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Political Leadership and its Role in Achieving GoodGovernance in KazakhstanShahjahan Bhuiyan aa Kazakhstan Institute of Management, Economics and Strategic Research (KIMEP),Department of Public Administration , Almaty , KazakhstanPublished online: 03 May 2012.

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International Journal of Public Administration, 35: 379–388, 2012Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLCISSN: 0190-0692 print / 1532-4265 onlineDOI: 10.1080/01900692.2012.655525

Political Leadership and its Role in Achieving GoodGovernance in Kazakhstan

Shahjahan BhuiyanKazakhstan Institute of Management, Economics and Strategic Research (KIMEP),

Department of Public Administration, Almaty, Kazakhstan

This article examines the role political leadership plays in achieving good governance inKazakhstan, a post-communist country in Central Asia. Since its withdrawal from the USSR,Kazakhstan maintains an authoritative political leadership, where President Nazarbayev, histrusted “inner-circle,” and the stalwarts of the Nur Otan party effectively rule the coun-try. Opposition political parties are weak and disorganized, and their leaders are not quitecapable of mobilizing favorable public opinion. The finding of the study suggests thatthe Kazakhstani political leadership has limited success in achieving good governance inKazakhstan.

Keywords: political leadership, good governance, Kazakhstan

INTRODUCTION

Political leadership is a significant but under-researchedissue in post-communist countries. Several studies (forexample, Bochel & Bochel, 2010; Goldsmith & Larsen,2004; Hartley & Benington, 2011; Pedersen & Hartley,2008; Svara 1990) have emphasized the importance of polit-ical leadership at all levels of government to ensure thepromotion of good governance. In Kazakhstan, there is asteadily growing interest in leadership as a field of scientificenquiry. A noted Kazakhstani political scientist, NurbolatMasanov, stresses that the Kazakhstani national leadershipprofile is characterized primarily by a traditional paternal-istic type of leader (“strong hand”), position in the variousechelons in government hierarchy, and family ties with theruling elite (Tolymbek, 2007, p. 50). These leadership pro-file dimensions are deeply anchored with Kazakhstan’s pasthistory of nomadic society and Soviet authoritarian legacy.Kazakhstan has envisioned being one of the 50 most com-petitive countries in the world by 2030 by implementing theambitious “Kazakhstan 2030” strategic policy. Admittedly,political leaders’ role, among other things, is a sine qua non

Correspondence should be addressed to Shahjahan Bhuiyan,Kazakhstan Institute of Management, Economics and Strategic Research(KIMEP), Department of Public Administration, 4 Abai Avenue, Almaty050010, Kazakhstan. E-mail: sbhuiyan_68@yahoo.com

to achieve this policy goal by ensuring good governance inKazakhstan.

The key objective of this contribution is to understand therole political leadership plays in achieving good governancein Kazakhstan. In order to fulfill this objective, the articleis divided into five sections. The first section conceptualizespolitical leadership and good governance. In the context ofthis article, it is necessary to discuss the role of party poli-tics in Kazakhstan because parties in authoritarian regimesare engaged in achieving a variety of goals for the consoli-dation of regimes such as the co-optation of potential rivals,marginalization of existing opposition, recruitment of newelites, and stimulation mass popular involvement with theregime (Bader, 2011, p. 189). The second section deals withunderstanding the nature of party politics in Kazakhstan.The third section describes and discusses various patterns ofpolitical leadership in Kazakhstan. The fourth section exam-ines the role political leadership plays in achieving goodgovernance in Kazakhstan, while the final section concludesthe article.

CONCEPTUALIZING POLITICAL LEADERSHIPAND GOOD GOVERNANCE

Seligman (1950, p. 913), in his seminal work on politicalleadership, emphasized that leadership is a representative

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role, which is a function of acceptance by the followers.In other words, for the achievement of organizational goals,as Burns (1978) elucidates, it is essential that the roles of theleaders and their followers are united. The former achievesorganizational goals by directing, motivating, mobilizing,and influencing the latter. Seligman (1950) termed lead-ership as “Central Person”—what Korac-Kakabadse andKouzmin (1997) called “captains of ship”—to describe theirstewardship role in operating the organization entrusted tothem (Kouzmin et al., 2007).

