EZEIBE Christian Chukwuebuka PG/M.SC/Ph.D/08/50046

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND CRISIS OF DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, 1960-

PRESENT

SOCIAL SCIENCES

POLITICAL SCIENCE

Content manager’s Name

Digitally Signed by: CHRIS EZEIBE/ 2011 DN : CN = Webmaster’s name O= University of Nigeria, Nsukka OU = Innovation Centre

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POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND CRISIS OF DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, 1960-PRESENT

BY

EZEIBE CHRISTIAN CHUKWUEBUKA PG/M.SC/Ph.D/08/50046

A PROJECT REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA NSUKKA, IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT

OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE AWARD OF MASTER OF SCIENCE DEGREE (MSC) IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (POLITICAL ECONOMY)

UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA NSUKKA

JANUARY, 2010

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TITLE PAGE

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND CRISIS OF DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, 1960-PRESENT

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APPROVAL PAGE

This Project report has been approved by the Department of Political Science, University

of Nigeria Nsukka.

Sgd 4/4/2010 _________________________ _____________________ Dr. Aloysius – Michaels Okolie Date (Supervisor) ___Sgd_______________ Professor, E. O. Ezeani _______5/4/10______________ (Heads of Department) Date

Sgd Professor, P.C. Onokala _______5/4/10________________ (Dean of Faculty) Date

Sgd 1/5/2010 _______________________________

External Examiner

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DEDICATION

This project report is dedicated to all the selfless Sub-Saharan African political leaders.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

If I have seen any further, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants. I sincerely

acknowledge all scholars whose works were cited in this study. This study would have

not been possible without your contributions both published and unpublished.

I sincerely acknowledge Dr. Aloysius .Michaels Okolie, whose display of

academic leadership in the process of supervision of this project was outstanding. My

supervisor per excellence, your brotherly and friendly manner of supervision has indeed

salvaged mankind in the quest for restoration of the lost dignity of man

I also appreciate Professor Emmanuel Ezeani, the Head of Department of Political

Science for laying a solid foundation to carry me throughout my research endeavours.

To my lecturers and colleagues, I want to say that you are all wonderful

My special thanks to my parent Sir & Lady G.E. Ezeibe (Esq.) for their moral

support and encouragement. To all my siblings, I love you all. I also remember Engr. &

Mrs P.N. Ojiaka for their support and assistance in one way or the other.

Again, I extend this warmest regards to all my friends most worthy of mention

Ama Agbo, may God bless and keep you all.

Finally, I give all honour and praise to God Almighty, the giver of life and

wisdom

C. C. Ezeibe Department of Political Science University of Nigeria Nsukka.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Title Page………………………………………………………………………………….ii

Approval Page……………………………………………………………………………...iii

Dedication…………………………………………………………………………….……iv

Acknowledgement………..…………………………………………………………………v

Table of Contents…………………………………………………………………………..vi

List of Tables……………………………………………………………………………….ix

List of Acronyms……………………………………………………………………………x

Abstract……………………………………………………………………………………xi

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………1

1.1 Statement of Problem…………………………………………..…………………….3

1.2 Objectives of Study…………………………………………………………………...6

1.3 Significance of the Study……………………………………………………………...6

1.4 Literature Review…………………………………………………………….…….....7 1.5 Theoretical Framework……………………………………………………….…….17

1.6 Hypotheses ………………………………………………………………………….21

1.7 Method of Data Collection and Analysis………………………..……………..…….22

1.8 Reliability and Validity……………………………………………………….. …….22 CHAPTER TWO: POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND PERSISTING ECONOMIC CRISIS……………………..………………..…....24

2.1 Leadership Qualities and Economic Problem of Sub-Saharan Africa……………………………………………………………… ….……….24 2.2 Causes of Leadership Crises in SSA Countries since 1960………… ….….. 26

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2.3 Impacts of Leadership Crises on Economic Development of SSA Countries……………………………………………………………………..29

2.4 Specific Leadership and Development Crises in Selected Sub-Saharan States……………………………………………………………33

. 2.5 Leadership Crises and Incidence of Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa……………………………………………………………..……………36 2.6 Link between bad leadership, failed states and economic crises………….… 41 2.7 New censure for African Leadership and Development Crises ……………....42 2.8 Political Leadership, Fiscal and Monetary Policies in Sub-Saharan Africa……………………………………………….……………45 2.9 Macro Economic Adjustment and Leadership failure………………………….49

CHAPTER THREE: POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND GLOBAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION……………..……………. 52 3.1 Sub-Saharan Africa Share of Global Trade …………………………………52 3.2 Membership of Sub-Saharan African States to International Financial Institutions…………………………………………………………………...57 3.3 Status of Sub-Saharan African States in World Trade Organization………….58 3.4 Political Leadership and Global Competitiveness………………..……………60 3.5 Reasons for Poor Integration of SSA Economies………………………………63 CHAPTER FOUR: POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND INTER-STATE RELATIONS……………………………………………………..66 4.1 Structure of Interstate Relations in Sub-Saharan Africa ………………………..66 4.2 Economic Relations within SSA Countries……………………………………...72 4.3 Political Leadership and Policy Inconsistency in SSA…………………………….75 4.4 Political Leadership and Crises of South-South Cooperation……………….…….77 4.5 From Organization of African Unity to African Union: Lessons from European Union……………………………………………………………..........78

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CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION……………………………80 5.1 Summary……………………………………………………………………………80 5.2 Conclusions………………………………………………………………………….82 5.3 Recommendations……………………………………………………………………83 BIBLIOGRAPHY……..………………………………………………………..………85 Appendix 1

Appendix 2

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.1: World’s Poorest Countries………………………………………..….25

Table 2.2 Selected Development Indicators for Some Economic Regions, 2000-2008…………………………………..………………………......36 Table 2.3: Governance Ratings and Household Consumption in Tropical Sub-Saharan Africa 2000-2008.……………………………37 Table 2:4 Main Exports in Sub-Saharan Africa 1960 – 2008…………………...38

Table 2.5: Key Indicators for Regional Data from the WDI database ………..…39

Table 2.6: Human Development Index ……….………………………………….40

Table 2.7 Index on African Governance …………………………………………44

Table 3.1: Sub-Saharan African Share of world made by countries 2000-2008 …………………………………………………………..……..53

Table 3.2: Annual Percentage Change in Trade in Sub-Saharan African Countries 2008……………………………………………………………56 Table 4.1 Trade Relations within ECOWAS Countries 1990-2004 …………..….73

Table 4.2: Trade relations within SADC………………………………………….73

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

WTO: World Trade Organization

SSA: Sub- Saharan Africa

MDGs.: Millennium Development Goal

IMF: International Monetary Fund

EU : European Union

AU: African Union

IFIs: International Financial Institutions

CNN: Cable News Network

BBC: British Broadcasting Corporation

ASEAN: Association of South East Asian Nations

APEC: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

NAFTA: North American Free Trade Area

ECA: Economic Commission for Africa

SACU: Southern Africa Customs Union

NEPAD: New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development

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ABSTRACT

In this study we explored the link between political leadership and persisting economic

problems in sub- Saharan Africa. Primarily, we interrogated the following questions: Is

there a link between persisting economic crises and incompetence on the part of political

leadership in sub- Saharan Africa between 1960 and 2009? Do leadership problems in

sub – Saharan Africa lead to poor integration of the region’s economies into the global

economy in the period under study? Is leadership failure responsible for poor inter-

state relation in sub- Saharan Africa ? This study was discussed under the perspective

prism of Marxian political economy as expounded by Karl Marx. In this study we put

forward the following hypotheses for testing: There is a link between incompetence on

the part of political leadership and persisting economic crises in sub- Saharan Africa

between 1960 and 2009. Leadership problems in sub – Saharan Africa lead to poor

integration of the region’s economies into the global economy in the period under study.

Leadership failure is responsible for the poor inter- state relation in sub- Saharan Africa.

These hypotheses were tested in chapters two, three and four respectively. The chapter

five contains the summary and conclusion

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION Sub-Saharan Africa also known as black Africa covers an area of 24.3 million

square kilometers. The region is obviously one of the poorest as it contains most of the

Least Developed States in the world. It forms bulk of ACP counties where diseases like

malaria is a chronic impediment to economic development. According to the World

Bank, the region’s GDP would have been 32% higher in 2003 if the disease had been

eradicated in 1960. The population of sub-Saharan Africa was 800 million in 2007 while

the current growth rate is 2.3% (www.subsaharanafricapolitical.com). The United

Nations (UN) prediction for the population of the region stands at nearly 1.5 billion in

2050. Figures for life expectancy, malnourishment, and infant mortality and HIV/AIDS

infections are also dramatic. More than 40% of the populations in sub-Saharan countries

are younger than 15 years old. Sub-Saharan Africa has very high child mortality rate. In

2002, one in six (17%) children died before the age of five, by 2007 this rate had declined

16%, to one in seven (15%) while it has increased to 24% since 2008 but with the

exception of South Africa (www. development .com).

The region has remained in lockstep with violence and instability since their

independence from late 1950s to 1960s, mainly due to the failure of past and present

leaders to effectively manage and/or reduce conflict drivers within the region. To surmount

this problem and prevent the region from careening towards the vortex of failed state,

scholars have advocated that leaders that are honest, sincere and committed to social

justice, equity, rule of law and other democratic values that help to bond society and

promote stability is unavoidably the answer.

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Decades after decolonization in Africa especially from 1990, many sub-Saharan

Africa states were immersed in seeming intractable leadership crisis. The fruits of

peaceful co-existence and harmony which include stability and socio-economic

development have remained largely illusive in the region. Echezona (1998:57) rightly

observed that “…the crisis which bestride each and every African country… are at the

same time ethnic, economic, social and environmental”.

Truly, the period spanning from 1960 to the present christened the Post colonial/

neo-colonial era witnessed an upsurge of development failure in developing countries

especially Africa. In Liberia Samuel Doe, Prince Yormie Johnson, and Charles Taylor

were the night mares of Liberian as they struggled for seizure of state power consecutively

or simultaneously and thereby inflicted economic hardship on the people of Liberia and the

sub-Saharan region at large (Echezona, 1993:99). This was not an exception as it was the

case across Africa. In Sierra Leone, Paul Koroma, Ahmed Tejan kabbah, John Karafa

Smart etc. were interlocked in intensive crisis for the capture of the state (Hassan, 2002). In

Somalia, Hussen Mohammed Aideed, Hassan Mohammed Nur Shatigudud, Abdiaji Yusuf

Ahmed and Sallad Hanssan were rivals (Hassan, 2002). In Burundi, and Rwanda, the Tutsi

and Hutu were engaged in a frontal blood bizarre. Conflict looks every part of Africa as

political leaderships fail to manage economic production justly. The states therefore do not

appear as the bank of interest of the generality of the people. A monopolistic capitalism,

crises drives away the few foreign investors in sub-Saharan Africa to more stable third

world countries in Asia, Latin America, North and South Africa

About five decades after political independent in sub- Saharan Africa, the impact of

political leadership on economic development in sub- Saharan Africa is adverse as the full

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scope of the danger becomes clear. In Sub-Saharan Africa, what appeared as mere ethnic

cleansing has turned into a long and brutal civil war in most cases. The consequences of

violent conflict on the African continent have been devastating. Similarly, there appears an

intensifying economic hardship in the region which seems to account for the declining

legitimacy to make authoritative decision for the majority of the citizenry at all levels of

governance. In the absence of peace and stability, government legitimacy, and economic

growth and development, most states in the region under study are described as failed or

failing states.

While this study does not dispute this supra argument that is mainly associated

with Chinua Achebe (1983) and many other sub Saharan scholars, this study seeks to

explore the interlinks between the style of leadership and the intensifying crises of

economic development in the sub- Saharan Africa with a view to deciphering brighter

prospects for African economic development. In this study, we shall explore the following

countries for emphases: Zimbabwe, Sudan, Somali, Liberia, Rwanda, Burundi, Gambia,

Ivory Coast, Niger, Chad, Nigeria and Tanzania.

1.1 Statement of Problem

Liberal democracy proposed by the West as the political model for economic

development appears to have proven incongruent with African experiences especially the

sub Saharan region that continue to be listed by UN, her agencies and other international

organization’s ‘bad books’ as the poorest, diseases- ridden and home to most ignorant

people in the world. Nonetheless, the US first black President Barrack Obama, in his

speech in Ghana reiterated that Africa has remained backward on account of the corrupt

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leadership since their various independents. He urged Africans to evolve strong institutions

and not strong men. Obama also restated that America would no longer dictate to nations

the path to political and economic development. The implication is that the US had done so

in the past probably through the activities of IMF and World Bank whose conditionalities

for loan to the poor regions of the world are at worst described as harsh on the economies

of the recipient countries (Echezona, 1993:99).

It is abundantly clear that due to differences in culture, geography, political and

socio-economic factors that there are no manuals or handouts on political leadership that a

nation should apply to achieve their economic end. We have countless prognosis of action

that unwittingly did not work in other places but generated internal upheaval here and

there. For example, to a large extent, while Western style democracy has worked perfectly

well in North America and Western Europe, it is yet to produce the desired results in

Nigeria, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Somalia, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Liberia and many other

countries that have so far experimented with it.

On the socio-economic front, the story is worse as the economies of most sub-

Saharan African states are mono- cultural. Governments of these states underpay and over

-tax citizens. Not only that, the region has one of the highest unemployment rates in the

world, the manufacturing and other allied industries are either dead or performing below

capacity. In addition, social infrastructures and services that would have helped to promote

socio-economic development are in deplorable conditions. Sustainable economic

opportunity in the region is at an average of 58% and human development at about 50 %.

This is in contrast with the 80% and 92% rate 85% and 90 % rate found in North America

and in Europe respectively (www.moibrahimfoundation .org). The roads are death traps,

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while electricity supply is erratic and people in urban areas often live in crowded squalor

from Abidjan to Abuja.

In the light of the above, we understand why the environment of lawlessness and its

consequences are fertile seedbeds for the flourishing of area boys, ethnic militias, child

labour, industrial disputes, religious crisis and many other socio-economic predicaments

across Africa. It is in connection with these political, economic and social crises that

various ethnic groups and civil society organisations in Africa are calling for either

National Conference or Constitutional Conference to address what they have tagged the

“Nigerian question, Somalia question, Sudanese question, Gabonese question,

Zimbabwean question Congolese question etc”. It is also against this background that the

recent US intelligent report on sub- Saharan Africa ranks it as one of the most unsafe

places to do business in the world.

The leadership problem connects with building core state institutions like the

police, civil service, the legislature, the judiciary and the executives. Without a good and

committed leadership, these institutions cannot function properly. For instance, if you have

leaders who have no respect for the rule of law, human rights, minority rights and other

values that help to tie and make society stable, you cannot expect the judiciary to function

properly. In other words, if leaders desecrate their core institutions, those institutions

cannot work creditably. This is the situation in most states in Africa.

However, inquiries on relationship between problems of leadership and economic

developments either concentrate in one country especially Nigeria, Liberia and Zimbabwe

or are carried out with the immediate post colonial Africa in mind (see, Echezona,

1993:99; Hassan, 2002; Hazeley, 2002 and Achebe, 1983). This does not help us to

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understand the contemporary link between leadership problems and development crises

hence this forms the lacuna in literature that we seek to bridge. This study therefore span a

period from 1960-2009 with emphasis on the major sub- Saharan African states. Most

states in the region are characterized by immanent crises of development; the tendency for

the US failed States Index to rank states in the region among the first 20 – 30 states at the

risk of violent internal conflict that can erupt like a volcano any moment; and the tendency

for apparent shabby scholarly articulation of interlinks of leadership problems and

development crises in the region. In the context of the foregoing discourse we pose the

following questions:

1) Is there a link between persisting economic crises and incompetence on the part of

political leadership in sub- Saharan Africa?

