Police Power Consti2

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POLICE POWER CONSTI2

Stone v. Mississippi 101 U.S. 814 (, 25 L.Ed. 1079)

It is now too late to contend that any contract which aState actually enters into when granting a charter to aprivate corporation is not within the protection of theclause in the Constitution of the United States that

prohibits States from passing laws impairing theobligation of contracts. Art. 1, sect. 10. The doctrines ofTrustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (4 Wheat.518), announced by this court more than sixty yearsago, have become so imbedded in the jurisprudence ofthe United States as to make them to all intents andpurposes a part of the Constitution itself. In thisconnection, however, it is to be kept in mind that it isnot the charter which is protected, but only anycontract the charter may contain. If there is nocontract, there is nothing in the grant on which theConstitution can act. Consequently, the first inquiry inthis class of cases always is, whether a contract has infact been entered into, and if so, what its obligationsare.

In the present case the question is whether the stateof Mississippi, in its sovereign capacity, did by thecharter now under consideration bind itself irrevocablyby a contract to permit 'the Mississippi Agricultural,Educational, and Manufacturing Aid Society,' fortwenty-five years, 'to receive subscriptions, and selland dispose of certificates of subscription which shallentitle the holders thereof to' 'any lands, books,paintings, antiques, scientific instruments orapparatus, or any other property or thing that may beornamental, valuable, or useful,' 'awarded to them' 'bythe casting of lots, or by lot, chance, or otherwise.'There can be no dispute but that under this form of

words the legislature of the State chartered a lotterycompany, having all the powers incident to such acorporation, for twenty-five years, and that inconsideration thereof the company paid into the Statetreasury $5,000 for the use of a university, and agreedto pay, and until the commencement of this suit didpay, an annual tax of $1,000 and 'one-half of one percent on the amount of receipts derived from the sale ofcertificates or tickets.' If the legislature that grantedthis charter had the power to bind the people of theState and all succeeding legislatures to allow thecorporation to continue its corporate business duringthe whole term of its authorized existence, there is nodoubt about the sufficiency of the language employed

to effect that object, although there was an evidentpurpose to conceal the vice of the transaction by thephrases that were used. Whether the alleged contractexists, therefore, or not, depends on the authority ofthe legislature to bind the State and the people of theState in that way.

All agree that the legislature cannot bargainaway the police power of a State. 'Irrevocablegrants of property and franchises may be madeif they do not impair the supreme authority tomake laws for the right government of the State;but no legislature can curtail the power of itssuccessors to make such laws as they may deem

proper in matters of police.' Metropolitan Board ofExcise v. Barrie, 34 N. Y. 657; Boyd v. Alabama, 94 U.S. 645. Many attempts have been made in this courtand elsewhere to define the police power, but neverwith entire success. It is always easier to determinewhether a particular case comes within the generalscope of the power, than to give an abstract definitionof the power itself which will be in all respectsaccurate. No one denies, however, that it extends to almatters affecting the public health or the publicmorals. Beer Company v. Massachusetts, 97 id. 25;Patterson v. Kentucky, id. 501. Neither can it be deniedthat lotteries are proper subjects for the exercise ofthis power. We are aware that formerly, when thesources of public revenue were fewer than now, theywere used in some or all of the States, and even in theDistrict of Columbia, to raise money for the erection ofpublic buildings, making public improvements, and notunfrequently for educational and religious purposes;but this court said, more than thirty years ago,speaking through Mr. Justice Grier, in Phalen v. Virginia(8 How. 163, 168), that 'experience has shown that thecommon forms of gambling are comparativelyinnocuous when placed in contrast with the wide-spread pestilence of lotteries. The former are confined

to a few persons and places, but the latter infests thewhole community; it enters every dwelling; it reachesevery class; it preys upon the hard earnings of thepoor; and it plunders the ignorant and simple.' Happily,under the influence of restrictive legislation, the evilsare not so apparent now; but we very much fear thatwith the same opportunities of indulgence the sameresults would be manifested.

If lotteries are to be tolerated at all, it is no doubtbetter that they should be regulated by law, so that thepeople may be protected as far as possible against theinherent vices of the system; but that they aredemoralizing in their effects, no matter how carefully

regulated, cannot dmit of a doubt. When thegovernment is untrammelled by any claim of vestedrights or chartered privileges, no one has eversupposed that lotteries could not lawfully besuppressed, and those who manage them punishedseverely as violators of the rules of social morality.From 1822 to 1867, without any constitutionalrequirement, they were prohibited by law inMississippi, and those who conducted them punishedas a kind of gamblers. During the provisionalgovernment of that State, in 1867, at the close of thelate civil war, the present act of incorporation, withmore of like character, was passed. The next year,1868, the people, in adopting a new constitution with aview to the resumption of their political rights as one of

the United States, provided that 'the legislature shallnever authorize any lottery, nor shall the sale oflottery-tickets be allowed, nor shall any lotteryheretofore authorized be permitted to be drawn, ortickets therein to be sold.' Art. 12, sect. 15. There isnow scarcely a State in the Union where lotteries aretolerated, and Congress has enacted a special statute,the object of which is to close the mails against them.Rev. Stat., sect. 3894; 19 Stat. 90, sect. 2.

