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Columbia University Spring 2006 Anna Czapliński, Editor Continued on page 2 transformation were and still are the subject of internal debate). Secondly, the country’s security problems could not be solved unilaterally and outside existing Western and pan-European security structures. Moreover, Poland’s security could not be achieved without taking into account the specific security needs of other countries in East Central Europe, including Czechoslovakia, Hungary, the three Baltic states, Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia - if the Russians were ready for partner-like relations. Poland’s foreign policy in the period of 1989-93 was creatively reconfigured and prudently conducted by Professor Krzysztof Skubiszewski, who was able to reconstruct Poland’s external align- ment. He also managed to generate political consensus in the country and credibility internationally. Lessons from the past were acknowledged and politi- cal attitudes and policies were adjusted accordingly. For example: the two ene- mies’ doctrine (Germany, Russia) was replaced by a friendly neighborhood approach; the entire treaty system link- ing Poland with its communist past was carefully converted into a network of 1 Poland on Its Own Way to the European Union, 1989-2004 (an insiders’ perspective) R arely in the turbulent, modern history of Europe has a country that was sandwiched in a vulner- able geopolitical location between un- friendly great powers, and undermined by both prolonged economic and politi- cal crises, managed to escape to democ- racy and freedom. With a political sys- tem imposed from abroad and military alliances both unwelcome by the nation and dangerous to its existence, Poland has been able during the last 10-15 years to reverse this pitiable state of affairs, without violence, and to the benefit of its neighbors and all of Europe. Rejecting communism in 1989, the Poles helped to end the Cold War that began in East Central Europe after World War II. Three questions will be briefly dis- cussed here. First, why was the eastward enlargement of the European Union in 2004 possible? Second, what internal challenges confronted the Polish central administration with respect to managing the integration efforts? Third, did the Polish authorities have any vision and any impact on the process of enlarge- ment? Since the beginning of the post- communist period in 1989-90, Poland almost instinctively oriented itself west- ward. The first non-communist govern- ment drafted, initiated, and coordinated the first efforts that eventually led to fu- ture membership in the European Eco- nomic Community and in North Atlan- tic Treaty Organization. The fall of com- munism raised one essential question: what now? Concerning national security and the well-being of society, two things were clear for the majority of the Polish people from the beginning. First, eco- nomic reforms in Poland should be based on the free market principle (although the speed and social aspects of treaties and diplomatic agreements securing Poland’s full independence and sovereignty; a strategic commu- nity of interests with a reunited Ger- many was established on the basis of friendship, partnership and the final recognition of the Polish-German border; a dual-track policy toward a dissipating Soviet Union was applied, allowing Poland to build good rela- tions both with the Russian Federa- tion and the emerging post-Soviet states; two triangle axes of pro- integrationist European cooperation were established: 1) the Weimar Tri- angle of France, Germany and Po- land whose goal it was to smooth Poland’s entry to the EU and, 2) the Visegrad Group of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland whose aim was to coordinate their respective EU policies; and finally, diplomatic rela- tions with the European Economic Community were established and negotiations on the association agree- ment were initiated in December 1990. In this way, Poland’s foreign policy diminished the country’s security di- lemma by implementing a coopera- tive security approach. This contrib- uted to the democratization and stabi- lization of East Central Europe (ECE) and created a solid base for Poland’s efforts to join the main- stream of European integration. In- separable links were made between regional peaceful stabilization, de- mocratic and market reforms, and the eastward extension of European inte- gration (can one imagine an enlarge- ment scenario with Poland and other ECE countries being unstable and contentious, with untransformed economies, closed markets, and Andrzej Harasimowicz Visiting Professor, Polish Studies Program

Transcript of Poland on Its Own Way to the European Union, 1989 …...Poland’s efforts to join the main-stream...

