1

POLI6002

International Relations (IR) Theory: A Critical Introduction

AY 2009-2010 (First Semester), Monday: 1.30– 4.30Pm

Instructor: Prof. Tang Shiping

Office: Social Sciences Building (wen-ke-lou), Rm. 814

Office Telephone: 55664582; Email: twukong@yahoo.com

Office Hours: Friday 3-5PM. No appointment needed during office hours.

General Introduction

This course emphasizes a critical approach toward different grand/major theories

of international relations (IR)/ international politics. The course is designed with two

convictions. First, all major theories (sometimes called schools, paradigms, or “isms”)

of IR are defective, one way or the other, in light of the fundamental paradigms of

social sciences. Thus, we must keep a critical but open mind toward these big theories.

Second, despite these defects, however, major theories are indispensable for

understanding international politics: all of us use some (crude) form of these major

theories as analytical tools when trying to make sense of international politics. Thus, a

critical understanding of these major theories (or macro-tools) helps us taking a more

critical view toward our own understanding of international politics.

For each session, a lecture, providing a brief historical account of the subject and,

lasting no more than 20 minutes, will be delivered. It will then be followed by

presentations from 3-4 students on the questions posed for each session. Each student

has about 15-20 minutes to make her/his cases on one question. Presentations will

then be followed by open discussion on the questions posed and students’

presentations. Additional questions of interest for the students can be added to the

discussion when time allows.

The instructor hopes that such a course design will enable students to think

independently from and challenge existing theoretical interpretations of IR.

Guide to Good Performance

1. Read the required readings carefully and take notes. You should finish at least

80% of the required readings (about 150-160 pages).

2. Read some of the recommended readings if you can, and especially if you are

assigned to do presentations for the session. Carefully consider which argument or

interpretation is most plausible, and why.

3. Write down what you have in mind on the questions posed, regardless whether

you are going to present or not.

2

4. Be out-spoken and try to challenge others’ points. Silence is not gold here.

5. Re-think and re-formulate your thoughts on the questions after each session, in

light of the discussions during the class, and put your more developed thoughts on

paper (Laziness will never pay). The questions in the final examination will

consist of questions that are derived from (but are different from) these questions

posed for each sessions.

6. Do not be late for class, or in turning in your assignments.

Performance Assessment

Students in this course are presumed to have some, but not much, background

knowledge about the topics to be discussed. Students who do not have much

background knowledge are encouraged to read some general texts (Daughtery 2005).

Students are expected to complete the required readings and encouraged to do the

recommended readings prior to class and be prepared to participate in discussions.

For each session, three students are picked to present their thoughts on the

questions posed for each session. They must outline their arguments and explain why

they have come to the arguments. Students are required to pick their topics for

presentations in session 1.

Any student who misses more than 3 sessions of the class will be advised to drop

the class. The same rule applies to all students, even though attendance and

discussion will not be part of the grade for Ph. D. students.

M. Sc. Students’ performance will be assessed based on the following criteria:

1. Attendance and discussion 10%

2. Two presentations in the Class 20%

3. Two essays (1200-1500 words) on a question posed in the course, and one of the

essays can be based on one of the presentations. (Of course, this means that the other

essay must be different from the other presentations) 20%

4. Final: The final will a take-home final, students will answer three questions

in short essays, each about 1200-1500 words) 50%

Ph. D. Students’ performance will be assessed based on the following criteria:

1. Attendance and discussion 10%

2. Two presentations in the Class 20%

3. Two essays (1500-2000 words) on a question posed in the course, and one of the

essays can be based on one of the presentations. (Of course, this means that the other

essay must be different from the other presentations) 20%

4. A research article (5,000-6,000 words) that addresses a significant theoretical

issue. The article must be theoretically sophisticated enough to pass. Please consult

with me before you pick your topic. 50%

Books Recommended for General Reading

3

The following two books are recommended not specifically for this course, but

for your general interest. These two books will provide invaluable intellectual support

for your understanding of the world around us, whether you stay in academia or work

in other professions.

1. Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton,

Princeton University Press, 1997). This book is the crowning achievement of

Jervis’s intellectual odyssey, so far. A must read for any social scientist.

2. Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel (New York, Norton, 1997). A

macro-history of human society, from 11000 B.C. on, told in an amazingly

accessible way.

General Texts for the Course

1. James E. Dougherty, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending theories of

international relations: a comprehensive survey. 5th

ed., 2004. This is a

standard introduction to various strains of IR theories (both macro- and

medium-).

2. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics

(Princeton, 1978). This book is a true classic, essentially for understanding

international politics.

3. Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont, Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern

Intellectuals’ Abuse of Science (New York: Picardo, 1998). This fun book

destroys much of the more radical side of the vast “post-modernist”,

“post-structuralist”, and “extreme social constructivist” literature, it will save

you enormous amount of time from reading (and more dangerously, being

captured by) a huge load of fashionable non-sense, especially from the more

cultural French philosophers (e.g., Lyotard, Derrida; Baudrillard).

Recommending this book, however, does not mean that I reject all

post-modernism, post-structuralism, and (social) constructivism literature.

Professional Journals

Please consulate the following journals. They mostly focus on theoretical issues,

although often with empirical evidences (and relevance).

International Organization, International Security, Security Studies, World

Politics, American Political Science Review, American Journal of Political Science,

European Journal of International Relations, International Studies Quarterly,

International Studies Review, Foreign Policy Analysis, Review of International

Studies, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Journal of Peace Studies,

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Cooperation and Conflict, International Relations,

International Interactions.

4

Outline

1: Introduction

Basic Labels and Notions: international/world politics, international relations.

Levels of analysis: man, state, and system

Theories of international politics

Theories of foreign policy: explaining state behavior.

Nationalism as given, state as the main actor (although other actors matter)

Ethnocentrism as barrier toward knowledge

Required

A brief guide to philosophy of social sciences (Tang 2005-2009)

Why a critical approach toward theory in general

1. Alberto O. Hirschman. 1970. “The Search for Paradigms as a Hindrance to

Understanding,” World Politics 22 (3): 329-343.

Recommended

Why a critical and a comparative approach toward theory in general

1. Giovanni Sartori, 1970. “Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics,”

American Political Science Review 64 (4): 1033-1053.

2. Lijphart, Arend. 1971. Comparative Politics and Comparative Method.

American Political Sciences Review 65 (3): 682-693.

Some Sociology of Anglo-Saxon-dominating IR Theory

1. Stanley Hoffman, “An American Social Science: International Relations,”

Daedalus 1 (1977): 41-60.

2. Ole Waever, “The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline: American

and European Developments in International Relations,” International

Organization, 52 (4): 687-727.

3. “Why there is no non-Western IR Theory?” International Relations of the

Asia-Pacific, 7 (3), special issue, 2008.