The question is therefore directly presented, whether,in view of these facts, the legislature of a State can, bythe charter of a lottery company, defeat the will of the


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people, authoritatively expressed, in relation to thefurther continuance of such business in their midst. Wethink it cannot. No legislature can bargain away thepublic health or the public morals. The peoplethemselves cannot do it, much less their servants. Thesupervision of both these subjects of governmentalpower is continuing in its nature, and they are to bedealt with as the special exigencies of the momentmay require. Government is organized with a view totheir preservation, and cannot divest itself of the powerto provide for them. For this purpose the largestlegislative discretion is allowed, and the discretioncannot be parted with any more than the power itself.Beer Company v. Massachusetts, supra.

In Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (4Wheat. 518), it was argued that the contract clause ofthe Constitution, if given the effect contended for inrespect to corporate franchises, 'would be anunprofitable and vexatious interference with theinternal concerns of a State, would unnecessarily andunwisely embarrass its legislation, and renderimmutable those civil institutions which are establishedfor the purpose of internal government, and which, tosubserve those purposes, ought to vary with varying

circumstances' (p. 628); but Mr. Chief Justice Marshall,when he announced the opinion of the court, wascareful to say (p. 629), 'that the framers of theConstitution did not intend to restrain States in theregulation of their civil institutions, adopted for internalgovernment, and that the instrument they have givenus is not to be so construed.' The present case, wethink, comes within this limitation. We have held, not,however, without strong opposition at times, that thisclause protected a corporation in its charterexemptions from taxation. While taxation is in generalnecessary for the support of government, it is not partof the government itself. Government was notorganized for the purposes of taxation, but taxation

may be necessary for the purposes of government. Assuch, taxation becomes an incident to the exercise ofthe legitimate functions of government, but nothingmore. No government dependent on taxation forsupport can bargain away its whole power of taxation,for that would be substantially abdication. All that hasbeen determined thus far is, that for a consideration itmay, in the exercise of a reasonable discretion, and forthe public good, surrender a part of its powers in thisparticular.

But the power of governing is a trust committed by thepeople to the government, no part of which can begranted away. The people, in their sovereign capacity,have establish d their agencies for the preservation ofthe public health and the public morals, and theprotection of public and private rights. These severalagencies can govern according to their discretion, ifwithin the scope of their general authority, while inpower; but they cannot give away nor sell thediscretion of those that are to come after them, inrespect to matters the government of which, from thevery nature of things, must 'vary with varyingcircumstances.' They may create corporations, andgive them, so to speak, a limited citizenship; but ascitizens, limited in their privileges, or otherwise, thesecreatures of the government creation are subject tosuch rules and regulations as may from time to time be

ordained and established for the preservation of healthand morality.

The contracts which the Constitution protects are thosethat relate to property rights, not governmental. It isnot always easy to tell on which side of the line whichseparates governmental from property rights aparticular case is to be put; but in respect to lotteriesthere can be no difficulty. They are not, in the legalacceptation of the term, mala in se, but, as we have

just seen, may properly be made mala prohibita. Theyare a species of gambling, and wrong in theirinfluences. They disturb the checks and balances of awell-ordered community. Society built on such afoundation would almost of necessity bring forth apopulation of speculators and gamblers, living on theexpectation of what, 'by the casting of lots, or by lot,chance, or otherwise,' might be 'awarded' to them fromthe accumulations of others. Certainly the right tosuppress them is governmental, to be exercised at alltimes by those in power, at their discretion. Any one,therefore, who accepts a lottery charter does so withthe implied understanding that the people, in theirsovereign capacity, and through their properlyconstituted agencies, may resume it at any time when

the public good shall require, whether it be paid for ornot. All that one can get by such a charter is asuspension of certain governmental rights in his favor,subject to withdrawal at will. He has in legal effectnothing more than a license to enjoy the privilege onthe terms named for the specified time, unless it besooner abrogated by the sovereign power of the State.It is a permit, good as against existing laws, but subjectto future legislative and constitutional control orwithdrawal.

On the whole, we find no error in the record.

Judgment affirmed.

ICHONG v. HERNANDEZ

Constitutional Law Treaties May Be Superseded byMunicipal Laws in the Exercise of Police Power

Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered thecountry to take advantage of business opportunitiesherein abound (then) particularly in the retailbusiness. For some time he and his fellow Chinesebusinessmen enjoyed a monopoly in the local marketin Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress passed theRA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the

purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right toengage in the retail business. Ichong then petitionedfor the nullification of the said Act on the ground that itcontravened several treaties concluded by the RPwhich, according to him, violates the equal protectionclause (pacta sund servanda). He said that as aChinese businessman engaged in the business here inthe country who helps in the income generation of thecountry he should be given equal opportunity.

ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate orsupersede treaties or generally accepted principles.


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HELD:Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or agenerally accepted principle. In this case, there is noconflict at all between the raised generally acceptedprinciple and with RA 1180. The equal protection of thelaw clause does not demand absolute equalityamongst residents; it merely requires that all personsshall be treated alike, under like circumstances andconditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilitiesenforced; and, that the equal protection clause is notinfringed by legislation which applies only to thosepersons falling within a specified class, if it appliesalike to all persons within such class, and reasonablegrounds exist for making a distinction between thosewho fall within such class and those who do not.

