Pogge-Can the Capability Approach Be Justified

8/12/2019 Pogge-Can the Capability Approach Be Justified

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/pogge-can-the-capability-approach-be-justified 1/60



1. Introduction

(n a discussion o$ ineuality among persons,- Amartya Sen suggests that !e are egalitarians no! and

that today's serious disputes in political philosophy and normative economics concern the uestion

8euality o$ !hat9'.2 (n developing this suggestion, Sen $ocuses especially on the debate about criteria

of social justice, that is, about ho! institutional schemes/ are to be assessed and re$ormed in the name o$

justice.0 (t is speci$ically in this domain that Sen asserts !e are egalitarians no! by endorsing the

euality and eual claims o$ individual human beings.

o understand !hat this assertion might mean, !e need to distinguish sharply, as Sen does not, bet!een

t!o di$$erent !ays o$ being an egalitarian in the domain o$ social justice. 6ne !ay involves endorsing a

criterion o$ social justice that reuires institutional schemes to be geared to!ard euality. 3y the lights

o$ such an eualitarian or euality!demanding criterion, an institutional order is just i$ it treats all

individuals living under it eually :in !hatever respects that criterion deems morally important $or the

assessment o$ institutional schemes;< and an institutional order is unjust to a greater or lesser degree

depending on ho! $ar it $alls short o$ reali"ing eual treatment :in those same morally important

respects;.

he other !ay o$ being an egalitarian in the domain o$ social justice involves endorsing an egalitarian

criterion of social justice = a criterion that, in the assessment o$ any institutional order, gives eual

consideration :in !hatever respects that criterion deems morally important $or the assessment o$

institutional schemes; to all individuals living under this order.

(n some cases, the employment o$ an egalitarian criterion o$ social justice has the conseuence that only

institutional schemes geared to!ard euality are assessed as just. 3ut, as !e shall see, other egalitarian

criteria o$ social justice approve institutional schemes that generate massive ineuality. >galitarian

criteria need not be euality1demanding.5

- Amartya Sen "neuality #ee$amined :ambridge, MA ?arvard @niversity 4ress -5 B-2C;, esp. chapter -.2 "bid ., -. Sen is here echoing earlier $ormulations o$ the same thought by D!or+in and ymlic+a. See &onald

D!or+in Taking #ights %eriously :ambridge MA ?arvard @niversity 4ress -EF B-EEC, 2E21E0< illymlic+a Contemporary Political Philosophy :6#$ord 6#$ord @niversity 4ress -G;, 0. See also Sen's essayH>uality o$ hat9I B-FGC in his Choice, Welfare and &easurement :ambridge MA ?arvard @niversity 4ress-;.

/ ( use the e#pression Hinstitutional orderI :plural Hinstitutional schemesI; $or the important and pervasive socialinstitutions or ground rules that structure and organi"e a society or other social system :such as the internationalstates system;.

0 Sen "neuality #ee$amined , - n. -.

5 >uality1demanding criteria are generally egalitarian. 3ut there may be e#ceptions non1egalitarian criteria o$social justice that are :at least under certain empirical conditions; euality1demanding.

pogge 2



Sen clearly does not mean to claim that !e no! endorse only euality1demanding criteria o$ social

justice. hat he !rites $its much better !ith the claim that !e no! endorse only egalitarian criteria o$

social justice. e agree, he holds, that the moral assessment o$ any institutional order should give eual

consideration :in the relevant respect; to all individuals living under this order. And !e disagree about

the respect in !hich a criterion o$ social justice should consider individuals eually, that is, about the

metric $or evaluating ho! individuals are treated by an institutional order or about :as Sen says; the space in !hich individual shares should be de$ined and evaluated or about :in J. A. ohen's phrase;

the currency o$ egalitarian justice.E

hat Sen says !e agree about can be decomposed into t!o steps 'ormative individualism holds that

any institutional order should be assessed solely by ho! it treats its individual human participants. his

imposes a constraint on relevant in$ormation. (galitarian normative individualism holds that the

assessment o$ any institutional order ought to consider its individual participants eually :in the relevant

respect;. hese t!o steps Sen deems uncontroversial, by and large. he third step then $i#es the respect

in !hich the assessment o$ institutional schemes ought to consider individuals eually. his third step is

the one Sen deems controversial. ( discuss the $irst t!o steps in this introductory section and devote the

remainder o$ the essay to the third.

Normative individualism is indeed !idely endorsed. 3ut its adherents di$$er in !hat e#actly they are

endorsing under this label, and there are theorists !ho do not endorse it at all. )our points in particular

are !orth mentioning.

(n this essay, ( use the !ord HshareI in re$erence to !hat individual persons have o$ !hatever goods and illsmatter $or evaluating ho! they are being treated by an institutional order under !hich they live. Shares may bede$ined in terms o$ !el$are, capabilities, or resources, $or e#ample. And they may be described in absolute termsor in relative terms :as !hen each income is e#pressed as a percentage o$ the median income; onceptions o$individual advantage as employed by di$$erent criteria o$ social justice might evaluate ho! institutional schemestreat their participants in absolute terms or in relative terms or in a !ay that ta+es account o$ both absolute andrelative aspects.E J. A. ohen H6n the urrency o$ >galitarian %ustice,I (thics :-F;, G100. he !ord HcurrencyI carries aconnotation o$ homogeneity, !hich is here inappropriate. ?o! any institutional order treats its participants may

be assessed in terms o$ a homogeneous good, such as utility, but it may also be assessed in terms o$ aheterogeneous set o$ goods such as rights, resources, or capabilities. @sing one spatial dimension = or several, i$distinct li$e phases are to be distinguished :cf . note belo!; = to represent each such good, !e can then e#presseach participant's speci$ic access to relevant goods as a vector o$ the same dimensionality. his is the point o$Sen's metaphor. Still, because the comparison o$ alternative $easible institutional schemes reuires interpersonalcomparisons, multidimensional accounts o$ advantage must say something about ho! individual bundles o$ goodscan be valued $or purposes o$ comparison. Such accounts may provide a $ully determinate $unction that assignseach multidimensional bundle a uniue point on a one1dimensional metric, !hich might then be described as acurrency. As Sen rightly suggests, such accounts may also leave some looseness in the intrapersonal aggregation$unction, !hich !ill then support a merely partial ordering o$ individual bundles. Cf . Amartya Sen )evelopment

as *reedom :Ne! Kor+ Anchor 3oo+s 2GGG;, EF.

pogge 3



here is some dispute about !ho should count as a participant in an institutional order. )or e#ample, in

assessing the institutional order o$ a country today, should !e consider ho! it treats compatriots !ho are

no longer alive and compatriots not yet born9 (nso$ar as di$$erent theorists !ould ans!er these uestions

di$$erently, the object o$ their consensus remains vague.

here is also the uestion !hether the assessment o$ an institutional order should be sensitive to ho!

this order treats outsiders.F Should not our assessment o$ alternative $easible designs o$ the @S economic

order, say, also ta+e account o$ its impact on $oreigners, on much poorer persons in A$rica and 7atin

America, $or instance9 heorists typically ignore such uestions by stipulating that there are no a$$ected

outsiders. 3ut this stipulation renders their consensus hollo! he theorists' super$icial agreement

about a $ictional state in !hich there are no a$$ected outsiders conceals deep disagreements about the

real !orld !hich !ould emerge i$ the stipulation !ere li$ted.

here is, thirdly, communitarian opposition to normative individualism. Such opposition involves the

belie$ that the moral assessment o$ any institutional order must be based in part on ho! it treats certaincollectives !ithin it, such as national, ethnic, religious, linguistic, or li$estyle groups. As the e#amples o$

al"er and ymlic+a sho!,-G this belie$ is compatible !ith normative individualism. ommunitarian

positions oppose normative individualism only i$ they also hold that, in the moral assessment o$ an

institutional order, some such collectives should be given consideration that is not reducible to the

consideration given to their individual members. his brand o$ communitarianism, prominently

e#empli$ied by ?egel,-- is alive in harles aylor's account o$ the reasons $or protecting and

maintaining Lubcois culture-2 as !ell as in &a!ls's account o$ international justice, !hich gives eual

consideration to :not individuals but; peoples, including Hdecent societiesI designed to be responsive to

the interests o$ :not individuals but; associations, corporations, and estates.-/

F Cf . Amartya Sen H6pen and losed (mpartiality,I +ournal of Philosophy :2GG2;, 0051. his stipulation is prominent, $or instance, in %ohn &a!ls Theory of +ustice :ambridge MA ?arvard@niversity 4ress - B-E-C;, 0, E, 0G-. (t is reiterated in his Political -iberalism :Ne! Kor+ olumbia@niversity 4ress -/;, 2E2 n. .

-G >sche!ing the ?egelian route, these thin+ers argue that cultural communities should be protected andmaintained because they sustain the good o$ community !hich in turn is an important component o$, or means to,

the $lourishing o$ individual human beings. (n this !ay, al"er and ymlic+a at least claim that their vie!s are$ully consistent !ith normative individualism. Cf . Michael al"er +ust and njust Wars :Ne! Kor+ 3asic3oo+s -EE;, 5/$., and ill ymlic+a &ulticultural Citi/enship0 -iberal Theory of &inority #ights :6#$ord6#$ord @niversity 4ress -5;, esp. hapter /.

-- Cf. Jeorg )riedrich ilhelm ?egel (lements of the Philosophy of #ight :ambridge ambridge @niversity4ress --;, esp. 4art hree, Section 2, the discussions o$ estates and corporations.

-2 harles aylor Hhe 4olitics o$ &ecognition,I in harles aylor and Amy Jutman, eds. &ulticulturalism

:4rinceton 4rinceton @niversity 4ress -0;.

-/ %ohn &a!ls The -aw of Peoples :ambridge, MA ?arvard @niversity 4ress -;, 251E and E2$. &a!ls'stheory o$ domestic justice $or liberal democracies does e#empli$y normative individualism.

pogge 4



here are, $inally, impersonal values that might also be thought to have a bearing on the moral

assessment o$ institutional schemes. hus &onald D!or+in invo+es the sanctity o$ human li$e in

assessing legal rules governing the treatment o$ $etuses-0 and he also holds that places o$ great natural

beauty may have an impersonal value that may justi$y other!ise inadmissible restrictive legislation.

6thers have stressed our obligations to animals in order to justi$y placing the $reedom o$ persons under

restrictions that, i$ they !ere not necessary $or the protection o$ animals, !ould be unjust.

-5

Despite these $our minor di$$iculties, Sen is right to suggest that the leading theories in political

philosophy and normative economics today e#empli$y, or at least closely appro#imate, normative

individualism.

Some!hat greater di$$iculties appear !hen !e e#amine the second step the move to egalitarian

normative individualism and the claim that it is $airly uncontroversial. 6ne major di$$iculty here is that

most !riters on social justice restrict their theory to the case o$ a national society. hey e#clude

$oreigners $rom the scope o$ the criterion o$ social justice they propose $or the institutional order o$ asociety and they also hold that their pre$erred criterion does not apply to the global institutional order. -

6nly by ignoring these t!o restrictions and $ocusing solely on the content o$ such theories can Sen be

justi$ied in counting them as egalitarian.

Moreover, there are many societies in !hich uneual practices = most typically involving an in$erior

status o$ !omen or o$ members o$ certain minority religions = are entrenched and popular among

politicians and the general public ali+e. Not surprisingly, these practices have their academic de$enders

in the societies in uestion. Many such de$enders endorse moral assessments that give less than eualconsideration to members o$ the disadvantaged groups. Luite possibly, Sen does not mean to include

such de$enders in the scope o$ his generali"ation. 3ut does he also mean to e#clude &a!ls, !ho has

recently argued that HdecentI societies, !hose institutional schemes and conceptions o$ justice assign an

in$erior status to some participants on account o$ their se# or religion, should nevertheless be accepted

as Heual participating members in good standing o$ a Society o$ 4eoplesI9-E 3y claiming that a just

international order !ould reserve such a place $or decent societies, &a!ls's la! o$ peoples !ould seem

to $all outside the egalitarian consensus Sen asserts.

-0 &onald D!or+in -ife1s )ominion0 n rgument about bortion, (uthanasia, and "ndividual *reedom :7ondon intage -/;.

-5 (.g. 4eter Singer nimal -iberation :Ne! Kor+ >cco 2GG- B-E5C;.

- he inegalitarian character o$ the latter restriction is discussed in homas . 4ogge World Poverty and 2uman

#ights :ambridge 4olity 4ress 2GG2;, chapter 0.-E &a!ls The -aw of Peoples, 5.

pogge 5



hese possible e#ceptions not!ithstanding, Sen is correct in describing this consensus as uite !ide. (t

is so !ide in large part because o$ ho! Sen understands egalitarianism in the domain o$ social justice.

o be an egalitarian in this domain, one need not endorse an eualitarian :euality1demanding; criterion

o$ social justice. 6ne need merely endorse an egalitarian criterion o$ social justice, !hich, in the

assessment o$ any institutional order, gives eual consideration :in !hatever respects that criterion

deems morally important $or the assessment o$ institutional schemes; to all individuals living under thisorder.

Sen holds that, so understood, the egalitarian consensus includes utilitarian vie!s according to !hich an

institutional order should ma#imi"e aggregate utility :!el$are; regardless o$ distributive pattern.-F Such

vie!s may justi$y institutional schemes that produce highly uneual utility distributions. Sen justi$ies

including them nonetheless by maintaining that Hthe ma#imi"ation o$ the sum1total o$ the utilities o$ all

people taken together ... ta+es the $orm o$ eual treatment o$ human beings in the space o$ gains and

losses o$ utilities. here is an insistence on eual !eights on everyone's utility gains in the utilitarian

objective $unction.I-

Sen also includes &a!ls's theory o$ domestic justice in the egalitarian consensus,2G but $ails to

characteri"e the space in !hich &a!ls's di$$erence principle is egalitarian. his principle is o$ten held up

as e#empli$ying a :ma#imin or le#imin; prioritarian as opposed to an eualitarian criterion o$ economic

justice.2- As this contrast is understood, eualitarian criteria $avor distributive patterns !ith smaller

deviations $rom the center, !hereas prioritarian criteria $avor distributive patterns !ith higher minima

and thus $avor an economic order that generates great ineuality over a $easible alternative that

generates much less ineuality, provided the $ormer also generates a superior lo!est position. he

di$$erence principle gives precedence to gains in the lo!est socioeconomic position, ho!ever slight,

over gains in socioeconomic euality, ho!ever large. learly, the di$$erence principle is then not

eualitarian in the sense o$ demanding euality o$ socioeconomic advantage :!hich &a!ls de$ines in

-F here are various such vie!s. hey di$$er on ho! utility is to be understood = as desire $ul$illment, perhaps, or

as pleasure minus pain. And they di$$er on ho! to aggregate = through arithmetic or geometric averaging, perhaps, or through summing up.

- Sen, "neuality #ee$amined , -/. he uoted passage sho!s ho! Sen includes in his postulated egalitarianconsensus vie!s that are egalitarian only in a $ormal, attenuated sense Sum1ran+ing utilitarianism is no moreconcerned !ith considering persons eually than an apple counter is concerned !ith considering apple treeseually. (n both cases, eual consideration is a mere byproduct o$ a !holly non1comparative concern. Cf . also%oseph &a" The &orality of *reedom :6#$ord larendon 4ress -F;, chapter .

2G Sen, "neuality #ee$amined , 2$.

2- Cf. esp. Dere+ 4ar$it H>uality or 4riorityI in Matthe! layton and Andre! illiams, eds. The "deal of

(uality :?oundmills Macmillan 2GGG;, F-1-25. See also the editors' introduction to this volume, ibid . -1-.

pogge 6



terms o$ an inde#, including income and !ealth, po!ers and prerogatives o$ o$$ices and positions o$

responsibility, and the social bases o$ sel$1respect22;.

>#tending the !ay Sen uali$ies utilitarianism as egalitarian, ( suppose he !ould thin+ o$ the di$$erence

principle as egalitarian in his sense on the ground that, in comparing alternative $easible institutional

schemes by re$erence to the lo!est socioeconomic position each o$ them generates, this principle pays

no attention to the identity o$ those !ho !ould be occupying this decisive lo!est position under any o$

the candidate schemes. More generally, the di$$erence principle is egalitarian by virtue o$ the $act that it

assesses $easible alternative institutional schemes on the basis o$ the distributive pattern o$ bundles o$

socioeconomic goods each such order !ould tend to generate, !ithout regard to !hich persons !ould

end up !ith !hich bundles.

($ this is ho! a ma#imin criterion uali$ies as egalitarian, then uali$ication cannot be denied to a

ma$ima$ criterion o$ economic justice, according to !hich an economy should be organi"ed so as to

ma#imi"e the largest shares. Such a criterion is egalitarian in Sen's sense in virtue o$ the $act that itassigns the same great value to very large shares no matter !hose shares these are.

7i+e!ise, the label HegalitarianI applies to sufficientarian vie!s, !hich assess any institutional order by

the e#tent to !hich its treatment o$ any o$ its participants avoidably $alls belo! some threshold

:ho!ever de$ined;.2/ 6n such a vie!, an institutional order could be per$ectly just even !hile it

generates vast ineualities above the threshold. Sen !ould nonetheless count such vie!s as egalitarian in

his sense on the ground that they give eual !eight to any given short$all belo! the threshold, regardless

o$ the identity o$ the person or persons !hose short$all this is.