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Columbia University Spring 2006 Anna Czapliński, Editor

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transformation were and still are the subject of internal debate). Secondly, the country’s security problems could not be solved unilaterally and outside existing Western and pan-European security structures. Moreover, Poland’s security could not be achieved without taking into account the specific security needs of other countries in East Central Europe, including Czechoslovakia, Hungary, the three Baltic states, Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia - if the Russians were ready for partner-like relations. Poland’s foreign policy in the period of 1989-93 was creatively reconfigured and prudently conducted by Professor Krzysztof Skubiszewski, who was able to reconstruct Poland’s external align-ment. He also managed to generate political consensus in the country and credibility internationally. Lessons from the past were acknowledged and politi-cal attitudes and policies were adjusted accordingly. For example: the two ene-mies’ doctrine (Germany, Russia) was replaced by a friendly neighborhood approach; the entire treaty system link-ing Poland with its communist past was carefully converted into a network of

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Poland on Its Own Way to the European Union, 1989-2004 (an insiders’ perspective)

R arely in the turbulent, modern history of Europe has a country that was sandwiched in a vulner-

able geopolitical location between un-friendly great powers, and undermined by both prolonged economic and politi-cal crises, managed to escape to democ-racy and freedom. With a political sys-tem imposed from abroad and military alliances both unwelcome by the nation and dangerous to its existence, Poland has been able during the last 10-15 years to reverse this pitiable state of affairs, without violence, and to the benefit of its neighbors and all of Europe. Rejecting communism in 1989, the Poles helped to end the Cold War that began in East Central Europe after World War II. Three questions will be briefly dis-cussed here. First, why was the eastward enlargement of the European Union in 2004 possible? Second, what internal challenges confronted the Polish central administration with respect to managing the integration efforts? Third, did the Polish authorities have any vision and any impact on the process of enlarge-ment? Since the beginning of the post-communist period in 1989-90, Poland almost instinctively oriented itself west-ward. The first non-communist govern-ment drafted, initiated, and coordinated the first efforts that eventually led to fu-ture membership in the European Eco-nomic Community and in North Atlan-tic Treaty Organization. The fall of com-munism raised one essential question: what now? Concerning national security and the well-being of society, two things were clear for the majority of the Polish people from the beginning. First, eco-nomic reforms in Poland should be based on the free market principle (although the speed and social aspects of

treaties and diplomatic agreements securing Poland’s full independence and sovereignty; a strategic commu-nity of interests with a reunited Ger-many was established on the basis of friendship, partnership and the final recognition of the Polish-German border; a dual-track policy toward a dissipating Soviet Union was applied, allowing Poland to build good rela-tions both with the Russian Federa-tion and the emerging post-Soviet states; two triangle axes of pro-integrationist European cooperation were established: 1) the Weimar Tri-angle of France, Germany and Po-land whose goal it was to smooth Poland’s entry to the EU and, 2) the Visegrad Group of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland whose aim was to coordinate their respective EU policies; and finally, diplomatic rela-tions with the European Economic Community were established and negotiations on the association agree-ment were initiated in December 1990. In this way, Poland’s foreign policy diminished the country’s security di-lemma by implementing a coopera-tive security approach. This contrib-uted to the democratization and stabi-lization of East Central Europe (ECE) and created a solid base for Poland’s efforts to join the main-stream of European integration. In-separable links were made between regional peaceful stabilization, de-mocratic and market reforms, and the eastward extension of European inte-gration (can one imagine an enlarge-ment scenario with Poland and other ECE countries being unstable and contentious, with untransformed economies, closed markets, and

Andrzej Harasimowicz Visiting Professor, Polish Studies Program

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halted democratic reforms?). Poland had been in the forefront of the transi-tion from communism. This had started as early as the 1980s with the ultimate push in 1989. The transforma-tion was conducted with a view to-ward liberal democracy, a vibrant civic society, a free market, with a coopera-tive security posture, and a westward orientation. It is easily forgotten that there were other options available: autocratic, nationalistic regimes, a “third way” in economics, ethnic and border tensions, self-help foreign poli-cies, neutrality, or eastward links. All of them became sad realities outside of East Central Europe. In Western Europe, the initial reac-tions toward the East Central Euro-pean countries’ ambitions to join the European Economic Community were not very encouraging and did not promise quick membership but rather in “tens of years.” Many doubts were expressed as to the EEC’s capacity to accept new members, including: a fear of losing the momentum of integra-tion, the applicants’ ability to meet demanding criteria of membership, the costs of enlargement, and the dangers to the functioning of the Single Mar-ket. This debate had its own internal dynamic within the EEC and the divi-sions among member states revealed themselves predictably. Some saw eastern enlargement as a good chance to slow the dynamic of political inte-gration while increasing trade and in-vestments (UK); some believed it would deepen federal t rends (Germany); some were politically neu-tral but saw the dangers as being more economic in nature, flowing from ex-pected trade competition and fearing a reduction in the current levels of finan-cial transfers (Spain, Greece). All of these expectations and espe-cially fears became very real barriers during the negotiations on the Europe Agreements with the first group of applicants in 1990-91 (Poland, Hun-gary, and Czechoslovakia). During the first rounds of talks the Visegrad coun-tries were surprised to see the degree of