2: Realism and Idealism through time, and the structural Revolution

Required

Realism vs. Idealism: Ancient, Classic, and Modern

1. Niebuhr, Reinhold. 1960 [1932]. Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in

Ethics and Politics (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons), “Introduction,” pp.

xi-xxv.

5

2. Hans J. Morgenthau, 1946. Scientific Man vs. Power Politics (Chicago), chap.

2, “The Age of Science and the Social World,” pp. 11-40.

3. Wolfers, Arnold. “The Pole of Power and the Pole of Indifference,” World

Politics, Vol. 4, No. 1. (Oct., 1951), pp. 39-63.

The Structural Revolution in IR Theory

1. Kenneth A. Waltz, 1959. Man, State, and War (Columbia), chap. 6, “The

Third Image: International Conflict and International Anarchy,” (pp. 159-186),

and “Conclusion”, pp. 224-238.

2. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye. 1977. Power and Interdependence.

(Boston: Little and Brown), chap. 1 and 2, pp. 3-37.

3. Alexander Wendt, 1992. “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social

Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization 46 (2): 391-425.

4. Powell, Robert, 1994. “Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The

Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate.” International Organization 48: 313-344.

Recommended

Classical Texts in Realism (note: they might have been correct, but this does not mean

they are or will be correct)

1. Thucydides, “The Melian Dialogue”, in The Peloponnesian War, pp. 401-408.

2. Introduction to Kautilya on War and Diplomacy, Boesche, Roger. 2003.

Kautilya’s Arthasatra on War and Diplomacy in Ancient India. Journal of

Military History 67: 9-38.

3. Joseph J. Spengler. 1969. “Kautilya, Plato, Lord Shang: Comparative Political

Economy,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 113 (6):

450-7. A brief comparative introduction to three ancient thinkers.

Other Expositions on Idealism and Realism

1. Roger T. Ames, The art of rulership: a study of ancient Chinese political

thought (Buffalo, N. Y.: SUNY Press, 1986), chap. 1, “Philosophy of

History,” An introduction to the same debate in ancient China.

2. Carr, E. H. 1940. The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939 (London: McMillan),

chap. 4 & 5, “The Harmony of Interests,” and “The Realist Critique.”

3. Raymond Aron. 1966. War and Peace. New York: Doubleday, chapters XIX

and XX, “In Searcy of a Morality, I & II”

The Structural Revolution

1. Kenneth A. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, M.A.:

Addison-Wesley, 1979), chaps. 6 and 7.

2. Robert O. Keohane, “Realism, Neorealism, and the Study of World Politics,”

in Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and its Critics (Columbia), pp. 1-25.

3. Keohane, Robert O. “Theory of World Politics,” in Robert O. Keohane, ed.,

Neorealism and Its Critics (Columbia), pp. 159-203.

6

The Coming Collapse of Realism ?

1. Gilpin, Robert. 1996. “No One loves a Political Realist,” Security Studies 5 (3):

3-26.

2. Stephen M. Walt, “The Progressive Power of Realism,” American Political

Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (Dec., 1997), pp. 931-935.

3. Robert Jervis, “Realism in the Study of World Politics,” International

Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 971-991.

4. Mearsheimer, John J. 2002. “Realism, the Real World, and the Academy.” In

Realism and Institutionalism in International Studies, edited by Michael

Brecher and Frank P. Harvey. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.

Human Nature and Realism: the “French Connection”?

1. Annette Freyberg-Inan, 2004. What Moves Man: The Realist Theory of

International Relations and its Judgment of Human Nature. New York: SUNY

Press.

2. Ish-Shalom, Piki, “The Triptych of Realism, Elitism, and Conservatism,”

International Studies Review 8 (2006): 441-468.

Questions

1. What are the key differences on human nature between realism and

idealism/utopianism? Does the structural revolution eliminate human nature

from realism? Why and why not?

2. Why has idealism (in various forms) persisted, if according to its realist

opponents, that idealism is profoundly misleading?

3. What is the essence of structural revolution? How much has it contributed or

hindered the growth of IR as a science (or a discipline)?

4. Does and can realism reject “normative” or “moral” principle per se, in

practice or in theorizing? Why? Why not?

A Question on the Sociology of Knowledge

1. Why did realism come to dominate in renaissance or modern world?

2. What is the value of realism and idealism, in academia and in the real world,

today?

3. Offensive Realism vs. Defensive Realism

Required

Offensive Realism

1. Mearsheimer, John J. (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York:

Norton, chap. 2. (pp. 29-54).

Defensive Realism: The Foundation

1. Arnold Wolfers, “‘National Security’ as an Ambiguous Symbol,” Political

Science Quarterly, 67/4 (Dec., 1952), pp. 481-502.

7

2. Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the security dilemma,” World Politics, vol.

30, no. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-214.

The Security Dilemma: A More Rigorous (Re-)Statement

1. Shiping Tang, “The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis,” Security

Studies, vol. 18, no. 3 (September 2009), pp. 587-623.

Defensive Realism: Development and Elaboration

1. Charles Glaser, “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-help,”

International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3. (Winter 1994-1995), pp. 50-90.

Offensive Realism vs. Non-offensive realism: a more rigorous differentiation

1. Shiping Tang, “Offensive Realism and Defensive Realism Revisited,”

unpublished manuscript (2007).

Recommended

Other Statements on Offensive Realism

1. Labs, Eric J. 1997. Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of

War Aims. Security Studies 6 (4): 1-49.

2. Zakaria, Fareed. 1998. From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of

America’s World Role (Princeton: Princeton University Press), chap. 2, “A

Theory of Foreign Policy.”

Earlier and Less Rigorous Statements on Offensive Realism vs. Defensive Realism

1. Brooks, Stephen G. 1997. “Dueling Realisms,” International Organization 51

(3): 445-477.

2. Taliaferro, Jeffery W. 2000-01. “Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive

Realism Revisited,” International Security 25:128-161.

3. Taliaferro, Jeffery W. 2001. “Realism, Power Shifts, and Major War,”

Security Studies 10 (4): 145-178.

Getting Realism Wrong? A Debate

1. Legro, Jeffrey W. and Andrew Morvascik. 1999. “Is Anybody still a Realist?”

International Security 24/2 (Fall): 5-55.

2. Feaver; Peter D. et al. (with Gunther Hellman; Randall L. Schweller; Jeffery

W. Taliaferro; William C. Wohlforth; Jeffery W. Lergo; Andrew Moravcsik),

2000. “Brother Can You Spare a Paradigm? (Or Was Anybody Ever a

Realist?)” International Security 25/1: 165-193.

Earlier and Less Rigorous Statements on the Security Dilemma

1. Herbert Butterfield. 1950. The Tragic Element in Modern International

Conflict. Review of Politics 12 (2): 147-164.

2. Herz, John H. 1950. Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma.

World Politics 2(2): 157-180.