According to Möller and Shierenbeck (2009), politicalleadership represents either individuals that exercise author-ity through an officially constituted position, such as beingpresident of a country or party leader, on a high-level in soci-ety, or individuals considered leaders even in the absenceof legally ascribed positions in society. These authors fur-ther illustrated that informal leaders exercise their authorityon the basis of sources of the legitimacy rather than thelegal framework. Burns (1978, p. 126) views political lead-ership as “a product of personal drives, social influences,political motivations, job skills, and the structure of careerpossibilities that not only shape the rising politician butinfluence one another.” In this definition, Burns considerspolitical leadership as a set of dynamic activities, which playsupportive roles to achieve organizational goals. Similarly,Heifetz (1994, p. 20) also found it useful to define leader-ship “as an activity.” In the context of political leadership,Peele (2005, p. 192) has listed the following dimensions ofleadership:

1. character of the leader(s);2. followers with whom the leader interacts;3. organizational or societal context in which the leader-

ship interaction occurs;4. agenda of problems or tasks which confront the leader;5. techniques which the leader uses to mobilize support

on behalf of his or her agenda and/or to maintainsupport and position, and

6. effects of leadership.

Analyzing the features of the leadership dimensions, itappears that leadership is primarily a leader-follower rela-tionship, and Kouzes and Posner (2002, p. 13) view thisrelationship as “skills that shape success.” In sum, politicalleadership is a conglomeration of activities, which functionthrough a challenging “leader-follower” relational process.

Leadership is an essential ingredient of good gover-nance. Admittedly, governance is a multifaceted concept(Andrews, 2008; Kjær, 2004; Weiss, 2000). Weale (2011,p. 58) explains governance as the processes of government,which involve networks of actors, both public and private,determining policy through negotiation, bargaining, and par-ticipation. Kaufmann et al. (1999, p. 1) defined governanceas “traditions and institutions by which authority in a country

is exercised.” The World Bank (1994, p. xiv) has identifiedthree key aspects of governance:

i. the form of political regime;ii. the process by which authority is exercised in the man-

agement of a country’s economic and social resourcesfor development; and

iii. the capacity of governments to design, formulate, andimplement policies and discharge functions.

Rhodes, (1996, p. 652) recognizes six distinct usesof governance: the minimal state; corporate governance;the new public management; “good governance”; socio-cybernetic systems; and self-organizing networks. Rhodes(2007, p. 1246) subsumes good governance as one of theuses of governance, and defines the term as “a process ofgoverning; or a changed condition of ordered rule; or thenew method by which society is governed.” Rhodes’s cur-rent definition of governance differs slightly from his earliertheoretical standing, where he stipulated that governancerefers to “self-organizing, interorganizational networks” andargued these networks complement markets and hierar-chies as governing structures for authoritatively allocatingresources and exercising control and coordination (Rhodes,1996, p. 653).

Jreisat (2004, p. 1004) attempts to understand the “whogoverns?” issue, one of the two basic concerns raised bypolitical science and public administration scholars, andargued that it deals with the issues of power and the dis-tribution of resources in the society. The second issue, “Howwell?” is related to “good government,” evaluated by factorssuch as effective institutions, efficient methods of operation,and equitable policy outcomes.

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) characterizes goodgovernance by accountability, participation, predictability,and transparency (ADB, 2000, p. 1–2). According to theOrganization for Economic Cooperation and Development(OECD), the key features of good governance are:

i. promotion of democracy and open pluralistic societies;ii. strengthening of transparent, accountable, efficient and

effective national government;iii. reinforcement of the rule of law, including fair and

accessible legal and judicial system;iv. promotion of an independent media and dissemination

of information;v. anti-corruption initiatives, and

vi. efforts to reduce excessive military expenditure(OECD, 1992 cited in Khan, 2002).

In the same vein, the United Nations DevelopmentProgram (UNDP) suggests the following salient features ofgood governance:

a. public participation;b. rule of law;

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POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN KAZAKHSTAN 381

c. transparency;d. building consensus among contesting group interests;e. equity to improve or maintain well-being of individu-

als;f. effectiveness and efficiency for making the best use of

resources;g. accountability andh. strategic vision of the leaders on good governance and

human development (UNDP, 1997).

A review of the myriad of characteristics developed bymajor international development agencies shows the pres-ence of a number of common good governance features:accountability, transparency, public participation, rule oflaw, and corruption control. Absence of them in manag-ing state functions brings bad governance symptoms. Thisarticle espouses the definition of governance by Kaufmannet al. (1999) and will focus on how political leadership exer-cises authority in Kazakhstan in the spirit of achieving goodgovernance.

Mayo (2004) has presented lessons learned about goodgovernance, including:

a. governance without accountability will not last;b. the need to align responsibility with authority;c. the benefits of difference and diversity;d. the scope for the user voice in governance; ande. the value of non-executive, or lay, members of boards.