caution with which the European Com-munity responded to the applicants’ de-mands for faster trade liberalization in all product categories, including agriculture, movement of people and fast-track inte-gration into the structures of the EC. On the applicants’ side it took some time to understand that the EEC’s negotiation of the Europe Agreements was not happen-ing in a vacuum, but was nested within a wider network of domestic and interna-tional games in which the EC was en-gaged during the early 1990s (EFTA, WTO, monetary and political union). “Negotiating while others were watch-ing” was both an informative and tough lesson for the Visegrad countries. They paid a high cost for this education, but ultimately showed themselves to be quite good students. They learned what it means to present and defend their posi-tions. They began to understand that the European Community is a “community of interests” but to make the system workable, interests have to be defined precisely in the language and spirit of European treaties and presented accord-ing to existing procedures. Polish officials took the lesson seri-ously, conducted analyses and drew con-clusions. The Office of the Government Plenipotentiary for European Integration and Foreign Assistance (led by Jacek Saryusz-Wolski) was created in January 1991, and soon found that some prob-lems that the applicant countries experi-enced during the association negotia-tions – especially at the level of working groups and while preparing negotiating positions - were, in large part, the result of a “socialist heritage.” The work and negotiation style was inherited from Comecon: one should not let others to know one’s real interests because they are, by definition, contrary and as such, uncompromising. ‘Do not be naïve. The negotiations are not “an art of getting others to agree” but a “zero sum game,” where you win or lose, and this is my 30 years experi-ence’ – one would hear over again, espe-cially from older officials during the training courses on the EU: its law and institutions, organized by the Govern-ment Plenipotentiary in 1992-97. It may

seem trivial from today’s perspective but this attitudinal difference in regard to resolving conflicts of interest and the lack of cooperative skills became a bar-rier in the effective implementation of the Europe Agreement. When this “difference” appeared, the Polish ad-ministration quite naturally started to struggle and remained uncompromising in its position instead of concentrating on searching for a solution. Even minor issues blocked the agenda and were sent to the highest levels for decisions. Among other weaknesses one could see a lack of initiative and creativity, a pas-sive waiting for instructions, and gener-ally un-cooperative attitudes among min-istries. What was desperately needed was personal initiative, openness in confront-ing new issues, a spirit of team-work, the ability to approach things horizontally, modern negotiating and administrative skills, and a command of foreign lan-guages. For the Government’s Plenipo-tentiary and his team it became evident that although the country’s foreign pol-icy had laid the groundwork for integra-tion, in order to obtain decisive results, the internal approach to European inte-gration and its management needed to be revamped and made more efficient, or the whole process might be endangered. This required good governance practices both in the central and local administra-tion, and later on, well programmed ef-forts, financed largely by PHARE, in order to elevate the skills and efficiency of the Polish administration. It took some time for the Polish administration to accept the fact that, while European negotiations, although a selfish game, may yet lead to a win-win situation, it was not automatic and that work hard was needed to secure even a part of the “win-win”. This upgrading of the central administration’s capacity to manage the demanding process of integration and t rans format ion was a s i l ent “bureaucratic” battle but one that would result its final victory. Also, other systematic works had been undertaken in the Office of Govern-ment’s Plenipotentiary for European Integration and Foreign Assistance to