2) Do leadership problems in sub – Saharan Africa account for poor integration of the

region’s economies into the global economy?

3) Is leadership failure responsible for poor inter- state relation in sub- Saharan

Africa?

1.2 Objectives of Study

The broad objective of this study is to examine the linkage between the method of

political leadership and crises of development in sub- Saharan Africa between 1960 and

2009. Specifically, this study has the following objectives

1) To ascertain if there is any link between persisting economic crises and

incompetence on the part of political leadership in sub- Saharan Africa.

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2) To examine if leadership problems in sub – Saharan Africa account for poor

integration of the region’s economies into the global economy in the period under

study.

3) To determine whether leadership failure is responsible for poor inter- state relation

in sub- Saharan Africa.

1.3 Significance of the Study

The study has both practical and theoretical significance. Practically, the study

will inform and guide policy makers of sub-Saharan African states in policy process in

relation with their external environment and in their domestic policy making and

implementation process to develop their various economies. It will also guide investors to

determine the direction of policies of leadership class and the degree of political stability

in sub-Saharan African while considering investment friendly sites and also to other

business ventures within the region. This study will also serve as a manual for every

peace chart in the region between rival groups and provide guide to aid agencies in

delivering aid to achieve economic growth and development.

Theoretically, this study furnishes both students and staff of Political Science in

particular and Social Sciences in general with new knowledge of leadership failure and

crises of development in the region. The study will also serve as the theoretical base for

the socio- economic and political transformation of the sub- Saharan African economies.

It will also aid the political leadership in preparing development projects and programmes

for the region. Finally, this study will serve as a source of secondary data for future

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researcher in the areas of leadership studies, development crisis and state failure in

Africa.

1.4 Literature Review

Literature on political leadership is much but has not received enough attention in the

recent past, and there are several criticisms of political leadership in Africa and other

developing economies. The study is narrowed to the following sub themes deriving from

our research questions.

A) Leadership problem and economic crises

B) Integration of Saharan African Economies into the global economy

C) Leadership and Inter- state relations in sub- Saharan Africa.

Leadership Problems and Economic Crises

Echezona (1998) quoting Claude Ake examined the state in capitalist society and

related it to the states in Africa. According to him, what distinguishes a capitalist society

from other societies is the pervasiveness of commoditization and autonomization.

Inherent in this assessment of state in capitalist societies in relation of capitalist states in

Africa is the fact that the way capitalism or capitalist state operates in Africa is different

from the way it operates in the Western world that hoisted it on Africa. Thus, it was

observed that in Africa, there has been willfully wrong placement of emphasis

(pervasiveness) on the acquisition of material wealth i.e. (commoditization) and the result

of which there emerged the autonomy of dominance by the wealthy ones over the poor

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ones i.e. autonomization of domination. These were the flaws of capitalist states in Africa

and these flaws are invisible in the western capitalist states.

To complicate and worsen the situation Anene and Brown (1981:47) noted that

the colonialist did not stop at merging of incompatible ethnic nations but also went on to

sensitizing and fuelling of ethnic division and differences so as to forestall any possible

integration and unity of the people in the state-colonies. In a very closely related

observation, Anene and Brown stressed on the excess ethnic awareness as one of the

complex legacies of colonial administration in Africa. Moron-Browne rightly observed

that one of the injurious legacies of colonial era in Africa was the intensification of ethnic

awareness either by altering the demographic balance or by introducing a new political

system.

Similarly, Vicker (1993) observes that ethnic conflicts occur as a result of

colonial power’s arbitrarily drawn frontiers following the 1884/1885 Berlin colonial

partition of Africa. This stems from the fact that most African states are but

amalgamation of different ethnic/national groups who have differences in their historical

background, cultural language, ideology and religion.

Nonetheless, Ake (1985) viewed leadership in Africa as one of the injurious

imports of the capitalist system of production in Africa. He argued that the capitalist

system of production brought into Africa a very serious antagonism between and among

leaders in different states of Africa, and consequent upon which there ensued crises

among them. Hence, Patrice Lumumba, Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere and Claude

Ake etc had argued that these conflicts are squarely the products of the emergence of

capitalism in Africa. They contended that the dynamic interplay of issues in capitalist

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system of production created antagonistic tendencies among the people since the relations

of production are mostly the relations of conflict and crises among different competing

interest struggling over the surplus that accrue in the production of goods and services.

Ezema (2001:51) cited some other case illustrations on where the schemes of

deprivation or alienation cause leadership crises especially in the period of post cold war

years in Africa. These include: the Liberian crises of twentieth century and beyond, the

Sierra Leone crises of twentieth century and beyond, also the crises in former Zaire now

Democratic Republic of Congo and the several years of apartheid crises in South African

etc. In fact, virtually all the leadership crises that have occurred in many Africa states

possess the traces of one deprivation or the other. While, this position of relative-

deprivation may appear attractive it fails to tell us why deprivation leads to aggression in

some areas and not the other. It did not account for the leaders influence in the crises of

development and why it has persisted.

Integration of Saharan African Economies into the Global Economy

Ntuli (2004) stated that the phenomenon of globalization appears to be a product

of renewed belief and contestations in a global process, which has drawn the international

community at the threshold of a global village. These range from politics, economy,

communication and education to even agriculture and food. National economies are all

dissolving and distinct management of national economies are all becoming irrelevant

and giving way to globalized strategies characterized by powerful market forces. All

forms of integration have also been a logical consequence of globalization. These include

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economic and monetary integration. He observed that these formations have affected not

only domestic policies of states but also led to compromise of sovereignty and autonomy

in domestic policy making and implementation. According to Ntuli, this process is not

new to sub-Saharan African region as a part of global community, events and activities in

the region have had their own logical outcomes, which could be attributed to the global

evolution. Part of this is found in the renewed vigor and efforts at coming together in

addressing regional problems ranging from harmonization of serenity efforts, health

legislative activities and process of adjudication. Over and above all is economic and

monetary integration, which is believed to be basis for rejuvenation and extractive

capabilities of member states. According to Ntuli, despite the effort to integrate the

Africa states appear very unlikely to be left behind in emerging global process, since

activities by states in the sub-regions demonstrate reinvigorated desires to become active

players in the “new deal” in the interest of their citizens.

Ntuli concluded that the emerging globalization process had incorporated

adequately economies of African state. While answering in the affirmative, he insisted

that it is not only that globalization has promoted greater developments in the region but

also that the globalization process has facilitated the implementation of treaties of

economic relation. However, Ntuli’s analysis has not helped us to ascertain the rationale

behind the continued problem of integrating African sub-Saharan economies in a world

that is increasingly becoming a global village with capitalism as its fulcrum or the effect

of leadership in the process. It however gave an insight into the status of African

economic integration in to the global economy in positive terms.

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Browne (1998) noted that regionalism is not new to the global agenda and that is

more and more frequently bracketed with globalization. All forms of political and

economic cooperation are receiving a higher priority among countries in all regions and

at all levels of development. While stating that regionalism is now in vogue, he noted that

there are a few examples of long established regional groupings that have become

stronger over time. Notably the European Union and the Association of South-East Asia

Nations have but many of those established over the last three decades have been short-

lived or have retained mainly symbolic political significance. The author stated that for a

number of reasons, there has been a growing commitment to regionalism since the late

1980s. Some of the reasons include increased understanding of the importance of trade

and economic openness. Inward-oriented development and self-sufficiency are terms

disappearing from the development lexicon.

He equally observed in many parts of the world, there is a more conciliatory

political climate. The cold war kept many neighbours at political odds. In its after math,

old ideological enemies and political rivals are more willing than before to collaborate.

For instance, countries of the Warsaw pact are now joining the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO) and seeking membership of the European Union. The same thing

is happening in West and Central Asia. The arrival of full democracy in South Africa also

gave a new lease of life to the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference,

renamed a Development Community in 1992. There have also been examples of stronger

regionalism in East and South Asia.

Browne concluded that regionalism is an important manifestation of greater

economic openness being witnessed on a global scale. However, regionalism in the

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context of a process of global trade liberalization led by the World Trade Organization is

ultimately contributory rather than inimical to free trade. By bringing more countries into

the fold of liberal and outward – looking economies moreover, regionalism also

contribute to continuing reform, especially in countries in a transitional phase away from

central planning and management. Finally while noting that regional bodies also

undertake important security and peace-keeping initiative, trade provides the driving

force for most regional initiatives. While Browne was elaborated on regionalism and

interstates relations, he was not emphatic in sub-Saharan Africa and he did not link

leadership to this poor interstate relation in the region.

Nwanegbo (2005) briefly interrogated the existing concepts of globalization and

regional integration and explored their interconnections in the context of global order. He

was more interested in exploring how the recent craze towards the formation of regional

bodies could give room to, or enhance globalization; hence of little importance for our

review. The author noted that integration entails the building up of a stronger and virile

body that will among other things seek to enhance the people’s way of life and to live. It

denotes the bringing together of hitherto autonomous regions or centres into a whole. It is

the combining of two or more things so that they work together effectively, like the closer

integration of the countries economies.

Using African Union as case study of regional integration, the author remarked

that globalization is not going to get the friendly cooperation to succeed. This is because

some of these regional bodies were established to serve as a center of negotiation,

primarily to cover up for the weakness of its constituting countries, in the face of others

(the bigger body). The author was equally interested in exploring how the formation of

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regional bodies could enhance the process of globalization. Notwithstanding the close

relationship this has with out task, it did not explore the link between political leadership

and interstate relation in the region under study hence, the questions we posed still beg

for answers.

Garcia (1998) studied Latin American patterns of globalization and regionalism.

She conceptualized globalization to imply changes in the way production is organized as

required by the general dismantling of trade barriers and the free mobility of accelerated

technological change. Rapid integration of national economies into the global market is

another especially conspicuous feature of the process. Garcia remarked that Latin

America has been forced to enter the process of globalization. The results of this process

in the economic sphere, is the repositioning of Latin America in the world economy,

measured by its international competitiveness and in social aspects, have not been

encouraging. According to the author, globalization protects the interest of some people

more than others. Because of this, the best approach towards joining this process of

globalization seems to be through globalization. Although, Garcia analysis was logical, it

was interested in globalization and rationalization in Latin America and this will not help

us to understand the effect of leadership on global integration of sub-Saharan African

economies.

Oyejide (1998) examined globalization and its implications for Africa trade policy

and reviewed the trade and patterns of African exports in the context of the regions

perceived marginalization in world trade. He started by conceptualizing globalization as

increased integration, across countries, of markets for good, services and capital. This in

turn implies accelerated expansion of economic activities globally and sharp increases in

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the movement of tangible and intangible goods across national and regional boundaries.

With that movement, individual countries are becoming more closely integrated into the

global economy. Their trade linkages and investment flows grow more complex, and

cross-border financial movements are more volatile. Deepening integration of trade,

markets and finance all mean increasing independence.

The author argued that Africa’s poor export and overall economic growth

performance predated and therefore, not directly ascribable to the current wave of

globalization. Oyejide was more interested in the marginalization of Africa in world trade

and the way to reverse this trend. He did not see leadership as an impediment towards

this goal or as a willing ally. In fact, his work did not address the issue of political

leadership and economic crises in sub-Saharan Africa.

Similarly Nnanna (2006) took a look at economic and monetary integration in

Africa. He opined that the ultimate goal of regional integration is to create a common

economic space among the participating countries. The process entails the harmonization

of macroeconomic politics, legal frameworks and real convergence. Some other

objectives include the enlargement and diversification of market size, the promotion of

intra-regional trade and the strengthening of member countries bargaining power in the

global economy. Other characteristics include factor, especially, capital and labour, and

the integration of the goods market. The author opines that based on available qualitative

and quantitative assessments the monetary union arrangement, Africa does not satisfy the

OCA conditions when measuring against the following criteria; income structure, product

market flexibility, labour market mobility, degree of opening, intra-trade relations and

asymmetric terms of trade shocks. With regard to income structure, he noted that African

27

regional arrangements fall short of the requirements, as in most regions, one or two

countries are at a higher development trajectory than others within the group. As regards

market flexibility, it is obvious that most countries in Africa and sub-Saharan Africa in

particular depend on limited number of primary commodities. His study was aimed at a

comparative analysis of the efforts made by African policy makers towards the

achievement of economic and monetary union, as well as to appraise the challenges and

prospects of achieving the objective.

Therefore, the question of effect of leadership and economic crises in sub-Saharan

African is still not satisfactorily answered. Though scholars have generally pointed out

the link between the two variables, it appears none have been specific with sub-Saharan

African being the poorest, most corrupt and unstable region of the world.

Leadership and Inter- state relation in sub- Saharan Africa

Igwe (1997) states that inter state relations in Africa in the post cold war years

were relations characterized by crisis management and resolution especially within the

political systems of different states. He insisted that leaders in many African states

shattered their political systems with series of crises that in most cases resulted into

bloody civil wars. Thus, many African relations with the outside world were hinged on

negotiation for acquisition and distribution of arms with which the rebels and those in

government fought themselves. Although, Igwe captured, the point here vividly he did

not narrow his study down to sub-Saharan Africa.

Nwachukwu (1998) observes that leadership and war going on in Africa aid the

western countries of the world that manufacture weapons of war to channel their relations

with these Africans towards selling and disposing of their manufactured war hardwares.

28

This led to the proliferation of arms in Africa and also the intensity of crises in the

continent.

Given the rampant cases of crises situations in Africa, he observed that the

African interaction with the world in the period of post colonial years had also been

marked with the request for the resolution of crises between or among the warring

factional leaders in many warring states in Africa. Okunola (1995:1251) noted that there

have been several calls for peace negotiations and agreements to resolve crisis in the

political leaderships of many states in Africa. Then there emerged many peace accords

for instance the Abuja accord on Liberian crises, Nairobi accord on crises in Democratic

Republic of Congo etc. But on these and more other instances, it should be noted that

while some of these peace accords failed to restore peace and hence the search and

negotiation for peace continued as the crises lingered on.

Nnoli (1989) argued that the Nigeria politics presents an image of deprivation

struggle among leaders of various ethnic groups for the sharing of national resources. He

further emphasized that most Nigerian have come to attach credence to the fact that

unless their own leaders were in government, they would not have an easy access to the

fair share of the national resources. Although his point was cogent, he did not extend this

to sun – Saharan Africa

Following literature reviewed, it appears inquiries on relationship between

problems of leadership and economic developments are either largely thematic or are

carried out with the immediate post colonial Africa in mind. This does not help us to

understand the contemporary link between leadership problems and development crises.

Again, the previous studies failed to emphasize the sub- Saharan African states leadership

29

crises as the poorest region in the world. Also the previous studies did not look at the

impact of leadership problems on inter- state relation in sub- Saharan Africa in the period

under study. Although the previous studies explored the link between persisting economic

crises and incompetence on the part of political leadership in Africa, they did not

particularize on sub- Saharan Africa in the period under study. Again, it also appears that

the previous studies did not address the relationship between leadership problem in sub –

Saharan Africa and integration of the region’s economies into the global economy. These

gaps in literature are what this study seeks to bridge. Filling of these lacunas constitute the

driving force or the motivating agent for this study.

1.5 Theoretical Framework

Although most academic works on leadership and development in the third world

countries especially sub-Saharan Africa (the poorest region of the world) are analyzed

either within the post- colonial theory of the state; dependency or centre –periphery

models as the theoretical frameworks of analyses. These frameworks are inadequate for

explicating, understanding and explaining the complex link between the super structure

and the sub – structure of sub-Saharan African states which have proved almost all IMF

and World Bank’s development models inefficient and void. This is because these

frameworks are largely descriptive, conservative and devoid of dialectical and scientific

analysis that Marxian dialectical Materialistic approach offers (Okolie, 2004; 2005).

