Political Economy of Growth: East Asia and Latin America Compared Bert Gilbert 3/16/2006 Bert...
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Transcript of Political Economy of Growth: East Asia and Latin America Compared Bert Gilbert 3/16/2006 Bert...
Political Economy of Growth: East Asia and Latin America
Compared
Political Economy of Growth: East Asia and Latin America
Compared
Bert Gilbert
3/16/2006
Bert Gilbert
3/16/2006
Haggard: Explaining Developmental Strategies
Haggard: Explaining Developmental Strategies
Developmental Strategies “Packages of policies aimed at steering
economic activity into a particular mixture of ownership and sectors (23)”
Based on more than factor endowments
Developmental Strategies “Packages of policies aimed at steering
economic activity into a particular mixture of ownership and sectors (23)”
Based on more than factor endowments
Comparing East Asian and Latin American NICs
Comparing East Asian and Latin American NICs
Three Patterns of development Import-Substitution (ISI)
Mexico, Brazil, several other large LDCs Export-Led Growth (ELG)
Korea, Taiwan Entrepôt Growth
Singapore, Hong Kong
Virtually all developing countries begin international trade as exporters of primary products
Three Patterns of development Import-Substitution (ISI)
Mexico, Brazil, several other large LDCs Export-Led Growth (ELG)
Korea, Taiwan Entrepôt Growth
Singapore, Hong Kong
Virtually all developing countries begin international trade as exporters of primary products
Difference Between East Asian and Latin American NICs
Difference Between East Asian and Latin American NICs
Industrialization through exports versus industrialization through import substitution Haggard uses comparative analysis to:
Weigh competing explanations of policy change Generate some contingent generalizations Develop more convincing explanations of particular cases
Four levels of analysis The International System Domestic Coalitions Domestic Institutions Ideology
Industrialization through exports versus industrialization through import substitution Haggard uses comparative analysis to:
Weigh competing explanations of policy change Generate some contingent generalizations Develop more convincing explanations of particular cases
Four levels of analysis The International System Domestic Coalitions Domestic Institutions Ideology
Comparing East Asian and Latin American NICs
Comparing East Asian and Latin American NICs
Haggard uses these analyses in order to explain variation across Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Brazil, and Mexico.
Haggard uses these analyses in order to explain variation across Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Brazil, and Mexico.
The International SystemThe International System
Table 2.2 pg. 33 Constrain state choices in two ways:
Market Pressures Depression of 1930s hit Latin America but not Korea and
Taiwan External economic shocks likely to influence outward-oriented
policies Political Pressures
Latin America independent for longer, increased freedom to maneuver
U.S. more concerned with East Asia, importance of aid flows on foreign policy
Table 2.2 pg. 33 Constrain state choices in two ways:
Market Pressures Depression of 1930s hit Latin America but not Korea and
Taiwan External economic shocks likely to influence outward-oriented
policies Political Pressures
Latin America independent for longer, increased freedom to maneuver
U.S. more concerned with East Asia, importance of aid flows on foreign policy
Domestic CoalitionsDomestic Coalitions
Weak private sector combines with export-led policies to provide opportunities for national firms. MNCs and Local Firms coexist without threat of
denationalization Latin America
Role of FDI involved greater potential for political conflict
East Asia, labor controlled for the purpose of pursuing export-led growth
Weak private sector combines with export-led policies to provide opportunities for national firms. MNCs and Local Firms coexist without threat of
denationalization Latin America
Role of FDI involved greater potential for political conflict
East Asia, labor controlled for the purpose of pursuing export-led growth
Domestic InstitutionsDomestic Institutions
Characteristics of the State as an Institution: Degree of autonomy from social forces
Corporatist structures in democracies have proved successful in extracting restraint from labor and business
Cohesion of the policy-making apparatus Larger states of Latin America more difficulty than East Asian
NICs
Available policy instruments Hong Kong, few instruments of intervention, relied on market-
oriented system of adjustment
Characteristics of the State as an Institution: Degree of autonomy from social forces
Corporatist structures in democracies have proved successful in extracting restraint from labor and business
Cohesion of the policy-making apparatus Larger states of Latin America more difficulty than East Asian
NICs
Available policy instruments Hong Kong, few instruments of intervention, relied on market-
oriented system of adjustment
IdeologyIdeology
Table 2.5 pg. 48 Chicago Boys in Chile Korea and Taiwan
Declining U.S. aid Various ideas about how to respond American advisors influenced developmental
thinking.