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Polish W1102 Elementary Polish II Instructor: Thomas Starky Polish W1202 Intermediate Polish II Instructor: Anna Frajlich-Zając Polish W3102 Advanced Polish II Instructor: Anna Frajlich-Zając Polish W4120 Polish Short Story in Comparative Context Instructor: Anna Frajlich-Zając International Affairs U8480 Politics & Society in Post-Rev. East Central Europe Instructor: John Micgiel History G8216 Topics in Eastern European History Instructor: Bradley Abrams International Affairs U4528 From Europe to EU-rope, 1945-2005 From Poland’s Perspective Instructor: Andrzej Harasimowicz International Affairs U8487 NATO-European Union 1989-2005 From Poland’s Perspective Instructor: Andrzej Harasimowicz

Spring 2006

Courses With an energetic and dedicated board this Spring semester, the Polish Club of Barnard College, Columbia University continues its goal to pro-mote Polish culture on campus through an array of activities and outings. Last semester the club partici-pated in several successful events, including representation at the Pu-laski Day Parade and Polish Students Organization's (PSO) Studia4U at the Polish Consulate. The club hosted a welcome back party, a Tribute to Solidarity and a poetry evening pay-ing tribute to Zbigniew Herbert.. The Annual Wigilia Christmas Gathering was yet again a smashing success with the attendance of Polish profes-sors, students and friends from vari-ous universities in New York. Opłatek was shared, kolędy were sung, and pierogie were eaten. Over-all a fun and memorable night of unity. This semester Columbians came together, dressed in their best suits and ball gowns, to attend the popular PSO’s 10th Annual Bal Studencki, held in Greenpoint, NY. Created specifically for the youth of Polonia, the Bal was a highly cultured evening that provided an uncommon elegant

experience on a student budget. Pro-ceeds of the bal go towards scholar-ships given by PSO, as well as for the Polish Studies Program at Co-lumbia. Future activities on the Polish Club’s calendar for the Spring in-clude a Dinner & Dancing trip to Lit-tle Polska (Greenpoint), a workshop on Pisanki Polish Easter Egg Paint-ing, a Jajko Easter Party, and a spe-cial tribute our beloved Pope John Paul II . The Club also hopes to host the Polish Students Leadership confer-ence, an EU members party, a Euro-pean movie marathon- featuring movies from the EU countries, a lecture on Poland in the EU by visit-ing Professor Andrzej Harasi-mowicz, and Polish conversation hours at the Hungarian pastry shop. To receive more detailed infor-mation regarding events listed above, please email Anna Czap-liński, the Polish Club president, at [email protected] or visit the events calendar on the Polish Stud-ies website at: http://www.sipa.columbia.edu/ece/polish_studies_2002.html

Polish Club Happenings

PCBC Board: Left to right: Secretary Janusz Kesek, President Anna Czap-liński, Treasurer Julia Kite, and Vice President Monika Urbanowicz

Polish Students enjoying an evening of dancing at PSO’s X Annual Bal Studencki.

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Columbia University's Renwick Professor Emeritus of Civil Engi-neering, Maciej P. Bieniek, whose groundbreaking work in structural dynamics involved maintaining and rehabilitating many of New York City's bridges, died on Monday, Jan. 23, in Atlanta, Ga. Bieniek gained an international reputation for his research on the Brooklyn, Williamsburg, Tribor-ough, Bronx-Whitestone, Throgs Neck, Verrazano-Narrows and George Washington bridges. As a professor, he taught many of the department's most advanced courses, including elasticity, plastic-ity and viscoelasticity. Born in Poland in 1927, Bieniek began his professional and aca-demic career in that country, gradu-ating from Gdansk Technical Uni-versity in 1948 with the equivalent of an M.S. in civil engineering, ma-

joring in structures and transpor-tation. He received a Ph.D. in applied mechanics in 1951. In 1958, he was appointed a visiting scholar at Columbia En-gineering's Department of Civil Engineering and Engineering Mechanics, and, the following year, was named visiting associ-ate professor. In 1960, he was named an associate professor of civil engineering.