This study will be discussed under the framework of Marxian political economy as

expounded in A contribution to the critique of political economy Karl Marx (1968). Karl

Marx critically reviewed the Hegelian philosophy of right which appeared in 1844 and

30

found that material (economic) life conditions the social, political and intellectual life

process in general. In the words of Marx, “it is not the consciousness of men that

determines their being, but on the contrary, their social being determine their

consciousness”. Hence, dialectical materialism, as its defining method is characterized

by:

(1) Dynamic character of social reality

(2) Inter relatedness of different levels of structure

(3) Primacy of material condition

In adopting the Marxist political economy as the analytical guide on this research, we

emphasize such objects of analysis like: the relations of production of good and services,

distribution of national resources and the attendant crises arising from both the relations

of production and the distribution of national resources. We emphasize these because

they are among the factors of economic indices that had always generated conflict and

crises in the societies more especially in the states of Africa. Very often both the relations

of production and distribution of national resources are characterized by conflicts

antagonism consequent upon which the motive propelling different conflicting factional

leaders are seen in terms of endless struggle for a position of dominance not only in the

state power in general but also particularly in the material production and distributions in

the state. At this juncture, statism is seen as the most potent and co and coercive

instrument or structure with which to achieve dominance in the society, and thereby

making politics to take predominance over economy. Hence production becomes

synonymous with power acquisition so that politics equally means production.

31

Moreover, in terms of focus, it highlights the primacy of the material conditions of

life (Asobie, 1990:17-20; Ake, 1981). Indeed, the approach contains a strong and explicit

theoretical formulation as a focus for research, which will, no doubt, continue to be

significantly inductive and empirical (Moon, 1991:34). However, its analysis on the sub-

structural and super-structural relationship is faulted when we empirically evaluate the

circumstances of developing economies. More especially when we note that the low level

of the productive forces in itself undermine efforts at enhancing state autonomy. Thus, in

such societies it is not primarily the sub-structure that determines the character of the

superstructure. Generally, the reverse is the case. At best both are innately self-

reinforcing and reciprocally complementary.

Hence, Alavi (1973:146-7) noted, inter alia, that “the problem of the relationship

between the state and the underlying economic structure is more complex than the

context in which it was posed”. In furtherance of this, Ekekwe (1986:12) remarked that,

“in the periphery of capitalism, factors which have to do with the level of development of

the productive forces make the state, through its several institutions and apparatuses, a

direct instrument for accumulation for the dominant class or its elements.” Therefore, as

observed by Miliband (1969), the state becomes the source of economic power as well as

an instrument of it; the state is a major means of production.

Therefore this paradigm tends to analyze the interlink of leadership failure and cries

of development in sub- Saharan Africa from several disciplinary perspectives and from

all the three levels of analysis namely: individual, state and international system, taking

into account the many actors and institutions involved, since each discipline makes

important but incomplete contribution to our understanding of global events. Landes

32

(1998) captured this prevailing unequal world order which moves with western

Capitalism as its fulcrum was transferred to peripheral African states since their

independents. Peripheral capitalism was transferred to the whole of sub-Saharan Africa

during the era of colonialism by the superpowers. This was in the economic interest of

super powers that were in pursuit of global peace without which world trade collapse and

foreign direct investment terminated thus income diminishes.

Frequently, the interest involved in responding to leadership failures in sub- Saharan

African states would be economical as well as political. The states in the region become

the big market where the political leaders allocate and distribute scarce resources to their

citizens on the basis of equality of states. Behind this seeming equality, lie political

leaders that still prioritize their personal political and economic interest. Decision on who

gets to benefit from this distribution is affected by the capacity of the benefactor to

influence seize state power and use it for their selfish interest. Moreover, this analytic

frame enabled us to understand the dynamics of poverty regeneration and continual

economic decay in sub- Saharan Africa.

Many sub-Saharan African states are operating a mono- cultural capitalist economic

system and this makes the removal of the pursuits of personal economic interest difficult.

Political channels are necessary to obtain economic advantage. Most leaders in the region

use political status to achieve or accumulate wealth by consolidating their position

through collusive relation with the powers that be and refuse to leave office. Bulks of

these resources are mined from the environment and the proceeds are siphoned by

political leaders. This force of economic interest leads to seat tight tendency among

African leaders.

33

Omar Bongo of Gabon died after 42 years in power; Muammar Gaddafi of Libya has

stayed 39 years in the Saddle; Teodoro Obiang Mbasong of Equatorial Guinea has held

on for 30 years; Hot on his heels is Mugabe at 29 in Zimbabwe, Hosim, Mubarak of

Egypt for 27 years; Paul Biya of Cameroon for 26 years; Yoweri Musevini of Uganda for

23 years; king Mswati 111 of Burkina Faso for 21 years and host of other (Anim,

2009:50). No wonder President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria was so much interested in

a third term bid. The saddest side of the story is that these rulers have shown lack of

ability to blend strength and experience to achieve the much desired development in

Africa, yet they remains in political office for self aggrandizement.

No wonder, various crises situation in sub-Saharan Africa is related to the struggle for

national question which is usually in protection of natural resources ranging from Gold to

Diamond and Tin to Crude oil. These natural resources are crucial to the survival of the

people on whose land it is located while sub-Saharan mono- cultural economies see these

resources as the sole source of foreign exchange for the entire state hence world not spare

the last military personnel to uproot any group standing in between the state (interest of

the dominant class) and the resources.

1.6 Hypotheses

In this study, we shall explore the following hypotheses:

1) There is a link between incompetence on the part of political leadership and

persisting economic crises in sub- Saharan Africa.

2) Leadership problems in sub – Saharan Africa account for poor integration of the

region’s economies into the global economy.

34

3) Leadership failure is responsible for the poor inter- state relations in sub- Saharan

Africa.

1.7 Method of Data Collection and analysis

The study is basically a library research hence we relied on documentary method

of data collection. We collected data on leadership problems and crises of development in

sub-Saharan farina from secondary sources such as books; journals; UN, ECOWAS, AU,

NIIA, World Bank and IMF publications; Seminar, Conference and Workshop papers;

Magazines; Newspapers and internet for this study.

Descriptive and explanatory methods of analysis were adopted for this qualitative

study to demonstrate the validity and reliability of findings of this study.

The study described the chains of events and actions that characterise political leadership

from 1960 to 2009 based on the materials provided by relevant books; journals; UN,

ECOWAS, AU, NIIA, World Bank and IMF publications; Seminar, Conference and

Workshop papers; Magazines; Newspapers and internet. Simple percentage and statistical

tools were also applied in the analysis when necessary.

1.8 RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY

In order to ensure that this study measures what it claims to be measuring, that is,

the relationship between political leadership and economic crisis in sub- Saharan Africa

35

since 1960 to present, we shall rely solely on consistent data of this region on crises of

political economy and development since 1960. We consulted newspaper publications,

seminar papers, government documents, academic journal bordering on the African

political economy and development, publications of international organizations (AU, EU,

IMF, UNDP, World Bank, ADB etc) on Africa. We also validated our conclusions by

comparing the leadership performances and political economic conditions in sub-

Saharan Africa with those of conditions of Northern and Southern African states and the

rest of the Third world countries.

36

CHAPTER TWO

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND PERSISTING ECONOMIC CRISIS

In this chapter, we explored our first hypothesis which states that there is a link

between incompetence on the part of political leadership and persisting economic crises in

sub- Saharan Africa (SSA) between 1960 and 2009. In order to do this we articulated few

leadership qualities and some economic problem of sub-Saharan Africa. We looked at

some causes of leadership crises in SSA and examined the impact of leadership crises on

economic development in the region under study. We equally explored leadership crises in

specific SSA countries to determine whether it has implications for economic

development. Again, we compared the sub-Saharan African economies with the economies

of the rest of the Third World with a new censure. Also, we examined the relationships

between political leadership and fiscal and monetary policies in the region. Finally, we

looked at how increasing incidence of poverty implicated political leadership in the region,

under study.

2.1 Leadership Qualities and Economic Problem of Sub-Saharan Africa

Chandan (1989:226) identified the basic leadership traits necessary for any

business to thrive whether in the private or public sphere. These traits include: leaders

must be able to inspire others; posses or cultivate skills necessary for solving problems;

exhibit self-confidence and maturity; be able to understand human behaviour; be

confident of his opinion and verbally assertive be willing to take risk and seek new

challenges and be skillful in the art of compromise and consensus. In addition to the

above qualities Nnabugwu (2005:109) argued that a leader should posses such traits as

initiative, organizational ability and perseverance.

37

More so, Okolie (2009:6) noted among others the quantities of a leader to include

intelligent, reasonable, ad-hoc pessimism, resourceful, selfless, visionary, responsible,

accountable/transparent, statesmanship, charisma, capacity for independent action,

innovative, tolerance, patriotic, courageous, hardworking, sense of mission, decisive,

technical proficiency etc. He also added that a leader has the functions of motivating,

coordinating, integrating, representing, directing, organizing and controlling.

Furthermore, Okolie (2009:18) also observed that when the ethical standing of a

leader is questioned, the leader looses all credibility and his legitimacy hangs in

symphony and that high ethical standing serves as a fortress and enhances legitimacy,

acceptance credibility and support. In fact he argued that leadership is directed at

societally acceptable good. Hence leadership in SSA countries becomes quixotic and this

has economic implication.

The present economic situation of African countries is disturbing as SSA

countries continue to be home to the poorest people in the world (see table 2.1 below)

Table 2.1 : WORLD’S POOREST COUNTRIES Rank Country GDP Per Capita 1. Sierra Leone $500

2. Tanzania $550

3. Ethiopia $560

4. Somalia $600

5. Cambodia $710

6. Democratic Rep of Congo $710

7. Rwanda $720

8. Comoros $725

9. Burundi $730

10. Eritrea $750

11. Yemen $750

12. Madagascar $780

13. Afghanistan $800

14. Tuvalu $800

15. Mali $820

16. Kiribati $760

17. Zambia $880

18. Guinea-Bissau $900

38

19. Malawi $940

20. Sudan $940

21. Nigeria $970

Compiled by CIA world fact book Curled from (Nwanegbo, 2005)

Table 2.1 above shows that the first 10 poorest countries in the world are in the

sub-Saharan African region. The GDP of SSA was US$ 744 billion, which was

equivalent of 28% of China’s GDP, 69% of Brazil’s, 74% of Russia’s, and 80% of

India’s (African Development Indicators, 2008). In 2008 GDP growth in Africa was 5.7

per cent; it was 6.1 per cent in 2007. This explains why World Bank has classified sub-

Saharan Africa as a debt distressed region as nation in the region find it extremely

difficult or impossible to service debt (Killick and Martins, 1989a). They rightly noted

that the basic amenities for the people living in sub-Saharan region are embarrassing.

Political leadership in this region has therefore been unable to organize or direct

economic programmes and projects that would steer their people away from poverty and

launch their economies in the global fact book of record as developed states. Socio-

economic and political indicators of states vulnerability are also contained in Appendix 1.

2.4 Causes of Leadership Crises in SSA Countries Since 1960

In Zimbabwe, President Robert Mugabe has been one of the civilian autocrats

who have been in power for twenty eight (28) years, tolerating no rivalry to his power.

His political desire to stay in the presidential office remains insatiable and unconstrained

by conscience hence, the repeated flaring up of crisis. As African leaders devote their

attentions and efforts to clinging to power, the continent continues to endure the burden

of underdevelopment, widespread poverty, high levels of illiteracy, widening income gap

between the haves and have-nots etc.

39

The end of the Cold War, thus, the ceasing of the once sharp ideological division

between the East and West, at the beginning of the 1990s appeared to herald an era of

democratization on the continent. The phenomenon of military coups d’etat, and

undemocratic way of bringing about leadership succession in Africa seemed to be on the

decline, as various forms of multiparty political systems were being introduced around

the continent. But the introduction of ‘multipartism’ did not prevent the leadership

succession from developing into an acute crisis on the continent. With military coups

being widely discredited, gaining and clinging to power now took the form of civilian

dictatorship, which is self-entrenched autocratic rule via different forms of intimidation,

rigging of elections and many other forms of undemocratic vices. These dishonest

methods of leadership succession often led to violent conflicts in the sub-region. African

autocrats do not hesitate to manipulate their national constitutions to prolong their stay in

power. Among the recent cases of succession-driven crises in Africa are those of Sierra

Leone, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Togo, Kenya and Zimbabwe Thousands of lives have been

lost due to the destructive nature of these conflicts. Another aspect of the leadership

succession crises in Africa is that of African heads of state stepping down from the

presidential office but maneuvering to desperately cling onto a certain measure of power

by remaining leaders of their political parties. The recent examples are that of Namibia

and Malawi.

In the case of Namibia, the constitution had to be amended to accommodate a

third term for the former president Sam Nujoma only. In Malawi, Nigeria and Zambia,

similar attempts were made to amend the constitutions, but these were thwarted by a

coalition of forces made up of opposition political parties, civil society organizations, and

40

even sections within the ruling parties. The ambitions of Bakili Muluzi, Olusegun

Obasanjo and Frederick Chiluba, in their attempts masquerading as born again democrats

best captures the point being made above.

In Zimbabwe and Uganda, opposition parties and civil society organizations

failed to stop the incumbent Presidents Robert Mugabe and Yoweri Museveni

respectively, from amending their constitutions in order to extend their terms of office.

Hence these two autocrats succeeded to extend their stay in power and this explains why

the crisis of leadership succession is continuing to brew in the two countries. The

succession issue engendered a constitutional crisis in Ivory Coast resulting in a military

coup, electoral fraud, civil unrest and subsequent division of the country into the south

and the north. In Togo, a succession crisis ensured in 2005 following the death of their

former military strongman Gnassingbe Eyadema, and the military installation of his son,

Faure Gnassingbe. Following the crisis of leadership succession in Africa has just

witnessed carnage in Kenya and inexorable deepening of a similar crisis in Zimbabwe.

In all these instances, countries did not only lose lives and property, but the

process of democratization has also been rolled back. Development and socio-economic

progress took the back burner to the self-serving blind and egotistical ambitions of some

of these leaders. As a consequence Africa lost decades of opportunity to overcome

poverty and its current global marginalization. This happened as Asia and other

developing regions were making quantum leaps in their economic growth and

development (Hamutenye, 2008).

In the light of these crises, African leaders must adopt a paradigm shift regarding

theirs style of governance in the continent. They must resolutely strive to oppose those

41

who seek to cling to power through electoral rigging and attempts to change the

constitutions to suit their greed for political control and self-enrichment. Africa must

adhere to constitutional governments, respect for human rights, and respect for the rule of

law, inclusiveness and freedom of expression and association.

2.3 Impacts of Leadership Crises on Economic Development of SSA Countries

Leadership crises have long been announced in Africa general and sub-Saharan

Africa in particular. The major impact of leadership crises in sub-Saharan Africa is that it

disunites political leaders and makes them unable to come to a common term to solve

common economic problem. Hence, misunderstandings and conflicts between or among

different leaders and states in sub-Saharan Africa has always been characterized by a

very noticeable divergence in opinion in relations to an issue with international

dimension and this affects their economic output and standing.

Obviously, leadership crises in SSA rob such states of economic growth. For

instance let us explore the economic implication of expelling Nigeria from the rest of the

world during Gen. Sani Abacha regime for human right offences. Nigeria was drawn into

a serious political economic crisis; there was no unified and common reaction of the

Nigerian leaders to the case of international sanctions placed on Nigeria during that time.

Some Nigerians though hoped to benefit from such sanction hence those who hoped to

benefit from the sanction supported the international community while others who

benefits from Abacha’s regime objected to the imposition of sanctions against Nigeria by

the international community (Ajasin 1997).

42

Though Ajasin (1995:10) had earlier remarked that in a state of governmental anarchy,

reckless misuse of power and disregard for decent norms, a barbaric regime subsumed in

political and economic debauchery and a government that have no perception of

tomorrow and no understanding of today, only sanction could successfully create

situations capable of brining Nigeria out of the despotic military rule of late General Sani

Abacha.