8

3. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics

(Princeton, 1978), chap. 3,

4. Booth, Ken, and Nicholas Wheeler. 2008. The Security Dilemma: Fear,

Cooperation, and Trust in World Politics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Questions

1. What is the central difference between the two realisms? Has the debate been

resolved? Why and why not?

2. Is the debate between offensive realism and defensive realism meaningful?

Why or why not?

3. Why is the security dilemma a foundational concept in the making of

defensive realism?

A more profound question (to be resolved in session 12)

1. Which versions of realism do you think have more validity for two historical

periods: pre-1648, post-1648 to pre-1945, and post-1945? Why?

Questions from Recommended Readings

1. Did Lego and Morvascik get realism wrong? Why or why not?

4. Cooperation in International Politics: The Divergent Point

between Offensive Realism vs. Non-offensive Realism Theories

Required

The possibility of cooperation: offensive realism vs. non-offensive realism

1. John Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, chap. 2, pp. 51-3.

2. Jervis, Robert. 1999. Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding

the Debate. International Security 24 (1): 42-63.

3. Shiping Tang. 2008a. “Fear in International Politics: Two Positions,”

International Studies Review (Sept., 2008)

Reassurance as Cooperation-building

1. Kydd, Andrew. 2000. Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation. International

Organization 54 (2): 325-357. (Skip the modeling part for now)

2. Shiping Tang, “Reassurance: Toward a Coherent Understanding,” from

Shiping Tang, A Theory of Security Strategy for Our Time: Defensive Realism

(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, forthcoming), chap. 5.

Institutions as Facilitators of Cooperation

1. Robert Axelrod; Robert O. Keohane, 1985. “Achieving Cooperation under

Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” World Politics, 38 (1): 226-254.

9

Recommended

The Study of Cooperation with PD Game

1. Jervis, Robert. 1988. “Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation.” World

Politics 40 (4): 317-349.

2. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books,

1984)

Earlier Critique of PD Game as a Model of Cooperation in IR

1. Joanne Gowa, 1986. Review: Anarchy, Egoism, and Third Images: The

Evolution of Cooperation and International Relations. International

Organization 40 (1): 167-186.

Structural Approach toward Cooperation and its (further) Discontent

1. Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the security dilemma,” World Politics, vol.

30, no. 2 (January, 1978), pp. 167-214.

2. Charles Glaser, “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-help,”

International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3. (Winter 1994-1995), pp. 50-90.

3. Evan Braden Montgomery. 2006. “Breaking out of the Security Dilemma:

Realism, Reassurance, and the Problem of Uncertainty.” International

Security 31(2):151-185.

4. Milner, Helen. 1992. International Theories of Cooperation among Nations:

Strengths and Weaknesses. World Politics 44 (3): 466-496.

5. Tang, Shiping. 2007. Correspondence: Uncertainty and Reassurance in

International Politics. International Security 27 (3): 193-197.

Reassurance: Further Readings

1. Osgood, Charles A. 1962. An Alternative to War or Surrender. Urbana:

University of Illinois Press.

2. Kydd, Andrew (1997) Sheep in Sheep’s Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do

Not Fight Each Other. Security Studies 7:114-155.

3. Kydd, Andrew. 2005. Trust and Mistrust in International Relations

(Princeton), chap. 7

Questions

1. Why is the possibility of achieving cooperation other than temporary alliance

when facing common opponents a fundamental divergent point between

offensive realism and all the non-offensive realism theories?

2. What is the core logic of cooperation-building via reassurance? In light of

Mearsheimer’s denial that cooperation-building via reassurance is possible

(Mearsheimer 2006, “Interview”), how can you counter by arguing that

cooperation-building via reassurance can really work?

3. What is wrong with structural theories of international cooperation?

10

Question from recommended reading (for the more capable)

1. In light of the more rigorous logic of cooperation-building via reassurance

developed by Kydd (2000, 2005) and Tang (2008), what is wrong with

Axelrod’s experiment as a platform for studying cooperation in international

politics, in addition to what Tang has pointed out?

5. Liberalism Theories of IR

Required

Kant’s Stone

1. Kant, Immanuel. 2003 [1795]. To Perceptual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch.

Trans. Ted Humphrey. Indianapolis, I.N.: Hackett.

2. Doyle, Michael W. “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs.” Philosophy

and Public Affairs 12/3 (Summer 1983), 205-235, 12/4 (Autumn 1983),

323-353.

3. Andrew Morvasick. 1997. “Taking Preference Seriously: A Liberal Theory of

International Relations.” International Organization 51 (4): 513-553.

The Devastating Critique

1. Rosato, Sebastian. 2003. The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory.

American Political Science Review 97 (4): 585-602.

2. Jahn, Beate. “Kant, Mill, and Illiberal Legacies in International Affairs,”

International Organization, 59 (Winter 2005), pp. 277-207.

Democratic Peace: Evidence and Explanation

1. David A. Lake, “Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War,” American

Political Science Review vol. 86, 1 (Mar., 1992), pp. 24-37.

2. Steve Chan, “In Search of Democratic Peace: Problems and Promise.”

Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 41, No. 1 (May, 1997), pp. 59-91.

3. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson and

Alastair Smith, 1999. “An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace,”

American Political Science Review 93 (4): 791-807.

Recommended

Reading Liberal Peace

1. Thomas Walker. 2008. Two Faces of Liberalism: Kant, Paine, and the

Question of Intervention. International Studies Quarterly 52 (2): 449-468.

2. Kenneth A. Waltz, “Kant, Liberalism, and War.” American Political Science

Review, 56/2 (Jun. 1962), pp. 331-340.

Other Expositions of Liberalism

11

1. Morvacsik, Andrew. 2003. “Liberal International Relations Theory: A

Scientific Assessment.” In Colin Elman and Miriam F. Elman eds., Progress

in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field (Cambridge: MIT

Press), pp. 159-205.

Other Criticism of the Democratic Peace

1. Christopher Layne, “Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace,”

International Security, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Autumn, 1994), pp. 5-49.

2. Desch, Michael C. 2008. “Liberal Illiberalism: The Ideological Origins of

Overreaction in US Foreign Policy,” International Security 32 (3): 7-43.

More on Democratic Peace

1. John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett, “The Kantian Peace: The Pacific

Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations,

1885-1992,” World Politics 52 (1), October 1999, pp. 1-37.

2. Lars-Erik Cederman, “Back to Kant: Reinterpreting the Democratic Peace as a

Macrohistorical Learning Process,” American Political Science Review, vol.

95, 1 (Mar., 2001), pp. 15-31.

3. John Macmillan, 2003. “Beyond the Separate Democratic Peace,” Journal of

Peace Research 40 (2): 233-243.

4. Bruce M. Russett, 1994. Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton, 1994).

5. Bruce M. Russett and John Oneal. 2001. Triangulating Peace: Democracy,

Interdependence, and International Organizations (W. W. Norton).