Another surprising entry on Sen's list o$ egalitarians is &obert No"ic+, !ho endorses the e#treme

ineuality o$ slavery. (nconsistently, Sen justi$ies this inclusion by pointing out that No"ic+ endorses an

euality1demanding criterion, speci$ically demanding Hthe euality o$ libertarian rights.I20 (ndeed,

according to No"ic+, enslavements must be e$$ected pursuant to eual initial rights !hich include the

:alienable; po!ers to sell onesel$ and to buy other persons $rom their present o!ners. No"ic+ holds that

all persons !ould start out !ith eual such po!ers in any H$ree systemI25 and also that their other rights,

liberties, po!ers, and immunities !ould be initially eual.

2

22 %ohn &a!ls Collected Papers :ambridge MA ?arvard @niversity 4ress -;, /-/$., cf . /.2/ ?ere greater short$alls may be assigned !eight that is proportionately or disproportionately greater than that o$smaller short$alls. (n the latter case, a given aggregate short$all mani$ests a lesser injustice !hen it consists inmany citi"ens $alling short a little than !hen it consists in a $e! $alling short a lot.

20 Sen "neuality #ee$amined , 2G.

25 Cf . &obert No"ic+ narchy, %tate and topia :Ne! Kor+ 3asic 3oo+s -E0;, //-.

2 ontrast No"ic+'s vie! !ith that o$ an aristocratic libertarian !ho holds, say, that noblemen start out !ith moree#tensive rights than commoners :that a nobleman's act can appropriate more uno!ned land than the same act

pogge



(n +eeping !ith his discussion o$ other HegalitarianI vie!s, Sen could have justi$ied his inclusion o$

No"ic+ by appealing not to the euality1demanding but to the egalitarian character o$ No"ic+'s criterion

o$ justice No"ic+ regards an institutional order under !hich certain libertarian rights o$ some are denied

or insecure as eually unjust, regardless o$ the identity o$ those su$$ering the rights denial or insecurity.2E

he egalitarianism Sen describes is !ea+. (t e#cludes only se#ist, racist, $eudalist, $ascist, and

$undamentalist vie!s !hich hold that the assessment o$ any institutional order must ta+e into account

ho! its treatment o$ its participants correlates !ith their H!orth.I 6n such vie!s, the $act that an

institutional order advantages certain persons over others ma+es this order more just inso$ar as !orthier

individuals :e.g., men, !hites, nobles, Aryans, devout believers; are advantaged and less just inso$ar as

such !orthier individuals are disadvantaged.

he shared element in the !ide consensus Sen s+etches might be less misleadingly described as a

commitment not to euality but to a variant o$ !hat economists call the anonymity condition. his

condition can, once again, be most elegantly characteri"ed as a constraint on relevant in$ormation heassessment o$ $easible alternative institutional schemes ought to be based on in$ormation about the

pattern o$ individual shares each !ould generate, !ithout regard to :$urther; in$ormation about the

individuals !hose shares these are. ($ alternative institutional schemes !ould generate the same pattern

o$ individual shares in some society, then they are eually just $or this society, even i$ they instantiate

di$$erent permutations o$ shares over individuals. Many uite di$$erent criteria o$ social justice could

agree on this point and then disagree about the correct characteri"ation o$ the shares that matter Should

these be individual utilities, opportunities $or !el$are, capability sets, bundles o$ social primary goods,

or !hat92F

per$ormed by a commoner, perhaps;. Cf . homas . 4ogge #eali/ing #awls :(thaca ornell @niversity 4ress-F;, 52.2E "bid . 5/15.

2F ?o! can a criterion o$ social justice that de$ines shares in a !ay that includes in$ormation about persons :e.g.,about their metabolic rates; satis$y the anonymity condition9 Does such a criterion not treat di$$erent personsdi$$erently9 6ne may respond that such a criterion can still satis$y the anonymity condition in this sense he

assessment o$ $easible alternative institutional schemes ought to be based on in$ormation about shares only,!ithout regard to further in$ormation about the persons !hose shares these are. hus, i$ persons' metabolic ratesand $ood access constitute their shares, these are evaluated !ithout regard to any $urther $eatures o$ their o!ners.3ut this response ris+s depriving the anonymity condition o$ all content &acists can propose a de$inition o$ sharesthat includes s+in color and they can then claim that this, too, satis$ies the anonymity condition %ust as persons!ith lo! metabolic rates and a small $ood supply are no !orse o$$ than persons !ith higher metabolic rates and a proportionately larger $ood supply, so blac+s !ith little access to education and culture are no !orse o$$ than!hites !ith much greater such access. o retain some bite $or the anonymity condition, one may there$ore !ant toidenti$y certain $eatures o$ persons = e.g., se#, race, ethnicity, birth, religion = that must not be included in thede$inition o$ shares. )or our purposes here, let us grant that Sen means to do this and that his notion o$egalitarianism thus does have some bite.

pogge !



he egalitarianism Sen suggests !e agree on is then !ea+er than one might have thought. (t does not

reuire endorsement o$ an euality1demanding criterion o$ social justice or even o$ an egalitarian

criterion that re$lects a comparative concern $or considering individuals eually :cf . note -;. &ather, it

reuires merely endorsement o$ a criterion !hose assessment o$ any institutional order is indi$$erent to

ho! the relevant individual shares this order generates map onto its participants.

6n the $ace o$ it, this !ea+ egalitarianism seems indisputable. Surely, one !ants to say, our assessment

o$ an institutional order must not be a$$ected by !hether some relevant disadvantage, some burden or

other hardship arising under it, is su$$ered by me or by you, by a man or a !oman, by a !hite or a blac+,

by a Mormon or a %e!. (n $act, ho!ever, this apparently uite !ea+ egalitarianism is still too strong to

be endorsed by most contemporary theorists, Sen himsel$ included. he reason is that the anonymity

condition rules out not only $eudal, racial, and other chauvinist distinctions. (t also rules out any

sensitivity, in the comparative assessment o$ alternative institutional schemes, to the correlation that

!ould e#ist under each bet!een the relevant shares persons have and their natural $eatures. (n this !ay,

the anonymity condition reuires criteria o$ social justice to pay no attention to !hether !omen or

blac+s or %e!s are overrepresented among the least advantaged. (nso$ar as the criteria currently put

$or!ard in political philosophy and normative economics do pay attention to such correlations, they $all

outside the !ea+ egalitarianism characteri"able by the anonymity condition.

o be sure, the anonymity condition permits criteria that are sensitive to !hether t!o di$$erent +inds o$

hardship are correlated. onsider institutional schemes under !hich hal$ the population are poor and

hal$ have no access to higher education. e may plausibly judge such an order to be more unjust !hen

the t!o groups coincide than !hen they are disjoint :so that no one bears both hardships;. 3y supporting

this judgment, a criterion o$ social justice does not violate the anonymity condition. = Ket this thought

does not help solve the problem ( have posed $or the anonymity condition 3eing $emale, blac+, or

%e!ish are not, as such, hardships. Se#, race, and religion are precisely the +inds o$ $actors the

anonymity condition screens out. So !e must discard the anonymity condition i$ !e !ant to count

against an institutional order that, in the pattern o$ shares that !ould e#ist under it, persons o$ certain

se#, s+in color, or religion are heavily overrepresented at the bottom. he anonymity condition, !hat

Sen calls egalitarianism, is incompatible !ith $air euality o$ opportunity or distributive $airness among

groups.

No! one may thin+ that such an o$$ensive overrepresentation could persist only under an institutional

order that is inherently unjust, by a$$ording pre$erential treatment to males, !hites, or hristians, $or

e#ample. Acceptance o$ the anonymity condition is there$ore plausible a$ter all. (t prevents us $rom

diagnosing the injustice o$ an institutional order on the basis o$ o$$ensive correlations< but this is no loss,

pogge "



because the anonymity condition does not prevent us $rom diagnosing the underlying institutional

injustice :pre$erential treatment; that mani$ests itsel$ in such o$$ensive correlations. = Ket this argument

$ails. 6$$ensive correlations need not mani$est inherent injustice o$ an institutional order. hey may

instead be caused by prevalent cultural practices and attitudes, and o$ten are so caused, as Sen and

Nussbaum have sho!n uite e$$ectively. As theorists o$ social justice, !e thus $ace this choice e can

either reuire that any institutional order, to be just, must be designed to modi$y, and to mitigate thee$$ects o$, cultural practices and attitudes that cause o$$ensive correlations. 6r !e can uphold the

anonymity condition and thus $ocus only on the distributive pattern as such, !hile being indi$$erent to

any reshu$$ling o$ individuals over the shares in this pattern.

( thin+ that Sen !ould !ant to resolve this con$lict at the e#pense o$ the anonymity condition. ?e !ould

then accept that the justice o$ an institutional order depends not only on the pattern o$ capability sets it

!ould engender, but can be marred by its $ailure to mitigate cultural practices and attitudes that cause

!omen to be heavily overrepresented among those !ith the greatest capability de$icits. ($ this conjecture

is correct, then Sen is obliged to reject the anonymity condition as a constraint on acceptable vie!s

about ho! institutional schemes should be assessed. his !ould place Sen himsel$ outside the

egalitarian consensus as he characteri"es it.

6rdinary utilitarians endorse the anonymity condition. hey hold that social institutions ought to be

designed so as to ma#imi"e aggregate utility regardless o$ its distribution :cf . note -F;. his design is

superior to any $easible alternative that, !hile lo!ering aggregate utility only slightly, !ould engender

much less ineuality in average utility bet!een men and !omen.

&a!ls's stance on this uestion is unclear. ?e reuires $air euality o$ opportunity only !ith respect to

the social class in !hich persons have been raised.2 iti"ens' initial social class is easily characteri"able

as a social good or hardship, and &a!ls's opportunity principle there$ore satis$ies the anonymity

condition ?e reuires that no one should su$$er both an in$erior upbringing and in$erior opportunities

$or given talents and motivation. &a!ls does not reuire $air euality o$ opportunity !ith regard to race

or se# = a reuirement that !ould violate the anonymity condition. 3ut since the validity o$ his narro!

principle o$ $air euality o$ opportunity is con$ined to ideal theory, &a!ls's e#clusion o$ race and se#

$rom this principle may merely re$lect his empirical assumption that any society satis$ying his $irst and

di$$erence principles is bound to be one in !hich signi$icant correlations bet!een persons' shares o$

social primary goods and their race or se# !ould not persist. ($ this interpretive conjecture is correct,

then &a!ls might yet believe that, should an institutional re$orm raising the lo!est socioeconomic

2 &a!ls Theory of +ustice, /< %ohn &a!ls +ustice as *airness0 #estatement :ambridge MA ?arvard@niversity 4ress 2GG-;, 00.

pogge 1#



position at the e#pense o$ $air euality o$ opportunity across natural groups be $easible a$ter all, justice

!ould rule it out. his $urther belie$ !ould violate the anonymity condition.

7et us ta+e stoc+. (n "neuality #ee$amined , Sen presents a general picture o$ the current state o$

political philosophy and normative economics. According to this picture, an understanding o$ the

competition among criteria o$ social justice can be developed in three steps. At Step 6ne, these criteria

agree that any institutional order should be assessed solely by ho! it treats its individual human

participants :normative individualism;. At Step !o, these criteria agree that any institutional order

should be assessed on the basis o$ the pattern o$ relevant shares it gives rise to, !ithout regard to the

resulting match1up bet!een shares and individuals :anonymity condition;. At Step hree, these criteria

disagree about the metric or space or currency in terms o$ !hich individual shares should be de$ined and

compared.

hus $ar, ( have argued that the $irst t!o steps are not as uncontroversial as Sen suggests. At Step 6ne,

there is some respectable opposition to normative individualism. More importantly, at Step !o, most

theorists !ould, on re$lection, reject even the !ea+ egalitarianism enshrined in the anonymity condition.

Nonetheless, Sen is right that the most important disagreements among contemporary criteria o$ social

justice occur at Step hree !here these criteria evaluate in diverse !ays ho! institutional schemes treat

their individual participants.

o render the ensuing discussion o$ Step hree as clear as possible, ( $ollo! the e#ample o$ Sen and

ohen by holding $i#ed the $irst t!o steps. At Step 6ne, ( assume a strengthened speci$ication o$

normative individualism !hich holds not only that alternative institutional schemes $easible $or the same

social system should be assessed solely by ho! each treats its individual human participants, but also

that one such candidate order cannot be more just than another unless it renders some person or

percentile o$ persons better o$$ in either absolute or relative terms./G riticism o$ any institutional order

as unjust must then be e#pressible as a complaint, set $orth in behal$ o$ one or more o$ its individual

participants, alleging that the institutional order treats the relevant person:s; absolutely or relatively

!orse than they should be treated.

Jiven the di$$iculties !e encountered at Step !o, ( $i# this step some!hat di$$erently $rom ho! Sen

and ohen do. 7eaving No"ic+ and utilitarianism aside, ( assume here that the correct criterion o$ social

justice is eualitarian :euality1demanding; or prioritarian or sufficientarian or some hybrid o$ any t!o

/G his assumption goes beyond normative individualism, !hich implies nothing about ho! in$ormationconcerning individual participants is to be processed into one assessment. Normative individualism is $ormallycompatible !ith a criterion according to !hich an institutional order is more just !hen it generates greater ineuality or a lower minimum or greater short$alls $rom su$$iciency.

pogge 11



o$ these or o$ all three. ombining both steps, ( assume then that criticism o$ any institutional order as

unjust must be e#pressible as a complaint alleging that this order treats some o$ its participants worse

than others :eualitarianism;, or treats some o$ its participants worse than any would be treated under

some alternative institutional order feasible for the same society or social system :prioritarianism;,/- or

treats some o$ its participants worse than some threshold and avoidably so :su$$icientarianism;. ($ there

is no valid complaint under any o$ these three pure types, then there is no valid complaint under anyhybrid criterion o$ social justice either.

omplaints o$ all three types involve interpersonal comparisons. >ualitarian criteria must merely be

able to compare shares !ithin one institutional order./2 4rioritarian criteria must, in addition, be able to

compare shares across alternative institutional schemes that are $easible $or the society :or other social

system; under assessment. Su$$icientarian criteria o$ social justice must, in addition, be able to compare

shares across di$$erent societies :!hich are to be governed by the same threshold;. (n discussing these

comparisons, ( !ill characteri"e such shares as more or less adeuate and, in re$erence to su$$icientarian

criteria, as either adeuate :at or above the threshold; or more or less inadeuate. he uestion at Step

hree is then (n !hat metric or space or currency should individual shares be de$ined so as to support

plausible comparative judgments about the justice o$ institutional schemes9 My critical e#amination o$

the capability approach as one ans!er to this uestion concentrates e#clusively on its alleged superiority

to its resourcist competitor, e#empli$ied by &a!ls's theory o$ domestic justice.

/-

( am here $ocusing on le#imin prioritarianism to +eep things perspicuous. 3ut a vie! that merely givessubstantially greater !eight to relative gains and losses $or any less advantaged persons or percentiles than toeual relative gains and losses to the same number o$ more advantaged persons or percentiles !ould also berecogni"ably prioritarian. :here is some arbitrariness here about the !ord Hsubstantially.I 3ut, clearly, a vie! isnot recogni"ably prioritarian i$ it counts O- to a pauper on a par !ith O2 to a billionaire. his 2- !eight ratio is$ar too small.; riteria o$ social justice that are eualitarian or prioritarian in this broad sense all embody the Pigou!)alton Condition, that is, they all hold that one institutional order is less just than a $easible alternative!hen the pattern generated by the latter sho!s a larger share increased and a smaller one reduced both by thesame amount. he di$$erence bet!een prioritarian and eualitarian vie!s is t!o$old )irst, unli+e mosteualitarian criteria, prioritarian criteria all embody the Pareto Condition, holding that one institutional order isless just than a $easible alternative !hen in the pattern generated by the $ormer at least one share is smaller andnone larger than in the pattern generated by the latter. :Ma#imin prioritarianism, being !holly indi$$erent to gainsand losses above the minimum, is inconsistent !ith both 4igou1Dalton and 4areto, and ( am leaving it aside $orthis reason.; Second, unli+e all eualitarian criteria, prioritarian criteria are all additively separable. his meansthat the assessed value o$ a distributional pattern is simply the aggregate o$ the assessed values o$ the individualshares. >ualitarian criteria, by contrast, ma+e a holistic assessment :!hich does not involve valuing individualshares in isolation $rom one another;. )or this notion o$ additive separability, see %ohn 3roome Weighing 3oods0

(uality, ncertainty and Time :6#$ord 3lac+!ell --; and %ohn 3roome H>uality ersus 4riority A @se$ulDistinctionI :$tpPP-0.-E.-5.-2P>>Pbroome-.pd$; $orthcoming in Daniel i+ler and hristopher %. 7. Murray,eds. 43oodness1 and 4*airness10 (thical "ssues in 2ealth #esource llocation :Jeneva ?6 4ublications;./2 o be sure, eualitarian criteria must be able to compare degrees o$ ineuality across alternative institutionalschemes that are $easible $or the same society or other social system. 3ut this e#ercise generally does not reuireinterpersonal comparisons o$ advantage across schemes.

pogge 12



)ollo!ing Sen and Nussbaum, ( use &a!ls as my e#emplar o$ a sophisticated resourcist. Doing so

involves conceiving resources more narro!ly than D!or+in, !ho brought tal+ o$ resources and

resourcism to academic prominence.// D!or+in includes among resources not merely social resources,

such as civil and political liberties, education, healthcare, employment, and claims to e#ternal space,

personal property and public goods, but also internal resources, such as someone's physical abilities and

state o$ health.