In contradistinction to the foregoing, other prominent Nigerians like Yakubu

Mohammed, Okechukwu Denis Anyamele-Philips Asiodu-argued that it was baseless and

irrational for international community to impose sanctions on Nigeria simply because

Nigeria was during that time under a military rule. In their objections, and some other

anti-sanctions on Nigeria reasoned that imposing sanctions against Nigeria would hurt

and worsen the poor economic state. Yakubu argued that the sanctions against Nigeria

would not affect much the government leaders because those leaders could easily help

themselves out of the realities of those sanctions. In his exact words, Yakubu (1996:6)

succinctly puts that:

Sanctions of any kind against Nigeria will hurt the people, the common Nigerians more than the leaders who can always find a way of helping themselves. The best the world could do for Nigerian…., is to show understanding. Those outside the shores of Nigeria inviting all kinds of dooms on the country do not mean well for their fellow country man who have no means of escaping the pangs of sanctions.

Leadership crises in sub-Saharan Africa states have also reduced greatly the

standing of African states in economic negotiations in the international setting.

Experiences have shown that the envoys of African countries with leadership crises in

their domains and who attend international conference and functions were often treated

43

with neglect and cynicisms. In fact they were looked down and sometimes ridiculed by

their counterparts from other countries that have peace in their domain. These regardless

put up against the envoys representing the crises ridden African countries in international

gathering have far reaching effects on the African participation in such international

gathering. This is because none of the contributory talks or speeches from any of these

envoys from the crises zones in Africa would be taken serious by their counterparts

representing the non crises nations.

Meanwhile the Zimbabwean envoy’s attempt to explain the real situation on the

crisis between the Mugabe’s led government and the Morgan Tsvangira’s led opposition

group was still impossible due to intimidation and mockery by the envoy especially from

the West bent on demeaning the Mugabe’s leadership in Zimbabwe s (Eze, 2002:42).

Similarly the Nigeria’s envoys suffered the same fate in the hands of Commonwealth in

1995 when Nigeria was once at the peak of leadership crises under the late Gen. Sani

Abacha Junta (Akpan 1996:12).

Remarkably, leadership crises in sub-Saharan African states discourage the victim

states to negotiate and bargain effectively in their favour in the global negiciations. This

undermined the development efforts of many African states and consequently vitiated

their strength in international organization. Hence, Echezona, (1998:250) observed that

Africa does not have greater involvement in trade observed for the average of the

developing countries. It does not have increased bargaining power.

This remarks on the African bargaining weakness remained difficult to be faulted.

This is because these African States in which the leaders dragged themselves into crises

record low involvement in international trade as the result of lack of effective negotiation

44

and bargaining power in trade and business engagements. Thus lack of effective

negotiation and bargaining power necessitates massive lost of creative business acumen

and fictionalization of people and emergence of rebel activities.

Notably, leadership crises in the region under study also scare away foreign

tourists, travelers and foreign investors needed to boost the economy of this region.

Often, these states with leadership crises are referred to as volatile, failing or restive

states and hence unsuitable for foreign investors and their investments. Whereas, foreign

investments are of strategic concern to the economies of SSA countries, the crises

prevalent in the region do not allow for the inflow of investors.

Doubtless foreign investment helps to boast the economy of a state. However the

foreign investors do not invest in a country engulfed with leadership crises and restive

masses. This is because of the fear of loosing both the capital and the entire investment.

Since sub-Saharan African states have been classified as the crisis ridden zones resulting

from the leadership crises the foreign investors were discouraged from investing in such

African states (Jalloh 1995:1246).

This slims the chances of SSA countries’ economic emancipation since the SSA

countries’ initiatives alone cannot turn around their economies for the better. Again, these

SSA countries are dependent on the West for the extraction of their natural resources and

lack the technical know-how for any tangible economic enhancement and prosperity.

Nonetheless, the leadership crises in the region under study have over stretched

the spectrum of the African contributions on peacekeeping missions in the world. Having

been bedeviled with leadership crises, constant great civil wars broke out in many states

45

of Africa and in guest to quelling those wars, there emerged peacekeeping operations

both on regional and international bases. Echezona (1998:187) noted that:

The Rwanda conflict provides a new doctrine to UN peacekeeping-that each should take care of its own conflict. It is not a re-affirmation of Article 51 but something which creeps in the post cold war order.

Hence, leadership crises also impose heavy burden of shouldering almost alone

the arduous task of peacekeeping operations in those African states with crises of

leadership. Non African states have been very reluctant to contributing troops to form or

join peacekeeping missions in SSA hence African states are face with the task of raising

the bulk of troops needed for peace keeping in African state. These crises also attract

military and economic sanctions. Britain, United States of America and other European

countries often impose sanctions on the African states whose leadership had been in

crises. SSA countries like Somali, Rwanda, Liberia, Sudan, Nigeria and Zimbabwe, etc

have at various times been subjected to sanctions by members of international community

simply because of the alleged cases of human right abuses arising from crises of

leadership in the region.

This therefore permits unnecessary foreign interference on the internal affairs of

many sub-Saharan African states. The foreign interference in African affairs produced

adverse effects in Africa. The worst of which had been cases of abrupt end to the patriotic

African leaders who do not religiously apply the policies of western institutions. Thus the

impact of leadership crises on economic development of sub-Saharan region is unending.

2.7 Specific Leadership and Development Crises in Selected Sub-Saharan States

46

United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator, following the erupted fighting in

Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo in early 2004 states that life in sub-Saharan

Africa is inhuman and comparable with slave trade era. He argued that political

leadership in Congo has been unable to control arms conflicts targeting civilian lives.

More than 33 million people are inhumanly treated by soldiers (Guardian, June 16,

2004). Head of UN Security Council alleged that Darfur in Eastern Sudan is better than

Congo because aid groups were allowed to enter Darfur and Congolese refugees number

increased daily in Burundi and Gatumba. These conflict no doubt forecloses all Foreign

Direct Investments in Congo.

Similarly, opposition in Zimbabwe had condemned the government’s order of

fighter Aircraft from China and other military equipments worth of $ 200 million in

2004. Opposition insisted that the purchase was aimed at intimidating Zimbabweans on

the 2005 and 2009 elections. This disagreement erupted crises in the Zimbabwean

leadership circle almost to the level of a civil war (Guardian, June 15, 2004). Opposition

faults the arms deal arguing it was anti-development.

Again, Sudan was unable to enforce cease fire in western Darfur region where

Khartoum and Allied militia have been fighting. Hence they sought assistance from

Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) though OIC did not respond. UN estimated that

since 2003 the Sudanese rebels began their operation, more than 10,000 people are dead

while about 1,300000 others have fled across the borders into Chad as refugee. This crisis

remains the world’s biggest humanitarian problem (Vanguard, June 16, 2004).

The former Malawian President attempted to arm twist the National Assembly

also remarked tendency for African leaders to seat tight in power. His attempt to amend

47

the constitution erupted crises that was finally settled by Muluzi set down (Sunday

Independent, June 20, 2004).

The rebels clash in Cote d’Ivoire had attracted about six Heads of States to settle

the dispute between North and South or Christians and Muslim. Since after the formal

declaration of the end of the clash in 2003, peace is not yet in sight in the region as

mutual suspicion continues to deter economic growth (Daily Independent, June 22,

2004).

Following the deployment of about 10,000 troops to the east of DRC in Beni,

Kindu and Kalemie in the areas next to Rwanda, the Rwandan Foreign Minister accused

the Congolese authorities of preparing to attach Rwanda. Relations between the two

countries have strained and worsened economic relation (Daily Independent, June 22,

2004).

In Madagascar, economic downturn stirs unrest. Rising oil price and import surge

are plunging the Island into poverty after the cyclone in 2004 (Guardian, June 25,

2004).Similarly, in Nairobi, protest rocks over constitutional reform in 2004 while the

state police is used to intimidate protestants violence also roar as effort was made to

recover money looted by politician (www.newsafrica.net). This has hauled business

activities and peaceful movement (Daily Independent, July 5, 2002).

It was only recently that UN peacekeepers started disarming numerous groups

fighting in Liberia after four months of end of blood bottle. UN set aside and $50 million

for rehabilitation of the ex-combatants. This sum could be directed to economic

development (www.newsafrica.net).

48

25 years ago Uganda was involved in numerous inhuman practices. Pope John

Paul II urged that African leaders and international community should prioritize peace

before economic development (Vanguard, July 28, 2004). Speaking in Darfur the Pontiff

said leadership crises breeds more poverty, desperation and death to the region.

Seychelles, the African number one success story only transited power from

Albert Rene to James Alix in 2004 after 27 years in office. The political leadership here

introduced free education, health care delivery, no civil wars, little poverty, low mortality

and low unemployment rate unlike in other African States (BBC on Africa, July 30 -

September 30, 2004). The economic implications of these specific leadership crises are

similar as it finds common expression in rising incidence of poverty in the region under

study.

2.8 Leadership Crises and Incidence of Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa

The centrality of political leadership has continued to engage attention of social

scientists. It is in fact political leadership that mobilizes and arouses the people in various

levels of political consciousness (Chikendu, 1998:1).

Nwoye (2005:267) cited positive legacies of Franklin Roosevelt, Winston

Churchill, Mahatma Ghandi, Nelson Mandela, and Dangerous legacies of Vladimir

Lenin, Benito Mussolini, Joseph Stalin and Adolf Hitler. However, despite various efforts

at democratization in Africa, most states here especially sub-Saharan Africa remain mired

in a vicious circle of corrupt, misguided, oligarchic leadership and poverty lacking in

discipline, vision and growth.

49

African development crisis is unique (Sachs, 2004:117) as Africa is not only the

poorest region in the world but it is in the sub-Saharan region of Africa that states had

negative growth in income per capita especially from 1980-2000 (see table 2.2 below).

Table: 2.2 Selected Development Indicators for some Economic Regions 2000-2008

Regions GN/PPP (Current International ) US

$ billion)

GDP (Current US $) Life expectantly (Total

Years)

2000 2005 2007 2008 2000 2005 2007 2008 2000 2005 2007 2008

Europe 7,684.21 9,457.66 10.555.2

3

10,830.

48

6,247.2

0

10,13057 12,291.63 13.56

5.48

78 80 80 -

East Asia

& Pacific

4,271.32 7,314.58 9,445.83 10.425.

91

17,21.9

2

3,038.31 4535,09 5,658

.32

70 72 72 -

Sub-

Saharan

Africa

869.39 1,254.92 1,517.05 1.628.3

4

342.28 641.45 853.39 987.1

2

50 51 52 -

Source World Development Indictors Database, September 2009 The health condition is worst on planet in sub-Saharan Africa as almost every adult

and baby especially women are HIV carries, life expectancy and mortality rates are

adverse The region has the record of a heavy debt burden since 1980. Sub-Saharan Africa

had annual growth rate of -1.1%, South Asia has 3.3%, Latin America 0.5% East Asia

6.4% and Middle East SI. North Africa 0.9 as indicated in table 2.2 above

Moreover, the standard diagnosis is that Africa is suffering from governance crises

(see table 2.3 below).

Table 2.3: Governance Ratings and Household consumption in Tropical Sub- Saharan Africa, 2000-2008

Country

Based on World Bank Governance indicators, 2002a

Based on Transparency International Index, 2003a

Household consumption expenditure capita, 2000 (1980)

Final consumption 2000 – 2008 in percentage private public

Benin Good n.a. 98.9 75.8 12.3

Burkina Faso Good n.a. 111.0 75.8 22.9

Ghana Good Average 92.8 76.2 18.4

50

Madagascar Good Good 64.0 74.4 n.a.

Malawi Good Good 111.2 n.a. 12.2

Mali Good Good 95.3 86.1 10.9

Mauritania Good Good 104.8 75.0 Senegal Good Good 99.6 n.a. 10.1

Cameroon Average Average 102.5 77.3 6.2

Central African Rep.

Average n.a. n.a. 71.3 23.4

Chad Average n.a. n.a. 28.2 9.4

Congo, Rep. of cote d’ Ivoire

Average Average 80.5 76.0 8.7

Eritrea Average n.a. 78.2 75.2 n.a.

Ethiopia Average Good n.a. n.a. 10.5

Guinea Average n.a. n.a. 84.0 6.7

Kenya Average Average 100.7 78.7 17.2

Mozambique Average Good 78.2 n.a. n.a.

Niger Average n..a n.a. 71.9 17.2

Nigeria Average Aveage n.a. 46.7 18.8

Rwanda Average n.a. 83.9 86.3 10.9

Sierra Leone Average Good 43.9 83.4 10.5

Tanzania Average Good n.a. 67.9 19.3

Togo Average n.a. 112.4 99.6 10.1

Uganda Average Average n.a. 80.4 11.9

Zambia Average Good 47.0 53.7 18.9

Angola Poor Poor n.a. 32.6 21.2

Burundi Poor n.a. 65.0 85.1 30.7

Congo, DRC Poor n.a. 45.1 52.5 18.6

Sudan Poor Average n.a. 61.6 15.6

Zimbabwe Poor Average 88.4 n.a. n.a.

Liberia n.a. n.a. n.a. 70.3 30.1

Somalia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.

Sources: Kaufmann, Kraay, et.al. (2003), Radelet (2004) and IMF Economic Outlook, October (2008).

Note: n.a = not available

Determined from the residuals of a regression of countries’ governance indicators

or scores on income per capita, (at purchasing power parity); countries with residuals

more than 1 standard deviation above or 1 standard deviation below the predicted value

are categorized as “good” or “poor”, respectively, and those with residuals within 1

standard deviation as “average”. For the first column, the World Bank governance

indicators are those calculated by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, (2003). For the

second column, Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index is used,

51

which relates to the degree of corruption in the country as perceived by business people,

academics, and risk analysts and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt).

The countries that ranked good are those that have low corruption followed by

average and low. This has attendant economic implications as sub-Saharan African states

grew more slowly than other developing countries by around 3% a year see (table 2.4)

below:

Table 2.4: Main Exports in Sub-Saharan Africa 1960 – 2008 Country Main Export Number of Products

accounting for more than 75% of export

Angola Oil 1

Burkina Faso Cotton/Sesamun 2

Chad Oil 1

Congo Oil 1

Equatorial Guinea Oil 1

Eritrea Natural Uranium/methanol 2

Gabon Oil/manganese 2

Guinea Bissau Cashew nut 1

Libya Oil 1

Mali Cotton/Guava 2

Niger Natural uranium 1

Nigeria Oil 1

Source: ComTrade Database, UN Statistics, March, 2009. The dependent variable is average annual growth of GDP per capita, 1980-2000. All

regressions are least squares and include a constant term (not reported). Most states in the

SSA are dependent on one or two primary product especially oil for their foreign earning.

This is illustrated in the table 2.4 above.

Table 2.5: Key indicators for Regional data from the WDI database People

Population

Life expectancy

Under-5 mortality rate

Youth literacy rate

Child malnutrition

Prevalence of HIV, Adults

Million 2007

Average annual

Years 2007 Per 1,000

Male %ages 15-24% ages

Female 2007

%under-weight

% ages 15-49

52

growth% 1980-2007

2007 2007 2000-2007 2007

East Asia and pacific 1,912

1,912 13 72 27 98 98 13 02

Europe and Central Asia

446 0.4 70 23 99 99 - 0.6

Latin America and Caribbean

561 1.7 73 26 97 97 4 0.5

Middle East and North Africa

313 2.3 70 38 93 86 - 0.1

South Asia 1,522 1.9 64 78 84 74 41 0.3 Sub-Saharan Africa

800 2.7 51 146 77 67 27 5.0

Economy

GNI

GNI Per Capita

GDP Per Capita

Services

Gross Capital Formation

Exports of Goods and Services

Total Debt Service to Exports

Atlas method $ billion s 2007

Atlas” $ 2007

PPP” $2007

Average annual real growth% 2006-07

% of GDP 2007

% of GDP 2007

$ billions 2007

% 2007

East Asia and Pacific

4.173 2.182 4.l969 11.4 41 38 1.997 4.0

Europe and Central Asia

2.697 6.052 11.262 6.9 60 25 1.079 18.7

Latin America and Caribbean

3.252 5.801 9.678 5.7 61 22 864 16.9

Middle East and North Africa

883 2.820 7.402 5.9 49 28 5.8

South Asia 1.339 880 2.532 8.4 53 35 244 12.9 Sub-Saharan Africa

761 951 1.870 6.2 53 22 323 5.0

Source: World development index, 2008.

