POL 1000 – Lecture 12: State-Society Relations

POL 1000 – Lecture 12: State-Society Relations

Sean ClarkLecturer, Memorial University

Doctoral Fellow, CFPS

Fall Semester, 2011

Sean ClarkLecturer, Memorial University

Doctoral Fellow, CFPS

Fall Semester, 2011

Lecture ArcLecture Arc

1. Pluralism. Classical. Neo-Pluralism.

2. Corporatism. State Corporatism. Neo-Corporatism.

3. Consociational Democracy. 4. Civil Society.

1. Pluralism. Classical. Neo-Pluralism.

2. Corporatism. State Corporatism. Neo-Corporatism.

3. Consociational Democracy. 4. Civil Society.

State-Society RelationsState-Society Relations Nature of relations btn state & society vary from one

political system to the next. State can have more or less involvement in daily public

life. How closely does ‘Big Brother’ watch you? Some ideologies prefer more of the former. Others desire less.

Can create a typology (pluralism, corporatism, & consociationalism) according to: 1. the intensity of competition in the political arena.

Is politics cooperative (Norway), or more competitive (India)? 2. the manner in which interest groups are founded &

organized to represent the interests of their constituencies. Who creates groups? How easy is it to do so? How do they

work? USSR: protest movements banned. Germany: no anti-democrats

permitted.

Nature of relations btn state & society vary from one political system to the next. State can have more or less involvement in daily public

life. How closely does ‘Big Brother’ watch you? Some ideologies prefer more of the former. Others desire less.

Can create a typology (pluralism, corporatism, & consociationalism) according to: 1. the intensity of competition in the political arena.

Is politics cooperative (Norway), or more competitive (India)? 2. the manner in which interest groups are founded &

organized to represent the interests of their constituencies. Who creates groups? How easy is it to do so? How do they

work? USSR: protest movements banned. Germany: no anti-democrats

permitted.

PluralismPluralism

CorporatismCorporatism Schmitter (‘74): interest groups are bound together, by function (i.e. all labour groups in

one body), in noncompetitive hierarchy. Generally ordered into ‘peak associations’ of govt, business, & labour.

Deals made at top (bargain here, rather than on street) are filtered down below. I.e. Japanese govt, exporters, & unions.

Aim: boost efficiency thru cooperation, rather than competition. Free markets seen as destructive & wasteful (spend time competing, i.e. tv ads, rather than innovating).

State Corporatism: groups have no choice. Template for corporate hierarchy is the army. Mussolini (22 ‘corporations’ to run entire economy), Hitler, Assad: politics & economics brought

together by force. Even more, sought to control private, social life as well (i.e. Hitler Youth, Soviet sports leagues, etc).

Failures of ‘40s overshadow successes of ‘30s. Neo-Corporatism (‘societal’): softer, more bargaining. Generally limited to econ affairs.

Post-war: little desire for state involvement in social affairs. Even so, when economy is bad, pressure for govt to diminish competition is common. ‘70s: trade & free market worries = growth in popularity (‘can protect us from the ravages of

capitalism’). Need to avoid job off-shoring & race-to-the-bottom wage spirals w ‘iron triangles’. I.e. Bayern govt, Quandt family, & unions all sit on BMW board.

Back today (i.e. AIG, GM bailouts, bc of risk-taking unbridled competition fosters)? Danger is sclerosis & corruption (i.e. Siemens). Govts good at running businesses?

Similarly, when leaders make decisions for everyone, is incentive to pursue own interest, rather than the group’s. I.e. Siemens: payments to union leader to reduce wage demands.

Lesson: popularity generally reflects social & economic circumstances. Still, some political cultures are more amenable (i.e. demanding) than others.

US, Canada, UK on one end; Sweden & France on the other.

Schmitter (‘74): interest groups are bound together, by function (i.e. all labour groups in one body), in noncompetitive hierarchy. Generally ordered into ‘peak associations’ of govt, business, & labour.

Deals made at top (bargain here, rather than on street) are filtered down below. I.e. Japanese govt, exporters, & unions.

Aim: boost efficiency thru cooperation, rather than competition. Free markets seen as destructive & wasteful (spend time competing, i.e. tv ads, rather than innovating).

State Corporatism: groups have no choice. Template for corporate hierarchy is the army. Mussolini (22 ‘corporations’ to run entire economy), Hitler, Assad: politics & economics brought

together by force. Even more, sought to control private, social life as well (i.e. Hitler Youth, Soviet sports leagues, etc).

Failures of ‘40s overshadow successes of ‘30s. Neo-Corporatism (‘societal’): softer, more bargaining. Generally limited to econ affairs.

Post-war: little desire for state involvement in social affairs. Even so, when economy is bad, pressure for govt to diminish competition is common. ‘70s: trade & free market worries = growth in popularity (‘can protect us from the ravages of

capitalism’). Need to avoid job off-shoring & race-to-the-bottom wage spirals w ‘iron triangles’. I.e. Bayern govt, Quandt family, & unions all sit on BMW board.