/0

D!or+in's vie! is there$ore, as he reali"es,

/5

close to Sen's in that both share the ideathat a just institutional order !ould regulate the distribution o$ social resources so as to compensate $or

ineualities in internal resources. hey di$$er only in ho! they !ant to $i# and justi$y the correct amount

o$ compensation Sen suggests that justice reuires institutional schemes to channel additional social

resources to those !orse endo!ed !ith internal resources inso$ar as this is necessary $or achieving !hat

he !ould regard as a just distribution o$ capabilities. D!or+in proposes the thought e#periment o$ a

hypothetical insurance mar+et, suggesting that justice reuires compensation $or only those de$iciencies

in internal resources that persons !ould insure against e$ ante.

&a!ls rejects such demands $or compensation or, as he says, the principle of redress, !hile pointing out

that an institutional order satis$ying his di$$erence principle !ould treat the poorly endo!ed a great deal

better than they have been treated historically and than they !ould be treated under other conceptions o$

social justice./ ?is t!o principles de$ine shares solely in terms o$ social primary goods, leaving aside

in$ormation about the distribution o$ natural primary goods, such as Hhealth and vigor, intelligence and

imagination.I/E (n !hat $ollo!s, ( spea+ o$ resources in this narro!er &a!lsian sense o$ social resources

and thus do not count natural primary goods :genetic endo!ments, internal resources; as resources at all.

his &a!lsian account o$ relevant resources is still uite broad, as !e shall see.

2. $o%e $upposed Contrasts Bet&een the Capability and 'esourcist Approaches

3oth Sen and Nussbaum hold that, $or purposes o$ assessing alternative $easible institutional schemes on

the basis o$ ho! each treats its individual participants, Hthe appropriate 8space' is neither that o$ utilities

:as claimed by !el$arists;, nor that o$ primary goods :as demanded by &a!ls;, but that o$ the substantive

$reedoms = the capabilities = to choose a li$e one has reason to value.I

/F

// &onald D!or+in Hhat is >uality9 4art 2 >uality o$ &esources,I Philosophy and Public ffairs -G :-F-;,2F/1/05, reprinted in his %overeign 5irtue :ambridge, MA ?arvard @niversity 4ress 2GGG;.

/0 D!or+in %overeign 5irtue, /GG. ( pre$er to call these internal rather than :as D!or+in does; personal resources, because in ordinary parlance my coins and bicycle are also considered personal resources, e$$ects, or property.

/5 "bid . /G2$./ &a!ls Theory of +ustice, F$. ( !ill come bac+ to this point in subsection 0.- belo!.

/E "bid., 50./F Sen )evelopment as *reedom, E0.

pogge 13



As J. A. ohen has pointed out, this emphasis on $reedoms as the hallmar+ o$ the capability approach

can be misleading./ (n e#plicating the meaning o$ Hcapabilities,I Sen emphasi"es that he is concerned

not !ith !hat persons have or are, !ith their achievements or $unctionings, but rather !ith !hat they

can have or be. apabilities are options to achieve valuable $unctionings.0G his emphasis, ho!ever, is

one that resourcists can $ully share. hey tend to $ocus not on the goods persons actually have or

consume, but on the goods persons can have or consume. &a!ls, $or instance, evaluates social positionsin terms o$ the access they provide to or through certain all1purpose means such as basic liberties,

opportunities, and money.0- he +ey uestion dividing the relevant approaches is then not Should

alternative $easible institutional schemes be assessed in terms o$ !hat their participants have or in terms

o$ !hat their participants have access to9

&ather, the +ey uestion is Should alternative $easible institutional schemes be assessed in terms o$ their

participants' access to valuable resources or in terms o$ their participants' capabilities, that is, access to

valuable functionings9 (n the conte#t o$ this dispute, the distinctive $eature o$ the capability approach is

its $ocus on !hat ohen help$ully calls Hmid$areI02 or, in Sen's !ords, Hon the state o$ the person,

distinguishing it both $rom the commodities that help generate that state, and $rom the utilities generated

by the state.I Luoting ohen, Sen continues He must loo+, $or e#ample, at her nutrition level, and not

just, as &a!lsians do, at her $ood supply, or, as !el$arists do, at the utility she gets out o$ eating $ood.I0/

(n light o$ this clari$ication, the dispute !ould be better described as being about resources versus

$unctionings rather than about resources versus capabilities = but ( !ill stic+ to the received labels.

he resourcist and capability approaches can each be speci$ied in a !ide variety o$ !ays. ( leave aside

this internal diversity as much as possible to $ocus instead on the central disagreement that divides the

t!o approaches. ($ one side !ere right about this central disagreement, then !e could in$er that !e

should loo+ on that side $or the most plausible criterion $or assessing alternative $easible institutional

schemes. e could not in$er, ho!ever, that every vie! on the !inning side is more plausible than every

vie! on the losing side. his second conclusion is mista+en, because a criterion o$ social justice on the

/ J. A. ohen H>uality o$ hat9 6n el$are, Joods, and apabilitiesI in Martha Nussbaum and Amartya SenThe 6uality of -ife :6#$ord larendon 4ress -/;, 12.0G

Sen o$ten gives the e#ample o$ a$$luent persons $asting by choice. hough they may be undernourished, they arenot to be grouped !ith other hungry people !ho cannot a$$ord enough to eat. hat matters is their capability to be !ell1nourished, in terms o$ !hich they are no !orse o$$ than other a$$luent people !ho are eating three suaremeals a day.

0- o be sure, it is di$$icult to identi$y !hat persons genuinely have access to, as !hen some have lostopportunities through choices made much earlier or others do not avail themselves o$ certain opportunities because o$ social conditioning or pressures. Still, these di$$iculties are common to both approaches and thus canhere be le$t aside.

02 J. A. ohen H>uality o$ hat9,I esp. -F.0/ Amartya Sen Hapability and ell13eingI in Nussbaum and Sen The 6uality of -ife, 0/.

pogge 14



!inning side o$ the resources1vs.1capabilities dispute may have many other serious $la!s that, all things

considered, render it in$erior to some criteria on the losing side o$ this dispute.

(t $ollo!s that the contrapositive o$ the second conclusion is eually mista+en he $act that one

particular capability vie! is more plausible than one particular resourcist vie! does not sho! that the

capability approach is superior to the resourcist approach. @n$ortunately, both Sen and Nussbaum

occasionally suggest this invalid argument hey compare an implausible resourcist vie! = typically

one that assesses alternative $easible institutional schemes by the average income :or JN4 per capita;

each !ould engender = to a more plausible capability vie! and then suggest that the capability

approach is there$ore more plausible than the resourcist approach.00

&a!ls ma+es the same sort o$ mista+e in the opposite direction. ?e argues that the reasons !e have $or

pre$erring a political over a comprehensive conception o$ social justice also sho! that the !ay an

institutional order treats its participants must be evaluated in terms o$ resources rather than capabilities.

his is so, according to &a!ls, because a capability vie! ta+es a stand on the relative value o$ the manydiverse ends human beings might pursue !hereas a resourcist vie! li+e his o!n can $ocus more

abstractly on certain all1purpose means that are essential to most any !ay o$ li$e.05 As Sen ma+es clear,

this is a bad argument.0 A resourcist vie! might !ell ta+e a stand, implicitly, on basic moral values and

on the relative merits o$ various human pursuits< it !ould be doing so i$ it $ocused not on such abstract

and general goods as &a!ls emphasi"es :e.g., political liberties, income and !ealth;, but on very

concrete and partisan goods such as being ruled by pious atholics or having access to erdi

per$ormances. More to the point, a capability vie! can be $ormulated uite generally so that it $ocuses

on capabilities that :li+e &a!ls's social primary goods; are important to all human pursuits or nearly all.

Sen has in $act emphasi"ed capabilities o$ this sort, such as being !ell1nourished and having physical

mobility. 3y ascribing to persons an interest in such capabilities, Sen is not : pace &a!ls0E; committing

himsel$ to any particular comprehensive conception o$ the good li$e.

o advance the debate bet!een the t!o approaches, !e need a sharper analysis o$ ho! they di$$er. Sen

has listed certain +ey determinants o$ uality o$ li$e that, he claims, are ignored by the simpler resourcist

00 Cf ., $or e#ample, Sen )evelopment as *reedom, FE, and Martha Nussbaum Women and 2uman )evelopment :ambridge ambridge @niversity 4ress 2GGG;, G$.

05 &a!ls Collected Papers, 05.0 Sen "neuality #ee$amined , F210.

0E &a!ls mista+enly ta+es Sen's advocacy o$ the capability approach to involve the thoughts that Hprimarygoods ... are not !hat, $rom !ithin anyone's comprehensive doctrine, can be ta+en as ultimately importantI andthat Hto $ocus on primary goods is ... to !or+ in the !rong space = in the space o$ institutional $eatures andmaterial things and not in the space o$ basic moral valuesI :&a!ls Collected Papers, 05;.

pogge 15



and unjust intra$amily distribution. (t does not settle the uestion !hat such injustice consists in he

capability theorist !ill describe the injustice as $amily resources being distributed so that males

systematically have greater capabilities. he resourcist !ill describe the injustice as men and boys

systematically receiving larger shares o$ $amily resources than !omen and girls do. (n any case, it is not

true, pace Sen, that the resourcist approach leads its adherents to overloo+ the very serious problem o$

intra$amily distribution.

:2; )ifferences in relational perspectives Hhe commodity reuirements o$ established patterns o$

behavior may vary bet!een communities, depending on conventions and customs. )or e#ample, being

relatively poor in a rich community can prevent a person $rom achieving some elementary

H$unctioningsI :such as ta+ing part in the li$e o$ the community; even though her income, in absolute

terms, may be much higher than the level o$ income at !hich members o$ poorer communities can

$unction !ith great ease and success.I5/ he point Sen ma+es here = that individual advantage has

relative as !ell as absolute aspects = is at right angles to the debate bet!een the t!o approaches A

capability theorist can run a$oul o$ Sen's point by disregarding all social and relative $unctionings and

$ocusing e#clusively on such $unctionings as being !ell1nourished and having physical mobility.

onversely, even a simple income resourcist can accept Sen's point by recogni"ing that the value o$

any level o$ income depends in part on !hat incomes other participants enjoy and that, partly $or this

reason, an institutional order may be unjust because the incomes it ma+es available to some are too lo!

relative to the incomes it ma+es available to others. A plausible resource metric must include all and

only the resources human beings need to $unction adeuately and must !eight these resources according

to their importance in $ul$illing standard human needs.50 ($ a reasonably competitive income is important

$or persons to $unction adeuately = and there is considerable evidence that this is so55 = then the

relative si"e o$ incomes should be incorporated into an appropriate resource metric.5

5/ Sen )evelopment as *reedom, E-. Cf. Sen 7n (conomic "neuality, 2-2$.

50 Does such a re$erence to standard human needs constitute a capitulation to the capability approach9 ($ it did, atruly resourcist vie! !ould have to select and !eight the resources !ithin its metric !ithout regard to our+no!ledge about !hat human beings generally need to $unction adeuately. Such HtrueI resourcism !ouldevidently be absurd. he interesting resourcism, here at issue, is distinctive by holding that the justice o$

institutional schemes should be judged on the basis o$ !hat distribution o$ valuable resources :rather thanvaluable capabilities or utilities; !ould e#ist under it. his !ill become much clearer in the seuel.

55 onsider the economics literature on positional goods as !ell as more recent evidence that relative poverty is animportant e#planatory $actor in human health. Cf . Sir Douglas 3lac+, %. N. Morris, yril Smith, 4eter o!nsendHhe 3lac+ &eport,I in 4eter o!nsend and Nic+ Davidson, eds. "neualities in 2ealth :7ondon 4enguin -G;and &ichard il+inson nhealthy %ocieties0 The fflictions of "neuality :7ondon and Ne! Kor+ &outledge-;.5 ithin &a!ls's theory, $or instance, there is strong reason to include persons' relative income = e#pressed perhaps as the ratio o$ income over median income = among the social bases o$ sel$1respect. Cf . 4ogge #eali/ing #awls, -2$.

pogge 1



More sophisticated resourcists !ill accept Sen's point !ith regard to various other goods they recogni"e

besides income he value and the moral adeuacy o$ the rights a person enjoys and o$ the education,

medical care, and employment available to her all depend in part on ho! they compare to the rights and

educational, medical, and employment opportunities enjoyed by those around her. (n &a!ls's theory,

these relative aspects are e#pressed in the demand $or eual basic liberties and eual opportunities as

!ell as in such intrinsically relational goods as Hpo!ers and prerogatives o$ o$$ices and positions o$responsibilityI and especially Hthe social bases o$ sel$1respect.I5E

:/; 5ariations in social climate Hhe conversion o$ personal incomes and resources into the uality o$

li$e is in$luenced also by social conditions, including public educational arrangements, and the

prevalence or absence o$ crime and violence ... epidemiology and pollution ... the nature o$ community

relationships.I5F his thought can properly be advanced against any resourcist vie! that $ocuses on

personal incomes and resources to the e#clusion o$ social capital and, more generally, public goods and

ills. Such a vie! !ould presumably oppose most ta#1$unded public e#penditures $or a criminal justice

system, $or public health, $or sports and the arts, and $or maintaining national par+s and public libraries.

o my +no!ledge, this is not a position any actual resourcists have ta+en. hey do not $ocus on personal

:rivalrous or e#cludable; resources alone, but rather count the prevalence o$ crime and violence and the

lac+ o$ public sa$eguards against biological and chemical ha"ards as diminishing a person's resources

broadly conceived. 6ur paradigm resourcist &a!ls sees such $actors as rendering insecure some o$ the

basic liberties o$ citi"ens such as their physical and psychological integrity and their $reedom o$

movement.5 ?e also emphasi"es the political liberties and their $air value as a crucial primary good that

allo!s citi"ens, together, to shape the social and natural conditions that shape their lives. (n these !ays,

a sophisticated resourcist vie! does ta+e account o$ social conditions and o$ their potentially di$$erential

impact on persons and groups = albeit in a di$$erent !ay than the capability approach !hich is sensitive

to these $actors only in proportion to the in$luence they e#ert on individuals' capabilities or uality o$

li$e.

:0; (nvironmental diversities Hariations in environmental conditions ... can in$luence !hat a person

gets out o$ a given level o$ income. ?eating and clothing reuirements o$ the poor in colder climates

cause problems that may not be shared by eually poor people in !armer lands. he presence o$

in$ectious diseases in a region ... alters the uality o$ li$e that inhabitants o$ that region may enjoy.IG

5E &a!ls Collected Papers, /2$., 050.

5F Sen )evelopment as *reedom, EG$.

5 Cf . &a!ls Theory of +ustice, 2--1-/, !here he ta+es the prevalence o$ crime and violence to constitute a lossin basic liberties !hich, as the preeminent primary goods, are governed by his $irst principle o$ justice.G Sen )evelopment as *reedom, EG.

pogge 1!



Again, these are points that resourcists have every reason to ta+e into account. hus, i$ !e count a place

!here one can live and !or+ among the personal goods or resources, then it ma+es sense to count such a

place as more valuable !hen it o$$ers a temperate climate and healthy environment, just as one !ould

count such a place as more valuable !hen it o$$ers an abundance o$ $reely available nutritious $ruits and

vegetables.

(t must be said, ho!ever, that actual resourcists have paid insu$$icient attention to variations in

environmental conditions. hey are not discussed by &a!ls, $or instance, and play no role in his

criterion o$ social justice. his is so, ( conjecture, because he assumes that the citi"ens o$ a just society

enjoy $reedom o$ movement. 6n this assumption, he $inds it implausible to count Susan as !orse o$$

than 3ill merely because she lives in a less hospitable environment = she lives there by choice, a$ter all,

and could live !here 3ill lives i$ she !anted to. :($ she is poorer than 3ill and cannot a$$ord to live

!here he lives $or this reason, then &a!ls's criterion !ill appropriately count her as !orse o$$ than 3ill,

but not on account o$ her environmental conditions but on account o$ her lesser income and !ealth.;

hile my conjecture goes some !ay to!ard de$ending &a!ls's criterion, it does not in the end provide a

valid de$ense. he di$$erence principle compares the socioeconomic positions o$ citi"ens in terms o$

:simply put; the !or+1pay pac+ages available to them, !ithout regard to the geographical area in !hich

such !or+1pay pac+ages may be available. his can lead to an intuitively implausible ran+ing o$

socioeconomic positions $or purposes o$ identi$ying the least advantaged under each $easible

institutional order and o$ comparing such institutional alternatives by re$erence to the least advantaged

position each generates. 4ersons !hose best option is to sell $ast $ood in San Diego $or a !age o$ OGG

per month are intuitively better o$$ than persons !hose best option is to per$orm the same !or+ in

Alas+a $or a !age o$ O-G per month. he reason is that the latter, to do the job, must live in Alas+a and

must then also pay more than the $ormer do $or clothing and $or heating their homes :additional

e#penses that e#ceed O-G per month;.