Apart from the last lesson, which is context-specific andtechnical in nature, the other four have impact on the promo-tion of good governance in any society. The essence of theselessons is mostly similar to the World Bank GovernanceIndicators dimensions: voice and accountability, politicalstability and the absence of violence/terrorism, governmenteffectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control ofcorruption (Kaufmann et al., 2009).

In the context of this study, the role of political leader-ship will be assessed on the following three most relevantgovernance dimensions:

i. voice and accountability,ii. political stability and the absence of violence/

terrorism, andiii. control of corruption.

The rationale behind choosing these three dimensionsfrom a total of six is multidimensional (Bhuiyan & Amagoh,2011). First, Kazakhstan is experiencing transition from theCommunist Party administration to a modern public admin-istration model. The Communist regime lacked achievingpublic accountability for the delivery of public services.In contrast, the foundation of a modern public administra-tion is to achieve public accountability by delivering cost-effective and cost-efficient public services to its citizens.

Kazakhstan is making efforts to achieve this goal. Second,in the recent past, several former Soviet countries (for exam-ple, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia) experienced political instabilitythrough “color” revolution. It is, therefore, necessary tounderstand the causes that contributed to Kazakhstan’s rela-tively high political stability in order to serve policy lessonsto politically unstable multi-ethnic countries. Third, Holmes(2006) emphasizes that the communist society was charac-terized by relatively high levels of corruption. Many scholars(for example, Grødeland & Aasland, 2011; Miller et al.,2001) predicted that corruption levels would fall followingits dissolution from the USSR, which was actually not thecase. Available data show that a high level of corruption pre-vails in Kazakhstan, and the Kazakhstan Government hastaken several steps to fight corruption.

UNDERSTANDING PARTY POLITICS INKAZAKHSTAN

Describing Russia’s polity as “managed democracy,”Anderson (2007) summarizes the country’s key politicalcharacteristics, where “elections are held but the outcomeis predetermined, and power is exercised by a contiguouselite with little institutional input from non-elites.” The sim-ilar situation prevails in most of the post-communist CentralAsian countries, albeit differently in Kazakhstan, wherethe formal political process is controlled and managed bypolitical leaders, particularly those in state power (Kjærnetet al., 2008). This limits the growth and development ofmulti-party politics in Central Asian states. Contrary to this,Pilon’s (1998) study draws a positive political landscape,where the Central Asians hugely expressed their willing-ness to actively participate in the political discourse oftheir nations and are supportive of their democratic rights.However, judging the pattern of politics, Iqbal (2007) arguesthat authoritarianism is a product of Central Asia’s politi-cal culture, which is historically rooted in totalitarian andtraditional values associated with clan and group identities.Merry (2004, p. 288) identifies that the authoritative politi-cal culture was developed in Central Asia as the then SovietUnion maintained its rule in this region for purposes of dom-ination and exploitation through a cadre of local elites inways that deliberately isolated them from common citizens.Similarly, Isaacs (2011) argues that Central Asian politi-cal parties are still a major source of Soviet institutionalcontinuity. He also observed that internal structures andcomposition of the parties remained relatively unchanged.This also applies to Kazakhstan as studies (for example,Isaacs, 2011; Smith, 2007) have reported that from theearly period of Kazakhstan’s independence, the Presidentwas motivated to establish a monolithic party resemblingthe Soviet-style Communist Party in terms of structureand shape. He achieved this goal by creating the Nur

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Otan, in 1999, after the merger of several pro-presidentialparties.

In post-independent Kazakhstan, President Nazarbayevquickly allowed forming political parties, which has intro-duced multi-party politics in a country that was domi-nated by a one-party system. Seemingly contrary to thisspirit, a 2002 law, which requires all political parties tobe registered with the Ministry of Justice to operate itsfunctions, has apparently thwarted the development of multi-party politics in Kazakhstan. Mishra (2009) emphasizesthat the implementation of this law reduced the num-ber of registered political parties from 19 in late 2002 to8 in November 2003, to 10 currently. The law requires,among other things, a membership of at least 50,000 (upfrom 3,000) people, divided into proportionately by oblasts(regions) with no fewer than 700 registered membershipin each of Kazakhstan’s 16 regions (Bowyer, 2008). TheCentral Election Commission of Kazakhstan has listedthe registered political parties, which met the membershipcriteria, and they are: the Ak Zhol Democratic Party ofKazakhstan (175,862 members), the Kazakhstan Social andDemocratic Party Auyl (61,043 members), the CommunistParty of Kazakhstan (90,000 members), the CommunistPeople’s Party of Kazakhstan (56,292 members), theDemocratic Party of Kazakhstan (97,157 members), theNational Democratic Party Nur Otan (607,557 members),the Patriots’ Party (172,000 members), the RukhaniyatParty (72,000 members), the Adilet Democratic Party ofKazakhstan (70,000 members, this party merged with AkZhol in 2007), and the National Social Democratic Party(140,000 members) (Central Election Commission, 2011).