For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumedthat a treaty would be in conflict with a statute thenthe statute must be upheld because it represented anexercise of the police power which, being inherentcould not be bargained away or surrendered throughthe medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longerassert his right to operate his market stalls in thePasay city market.

Powell v. Pennsyllvania

Two questions are thus distinctly presented: first,whether a state can lawfully prohibit the manufactureof a healthy and nutritious article of food designed totake the place of butter out of any oleaginoussubstance, or compound of the same, other than thatproduced from pure milk or cream, and its sale whenmanufactured, and second, whether a state can,without compensation to the owner, prohibit the sale ofan article of food, in itself healthy and nutritious, whichhas been manufactured in accordance with its laws.These questions are not presented in the opinion of theCourt as nakedly and broadly as here stated, but theynevertheless truly indicate the precise points involved,

and nothing else. Upon first impressions, one wouldsuppose that it would be a matter for congratulation onthe part of the state that, in the progress of science, ameans had been discovered by which a new article offood could be produced equally healthy and nutritiouswith and less expensive than one already existing, andfor which it could be used as a substitute. Thanks andrewards would seem to be the natural return for such adiscovery and the increase of the article by the use ofthe means thereby encouraged. But not so thought thelegislature of the commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Bythe enactment in question it declared that no article offood to take the place of butter shall be manufacturedout of any other oleaginous matter than that which is

produced from pure milk or cream, or be sold within itslimits or kept for sale, under penalty of fine andimprisonment.

Syllabus

The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution wasnot designed to interfere with the exercise of the policepower by the state for the protection of health, theprevention of fraud, and the preservation of the publicmorals.

The prohibition of the manufacture out of oleaginoussubstances, or out of any compound thereof other thanthat produced from unadulterated milk or cream fromunadulterated milk, of an article designed to take theplace of butter or cheese produced from pureunadulterated milk or cream from unadulterated milk,or the prohibition upon the manufacture of anyimitation or adulterated butter or cheese, or upon theselling or offering for sale, or having in possession withintent to sell, the same, as an article of food, is a lawfuexercise by the power to protect, by police regulations,the public health.

Whether the manufacture of oleomargarine or imitationbutter of the kind described in the Act of theLegislature of Pennsylvania of May 21, 1885 (Laws ofPenn. of 1885, p. 22, No. 25) is or may be conducted insuch a way or with such skill and secrecy as to baffleordinary inspection, or whether it involves such dangerto the public health as to require, for the protection ofthe people, the entire suppression of the business,rather than its regulation in such manner as to permitthe manufacture and sale of articles of that class thatdo not contain noxious ingredients, are questions offact and of public policy which belong to the legislative

department to determine .

The statute of Pennsylvania of May 21, 1885, "for theprotection of the public health, and to preventadulteration of dairy products and fraud in the salethereof" neither denies to persons within thejurisdiction of the state the equal protection of the lawsnor deprives persons of their property without thatcompensation required by law, and is not repugnant inthese respects to the Fourteenth Amendment to theConstitution of the United States.

The case is stated in the opinion.

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of theCourt.

This writ of error brings up for review a judgment of theSupreme Court of Pennsylvania sustaining the validityof a statute of that commonwealth relating to themanufacture and sale of what is commonly called"oleomargarine butter." That judgment, the plaintiff inerror contends, denies to him certain rights andprivileges specially claimed under the FourteenthAmendment to the Constitution of the United States.

By Acts of the General Assembly of Pennsylvania, one

approved May 22, 1878, and entitled "An act toprevent deception in the sale of butter and cheese,"and the other approved May 24, 1883, and entitled "Anact for the protection of dairymen, and to preventdeception in sales of butter and cheese," provision wasmade for the stamping, branding, or marking in aprescribed mode manufactured articles or substancesin semblance or imitation of butter or cheese, not thelegitimate product of the dairy and not madeexclusively of milk or cream, but into which oil, lard, orfat, not produced from milk or cream, entered as acomponent part, or into which melted butter, or any oilthereof, had been introduced to take the place ofcream. Laws of Pennsylvania, 1878, p. 87; 1883, p. 43.


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But this legislation, we presume, failed to accomplishthe objects intended by the legislature. For, by asubsequent act approved May 21, 1885, and whichtook effect July 1, 1885, entitled "An act for theprotection of the public health, and to preventadulteration of dairy products, and fraud in the salethereof," it was provided, among other things, asfollows:

"SECTION 1. That no person, firm, or corporate body

shall manufacture out of any oleaginous substance orany compound of the same other than that producedfrom unadulterated milk, or of cream from the same,any article designed to take the place of butter orcheese produced from pure unadulterated milk, orcream from the same, or of any imitation oradulterated butter or cheese, nor shall sell, or offer forsale, or have in his, her, or their possession, with intentto sell, the same as an article of food. "

"SECTION 2. Every sale of such article or substancewhich is prohibited by the first section of this act, madeafter this act shall take effect, is hereby declared to beunlawful and void, and no action shall be maintained inany of the courts in this state to recover upon anycontract for the sale of any such article or substance."