The table of Key indicators from the WDI database above shows that life

expectancy is low; under 5 years mortality rate is high; youth illiteracy is profuse; child

malnutrition prevalent and GDP and GNI of SSA countries remain low compared to the

other regions of the world. Again, most sub- Saharan African countries are ranked as low

human development index states in the face of the increasing poverty in the region (See

table 2.6 below).

53

Table 2.6: Human Development Index,2008 Rank Country HD1 World Rank

High Human Development 1 Seychelles 0.842 47

2 Mauritius 0.800 63

Medium Human Development

Rank Country HD1 World Rank 3. Libya 0.798 64

4 Algeria 0.728 102

5 Cape Verde 0.722 106

6 Egypt 0.702 111

7 Equatorial Guinea 0.653 120

8 South Africa 0.653 121

9 Morocco 0.640 123

10 Gabon 0.633 124

11 Namibia 0.626 125

12 Sao Tome’ and Principe 0.607 127

13 Botswana 0.570 131

14 Comoros 0.556 132

15 Ghana 0.532 136

16 Republic of the Congo 0.520 140

17 Sudan 0.516 141

18 Madagascar 0.509 143

19 Cameroon 0.506 144

20 Uganda 0.502 145

21 Swaziland 0.500 146

Low Human Development Index

Rank Country HD1 World Rank 22 Togo 0.495 147

23 Djibouti 0.494 148

24 Lesotho 0.494 149

25 Zimbabwe 0.491 151

26 Kenya 0.491 152

27 Mauritania 0.486 153

28 Gambia 0.479 155

29 Senegal 0.460 156

30 Eritrea 0.454 157

31 Rwanda 0.450 160

32 Nigeria 0.448 159

33 Guinea 0.445 160

34 Angola 0.439 161

35 Tanzania 0.430 162

36 Benin 0.428 163

37 Cote d’ Ivoire 0.421 164

38 Zambia 0.407 165

39 Malawi 0.400 166

40 Democratic Republic of the Congo 0.391 167

41 Mozambique 0.390 168

42 Burundi 0.384 169

43 Ethiopia 0.371 170

44 Chad 0.368 171

Source: Wikipedia, the… http://wikipedia.org/wiki/list of African countries by HDI.

54

2.6 Link between bad leadership, failed states and economic crises

The essential characteristic is the failure of the political leadership to embrace and

respect the virtues that bond society, promote stability and harmony such as social

justice, equity, rule of law and respect for individual/group rights and other democratic

principles. Bad governance triggers conflict drivers in the society such as communal

tension, social division, militarization, elites’ fragmentation and competition and the

emergence of ethnic and sectarian militias. It also reduces the state capacity to make

authoritative decision for the entire citizens, provide basic public services and the ability

of core state institutions to regulate the activities of individuals and groups within the

society. This leads to declining legitimacy and the desperate use of repressive laws and

violence to cling to power by the ruling elites (Akpan, 2008:23).

The nexus between bad leadership, failed state and economic crises is directional,

in the sense that, bad governance precedes failed state, but failed state reinforces bad

governance and they together produce economic crises which reinforces them. Thus, it is

not unidirectional, it oscillate like waves. In existential terms, the immanent linkage

between bad governance and failed state is non-linear, but dialectical. Bad governance

breeds failed state and failed state in turn sustains bad governance. The internal political,

economic and social crises that normally triggers weak, failing and failed state are cause

by bad governance. However, the causal relationship between the independent and

dependent variables is symbiotic in nature, as the dependent variable tends to reinforce

the attributes of the independent variable as soon as the process is set in motion. Robert

Mugabe of Zimbabwe provides ample evidence in this regard. In an attempt to settle the

55

crisis of nation building in Zimbabwe, Mugabe’s government policies in the last five

years have reinforce the dangers and emerging threats to the country within the context of

the relationship between bad governance and failed state (Akpan 2008:24). William

(2007:14) defines failing states as Follows:

Diminished states are unstable. Lacking a strong central government, adequate army and police, as well as an effective rule of law, the environment of lawlessness and its consequences inhibits society.

Chomsky (2006) had earlier argued that failed states are characterized by :

loss of physical control over territory, lack of a monopoly on the use of force, declining legitimacy to make authoritative decisions for the majority of the community, an inability to provide security or social services to its people.

Sub-Saharan African states are weak and vulnerable on all indices of weak and

failing states such as lack of respect for human/group rights, religious tolerance, and the

rule of law, an independent judiciary, and representative government. These are the major

sources of violence and warfare in most African states Some of the indicators of failed or

failing states are contained in Appendix A behind.

2.7 New censure for African Leadership and Development Crises

In the face of global economic meltdown most sub-Saharan African states have

indicated that their economies is moving deeper into recession, while the impact of the

global economic crisis is waning in other countries. In Nigeria this regression tendency is

blamed on President Yar’adua’s policies reversals. In late 2009, the GDP of Nigeria was

at 2.9% against estimated 8.5%. As at June 53 companies have folder up in Nigeria with

the others barely hanging (Mordi, 2009:7-8). A magazine reporter aptly captured it when

56

he exclaimed that the Nigerian state like most other sub-Saharan African states are in

deep political economic crises (Abu, 2009:9).

Poor leadership in Africa has often been criticized by individual scholarship and

also the governments of various developed states especially United States and the

European Union through their Non- Governmental Organizations (NGOS). These

reproached have often been countered by African leaders and citizens and regarded as a

means of Western media imperialism. Recently notable NGOs have emerged from within

Africa to condemn the visionless leadership trend in Africa. Pronounced among these

groups is Moibrahim Foundations.

In furtherance of good governance and in cerebration of good leadership, which

critics have insisted it has become rare in Africa, Moibrahim Foundations instituted an

annual prize, which rewards African Leaders who have offered good leadership. The

foundation first honoured Joaquim Alberto Chissano, President of Mozambique between

November 1986 and February 2005 for his contributions towards the peace and stability of

a war –torn nation. Nelson Mandela was honoured with the same prize in 2007 for the

good leadership skills he exhibited in the struggle against the apartheid regime in South

Africa. In 2008, Festus Gontebanye Mogae, the third President of Botswana between 1998

and 2008 for the implementation of life changing programme (Oboh, 2009:30). The

winners are expected to be democratically elected who left office three years before the

award. The third term rancor of President Obasanjo of Nigeria and unsatisfying valediction

of Mbeki of South Africa internationally attracted disapproval for the two past Presidents

in Africa.

57

Table 2.7 INDEX ON AFRICAN GOVERNANCE, 2009 Country Overall Score Overall Rank Algeria 58.4 14

Angola 41.0 42

Benin 58.2 15

Botswana 73.6 4

Burkina Faso 51.6 27

Burundi 45.3 38

Cameroon 47.0 33

Cape Verde 78.0 2

Central African Republic 35.0 48

Chad 29.9 52

Comoros 48.6 31

Congo 42.8 41

Congo, Democratic Rep. 33.2 50

Cote D’iviore 36.6 47

Djibouti 46.0 36

Egypt 60.1 11

Equatorial Guinea 39.4 45

Eritrea 37.0 46

Ethiopia 45.6 37

Gabon 53.9 21

Gambia 55.1 19

Ghana 66.0 7

Guinea 40.4 44

Guinea-Bissau 43.5 40

Kenya 53.7 22

Lesotho 61.2 9

Liberia 44.9 39

Libya 53.7 23

Madagascar 58.4 13

Malawi 53.0 25

Mali 54.5 20

Mauritania 50.6 28

Mauritius 82.8 1

Morocco 57.8 16

Mozambique 52.4 26

Namibia 68.8 6

Niger 46.6 34

Nigeria 46.5 35

Rwanda 48.5 32

Sao Tome and Principe 60.2 10

Senegal 56.0 17

Seychelles 77.1 3

Sierra Leone 48.9 30

Somalia 15.2 53

South Africa 69.4 5

Sudan 33.4 49

Swaziland 49.4 29

Tanzania 59.2 12

Togo 40.8 43

58

Tunisia 65.8 8

Uganda 53.6 24

Zambia 55.3 18

Zimbabwe 31.3 51

Source: www.moibrahimfoundation.org

The table above shows the African Governance Index where overall score is

calculated from 0-100 and rank from 1 – 53 with reference to safety and rule of law,

participation and human right, sustainable economic opportunity and human development.

Mauritania, which has one of the most stable economies in Africa, was ranked first while

Chad with one of the worst economies ranked last in the index. Notably, more stable

polities and economies have the tendency to attract more foreign direct investments than

unstable economies and polities.

2.8 Political Leadership, Fiscal and Monetary Policies in Sub-Saharan Africa

It is the function of political leadership to formulate and implement fiscal and

monetary policies in the region individually or collectively. The inability of political

leadership to perform effectively in this regard in Sub-Saharan Africa introduces

economic disarray and confusion.

Monetary policy involves measures designed to regulate and control the volume,

cost, availability and direction of money and credit in an economy to achieve some

specified macroeconomic policy objectives (Anyanwu, 1993). It is that policy which

deals with (a) The controls of paper assets by the changes in money conditions: and (b)

passive purchases and sales of paper assets resulting from the maintenance of a particular

interest rate structure the stability of security prices, or meeting other obligations and

commitments.

59

In developing nations, monetary policy plays an important role in accelerating

development by influencing the cost and availability of credit by controlling inflation by

maintaining of balance of payments equilibrium. The objectives of monetary policy

include sustaining increase in outputs, and growth, price stability, full employment,

sustainable balance of payments, exchange rate stability to make use of most suitable

interest rate, debt management and expansion of the financial institutions.

Fiscal system refers to the kind of arrangement or institutional framework which

exists in a society for making budgetary decisions of raising revenue, incurring

expenditure and engaging in debt or borrowing operations (Anyanwu, 1997:241).

According to Anyanwu, the fiscal system of a country may be decentralized or

centralized, depending on whether the political constitution and structure is federalist or

unitary. In Nigeria, the fiscal system is decentralized such that there is a division or

sharing of fiscal powers and responsibilities among the federal (central), State and the

local governments (Anyanwu, 1997:1).

Fiscal policy deals with taxation, other revenues, the public borrowing and public

expenditure aimed at influencing economic activities or the achievement of certain

desirable national goals and macro economic goals (Anyanwu 1993:28).

Fiscal policy, as an effective instrument of policy, may be used to accomplish

many goals. The classical examples of fiscal policy goals are:

1. Price Stability: One major aim of fiscal policy is the stabilization of prices in

an economy. By this, we mean counteracting or avoiding inflation and

deflation. Expansionary fiscal policy is used to fight deflation while a

60

concretionary fiscal policy is used to fight inflation, taking into cognizance the

aim of attaining full employment.

2. Full Employment: Government expenditure arising from tax revenue will

help to increase employment. Different industries will be stimulated according

to the manner in which the government spends the money.

3. Economic Growth: Fiscal policy can facilitate steady growth in national

resources and national output as well as structural and attitudinal changes in

the economy.

4. Income Redistribution: Fiscal policy measures could be used to redistribute

income in the society as to attain social and economic justice.

5. Fixed and Stable Exchange Rate: Effective fiscal measures could be used to

avoid fluctuations in the nation’s external reserves and to avoid fundamental

disequilibrium in the nation’s balance of payments position.

6. Balance of Payments Surplus: Fiscal policy can also be used to avoid or

direct balance of payment deficits in the nation’s external trade relations.

7. To increase the rate of Investment: Fiscal policy is also used to generate

resources to use to increase investment in the key security of the economy. By

increasing investment employment opportunities is also increased.

In advanced economies, discretionary fiscal policies are deliberately manipulated

by the legislative or executive action for the purpose of altering real national output and

employment, controlling inflation, and stimulating economic growth. When recession

exists, an expansionary fiscal policy is in order. This entails:

61

(1) Increased government spending

(2) Lower taxes,

(3) A combination of the two.

In other words, if the budget is balanced at the outset, fiscal policy should move

in the direction of a government budget deficit during a recession or depression.

Conversely, when demand-pull inflation stalks the land, a restrictive or concretionary

fiscal policy is appropriate. A concretionary policy is composed of:

(1) Decreased government spending,

(2) Higher taxes,

(3) A combination of these two policies.

Fiscal policy should move toward a surplus in the government’s budget when the

economy is faced with the problem of controlling inflation. Again developed economies

apply automatic fiscal stabilizers or passive fiscal policies to function in a

countercyclical fashion to improve the performance of the economy, without the

necessity of the adhoc adjustments in response to an immediate macroeconomic problem.

With a given tax and expenditure structure, changes in total output and income result in

automatic changes in tax yields and in certain outlays, the first changing in the same

direction as income and the latter in the opposite direction.

In SSA countries monetary and fiscal policies are faced with a lot of political

problems. Fiscal policy is created in the political arena and this greatly complicates its

use in stabilizing the economy. Deficits tend to be politically attractive and surpluses

politically painful. That is, there may well be a political bias in favour of deficits hence

fiscal policy may embody an expansionary bias. Tax reductions tend to be politically

62

popular. And so are increases in government spending, provided that the given politicians

constituents share liberally in the benefits. But higher taxes upset voters and reducing

government expenditures can be politically precarious.

Generally in SSA countries the overriding goal of politicians is to get reelected. A

few economists have recently put forth the notion of political business cycle. That is,

they have argued that politicians might manipulate fiscal policy to maximize voter

support, even though their fiscal decisions tend to destabilize the economy. According to

this view, fiscal policy, as we have described it, may be corrupted for political purposes

and thereby be a cause of economic fluctuations.

2.9 Macro Economic Adjustment and Leadership failure

Macro economic adjustments with its negative and positive under turns were

introduced to African people through their leaders by the International Financial

Institutions. It was the function of competent leadership to assess these adjustments

before they either accept or reject them. To accept when you are indeed supposed to

reject or reject when you are supposed to accept is an indication of leadership error hence

incompetence.

Onah (1988) identified those broad objectives of Structural Adjustment

Programme SAP as:

- Correction of balance of payment imbalance

- Elimination of distortion

- Reduction of inflation

- Diversify economy etc.

63

Sub-Saharan African states like the rest of the Third World countries in debt crises

were advised to:

- devalue their currencies

- rationalize public spending

- stimulate production

- encourage domestic production

- change in consumption pattern

- deregulation/liberalization

The widespread adoption by governments of the Washington Consensus was to a

large degree a reaction to the macroeconomic crisis that hit much of Latin America, and

some other developing regions, during the 1980s. The crisis multiple origins: the drastic

rise in the price of imported oil following the emergence of OPEC, mounting levels of

external debt, the exogenous rise in US (and hence international) interest rates, and –

consequent to the foregoing problems—loss of access to additional foreign credit. The

import-substitution policies that had been pursued by many developing country

governments in Latin America and elsewhere for several decades had left their economies

ill-equipped to expand exports at all quickly to pay for the additional cost of imported oil

(by contrast, many countries in East Asia, which had followed more export-oriented

strategies, found it comparatively easy to expand exports still further, and as such

managed to accommodate the external shocks with much less economic and social

disruption). Unable either to expand external borrowing further or to ramp up export

earnings easily, many Latin American countries faced no obvious sustainable alternatives

to reducing overall domestic demand via greater fiscal discipline, while in parallel

64

adopting policies to reduce protectionism and increase their economies’ export

orientation.