Three years later, Bieniek be-came a professor of civil engineer-ing at the University of Southern California, but returned to Colum-bia in 1969 as a full professor of civil engineering. He continued his academic career at Columbia, chairing the department from 1979 to 1981. In 1989, he was named Renwick Professor and, upon his retirement in 1993, Renwick Pro-fessor Emeritus. Bieniek received the Great Teacher Award of the Society of Columbia Graduates (SOCG) in 1979 and, in 1995, was named an Honorary Member of the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), one of the highest honors an engi-neer can receive. Published in the Columbia News Feb 1, 2006. http://www.columbia.edu/cu/news/06/02/maciejPBieniek.html

Columbia Civil Engineer Maciej P. Bieniek Has Passed Away

Director of the East Central European Center, Professor John S. Micgiel (far left), pictured with the keynote speaker of the “Polish Foreign Policy, Past, Present and Future” Conference Professor Zbigniew Brzeziński (immediate left). Brzeziński is a Polish Ameri-can political scientist, geostrategist, and statesman, who served as United States National Security Advisor under President Jimmy Carter. View the conference in its entirety at our website: http://www.sipa.columbia.edu/ece

Professor Bronisław Geremek (immediate right) speaking at the “Europe and its Others in the Mirror of Transatlantic Rela-tions” Conference held on November 11, 2005. Geremek is a distinguished Polish social historian and politician, and was an advisor to Solidarity leader Lech Wałęsa.

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identify challenges of a more sub-stantial nature. Inter-ministerial study groups were created and goal-oriented efforts taken to link mem-bership preparations with the main streams of transformation, to define short-, mid-, and long-term national interests within the European inte-gration process, to elaborate a vision of the EU that Poland wanted to join, and to make the PHARE pro-gram and other forms of bilateral external assistance optimal instru-ments of integration. Adjustment programs for the Pol-ish economy and legal system were adopted by the Government in 1992-93 in order to streamline the imple-mentation of the Europe Agreement. A National Strategy for European Integration was adopted in 1997, and set the framework for Poland’s membership in the EU. The approxi-mation of Polish legislation to Com-munity law was given priority and few thousand legal acts were scruti-nized from the point of view of their compatibility with the acquis com-munautaire. In the result numerous changes has been introduced to the country’s legal system. Hundreds of new laws and regulations were pre-pared by the Government and en-acted by parliament. The constitu-tional framework for Poland’s acces-sion to the EU has been established in the new Constitution of 1997. During the intensive consultations conducted with the member states’ governments, EU institutions, aca-demic and business communities, NGOs and others, it was found that “size and numbers do matter” and that the future position and represen-tation of Poland in the EU institu-tions is of utmost importance and should not be left for last moment decisions but should be pronounced, mildly but clearly, and agreed ear-lier. Most applicants, mostly small countries, considered it rational, and probably rightly so, to accept the role of “the best pupil in the class.”

Poland, having the largest population and territory among the applicants com-bined, sought to influence, if not lead, the process of accession and to shape it in a way conforming to its own needs, those of other applicants and the EU. Although it was not always accepted with great enthusiasm by other appli-cants, even within the Visegrad group, one could not deny that the Polish Gov-ernment at least tried to play this role with a dose of tact and empathy for other interests and was a relentless proponent of consultations with the aim of stronger bargaining position and better final re-sults on behalf of all candidates. This was not just a case of “our taking our own gains and sharing burdens with eve-ryone else,” and it was credible, it seems. It needs to be stressed that in taking this role, the Poles were in no case motivated by big power illusions, but rather by geo-political and economic realities, such as: Poland’s strategic location between Ger-