"SECTION 3. Every person, company, firm, or corporatebody who shall manufacture, sell, or offer or expose forsale, or have in his, her, or their possession with intentto sell, any substance the manufacture and sale ofwhich is prohibited by the first section of this act, shall,for every such offense, forfeit and pay the sum of onehundred dollars, which shall be recoverable, with costs,by any person suing in the name of thecommonwealth, as debts of like amount are by lawrecoverable, one-half of which sum, when sorecovered, shall be paid to the proper county treasurerfor the use of the county in which suit is brought, and

the other half to the person or persons at whoseinstance such a suit shall or may be commenced andprosecuted to recovery."

"SECTION 4. Every person who violates the provision ofthe first section of this act shall be deemed guilty of amisdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be punishedby a fine of not less than one hundred dollars nor morethan three hundred, or by imprisonment in the countyjail for not less than ten nor more than thirty days, orboth such fine and imprisonment, for the first offense,and imprisonment for one year for every subsequentoffense."

The plaintiff in error was indicted under the last statutein the Court of Quarter Sessions of the Peace inDauphin County, Pennsylvania. The charge in the firstcount of the indictment is that he unlawfully sold "asan article of food two cases, containing five poundseach, of an article designed to take the place of butterproduced from pure unadulterated milk, or cream frommilk, the said article so sold as aforesaid being anarticle manufactured out of certain oleaginoussubstances and compounds of the same other thanthat produced from unadulterated milk or cream frommilk, and said article so sold as aforesaid being animitation butter."

In the second count, the charge is that he unlawfullyhad in his possession,

"with intent to sell the same as an article of food aquantity, viz., one hundred pounds, of imitation butterdesigned to take the place of butter produced frompure unadulterated milk or cream from the same,manufactured out of certain oleaginous substances orcompounds of the same other than that produced frommilk or cream from the same."

It was agreed for the purposes of the trial that thedefendant, on July 10, 1885, in the City of Harrisburg,sold to the prosecuting witness as an article of foodtwo original packages of the kind described in the firstcount; that such packages were sold and bought as"butterine," and not as butter produced from pureunadulterated milk or cream from unadulterated milk,and that each of said packages was at the time of salemarked with the words "Oleomargarine Butter" uponthe lid and side in a straight line, in Roman letters halfan inch long.

It was also agreed that the defendant had in his

possession one hundred pounds of the same articlewith intent to sell it as an article of food.

This was the case made by the commonwealth.

The defendant then offered to prove by Prof. HugoBlanck that he saw manufactured the article sold to theprosecuting witness; that it was made from pureanimal fats; that the process of manufacture was cleanand wholesome, the article containing the sameelements as dairy butter, the only difference betweenthem being that the manufactured article contained asmaller proportion of the fatty substance known as"butterine"; that this butterine existed in dairy butter in

the proportion of from three to seven percent, and inthe manufactured article in a smaller proportion, andwas increased in the latter by the introduction of milkand cream; that, this having been done, the articlecontained all the elements of butter produced frompure unadulterated milk, or cream from the same,except that the percentage of butterine was slightlysmaller; that the only effect of butterine was to giveflavor to the butter, and that it had nothing to do withits wholesomeness; that the oleaginous substances inthe manufactured article were substantially identicalwith those produced from milk or cream, and that thearticle sold to the prosecuting witness was awholesome and nutritious article of food, in all respectsas wholesome as butter produced from pureunadulterated milk or cream from unadulterated milk.

The defendant also offered to prove that he wasengaged in the grocery and provision business in theCity of Harrisburg, and that the article sold by him waspart of a large and valuable quantity manufacturedprior to the 21st of May, 1885, in accordance with thelaws of this commonwealth relating to the manufactureand sale of said article, and so sold by him; that for thepurpose of prosecuting that business, largeinvestments were made by him in the purchase ofsuitable real estate, in the erection of proper buildingsand in the purchase of the necessary machinery and


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ingredients; that in his traffic in said article he madelarge profits, and if prevented from continuing it, thevalue of his property employed therein would beentirely lost and he be deprived of the means oflivelihood.

To each offer the commonwealth objected upon theground that the evidence proposed to be introducedwas immaterial and irrelevant. The purpose of theseoffers of proof was avowed to be (1) to show that the

article sold was a new invention, not an adulteration ofdairy products nor injurious to the public health, butwholesome and nutritious as an article of food, andthat its manufacture and sale were in conformity to theActs of May 22, 1878, and May 24, 1883; (2) to showthat the statute upon which the prosecution wasfounded was unconstitutional as not a lawful exerciseof police power and also because it deprived thedefendant of the lawful use "of his property, liberty,and faculties, and destroys his property withoutmaking compensation."

The court sustained the objection to each offer andexcluded the evidence. An exception to that ruling wasduly taken by the defendant.

A verdict of guilty having been returned, and motionsin arrest of judgment and for a new trial having beenoverruled, the defendant was adjudged to pay a fine of$100 and costs of prosecution or give bail to pay thesame in ten days and be in custody until the judgmentwas performed. That judgment was affirmed by thesupreme court of the state. 114 Penn.St. 265.

This case, in its important aspects, is governed by theprinciples announced in Mugler v. Kansas,123 U. S.623.

It is immaterial to inquire whether the acts with whichthe defendant is charged were authorized by thestatute of May 22, 1878, or by that of May 24, 1883.The present prosecution is founded upon the statute ofMay 21, 1885, and if that statute be not in conflict withthe Constitution of the United States, the judgment ofthe Supreme Court of Pennsylvania must be affirmed.