Back today (i.e. AIG, GM bailouts, bc of risk-taking unbridled competition fosters)? Danger is sclerosis & corruption (i.e. Siemens). Govts good at running businesses?

Similarly, when leaders make decisions for everyone, is incentive to pursue own interest, rather than the group’s. I.e. Siemens: payments to union leader to reduce wage demands.

Lesson: popularity generally reflects social & economic circumstances. Still, some political cultures are more amenable (i.e. demanding) than others.

US, Canada, UK on one end; Sweden & France on the other.

Consociational DemocracyConsociational Democracy Some countries (i.e. Belgium--language, Switzerland--ethnicity, Austria--

religion) torn by deep divisions. Lijphart: overcome this thru political instxns which enhance cooperation &

accommodation (rather than simple majorities). Can even have pluralist economics at the same time (though often goes hand-in-hand w

neocorporatist economics). These consensus-building mechanisms include:

Coalition govts: bring in minority parties. Mutual veto: give minority groups right to torpedo legislation affecting them. Proportionality: use a PR electoral system to broaden representation. Segmental Autonomy: give minority groups exclusive rights over their own affairs.

Most commonly run own language, religion, & schools. Also HK & China. Thus in UK, majority winner (even if need coalition) takes all. Vs. in

Switzerland, every group gets to share in governing. Is a third way of doing things (i.e. btn pluralist & corporatist extremes).

Want groups to freely mobilize, yet not about winner-take-all. Prob: again, what if accommodation comes at expense of national viability?

Plus, not stop conflict (i.e. Lebanon)--& vetoes can = deadlock (Belgium waits months for new govt).

Some countries (i.e. Belgium--language, Switzerland--ethnicity, Austria--religion) torn by deep divisions. Lijphart: overcome this thru political instxns which enhance cooperation &

accommodation (rather than simple majorities). Can even have pluralist economics at the same time (though often goes hand-in-hand w

neocorporatist economics). These consensus-building mechanisms include:

Coalition govts: bring in minority parties. Mutual veto: give minority groups right to torpedo legislation affecting them. Proportionality: use a PR electoral system to broaden representation. Segmental Autonomy: give minority groups exclusive rights over their own affairs.

Most commonly run own language, religion, & schools. Also HK & China. Thus in UK, majority winner (even if need coalition) takes all. Vs. in

Switzerland, every group gets to share in governing. Is a third way of doing things (i.e. btn pluralist & corporatist extremes).

Want groups to freely mobilize, yet not about winner-take-all. Prob: again, what if accommodation comes at expense of national viability?

Plus, not stop conflict (i.e. Lebanon)--& vetoes can = deadlock (Belgium waits months for new govt).

Civil SocietyCivil Society We spend a lot of time thinking about structures of govt. But have only

recently returned to idea of just how important private groups are. In many ways, what private citizens do--& the interest groups they form—

are just as important as the govts that rule them. Private association is fuel of democracy (can be no liberty w/o public vibrancy). Without private association there can be no democracy, no check on predatory power

of the state, no pursuit of interests outside the govt’s. Govts care more about prisoners when Amnesty around. Includes trade unions, professional syndicates, parties, NGOs, charities, & clubs.

Now a trans-national component as well. Diamond, Linz, & Lipste ’95: is also a matter of training/improving pol skills of the public (p28).

Work of private groups made vastly easier when operate in climate of tolerance & mutual legitimacy (de Tocqueville, Putnam). ‘Social capital’ (trust in instxns & others) makes it easier to cooperate.

Empirical evidence: ‘civil culture’ (lots of trust in instxns & others, political engagement, etc) generally coincides w political stability & affluence.

Even when deferential in politics (i.e. Singapore), social trust can bind a society together. Prob: how operationalize? How graph? How boost its production?

Is not easy to graph ‘trust’. Feelings are not numbers. How build society when it does not exist (i.e. religious mistrust in Iraq,

ethnic in Afghanistan)?

We spend a lot of time thinking about structures of govt. But have only recently returned to idea of just how important private groups are. In many ways, what private citizens do--& the interest groups they form—

are just as important as the govts that rule them. Private association is fuel of democracy (can be no liberty w/o public vibrancy). Without private association there can be no democracy, no check on predatory power

of the state, no pursuit of interests outside the govt’s. Govts care more about prisoners when Amnesty around. Includes trade unions, professional syndicates, parties, NGOs, charities, & clubs.

Now a trans-national component as well. Diamond, Linz, & Lipste ’95: is also a matter of training/improving pol skills of the public (p28).

Work of private groups made vastly easier when operate in climate of tolerance & mutual legitimacy (de Tocqueville, Putnam). ‘Social capital’ (trust in instxns & others) makes it easier to cooperate.

Empirical evidence: ‘civil culture’ (lots of trust in instxns & others, political engagement, etc) generally coincides w political stability & affluence.

Even when deferential in politics (i.e. Singapore), social trust can bind a society together. Prob: how operationalize? How graph? How boost its production?

Is not easy to graph ‘trust’. Feelings are not numbers. How build society when it does not exist (i.e. religious mistrust in Iraq,

ethnic in Afghanistan)?