( agree then that a plausible criterion o$ social justice must ta+e account o$ environmental diversities and

that actual resourcists have $ailed to do so. Still, the needed correction is in the spirit o$ the resourcist

approach (n measuring resources persons have access to, one must subtract resources standardly needed

to enjoy such access = the heavy coat one needs to !ithstand the Alas+an !inter as much as the

uni$orm one may need in order to hold do!n a job as a mail carrier or !aitress.

:5; Personal heterogeneities H4eople have disparate physical characteristics connected !ith disability,

illness, age or gender, and these ma+e their needs diverse.I - ?o! such personal heterogeneities should

be treated is really at the core o$ the debate bet!een the t!o approaches. &esourcists de$ine and consider

- "bid., EG.

pogge 1"



individual shares !ithout regard to the particular $eatures o$ the persons !hose shares they are. (n

selecting the various goods in terms o$ !hich they de$ine their resourcist metric, and in !eighting these

selected goods relative to one another, resourcists are guided by some conception o$ the standard needs

and endo!ments o$ human beings. apability theorists, by contrast, value the goods persons have access

to by re$erence to the specific needs and endo!ments o$ each particular person. (n this sense, capability

theorists are, !hile resourcists are not, sensitive to personal heterogeneities.

Sen tends to overstate the contrast, ho!ever, in that some o$ the $eatures he lists as personal

heterogeneities are ones that resourcists can and do ta+e into account.

:5.-; Sen gives the e#ample o$ !omen !ho, because they are breast1$eeding an in$ant child, need more

nutrition than other persons.2 3ut surely resourcists are not committed to counting the needs o$ in$ants

$or naught. o the contrary, they are committed to recogni"ing that a share o$ $ood or income just

adeuate $or a single adult is less or not adeuate i$ shared by a !oman and her in$ant child together.

losely related is Sen's e#ample o$ e#tra $ood needs during pregnancy. / &esourcists can hardly $ail to

recogni"e that all human beings have needs even be$ore they are born and must have these needs met in

order to reach their $ull human potential. 6nly their mothers can meet these pre1birth needs and, i$ they

decide to do so, these mothers have additional needs related to their pregnancy. hey must be able to

meet these needs in order to meet the pre1birth needs o$ their $uture children. @nderstanding this,

resourcists can easily agree !ith Sen that a share o$ $ood or income just adeuate $or a non1pregnant

!oman is less or not adeuate $or a pregnant !oman and her unborn child. Any plausible resourcist

vie! !ill ta+e account o$ pregnancy and lactation.

Ma+ing this point does not in any !ay detract $rom the very great contributions Sen and Nussbaum have

made to!ard spreading a!areness o$ the economic injustices in$licted speci$ically upon !omen and

girls. 3ut it does sho! that these great contributions do not presuppose the capability approach. he

commitment to $eminism is separable $rom the commitment to the capability approach he $ormer does

not presuppose the latter and there$ore cannot support it either.0

(n $act, the capability approach may even !ea+en the $eminist case by suggesting = $alsely = that

!omen's terrible and disproportionate su$$ering in most o$ this !orld is due to their being insu$$iciently

2 Cf. e.g. Sen Commodities and Capabilities :Ne! Delhi 6#$ord @niversity 4ress -;, -, and Sen "neuality

#ee$amined , --/.

/ Cf. e.g. Sen Commodities and Capabilities, -, Sen "neuality #ee$amined , // and --/.

0 he validity o$ this point is con$ined to the debate bet!een capability theorists and resourcists. (n the debate!ith !el$arism, capability theorists can employ $eminist arguments. hey can point out, $or e#ample, that!el$arism does not count as disadvantaged !omen !ho have = through social conditioning or by choice:adaptive pre$erence $ormation; = accepted their in$erior status in their society. his important point against!el$arism can, ho!ever, be made just as e$$ectively by resourcists as !ell.

pogge 2#



compensated $or their in$erior natural endo!ments. omen's su$$ering in the !orld as it is does not

result $rom social institutions being insu$$iciently sensitive to the special needs arising $rom their

di$$erent natural constitution. &ather, it over!helmingly results $rom institutional schemes and cultural

practices being $ar too sensitive to their biological di$$erence by ma+ing se# the basis $or all +inds o$

social :legal and cultural; e#clusions and disadvantages. omen and girls have a po!er$ul justice claim

to the removal o$ these barriers, to eual treatment :in a resourcist sense;. ($ these barriers !ereremoved, i$ our social institutions assured !omen o$ eual and eually e$$ective civil and political

rights, o$ eual opportunities, o$ eual pay $or eual !or+, !omen could thrive $ully even !ithout any

special brea+s and considerations. So !hy detract $rom this irresistible demand $or eual treatment in a

resourcist sense by sta+ing claims to compensation $or greater needs or special disabilities9 hy open

the door to all sorts o$ counter1claims invo+ing the special needs and disabilities o$ males, based perhaps

on their naturally lo!er li$e e#pectancy or on their larger bodies in need o$ additional $ood and clothing9

hy, as it !ere, muddy the !aters9

(nstitutional schemes are o$ten $acially se# neutral = not openly discriminatory against !omen and

girls, and yet male centered. )or e#ample, access to certain positions can be subject to restrictions that

are not substantially related to the demands o$ the job and, !hile not e#cluding !omen as such,

nonetheless ma+e it much harder or rarer $or !omen to uali$y. he restrictions do this by targeting

$eatures o$ persons that, $or biological or cultural reasons, are correlated !ith se#. Such restrictions may,

$or instance, avoidably e#clude candidates !ho are pregnant or have small children to ta+e care o$ or $all

belo! a certain height or !eight or !ear HobtrusiveI headgear :chadors but not yamul+as;.

A criterion o$ social justice, too, can be $acially se# neutral and yet male centered, and may then be blind

to the unjust biases built into some o$ the institutional schemes it is used to assess. Such a criterion may,

$or instance, speci$y the standard needs and endo!ments o$ human beings in a !ay that is more

appropriate $or males than $or $emales. Such a male1centered criterion o$ social justice may blind its

adherents to the !ays in !hich their institutional order is covertly discriminatory against !omen.

his danger is real and important. 3ut it is, once again, orthogonal to the contrast at issue. (t is possible

to $ormulate a resourcist criterion o$ social justice that, in selecting, $ormulating, and !eighting valuable

resources, ta+es $ull account o$ any divergences in the needs o$ males and $emales and also is

appropriately sensitive to covert $orms o$ discrimination by assessing any institutional order by ho! it

actually !or+s in its social and natural conte#t. Such a resourcist criterion !ould employ an unbiased

conception o$ the standard needs and endo!ments o$ human beings and !ould count an institutional

order as just only i$ it secured genuinely eual treatment to its $emale and male participants. 6n the other

hand, it is also easily possible to $ormulate a male1centered capability vie! that bases its selection,

pogge 21



$ormulation, and !eighting o$ valuable capabilities on the standard needs o$ males and also is insensitive

to covert $orms o$ discrimination by analy"ing any institutional order !ithout attention to the possibly

uite se#ist culture !ithin !hich it is operating.

(t is certainly di$$icult, !ithin either approach, to develop a criterion o$ social justice that $ully meets this

vital challenge = !ith respect to !omen as !ell as to other historically disadvantaged groups. 6n this

score, the capability theorists are !ay ahead o$ most resourcists, than+s to the great e$$orts by Sen,

Nussbaum, and others. 3ut ( see no reason to doubt that resourcists can do as !ell. hey should

certainly ma+e the e$$ort.

:5.2; (n response to Sen's e#amples o$ lactation and pregnancy, ( have de$ended resourcism by invo+ing

the needs human beings have during their in$ancy and gestation in the !omb. his de$ense heightens the

interest o$ the ne#t e#ample he adduces to sho! that a capability criterion can treat personal

heterogeneities in a more plausible !ay than any resourcist criterion can. ?ere Sen argues that !hen a

criterion o$ social justice ma+es interpersonal comparisons in terms o$ a resource metric, it ignores the$act that human needs vary !ith age.5 Ket, in regard to this e#ample as !ell, resourcism can do rather

better than Sen supposes. &ecall that normative individualism, common ground bet!een the resourcist

and capability approaches, holds that any institutional order should be assessed by ho! it treats its

individual human participants. Sen's e#ample has $orce, i$ !e thin+ o$ such participants as time slices.

3ut it then poses an eually po!er$ul objection to the capability approach as !ell hether you thin+ o$

human beings as needing certain resources or certain $unctionings = either !ay, our needs vary !ith

age.

(t is more common, and plainly more plausible !ithin both approaches, to conceive o$ participants as

persons over a complete li$e. hey are certainly so conceived by &a!ls,E !ho does not regard an

institutional order under !hich all persons enjoy the same up!ard mobility, !ith uni$ormly rising ran+

and income, as ineualitarian merely because, at any given time, older persons enjoy higher

socioeconomic status than younger ones. ?is di$$erence principle does not judge such an order, under

!hich the incomes o$ the least advantaged rise !ith age $rom O5 to O-2 per hour, say, in$erior to a

$easible alternative under !hich the least advantaged earn O per hour throughout their lives.F

5 Cf. e.g. Sen 7n (conomic "neuality, 2-2< Sen "neuality #ee$amined , --/< Sen )evelopment as *reedom, EGand FF.

Koung children do not have much use, $or instance, $or some o$ the capabilities Nussbaum lists, $or Hbeing ableto participate e$$ectively in political choices that govern oneQs li$eI or Hbeing able to search $or the ultimatemeaning o$ li$e in oneQs o!n !ayI :Nussbaum Women and 2uman )evelopment , EF1FG, capabilities 0 and -GA;.

E Cf. e.g. &a!ls Theory of +ustice, 5, coining the e#pression Hli$e prospectsI, and &a!ls Collected Papers,/0.F )or discussion o$ such a case, cf. &a!ls Political -iberalism, 2EG$.

pogge 22



($ participants are conceived as persons over a complete li$e, age1speci$ic variations in needs are not a

personal heterogeneity. 4ersons have diverse needs at di$$erent times o$ their lives, and the adeuacy o$

individual shares depends then not merely on !hat persons have access to, but also on when they have

such access. %ust as having access to ten pounds o$ $ood once a !ee+ is less adeuate than having access

to one pound o$ $ood each day, so having access to dentures as an in$ant and to mother's mil+ in old age

is less adeuate than the other !ay round. &ecogni"ing these points, resourcists can speci$y the standardneeds o$ human beings in the various phases o$ their lives and can then de$ine the adeuacy o$ a

person's li$etime share as an intertemporal aggregate o$ ho! adeuate the resources she has access to in

each phase o$ her li$e are relative to the age1speci$ic standard human resource needs during this phase.

o be sure, resourcists have not tac+led this tas+, but capability theorists have not tac+led it either.

3oth have clear reason to conceive the participants in institutional schemes as persons over a complete

li$e :rather than as time1slices o$ such persons; and to recogni"e that the needs o$ such persons vary !ith

age. Doing so, both approaches can easily avoid the conclusion Sen rightly $inds embarrassing hey

can avoid saying that an institutional order containing special provisions to meet age1speci$ic needs is,

$or this reason alone, treating its participants uneually. A society is not ineualitarian merely because it

has a public school system that is open to teenagers but not to septogenarians, i$ the latter had similar

opportunities !hen they !ere young. Nor is it ineualitarian merely because it o$$ers a special ta# brea+

to the aged, i$ those currently ineligible can receive an euivalent ta# brea+ in their old age.

Surely, a great deal more could be said about justice bet!een generations, and even !hat little ( have

said about ho! best to respond to the $act o$ age1speci$ic needs is not uncontroversial.EG Still, no more

need be said to establish this minimal point riteria o$ social justice that employ a resource metric are

not, $or this reason, insensitive to age1speci$ic needs.

:5./; >ven i$ participants are conceived as persons over a complete li$e and age1speci$ic di$$erences are

thus le$t aside, participants do o$ course still di$$er considerably in both body and mind and there$ore

also in their capacity to convert valuable resources into valuable $unctionings. >ven these di$$erences,

ho!ever, are not ones that resourcist vie!s are constrained to ignore !holesale. &esourcists can

recogni"e that a person's mental and physical constitution is, to a considerable e#tent, shaped by social

$actors by the locality and $amily in !hich one is raised :!hich greatly in$luence one's access to

&a!ls has nothing to say about intertemporal aggregation !ithin one li$e, although this topic is essential $orma+ing his t!o principles o$ justice operational in the real !orld. )or a tentative treatment o$ this topic !ithin a&a!lsian $rame!or+ see homas . 4ogge 8ant, #awls, and 3lobal +ustice :Ann Arbor @niversity Micro$ilms(nternational -F/;, chapter /. ( also try there to accommodate !ithin &a!ls's resourcist $rame!or+ !hatundeniably is a personal heterogeneity the $act that persons die at di$$erent ages.EG Some o$ the comple#ities and controversies are interestingly discussed in Dennis Mcerlie H>uality andime,I (thics :-F;, 0E510-, Dennis Mcerlie H>uality 3et!een Age1Jroups,I Philosophy and Public

ffairs 2- :-2;, 0E5105, and 7arry S. em+in "neuality :6#$ord 6#$ord @niversity 4ress -/;, chapter F.

pogge 23



nutrition, medical care, physical e#ercise, play, and educational opportunities during childhood and

adolescence; and by the culture and institutional order o$ one's society :!hich determines one's

opportunities $or social and political participation;. &esourcists can recogni"e, there$ore, that persons'

developed capacities to derive bene$it $rom resources are co1determined by their prior access to

resources.

(n our !orld, social $actors play a huge role in e#plaining actual mental and physical di$$erences

relevant to persons' capacity to derive bene$it $rom resources. ast numbers o$ people gro! up in

conditions !here they and their mothers are chronically undernourished and have inadeuate access to

basic :including maternal and perinatal; medical care, immuni"ations, essential nutrients and sa$e !ater.

As a conseuence, many o$ them become mentally and physically stunted and especially vulnerable to

diseases.E- Not having had access to even a minimal education, some F50 million adults are illiterate.E2

Due to se#ist cultural traditions and practices and se#ist institutional arrangements, !omen are

signi$icantly overrepresented in all these horri$ying statistics.

&esourcist vie!s have every reason to ta+e account o$ interpersonal di$$erences inso$ar as these are due

= as in $act they over!helmingly are in the !orld at large = to past ineualities in the resource access

persons had under their institutional order. Nearly all persons !ith special mental or physical needs or

disabilities today !ould be per$ectly capable o$ leading happy and healthy lives i$ they !ere not

su$$ering the e$$ects o$ severe past :and present; resource deprivation lac+ o$ e$$ective civil and political

rights and inadeuate access to !ater, $ood, shelter, health care, and education. (nso$ar as such resource

deprivation !as unjust, a just institutional order !ill compensate $or its e$$ects. he members o$ a

society or other social system have a duty o$ justice to mitigate the harms caused by their prior

!rongdoing.

hese problems are addressed more compellingly by resourcists than by capability theorists. here the

latter critici"e institutional schemes $or their $ailure to compensate $or special physical and mental

$railties, resourcists more po!er$ully critici"e the same institutional schemes $or their $ailure to

compensate $or $railties they themselves produce through the severe mistreatment they impose on so

many children and adults.

his criticism is closely lin+ed !ith another he re$orm o$ such institutional schemes must not merely

ensure that they compensate $or $railties they had produced in the past :inso$ar as doing so is still

E- H!o out o$ $ive children in the developing !orld are stunted, one in three is under!eight and one in ten is!asted.I )A6 :)ood and Agriculture 6rgani"ation o$ the @nited Nations; The %tate of *ood "nsecurity in the

World 9::: :!!!.$ao.orgPne!sP-PimgPso$i1e.pd$;, --. Cf . also belo!, te#t at notes -0/1F.

E2 @ND4 :@nited Nations Development 4rogram; 2uman )evelopment #eport ;<<; :Ne! Kor+ 6#$ord@niversity 4ress 2GG2;, --.

pogge 24



though the t!o cases are not distinguishable in the capability space, an adeuate

theory o$ justice cannot really ignore the di$$erences bet!een the t!o cases. (n this

sense, the capability perspective, central as it is $or a theory o$ justice, cannot be

entirely adeuate $or it.E/

:5.0; hile the capability approach may, as Sen suggests in this passage, not be sensitive enough to the

causal origins o$ special needs and disabilities, the resourcist approach may be too sensitive to such

causal origins by ignoring completely any di$$erences in participants' mental and physical needs and

endo!ments in !hose emergence social institutions are not materially involved. Such di$$erences could

be due to any combination o$ three other +inds o$ $actors ordinary genetic variations, as !hen some

people have lesser native intelligence or a $aster metabolic rate< sel$1caused $actors, as !hen people ruin

their bodies or minds through drugs or lac+ o$ e#ercise< and di$$erential luc+, as !hen someone is hurt

by lightning or in a natural disaster.

&esourcists can ma+e three responses to this !orry. )irst, they can point out that special needs anddisabilities in !hich social causes play no role at all are rare. Most special needs and disabilities are due

to a con$luence o$ diverse causes, social ones included. Social rules generating e#cessive poverty may,

by $orcing many people to live in $limsy huts or at e#posed locations, magni$y the harm done by a

natural disaster. Social rules governing advertising may contribute to the damage adolescent smo+ers are

doing to their lungs. And rules governing social strati$ication and social mobility in$luence mating

patterns and thereby possibly the $reuency o$ speci$ic genetic characteristics. he uestion ho! a

resourcist vie! should plausibly be responsive to these comple# interdependencies is evidently $ar too

di$$icult to be addressed here. 3ut mere a!areness o$ these comple#ities should su$$ice to sho! that

resourcists are not straight$or!ardly compelled to ignore a !ide range o$ personal heterogeneities.