Heinrich (2010) observes that a complex system is inplace for the verification process of the registration require-ments for parties interested in competing in elections.Evidence suggests that even a minor mistake in applicationdoes not escape the scrutiny of the election commission-ers, which eventually leads to a registration request rejected.In this context, Hunter (1996, p. 55) points to the factthat several dimensions of the Kazakhstani law on politi-cal parties and election procedures largely limit the citizen’sfreedom of association and impede the activities of a numberof political groups. Similarly, Bukkvoll (2004) commentsthat President Nazarbayev gradually moving on to a moreand more autocratic direction, his political survival becameheavily dependent on the support of elite groups than thatof popular support. The former primarily dispenses supportto the President what he could deliver to them in terms ofpolitical influence and material incentives (Dubnov, 2004cited in Bukkvoll, 2004). As a result, Mishra (2009) foundthat the Nur Otan along with other pro-regime (and “domes-tic” opposition) parties such as Ak Zhol, Patriots’ Party andRukhaniyat increasingly enjoy numerous political patron-ages. This rent-seeking behavior, according to Cummings(2002), stems from an ambiguous state-elite relationship inKazakhstan.

Political parties in Kazakhstan generally tend to bepoorly organized–where decisions are made under central-ized structures, excluding many from the decision-makingprocess (Heinrich, 2010; Isaacs, 2008). In the same vein,Bowyer’s (2008) study shows that the Kazakhstani politicalparty system was dispersed and underdeveloped, most of theparties having failed to establish a reflective public engage-ment. Consequently, the impact of political parties is limitedas their activities are centered on a small group of elites or acharismatic political leader, providing relatively less focuson an idea or issue-based party program (Bowyer, 2008;Heinrich, 2010; Isaacs, 2008). This view was supported bythe results of a 2004 survey conducted in Kazakhstan by theInternational Republican Institute, where a 38 percent of therespondents opined that a party leadership was the most sig-nificant factor for them in deciding whether or not to votefor a party (Bowyer, 2008, p. 16).

In spite of public support to his leadership, PresidentNazarbayev has faced domestic political challenge since1991 (Bukkvoll, 2004). He so far has succeeded in over-coming them by employing his tactics of combining reformand repression – what Gleason (1997) calls a “product ofcompromise” – to limit the opposition’s appeal among thegeneral masses (Junisbai & Junisbai, 2005). This situationlimits the possibility of establishing a platform to ensure ademocratic political competition. However, political expertsopined that Kazakhstan’s political opposition is the mostdeveloped in the region in the sense that many of theirleaders had direct work experience with the government’spolicy-making processes and hold adequate financial assetsunder their control (Junisbai & Junisbai, 2005). Several stud-ies (for example, Junisbai, 2010; Junisbai & Junisbai, 2005;Schmitz, 2003) ascertain that the root cause of politicalrivalry between President Nazarbayev (and his inner-circle)and the opposition leaders is mainly to keep control overeconomic and political resources. This particular approachand its associated operational implications are responsiblefor accelerating political tension between the party in powerand the parties in opposition.

IMAGES OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP INKAZAKHSTAN

Gaffney (2001) stresses that the image of political leadersis an important element of leadership and politics. This isrelated to both political culture and institutions. This section,therefore, deals with unpacking the images of Kazakhstanipolitical leadership.

After Kazakhstan’s withdrawal from the USSR, PresidentNazarbayev has remained at the helm of power. According toIsaacs (2010a), this is because of his perceived charismatic-leadership as the father of the nation, and possibly theonly politician capable of meeting the challenges of post-Soviet nation-building. This political capability of President

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Nazarbayev, as Isaacs (2010b) explains, stems from his skill-ful use of informal forms of politics to manage transitionaluncertainty, which has helped consolidate his power baseand thus the imposition of personal authoritarian rule. Underthe rubric of neopatrimonial governance, Kazakhstan hasmade steady progress in almost all spheres of life, which ispartly credited to the President’s strategic vision “Economyfirst and then politics.”

In the context of regime consolidation, Kendall-Taylor(2011) aptly notes that President Nazerbayev established aconsiderable degree of political loyalty before Kazakhstan’shydrocarbon economy moved on its upward journey.Admittedly, oil revenue gave him the strength to form a newpolitical system with new political elites who are largelydependent on him primarily to exploit state support andprivileges from the current regime (Kendall-Taylor, 2011).Another possible reason for this elite dependence on thePresident emerges from the latter’s “charisma-like” leader-ship qualities that facilitate building a “new” Kazakhstan.