Note About the Polish Studies Program A very important feature of Polish Studies at Columbia University is its impressive Graduate Program in POLISH LITERATURE. Several Universities, including Ivy League schools, advertise Ph.D. programs in this area but Columbia has a large number of active courses to sustain its respectable program. Moreover, many of our graduate students in Comparative Literature defend their M.A. in Polish Literature, and a hand-ful of our Ph.D. candidates in Russian Literature minor in Polish, which allows them to teach Polish language and literature in their future respective Departments. Thus, our program prepares future generations of scholars to carry the torch. Four of our current Ph.D. candidates defended their minor oral in Polish literature: Marysia Dzieduszycka, Elizabeth Kossakowska, Collen McQuillen and Erica Siegel. One of our students at the MPHIL level, Thomas Starky, did his M.A. in Polish Literature and is continuing for the Phd. in Comparative Literature, with Polish as his major field. Another student, who is currently completing his Masters in Polish, is plan-ning to continue towards a Phd. in Polish Literature. The courses in Polish Literature offered by the Slavic Department are as follows: David A. Goldfarb, Assistant Professor: Renaissance Poetry in Poland: From Latin to Polish; The Polish Novel, Poland, Romanticism, and Polish Romanticism; Polish Avantgardism; Bruno Schulz; Directed Research in Literary Translation Anna Frajlich-Zając, Sr. Lecturer: Advanced Polish; Intermediate Polish; Polish Short Story in Comparative Context; Mickiewicz; Bestsellers of Polish Prose; and North America in the Mirror of Polish Literature Also, Individual, Independent, Supervised Directed Research under tutelage of each professor is available and taken advantage of by students from many other Departments. Elementary Polish is taught at present by Thomas Starky.

many and Russia, which necessitated a strong say in the domain of Common Foreign and Security Policy and Home and Justice Affairs; the size of Poland’s agriculture making it one of the main players within Common Agriculture Policy and European Community budgetary planning; Poland’s geo-graphical location makes transit and transport issues of utmost importance: most of the East-West and North-South European Transport Networks, including energy, cross Poland’s terri-tory. Taking all these elements into consid-eration, between 1992-95, the Office of the Plenipotentiary formulated a com-prehensive set of postulates that shaped Poland’s positions on the main issues connected with its entry into the EU. One may summarize them in the fol-lowing way: 1) Timing: membership in the EU was for Poland a natural and optimal choice in general and should

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The Polish Cultural Institute & Columbia University

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Four Polish Organists Four Sundays in February

Four Superb Organs Four Manhattan Churches

Feb. 5: Witold Zalewski - 4:00pm: Church of the Holy Trinity, 316 E. 88th St. (1st & 2st Aves.) Feb.12: Marek Kudlicki – 3:00pm: St.Vincent Ferrer Church, 869 Lexing-ton Ave. at 65th St. Feb.19: Robert Grudzien – 2:00pm: St.Paul's Chapel, Columbia U, 116th St. at Broadway Feb.26: Bogusław Grabowski– 4:00pm: First Presbyterian, Fifth Ave. at 12th St.

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be forced with all energy at all forums, with the year 2000 as the proposed date for accession, especially that this Central European widening is not just the next wave of enlargement but unification of Europe. 2) Method: the transformation of the Polish economy and its institutional-legal system should be linked with the association/integration process as closely as possible. Streamlining modernization and integration are one policy, not two. 3) The EU we want: the dilemma of “widening or deepening” the EU was a false one and continued the Cold War division of Europe; Poland should pro-mote the “widen in order to deepen” con-cept which seemed to be the best guaran-tee to overcome divides within the EU, to promote a strong EU with a growing international identity, efficient, develop-

ing new policies and acting in a spirit of solidarity. This clearly meant a bigger role for the European Commission and for the European Parliament. 4) Costs: the eastward enlargement, if well prepared, would be politically and economically ad-vantageous for both sides. The wid-ening should not be seen as a budg-etary burden for the EU (“the book-keeper’s view”) as the costs would be borne by both sides. Moreover, the balance to date was clearly to the EU’s advantage, and the costs of not expanding the EU would be much greater (“costs of non-Europe”). 5) Principles: both integrating enti-ties, the EU and applicant countries, are equal although they vary in size and wealth. Therefore, the partner-ship principle should be the guiding directive during the process of acces-sion and that required an early in-volvement of the acceding countries into the EU decision making ma-chinery, as observers. 6) Formula of accession: in the case of Poland, the so-called “Spanish formula of accession” should be ap-plied, which meant: full adjustment to the acquis communautaire should be allowed after (not prior to) join-ing, in the first, hopefully short, pe-riod after accession; the full opening of the big Polish market - Poland had experienced huge trade deficits with the EU until then - should be compensated by generous cohesion and structural policies, along with other new members; the number of votes allocated in the Council of Ministers and representation in EU institutions should be comparable to that of Spain. 7) “Better trade than aid”: EU market access liberaliza-tion would be the best incentive to restructure and modernize acceding countries’ economies. Aid is impor-tant but of secondary importance. 8) Criteria of accession: before the Co-penhagen criteria were formulated and accepted in 1993, the Polish Government proposed in 1992 that