It is contended that the last statute is void in that itdeprives all coming within its provisions of rights ofliberty and property without due process of law anddenies to them the equal protection of the laws, rightswhich are secured by the Fourteenth Amendment ofthe Constitution of the United States.

It is scarcely necessary to say that if this statute is alegitimate exercise of the police power of the state forthe protection of the health of the people and for theprevention of fraud, it is not inconsistent with thatamendment, for it is the settled doctrine of this Courtthat as government is organized for the purpose,among others, of preserving the public health and thepublic morals, it cannot divest itself of the power toprovide for those objects, and that the FourteenthAmendment was not designed to interfere with theexercise of that power by the states. Mugler v. Kansas,123 U. S. 663; Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co.,111 U. S. 746, 111 U. S. 751; Barbier v. Connolly,113

U. S. 27;Yick Wo v. Hopkins,118 U. S. 356. Thequestion, therefore, is whether the prohibition of themanufacture out of oleaginous substances or out ofany compound thereof other than that produced fromunadulterated milk or cream from unadulterated milkof an article designed to take the place of butter orcheese produced from pure unadulterated milk orcream from unadulterated milk, or the prohibition uponthe manufacture of any imitation or adulterated butteror cheese or upon the selling or offering for sale orhaving in possession with intent to sell the same as anarticle of food is a lawful exercise by the state of thepower to protect, by police regulations, the publichealth.

The main proposition advanced by the defendant isthat his enjoyment upon terms of equality with allothers in similar circumstances of the privilege ofpursuing an ordinary calling or trade and of acquiring,holding, and selling property is an essential part of hisrights of liberty and property as guaranteed by theFourteenth Amendment. The Court assents to thisgeneral proposition as embodying a sound principle ofconstitutional law. But it cannot adjudge that thedefendant's rights of liberty and property, as thus

defined, have been infringed by the statute ofPennsylvania without holding that, although it mayhave been enacted in good faith for the objectsexpressed in its title, mainly to protect the publichealth and to prevent the adulteration of dairyproducts and fraud in the sale thereof, it has in fact noreal or substantial relation to those objects. Mugler v.Kansas,123 U. S. 623,123 U. S. 661. The Court isunable to affirm that this legislation has no real orsubstantial relation to such objects.

It will be observed that the offer in the court below wasto show by proof that the particular articles thedefendant sold and those in his possession for sale in

violation of the statute were in fact wholesome ornutritious articles of food. It is entirely consistent withthat offer that many -- indeed that most -- kinds ofoleomargarine butter in the market contain ingredientsthat are or may become injurious to health. The Courtcannot say from anything of which it may take judicialcognizance that such is not the fact. Under thecircumstances disclosed in the record, and inobedience to settled rules of constitutionalconstruction, it must be assumed that such is the fact."Every possible presumption," CHIEF JUSTICE WAITEsaid, speaking for the Court in Sinking Fund Cases,99U. S. 700,99 U. S. 718,

"is in favor of the validity of a statute, and thiscontinues until the contrary is shown beyond a rationaldoubt. One branch of the government cannotencroach on the domain of another without danger.The safety of our institutions depends in no smalldegree on a strict observance of this salutary rule."

See also Fletcher v. Peck,6 Cranch 128;DartmouthCollege v. Woodward,4 Wheat. 518,17 U. S. 625;Livingston v. Darlington,101 U. S. 407.

Whether the manufacture of oleomargarine or imitationbutter of the kind described in the statute is or may be
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conducted in such a way or with such skill and secrecyas to baffle ordinary inspection, or whether it involvessuch danger to the public health as to require, for theprotection of the people, the entire suppression of thebusiness, rather than its regulation in such manner asto permit the manufacture and sale of articles of thatclass that do not contain noxious ingredients, arequestions of fact and of public policy which belong tothe legislative department to determine. And as it doesnot appear upon the face of the statute or from anyfacts of which the court must take judicial cognizancethat it infringes rights secured by the fundamental law,the legislative determination of those questions isconclusive upon the courts. It is not a part of theirfunctions to conduct investigations of facts enteringinto questions of public policy merely, and to sustain orfrustrate the legislative will, embodied in statutes, asthey may happen to approve or disapprove itsdetermination of such questions. The power which thelegislature has to promote the general welfare is verygreat, and the discretion which that department of thegovernment has in the employment of means to thatend is very large. While both its power and itsdiscretion must be so exercised as not to impair thefundamental rights of life, liberty, and property, and

while, according to the principles upon which ourinstitutions rest,

"the very idea that one man may be compelled to holdhis life or the means of living or any material rightessential to the enjoyment of life at the mere will ofanother seems to be intolerable in any country wherefreedom prevails, as being the essence of slaveryitself,"

yet

"in many cases of mere administration, theresponsibility is purely political, no appeal lying except

to the ultimate tribunal of the public

Page 127 U. S. 686

judgment, exercised either in the pressure of publicopinion or by means of the suffrage."