Second, resourcists can say that the impact o$ interpersonal variations in needs and endo!ments on

individuals is very signi$icantly in$luenced by the institutional order as !ell as by social practices and

cultural traditions. o ta+e an obvious e#ample he mobility o$ a !al+ing1impaired person may greatly

depend on !hether our buildings and public transportation system are !heelchair accessible. his

general point is relevant inso$ar as resourcists base their selection, $ormulation, and !eighting o$

valuable resources on some account o$ standard human needs. (n doing so, they must avoid the

complaint that this account is modeled mainly on the needs o$ some and much less appropriate to the

E/ Sen "neuality #ee$amined , FE< cf . )evelopment as *reedom, EE. >ven i$ this di$$erence is morally relevant, sothat persons in the $irst category but not those in the second can demand compensation as a right, !e may still!ant to design our institutional order so that it treats both ali+e, especially !hen the distinction is less than clear1cut or there are only a $e! cases in the second category. (t !ould not be unjust $or a society to do as much $orcongenitally blind children as it must do $or children !hose eyesight !as lost due to dangerous medications or pollutants.

pogge 26



needs o$ others. e discussed a $eminist variant o$ this complaint above = the charge that some

resourcist vie!s are male centered by employing metrics modeled on the needs o$ males considered

prototypical o$ human beings. &esourcist vie!s must avoid analogous complaints by the disabled ($ a

resourcist criterion o$ social justice is to ensure that any institutional order satis$ying it a$$ords all its

participants genuinely eual treatment, then its resource metric must ta+e account o$ the $ull range o$

diverse human needs and endo!ments. &a!ls tries to solve this problem by !or+ing !ith abstractlyde$ined resources, such as basic liberties and income, !hich, as Hall1purpose means,I can be use$ully

employed by persons !ith uite di$$erent needs and endo!ments.E0

(nso$ar as a resourcist vie! satis$ies this condition, it has a more attractive !ay o$ accommodating

special needs than capability theorists do. he latter say to the disabled person H( understand that you

have a lesser capacity to convert resources into valuable $unctionings. )or this reason, !e !ill ensure

that you get more resources than others as compensation $or your disability. (n doing so, our objective is

that, by converting your larger bundle o$ resources, you !ill be able to reach roughly the same level o$

capability as the rest o$ us, that you !ill be roughly as able as !e are to attain the various valuable

$unctionings.I he resourcist might say instead H( understand that the present organi"ation o$ our

society is less appropriate to your mental and physical constitution than to those o$ most o$ your $ello!

citi"ens. (n this sense, our shared institutional order is not a$$ording you genuinely eual treatment. o

ma+e up $or the !ays in !hich !e are treating you !orse than most others, !e propose to treat you

better than them in other respects. )or e#ample, to ma+e up $or the $act that tra$$ic instructions are

communicated through visible but inaudible signals, !e !ill provide $ree guide dogs to the blind. (n

doing so, our objective is that our institutional order as a !hole should a$$ord you genuinely eual

treatment.I his resourcist accommodation does not, ho!ever, apply in all cases = i$ tra$$ic instructions

are communicated through both visible and audible signals, $ree guide dogs may not be reuired by

justice. And this resourcist accommodation rarely results in eual capabilities, as a $ormerly

disadvantaged group, once it is being treated eually, may still have belo!1average capabilities = the

blind may still not get around as !ell as the seeing.E5

hird, resourcists can also point out that justice is not the only moral virtue o$ persons and institutional

schemes. hus, even i$ there are some among us !ho have special needs and disabilities that the rest o$

us have no duties of justice to alleviate = because !e did not contribute to their emergence and do not

bene$it $rom their e#istence = !e may nonetheless have other uite stringent moral reasons individually

E0 &a!ls Theory of +ustice, 50$., EF1F-. &a!ls also needs to sho! that his account o$ the importance o$ thesegoods relative to one another :as e#pressed in the le#ical priority ran+ing o$ his principles o$ justice; is euallyappropriate $or persons !ith di$$erent needs and endo!ments.

E5 (t is also possible, o$ course, that such a $ormerly disadvantaged group, once treated eually, has above1averagecapabilities.

pogge 2



or collectively to engage in such alleviation duties o$ humanity to!ard all human beings, $or e#ample,

or duties o$ solidarity to!ard those !ith !hom !e share a common political li$e. Such duties are

appealed to !hen it is said that, though hi+ers, s!immers, and sailors have no right to be rescued $rom

li$e1threatening situations at public e#pense, it !ould nonetheless be morally intolerable $or a reasonably

a$$luent society simply to let them die. (t !ould be similarly intolerable $or such a society to allo! poor

persons !ith congenital health problems to die untreated.

At the end o$ this long section, it appears that the resourcist approach is no less able to address most o$

the important deprivations and ineualities that so dis$igure our !orld = though, as !e have seen, the

t!o approaches may address them some!hat di$$erently. hat remains as the +ey theoretical di$$erence

is ho! the t!o approaches direct institutional schemes to respond to !hat one might call pure personal

heterogeneities. he !ord HpureI here serves to e#clude $eatures that, it has turned out, are not genuine

personal heterogeneities at all and should not be ignored by resourcists lactation, pregnancy, and age. (t

is meant to e#clude also personal heterogeneities to the genesis o$ !hich social $actors substantially

contribute = such as the e$$ects o$ accidents produced by a socially sanctioned motori"ed tra$$ic system

or the genetic e$$ects o$ socially sanctioned drugs :thalidomide; or pollution. o avoid the rather

cumbersome language o$ pure personal heterogeneities, let me rephrase the topic as how institutional

schemes are to respond to natural human diversity, !ith the reminder that such natural diversity may

arise $rom any combination o$ ordinary genetic variations, sel$1caused $actors, and di$$erential luc+.

3. Capabilities (ersus 'esources) *o& Not to 'esol+e the ,ispute

($ !e con$ine ourselves, !ith &a!ls and Sen, to the more general and abstract currencies appropriate $or

a distinctly political conception o$ social justice, then the central disagreement bet!een the t!o

approaches is this &esourcists believe that individual shares should be de$ined as bundles o$ goods or

resources needed by human beings in general, !ithout re$erence to the natural diversity among them.

hese goods might include certain rights and liberties, po!ers and prerogatives, income and !ealth, as

!ell as access to education, health care, employment, and public goods = !ith di$$erent lists and

di$$erent !eights speci$ied by di$$erent resourcist vie!s. Adherents o$ the capability approach hold, bycontrast, that individual shares should be de$ined so as to ta+e account o$ Hpersonal characteristics that

govern the conversion o$ primary goods into the person's ability to promote her ends.IE hus, an

E Sen )evelopment as *reedom, E0. his $ormulation is de$ective by suggesting that the capability approach$eatures criteria o$ social justice that ta+e account o$ the speci$ic ends that di$$erent persons are pursuing. his isnot the case. apabilities are de$ined !ithout regard to such ends. 6ne person does not count as having lessercapabilities than another merely because the $ormer chooses to pursue more ambitious ends. hat matters $orcapability theorists is each person's ability to promote typical or standard human ends = and not each person'sability to promote his or her o!n particular ends.

pogge 2!



eualitarian capability criterion holds that, under a just institutional order, persons !ith mental or

physical $railties or disabilities !ould receive more resources than others, enabling them to reach the

same level o$ capabilities, the same level o$ opportunities to promote human ends, inso$ar as this is

reasonably possible.

?o! does one resolve such a disagreement9 7et me proceed by disposing o$ $our $urther inconclusive

arguments in $avor o$ the capability approach.EE

he $irst o$ these invo+es the thought that resources are o$ merely instrumental signi$icance :cf . also

note 50;

>uality in these spaces Bprimary goods, resourcesC is seen as important because they

are instrumental in giving people euitable opportunity, in some sense, to pursue their

respective goals and objectives. his distance does, in $act, introduce = ( !ould claim

= some internal tension in these theories, since the derivative importance o$ primary

goods or resources depends on the respective opportunities to convert primary goods

or resources into the $ul$ilment o$ the respective goals, or into $reedoms to pursue

them.EF

Sen's resourcist opponents !ill gladly grant that resources are o$ merely instrumental signi$icance, are

important only i$ and inso$ar as they give persons opportunities to pursue their goals. &esourcists !ill

$urther grant that a plausible resource metric must include all and only the resources human beings need

to $unction adeuately and must !eight these resources according to their importance in $ul$illing

standard human needs.E &esourcists may even grant that !hat ultimately matters is that opportunities to

pursue human goals be distributed euitably in some sense. 3ut, such resourcists !ill maintain, the

correct sense in !hich the distribution o$ opportunities ought to be euitable must be de$ined in the

space o$ resources.

here is no internal tension in this position. o see this, consider a simple e#ample o$ t!o young single

!or+ers per$orming ualitatively and uantitatively identical labor at the same gross !age. hen as+ing

ho! these t!o !or+ers should be ta#ed, !e understand that they are not interested in their !ages as

such, but regard money as purely instrumental to!ard other goals. And !e may agree !ith Sen that our

ta# system should aim $or an euitable distribution o$ opportunities. Ket, !e may still believe that !hat

ma+es such a distribution euitable is that !or+ers doing eual !or+ are paid eually and ta$ed eually.

EE he !ord H$urtherI re$ers bac+ to the $irst $ive paragraphs o$ section 2. (n +eeping !ith the title uestion o$ thisessay, the present section $ocuses one1sidedly on arguments advanced against resourcism and in $avor o$ thecapability approach.

EF Sen "neuality #ee$amined , - n. 2G.E Cf . &a!ls +ustice as *airness, -$.

pogge 2"



e may still believe that it !ould be ineuitable to ta# one o$ the !or+ers less on account o$ his lesser

capacity to convert money into valuable $unctionings.

Sen should be grate$ul that the tension he alleges is no problem $or the resourcist approach. ($ it !ere,

then a similar tension !ould be problematic $or the capability approach. 7i+e rights and access to

money, so the abilities to be !ell nourished and to move about are o$ mostly instrumental importance.

Sen's criticism o$ resourcism could thus be turned against himsel$ H>uality in the space o$ capabilities

is seen as important because they are instrumental in giving people euitable opportunity to pursue their

respective goals and objectives. his distance introduces some internal tension in Sen's theory, since the

derivative importance o$ capabilities depends on their role in allo!ing persons to $ul$ill their ends.I ($

Sen's argument !ere sound, it !ould sho! that !hat matters $or social justice is not euity in the space

o$ capabilities :access to $unctionings; but euity in the space o$ opportunities to $ul$ill one's particular

goals.

A second inconclusive argument in $avor o$ the capability approach is presented by Sen in the $orm o$ a parable.FG Annapurna !ants some indivisible !or+ to be done in her garden and must choose one o$

three poor, unemployed laborers to do the job. All three are uite eager to !or+ $or her. Dinu is the

!orst1o$$ $inancially, and giving him the job !ould there$ore contribute most to!ard improving the

distribution o$ income. 3ishanno is the unhappiest, and giving him the job !ould contribute most to!ard

improving the distribution o$ !el$are. &ogini su$$ers $rom a debilitating disease that the income $rom

this job !ould enable her to have cured< and giving her the job !ould there$ore contribute most to!ard

improving the distribution o$ capabilities. Sen invites us to conclude that Annapurna should give the job

to &ogini.

6ne may uarrel !ith this conclusion. 3ut the more important point is that, even i$ !e accept this

conclusion, the parable is nonetheless inconclusive because it $alls in the domain o$ !hat Sen calls

personal ethics rather than political philosophy. Sen himsel$ insists strongly that these t!o domains must

be distinguished, that uite di$$erent moral principles may apply to the moral assessment o$ personal

behavior, on the one hand, and to the moral assessment o$ institutional schemes, on the other.F- So !e

cannot in$er $rom Annapurna's moral reason to give pre$erence to &ogini over Dinu and 3ishanno in

that imagined situation that !e have moral reason to structure our society's ta# and social1security

systems so that they are sensitive to capability ineualities rather than to resource ineualities. Section 0

!ill sho! more concretely and in detail !hy the intuitions Sen mobili"es through his parable have much

less !eight, i$ any, !ith regard to the choice among alternative public criteria o$ social justice.

FG Sen )evelopment as *reedom, 50$.F- Sen "neuality #ee$amined , - n. -.

pogge 3#



A third inconclusive argument in $avor o$ the capability approach invo+es the claim that di$$erences in

human capacities to convert resources into $unctionings are unchosen. (nso$ar as this claim is true, it

$urnishes a complaint against any institutional order that disregards such di$$erential conversion

capacities H(t is through no $ault o$ ours that, !ith eual resources, !e are unable to attain the same

valuable $unctionings as others. 3y allo!ing this capability ineuality to stand uncorrected, the

institutional order allo!s us to be un$airly penali"ed by internal characteristics $or !hich !e bear noresponsibility. he institutional order should there$ore be redesigned so that !e have additional

resources that even out our unchosen lo!er conversion capacities.I

(s this a compelling complaint9 onsider that those !ith greater conversion capacities can present a

roughly symmetrical complaint H(t is through no $ault o$ ours, either, that you have lesser conversion

capacities than !e do. 3y compensating you at our e#pense, the institutional order !ould un$airly

penali"e us $or di$$erences in internal characteristics $or !hich !e bear no responsibility. he

institutional order should there$ore be designed so that our resource shares are not diminished by our

unchosen greater conversion capacities.I he ju#taposition o$ these t!o complaints brings out that each

o$ them presupposes a vie! about the metric or space in terms o$ !hich individual shares should be

de$ined $or purposes o$ assessing alternative $easible institutional schemes he $ormer complaint

protests penali"ation in the space o$ capabilities, the latter protests penali"ation in the space o$

resources.F2 Neither complaint can there$ore serve as an argument $or deciding this uestion o$ metric or

space one !ay or the other. @sing either complaint as such an argument amounts to begging the

uestion.

he $ourth inconclusive argument begs the uestion !ith more elegant directness. ?ere the capability

theorist simply points out that resourcist vie!s ignore the $act that the uality o$ persons' lives, their

!ell1being, is substantially a$$ected not only by the resources at their disposal but also by their capacity

to employ these resources in the pursuit o$ ends

An important and $reuently encountered problem arises $rom concentrating on

ineuality o$ incomes as the primary $ocus o$ attention in the analysis o$ ineuality.

he e#tent o$ real ineuality o$ opportunities that people $ace cannot be readily

deduced $rom the magnitude o$ ineuality o$ incomes, since !hat !e can and cannot

F2 Another complaint might protest penali"ation in the space o$ !el$are or personal goal attainment H(t is throughno $ault o$ ours that, !ith eual capabilities, !e are unable to attain our goals as !ell as others can attain theirs.e did not choose to have, unli+e you, a special gi$t $or and great attraction to!ard playing an e#pensive musicalinstrument....I

pogge 31



do, can or cannot achieve, do not depend just on our incomes but also on the variety o$

physical and social characteristics that a$$ect our lives and ma+e us !hat !e are.F/

his passage $ocuses on a $la!ed variant o$ the resourcist approach, one that de$ines shares in terms o$

income alone. 3ut !hat matters here is ho! it proceeds to argue against this resourcist vie!. (t argues

that ineuality o$ resources is a poor indicator $or ineuality in real opportunities because the latter

depend not merely on ineualities in resources but also on ineualities in internal characteristics

governing the conversion o$ resources into real opportunities. No! it is true, o$ course, that the

resourcist approach disregards such natural diversity and $ocuses e#clusively on resource ineualities.

3ut this is not an argument against the resourcist approach. his is the resourcist approach.F0 3y

restating it, loudly and !ith raised eyebro!s, one is merely begging the uestion, not ma+ing progress

to!ard de$eating resourcism. Sen is begging the uestion by assuming that his opponent, li+e Sen

himsel$, cares about the e#tent o$ real ineuality o$ capabilities but then $oolishly overloo+s one crucial

determinant o$ such ineuality. A resourcist, ho!ever, is not a $oolish capability theorist !ho overloo+s

a crucial determinant o$ ineuality in capabilities. &ather a resourcist is someone !ho believes that any

institutional order should be assessed on the basis o$ the distributive pattern o$ relevant resources it

engenders, !ithout regard to ho! this distribution o$ resources correlates !ith persons' di$$erential

capacities to convert such resources into valuable $unctionings.

4. -he 'eal Contrast) Co%pensation for atural ,ifferences

&egarding the treatment o$ natural human diversity, institutional schemes and the criteria o$ social

justice in$orming them may be said to be de$ective in three distinct respects. 6nly complaints o$ the last

o$ these +inds are controversial bet!een the t!o approaches, and ( !ill there$ore $ocus on them alone.