6. Kelly M. Kadera, Mark J. C. Crescenzi, and Megan L. Shannon, “Democratic

Survival, Peace, and War in the International System,” American Journal of

Political Science, Vol. 47, No.2 (Apr., 2003), pp.234-247.

7. John Owen. 2004. Democratic Peace Research: Whence and Whither?

International Politics 41: 605-617.

Debating Rawls’s “Law of Peoples”

1. John Rawls, 1993. “The Law of Peoples.” Critical Inquiry, 20/1 (Fall 1993),

36-68.

2. Charles. R. Beitz, 2000. “Rawls’ Law of the People.” Ethics 110 (4): 669-696.

3. Allen Buchanan, 2000. “Rawls’ Law of the People: Rules for a Vanished

Westphalian World,” Ethics 110 (4): 697-721.

Questions

1. Is it fair for us (whether realists or not) to label liberalism as part of “idealism”,

if idealism is to mean “utopianism”?

2. Why does liberal internationalism (or international liberalism) have an

imperialistic dimension, in theory and in practice?

12

3. What does “democratic peace” mean for a liberal theory of international

politics? (i.e., Can a liberal theory of international politics remain viable, if

“democratic peace” is not real? Why or why not?)

4. What does a liberal theory of international politics imply, other than

democratic peace? What does this mean for the theory in IR?

6: International Institutions and Order: “Neoliberalism” and the English

School

Required

What is institution?

1. John. S. Duffield. What are international Institutions? International Studies

Review, 9 (2007): 1-22.

Neoliberalism and its Critics

1. Keohane, Robert O. (1984) After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the

World Political Economy (Princeton University Press), chaps. 1, 4-6.

2. John G. Ikenberry. 1998. Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence

of Great Power Order. International Security (Winter 1998/99). 23/3, 43-78.

3. Schweller, Randall L. 2001. “The Problem of International Order Revisited: A

Review Essay,” International Security, 26 (1): 161-186.

The English School and its Critics

1. Bull, Hedley. 1995 [1977]. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World

Politics, 2nd

ed (New York: Columbia University Press), chap. 1-3, pp. 3-73.

2. Barry Buzan. 1993. “From International System to International Society:

Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School.”

International Organization, 47 (3): 327-352.

3. Dale Copeland. 2003. “A Realist Critique of the English School,” Review of

International Studies 29: 427-441.

4. Yuen Foong Khong, “The Elusiveness of Regional Order: Leifer, the English

School and Southeast Asia,” The Pacific Review, 18/1 (March 2005), pp.

23-41.

A Synthesis?

1. Christian Reus-Smit. 1997. The Constitutional Structure of International

Society and the Nature of Fundamental Institutions. International

Organization 51 (4): 555-589.

Recommended

Debating Institutions

1. Mearsheimer, John J. (1994-95). The False Promise of International

Institutions. International Security 19:5-49.

13

2. Schweller, Randall L. and David Priess, ‘A Tale of Two Realisms: Expanding

the Institutions Debate,” Mershon International Studies Review, 41 (1997), pp.

1-32.

3. Jervis, Robert. 1999. Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding

the Debate. International Security 24 (1): 42-63.

4. Keohane, Robert O. and Lisa L. Martin. 2003. Institutional Theory as a

Research Program, in, Colin Elman and Miriam F. Elman eds., Progress in

International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field (Cambridge: MIT Press),

pp. 71-107.

5. Krasner, Stephen D. 1982a. “Structural Causes and Regimes Consequences:

Regime as Intervening Variables.” International Organization 36 (2): 185-205

6. Krasner, Stephen D. 1982b. “Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as

Autonomous Variables.” International Organization 36 (2): 497–510.

Debating English School

1. Richard D. Little. 2000. “The English School’s Contribution to the Study of

International Relations.” European Journal of International Relations, 6 (3):

395-423.

2. Richard D. Little. 2003. The English School vs. American Realism: a meeting

of minds or divided by a common language? Review of International Studies

29 (3): 443-460.

A History of the English School

1. Dunne, Timothy, 1998. Inventing international society: a history of the

English school. New York: St. Martin. (RSIS library JZ1249 DUN)

A (Re-)construction of the English School?

1. Buzan, Barry. 2004. From International to World Society? English School

Theory and the Social Structure of Globalization. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

Questions

1. What are the fundamental differences between neoliberialism and realism?

Have the differences been resolved?

2. What do you think of some of the realists’ attack against neoliberalism?

Contrast Mearsheimer/Schweller-Priess vs. Jervis. After realism’s attack, what

is wrong with neoliberialism? What is good?

3. How do norms, institutions (rules) come into exist? What have been

neoliberalism and the English school’s answer to this fundamental question?

Have they really answered this more fundamental question?

4. Is the English school really that distinct, from neoliberalism and

constructivism (discussed below)? (Hint: what is order, whose order, and

tackle the question along the pluralist vs. solidarist divide)

14

A more fundamental question

1. Institutions (as rules) are simply ossified ideas. If this is the case, whose

institutions, whose ideas?

7. Culturalism and Civilizationalism

Required

Culturalism: From Political Culture to Strategic Culture

1. Johnston, Alastair Iain. 1995. “Introduction,” Cultural Realism: Strategic

Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History. Princeton: Princeton

University Press.

2. Colin S. Gray. 1999. Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation

Theory Strikes Back. Review of International Studies, 25:49-69.

Civilizationalism

1. Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72 (3):

22-49.

Counter-Culturalism and counter-civilizationism.

1. Jack Snyder, Anarchy and Culture: Insights from the Anthropology of War.

International Organization 56 (2002): 7-45.

2. Desch, Michael C. 1998. “Cultural Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas

in Security Studies.” International Security 23 (1): 141-170.

3. Etzioni, Amitai. The Real Threat: Essay on Samuel Huntington.

Contemporary Sociology 2005. 34 (5): 477-485.

4. Douglas Porch. 2000. Military "Culture" and the Fall of France in 1940: A

Review Essay. International Security, Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 157-180.

Recommended

General: Political Culture and Strategic Culture

1. Alastair Iain Johnston. 1995. “Thinking about Strategic Culture.”

International Security, 19 (4): 32-64.

2. Alastair Iain Johnston. 1999. “Strategic Cultures revisited: reply to Colin

Gray.” Review of International studies 25: 519-523.

3. Kier, Elizabeth. 1995. “Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the

Wars.” International Security 19 (4): 65-93.

4. Jeffrey Legro, Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation

Two-Step. American Political Science Review, Vol. 90, No. 1 (Mar., 1996), pp.

118-137.

5. Berger, Thomas. “Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and

Japan,” in Peter Katzenstein eds., Cultural Norms and National Security:

Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia). 1996.

15

6. Mitzen, Jennifer. 2006. Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity

and Security Dilemma. European Journal of International Relations 12 (3):

341-370.

7. Walter Russell Mead. God and Gold: Britain, America, and the Making of the

Modern World. New York: Knopf. 2008.