Yick Wo v. Hopkins,118 U. S. 370. The case before usbelongs to the latter class. The Legislature ofPennsylvania, upon the fullest investigation, as wemust conclusively presume, and upon reasonablegrounds, as must be assumed from the record, hasdetermined that the prohibition of the sale, or offering

for sale, or having in possession to sell for purposes offood of any article manufactured out of oleaginoussubstances or compounds other than those producedfrom unadulterated milk or cream from unadulteratedmilk to take the place of butter produced fromunadulterated milk or cream from unadulterated milkwill promote the public health and prevent frauds inthe sale of such articles. If all that can be said of thislegislation is that it is unwise or unnecessarilyoppressive to those manufacturing or sellingwholesome oleomargarine as an article of food, theirappeal must be to the legislature or to the ballot box,not to the judiciary. The latter cannot interfere without

usurping powers committed to another department ofgovernment.

It is argued in behalf of the defendant that if thestatute in question is sustained as a valid exercise oflegislative power, then nothing stands in the way of thedestruction by the legislative department of theconstitutional guarantees of liberty and property. Butthe possibility of the abuse of legislative power doesnot disprove its existence. That possibility exists even

in reference to powers that are conceded to exist.Besides, the judiciary department is bound not to giveeffect to statutory enactments that are plainlyforbidden by the Constitution. This duty, the Court hassaid, is always one of extreme delicacy, for apart fromthe necessity of avoiding conflicts between coordinatebranches of the government, whether state or nationalit is often difficult to determine whether suchenactments are within the powers granted to orpossessed by the legislature. Nevertheless, if theincompatibility of the Constitution and the statute isclear or palpable, the courts must give effect to theformer. And such would be the duty of the Court if thestate legislature, under the pretense of guarding thepublic health, the public morals, or the public safety,

should invade the rights of life, liberty, or property orother rights secured by the supreme law of the land.

The objection that the statute is repugnant to theclause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbidding thedenial by the state to any person within its jurisdictionof the equal protection of the laws is untenable. Thestatute places under the same restrictions and subjectsto like penalties and burdens all who manufacture orsell or offer for sale or keep in possession to sell thearticles embraced by its prohibitions, thus recognizingand preserving the principle of equality among thoseengaged in the same business. Barbier v. Connolly,113U. S. 27;Soon Hing v. Crowley,113 U. S. 703; Railway

Co. v. Humes,115 U. S. 512,115 U. S. 519.

It is also contended that the Act of May 21, 1885, is inconflict with the Fourteenth Amendment in that itdeprives the defendant of his property without thatcompensation required by law. This contention iswithout merit, as was held in Mugler v. Kansas.

Upon the whole case, we are of opinion that there is noerror in the judgment, and it is therefore

Affirmed.

Lutz v. Araneta

WALTER LUTZ, as Judicial Administrator of theIntestate Estate of the deceased Antonio JaymeLedesma, plaintiff-appellant,vs.J. ANTONIO ARANETA, as the Collector of InternalRevenue, defendant-appellee

In 1940 with a declaration of emergency, due to thethreat to our industry by the imminent imposition ofexport taxes upon sugar as provided in the Tydings-McDuffe Act, and the "eventual loss of its preferential
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position in the United States market"; a law wasenacted "to obtain a readjustment of the benefitsderived from the sugar industry by the componentelements thereof" and "to stabilize the sugar industryso as to prepare it for the eventuality of the loss of itspreferential position in the United States market andthe imposition of the export taxes."

ISSUE: WON the taxes imposed by Commonwealth ActNo. 567, otherwise known as the Sugar Adjustment Act

is a valid police power.

Held

That the tax to be levied should burden the sugarproducers themselves can hardly be a ground ofcomplaint; indeed, it appears rational that the tax beobtained precisely from those who are to be benefitedfrom the expenditure of the funds derived from it.

Here, the legislative discretion must be allowed fullyplay, subject only to the test of reasonableness; and itis not contended that the means provided in section 6of the law (above quoted) bear no relation to the

objective pursued or are oppressive in character. Ifobjective and methods are alike constitutionally valid,no reason is seen why the state may not levy taxes toraise funds for their prosecution and attainment.Taxation may be made the implement of the state'spolice power (Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. vs. Grosjean,301 U. S. 412, 81 L. Ed. 1193; U. S. vs. Butler, 297 U. S.1, 80 L. Ed. 477; M'Culloch vs. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316,4 L. Ed. 579).

From the point of view we have taken it appears of nomoment that the funds raised under the SugarStabilization Act, now in question, should beexclusively spent in aid of the sugar industry, since it is

that very enterprise that is being protected

Even from the standpoint that the Act is a pure taxmeasure, it cannot be said that the devotion of taxmoney to experimental stations to seek increase ofefficiency in sugar production, utilization of by-products and solution of allied problems, as well as tothe improvements of living and working conditions insugar mills or plantations, without any part of suchmoney being channeled directly to private persons,constitutes expenditure of tax money for privatepurposes, (compare Everson vs. Board of Education, 91L. Ed. 472, 168 ALR 1392, 1400).

The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costsagainst appellant. So ordered.

TIO v. Videogram Regulatory Board

GR No. :75697 June 18,1987

Facts: The case is a petition filed by petitioner onbehalf of videogram operators adversely affected byPresidential Decree No. 1987, An Act Creating theVideogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers toregulate and supervise the videogram industry.