Many politicians and political observers are of the opin-ion that in the hazy political landscape of Kazakhstan,President Nazarbayev is the “only” political leader capableof granting and distributing resources to elites. By exercis-ing this capacity he has effectively created a clique primarilyobedient to him and his regime rather than to the coun-try. The members of this clique are carefully chosen byNazerbayev from various groups, such as his immediatefamily members, people from his tribe (the senior horde),friends, distant relatives, and businessmen – all have cre-ated what may be called a “super clan” – who mutuallyprofit by exploiting their networks. Based on a 2007 esti-mation, Junisbai (2010, p. 244–246) presented an indicativelist of 17 elites, who, according to given evidence and popu-lar perceptions, have made their fortune through a susceptivestate-elite relationship.

Available studies (for example, Bertelsmann Stiftung,2009) report that, Nazerbayev is sensitive to any deviantbehavior within his regime by the “super clan.” The disloyalelites suffer the consequences of their “betrayal” behavior,which is manifested in many ways, such as shutting downtheir businesses, the issuance of corruption and extortioncharges, the confiscation of their assets, and the “encour-agement” of out migration from Kazakhstan. Hayman andMayne (2010) stressed that any activity that is, or couldpotentially be considered contrary to the ruling party’sinterest will eventually be quashed. The 2009 BertelsmannStiftung Report has succinctly summarized the state ofpolitical engagement in Kazakhstan:

Groups that attempt to influence the political process frombelow have been systematically harassed, isolated or impris-oned. The political center has been monopolized by thecurrent regime, and individuals in movements that haveformed from within the elite have often been co-opted.(Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009, p. 7)

The elites and political activists who were displeasedwith, and disgraced by, Nazarbayeva’s rule gathered togetherand formed a political party, the Democratic Choice ofKazakhstan (DCK), in 2001. Many scholars (for example,Daly, 2008; Isaacs, 2011) have considered the emergence ofthe DCK as a significant event in the context of the devel-opment of political pluralism in Kazakhstan. Junisbai andJunisbai (2005, p. 374) view the formation of the DCKas “a new stage in the evolution of post-Soviet CentralAsian opposition movements brought on by the emergenceof a new economic cleavage within the country’s previouslyhomogenous elite.” They further argued that the DCK’sfounders were driven both by self-interest and ideology, acharacteristic that distinguished this new kind of politicalopposition from other forms of opposition in Central Asia.In spite of the President’s early indication of support for theDCK (Junisbai, 2010), he subsequently changed his posi-tion, and employed repressive techniques, scrapping of theirpolitical movement. As a result, the DCK members holdinggovernment positions were removed by a presidential decreeand criminal allegations related to tax evasion and misuse ofoffice were brought against two of its leaders, GalymzhanZhakiyanov and Mukhtar Ablyazov. As a result of this pres-sure, many original signatories of the formation of the DCKwithdrew their support (Junisbai & Junisbai, 2005, p. 380).

Because of the state-sponsored surveillance, the DCKwas short-lived. Based on her interviews with theKazakhstani politicians and political observers, Junisbai(2010) explains that inter-party rivalries had weakened theimportance of the DCK’s existence, which contributed to itscollapse.

LOCAL PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONLEADERSHIP

In Kazakhstan, the prospect of growth and development oflocal public administration (that is, local government) lead-ership is limited. The internal organizational structure oflocal public administrations and the politics of their prac-tical operational remit made them dependent on the centralgovernment (Bhuiyan, 2010; Makhmutova, 2006). Satpaev(2007, p. 296) has identified some factors that inhibit theformation of local (regional) elites in Kazakhstan:

1. Lack of a mechanism for electing regional leaders(akims), who are currently appointed by the President;

2. The regions’ financial dependence on the center, and3. The President’s lack of interest in the appearance of

strong regional leaders.

The current regime uses this central-local administrationdependency as an opportunity for controlling and manip-ulating local-level political leaders. According to Junisbai(2010), the center’s control over the periphery minimizes

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the chances that ambitious local elites are able to build afoundation of local support. In addition, frequent rotationof akims (governor/mayor) has further limited the possi-bility of cementing their popular support base among theirconstituents. Analyzing the number of akims appointed inall 16 Kazakhstani oblasts from 1992 to 2009, a recentstudy reveals that as many as 10 akims were appointed inan oblast, and their mean tenure was 1.9 years (Junisbai,2010, pp. 256–257). Thus, in Kazakhstan, akim tenure isshort, making them less attentive and committed to theirjob. This causes, among other things, inefficient implemen-tation of public policies, and thus local development. In thecontext of Central Asia, both Cummings (2000) and Luong(2004) identified that inefficiency and lack of accountabilityare products of centralized administrative system.