Table 2.5 pg. 48 Chicago Boys in Chile Korea and Taiwan
Declining U.S. aid Various ideas about how to respond American advisors influenced developmental
thinking.
Evans: Class, State, and Dependence in East Asia:
Lessons for Latin Americanists
Evans: Class, State, and Dependence in East Asia:
Lessons for Latin Americanists Using analysis of East Asia to further the
dependency approach Insights of East Asianists may lead us to a
better understanding of dependent capitalist development
East Asia’s different history than Latin America allows us to apply dependency theory elsewhere, test the theory
Using analysis of East Asia to further the dependency approach
Insights of East Asianists may lead us to a better understanding of dependent capitalist development
East Asia’s different history than Latin America allows us to apply dependency theory elsewhere, test the theory
Differences between Dependence of East Asian NICs
and Latin American NICs
Differences between Dependence of East Asian NICs
and Latin American NICs Most important difference: Role of FDI
Latin American Industrialization maximized the consequences of FDI Foreign economic domination
East Asian Industrialization occurred during a period of little FDI
Flows of FDI to East Asia still significantly lower than to Latin America
Most important difference: Role of FDI Latin American Industrialization maximized the
consequences of FDI Foreign economic domination
East Asian Industrialization occurred during a period of little FDI
Flows of FDI to East Asia still significantly lower than to Latin America
Aid & TradeAid & Trade
East Asian countries highly dependent on international trade Does not seem to have slowed down their economic
growth or distribution of benefits East Asian NICs, aid has little to do with the
interests of U.S. transnational corporations Strengthen ability of states to confront Communist
neighbors Consequences of trade between rich and poor
countries depends on the specific social structure in which trade takes place
East Asian countries highly dependent on international trade Does not seem to have slowed down their economic
growth or distribution of benefits East Asian NICs, aid has little to do with the
interests of U.S. transnational corporations Strengthen ability of states to confront Communist
neighbors Consequences of trade between rich and poor
countries depends on the specific social structure in which trade takes place
The State and the Local Bourgeoisie
The State and the Local Bourgeoisie
Japanese colonialism left little space in East Asia for the emergence of even the relatively weak industrial bourgeoisies found in Latin America
Relations between state and local bourgeoisie make it more difficult for the state to smoothly impose such policies as EOI
Absence of rural elite influence from the formation of state policy unites East Asian cases and seperates them from those of Latin America
Japanese colonialism left little space in East Asia for the emergence of even the relatively weak industrial bourgeoisies found in Latin America
Relations between state and local bourgeoisie make it more difficult for the state to smoothly impose such policies as EOI
Absence of rural elite influence from the formation of state policy unites East Asian cases and seperates them from those of Latin America
Inequality in East Asian Dependent DevelopmentInequality in East Asian Dependent Development
Latin America characterized by large scale inequality
East Asian development has been very equal Long unbroken historical experience of FDI
produces a greater likelihood of inequality Confirms suspicions regarding the negative
welfare consequences of transnational dominated industrialization
Latin America characterized by large scale inequality
East Asian development has been very equal Long unbroken historical experience of FDI
produces a greater likelihood of inequality Confirms suspicions regarding the negative
welfare consequences of transnational dominated industrialization
Evans -- ConclusionsEvans -- Conclusions
Triple Alliance East Asia: State is dominant partner Latin America: TNC and Local Private Capital more
important Suggestions
Latin Americanists should be careful not to overemphasize industrial class relations
We don’t really understand the consequences of a relatively more autonomous state machine
Avoid false parallels Careful analyses of concrete historical situations must precede any
expectations about results from policy.