A month after the promulgation of the said PresidentialDecree, the amended the National Internal RevenueCode provided that:

"SEC. 134. Video Tapes. There shall be collected oneach processed video-tape cassette, ready forplayback, regardless of length, an annual tax of fivepesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or importedblank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax."

"Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition ofVideograms. Notwithstanding any provision of law tothe contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirtypercent (30%) of the purchase price or rental rate, asthe case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition ofa videogram containing a reproduction of any motionpicture or audiovisual program.

Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the taxcollected shall accrue to the province, and the otherfifty percent (50%) shall accrue to the municipalitywhere the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That inMetropolitan Manila, the tax shall be shared equally bythe City/Municipality and the Metropolitan ManilaCommission.

The rationale behind the tax provision is to curb theproliferation and unregulated circulation of videogramsincluding, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettesor any technical improvement or variation thereof,have greatly prejudiced the operations of moviehouses and theaters. Such unregulated circulationhave caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendanceby at least forty percent (40%) and a tremendous dropin the collection of sales, contractor's specific,amusement and other taxes, thereby resulting insubstantial losses estimated at P450 Million annually ingovernment revenues.

Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around

P600 Million per annum from rentals, sales anddisposition of videograms, and these earnings have notbeen subjected to tax, thereby depriving theGovernment of approximately P180 Million in taxeseach year.

The unregulated activities of videogramestablishments have also affected the viability of themovie industry.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not tax imposed by the DECREE is a

valid exercise of police power.

(2) Whether or nor the DECREE is constitutional.

Held: Taxation has been made the implement of thestate's police power. The levy of the 30% tax is for apublic purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer theneed for regulating the video industry, particularlybecause of the rampant film piracy, the flagrantviolation of intellectual property rights, and theproliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while itwas also an objective of the DECREE to protect themovie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.


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We find no clear violation of the Constitution whichwould justify us in pronouncing Presidential Decree No.1987 as unconstitutional and void. While theunderlying objective of the DECREE is to protect themoribund movie industry, there is no question thatpublic welfare is at bottom of its enactment,considering "the unfair competition posed by rampantfilm piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of theviewing public brought about by the availability ofunclassified and unreviewed video tapes containingpornographic films and films with brutally violentsequences; and losses in government revenues due tothe drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention thefact that the activities of video establishments arevirtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayor'spermit and municipal license fees are required toengage in business."

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed.No costs.

Association of Small Land Owners v. Sec. ofAgrarian Reform

(too long)

Jacobson v. Massachussetts

Case Brief: Jacobson v. Massachusetts (1905)

Facts: The Massachusetts legislature authorized theboard of health of a city or town to require andenforce the vaccination and revaccination of all theinhabitants thereof, and shall provide them with themeans of free vaccination if the board deems it

necessary. In 1902, the board of health of Cambridge,Massachusetts ruled that it was necessary for thespeedy extermination of the disease that all personsnot protected by vaccination should be vaccinated.When Mr. Jacobson, a resident over the age of twenty-one and not under guardianship, refused to comply,both the Municipal Court and the Supreme Court ofMassachusetts ruled against him. He then appealed tothe Supreme Court.Decision: 7 2 Massachusetts wins. Justice Harlandelivered the Opinion of the Court.Doctrine: A state legislature may reasonably restrict apersons right to life, liberty, or property without dueprocess of law if such action is necessary to secure

the general comfort, health, and prosperity of thestate.Reasoning: According to the Court, since the spirit ofthe Constitution rests in the words of the text, theCourt must decide the case based on the words withinthat document. While Jacobson argued that theMassachusetts law violated the spirit of theConstitution, the Court ruled that there is no need inthis case to go beyond the plain, obvious meaning ofthe words in those provisions of the Constitution.Upon the principle of self-defense, of paramountnecessity, ruled the Court, a community has the rightto protect itself against an epidemic of disease whichthreatens the safety of its members. Although the

14thAmendment of the Constitution mandates that nostate shall deprive any person of life, liberty, orproperty, without due process of law, the Court ruledthat a persons rights are not absolute. Rather,persons and property are subjected to all kinds ofrestraints and burdens in order to secure the generalcomfort, health, and prosperity of the state, wrote theCourt. According to the Court, the good and welfare ofthe commonwealth, of which the legislature is primarilythe judge, is the basis on which the police power restsin Massachusetts.A persons rights are subject for the common goodbecause without such limitations, organized societycould not exist. A society that guaranteed its citizensrights regardless of the injury that may be done toothers would soon be confronted with disorder andanarchy, the Court wrote.Jacobson argued that compulsory vaccination is not areasonable interference with his liberty because manyscientists attach little or no value to vaccination as ameans of preventing the spread of smallpox andmany more think that vaccination causes otherdiseases of the body. In response, the Court wrotethat the legislature of Massachusetts was not unawareof these opposing theories, and was compelled, of

necessity, to choose between them. When theMassachusetts legislature referred the question to aboard of health composed of persons residing in thelocality affected, the body decided that thevaccination was necessary for the public health or thepublic safety. In other words, the Massachusetts statelegislature subscribed to the theory that accordedwith the common belief and was maintained by highmedical authority.

