in the United States is highly fractured, marked by a wide array of comprehensive doctrines, many of which are incompatible. Within this historical context, it would be unreasonable for any particular religious or secular group to advocate for social policies or legal rights simply by appeal to their own comprehensive doctrine or for the purpose of advancing their comprehensive doctrine. Instead, if they are reasonable, they will abide by the


principle of reciprocity which requires that each citizen offer fair terms of cooperation to every other citizen irrespective of any particular comprehensive doctrine.

ls the United States a "liberal people" by this definition? I think not. Although the United States is potentially a liberal people, it is not currently a liberal people. Many groups and individuals continue to regard it as proper that their particular comprehensive doctrine should be favored by the state and consequently regularly lobby legislatures on behalf of their own parochial interests. This is especially true of many conservative religious groups, many of whom typically regard the laws and policies of the state to be illegitimate insofar as they do not embody their particular moral codes. But, notably, this is also true for dominate secular forms of liberalism in the United States, by which I mean, when liberalism itself takes the form of a comprehensive doctrine. Even secular liberals, like their conservative religious counterparts, are unreasonable insofar as they appeal to a "comprehensive doctrine" as the basis for social and legal policy. The contemporary situation in the United States, then, is one in which political discourse frequently assumes the character of a contest between competing comprehensive doctrines--made worse by the distorting effect personal and corporate wealth has on the political process.

This failure of the American people to be a liberal people has far-reaching nega- tive consequences because this failure mirrors the logical structure of American hegemony and aggression in international affairs. In short, the United States is neither liberal at home nor abroad. The failure of the United States to advocate for democracy and freedom throughout the world is well established. As a nation, my people have regularly used military and economic force, not primarily to promote freedom, equality, and democracy, but rather to advance our own domestic interests--such policies fail miserably to be politically liberal. America has shown unwarranted support for non-democratic military regimes throughout the Middle East during this century and American foreign policy routinely fails effectively to address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict--a failure that is rooted in the unreasonable- ness of a number of religious and secular doctrines that are prevalent among the American people. When it comes to international affairs, the world rightly suspects that the rhetoric of defending human rights and promoting democracy is largely just a cover for more selfish motivations--a view unfortunately reinforced by the recent war against Iraq, a war supported by rhetorical claims that have proved to be empty.

Why is this? In part, I am arguing, it is because we are not yet a liberal people. In particular, many citizens hold comprehensive doctrines that are not reasonable in that they do not offer fair terms of cooperation to all citizens and instead regard it as a proper goal that the political power of the state be determined by their own comprehensive doctrine and that as such, it be used to support what they regard as true. Such views, a part of both secular and religious doctrines, are unreasonable. They are evidenced not only by domestic strife, but by the inability of the United States to articulate and act upon a coherent international policy that promotes human rights and justice through the support of emerging liberal peoples and through coopera-

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tion with decent peoples. On the other hand, it may well be that the people of the United States are in fact a liberal people, but that they have not yet been able to create a state that reflects their commitments to reciprocity and reasonableness.

Similar comments hold for the Islamic Republic of Iran and its failure to be a decent society. Despite traditional grounds for religious toleration consistent with Islamic doctrine, Iran fails to protect adequately the religious freedoms of non- Muslims for two reasons. First, contemporary Islamic scholars extend religious freedom only to the dhimmi ("people of the book" or "people of the covenant"). This group, however, is limited to Zoroastrianism, Judaism, and Christianity--all religions that preceded the revelation of Allah to his prophet Mohammed.14 Other religions, Hinduism, for example, but more importantly the Baha'i faith, are not protected by this definition. Indeed, despite the historical connections of Iran to the origins of the Baha'i religion, according to the Iranian government there are offi- cially no Baha'i in Iran. In fact, there may be over 300,000 Baha'i adherents living in Iran despite their ongoing persecution by the Iranian state, t5 Second, Iran contin- ues to fail to protect adequately the rights of even those considered dhimmi. Current interpretations of Shari'a by Muslim fundamentalists and conservatives have obscured traditional Islamic grounds for religious toleration. This is evident, for example, from how the minority of population of Jews with Iran have been treated. Relatively substantial populations of Jews have for several centuries been a part of Iranian society in Isfahan, and yet only since the imposition of Shari'a have vast numbers of Iranian Jews been forced to leave their home nation because of the failure of the Iranian people to provide basic and social religious freedoms and protections. Moreover, the fact that this population flourished in Iran for centuries prior to the imposition of Shari'a is prima facie evidence that this community has historically been a reasonable group and as such deserves legal protection. ~6

But this is not merely a domestic failure within the nation of Iran. The Iranian state has adopted a similar stance toward other nations insofar as it does not recognize the right of non-Islamic nations to govern themselves, especially the rights of reasonable and liberal peoples to create politically liberal governments. Again, however, there is an alternative explanation: perhaps the Iranian people are decent while the clerical rulers of the Iranian state are not. Certainly, many Iranians do not regard the Iranian state as reflective of the true moral character of the Iranian people and recent student protests in lran support this view. Perhaps, then, the failure of Iran to be decent is primarily a result of the failure of the state to embody the moral character of the Iranian people and not a flaw in their character as a people.