The Washington Consensus, as framed by Williamson, envisaged a largely

unilateral process of trade reform, by which countries would lower their non-tariff

(especially) and tariff barriers to imports. Many countries, including the majority of those

in Latin America, have indeed undertaken significant unilateral trade liberalization over

subsequent years, opening their economies to greater import competition while

simultaneously increasing the share of exports in their GDP (in parallel, Latin America’s

share in global trade has also increased).

As of 2008, several Latin American countries are led by socialist or other left

wing governments, some of which have campaigned and adopted policies contrary to the

Washington Consensus set of policies. They have been joined in their criticism by some

US economists, such as Joseph Stiglitz and Rodrik, who have challenged the

‘fundamentalist’ policies of the International Monetary fund and the US Treasury for

what Stiglitz calls a ‘one size fits all’ treatment of individual economies. According to

Stiglitz the treatment suggested by the IMF is too simple: one does, and fast-stabilize,

liberalize and privatize, without prioritizing of watching for side effects (Stiglitz, 2003:

33-40).

One thing that is generally agreed on about the consequences of these reforms is

that things have not quite worked out the way they were intended. Even their most ardent

supporters now concede that growth has bee below expectations in Latin America (and

the “transition crisis” deeper and more sustained than expected in former socialist

economies). Not only were success stories in Sub-Saharan Africa few and far in between,

65

but the market-oriented reforms of the 1990s proved ill-suited to deal with the growing

public health emergency in which the continent became embroiled. The critics,

meanwhile, feel that the disappointing outcomes have vindicated their concerns about the

inappropriateness of the standard reform agenda (Rodrik, 2006:2).

We infer from the preceding discussion that the persisting economic crisis in sub-

Saharan Africa between the periods under study is as a result of incompetence on the part

of political leadership hence we validate our first hypothesis that there is a link between

incompetence on the part of political leadership and persisting economic crises in sub-

Saharan African countries.

66

CHAPTER THREE

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND GLOBAL ECONOMY INTEGRATION

In this chapter we tried to investigate the hypothesis which states that leadership

crises in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) lead to poor integration of the regions economies into

the global economy in the period under study. To achieve this we examined the effect of

political leadership on the declining sub-regions share of global trade; the sub-regions

membership to international financial institution, status of selected states from the region

in World Trade Organization (WTO). Again, we assessed at how sub-Saharan African

countries pursue MDG’s in the globalizing world. We finally explored the link between

leadership crises and global competitiveness in sub-Saharan African countries.

3.1 Sub-Saharan Africa Share of Global Trade

The events in sub-Saharan African countries take the general trend of events in

the whole of African. Although the focus is on sub-Saharan Africa, some results are

reported for all Africa, (allowing comparison between West Africa and other regions in

the continent). Africa as a region has indication of poor economic performance over the

past two decades. Though some countries like Mauritania, Ghana and some of the

Irelands around Africa have positive trend and performance, the regional performance is

a cause for alarm. Africa’s share of world trade declined between 1990 and 2000, in

terms of both exports and imports (Ackah and Morrisey, 2005:2). See table 3.1 below:

67

Table 3.1: Sub-Saharan African Share of world made by countries 2000-2008 Country Import % Export % Guinea 0.01 0.01

Ghana 0.03 0.06

Burundi 0.00 0.00

Ivory Coast 0.06 0.04

Burkina Faso 0.00 0.01

Malawi 0.00 0.01

Ethiopia 0.01 0.05

Niger 0.01 0.01

Guinea Bussan 0.00 0.00

Nigeria 0.50 0.25

Congo 0.06 0.02

Source: WTO Trade Profile, 2010 The EU’s share of the world total export is 15.91 percent while the import is

about 18.33 percent. Sub-Saharan Africa appear not have benefited from the economic

expansion and success that follow the end of cold war. From the table above, it is clear

that Africa has not shared in the growth of world trade. In 1990 and 2000, while Western

Europe exported goods accounting for 48.3% and 39.5% respectively, of total world

exports, Africa only accounted for 3.1% and 2.3% respectively. Within the same period,

Western Europe accounted for 48.7% and 39.6% of total world imports; Africa’s share

was only 2.7% and 2.1% respectively. When these shares are further divided in Africa,

North and South Africa would account for greatest share of world trade in Africa while

the sub-Saharan Africa shares little or nothing.

Oyejide (1998:109-110), rightly observed that both the value and volume of world

trade expanded rapidly during the 1980s and the 1990s, and many developing countries

shared in the trade buoyancy. However, the African region failed to participate in this

virtual global trade expansion. Thus, while world trade expanded at an average annual

growth rate of over 6 per cent during this period, African exports suffered an average

68

annual decline of 1 percent, compared to more robust growth rate of 7% and 5% for Asia

and Latin America, respectively.

Poor export growth recorded in sub-Saharan Africa is reflected in the steady

decline of the region’s share of world merchandise trade which fell from 6% in the 1980s

to roughly 2% in the mid-1990s. In comparison, Latin America maintained its share of

about 5% throughout, while Asia sharply increased its share from 16% to 27%. These

comparisons broadly confirm that Africa has been marginalized in terms of share of

global trade (Oyejide, 1998:109).

The Agricultural sector where most of the black African states used to have

comparative advantage also suffered decline. Between 1970 and 1997, Africa’s share of

world trade declined for its major export crops cocoa, groundnut, coffee, cotton, rubber,

banana, and sugar. Overall, Africa’s share in world trade as measured by its share of

world exports or world imports has steadily declined since 1970. In 1970, Africa’s share

of world exports was 4.4% but by 1997, its share of world exports had declined to 2.3%.

Africa did not fare much better in imports as its share of world imports fell from 6.1% in

1970 to 3.9% in 1997 and it was predicted to further decline (Iyoha 2005:11).

Hence, the region’s terms of trade have deteriorated significantly over the years.

This has placed SSA at the very fringe of the global economy. In terms of the region’s

trade, there has been little structural transformation, with trade being dominated by

exports of primary commodities. In 2004 for instance, over 89% of Africa’s foreign

exchange earnings were derived from primary commodities including crude petroleum

(Osakwe, 2006:4).

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Africa, with about 689 million people, accounts for a smaller share of world

exports than Belgium, with 10 million people only while most other regions have derived

significant benefits from growth in trade and investment as well as their structural

transformation, sub-Saharan Africa has been by-passed, and further marginalized within

the world economy. Its share of world trade, investment and output have declined to

negligible proportions, varying from 4.1% to 4.9% from 1960 to 1965, and maintaining

the fluctuation level of around 4.4% during the 1970s, while the 1990s saw the trade

share decline to 2-3%. By 1996, sub-Saharan Africa’s share of global trade had fallen to

1.5% (Ntuli, 2004:2).

According to Ackah and Morrissey (2005:4), world prices for many products

important to this region declined between 1990 and 2000. Cocoa declined by 29%, sugar

by 26%, coffee by 9%; cotton by 28% and copper by 32 %, while minerals overall

declined by 14%. Iloh (2007:80) had rightly noted that the prices of these products

declined because they are not controlled internally but are subjected to the demands of

the importing countries. In other words, the prices are not only fixed in the industrialized

countries but are also heavily influenced by developments in those countries.

Thus poor leadership commitment accounts for this poor integration of sub-

Saharan African states economies to the global economy reflected in decreasing share of

her trade. It could even be proven that regional integration enhances a region’s share of

world trade but regionalism entails committed leadership. In fact, evidence abounds to

show that the stronger the regional integration is, the higher the region’s share of world

trade. This could be justified with the Europeans Union (EU) and her committed

leadership. The EU is an example of regional integration success story. The members of

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the union account for the world largest share in global trade. Political leadership of

nations that make up the EU do not fear lost of sovereignty like their African counterpart

who need state power for primitive accumulation. See tables 3.2 and 3.3 below for the

import and export trade of selected countries in the two regions respectively for 2003

only.

Table 3.2 Annual Percentage Change in Trade in Sub-Saharan African Countries 2008 Country Import Export Guinea 13 9

Ghana 17 15

Burundi 13 2

Ivory Coast - 13

Burkina Faso 14 13

Malawi 15 9

Ethiopia 25 16

Niger 17 15

Guinea Bussan - 6

Nigeria 22 18

Congo 26 18

Source: WTO Profile, 2010. Meanwhile, the annual percentage change in Trade in the 27 countries of

European Union from 2000 to 2008 is on an average of 12 on import and export

respectively. In contradistinction to sub-Saharan Africa in the same period, it becomes

very clear that the African sub-region is far behind and of course political leadership is

implicated as successive African leadership since 1960 oppose such regionalism similar

to that of Europe because of fear of lost of power.

A comparative study of tables 3.1 and 3.2 shows that the gap between the EU

countries and SSA countries in their share of global trade is very wide both in exports and

imports. The export of France for instance, in 2003 amounted to $384,662 billion and the

import was $388.373 these figures are higher than export and import of all SSA countries

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put together respectively for that same year. Hence, the decreasing of sub-Saharan

African share of world trade cannot be linked to other factors outside leadership failure

expressed in massive corruption.

3.2 Membership of Sub-Saharan African States to International Financial

Institutions

Both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank are parts of the

International Financial Institutions (IFIs). Meanwhile, representation and membership of

SSA is a political leadership function. States participate in such organizations to benefit

her citizens through global interdependence. Onuh (2004:270) had earlier predicted that

globalization would spring many supra-national organizations and arrangement to

improve the economies of the nation states. The impression in the 21st century is that no

region would survive the heat of the current wave outside the framework of supra-

nationality. In this case, therefore, it is not enough to restrict oneself to a regional bloc.

Interaction with the outside world is desirable and necessary.

However, one can not be relevant in this globalizing world without good political

leadership and would ensure dynamism.

Aghahowa (2000:52-53) succinctly puts that:

…for a nation to survive economic front today, there is a tendency for such nation to rely on the IFIs in order to help them re-establish their economic and financial lives especially for the Third World countries. IMF was established with the central aim of providing loans to

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assist its members to correct their temporary balance of payments deficits.

Aghahowa (2000:57) further stated that:

The IMF is a financial cooperative in which members pool a portion of their foreign currency reserves and agree to abide by set rules for ordering their payments transactions with other countries in return for certain rights. Its purposes are to provide a forum for separation on monetary issues, to promote stability and an open international trade and payments system, and to oversee the “code of conduct” under which its members carry out their external monetary relations. Moreover, it provides temporary financial support for its members when they run into difficulties is their external payments

These financial institutions are sources of money and credit facilities to member

nations. They also have large stock of capital, and technical advisory staff for project

evaluation, possible designing and execution (Aja-Akpuru Aja, 2002:82).

Echezona (1998:74) refers to the IFIs when he acknowledged the global mutual

relationship of dependence in which two or more things depend on one another to fulfill

certain goals. The goals of the units of international society include the survival of these

units, security, world peace, ecological stability, economic stability, human rights etc. It

must depend on others as much as others must depend on it to fulfill its functions in an

international society that has become global in human history. In this way, the global

political economy is sustained. Sub-Saharan African states can not gainfully participate in

such a completive world in the face of serious leadership problems.

3.3 Status of Sub-Saharan African States in World Trade Organization

Like in IMF and World Bank, it is the political leadership function to negotiate on

behalf of states in World Trade Organization (WTO). These negotiations and the status of

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members accounts for both gains and losses of states in the WTO. The nature of the

region’s (SSA) membership to WTO cannot be discussed outside the structure of the

global capitalist economy. This structure ensures a vertical integration of the countries at

the centre and those at the periphery. It thus maintains a relationship of dependence

between the two sets of countries. Since in the international political economy, SSA

countries are in the periphery, it then follows that their membership of the WTO is

peripheral.

This explains why the SSA countries, do participate in the meetings and

deliberations of the WTO most of the times yet, the outcomes are binding on them. This

is as a result of the fact that the WTO is structured in such a way that it allows more than

one meeting to be held at the same time and in most cases, they are held in Geneva where

most SSA countries can not afford to have representatives at all these meetings (Tandon,

2003:63). Again, the nature of these deliberations is too technical and as such, requires

experts which lack in these SSA countries. However, in these meetings matters that

concerns all the members are discussed and decision taken irrespective of whether they

participated or not are binding.

Nonetheless, the attendance to these meetings does not have much significance

since no issue is ever brought to the WTO without prior consultation between or among

the First World (Tandon, 2000:62). It follows then that decisions are already taken prior

to the meetings. Hence the SSA countries attend the meetings just to concur with

whatever decisions that have taken by the Quad group of countries. The SSA political

leadership has not questioned their status in WTO to improve their trade quota;

negotiation power and global position..

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EU is a member of the WTO in its own right as a regional organization

irrespective of the fact that its individual members are equally members as individual

countries. This makes it possible for their negotiations in the trade body to be strong and

forceful. What they cannot achieve as individual members of the WTO, they normally

achieve as a group under the auspices of the EU. This is an evidence of strong political

will. SSA countries cannot benefit maximally within the current structure of the global

political economy unless their political leadership develop the kind of will found among

their European counterpart.

More so, the underdevelopment of infrastructure is a factor that affects the

participation of SSA in world trade thus limiting their share of world trade. According

World Bank shows that the underdevelopment of infrastructure contributes much towards

the significant negative impact on the sub-Saharan Africa’s exports and the location of

manufacturing activities. Such factors, as high transport costs and high cost of

telecommunication ( Ntuli, 2004:3) .

Similarly, Iyoha (2005:15) agreed with the above ascertain and noted that the

fundamental cause of Africa’s falling export could be ascribed to lack of competitiveness

arising mainly from productivity, undercapitalization, high transaction costs, inadequate

market infrastructure, weak institutions and support services, inadequate diversification,

and poor macro economic policies. The argument above implicated political leadership

hence poor integration of the SSA regional economy is as a result of lack of

competitiveness of the region’s economy in the global economy.

3.4 Political Leadership and Global Competitiveness

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Political leadership also has the function of development. After many decades of

implementation of development agenda in SSA countries these nations are still deep

necked into poverty and general underdevelopment (Obi 2005:25). Hence, the SSA

countries can not favourably compete in the global market and these states are

characterized by weak institutional frameworks and massive infrastructural collapse. Let

is now quickly turn to analyze some of the factors that discourages competitiveness of

SSA countries.

Firstly, under-developed media - As the contemporary world speeds on the

information super highway, the variety, volume and pace of data movement continues to

have perplexing impact on the human mind. There is no doubt that the media constitute a

very powerful instrument of political and social engineering which explains why they are

generally used by dictators to their own ends, often by saturating members of the public

with only one kind of reality and shutting them off from exposure to alternative views.

This tendency abounds in SSA countries following colonial heritage and this has been

exacerbated by media imperialism in an unequal information order. Since information is

not value free or neutral Cable News Network (CNN) taint news in favour of USA while

British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) taint in favour of Britain (Sogolo, 2002:131-

134).

To be competitive African media must tell and sell African ideas, goods and

services to the world. Faced with other global media institutions and hostile attitude of

decision makers towards African media, the SSA media because uncompetitive.

The reality is that leadership has no way of getting to the people except through

the media. If African leaders continue to maintain their disdain for media, all effort at

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favourable integration of SSA economics would remain an esoteric dream, waking to

evaporate over time and competitiveness an illusion.

Secondly, corrupt political leadership - At this stage in many SSA countries,

corruption becomes people’s way of life. Kwashi (2002:2) noted that:

as long as African leaders continue to pay lip service to fighting corruption without purging themselves first of the menace, corruption will continue to live with us.

Studies conducted between 1960 and 1985 for a cross-section of 7 countries showed that

statistically and economically corruption lowers investment and reduces growth. Fund

which should be used for public developmental purposes are now in the hard of few

selfish ones (Olugbekan 2001:14). In Nigeria for instance the Federal Government lost

N50 million every month to ghost workers, this amount to N600 million a year. Chinua

Achebe speculates that Nigeria could build two more international airports like Murtala

Mohammed airports in Lagos or buy three refineries or build a dual express way from

Lagos to Kaduna and or Pay salaries of grade 01 workers for forty years (Achebe,

1983:41). This certainly does not promote competitiveness and it is replicated all over

SSA countries (See Appendix 2 for the Corruption Perception Index).