LEGISLATIVE LEADERSHIP

According to the provision of the 1995 Constitution,Kazakhstan has a two-chamber parliament, Senate (upperhouse) and Majilis (lower house). The 2007 constitutionalreform increased the number of members in both houses.The Senate expanded from 39 to 47, allowing the Presidentto appoint 15 most prominent public figures, academics, andintellectuals in Kazakhstan to this House. On the other hand,the members of the Majilis have been increased from 77 to107. Of them, in compliance with the constitutional provi-sion, 98 members are elected in a countrywide proportional,party list-based election. The remaining nine are elected bya 364-member Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan, abody appointed by the President, with representatives fromall ethnic minorities (Isaacs, 2008).

The last Majilis elections, held in 2007 under the revisedconstitutional provision, a total seven political parties con-tested, and they were: the Nur Otan, the All-National SocialDemocratic Party, the Ak Zhol, the Social and DemocraticParty (Auyl), the Communist People’s Party of Kazakhstan,the Party of Patriots, and the Rukhaniyat. The Nur Otanwon a landslide victory, receiving a little over 88 percentof the total casted votes, and won overall 98 seats. Theother parties contested the election, but could not secure therequired 7 percent threshold and thus failed to win a seat(The Economist, 2007).

As to the emergence of the legislative leadership, basedon the tenure of the deputies in the Majilis between 1996 and2007, Junisbai (2010, p. 261) shows that most deputies(about 72 percent) serve only one term in office, while about28 percent have been re-elected at least once. On the otherhand, in the Senate, more than half of the senators ever inoffice have served two or more terms. These data revealthat in both houses new leadership emerges, a positive signfor the institutionalization of Kazakhstani politics. In spiteof this encouraging indication, a recent study (Bader, 2011,p. 194) highlights that more than half of the deputies elected

through the 2007 Majilis elections are of or near retirementage. It is highly doubtful whether this group of deputies isable to make any meaningful contributions to nation build-ing after they leave the office. The politics behind choosingsuch legislators stem from the fact that they will possiblypose no challenge to Nazerbayev’s leadership.

In the context of the legislative history, the Nur Otanshows a limited capacity to consolidate the democratiza-tion process in Kazakhstan. Recent studies (Bader, 2011;Kubicek, 2011; Olsson, 2011) have evidenced that thestrength of Nur Otan is used to support the regime toachieve party-based authoritarianism under the camouflageof democracy. To change the practice, it is imperative toinstitutionalize the exercise of in-house leadership develop-ment activities among the Nur Otan rank and file. Reviewingthe composition of central-level committees shows that themembers are “hand-picked” from the President’s inner-circle, while the President himself heads the party. In thesame vein, oblast-level and local Nur Otan committees areformed without following a transparent democratic proce-dure and practices.

THE ROLE OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP INACHIEVING GOOD GOVERNANCE IN

KAZAKHSTAN

This section deals with examining the role of political lead-ership in achieving good governance in Kazakhstan. In thisregard, the following three governance dimensions:

i. voice and accountability,ii. political stability and the absence of violence/

terrorism andiii. control of corruption,

are briefly examined.

Voice and Accountability

Voice and accountability summarize the perception of theextent to which a country’s citizens are able to participatein selecting their government, as well as freedom of expres-sion, freedom of association, and a free media (Kaufmannet al., 2010). The role of the political leadership continuesto grow in order to ensure achieving the key components ofvoice and accountability indicator. This is because a politi-cal leader receives authority from the people and those whoare politically elected, but must also be sensitive to people’sviews (Christensen et al., 2007).

In its formal sense, in Kazakhstan, citizens exercise theirvoting rights to elect their political leaders. For exam-ple, in the 2011 presidential election, held on April 3, theKazakhstanis re-elected President Nazerbayev for the fourthtime in a row, securing 95.5 percent of the votes, with a

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POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN KAZAKHSTAN 385

turnout of 89.5 percent. In the previous presidential elec-tion held in 2005, he received just over 91 percent of thevotes (The Economist, 5 April 2011). In the 2007 Majiliselections, Nur Otan candidates won all the seats. The elec-tions, both presidential and parliamentary, display a glaringlack of political competition. The Nur Otan dominates thepolitical landscape, which weakened the growth of politicalopposition. This reflects in the 2011 Freedom House Report,where Kazakhstan is categorized as a “not free” country, dueto the absence of basic political rights, and fundamental civilliberties are denied (Freedom House, 2011).