“economy healthy, not necessarily wealthy” should be the guiding crite-rion in the assessment of applicants’ readiness to jo in. 9) Ass is -tance/PHARE: EU funds and other forms of bilateral assistance should be focused on supporting the associa-tion/integration process. Simple forms of technical assistance should be re-placed by quasi-structural assistance in order to promote regional develop-m e n t , e n t r e p r e n e u r s h i p a n d small/medium size enterprises, mod-ernization of agriculture, environ-mental planning, legal adjustments and training for central and local gov-ernment officials, support for Euro-pean Studies. PHARE procedures should be made shorter and less bu-reaucratic, and recipients should be-come more involved in early planning. These postulates, although not al-ways heartily welcomed at the time, had some positive impact on the asso-ciation/integration process and they constitute an original contribution of an acceding country to the success of 2004 Enlargement of the EU. When we compare them with the terms of accession we can see that its costs are bearable, the Single Market is func-tioning, the decision making process is not in gridlock etc. To answer our opening queries, one may say that Poland opened the door to eastward enlargement in 1989, mak-ing possible the process of transforma-tion in East Central Europe by setting a cooperative, peaceful tone and intro-ducing democratic processes. Also, Poland’s great internal effort to streamline its internal transformation and to link it to European integration had a positive impact on the enlarge-ment process and has contributed to the success of the 2004 Enlargement of the EU.

Selected bibliography: 1. A. Mayhew, Recreating Europe. The EU’s Policy towards Central and Eastern Europe, Cambridge University Press, 1998. 2. J. Saryusz – Wolski, The Reintegration of

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January 17 “Polish Intelligence During World War Two.” Rafal Wnuk and Jan Ciechanowski, IPN and Warsaw University. 10:00am-11:15am, 1510 International Affairs Building (IAB). 420 West 118th St (corner of Amsterdam Ave.)

March 1 “From the Baltic to the Black to the Caspian: Building a ‘Community of Democratic Choice.” Featuring Vyacheslav Kyrylenko, Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine, Ambas-sador of Georgia to the United States Levan Mikeladze, and Polish American Ukrainian Cooperative Initiative Director Jan Pieklo. NYU Torch Club, 18 Waverley Place. Cosponsored by the Polish and Ukrainian Studies Programs at Co-lumbia.

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the “Old Continent”: Avoiding the Costs of “Half-Europe”, in Economic and Political Integration in Europe, ed. by A. Scott, Blackwell Publishers Oxford, UK and Cambridge, USA, 1994. 3. Poland in the EU, ed. by E. Kawecka-Wyrzykowska and E. Synowiec, Foreign Trade Research Institute, Warsaw 2004. 4. A. Harasimowicz, Integracja Polski z Unią Europejską, 1989-2004, WSGK, Kutno 2005. 5. J. Spero, Bridging the European Divide: Middle Power Politics and Re-gional Security Dilemmas, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004. 6. D. Papadimitriou, Negotiating When Others Watching: Explaining the outcome of the Association Ne-gotiations and the Countries of Cen-tral and Eastern Europe, 1990-1991, in Understanding the EU’s External Relations, ed. by M. Knodt and S. Princen, Routledge, London and New York, 2003.

March 2 “Poetics in Translation: Gom-browicz’s Ferdydurke (in Spanish, French and English).” A lecture by Magdalena Miecznicka of the Polish Institute of Literary Research (IBL) in Warsaw. Sponsored by the Barnard Slavic Department. 6 pm, Ella Weed Room Milbank Hall, Second Floor, Barnard College. 117th St. & Broad-way.