Thirdly, ethno-religious conflicts- The genetically engineered seeds of

democracy planted by successive military regions in SSA countries have matured for

harvest (Jega, 2007:116). Hence, it has exploded and found expression in violent ethnic-

religious and communal conflict. In Nigeria for instance between May 1999 and May

2007 more than 40 ethno-religious crises were reported with consequent lost of lives;

billions of naira and property. Lack of cordiality and prevalence of mutual suspicion

points towards violent confrontations in the SSA. The ruling class derived both its origin

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and wealth from the state around which it gravitates using every available means to

secure power and assets in Africa hence resurgence of identity politics (Jega, 2000b:19 .

Such condition detracts from competitiveness.

Fourthly, tragic public policy and weak civil society - It is generally upheld in

dialectical logic that the process through which public policy is conceived, formulated

and implemented is one of the most important processes of governance.

Long years of colonialism and military rule in most SSA countries have reasserted

itself into military disposition and tendencies towards use of force for every political

decision in the region hence democratization becomes an illusion. Ethnic conflicts result

as groups attempts to improve their political participation or change authoritarian and

anti-people mind-sets of public officials (Jega, 2007:114).

The civil society which is linked to democratization contains autonomous

associations which serve as independent eye of the society that regulate and check the

state in overall interest of the society. In SSA these societies are not vibrant like in most

advanced or even other developing countries. Since after the radicalization of civil

societies in SSA by SAP, these societies have gone to hidings since the post SAP era

(Jega, 2007:256). Both public policies and civil societies in the SSA indicates weakness

and fragility hence countries in the SSA tend to regress to dictatorship even often public

declarations in favour of demoralization. This trend neither support nor promote global

competitiveness of SSA countries.

Fifthly, the general collapse of infrastructure- A reliable infrastructure is the key

to economic development especially for states transforming from subsistence to

commercial economy like the SSA countries. These infrastructures include roads,

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airways, telephone network, postal services, meteorological service and electricity.

Evidence of the benefits of integrating infrastructure comes everyday not only from

Europe and North America but from the Asian Tigers and some of other industrializing

nations (Aribisala, 2002:118).

The major constraints of SSA infrastructural development are unreliable road, rail

and air transport; inefficient or unaffordable telecommunication access and epileptic

hydro, solar and electric energy. Though some of these SSA countries have began to

address these problems mainly through privatization and communalization, there is an

emerging tendency for political leaders to siphon part or whole of fund budgeted for this

projects.

The poor infrastructure and services leave the whole of SSA countries at a great

disadvantage by hampering efforts of the region’s investments owing to high cost of

doing business.

3.5 Reasons for Poor Integration of SSA Economies

Simply and squarely the reason for this failure of integration is confused political

leadership in SSA countries. After political independence, political leaders that emerged

in Africa as a whole were exposed to new conflicts. Increasing competition and conflict

among nationalities, ethnic groups and communal interest groups was reflected hence

emphasis shifted to vertical solidarity. Weak national base of political leaders further

reinforced the use of state power for accumulation of capital. This political environment

is hostile to development.

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As noted by (Ake 1996:18) political leaders in Africa never pushed any

development agenda rather they were engaged in bitter political struggle for self

economic survival. These leaders in SSA countries foisted the burden of development on

other countries and hence became dependent development. It would have been difficult to

avoid this type of development because of the nature of integration of African economies

into metropolitan economies during colonialism. African countries came to independence

without clear cut plan for development except for a few countries such as Botswana.

State power remained arbitrary, often violent, and threatening.

The composed political leadership was busy, evolving one development plan after

the other ranging from Kenyan development plan 1964 (Red plan), Kenyan Green Plan

1966 and Tanzanian Development Plan 1964. Between 1962 and 1990 Nigeria had more

than five national development plans without implementation.

Conflicts abound between the Bretton Wood institutions and African governments

over the approach to African development. Some of these approaches explored include

Lagos Plan and Structural Adjustment (Ake 1996). Meanwhile, in the face of confused

leadership in African, regional integration will not commence until the struggle for

political power becomes subject to rule of law. From the preceding discussion, we

therefore validate our second hypothesis that leadership crises in sub-Saharan Africa lead

to poor integration of the regions economies into the global economy.

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CHAPTER FOUR

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND INTERSTATE RELATIONS

In this chapter, we explored our third hypothesis which states that incompetence

on the part of political leadership account for the poor inter-state relation in sub-Saharan

Africa in the period under study. In attempt to do this we examined the impact of political

leadership on the state relation in SSA states and the economic relations between

countries of SSA. We also looked at the impact of policies inconsistence on interstate

relations among SSA states; crises of South-South corporation and finally examined the

lessons from EU for AU as continuity in change.

4.1 Structure of Interstate Relations in Sub-Saharan Africa

The SSA countries obviously were colonized by different European powers-

Britain, France, Germany, Portugal etc. This has structural implications, for instance

those SSA countries colonized by France avoid much economic relation with those

colonized by Britain or other European power. This weak structure of inter SSA relations

also serve the neo colonialists who explore this weakness for their economic gains. These

SSA countries sometimes have stronger economic, political and cultural relation with

their former colonizers more than the other SSA countries and other European powers

hence emphasis on Francophone or Anglophone. This emphasis is more among

francophone as France fear British encroachment in her former colonies. Free trade area

in SSA becomes limited as francophone or Anglophone SSA countries reduce the trade

barriers tariffs only within sub- groups (Jhingan 1997:291).

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Empirical evidence shows that most SSA countries have liberalized their trade

since 1960. Meanwhile, collective trade liberalization is not on the agenda of most SSA

countries. Collectively, liberalization would have achieved uniform reduction of tariffs

across board. Ackah and Morrissey (2005) observed that between 2000 and 2005 tariff

reduction rate vary greatly within SSA countries. For instance Burkina Faso’s average

annual external tariff was 12%; Ghana was 14.6%; Mauritania was 10.9%; Nigeria was

30%; and Senegal was 12%. These different trends have always been maintained

recently.

Incompetent political leadership is also implicated for this variation and this

hampers the integration of sub-region into the global process which will enable the SSA

countries to acquire the required credentials to compete effectively in the global

economy. This explains why a WTO circle argues that the reason why Africa and the

sub-Saharan Africa in particular have not been reaping the benefits of international trade

is because they have not liberalized their trade as required. The point being made here is

that trade liberalization within SSA countries would have had the benefit of making the

region competitive in the globalizing world.

This has further undermined the efforts of other economic groups in the SSA

towards economic cooperation among member states. Political leadership feared that

removal of tariffs and other trade barriers among themselves could threaten their

economic stake hence they frustrate in conjunction with external forces every march

towards the formation of a customs union in SSA. For instance under the free trade area

arrangement of ECOWAS, member countries retained freedom to maintain its own

tariffs, trade restrictions and commercial policies with non-members. Notably SSA

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countries with low external tariffs encourage trade with the outside world, thereby

indirectly encouraging international trade within the sub-region and further exposing

infant SSA industries to acute competition with the MNCS.

Though the ECOWAS tariff arrangement is capable of translating to a strong

economic bloc in SSA that can compete effectively in the international market but

political leadership appears confused. This is because, if a common economic bloc

succeeds in SSA, then a common political bloc might be negotiated and the current

political leadership structure should be dispensed.

The full implementation of the Common External Tariff (CET) earlier stated for

January 1, 2008 suffered severe setback because of internal wrangling and disagreements

among the leaders of member states (Ademuyiwa, 2007:3). Once Nigeria suspended full

implementation of the CET, because of a statement in negotiation between their Federal

Government and ECOWAS on the Type B Exception List of the tariff which allows

individual countries to fix their tariff at variance with CET. Type B Exception List

include items such as steel, petroleum, rice, beer, pharmaceutical products, soft drinks

and tobacco, among others. Every member state has an Exception List which consists of

items whose duty rates are at variance with the ECOWAS CET, Nigeria has a total of 308

tariff lines in her list. Five tariff bands exist under the CET. They are category I under

which goods attract zero percent; category 2 which attracts 5%; category 3 attracts 10%;

category 4 attracts 20% and category 5 attracts 50%. Under category I, zero percent

tariffs apply to basic necessities, social goods, medicament, industrial machinery and

equipment. 5% tariff is recommended for raw materials under category 2. 10% tariff is

recommended for intermediate goods under category 3; 20% tariff is recommended for

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finished goods under category 4, and 50% tariff is recommended for luxury goods under

category 5 (Ademuyiwa, 2007:3).

Political leadership refused to compromise or sacrifice national interests for the

benefit of other SSA became national interest also reflect their selfish economic and

political interest. Nigeria for instances suspended implementation of the CET on this

ground. Other countries in SSA are not also ready to make these sacrifices.

Again, there appears to be an internal rivalry between the Francophone and the

SSA especially in West African. This is manifested in their different pursuits of economic

policies despite the fact that they all belong to one sub-regional economic bloc-

ECOWAS. With the exception of Guinea, all other francophone countries in West Africa

are still tied to the apron-strings of their former colonial master-France. In fact, they have

always done their things their own way in total disregard of the larger political economic

interest of SSA countries. For instance, by the year 2000, the Francophone member

countries of ECOWAS constituting the West African Economic and Monetary Union

(UEMOA) had established a free trade area themselves and had adopted a four line (10%,

5%, 10%, and 20%) rate CET applicable to all third world countries including non-

UEMOA member states of ECOWAS, thus rendering UEMOA a customs union. It was

on the basis of this UEMOA CET that ECOWAS took a decision in December 2000 to

extend the CET to all member states by January 2008, which had already, failed as we

noted above (Ademnyaw, 2007:4).

These francophone countries also formed monetary union among themselves

without recourse to the ECOWAS. They also adopted a common currency amongst

themselves- CFA Franc. This spurred the remaining countries, that is the Anglophone

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West African countries; Nigeria, Ghana, Gambia, Sierra Leone and of course, Guinea, to

form the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) with the intention of adopting a

common currency too though with little success these division and antagonism within

SSA are plots by political leadership within SSA to hampers the efforts of common

economic bloc in the region (Ademuyiwa, 2007:4-5).

Political leadership in SSA has ignored the argument and the truism that open

regionalism promotes competitiveness, specialization, and thereby higher productivity on

the domestic market to the obvious benefit of the consumers and of economic soundness

in general. Open regional integration programs are part of an overall strategy of opening

oneself to the world economy and hence complement the unilateral and multilateral

programmes for liberalization of trade in the region (Iglesias, 1997:10). Leaderships in

SSA are focused on inner directed regionalism instead of a kind of open regionalism.

This restrains the region’s international competitiveness. Iglesias (1997:10-11) articulated

some benefits of open-regionalism. Firstly, bilateral and regional free-trade arrangements

in tandem with open regionalism allow the participating countries to eliminate the

barriers to trade among them faster than it would be in a multilateral context. Secondly, it

usually meets less political resistance because it is concluded in a setting of “reciprocity”

with legal guarantees of market access not available under a strategy of unilateral

opening. Thirdly, it limits the short-term negative repercussions on fiscal revenues from

the liberalization of foreign trade. Fourthly, more intense competition in a wider market

compels local enterprise to become more productive, and so prepares them for a future

programme of unilateral and multilateral liberalization. Fifthly, regional integration plans

can help participating countries obtain larger volumes of foreign investment.

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Nevertheless, the inner-directed form of regional integration adopted by most

SSA leader retards the promotion of competitive economy hence undermines efforts at

enhancing trade among member states. It is possible that regional integration programmes

and regional cooperation will become effective instruments of economic growth and

development in the SSA provided they are guided by the principle of open regionalism.

Comparing ECOWAS with EU, Janowski (2006:20-21) noted that it is widely

agreed that the EU is the most developed form of regional integration that currently

exists. European integration is qualified as a kind of “deep regionalism” that creates a

certain contrast to other regionalism in the world. The EU regionalism is natural,

geographic, regular, organized and capable for decision making spontaneously. This

explains why EU negotiates her external trade relations unlike ECOWAS where

respective member states negotiate external relation of ECOWAS. Again, leaders of

respective SSA countries face legitimacy crises when we bear in mind the manner of their

evolution as leaders hence they cannot evolve a legitimate structure of decision making.

Thus SSA leaderships established system of decision making that is highly personalized,

unlike in Europe where democratic legitimacy is provided mainly by the European

Parliament as the representative of the European citizens.

When also compared with other regional blocs like the Association of South East

Asian Nations (ASEAN); the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC); North

American Free Trade Area (NAFTA); European Free Trade Area (EFTA) etc,

ECOWAS’ competitiveness is put to question. Generally, ECOWAS and other sub-

Saharan Africa economic blocs like West African Economic and Monetary Union

(UEMOA) comprising eight members of ECOWAS, West African Monetary Zone

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(WAMZ) compromising five members of ECOWAS, and Mano River Union (MRU)

with three members of ECOWAS when compared with the other regional blocs like

ASEAN, APEC, and NAFTA are uncompetitive. This implicated the quality of political

leadership in SSA as being responsible for poor inter-state relation in the region. This is

because these leaders subscribe to regional blocs with conflicting economic interest like

we noted above.

4.2 Economic Relations within SSA Countries

Trade within and without SSA countries remain marginal. The low level of trade

in SSA follows the general pattern of low level of trade in African.

Iyoha (2005:6) observed that intra-African trade had remained low since 1960.

Similarly, Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) (2003:38) noted that:

Trade among sub-Saharan African countries (Africa-to-Africa trade) account for only 12% of sub-Saharan exports in 1989. Meanwhile the shares of Africa-to-Africa trade were either stagnant or declining between 1989 and 1993.

A study by ECA concluded that regional integration arrangement has failed to

positively affect intra-regional trade. In fact, intra COMESA trade is not significantly

different from its trade with non-member countries. This is the case for both imports and

exports.

Significantly, the shares of intra-regional exports are typically below 5% in

African. The two exceptions to this phenomenon of low intra-regional trade are CFAO

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and the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU) which, both have shares of intra-

regional trade in excess of 10% of total trade. In 1990, CEAO’s intra-regional trade

amounted to 11.3% of total exports while in 1994, SACU’s intra-regional exports was an

impressive 20.3% of total exports (Iyoha, 2005:6). In sub-Saharan Africa inter economic

relation is marginal. For instance Alaba (2006:9) observed that within ECOWAS export

and import shows dismal performance. On the average trade among ECOWAS countries

was only about 11% of trade with non- ECOWAS countries. For instance, in 2000, only

about 6% of Nigeria’s exports (mainly oil) were traded with ECOWAS members (mainly

to Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire). This implies that apart from crude oil, Nigeria does not have

anything to export to other SSA countries. On the import side, less than 2% of Nigeria’s

imports originated from ECOWAS states (mainly Benin, Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire)

(Alaba, 2006:9). Table 4.1 below shows the percentage of trade relations within

ECOWAS countries from 1990-2004.

Table 4.1 Trade Relations within ECOWAS Countries 1990-2006 Year Percentage Million of Dollars 1990 8 1,532.30

1995 9 1,874.80

2000 7.6 2,714.90

2001 8.2 2,241.50

2002 10.8 3,135.70

2003 8.3 2,972.00

2004 8.2 3,910.30

Source: UNCTAD, 2007.