Against Huntington

1. David Welch, 1997. The Clash of Civilizations Thesis as an argument and as a

Phenomenon. Security Studies, 6(4): 197-216.

2. Tal Alkopher. The Social (and Religious) Meanings that Constitute War: The

Crusades as Realpolitk and Socialpolitk. International Studies Review 49

(2005): 715-739

Questions

1. How much does culture and civilization explain when it comes to state

behavior? Can culture be the Ultimate Explanation? Why and why not?

2. The most devastating admission by Culturalists might have been Iain

Johnston’s admission that China’s strategic culture actually differed little from

realpolitik (supposedly a Western culture): if two very different cultures

produce the same kind of strategic culture, what is left for culture? Can you

explain why ancient China (esp. Ming dynasty) and European realpolitik were

so strikingly similar, without falling back on a cultural explanation?

3. What are the relationships between culture, preferences (over goals and

means), norm, and identity? Here, you inevitable come to a problem of (finite)

regress (i.e., logic being pushed back one step further and further). Interest (as

given by realists)--preferences (goals, motivations; not intentions)—identities

—culture. What is wrong with this scheme? What is right with this scheme?

A More profound questions

1. What is relationship between culturalist explanation and ethnocentrism?

Session 8: Constructivism

Required

Constructivism

1. Emanuel Adler. 1991, “Cognitive Evolution: A Dynamic Approach for the

study of International Relations and Their Progress,” reprinte in Emanuel

Adler 2005. Communitarian International Relations: The Epistemic

Foundations of International Relations. London: Routledge, pp. 65-88.

2. Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social

Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2.

(Spring 1992), 391-425.

16

3. Emanuel Adler. 1997. Seizing the middle ground: constructivism in world

politics. European Journal of International Relations 3 (3): 319-363.

Critiques of Constructivism: Weak

1. Copeland, Dale. 2000. “The Constructivism Challenge against Structural

Realism: A Review Essay,” International Security 25 (2): 187-212.

2. Sterling-Folker, Jennifer (2000) Competing Paradigms or Birds of a Feather?

Constructivism and Neoliberal Institutionalism Compared. International

Studies Quarterly 44: 97-119.

Critiques of Constructivism: Fundamental and Strong

1. Palan, Ronen, 2000. “A World of Their Making: An Evaluation of the

Constructivist Critique in International Relations.” Review of International

Studies, 26 (4): 575-598

Recommended

More Constructing: Theoretical and Empirical

1. Alexander Wendt, 1999. Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge).

2. Stefano Guzzini, “A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International

Relations,” European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 6, No. 2,

147-182 (2000).

3. Alastair Iain Johnston. 2001. “Treating International Institutions as Social

Environments,” International Studies Quarterly 45 (4): 487-515.

4. Alastair Iain Johnston. 2008. Social State (Princeton).

5. David L. Rousseau, Identifying Threat and Threatening Identities: The Social

Construction of Realism and Liberalism (Stanford, 2006).

State as a person and its identity

1. Hogg et al, 1995. “A Tale of Two Theories: Identity Theory with Social

Identity Theory.” Social Psychological Quarterly 58 (4): 255-69.

2. Alexander Wendt, “The state as person in international theory,” Review of

International Studies 30 (2004) : 289-316

3. Alexander Wendt, 2006. “Social Theory as Cartesian Science: an auto-critque

from a quantum perspective,” in Stefano Guzzini and Anna Leander eds.,

Constructivism and International Relations: Alexander Wendt and his Critics.

London: Routledge, pp. 181-219.

Questions

1. Wendt claimed that he wanted a “rump materialism” (thus a middle ground

between materialism and ideationalism), whereas Adler believed that

constructivism stakes a “middle ground” between a “rationalist” stand and

“interpretive/reflexive” stand. In your opinion, which middle ground is more

critical for understanding international politics? Why so?

17

2. Does constructivism really occupy a middle ground along the two dimensions

noted above? (Hint, a genuine middle ground demands an organic synthesis

of the two dyadic approaches). Why? Why not?

3. There is no doubt that constructivism is an improvement over culturalism

(and much more so over civilizationism). In your opinion, what are the key

aspects that constructivism has improved upon culturalism and

civilizationism?

4. At the same time, constructivism suffers some of the same fundamental

deficiencies as culturalism and civilizationism. In your opinoin, what are

these key deficiencies?

9. Copenhagen School, Critical Theory, and Postmodernism

Required

The Copenhagen School

1. Ole Weaver, 1995. “Securitization and De-Securitization,” in, Ronnie D.

Lipschutz ed., On Security (Columbia), pp. 46-86.

2. Michael C. Williams. “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and

International Politics,” International Studies Quarterly 47 (2003): 511-531

Critical Theory

1. Benhabib, Seyla. 1985. The Utopian Dimension in Communicative Ethics.

New German Critique 35: 83-96.

2. Robert Cox. 1981. “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond

International Relations Theory,” Millenium: Journal of International Studies

10 (2): 126-155. (Reprinted in Robert O. Keohane ed., Neorealism and Its

Critics, Columbia University Press, 1986, pp. 204-254.)

3. Keith Krause, 1998. “Critical Theory and Security Studies,” Cooperation and

Conflict 33 (3): 298-333.

Post-Modernism vs. Critical Theory

1. Michel Foucault, “Truth and Power,” in Foucault, 1980. Power/knowledge:

selected interviews and other writings, 1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon (New

York: Pantheon), pp. 109-133.

2. Ehrhard Bahr, 1988. “In Defense of Enlightenment: Foucault and Habermas,”

German Studies Review 11 (1): 97-109

Recommended

All kinds of Security and Securitization

1. Buzan, Barry. 1991. People, States, and Fear, Chap. 10, “Concluding

Thoughts on International Security Studies,” 363-382.

18

2. Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, 1998. Security: a new

framework for analysis (Boulder, Colo. : Lynne Rienner).

3. Mitzen, Jennifer. 2006. Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity

and Security Dilemma. European Journal of International Relations 12 (3):

341-370.

4. Holger Stritzel. 2007. Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and

Beyond, European Journal of International Relations, 13(3): 357-383.

Societal Security: Social Psychology to the Rescue?

1. Tobias Theiler, “Societal Security and Social Psychology,” Review of

International Studies 29 (2003): 249-268.

Critical Security Studies

1. Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds.) 1997. Critical security studies:

concepts and cases. Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press

2. Ken Booth (ed.). 2005. Critical security studies and world politics (Boulder:

Lynne Rienner Publishers).

Foucault, Postmodernism, and Political Science

1. Paul Brass. 2000. “Foucault steals Political Science,” Annual Review of

Political Science 3: 305-30.

Questions

1. What is right and wrong with the Copenhagen School? Did it get to the bottom

of the question? (hint, why and what do states/elite securitize?)

2. Why there is no post-modernism (especially Foucault-ism) in political science

in general, and IR in particular? Can Foucault-ism offer a solution to the

question left behind by the Copenhagen school? Why and why not?