March 2 Visegrad-Ukraine: A Multi-Regional Perspective. A conference featuring among others, Adam Towpik, Perma-nent Representative of Poland to the UN; Elzbieta Dzirba, Vice President, Polish Oil and Gas Company; and Jan Pieklo, Director, Polish American Ukrainian Cooperation Initiative. Cosponsored by the Polish and Ukrainian Studies Programs at Co-lumbia. 9:30 am-5pm, 1501 IAB.

May 22-24 Certification Exams in Polish of-fered by the Polish Supplementary School Council (PSSC), 5-8 pm, 15th Floor IAB. For registration and other information, please con-tact Mrs. Dorota Andraka, Presi-dent, PSSC, at: [email protected].

Ms. Alicja Małecka, Chief Executive Officer of the Polish Slavic Federal Credit Union, presents Dr. John S. Micgiel with the PSFCU’s most recent donation of $100,000 on behalf of the Polish Studies Professorship.

April A Spring Polish Recruitment Day aimed at potential students, and organized by Columbia’s Polish Studies Program, the Polish Stu-dents Organization, the Barnard Polish Club, and the Polish Slavic Federal Credit Union. Representa-tives of Columbia and Barnard Colleges will be there to answer questions. Information will be pro-vided on our website shortly.

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East Central European Center Columbia University MC3336 420 West 118th Street New York, NY 10027

Mr. Zdzislaw Baran Mr. & Mrs. Stanley Borowiec Dr. John Cetner Dr. Anna Cienciala Mr. Tadeusz Cieplak Mr. & Mrs. Jan Czaplinski Mr. Daniel Domogala LtG Leo Dulacki Mr. Edward Dzielenski Mr. Edward Faye Mr. John Gacek Mr. Jacek Galazka Ms. Frances Gates Ms. Gizela Gawronski Mr. & Mrs. Joseph Gore, Esq. Dr. Andrzej Harasimowicz Mr. Waclaw Hoinoski Ms. Irene Jacey Mrs. Eva Jedruch Ms. & Mr. Stanislaw Jedrysek

Mr. Christopher Jurkiewicz Dr. Czeslaw Karkowski Ms. Janet Kogut Dr. Andrzej Korbonski Mr. & Mrs. Roman Korzan Mr. & Mrs. Artur Kowalski Ms. Regina & Louis Krzych Mr. Paul Krzywicki Mr. Alan Kubarek Mr. Piotr Kumelowski Mr.& Mrs. Walter Kuskowski Dr. John Kutolowski Mr. Edward Kwiatkowski Ms. Helen Mayek Mr.& Mrs. Edward Meros Dr. & Mrs. John S. Micgiel Dr. Peter Mieszkowski Dr Stanislaw Milewski Mr. London Morawski Mr. Walter Morris

Mr. Zbigniew Muszynski Mr. Richard Poremski Polish Army Veterans Association Mr. Tadeusz Rybkiewicz Dr. Harold Segel Dr. Boleslaw Szymanski Mr. Maciej Tomaszewski Mr. Wojciech Uzdelewicz Mr. & Mrs. Henry Walentowicz Mrs. Barbara Wierzbianski Wanda & Stefan Wilk Dr. Josef Zwislocki Polish Slavic Federal Credit Union Semper Polonia Foundation Kościuszko Foundation

Please visit our website at: http://sipa.columbia.edu/REGIONAL/ECE/polish_studies_2002.html.

Donors 2005

Ms. Eugene Baut Mr. Richard Brzozowski Mr. Henryk Bukowski Dr. Anna Cienciala Dr. Joanna Clark Dr. Anna Frajlich Zajac Mr. & Mrs. Ryszard Gajewski Ms. Frances Gates Dr. Janusz Gorzynski Mr. & Mrs. Richard Hermanowski Mr. Kazimierz Kasprzak Mr. Rudolph Kosiba Mr.& Mrs. Walter Kuskowski Mr. Richard Lis Mr. & Mrs. Casimir Matwey Dr. Stanislaw Milewski Ms. Katarzyna Newcomer The Pulaski Association Mr. Frank Serafin Mr. Jerzy Swierbutowicz

Adam Mickiewicz Endowment Fund Polish Studies Professorship