Since ECOWAS countries are classified as core part of SSA, the table above

indicates that bulk of the trade relations are between the SSA countries and non-sub-

Sahara African countries. In 1990 intra SSA trade constituted only 8% of their total trade,

in 1995, it rose become 9%, dropped in 2000 to 7.6% and rose again in 2001 to 8.2%, in

2002, it rose further to 10.8%, but in subsequent years (2003 and 2004) it dropped again

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to 8.3% and 8.2% respectively and continued to drop as political leadership muzzle

production activities through their lack of commitment and embezzlement of fund meant

for development of infrastructure. This trend in SSA is not replicated in other parts of

Africa with visionary leadership like South Africa. (See table 4.2 below)

Table 4.2: Trade relations within SADC

1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

SADC Percentage 3.1 10.6 9.3 8.6 8.9 9.1 8.8

Millions of Dollars

1,085.20 4124.10 4,279.90 3,768.60 4,081.60 4,966.60 6,006.70

Source: UNCTAD (2005). Note SADC-Southern African Development Community

Tables 4.1 and 4.2 shows that apart from 1990 when the percentage and value of

the trade relation within ECOWAS countries is high than trade relations within SADC,

the percentage of trade within SADC more than doubled that within ECOWAS especially

after the independence of South Africa in 1994. This further reveals the effect of

committed stable leadership in intra regional trade.

This tendency in SSA could be gleaned from the inability of these countries to

look beyond the production of primary products. Hence lack of variety in what is

produced in SSA countries. They all produce the same kind of thing which they do not

need. Therefore, they are always outward looking. Thus Iyoha (2005:6) agreed that the

nature of products and low manufacturing capacity is the major contributing factor to low

level of intra-regional trade in SSA. This production typing explains why political

leadership looks towards Europe; North America and other industrial countries of Asia

for aid and trade relation.

Moreover, these SSA countries cannot manufacture without infrastructural base

which political leadership is incapable of erecting. Since 1960 no improvement has been

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recorded in the manufacturing capacity of SSA countries. In 1980, Senegal’s share of

manufactured exports was 15.1%, in 1990 and 2003; it was 22.5% and 28.8%

respectively. Togo was 10.6% in 1970. In 1990, it dropped to 9.1% but went up to almost

50% in 2003. In Nigeria, it was 0.3% in 1980 and 0.2 in 2003 like in Nigeria the export

of manufactured exports is very low in SSA (ECA: 2004). Political leadership in some

SSA countries depends critically on trade taxes as a source of government revenue. They

have, therefore, been reluctant to eliminate trade without an assured compensatory source

of revenue. The inability of the governments in the sub-region to explore veritable

alternatives to tariff revenue has continued to impose serious constraints on intra-

community flow of trade. More than one-third and a quarter of Gambia and Cape Verde’s

total revenue respectively accrue from import duties. Import duties share in total

government revenue are 18%, and 17.8% for Benin and Senegal respectively. Nigeria and

Cote of d’Ivoire have the least shares of 4.7 and 8.2% respectively (Iyoha, 2005:6). While

more than 70% of the EU total trade happened within the community free trade

arrangement, intra-community trade in SSA remains for less than 15% (Iyoha, 2005:4).

4.4 Political Leadership and Policy Inconsistency in SSA

Regimes change or rash and frequenting impeachments and or resignation of

political leaderships in SSA result into policy inconsistencies at the level of making

implementation and evaluation. Illustrating with Nigeria Onuoha (2009) apparently

survey’s sub-Saharan Africa as these qualities of inconsistencies noted in Nigeria prevails

in other parts of SSA.

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Onuoha (2009:42) argued that Nigeria had been experiencing policy

inconsistencies and hence the consequent inability to revamp the economy. On

ideological grounds he observed that Nigeria had experimented with mixed economy in

1960’s, Structural Adjustment in the 1970’s and other such policies as economic

diplomacy, debt rescheduling, debt cancellation, indigenization of foreign companies,

commercialization, privatization, liberalization and deregulation and yet refused to smile

to doctors of IMF and World Bank and instead relapses into comatose. As a consequence

Nigeria had launched numerous visions and dream without success. It started firstly with

Vision 2000 when it become clear that the vision had failed, Vision 2010 followed, with

2010 already here, attention has shifted to 2015 under MDGs and 202020 under President

Yar’adua’s 7point Agenda.

According to Onuoha (2009:43) successive governments in Nigeria-Tafawa

Blewa (1960-1966), Yakubu Gowon (1966-1975) Murtala Muhammad, Burhari, Ibrahim

Babangide, Sani Abacha, Abdusalami Abubakar and democratic governments of

Olusegun Obasanjo 1999-2007 and (Musa Yar’adua from 2007-present) (emphasis mine)

are captured by a captor or group of captors who determine(s) the policy line

government should pursue.

Onuoha (2009:44) differentiated between two types of captor (nationalist and

reformers) while the Nationalists are protectionist the reformers are liberals who facilitate

economic reforms. The policies pursued by each of the leadership mentioned above is

determines by the group that has captured the government. The struggle between these

two groups therefore characterize SSA and it this struggle also account for the fragile

government and leadership crises in most parts of Africa especially SSA.

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Again, change of leadership in most states in Africa also brings about change of

policies due to lack of institutional mechanisms for policy making, implementation and

evaluation. Following these policy inconsistencies in SSA, the political leaders now faces

the extraordinary task, at a time of economic crisis of maintaining stability and progress,

including growth, poverty reduction and achievement of the Millennium Development

Goals.

Many countries are showing that determined leadership can bring about

impressive results even in tough circumstances-for example, Rwanda, Mozambique,

Malawi and Ghana. At a time when financial flows such as domestic revenues,

investment and remittances are dropping, jobs food security and health are all directly

affected. Not just livelihoods but lives are at stake.

Calling for clear-sighted African leadership, McCullagh states that “primary

responsibility for Africa’s progress rests with her political leaders”, And that priority

needs to be given to job creation, integrating climate change into development strategies,

and addressing food security noting that national capacities to tackle these challenges are

still very limited in SSA (McCullagh, 2009:2).

4.4 Political Leadership and Crises of South-South Cooperation

Political leadership in SSA defies efforts by other relatively developed countries

in the Southern hemisphere through their rude political behaviour. This is largely

expressed through frequent human right abuse in particular and little commitment to

democratization in general in the SSA. Geographically, the South refers to those

countries located in the Southern hemisphere of the globe. These countries can be found

in South America, Africa and Asia.

92

Coincidentally, most states in the South are poor relative to their northern

counterpart of Europe, North America and Japan. Notably, differences exist between

South countries. For instance the GDP of Brazil in 2007 is over and $1.3 trillion while

that of Chad is about $ 15 billion (wiki/BrazilandwikiRedio.org/wiki/Chad). By South-

South cooperation in this context we mean the relation between Brazil as a relative super

power and Chad of sub-Saharan Africa.

Ake (1981:20) observed that an economy that is dependent such that its position

and relation to other economies in the global community is directed externally is

incapable of auto-centric development. This is a substantial problem for South-South

cooperation since most states in the south are dependent on the North for technology,

fund and trade (Ubaka, 2008:108-109).

If political leadership in SSA cannot guarantee internal peaceful atmosphere for

interaction then South-South cooperation cannot thrive. Most SSA countries are

undemocratic and these tendencies undermine economic development. The records of

human right abuse and seat tight or life presidency abound in SSA. This was apt in Zaire

under Mobutu Sese Seko (Echezona, 1991), Liberia under Samuel Doe (Vogt 1992),

Zimbabwe under Robert Mugabe (Vogt, 1992). Mali under Mouse Tarore, Togo under

Gnassingbe Eyadema, Benin under Mathew Kerekou, Longo under Dennis Sassu

Nguesso, and Nigeria under Sani Abacha etc (Echejona 1993:118). The virtual

governance of these regimes kills regional cooperation. Hence in the face of failed South-

South cooperation, SSA becomes unprotected for the MNC and other global actors

especially from the Northern hemisphere (Obianyo, 2009:1).

93

4.5 From Organization of African Unity to African Union: Lessons from

European Union

The early 21st century witnessed remarkable attempts by African political

leadership to promote regional integration as a means of fostering economic growth;

facilitating peace and security, consolidating democracy and promotes general welfare of

Africans though without success. Hence the transition from Organization of African

Unity (OAU) to African Union (AU) as well as the fostering of a new economic blue

print known as New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD),

combined with growing role of sub-regional economic communities in harmonizing

political and economic issues of Africa (Mwangi, 2009:35).

Under OAU integration was pursued as exclusive responsibility of governments

and political leaders whose practice of non-interference was not conducive for realizing

the goal hence people were not involved.

AU effectively began on May 26th 2001 but it appears it largely retains those traits

of OAU as integration remains the sole responsibility of Obasanjo, Mbeki, Kibaki, Wade

hence individual leaders. The continent thus is further ravaged by poverty, hunger, wars,

conflicts, HIV/AIDS pandemic, severe debt, and corruption especially in the SSA. The

resurgence of these problems suggest that the AU objectives or blue print has not been

implement or ill-implemented since 2001.

Political leadership criminalized the political economies of SSA and turn to seek

the kind of integration pursued by EU for Economic progress. This fossilized into the

formulation of NEPAD (Oyugi, 2001:101). Some of the objectives of NEPAD include:

• Economic growth and increased employment

94

• Reduction in poverty and inequality.

• Diversification of production

• Increased African integration (NEPAD, 2003).

These overlaps with AU constitutive act (See Article 3, Objective C, African Union

Commission, 2002).

Despite that African leaders insist on modeling AU after EU, they have refused to

surrender some authority over to the AU Commission to act on collective interest like

member nations constituting EU did. Today EU have single market, four dimensional

freedom-movement of person, goods, services and capital cooperate on agricultural and

environmental matters, and in fiscal and monetary issues (European Union, 1992). So

long as, AU constitutive members do not devolve power to the commission like EU

members did, AU would remain but an inspirational union and an end-point rather than

means to the end namely African economic development. (Inter African Group/Justice

Africa, 2002). From the foregoing analysis we therefore validate our third hypothesis that

incompetence on the part of political leadership account for the poor inter-state relation in

sub-Saharan Africa.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

5.1 Summary

The study examined the whole issue revolving around sub- Saharan African

political leadership and economic development. To adequately interrogate the problem

95

under study, we posed the following questions:

� Is there a link between persisting economic crises and incompetence on the

part of political leadership in sub- Saharan Africa between 1960 and 2009?

� Do leadership problems in sub – Saharan Africa account for poor integration

of the region’s economies into the global economy in the period under

study?

� Is leadership failure responsible for poor inter- state relation in sub- Saharan

Africa in the period under study?

This study has the following objectives:

� To ascertain if there is any link between persisting economic crises and

incompetence on the part of political leadership in sub- Saharan Africa

between 1960 and 2009.

� To examine if leadership problem in sub – Saharan Africa account for poor

integration of the region’s economies into the global economy in the period

under study.

� To determine whether political failure is responsible for poor inter- state

relation in sub- Saharan Africa in the period under study.

This work was discussed under the perspective prism of Marxian political economy

approach as expounded in A contribution to the critique of political economy. In the

words of Marx, “it is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but on the

contrary, their social being that determine their consciousness”.

96

In adopting the Marxist political economy as the analytical guide on this research,

we emphasize such objects of analysis like: the relations of production of good and

services, distribution of national resources and the attendant crises arising from both the

relations of production and the distribution of national resources. We emphasize these

because they are among the factors of economic indices that had always generated

conflict and crises in the societies more especially in the states of Africa.

In this study we put forward the following hypotheses for testing:

� There is a link between incompetence on the part of political leadership and

persisting economic crises in sub- Saharan Africa between 1960 and 2009.

� Leadership problems in sub – Saharan Africa account for to poor integration of the

region’s economies into the global economy in the period under study.

� Leadership failure is responsible for poor inter- state relation in sub- Saharan

Africa in the period under study.

Data for this study were collected mainly from secondary sources such as books;

journals; UN, ECOWAS, AU, NIIA, World Bank and IMF publications; Seminar,

Conference and Workshop papers; Magazines; Newspapers and internet for this study.

And finally, descriptive and explanatory methods of analysis were adopted for this

qualitative study to demonstrate the validity and reliability of findings of this study.

5.2 Conclusions

The cause of the woes of the African continent is squarely at the feet of his

leadership .This implied that both past and present generations of African leaders have

failed in their services to the people of Africa. However, this assertion merely extended

97

Achebe’s thesis on Nigeria to Africa. Achebe (1983:1) wrote that, “the trouble with

Nigeria is simply and squarely a failure of leadership….” The Nigerian problem is the

unwillingness or inability of its leaders to rise to the responsibilities and challenges of

personal examples which are the hallmark of true leadership.

In SSA countries values and ethos have waned. We often look for rationalization

of our criminal actions. Leaders in the region appear as the monster which Gandhi

described as deadly. These monsters seek wealth without work, pleasure without

conscience, commerce without morality, science without humanity, worship without

sacrifice, politics without principles, rights without responsibility and knowledge without

character (Anya, 2008:16).

Leadership in most SSA countries pursue dictatorial development without

tolerance of opposition, centralized state, no legitimacy and maximum executive power

between 1960 and 1970’s; criminalization of popular participation in development and

criminalization of opposition and patriots between 1980s and 1990s and reengagement

and struggle for popular participation in development necessitated by failure of SAP and

agitation for demoralization from 1993-present.

Leaders of SSA countries however have joined external factors and forces to block

development of the region for their economic interest. This explains why poverty persists

after many decades of ‘developmentization’ attempts in SSA.

Continued leadership problem is a product of demobilization of masses first

engendered by colonialism and reinforced by militarization in SSA. This culminates into

monumental suppression, corruption and poverty.

At the end of our investigations, we arrived at the following findings:

98

� There is a link between incompetence on the part of political leadership and

persisting economic crises in sub- Saharan Africa between 1960 and 2009.

� Leadership problems in sub – Saharan Africa lead to poor integration of the

region’s economies into the global economy in the period under study.

� Leadership failure is responsible for the poor inter- state relation in sub-

Saharan Africa in the period under study.

5.3 Recommendations

Most leaders in SSA do not abide by the rule of law. These leaders had severally

succumbed to bending and repealing certain portions of their constitutions that tended to

obstruct their mischievous interest. Hence, we recommend constitutionalism.

Though many leaders of SSA countries have no regards for judiciary, this arm of

government ensures political and economic stability in developed states and other

developing Third world countries like South Africa, Egypt, Brazil, and the Asian Tigers.

The judiciary should be strengthened for independent and effective judicial services. This

would help in no small measure to entrenching justice and fair play in SSA politics and

thereby remove any obstacle that undermined development effort of such states and then

enhance their strength in international organization.

Change of leadership in SSA countries had often attracted crises of different

quantum as deadly struggles ensued between prospective leaders. This is warranted by

the tendencies of leaders to cling tenaciously to state power. This situation had always

created frictions, crises and even civil war in some cases. SSA countries should embark

on urgent electoral reform process to arrest this ill situation of seat tight syndrome. An all

round reform of the educational, health, judicial and electoral processes in SSA is

99

inevitable and these form a vicious circle. A healthy person received sound education,

participate in election and seek redress when he perceives unfairness. When these

reforms are completed, corrupt practices will be easy to identify and tackle; religious

jingoists will be fished out dealt with and unworthy economic policies abandoned.

Again, cooperation among SSA countries is extremely important in the region for

peace, progress and advancement. This is because with such co-operations and

integrations, then a secured community would emerge. When leaders are so diverse and

unrecognized in opinion and ideas the effect would be crises and economic backwardness

of the region. We have to do more on changing elitist attitude and massive value

reorientation with the view of curbing greed and self among leaders and the led in SSA.

Again, credible alliance by credible people is required to ensure the emergence of a

larger civil society which is a prerequisite for a democratic political culture, peaceful

coexistence and dialogue in the region.

Generally, the masses should expose bigots and jingoists who exploit differences

in tribe and tongue to satisfy their economic interests with a view to re-build ethno-

religions bridges especially Christian-Muslim in SSA. Also, the tackling of poverty

should be declared as an emergency all over the SSA countries since poverty is the

source and or cause of most other predicaments of the SSA.

Until these reforms are undertaken the current political leadership structure in

SSA cannot guarantee economic progress and human welfare in the region even in the

next millennium.

100

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