In 1998, the President identified several elements ofdemocratization and political liberalization, which are essen-tially critical for political reform in Kazakhstan. One ofthem is to build a free, uncensored, and independent press(Mishra, 2009). In practice, Kazakhstan has not made anycredible improvement to the country’s image as a repressorof press freedom. Moreover, the President decreed prisonsentences for anyone attacking his “honor” and “dignity”and tightened rules for formally registered media outlets(Reporters without Borders, 2011). A 2009 law has givenblogs, chat-rooms, and other websites the same legal statusas the traditional print media, thus making the incumbentsliable to stand trial for press offences, which are punishableby imprisonment (Reporters without Borders, 2011).

The Kazakhstan constitution guarantees freedom ofassociation to its citizens. In reality, the BertelsmannStiftung’s study on Kazakhstan reports that less than10 percent of associations are engaged in issues relatedto civil liberties, human rights, and minority protection(Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009, p. 10). This study observesthat those are associated with civic activities frequentlyexperience stringent vigilance by the government agencies.This discourages people from being involved with activitiesrelated to civil liberties and human rights protection.Against this backdrop, Daly (2008) indicates that the coun-try’s rapidly growing middle class enjoys some privilegeof organizing associational networks for maximizing theireconomic benefits, which raises hope for civil societyactivists. Table 1 shows that Kazakhstan performs poorly invoice and accountability.

Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism

Kazakhstan is politically a stable country. This politicalstability does not guarantee it will achieve democracy.Referring to Auty (2006) and Tsalik (2003), Rustemova(2011) opines that, in Kazakhstan, democracy is difficult toachieve because the state has established a patronage sys-tem of government that builds government-business nexusesand integrates them into a single political system. Thissymbiotic relationship supports the development of sucha government that bends economy and prevents economicdevelopment. Rustemova (2011) further notes Kazakhstan’seconomic system yields little incentive for democratization.

TABLE 1Selected Governance Aggregate Indicators

Governance Indicator YearPercentile

Rank (0–100)1Governance Score(−2.5 to +2.5)2

Voice and Accountability 20092004

19.017.3

−1.04−1.11

Political Stability 20092004

69.847.6

+0.64+0.00

Control of Corruption 20092004

19.010.7

−0.91−1.19

Source: Kaufmann et al., 20101Indicates rank of country among all countries in the world. “0”’

corresponds to lowest rank and ‘100’ corresponds to highest rank.2Estimates of governance measured on a scale from approximately

−2.5 to +2.5. Higher values correspond to better governance.

Evidence suggests that both foreign and local large compa-nies participating in the flow of foreign direct investment areinterested in the stability and continuation of their businesscontracts and thus maintain the status quo, which the currentregime unfailingly delivers. However, the 2010 DemocracyIndex prepared by the Economist Intelligence Unit consid-ers Kazakhstan an “authoritarian regime,” and it ranks 132(of 167 economies) with an index value of 3.32 (maxi-mum possible 10.00, in the scale of 1–10), owing to a weakelectoral and political system, lack of checks and balances,and reduced media freedom (Economist Intelligence Unit,2010).

Kazakhstan is largely a peaceful country, where hun-dreds of ethnic minorities with diverse cultural back-grounds live side by side with harmony and mutual respect.The 2011 Global Peace Index published by the Institutefor Economics and Peace ranks Kazakhstan 93 among153 countries with an index value of 2.14 (maximum pos-sible 1, in the scale of 1–5): it is considered the bestperformer among the Caucasian and Central Asian coun-tries (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2011, p. 11).However, the UK-based Maplecroft’s 2010–2011 TerrorismRisk Index identifies Kazakhstan as a risky country dueto its territorial proximity with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, andTurkmenistan-the countries that have been threatened orhave failed attempts of terrorist attacks by terrorists orIslamic militants (Peter, 2010). The Kazakhstan Governmentis aware of the issue and has adopted anti-terror leg-islation to handle such anticipated risks. Table 1 por-trays Kazakhstan’s relatively better performance in politicalstability.

Control of Corruption

Das and DiRienzo (2010, p. 833) argue that corruptioncompromises the ability of political management to con-trol and direct economic, social, and political transformativechanges. For example, corruption tends to create barriers

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for any political change by lowering trust of political lead-ership, which impedes the ability of political leadership toengage in consensus building and to establish internationalcooperation and relationships.