Despite our collective failures, both the people of the United States and Iran have at their disposal vast traditions and rich resources call them back toward a path of domestic tranquility and international peace. Both our peoples share a common task of sorting through an array of competing reasonable and unreasonable doctrines, some of which lead to continued strife and war, and others of which lead to peace and justice for all persons. By embracing those parts of histories and traditions that protect the liberties and freedoms of all religions, we can each rightfully


take our places among the world's nations as Liberal and decent peoples--an out-

come we owe not only to ourselves, but to our descendents for generations to come.

Notes

* AUTHOR'S NOTE: Draft portions of this paper were presented at the Second International Conference on Human Rights: Theoretical Foundations of Human Rights, held 17-18 May 2003 at Mofid University (Qom, lran). Because of the significance of this setting, I have retained as much as possible appropriate discussions of the peoples of the United States and Iram 1 wish to thank participants in the conference for their helpful feedback on this paper, especially Jack Donnelly, Michael Freeman, Stephen Macedo, Samuel Fleishacker, Omar Dahbour, Yasien All Mohamed, and Saladin Meckled-Garcia. Our hosts at Mof~d University were very generous, selflessly organizing what many Western participants will remember as perhaps the most memo- rable conference of our academic careers. I offer sincere appreciation to the Executive Commit- tee of the Conference and especially to Sayyed Masoud Moosavi Karimi, Nasser Elahi, and Mohammad Habibi Modjandeh.

1. I follow John RaMs here in using the term "people" as opposed to "state" or "nation." See Rawls, J. (1999) The Law of Peoples, with "The Idea of Public Reason" (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts). Page numbers in parentheses are references to this book.

2. Beitz, C. R. (2000) "Rawls's Law of Peoples," Ethics 110, 4, p. 669. 3. Pogge, T. (2001), "RaMs on International Justice," The Philosophical Quarterly 51, p. 247. 4. Kuper, A. (2000), "Rawlsian Global Justice: Beyond The Law of Peoples to a Cosmopolitan Law

of Persons," Political Theory 28, 5, p. 643. 5. Buchanan,A. ( 2•0•) ``Raw•s , s Law •f Pe•p•es: Ru•es f•r a Vanished westphalian W•r•d,,, Ethics

110, 4, p. 701 and pp. 716ff. 6. In "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited," Rawls distinguishes the term "doctrine," which he

uses "for comprehensive views of all kinds" and the term "conception," which is used to indicate "a political conception and its component parts, such as the conception of the person as a citizen." See p. 131, note 2.

7. Martinich argues that no one actually holds a "fully comprehensive doctrine." See Martinich, A. R (2000) "Religion, Fanaticism, and Liberalism," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81, 4, pp. 409-425.

8. The use of the phrase "comprehensive conception" expresses the fact that as a conception a conception of the good is political while as comprehensive it is a religious or doctrinal view. See note 6 supra. Precise language is difficult here because, as I will argue, there is no distinction between a comprehensive doctrine and a political conception for decent peoples.

9. Beitz (2000), p. 674. 10. My argument follows the argumentative strategy used by RaMs in LP according to which "lib-

eral societies ask how they are to conduct themselves toward other societies from the point of view of their own political conceptions" (p. 121, italics original).

11. For example, the right of Christians in Iran to produce wine for use in religious ceremonies. 12. Employment Div., Ore. Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 13. Pogge (2001), p. 247. 14. These views are widely known. For example, see Al-Aayed, S. H. (2002) The Rights of Non-

Muslims in the Islamic World, translated by Alexander Alosh (Dar Eshbelia Publishing, Riyadh). This book was freely distributed at the Mofid University Conference. A1-Aayed intends his book as a contribution toward the reconciliation of Islamic and non-Islamic peoples, however seen from the position of political liberalism, it illustrates the failure of Islamic scholars to specify a conception of religious minority rights that meets the minimum standards of political liberalism.

15. Again, this is widely known. See Baker, R L. (2001), Iran (The Globe Pequot Press Inc., Guilford, Connecticut), p. 22.

16. A useful summary discussion of these issues can be found in Bielefeldt, H. (2000) " 'Western' versus 'Islamic' Human Rights Conceptions? A Critique of Cultural Essentialism in the Discus- sion on Human Rights," Political Theory, 28, 1, pp. 90-12l. Despite the fact that some Islamic

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clerics currently contend that human rights, including religious rights, have always been protected by Shari'a and advocate for the deep commitment of Islam to human rights, it remains the case that "apostasy" or "blasphemy against Islam" is a crime punishable by death in countries such as Iran, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia. Equally significant is the fact that the list of human rights put forward by these clerics does not include any provision for gender equality. And yet, Islamic nations such as lran are increasingly interested in claiming "human rights" as a legitimate part of their Islamic heritage. Rawls, for his part, argues that more moderate interpretations of Shari'a are possible and historically defensible and thus a decent Islamic people is conceivable. I concur. See LP, p. 76, notes 17 and 18, and "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited," p. 151, note 46.

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