"ntrinsic discrimination complaints allege that an institutional order is unjustly biased against persons

!ith certain natural $eatures and demand that such bias be mitigated or removed. Such a complaint may

allege overt bias involving social rules or criteria o$ social justice that openly discriminate on the basis

o$ natural $eatures such as s+in color or se#. 6r it may allege covert bias involving $acially neutral social

F/ Sen "neuality #ee$amined , 2F, cf. also F2, FE as !ell as Nussbaum Women and 2uman )evelopment , F, .:here are many other passages !here Sen and Nussbaum deliver this point in the tone o$ a po!er$ul argument.;he re$erence to social characteristics alludes to points :-;, :2;, :/;, :5./;, discussed in the preceding section,!here ( argue that such social characteristics can and should be included in a resource metric. = 6nce again, ananalogous critiue can be made o$ the capability approach, as $ollo!s HAn important and $reuently encountered problem arises $rom concentrating on ineuality o$ capabilities as the primary $ocus o$ attention in the analysis o$ineuality. he e#tent o$ real ineuality in !el$are :or personal goal attainment; !e $ace cannot be readilydeduced $rom the magnitude o$ ineuality o$ capabilities, since our success in attaining our goals depends notonly on our capabilities but also on the particular goals each o$ us has.IF0 Again, in my &a!ls1oriented sense o$ this !ord, not in D!or+in's.

pogge 32



rules or criteria o$ social justice that nonetheless systematically disadvantage persons !ith certain

natural $eatures, such as blac+s, !omen, or the !al+ing1impaired. (nstances o$ such bias !ere discussed

above :section 2, :5.-; and :5.0;;. omplaints alleging :especially covert; bias can be uite di$$icult to

resolve. 3ut the problems they pose are eually serious $or both approaches.

($trinsic discrimination complaints allege that an institutional order unjustly $ails to be :su$$iciently;

biased in $avor o$ persons !ho are su$$ering social disadvantages due to historical or cultural

discrimination based on certain natural $eatures. ?ere the complaint is not that the institutional order is

itsel$ discriminatory, but that it $ails :su$$iciently; to dislodge, or to redress the e$$ects o$, discrimination

e#trinsic to itsel$. o cope !ell !ith such e#trinsic discrimination, an institutional order must be shaped

in light o$ three, possibly competing desiderata to mitigate the more grievous and pervasive e$$ects o$

present and past discrimination, to help dissolve prejudice and discrimination in present practices,

attitudes, or !ays o$ li$e, and to avoid imposing ne! discriminatory burdens on participants !ho are

innocent o$ the discrimination to be alleviated. his comple# tas+ poses eually di$$icult and serious

problems $or resourcists and capability theorists ali+e, and ( can there$ore leave it aside as !ell.

Compensation complaints allege that an institutional order unjustly $ails to be :su$$iciently; biased in

$avor o$ persons !ho are dis$avored by !hat &a!ls has called the natural lottery.F5 hile capability

theorists approve o$ some such complaints and believe that institutional schemes ought to be designed to

even out some natural ineuality, resourcists do not. apability theorists see+ an institutional order

under !hich resources are so distributed that the resulting distributive pattern o$ individual capabilities

= dependent on individual endo!ments and resources = satis$ies their pre$erred criterion. &esourcists,

by contrast, see+ an institutional order under !hich the distributive pattern o$ resource access satis$ies

their pre$erred criterion. hey pay no attention to ho! this distribution correlates !ith the distribution o$

natural $eatures. ?o! can !e ma+e progress to!ard resolving this dispute9

A compelling ad hominem argument can be made on behal$ o$ the capability approach speci$ically

against &a!ls's resourcist criterion. he argument sho!s that the parties in the original position, as

&a!ls himsel$ describes them, !ould $avor a criterion o$ social justice that is sensitive to natural

ineuality in the !ay the capability approach envisions.

&ecall &a!ls's central thesis that !e should morally endorse that public criterion o$ social justice !hich

parties in the original position !ould endorse prudentially. ?e imagines these parties to deliberate on

behal$ o$ prospective participants = but behind a veil o$ ignorance, so that they +no! nothing speci$ic

about the particular persons they represent. he parties are made to assume, ho!ever, that every

prospective participant has three interests, !hich &a!ls sees as closely connected to their role as citi"ens

F5 &a!ls Collected Papers, F2< Theory of +ustice, 0.

pogge 33



in a democratic society :and hence as not being partisan to any particular religious, philosophical, or

ethical !orldvie! or !ay o$ li$e;.

&a!ls calls these the three higher!order :or fundamental ; interests, suggesting both that they are

interests in the content and $ul$illment o$ other interests :li+e second1order desires are desires about

desires; and also that they are deep, stable, and normally decisive. he $irst t!o higher1order interests

are interests in developing and e#ercising t!o moral po!ers,F namely Hthe capacity $or a sense o$

justice ... to understand, to apply, and to act $rom :and not merely in accordance !ith; the principles o$

political justice that speci$y the $air terms o$ cooperation BandC a capacity ... to have, to revise, and

rationally to pursue a conception o$ the good.IFE he third higher1order interest is Hto protect and

advance some determinate :but unspeci$ied; conceptions o$ the good over a complete li$e,IFF that is, the

interest to be success$ul in the pursuit o$ one's $inal ends and aims, !hatever these may be.

No! it is evident that the e#tent to !hich a person's higher1order interests = especially the third = are

$ul$illed depends not merely on her access to resources or social goods but also on her naturalendo!ments. A person !ith energy, intelligence, good health, and good loo+s is better able to advance

her conception o$ the good than someone !ho is sic+ly, gloomy, unintelligent, and ugly. >ven i$ the

parties are made to assume that the institutional order cannot a$$ect such natural human diversity itsel$,

they !ould still !ant this order to promote the ne#t best thing a negative correlation bet!een the uality

o$ individuals' natural endo!ments and their access to resources. (n particular, the parties !ill !ant the

institutional order to ensure that no one scores poorly in regard to both natural endo!ments and

resources access. 3y thus choosing a public criterion o$ social justice pursuant to !hich the naturally

dis$avored are $avored in the distribution o$ social goods and ills, the parties can best protect the higher1

order interests o$ their clients. ?ence they !ould choose such a compensatory criterion = perhaps one

involving a capability metric = over the resourcist criterion &a!ls claims they !ould choose.

($ this po!er$ul argument does not move me to abandon resourcism, it is because ( see compelling

independent reasons $or rejecting the thought e#periment o$ the original position and the purely

recipient1oriented theori"ing it so elegantly encapsulates.F Still, the interests o$ recipients = o$ those

F

&a!ls Political -iberalism, E0< cf . +ustice as *airness, -2.FE &a!ls +ustice as *airness, -F$.< cf . Political -iberalism, -.

FF &a!ls Political -iberalism, E0< cf . +ustice as *airness, -2.F A conception o$ social justice is purely recipient1oriented i$ and only i$ its assessments are based e#clusively onin$ormation about the pattern o$ shares e#pected to e#ist under alternative $easible institutional schemes. (n particular, purely recipient1oriented conceptions attach no moral signi$icance to in$ormation about the character o$the causal relation bet!een institutional schemes, on the one hand, and individual bene$its and burdens, on theother. Such conceptions attach no moral signi$icance, $or instance, to !hether an institutional order gives rise to particular burdens by mandating, authori"ing, or engendering them, or through $ailures to prevent, to deter, or tocompensate. Cf . 4ogge World Poverty and 2uman #ights, 0-$., and Hhree 4roblems !ith ontractarian1

pogge 34



!ho live under the institutional order to be assessed = do matter, o$ course, and ( should there$ore be

able to e#plain !hy ( resist the move $rom a resourcist to a capability metric despite the $act that it

seems to improve participants' e$ ante prospects. he $ollo!ing $our subsections give my reasons.

4.1 How Resourcism Is Sensitive After All to Unequal Work-Relevant Enowments

My $irst reason only dilutes the argument $or pre$erring the capability approach. (t sho!s that !hile the

resourcist approach cannot achieve as nuanced an accommodation o$ human natural diversity, it has a

good bit more to o$$er than nothing at all. o bring the points out in a clear and e$$icient !ay, ( display

them in the conte#t o$ a styli"ed economic scenario in !hich the approaches contrast star+ly.

(magine then a group o$ adults o$ !or+ing age stranded together on an island and no! cooperating in

$ood production. (n as+ing ho! the $ood acuired through their !or+ should be distributed among them

as income, ( assume at $irst that, as it happens, these adults are such that eual income a$$ords them

eual capabilities. heir mental and physical constitutions are similar enough or else the pluses and

minuses cancel out so that there is no vertical overall ineuality. his highly arti$icial case lac+s then

e#actly that empirical $eature !hose treatment resourcists and capability theorists really disagree about.

(n accordance !ith a stipulation made in section -, let us also concentrate on criteria o$ social justice

that are either eualitarian or prioritarian or su$$icientarian or some hybrid o$ any t!o o$ these or o$ all

three. hat space or metric or currency should one !ant to incorporate into such a criterion $or this

simple case9 here are three main possibilities.

6ne straight$or!ard idea is to use the space o$ income.G he obvious objection to such an income

metric is that it ignores variations in the amount o$ !or+ di$$erent persons contribute he assessment o$

$easible alternative institutional schemes is based entirely on the pro$ile o$ income shares :average

annual income over a li$etime, say; each tends to engender, !ithout regard to ho! this income pro$ile is

correlated !ith the pro$ile o$ !or+ contributions. An eualitarian theory using this space !ould $avor an

institutional order under !hich persons can decline to !or+ and still be entitled to an eual share o$ all

the $ood produced by the others. @nder the rules that prioritarian and many su$$icientarian theories using

this metric !ould $avor, there !ould li+ely be di$$erential re!ards as !or+ incentives. 3ut these

incentives !ould be designed so as to ma#imi"e the lo!est average annual income :or, euivalently, so

as to minimi"e the greatest short$all $rom su$$iciency; and !ould there$ore lead to a distribution that

onseuentialist ays o$ Assessing Social (nstitutionsI in >llen )ran+el 4aul et al., eds. The +ust %ociety :ambridge ambridge @niversity 4ress -5;, 20-12. 6ne o$ my critiues there concerns the $act that theoriginal position implicitly endorses the anonymity condition, !hich ( have critici"ed in section - above $or its blindness to group ineuities. Another problem is that purely recipient1oriented theori"ing leads to highlycounterintuitive demands on penal institutions.

G (ncome !ill be understood as net o$ ta#es and net o$ e#penses that must be incurred by those holding the job:e.g., !arm clothing $or that job in Alas+a;.

pogge 35



re!ards less the !or+ o$ those !ho !or+ more. hese people doing more !or+ may !ell complain that

they are receiving less than eual pay $or eual !or+ = and this $or the sa+e o$ giving $ar too good a

deal to those !ho do little !or+ or none at all.

An income metric is certainly de$ensible nonetheless, especially in conjunction !ith a prioritarian

interpersonal aggregation $unction. (n $act, 4hilippe van 4arijs has done an impressive job de$ending,

!ithin the technological and socioeconomic conte#t o$ contemporary continental >urope, a conception

o$ social justice that is prioritarian in the space o$ income.-

&esponding to some remar+s by &ichard Musgrave,2 &a!ls has decided to settle on another possibility

using the space o$ some inde# o$ income and time !or+ed. ?e proposes a speci$ic income=worktime

metric that stipulates leisure as another social primary good and considers those un!illing to put in a $ull

standard !or+day as having e#tra leisure./ his proposal involves some arbitrariness regarding the

length o$ the standard !or+ day and regarding the :intrapersonal; aggregation $unction that sums any

uantities o$ these t!o goods :income and leisure; into a single inde# number. o +eep things perspicuous, let us here consider a more elegant incomeP!or+time metric, !hich avoids both sources o$

arbitrariness by de$ining the inde# simply as the ratio o$ income over hours !or+ed. his de$inition is

problematic in various !ays,0 but it !ill do !ell enough $or our purposes here i$ !e add the assumption

that all islanders have the same $reedom to vary the number o$ hours they !or+ at their respective

personal rate.5

Such an incomeP!or+time metric $aces a milder version o$ the same objection !e sa! aimed at an

income metric %ust as it matters ho! many hours o$ !or+ persons put in, one might say, so it also

- 4hilippe van 4arijs #eal *reedom for ll :Ne! Kor+ 6#$ord @niversity 4ress -5;.

2 &. A. Musgrave HMa#imin, @ncertainty, and the 7eisure rade16$$,I 6uarterly +ournal of (conomics FF:-E0;, 251/2.

/ &a!ls Collected Papers, 055 n. E, cf . 252$.0 Cf . 4ogge #eali/ing #awls, $., -F$. )or e#ample, the assumption that persons !or+ing at a higher hourly!age rate are better o$$ than others !or+ing at a lo!er hourly !age rate may be implausible !hen the $ormercannot choose $reely ho! many hours to put in. (n the real !orld, many jobs are all1or1nothing a$$airs. And being$ree to !or+ either si#ty or "ero hours !ee+ly at O0 per hour may not be better than being $ree to !or+ as many oras $e! hours as one li+es at O/ per hour. And even i$ persons are $ree to vary their hours at !ill, there may still beimportant di$$erences, as t!o persons each earning O0 per hour may $ace uite di$$erent options at the margins6ne may be doing t!enty hours a !ee+ o$ unpaid !or+ :caring $or children or $or a sic+ or elderly person; plust!enty hours a !ee+ at OFPhour !ith the option o$ increasing or decreasing the latter hours, !hile another may be!or+ing t!enty hours a !ee+ at O5Phour plus another ten hours at O2Phour !ith the option o$ increasing ordecreasing the latter hours.

5 his $reedom is, o$ course, uite rare in the real !orld. Also, the hourly !age rate available to a person may besensitive to ho! many hours they !or+ :e.g., on account o$ progressive ta#ation;. And it may also vary $rom yearto year, !hich raises di$$icult issues o$ intertemporal aggregation :being paid O/Phour during one decade, thenO0Phour during the ne#t, and O5Phour during the one a$ter that ma+es $or a less adeuate li$etime share than being paid O0Phour during all three decades;. ( !ill leave such variations aside.

pogge 36



matters ho! hard or productively they !or+ during those hours. his problem is clearest !hen an

incomeP!or+time metric is used !ithin an eualitarian theory. Such a theory $avors an institutional order

under !hich !or+ers are entitled to the same hourly income regardless o$ ho! hard they !or+. o be

sure, prioritarian and many su$$icientarian theories are li+ely to $avor incentives that re!ard hard !or+.

3ut such incentives !ould be designed to ma#imi"e the lo!est income per hour< so !or+ done slo!ly

!ill tend to be better re!arded than the same amount o$ !or+ done more e$$iciently. ?ard1!or+ing people may !ell then complain that they are receiving less than eual pay $or eual !or+ = and this $or

the sa+e o$ giving $ar too good a deal to those !ho !or+ much belo! their potential.

here is a related but di$$erent objection to an incomeP!or+time metric that it inconsistently treats

di$$erently t!o $actors that are really on a par ho! long people !or+ and ho! hard people !or+. hy

should someone !ho !or+s very hard $or only t!o hours each day be treated any di$$erently $rom ho!

she !ould be treated, i$ she stretched the same !or+ over $our hours :i.e., i$ she !or+ed t!ice as long

and hal$ as hard;9

hese objections suggest conceiving the cost o$ cooperation not as time !or+ed, but as productive

contribution, proportional to both ho! long and ho! hard persons are !or+ing. his is the third

possibility an income=contribution metric. A simple e#ample o$ such a metric is the ratio o$ income

over productive contribution. o be sure, productive contribution is not an easy concept to

operationali"e !ithin a comple# net!or+ o$ cooperative interaction A $ree1mar+et system in !hich

contributions are valued at !hat others are !illing to pay $or them can at best be a rough appro#imation,

notoriously undervaluing contributions :by nurses, teachers, homema+ers; that are partly motivated

altruistically. Moreover, actual such systems are o$ten uite un$ree and noncompetitive in some respects

so that it !ould be preposterous to in$er $rom current gross income data that ten @S chie$ e#ecutives

contribute as much to the global social product as one million 3angladeshi seamstresses. Still !e can,

in the conte#t o$ the simple island case, !aive these di$$iculties $or purposes o$ clari$ying theoretically

the more prominent metric options.

( have described a very simple !orld in !hich there are only t!o relevant individual parameters :$ood

and !or+; and in !hich all persons have roughly the same mental and physical constitution, the same

endo!ments, needs, and conversion capacities. And ( have distinguished nine pure criteria o$ social

justice $or this !orld, each constructed o$ t!o components an interpersonal aggregation $unction

:eualitarian, prioritarian, or su$$icientarian; and a metric $or de$ining and comparing individual shares

o mention just the most obvious $actors or+ers $rom poor countries are not $ree to o$$er their services in richcountries. hat they produce cannot be $reely sold in rich countries, but is subject to uotas, tari$$s, anti1dumpingduties, and competition $rom un$airly subsidi"ed rich1country products. And @S >6s play a major role inappointing members to the boards that determine their salaries, stoc+ options, and other per+s.

pogge 3



:income, incomeP!or+time, or incomePcontribution;. hese nine criteria represent the basic options $or

adherents o$ both the capability and resourcist approaches. hese approaches have not parted company

thus $ar because !e have not yet introduced into the story any diversities in overall natural endo!ments

!hich capability theorists deem $it $or compensation. 3e$ore doing so, let me ma+e three orienting

remar+s.