3. The essence of critical theory is to criticize the prevailing social system/norms.

Has critical security studies been really that of critical, in the sense it seeks to

criticize the prevailing international institutions/system?

4. Nobody disputes that “critical theory” has an emancipatory goal from its

Hegelian-Marxist origin, thus a utopian goal. If this is the case, what have

been the progresses made by critical security studies over the utopian thinking

so fiercely attacked by Carr, Niebuhr, and Morgenthau?

A More Fundamental Question

1. Why utopian thinking has been so persistent-it always comes back in a new

name (old wine in a new bottle)?

10. Social Psychology of International Politics-I

Required Readings

19

Ethnocentrism and Intergroup Relations

1. Levine, Robert A. and Donald T. Campbell. 1972. Ethnocentrism: Theories of

Conflict, Ethnic Attitudes, and Group Behaviors. New York: John Wiley &

Sons, pp. 7-21 (NTU library).

2. Brewer, Marilynn. 1986. “The Role of Ethnocentrism in Intergroup Conflict,”

in, Worchel, Stephen, and William G. Austin (eds). 1986. Psychology of

Intergroup Relations. Chicago: Nelson-Hall, pp. 88-102 (HSS library).

3. Pettigrew, Thomas F. 1979. The “Ultimate Attribution Error”: Extending

Allport’s Cognitive Analysis of Prejudice. Personality and Social Psychology

Bulletin, 5: 461-476.

4. Tajfel, Henri. 1982. “Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations.” Annual

Review of Psychology 33: 1-39.

5. Hewstone, Miles, et al. 2002. Intergroup Bias. Annual Review of Psychology

53: 575-604.

Motivated Biases

1. Janice G. Stein, 1988. Bringing Politics into Psychology: The Misperception

of Threat. Political Psychology 9 (2): 245-271.

2. Ziva Kunda, 1990. The Case for Motivated Reasoning. Psychological Bulletin

108 (3): 480-498.

Learning: Overview

1. Jack S. Levy. Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield.

International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2. (Spring, 1994), pp. 279-312.

Perception and Misperception in Learning from History

1. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics

(Princeton, 1978), chap. 6, “How Decision-Makers Learn from History,” pp.

217-287.

Prospect Theory: Loss Aversion and endowment effect

1. Jervis, Robert. 1992. The Political Implications of Loss Aversion. Political

Psychology 13 (1): 187-204

2. Jack S. Levy. 1997. Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International

Relations. International Studies Quarterly, 41 (1): 87-112.

Recommended

Ethnocentrism, Prejudice, and Group Psychology

1. Allport, Gordon W. 1958. The Nature of Prejudice (abridged version). New

York: Double Day and Anchor.

General Overview

20

1. Jonathan Mercer. 2005. Rationality and Psychology in International Politics.

International Organization 59: 77-106.

2. James M. Goldgeier and Philip E. Tetlock, “Psychology and International

Relations Theory,” Annual Review of Political Science 4 (2001): 67-92.

3. James M. Goldgeier. 1997. “Psychology and Security,” Security Studies 6 (4):

137-66.

Prospect Theory

1. Robert Jervis, The Implications of Prospect Theory for Human Nature and

Values. Political Psychology, Vol. 25, No. 2. (Apr., 2004), pp. 163-176.

2. Jack S. Levy. Loss Aversion, Framing, and Bargaining: The Implications of

Prospect Theory for International Conflict. International Political Science

Review Vol. 17, No. 2, Crisis, Conflict and War. (Apr., 1996), pp. 179-195.

A Misguided Application of Prospect Theory

1. Taliaferro, Jeffery W. 2004. Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention in the

Periphery. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Learning from History

1. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, part

III, “Common Misperceptions.”

2. Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies of War (Princeton, 1992), chap. 2.

3. Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: The Use of

History for Decision-makers (New York: Free Press, 1986).

4. Alexander George. 1997. Knowledge for Statecraft: The Challenge for

Political Science and History. International Security 22 (1): 44-52.

Questions

1. What are ethnocentrism’s implications for international conflict and

cooperation?

2. How do leaders learn from history? How do you learn? Who will learn better,

you or leaders? Why?

3. Which is more difficult, learning from one’s own experiences versus learning

from others’ experiences? Why?

4. Can you identify some common “motivated biases” from leaders’ rhetoric and

behavior?

11. Social Psychology of International Politics-II

Required

Reputation for Resolve in Conflict

1. Tang, Shiping (2005) Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and International

Conflict. Security Studies 14:34-62.

21

2. Huth, Paul. 1997. Reputation and Deterrence: A Theoretical and Empirical

Assessment. Security Studies 7 (1): 72-99.

Fear and Trust

1. Shiping Tang, 2008. “Social Evolutionary Psychology of Fear (and Trust): or

why is international cooperation difficult?” Unpublished manuscript.

Emotions in International Politics

1. Neta C. Crawford, 2000. “The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on

Emotion and Emotional Relationship,” International Security 24 (4):116-156.

2. Jonathan Mercer. 2010. Emotional Beliefs. International Organization

(forthcoming).

Uncertainty in IR

1. Shiping Tang. 2009. “Dimensions of Uncertainty: A Social Evolutionary

Psychology Perspective.” Paper presented in 2009 American Political Science

Association annual meeting in Toronto.

Counterfactual Thinking in Learning

1. Roese, N. J. (1997). Counterfactual Thinking. Psychological Bulletin, 121,

133-148.

2. Richard Ned Lebow. 2000. Review article: What’s so different about a

counterfactual? World Politics 52 (3): 550-85.

Recommended

Reputation for Resolve

1. Daryl G. Press, 2004-05, “The Credibility of Power: Assessing Threats during

the “Appeasement” Crises of the 1930s,” International Security 29 (3):

136-169

2. Jonathan Mercer, 1997. Reputation in International Relations. Cornell

University Press.

3. Press, Daryl. 2005. Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military

Threat during Crisis. Ithaca: Cornell University Press

Uncertainty in IR

1. Rathbun, Brian C. 2007. Uncertain about Uncertainty: Understanding the

Multiple Meanings of a Crucial Concept in International Relations Theory.

International Studies Quarterly 51: 533-557.

Fear, Prestige, Interest, and Trust in International Politics

1. Markey, Daniel. 1999. “Prestige and the Origins of War,” Security Studies 8

(4): 126-173.

2. Lebow, Richard Ned. 2006. Fear, Interest and Honor: Outlines of a theory of

International Relations. International Affairs 82 (3): 431-448.

22

3. Brian Rathbun. 2010. It takes all types: social psychology, trust, and the IR

paradigms in our minds. International Theory (forthcoming).

Human Nature and IR Theories

1. Jonathan Mercer, 2006. Human Nature and the First Image: emotion in

international politics. Journal of International Relations and Development 9:

288-303.