Similarly, Duvanova (2007), based on cross-country sur-vey data on 26 post-communist countries, considers cor-ruption to be a formidable obstacle to the effective andefficient operation of emerging markets in transitional coun-tries. In Kazakhstan, both “petty” and “grand” corruption arerampant, and became an integral part of everyday life. TheBerlin-based 2010 Transparency International report ranksKazakhstan 105 among 178 countries, with an index scoreof 2.9, on a scale from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly clean)(Transparency International, 2010)(see Table 1). Severalstudies (for example, Perlman & Gleason, 2007; Schatz,2005) have evidenced that the root cause of corruption iswithin the fabric of traditional clan and tribe rule.

The political leadership of Kazakhstan expressed itsfirm commitment to control corruption. On his part, forexample, President Nazarbayev in a 2006 session of theSecurity Council expressed his dissatisfaction on the unbri-dled bribery and cronyism among top civil servants. As aresult, 37 senior officials were indicted on corruption chargesand 29 officers of the Interior Ministry, the Customs Agency,the Financial Police, the Tax Committee, the Ministryof Environment, and the Prosecutor’s Office were dis-missed (Yermukanov, 2006). As a sign of continued gov-ernment commitment to corruption control, Astana, thenew capital of Kazakhstan, hosted a high profile meetingin September 2009, where the heads of Anti-CorruptionNetwork for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, IstanbulAnti-Corruption Action Plan Countries, and other countriesattended. A joint statement called the “Astana Statementon Good Governance and Fighting Corruption” was issued,where all parties acknowledged that corruption threatensthe stability and security of societies, democratic institu-tions, and the sustainable economic and social develop-ment of any country (OECD, 2009). The leaders, there-fore, agreed that international cooperation, mutual learn-ing and country reviews reinforce national anti-corruptionefforts and support existing mechanisms such as the OECDWorking Paper on Bribery and the Council of EuropeGroup of States against Corruption and support a reviewmechanism for the United Nations Convention againstCorruption.

Notwithstanding the above initiatives, the Kazakhstanchapter of Transparency International initiated a projecttitled “Combating Corruption through Civic Education,”which has had some effect at the local level. Theeffectiveness of another project, the Extractive IndustriesTransparency Initiative, which was launched to enhance thetransparency of payments received by companies, has beenless effective (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009).

The discussion and analysis presented above demon-strates that Kazakhstan has made some progress in achieving

the selected three good governance dimensions. It is evi-denced that, in the political stage of Kazakhstan, PresidentNazarbayev remains the principal actor, and rules the coun-try with the support of his inner-circle and party stalwarts.The analysis further suggests that the political leaders donot play any significant role in achieving good governancein Kazakhstan. This governance style probably stems fromthe post-Soviet public’s favorable attitude toward an author-itarian leadership (Tolymbek, 2007, p. 11). A study byLubin (1995) also shows the same kind of public expecta-tions (strong leadership) exist in Kazakhstan. In this regardaftermath of the, Tolymbek (2007, p. 12) argues that thepreference of the public for a strong leader, after achievingindependence, was probably due to the public’s perceptionthat such a leader is able to restore law and order and tosecure economic revival and social safety. In the midst of thecurrent financial crisis and corresponding economic down-turn, it is unclear whether the perceptions of Kazakhstanisabout the mode of governance will quickly change.

CONCLUSION

This article has attempted to examine the role of politi-cal leadership in achieving good governance in Kazakhstan.Political leaders are responsible for guiding a country’seconomic, social and political development by formulatingand implementing strategic policy goals (Das & DiRienzo,2010). The evidence and analysis presented in this articlereveal that the Kazakhstani political leaders are engaged inmaking and implementing various plans and programs withthe goal of building Kazakhstan into the leading countryof Central Asia. In spite of many positive improvements,the image constructed here suggests that the nature of thecountry’s ruling leadership remains largely authoritative.Kazakhstan’s political landscape is dominated, effectively,by a handful of state actors, the President and his “superclan,” supported by the Nur Otan stalwarts. Political opposi-tion is disorganized and weak. A multi-party political systemis in place but run in a way that gives preferential treatmentto the pro-presidential parties and disadvantages to the par-ties in opposition. The hubs of political engagement, Senateand Majilis, are captured by the legislators only from the NurOtan, leaving little room for political participation by theopposition. This has essentially created a political vacuum,which signals a governance crisis.

Overcoming two decades of governance crises dependson a successful political marriage between the governmentand opposition. The relationship between Nur Otan and“so called” opposition parties is not fully supportive of agradual political development in Kazakhstan. The absenceof credible opposition parties undercuts the prospect ofinstitutionalization of multi-party politics. This effectivelylimits the role of political leadership in achieving goodgovernance in Kazakhstan.

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