)irst, !e can e#pect that, !hen such vertical natural ineuality ma+es its appearance, resourcists !ill

still endorse one o$ the nine criteria o$ social justice outlined above. apability theorists, by contrast,

!ill !ant to modi$y the criterion they have advocated $or the simple !orld so as to incorporate vertical

natural ineuality. )or no! let's assume they do this not by changing their pre$erred interpersonal

aggregation $unction :eualitarian, prioritarian, or su$$icientarian;, but by modi$ying only the metric

they had advocated $or the simple case. ?ere is an e#ample o$ such modi$ication An eualitarian in the

space o$ income, learning that persons have di$$erent metabolic rates, may change her metric $rom

income to incomePmetabolic1rate. She may then reuire, perhaps, that each islander should share in the

social product in proportion to his or her metabolic $ood needs. hus, i$ the social product is --5 percent

o$ !hat is needed $or all islanders to be minimally !ell nourished, then just rules should assign to every

islander --5 percent o$ !hat he or she needs to be minimally !ell nourished, rather than eual amounts

o$ $ood to each.

Second, how a capability theorist !ill be moved to modi$y her metric !ill depend on !hat metric she

had pre$erred in the absence o$ vertical natural ineuality. (t is there$ore some!hat un$ortunate that the

vie!s set $orth by Sen and Nussbaum are not speci$ic enough to address even the simple case :!here

vertical natural ineuality is assumed absent;. ($ they !ere committed to one o$ the nine possible criteria

:or some hybrid;, then !e could concentrate our e$$orts on e#amining ho! this criterion might be

modi$ied in response to the introduction o$ vertical natural ineuality. &a!ls's choice $rom among the

nine possible criteria o$ social justice $or our simple island !orld seems, by contrast, uite clear ?e

!ould !ant alternative $easible economic schemes to be assessed by a criterion that is prioritarian in a

space o$ income=worktime he islanders should organi"e their economy so that the lo!est hourly

income rate is as high as possible.E

hird, and most important, although resourcists re$use to incorporate re$erence to vertical natural

ineuality into their chosen metric, their nine alternative criteria nonetheless di$$er in the relative

bene$its and burdens they bring to persons !ith various natural endo!ments. )or e#ample, a person !ith

E his statement simpli$ies by leaving aside constraints and e#penses arising $rom maintaining the eual basicliberties and $air euality o$ opportunity as !ell as democratically sanctioned e#penses $or, and opportunity costsarising $rom, public goods such as national par+s. Also, at issue here are not income rates available to persons atsome particular time, but some aggregate o$ such available rates over a person's li$etime :cf . note 5;.

pogge 3!



poor !or+1relevant natural endo!ments !ill $are much better i$ the economy is governed by a

prioritarian incomeP!or+time criterion than i$ it is governed by a prioritarian incomePcontribution

criterion.

ith these remar+s in mind, let us no! set aside our supposition that all islanders o$ !or+ing age have

roughly euivalent natural endo!ments by introducing :!hat capability theorists !ould regard as;

vertical natural ineuality.F

7et us begin !ith the $act that persons di$$er in ho! much effort the !or+ they do reuires o$ them. 3y

He$$ortI ( mean something uite distinct $rom ho! intensively or hard persons are !or+ing. (ntensity is

an objective matter. A person !or+s very hard or intensively !hen her average contribution per hour o$

!or+ is above FG percent o$ her capacity, say. >$$ort, ho!ever, is a subjective matter Some persons

enjoy !or+ing and enjoy !or+ing hard. hey li+e !or+ing G hours a !ee+ and also $ind it uite

$rustrating to !or+ at less than EG percent o$ their capacity. )or them, !or+ing very hard at G percent o$

their capacity is re!arding and reuires no special e$$ort or sacri$ice. 6thers are much happier ta+ing iteasy. hey !or+ only because they must, and they $ind that contributing at above /G percent o$ their

capacity reuires a real e$$ort on their part and that going above 5G percent is positively pain$ul.

Suppose Ann and Sam are eually productive, !or+ing eually hard, $or the same number o$ hours, in

the same job. And suppose Ann li+es her !or+ !hile it is pain$ul $or Sam. Should !e say that their

institutional order is treating Ann and Sam eually only i$ Sam's net income is higher than Ann's9

Arranging such earning di$$erentials may !ell turn out to be practically in$easible because o$ theoretical

di$$iculties about interpersonal comparisons o$ reluctance and practical di$$iculties about dissimulationand perverse incentives. Still, it is interesting to as+ !hether one should !ant to incorporate this natural

di$$erence into one's metric i$ this could be done !ithout undermining its !or+ability.

he !el$arist ans!er is a clear yes. >ualitarians, prioritarians, and su$$icientarians in the space o$

!el$are !ould ideally !ant the institutional order to be sensitive to the larger !el$are losses Sam incurs

$rom !or+ing. An eualitarian !el$arist, $or e#ample, !ill !ant more income to be channeled to Sam,

!hose !or+ costs him greater e$$ort, so that his e#tra pain $rom !or+ is compensated by greater

pleasures available through e#tra income. his reduces the income o$ Ann, !ho !or+s hard !ith littlee$$ort or sacri$ice and can thus reach the same !el$are level !ith much less income.

F e may need the reminder that natural ineualities are de$ined as ones to !hich relevant social $actors do notsubstantially contribute. e might circumvent complications :cf . section /, :5./;, supra; in our simple case bythin+ing o$ the islanders as $reshly thro!n together by $ate and hailing $rom di$$erent parts o$ the !orld so thatthey bear no responsibility $or one another's physical and mental development. (n support o$ their vie!, they might say that dispositions to li+e or to disli+e hard !or+ are largely unchosen bythe persons !hose disposition they are :cf . note F2 above;. ?o! can !e allo! Sam to be penali"ed $or hisdisposition by being paid no more $or his !or+ than Ann9

pogge 3"



e can bring this uestion into a some!hat more perspicuous $orm by means o$ a simple mathematical

model in !hich any person's productive contribution is analy"ed as the product o$ three $actors ho!

long :average annual number o$ hours; she !or+s :7;, ho! hard she !or+s on average :?;, and ho!

good !or+1relevant natural endo!ments she brings to bear :N; R7?N. (t is uncontroversial that

individual shares should be de$ined to be sensitive to income 6ther things being eual, persons !ho

receive more income than others under the same institutional order do count as being treated better bythis order. (t is, as !e have seen, controversial !hether individual shares should be de$ined to be

sensitive to 7 :and perhaps ? as !ell;, so that persons !ho receive more income than others under some

institutional order may nonetheless not count as being treated better by this order i$ they also contribute

more by !ay o$ 7 :or 7?;. he ne! uestion is !hether individual shares should be de$ined to be

sensitive also to !or+1relevant natural endo!ments, so that persons !ho receive more income than

others !ith the same 7 and ? may nonetheless not count as being treated better i$ they also contribute

more by virtue o$ a higher N.

heorists !ho hold, li+e van 4arijs, that individual shares should be de$ined !ithout regard to

contribution $actors 7 and ? !ill $ind this an easy uestion to ans!er ontribution $actor N should also

be ignored. ($ persons !ith lo!er incomes count as !orse o$$ even i$ they choose to !or+ less long and

less hard, then surely persons !ith lo!er incomes must still count as !orse o$$ even i$ they bring to bear

lesser !or+1relevant natural endo!ments. he reason is that income ineualities arising $rom !or+1

relevant natural endo!ments are less justi$iable than income ineualities arising $rom ho! long or ho!

hard persons !or+. hy so9 onsider a scheme o$ rules under !hich only hal$ as much income goes to

one person than to another !ho, because she !or+s longer and harder, gets t!ice as much !or+ done.

hese rules can be justi$ied to the $irst person by pointing out that he is uite $ree to !or+ as long and as

hard, and then to earn as much, as the second one does. 3ut this justi$ication is unavailable $or a scheme

o$ rules under !hich only hal$ as much income goes to one person than to another !ho, because she can

bring to bear greater !or+1relevant natural endo!ments, gets t!ice as much !or+ done :!ithout

!or+ing any harder;.

he uestion is more di$$icult to ans!er $or theorists at the other end o$ the spectrum, !ho endorsed an

incomePcontribution metric $or the simple case. he more libertarian o$ them !ill $eel that an

institutional order is not treating one person !orse than another !ho earns t!ice as much $or t!ice the

!or+ contribution, even i$ the latter's greater contribution is due entirely to greater !or+1relevant natural

endo!ments. hey believe that !hile income ineualities arising $rom !or+1relevant natural

endo!ments may be less justi$iable than income ineualities arising $rom ho! long or ho! hard persons

pogge 41



!or+, they are still justi$iable enough. N may be incorporated in the same !ay as ? and 7, and there is

then no need to modi$y the incomePcontribution metric pre$erred $or the simple case.

A theorist !ho $avors the incomePcontribution metric $or the simple case but believes that persons' lac+

o$ control over their !or+1relevant natural endo!ments is morally too signi$icant to be ignored !ill

naturally be dra!n to an income=2- metric.-G0 3ut this proposal may not be in$ormationally !or+able. (n

the real !orld, it is all but impossible to tell to !hat e#tent observed di$$erences in persons' productive

contributions are due to ho! hard they !or+ or due to their !or+1relevant natural endo!ments. he

problem here is not merely that o$ estimating ho! much more productive each person could be in the job

he or she is in. (n a !orld !ith signi$icant di$$erences in !or+1relevant natural endo!ments, it also

matters ho! much more productive each person could be in other jobs. 4ersons generally have control

over ho! much they contribute to the social product not only through their choice o$ ho! hard they

!or+ in their job, but also through their choice o$ job hey can choose bet!een jobs $or !hich they are

relatively talented and jobs $or !hich they are relatively untalented :that is, bet!een jobs in !hich they

can outper$orm a largerPsmaller percentage o$ their peers;. And they can choose bet!een jobs that tend

to contribute more to the social product and jobs that tend to contribute less. (t ma+es sense to treat such

career choices as an element o$ ? by de$ining ho! hard a person !or+s, during a given !or+ period, as

the ratio o$ !hat she contributed to the social product over the most she could have contributed in this

period. hus, a person !ho contributes all she can in a job she is not good at does not count as !or+ing

hard at all, i$ she could instead have !or+ed in another job in !hich, contributing as much as she can,

she !ould have contributed much more. >stimates o$ ho! hard a person is !or+ing are thus all but

impossible because o$ their dependence on a large number o$ di$$icult subjunctives.

&everting to our simple mathematical model, a person's productive contribution can be measured :or at

least estimated; and is +no!n to be the product o$ three $actors the length o$ time she !or+s :7;, ho!

hard she !or+s on average :?;, and the uality o$ the !or+1relevant natural endo!ments she brings to

bear :N;. R 7?N. No!, since 7 is measurable, it is possible to bac+ out ?N as P7. 3ut it is generally

-G0 Such a metric may also seem implausible. onsider t!o persons !or+ing eually productively in the same job$or the same number o$ hours per year. %ean could be t!ice as productive :in the same or another job;, !hile 3ob

is as productive as he can be. (n this case, 3ob counts as !or+ing t!ice as hard as %ean< and a system o$ rules!ould be treating them eually, by the lights o$ an incomeP?7 metric, only i$ 3ob had t!ice %ean's income underit. = here are also t!o $urther, some!hat less natural possibilities an >f 9>' @ income=contribution metric or an f ;>' @ income=contribution metric, !ith $ - and $ 2 linear increasing $unctions. he $irst o$ these metrics !ouldachieve eual treatment !hen persons have gross pay proportional to their contributions, !hich is then diminished by a percentage proportional to their !or+1relevant endo!ments. he second o$ these !ould achieve eualtreatment !hen persons have gross pay proportional to their contributions, !hich is then diminished by alumpsum ta# :or Hhead ta#I; proportional to their !or+1relevant endo!ments. >ach o$ these $urther possibilitiesentails that, to treat %ean and 3ob eually, an institutional order must ensure that 3ob receives more income than%ean does $or the same productive contribution. he t!o $urther possibilities also both run into the in$ormational problem s+etched in the remainder o$ the paragraph.

pogge 42



not possible to determine ? and N. (t is observable that a person contributes, on average, O2GPh to the

social product, say, but it is not observable !hat her ma#imum average contribution !ould be. ould

she ma#imally contribute O0GPh, so that ?RG.5, or could she contribute O-GGPh, in !hich case ?RG.2, or

could she contribute even more9 his is uite di$$icult to +no! in an economy that is at all comple#.

And it !ould be even more di$$icult to +no! in an economy !here income re!ards are more sensitive to

? than to N and !here persons !ould there$ore have an incentive to dissimulate by playing up their ?and do!nplaying their N.

Jiven this practical complication, theorists dra!n to an incomeP?7 metric thus $ace a trilemma hey

$ind it justi$ied to ma+e income sensitive to ? and 7, and much less justi$ied :i$ at all; to ma+e income

sensitive to N. 3ut because ? and N are empirically inseparable, it is impossible to do justice to all o$

these ordinal relations. 6ne can ma+e income as sensitive to N as income should be to ? and 7, thereby

doing violence to the disparity bet!een N on the one hand and ? and 7 on the other. his horn leads to

the libertarian incomePcontribution metric. 6ne can ma+e income as insensitive to ? and 7 as income

should be to N, thereby doing violence to the same disparity bet!een N on the one hand and ? and 7 on

the other. his horn leads to an income metric la van 4arijs. 6r one can ma+e income as insensitive to

? as income should be to N, thereby doing violence to the disparity o$ ? and N as !ell as to the parity

o$ 7 and ?. his horn leads to the compromise o$ a &a!lsian incomeP!or+time metric, !hich loo+ed

inconsistent in the simple case but no! gains in stature !hen seen as such a practical compromise. he

trilemma sho!s ho! an in$ormational problem can plausibly a$$ect our choice $rom among candidate

public criteria o$ social justice.

oncluding the discussion o$ !or+1relevant natural endo!ments, !e $ind that although resourcists do

not incorporate this natural ineuality into their pre$erred criteria o$ social justice, their choice o$ one

such criterion nonetheless has important implications $or ho! persons !ith diverse !or+1relevant

natural endo!ments !ill $are. ?ere the di$$erence principle accommodates persons !ith lesser !or+1

relevant natural endo!ments in t!o important respects. )irst, it employs an incomeP!or+time metric,

under !hich those !ith lesser !or+1relevant natural endo!ments !ill $are much better, in both relative

and absolute terms, than they !ould $are under an incomePcontribution metric. Second, the di$$erence

principle is prioritarian. his means, on the one hand, that there !ill be income re!ards that may be

inaccessible to those !ith lesser !or+1relevant natural endo!ments. 3ut it also means, on the other

hand, that these incentives are constrained so as to optimi"e the lo!est socioeconomic position in !hich

those !ith poor !or+1relevant natural endo!ments are overrepresented. hus &a!ls can say !ith some

justi$ication Hthe di$$erence principle represents, in e$$ect, an agreement Bthat tChose !ho have been

pogge 43



$avored by nature, !hoever they are, may gain $rom their good $ortune only on terms that improve the

situation o$ those !ho have lost out.I-G5

apability theorists may be moved to concede that a resourcist vie! li+e &a!ls's does cope acceptably

!ell !ith ineualities in !or+1relevant natural endo!ments. hey may also concede that it is acceptable

$or &a!ls to ma+e no allo!ance $or those $rom !hom !or+ reuires greater e$$ort. hey see the main

!ea+ness o$ a &a!lsian vie! in its inability to accommodate other natural ineualities. And they may

even dra! ammunition $rom my uali$ied de$ense o$ a &a!lsian vie! by trying to argue that &a!ls is

inconsistently more concerned to accommodate those !ith lesser !or+1relevant natural endo!ments

than those !ith greater natural needs. ?o!ever, be$ore considering !hether such an argument may be

available, one !ould !ant to +no! more about the alternative that capability theorists !ant to propose.

?o! do they conceive the burdens o$ economic cooperation9 ?o! do they propose to accommodate

ineualities in !or+1relevant natural endo!ments and ineualities in the amount o$ e$$ort persons' !or+

reuires o$ them9 (nso$ar as capability theorists have not o$$ered any criterion o$ social justice speci$ic

enough to ans!er such uestions, their rationale $or pre$erring the capability approach over resourcism

remains obscure.

4.! "#e "reatment of Natural $iversit%& "#e 'ertical-Inequalit% (ro)lem

3y see+ing to shape the institutional order so that the distribution o$ resources it generates compensates

$or natural ineuality, capability theorists regard human natural diversity in vertical terms and human

beings as better or !orse endo!ed. )ores!earing any such compensatory ambitions, resourcists have no

use $or the very idea o$ greater or lesser human endo!ments and can thus endorse a hori/ontal conception o$ human natural diversity. his di$$erence is o$ some conseuence.

?uman beings di$$er $rom one another in countless !ays in their mental and physical $eatures. All our

lives are immensely enriched by this variety. e can best share the delight in our natural diversity !hen

!e thin+ o$ it in hori"ontal terms. e then see persons as di$$erent = in regard to the color o$ their eyes,

$or instance = !ithout believing that having green eyes is either better or !orse than having bro!n

ones. ?istory !ould have gone vastly better i$ prominent natural ineualities :se#, height, s+in color;

had al!ays been seen as hori"ontal.

o be sure, many natural ineualities can hardly be seen as hori"ontal. e spea+ o$ bad posture, bad

health, and bad memory and thereby e#plicitly deny that these are no !orse than their HgoodI

counterparts. And many other predicates carry similarly strong negative connotations (t is !idely

considered !orse to be unintelligent, obese, balding, $rail, tone1dea$, or short than the opposite. hese

entrenched valuations are cultural to some e#tent, and !e may hope to eradicate some o$ them and to

-G5 &a!ls Theory of +ustice, FE.

pogge 44



so$ten others. Still, !e cannot realistically = and perhaps should not = hope $or a !orld in !hich no

one admires some natural $eatures in another. hat such a !orld is out o$ reach is no mis$ortune. )or

partial verticality = con$ined to particular natural $eatures or to particular judges = need not

undermine the shared public sense that human natural diversity overall is hori"ontal.