Triple Alliance East Asia: State is dominant partner Latin America: TNC and Local Private Capital more
important Suggestions
Latin Americanists should be careful not to overemphasize industrial class relations
We don’t really understand the consequences of a relatively more autonomous state machine
Avoid false parallels Careful analyses of concrete historical situations must precede any
expectations about results from policy.
Silva: State-Business Relations in Latin America
Silva: State-Business Relations in Latin America
Latin America Political and Economic calamities culminating
in debt crisis of early 1980s Replace state-led, ISI, populism, and
authoritarian regimes with free-market economic reform, fiscal sobriety, and political democracy.
Latin America Political and Economic calamities culminating
in debt crisis of early 1980s Replace state-led, ISI, populism, and
authoritarian regimes with free-market economic reform, fiscal sobriety, and political democracy.
Structural Adjustment and Business-System ChangeStructural Adjustment and Business-System Change
Common view: Developmentalist state generated weak, state-dependent private sectors
Free-market reforms: fiscal restraint, macroeconomic stability, privatization, financial-sector liberalization, and opening to international competition
Personal and Family Ownership, closed-property firm, interlocking directorships in conglomerates prevail. Banks more than capital markets for financing long-term investment.
Privatization: 1) Adopt Anglo-American business practices 2) Conglomerate expansion too rapid 3) expand in regional economic blocs 4) difficulty in extracting state from some enterprises
Common view: Developmentalist state generated weak, state-dependent private sectors
Free-market reforms: fiscal restraint, macroeconomic stability, privatization, financial-sector liberalization, and opening to international competition
Personal and Family Ownership, closed-property firm, interlocking directorships in conglomerates prevail. Banks more than capital markets for financing long-term investment.
Privatization: 1) Adopt Anglo-American business practices 2) Conglomerate expansion too rapid 3) expand in regional economic blocs 4) difficulty in extracting state from some enterprises
Economic Change and Recasting Business-State Relations
Economic Change and Recasting Business-State Relations
Management of economic change benefits from centralized state that is autonomous from social and political forces
Business-state relations founded on established conglomerate more stable than newly created, competing conglomerates
No “Latin American” model of business-state relations
Management of economic change benefits from centralized state that is autonomous from social and political forces
Business-state relations founded on established conglomerate more stable than newly created, competing conglomerates
No “Latin American” model of business-state relations
Business and Democracy in Latin America
Business and Democracy in Latin America
Absence of state control of organized interests creates space for a vibrant civil society which is a crucial feature of democracy
Institutionalized Tripartite negotiating system of societal corporatism provides a meaningful channel for the civil society’s participation in public policy
LA not ripe for societal corporatism Institutional element underdeveloped LA closer to U.S. pluralist model Exclusionary business-state relationships that work now may
contribute to economic and political difficulties in the future
Absence of state control of organized interests creates space for a vibrant civil society which is a crucial feature of democracy
Institutionalized Tripartite negotiating system of societal corporatism provides a meaningful channel for the civil society’s participation in public policy
LA not ripe for societal corporatism Institutional element underdeveloped LA closer to U.S. pluralist model Exclusionary business-state relationships that work now may
contribute to economic and political difficulties in the future
QuestionsQuestions
How applicable is the developmentalist model to East Asian development?
From what we have seen, what is the most important factor in predicting a country’s development strategy?
What is the biggest problem in comparing East Asian development to Latin American development?
How applicable is the developmentalist model to East Asian development?
From what we have seen, what is the most important factor in predicting a country’s development strategy?
What is the biggest problem in comparing East Asian development to Latin American development?