2. Neta C. Crawford. 2009. “Human Nature and World Politics: Rethinking

Man.” International Politics 23 (2): 271-288.

3. Chris Brown. 2009. “Structural Realism, Classical Realism and Human

Nature.” International Politics 23 (2): 257-270.

Counterfactuals in IR

1. Richard Ned Lebow. 2001. Contingency, Catalyst, and International System

Change. Political Science Quarterly 115 (4): 591-616.

2. Epstude, K., & Roese, N. J. (2008). The Functional Theory of Counterfactual

Thinking. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 12, 168-192.

Questions

1. Given the central of fear for one’s survival at the group level in international

politics, what things can states do to alleviate their fear about each other?

2. Why is concern for reputation (for resolve) an important driver of escalation?

What kind of roles reputation will likely play in international cooperation?

3. The psychology of counterfactuals holds some very interesting (and perhaps

depressing) implications for our learning from history. What are they?

12. Social Evolution of International Politics: Emerging Paradigm

Required

Overview

1. Sterling-Folker, Jennifer. 2000. “Evolutionary Tendencies in Realist and

Liberal Theory,” in William R. Thompson ed., Evolutionary Interpretations of

World Politics. London: Routledge, 62-109.

Biological Evolution versus Social Evolution

1. Tang, Shiping. 2009a, On Social Evolution as a Phenomenon (unpublished

book manuscript)

2. Tang, Shiping. 2009b, The Social Evolution Paradigm (unpublished book

manuscript).

Applications of Social Evolutionary Theory in IR: Structural Level

1. Spruyt, Hendrik. 1994. Institutional Selection in International Relations: State

Anarchy as Order. International Organization 48 (4): 527-557.

23

2. Tang, Shiping. 2009. “Social Evolution of International Politics: Mearsheimer

to Jervis,” European Journal of International Relations (forthcoming)

Applications of Social Evolutionary Theory in IR: State-level

1. Jeffrey W. Legro, 2000. “The Transformation of Policy Ideas,” American

Journal of Political Science, 44 (3): 419-432.

2. Shiping Tang. “From Offensive to Defensive Realism: An Evolutionary

Interpretation of China’s Security Strategy,” in Robert Ross and Zhu Feng eds.,

China Ascent (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), pp. 141-142. (A longer

version of the chapter was published as RSIS State of Security and

International Studies Series, No. 3, July 2007).

Recommended

Understanding Evolution

1. Janet Radcliffe Richards, 2000. Human Nature after Darwin: A philosophical

Introduction. London: Routledge (Library 2, Bd450, R516). This is a Succinct

and Fun-to-read Introduction to Evolution and its implications for

understanding human life and society

2. Dennett, Daniel. 1995. Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meaning

of Life. London: Allen Lane (LWN Library, QH375.D399). This book deals

with specific controversies within evolution theory in more detail.

(Semi-)Evolutionary Interpretation of History at Macro-level

1. Spruyt, Hendrik. 1994. The Sovereign State and its Competitors: An Analysis

of Systems Changes. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

2. Ruggie, John G. 1983. Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity:

Toward a Neorealist Synthesis. World Politics 25 (2): 261-285.

3. Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social

Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2.

(Spring 1992), 391-425.

4. Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge, 1999),

chap. 7, “Process and Structural Change”

Evolutionary Thinking at the State Level

1. Jack S. Levy. Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield.

International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2. (Spring, 1994), pp. 279-312.

2. Legro, Jeffrey A. 2005. Re-thinking the World. Cornell University Press.

Various Evolutionary Thinking in International Politics: Reviews

1. Kahler, Miles. 1999. “Evolution, Choice, and International Change.” In

Strategic Choices and International Relations, eds. David A. Lake and Robert

Powell. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 165-196.

24

Sociobiology in International Relations: A Debate

1. Bradley A. Thayer, 2000. “Bringing in Darwin: Evolutionary Theory, Realism,

and International Politics,” International Security, 25 (2): 124-151.

2. Duncan S.A. Bell, Paul K. MacDonald, and Bradley A. Thayer. 2001.

“Correspondence: Start the Evolution without Us,” International Security 26

(1): 187-198.

3. Bradley A. Thayer, 2004. Darwin and International Relations: ON the

Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethic Conflict. Lexington: University Press

of Kentucky.

Questions

1. In light of the evolutionary approach toward human society, what does

“human nature” mean now? Can IR theory (or any social theory) really get

away from “human nature”, however defined?

2. Has the evolutionary interpretation resolved the debate between offensive

realism and defensive realism? Why or why not?

3. What is the general challenge posed by continuity and change in human

society (and nature)? Do you think a social evolutionary framework offer

some powerful explanations?

A More Fundamental Question

1. Can you justify my claim that SEP is the ultimate paradigm in social sciences?

Why cannot a non-evolutionary interpretation do better?

13. Theories of Foreign Policy

Required Readings

Overview of (Realism) Theories of Foreign Policy

1. Rose, Gideon. 1998. “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,”

World Politics, 51/1 (October): 144-172.

2. “Introduction”, In Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy. Edited

by Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2009.

3. Shiping Tang, 2009. “Taking Stock of Neoclassical Realism,” International

Studies Review, 11/4 (Dec. 2009), pp. 798-803.

Theories of Foreign Policy in Conflict: expansion vs. under-balancing

1. Schweller, Randall L. 2004. Unanswered Threat: A Neoclassical Realist

Theory of Underbalancing. International Security 29 (2): 159-201.

2. Lynn-Jones, Sean M. 1998. Realism and America’s Rise. International

Security 23/2 (Fall): 157-182.

Theories of Foreign Policy in International Cooperation

25

1. Robert D. Putnam. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of

Two-Level Games." International Organization. 42(Summer 1988):427-460.

2. Schultz, Kenneth. 2005. The Politics of Risking Peace: Do Hawks or Doves

Deliver the Olive Branch? International Organization 59 (1): 1-38.

3. Fravel, M. Taylor. 2005. Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation:

Explaining China's Compromises in Territorial Disputes. International

Security 30 (2): 46-83.

Toward a General Theory of Foreign Policy Change

1. Shiping Tang. “From Offensive to Defensive Realism: An Evolutionary

Interpretation of China’s Security Strategy,” in Robert Ross and Zhu Feng eds.,

China Ascent (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), pp. 141-142. (A longer

version of the chapter was published as RSIS State of Security and

International Studies Series, No. 3, July 2007).

Recommended

General

1. Zakaria, Fareed. 1992. Realism and Domestic Politics. International Security

17 (1): 177-198.

2. Schweller, Randall L. 2003. “The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism,”

in Colin Elman and Miriam F. Elman eds., Progress in International Relations

Theory (MIT Press), pp. 311-347.

Specific Theories

1. Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, eds., The Domestic Bases of Grand

Strategy (Cornell 1993).

2. Thomas J. Christensen, 1996. Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic

Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton).