The authority to determine for all what ought to bedone in such an emergency must have been lodgedsomewhere or in some body, and, according to theCourt it belongs to the legislature. Since the legislature

of Massachusetts decided, when considering the law,that mandatory vaccination for all persons notprotected by vaccination was necessary for the safetyof population, the judiciary did not have the power toreview this action of the legislature

U.S. v. Toribio

Facts: Respondent Toribio is an owner of carabaoresiding in the town of Carmen in the province oBohol. The trial court of Bohol found that therespondent slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered a

carabao without a permit from the municipal treasurerof the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, inviolation of Sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Actregulating the registration, branding, and slaughter ofLarge Cattle. The act prohibits the slaughter of largecattle fit for agricultural work or other draft purposesfor human consumption.

The respondent counters by stating that what the Actis (1) prohibiting is the slaughter of large cattle in themunicipal slaughter house without a permit given bythe municipal treasurer. Furthermore, he contends thathe municipality of Carmen has no slaughter house andthat he slaughtered his carabao in his dwelling, (2) the
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act constitutes a taking of property for public use in theexercise of the right of eminent domain withoutproviding for the compensation of owners, and it is anundue and unauthorized exercise of police power ofthe state for it deprives them of the enjoyment of theirprivate property.

Issue: Whether or not Act. No. 1147, regulating theregistration, branding and slaughter of large cattle, isan undue and unauthorized exercise of police power.

Held: It is a valid exercise of police power of thestate.

Police power is the inherent power of the state tolegislate laws which may interfere with personalliberties. To justify the state in the exercise of itssovereign police power it must appear (1) that theinterest of the general public requires it and (2) thatthe means are reasonably necessary for theaccomplishment of the purpose, and not undulyoppressive upon individuals.

The court is of the opinion that the act appliesgenerally to the slaughter of large cattle for human

consumption, ANYWHERE, without a permit dulysecured from the municipal treasurer, For to dootherwise is to defeat the purpose of the law and theintent of the law makers. The act primarily seeks toprotect large cattle against theft to make it easy forthe recovery and return to owners, which encouragedthem to regulate the registration and slaughter of largecattle.

Several years prior to the enactment of the said law,an epidemic struck the Philippine islands whichthreatened the survival of carabaos in the country. Insome provinces seventy, eighty and even one hundredpercent of their local carabaos perished due to the saidepidemic. This drove the prices of carabaos up to four

or five-fold, as a consequence carabao theft becamerampant due to the luxurious prices of these workanimals. Moreover, this greatly affected the foodproduction of the country which prompted thegovernment to import rice from its neighboringcountries.

As these work animals are vested with public interestfor they are of fundamental use for the production ofcrops, the government was prompted to pass a lawthat would protect these work animals. The purpose ofthe law is to stabilize the number of carabaos in thecountry as well as to redistribute them throughout theentire archipelago. It was also the same reason why

large cattles fit for farm work was prohibited to beslaughtered for human consumption. Most importantly,the respondents carabao was found to be fit for farmwork.

These reasons satisfy the requisites for the validexercise of police power.

Act No. 1147 is not an exercise of the inherent powerof eminent domain. The said law does not constitutethe taking of carabaos for public purpose; it just servesas a mere regulation for the consumption of theseprivate properties for the protection of general welfare

and public interest. Thus, the demand focompensation of the owner must fail.

Churchill & Tait v. Rafferty

Facts:The case arises from the fact that defendant,Collector of Internal Revenue, would like todestroy or remove any sign, signboard, or

billboard, the property of the plaintiffs, forthe sole reason that such sign, signboard, orbillboard is, or may be offensive to the sight.

The plaintiffs allege otherwise. Was therevalid exercise of police power in this case?

Held:Yes. There can be no doubt that the exerciseof the police power of the PhilippineGovernment belongs to the Legislature andthat this power is limited only by the Acts ofCongress and those fundamentals principles

which lie at the foundation of all republicanforms of government. An Act of theLegislature which is obviously andundoubtedly foreign to any of the purposesof the police power and interferes with theordinary enjoyment of property would,without doubt, be held to be invalid. Butwhere the Act is reasonably within a properconsideration of and care for the publichealth, safety, or comfort, it should not bedisturbed by the courts."The power vested in the legislature by the

constitution to make, ordain, and establishall manner of wholesome and reasonablelaws, statutes, and ordinances, either withpenalties or without, not repugnant to theconstitution, as they shall judge to be for thegood and welfare of the commonwealth, andof the subjects of the same.""The police power of the State, so far, hasnot received a full and complete definition. Itmay be said, however, to be the right of theState, or state functionary, to prescriberegulations for the good order, peace, health

protection, comfort, convenience and moralsof the community, which do not ... violateany of the provisions of the organic law.""It [the police power] has for its object theimprovement of social and economicconditioned affecting the community at largeand collectively with a view to bring about"he greatest good of the greatestnumber."Courts have consistently and wiselydeclined to set any fixed limitations uponsubjects calling for the exercise of this


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power. It is elastic and is exercised from timeto time as varying social conditions demandcorrection.""It may be said in a general way that thepolice power extends to all the great publicneeds. It may be put forth in aid of what issanctioned by usage, or held by theprevailing morality or strong andpreponderant opinion to be greatly andimmediately necessary to the publicwelfare.""It is much easier to perceive and realize theexistence and sources of this police powerthan to mark its boundaries, or to prescribelimits to its exercise."

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