3. Zakaria, Fareed. 1998. From Wealth to Power: the Unusual Origins of

America’s World Role (Princeton).

4. Lobell, Steven E. 2002-03. War is Politics: Offensive realism, domestic

politics, and security strategy. Security Studies 12 (2): 165-95.

Questions

1. What are the challenges, thus problems for generalizing, theories of foreign

policy? Is a general theory of foreign policy possible?

2. What are the differences, if any, between explaining a particular policy and

explaining a particular change in foreign policy?

14. Theory of Region and Regionalism?

Required

The Classic Tradition

26

1. Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver, Regions and Power: The Structure of

International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), chap.

3, “Security Complexes: A Theory of Regional Security,” pp. 40-82.

2. Barry Buzan “Security architecture in Asia: the interplay of regional and

global levels.” The Pacific Review 16/2 (June, 2003):143-173.

3. Amitav Acharya, 2007. Review Article: The Emerging Regional Structure of

World Politics. World Politics 59 (July): 629-52.

4. Yuen Foong Khong, “The Elusiveness of Regional Order: Leifer, the English

School and Southeast Asia,” The Pacific Review, 18/1 (March 2005), pp.

23-41.

A New Direction?

1. Solingen, Etel, 2008. The Genesis, Design and Effects of Regional

Institutions: Lessons from East Asia and the Middle East. International

Studies Quarterly, Vol. 52, No. 1 (June 2008), pp. 261-294.

2. Solingen, Etel, 2007. Pax Asiatica versus Bella Levantina: The Foundations

of War and Peace in East Asia and the Middle East. American Political

Science Review 101 (4): 757-780.

A Deeper Problem

1. Alexander B. Murphy, “The Sovereign State System as political-territorial

ideal: historical and contemporary considerations,” in Thomas J. Biersteker

and Cynthia Weber eds., State Sovereignty as Social Construct (Cambridge,

1996), pp. 81-120.

2. David Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong, Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New

Analytical Frameworks,” International Security, 27/4 (Spring 2003), 57-85.

Recommended

General Text

1. Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear, 2nd

ed. (New York: Harvester

Wheatsheaf, 1991), Chap. 5, “Regional Security,” pp. 186-229. (This is a more

dated exposition of Buzan’s Regional Security Complex concept.)

2. David A. Lake and Patrick Morgan (eds.). 1997. Regional orders: building

security in a new world. College Park, P. A.: Pennsylvania State University

Press

3. Amitav Acharya, 2001. Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia.

London: Routledge. (2nd

edition, 2009).

Debating Kang’s Thesis

1. Amitav Acharya, “Will Asia's Past Be Its Future?” International Security,

28/3 (Winter 2003/04), pp. 149-164

2. David Kang, “Hierarchy, Balancing, and Empirical Puzzles in Asian

International Relations,” International Security, 28/3 (Winter 2003/04), pp.

165-180.

27

Background Readings on Kang and European System

1. Andreas Osinder, “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalia

Myth,” International Organization, 55/2 (Spring 2001), 251-287.

2. John King Fairbank, “A Preliminary Framework,” in John King Fairbank, ed.,

The Chinese World Order: traditional China's foreign relations (Oxford,

1968), pp. 1-19.

Questions

1. There is no doubt that region has become an important variable for

understanding state behavior and international outcomes, especially after the

end of the Cold War. Why is region important now, and why has it been

(relatively) neglected before the end of the Cold War?

2. There is no doubt that the literature on regionalism has been mostly in the

neoliberals and constructivism tradition. What is the strength and weakness

of such a stand?

3. Almost everyone within the regional/regionalism literature focuses on

regional order and regional institutions as a key variable for explaining

regional peace and war. In light of Khong (2005)’s critique of the English

School, what is the danger of relying on regional order and regional

institutions as a key explanatory variable for regional peace and war?

15. Game Theory (“Rational Choice”) Approach toward IR

Required Reading

War

1. James D. Fearon, 1995. “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International

Organization 49 (3): 379-414.

2. Robert Powell, 2006. “War as a Commitment Problem." International

Organization 60 (1): 169-203.

3. Erik Gartzke, 1999. “War is in the Error Term,” International Organization 53

(3): 567-587.

Peace/Cooperation

1. Kydd, Andrew. 2000. Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation. International

Organization 54 (2): 325-357.

2. Schultz, Kenneth. 2005. The Politics of Risking Peace: Do Hawks or Doves

Deliver the Olive Branch? International Organization 59 (1): 1-38.

Against Rational Choice: Normative and Epistemological

1. Stephen M. Walt. “Rigor or Rigor Mortis: Rational Choice and Security

Studies.” International Security, 23/4 (Spring 1999), pp. 5-58.

28

2. MacDonald, Paul K. “Useful Fiction or Miracle Maker: The Competing

Epistemological Foundations of Rational Choice Theory.” American Political

Science Review 97/4 (Nov. 2003): 551-565.

Recommended

1. Robert Powell, “Bargaining Theory and International Conflict,” Annual

Review of Political Science, 5 (2002): 1-30.

2. Harrison Wagoner, Who is Afraid of Rational Choice Theory? On line paper

3. International Security, 24/2 (Fall 1999), the debate on rational choice theory

of war.

Questions

1. What is wrong with the Fearon-inspired rational choice theory of war?

2. What is the value for a “rational choice” theory of war? What is the value of a

rational choice theory of cooperation?

3. Can rational choice theory provide a robust and inclusive theory of foreign

policy (i.e., state behavior)? Why or why not?

4. To use Alberto O. Hirschman’s understanding on social sciences (from the

first session), what additional criticisms can you advance against the “rational

choice” approach toward war and peace?

More Fundamental Questions

1. In scientific enterprise, should knowledge always take priority over logical

beauty? Why or why not?

16. Systemic Complexity: Some Challenges in Theorizing IR

Required

Human Society as an extremely complex system: ontology and epistemology

1. Shiping Tang, “Foundational Paradigms of Social Sciences,” Philosophy of the

Social Sciences (forthcoming 2010).

Human Society as an extremely complex system: methodology

1. Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton,

Princeton University Press, 1997), chap. 2, “System Effects,” pp. 29-87.

We Shape Society via Theorizing

1. David Patrick Houghton. 2009. The Role of Self-fulfilling and Self-negating

Prophecies in International Relations. International Studies Review, 11: 552-584.

Recommended

We Shape Society via Theorizing

29

1. Robert Jervis, 2008. Bridges, Barriers, and Gaps: Research and Policy. Political

Psychology 29: 571-592.

2. Michel Foucault. 1980. Power/knowledge: selected interviews and other writings,

1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon).

Questions

1. Use the foundational paradigms of social sciences to dissect one or two major IR

theories, and then elaborate on their relative strength and weakness.

2. What are some of the most important drawbacks if one does not grasp all the

foundational paradigms of social sciences? Illustrate your arguments with cases

from IR theory.