As !e admire certain $eatures in another = his $ull dar+ hair, beauti$ul eyes, ama"ing memory, regal

posture, or uic+ness o$ mind = !e may also reali"e that !e have mental and physical gi$ts that the

other might admire in us. And !hile !e !ould be !ell pleased to trade our height or memory $or

another's, !e !ould be uite reluctant indeed to trade in our $ull pac+age o$ natural $eatures $or his. o

approve such a trade, to conclude !ith con$idence that the other is better endo!ed all things considered,

!e !ould not merely need to +no! in detail all the myriad $eatures o$ ourselves and o$ the other, but

also ho! to value each o$ these $eatures relative to all the others. 3ut ho! do you compare e#tra hair on

your head !ith e#tra musical talent9 Jood health !ith good loo+s9 Acne !ith melancholy9 A per$ect

memory !ith per$ect teeth9 hat He#change ratesI !ould you use9

(nso$ar as some o$ us have ans!ers to some or even to all o$ these uestions, their ans!ers tend to be

shaped by their o!n $eatures, and normally !ith a bias against the trade Musical persons tend to attach

great importance to being musical, athletes to being athletic, brainy people to brains, and = most

notoriously = beauti$ul people to being beauti$ul.-G his rein$orces our reluctance to trade, our

reluctance to envy. And our a!areness o$ the great diversity in our valuations and o$ the bias in $avor o$

one's o!n endo!ments militates against the idea o$ a socially shared ran+ing o$ persons' overall

endo!ments. 7oo+ing at each person's $ull set o$ endo!ments $rom a shared social point o$ vie! !e can

sustain the conception o$ natural ineuality as hori"ontal. e can thin+ o$ human+ind as displaying a

!onder$ul natural diversity rather than, as !as done through most o$ human history, a natural hierarchy

o$ persons more or less !ell1born.-GE his thought po!er$ully rein$orces the modern ethos o$ democratic

euality.

hile the resourcist approach is supported by this conception o$ natural ineuality as hori"ontal, the

capability approach reuires that natural ineuality be conceived as vertical. hen a capability theorist

a$$irms that institutional schemes ought to be biased in $avor o$ certain persons on account o$ their

natural endo!ments, she thereby advocates that these endo!ments should be characteri"ed as de$icient

and in$erior, and those persons as naturally dis$avored and !orse endo!ed = not just in this or that

-G ?ealth may be an e#ception in this regard in that persons in poor health tend to attach more importance tohealth than healthy people do.-GE Acceptance o$ a resourcist criterion does not entail or presuppose these thoughts in celebration o$ humannatural diversity. My point is that resourcist criteria are, !hile capability criteria are not, compatible !ith thesesentiments.

pogge 45



respect, but overall = not just in the eyes o$ this or that observer, but in the eyes o$ the shared public

criterion o$ social justice.-GF

Although conceiving human natural diversity as vertical is central to the capability approach, its intent is

opposite to the historically dominant one here Aristotle postulated natural hierarchy in order to claim

greater resources $or the better endo!ed, !ho alone, he thought, !ere able to deploy them to!ard a truly

good li$e, contemporary capability theorists postulate natural hierarchy in order to claim greater

resources $or the worse endo!ed so as to ma+e up $or their natural de$iciencies and to provide them

access to the $ull range o$ valuable human $unctionings. hile this concern $or the naturally dis$avored

is noble, it is destructive o$ any social conception o$ human natural diversity as hori"ontal. (n this !ay,

the return to a natural hierarchy constitutes a social loss = not least $or those !ho, singled out $or

special compensatory e$$orts, are characteri"ed as naturally dis$avored or !orse endo!ed.

he capability approach see+s to give to such a person a claim in justice, so she need not as+ $or e#tra

resources as a special $avor, but can come $or!ard proudly, !ith her head held high, insisting onadditional resources as her due. 3ut the capability approach must then provide $or such claims a ground

that subverts the point o$ the e#ercise. (n order to justi$y her claim in justice, the claimant is made to say

that she is overall !orse endo!ed than others. (t is not enough $or her to point to one respect in !hich

she has a special limitation, need, or handicap that renders her !orse o$$ than most others are. )or there

are many other respects in !hich the addressees o$ her claim have special limitations, needs, or

handicaps, other respects in !hich she may be better endo!ed than those she is addressing. o have a

valid claim that she is o!ed compensation as a matter o$ justice, she must present her special limitation,

need, or handicap as one that out!eighs all other particular vertical ineualities and entitles her to count

as !orse endo!ed all things considered.

ould you !ant to claim that your endo!ments are in$erior, overall, than those o$ most others9 ould

you !ant to be o$$icially singled out by your society $or special compensatory bene$its reserved $or the

H!orse endo!edI9 Many disability groups resist such labeling, pointing out that their disability opens

realms o$ human e#perience and interaction that are closed to HnormalI persons. hey see such labeling

as undermining their demand that their condition should not be an admissible ground $or selective

abortions or $or the denial o$ $ertility treatment and reproductive counseling-G or $or assigning them a

-GF As !e just sa!, &a!ls also uses the language o$ vertical natural ineuality :H$avored by natureI;. 3ut suchnotions play no role in the public criterion o$ justice he advocates. And their use could :and, ( thin+, should; becon$ined to conte#ts !here resourcists respond to objections $rom !el$arists and capability theorists. &a!ls mightthen be saying Hhose !hom you call naturally dis$avored and !hom you !ant the institutional order tocompensate !ould actually $are rather !ell under the di$$erence principle even !ithout being singled out $orspecial compensatory bene$its.I

-G ithin Dea$ communities, couples have demanded counseling and support $or their e$$orts to conceive children!ho !ill share their condition.

pogge 46



lo!er uality o$ li$e $or purposes o$ allocating scarce medical resources.--G hey understand that the

$orce o$ the label cannot be neatly con$ined to the grounding o$ compensation claims.

>li"abeth Anderson has appealed to something much li+e the vertical1ineuality problem by !ay o$

sho!ing that the capability approach is superior to D!or+in's vie! and to eualitarian !el$arism and to

variants upon these.--- She succeeds !ith this claim by tailoring her o!n capability vie! in three

signi$icant respects )irst, she $avors a narro!, modest list o$ capabilities HNegatively, people are

entitled to !hatever capabilities are necessary to enable them to avoid or escape entanglement in

oppressive social relationships. 4ositively, they are entitled to the capabilities necessary $or $unctioning

as an eual citi"en in a democratic state.I--2 his contrasts dramatically !ith the !ide1ranging and

ambitious list provided by Martha Nussbaum. Second, Anderson is, despite the some!hat misleading

injection o$ the !ord Heual,I a su$$icientarian Above some threshold, she counts persons as

$unctioning as eual citi"ens even i$ some are $unctioning much better than others in the very respects in

!hich no one is supposed to $all belo! the threshold.--/ hird, Anderson not merely fails to reuire

compensation $or natural ineuality above the threshold, but opposes such compensation. ?er vie! thus

is a hybrid !hich dra!s on a capability vie! $or speci$ying the threshold and $or grounding justice

claims belo! it, and on an :unspeci$ied; resourcist vie! $or grounding justice claims above the

threshold.

?aving appealed to the vertical1ineuality problem, Anderson $ocuses her diagnosis o$ e#isting

injustices on :intrinsic and e#trinsic; discrimination complaints = a diagnosis that resourcists can $ully

share. ?o!ever, consistent !ith the capability component o$ her vie!, she also echoes Sen's mantra

H3ecause o$ di$$erences in their internal capacities and social situations, people are not eually able to

convert resources into capabilities $or $unctioning. hey are there$ore entitled to di$$erent amounts o$

resources so they can enjoy $reedom as euals.I--0 &emar+ably, Anderson seems not to notice that this

move e#poses her o!n vie! to the vertical1ineuality problem she hersel$ had uite polemically pressed

against D!or+in and the !el$arists. he problem sho!s up !hen she reuires the state to give $ree

!heelchairs to the !al+ing1impaired on the ground that they !ould be $unctioning as less than eual

--G

According to a !idely used method, the achievements o$ a society's medical system are measured in terms o$Huality1adjusted li$e yearsI :LA7Ks; or Hdisability1adjusted li$e yearsI :DA7Ks;. his method assigns greatervalue to the li$e years o$ HnormalI than o$ HdisabledI persons and thereby gives the $ormer precedence over thelatter in the allocation o$ scarce medical resources.

--- >li"abeth S. Anderson Hhat is the 4oint o$ >uality9I in (thics -G :-;, 2FE1//E, at /G5$ and /-$$.--2 "bid ., /-.

--/ "bid ., /-F$. Nussbaum !or+s !ith t!o capability thresholds. See her H?uman apabilities, )emale ?uman3eingsI in Martha Nussbaum and %onathan Jlover, eds. Women, Culture and )evelopment :6#$ord 6#$ord@niversity 4ress -5;, F-$$.--0 Anderson Hhat is the 4oint o$ >uality9,I /2G.

pogge 4



citi"ens !ithout them. (t is apparent also in Anderson's discussion o$ the ugly, !ho o$ten lac+ the

capability to appear in public !ithout shame.--5 &ecogni"ing that practices o$ stigmati"ing and e#cluding

the ugly cannot be !holly eradicated in a liberal society, Anderson concludes H@nder these conditions,

the better option may !ell be to supply the plastic surgery.I-- And so the State >ual iti"enship

3ureau o$ Anderson's ideal society !ill be !riting letters to the handicapped and the ugly much li+e the

letters she imagines might be !ritten in the ideal eualitarian society envisioned by D!or+in and the!el$arists HDear Naturally Dis$avored, e have determined that, given your in$erior natural

endo!ments, you must receive special compensatory state bene$its in order to be capable o$ $unctioning

as !hat !e could recogni"e as an eual citi"en....I

apability theorists may !ant to respond to this critiue that it is less stigmati"ing to be given e#tra

resources to!ard enhancing one's other!ise de$icient capabilities than to!ard enhancing one's

other!ise de$icient opportunities $or !el$are or to!ard honoring some hypothetical insurance policy it is

presumed one !ould have purchased. ( loo+ $or!ard to seeing such a response. Mean!hile, ( conclude

that only the resourcist approach avoids such stigmati"ation altogether.

4.* "#e S+ecificit% Require of a Worka)le (u)lic ,riterion of Social ustice

Much intuitive appeal o$ the capability approach derives $rom the $eeling that it is not $air that some

human beings are less healthy, bright, tall, handsome, athletic, or cheer$ul than others or just need more

$ood, !ater, or clothing. ouldn't the !orld be a better place i$ human diversity !ere less vertical, as it

!ere, !ith people more eual in their health and needs, and !ith all people being bright, handsome, and

athletic in their o!n diverse !ays9 )ailing this, !ould it not be good i$ those dis$avored by nature atleast had additional resources as compensation9

his intuitive appeal is misleading. he uestion to !hich resourcists and capability theorists give

competing ans!ers is not about !hat ma+es the !orld better or !orse, but about !hat ma+es

institutional schemes more or less just. his latter uestion is di$$erent in many respects. (t is di$$erent,

$or instance, by involving a complementarity o$ relative gains and losses. ($ persons !ith higher

metabolic rates are to be entitled to $ree supplementary $ood, then !ho !ill be made to bear to cost o$ its

production9 (n thin+ing about the just design o$ such institutional schemes, !e must as+ not merely!hether !e approve o$ the relative gains they bring to the Hnaturally dis$avored,I but also !hether !e

can accept the relative losses they bring to others. And !e must as+ !hether proposed compensation

rules achieve euity among their bene$iciaries !ith their diverse special needs, and euity also among

--5 Anderson considers this capability, originating !ith Adam Smith and o$ten invo+ed by Sen, to be necessary $or$unctioning as an eual citi"en :e.g. ibid ., /2G;.-- "bid ., //.

pogge 4!



their contributors. hus, in addition to the vertical1ineuality problem, capability theorists also $ace the

di$$icult tas+ o$ speci$ying a plausible such criterion o$ social justice in detail.

apability theorists usually leave such uestions aside. Kou can read thousands o$ pages o$ their

!ritings !ithout $inding any hint about ho! compensation is to be $inanced. As !e sa!, Anderson

seems opposed to ta+ing natural ineuality into account above the threshold. 3ut !hy9 ($ justice reuires

special compensatory bene$its $or the naturally dis$avored in proportion to ho! dis$avored they are, !hy

should justice not also reuire special compensatory burdens on the naturally $avored in proportion to

ho! $avored they are9 ($ a just institutional order must treat those !ith an abnormally high metabolic

rate better than those !ith a normal one, !hy must it not also treat those !ith a normal metabolic rate

better than those !ith an abnormally lo! one9 onversely, i$ justice reuires or permits institutional

schemes to treat persons above some capability threshold in resourcist terms :e.g., by ta#ing them

!ithout regard to their particular needs and endo!ments;, then doesn't this sho! that justice is not tied

to a capability metric and that our moral concern to meet the special needs o$ some is not a concern o$

justice9--E

($ each participant's resource entitlements under a just institutional order are to be determined in part by

the overall uality o$ his or her natural endo!ments, then !e need some !ay o$ measuring such overall

endo!ments ho! naturally $avored or dis$avored each participant is. apability theorists !ill base their

measure o$ human natural endo!ments on their pre$erred capability metric &oughly spea+ing, the more

numerous and important are the valuable capabilities that a particular human endo!ment helps persons

to achieve, and the greater the contribution that endo!ment ma+es to this achievement, the more !eight

it merits !ithin the overall measure o$ human natural endo!ment. (t is obvious that it !ould be

e#tremely di$$icult in the contemporary !orld to reach agreement on the $our +ey points on the list o$

valuable capabilities, on ho! to measure achievements !ith respect to each listed capability, on the

relative !eights o$ achievements in regard to di$$erent listed capabilities, and on the relative value o$

diverse overall endo!ments in respect to overall capability achievement.

Martha Nussbaum has gone $urther than anyone to!ard tac+ling the $irst tas+ to!ard $acilitating

agreement on a !idely acceptable list o$ valuable capabilities.--F ?er e#tensive list is thought$ul and !ell

constructed. Some o$ the items she includes = having opportunities $or se#ual satis$action, being able to

e#perience justi$ied anger = may raise eyebro!s. 3ut suppose !e could agree on the !hole list, or one

li+e it. ould !e agree on rules $or evaluating individual natural endo!ments on the basis o$ this list so

--E A prioritarian capability theorist may have an ans!er to this challenge H%ustice reuires the highest possiblecapability threshold. 3ecause a ta# system ta+ing natural ineuality into account is more cumbersome ande#pensive to operate than a conventional one based on income andPor consumption, the latter should be pre$erredon the ground that it yields larger net revenues and thus enables a higher capability threshold.I--F Nussbaum Women and 2uman )evelopment , EF1FG.

pogge 4"



as to compensate $or the greater or lesser suitability o$ participants' overall endo!ments to their

achievement o$ the $ull range o$ valuable capabilities9

(n pressing the enormous di$$iculty o$ the remaining three tas+s, ( am not critical o$ Nussbaum's list, but

only o$ a certain use to !hich it might be put. ?er list o$ capabilities is a use$ul heuristic in the

development o$ a resourcist criterion o$ social justice. (t can help us thin+ o$ all the personal and public

goods and supports that human beings need to $lourish $ully, $rom the school curriculum to the

organi"ation o$ !or+places and organs o$ democratic decision ma+ing. ( have no objections to a list o$

capabilities being used in this role = not as the metric !ithin a public criterion o$ social justice, but as a

use$ul guide in the development o$ such a criterion :cf . note 50 supra;.

&elatedly, an account o$ human capabilities can also play an important evidentiary role. he observed

$act that many persons are lac+ing certain vital $unctionings may be good reason to revise our resourcist

criterion o$ social justice. )or e#ample, i$ !e $ind that many persons living above the international

poverty line :and thus counted as having su$$icient income; are in $act malnourished, !e have strongreason to conclude that something has gone !rong. ($ the observed malnutrition is concentrated in

certain countries or years, !e may need to rethin+ the method used to translate the international poverty

line $rom the base year and base currency into other years and other national currencies. ($ the observed

malnutrition is concentrated among girls and !omen, !e may have to jettison the empirical conjecture

that household resources are normally shared eually among its members and may then need to re$orm

the institutional order so as to achieve a more euitable intra1$amily distribution o$ resources. ($

malnutrition among the Hnon1poorI sho!s no patterns o$ these +inds, !e may conclude that the

international poverty line is set too lo! to e#press a plausible notion o$ su$$iciency.-- (n these diverse

!ays, data about important $unctionings can, as Sen says, provide a crucial chec+.-2G &esources do not,

a$ter all, $igure as ultimate ends in human lives, but as means $or meeting human needs and, ultimately,

$or pursuing all the diverse ends that persons may set themselves.

hile accounts o$ human capabilities can be uite use$ul in the t!o roles just s+etched, ( $ind them

distinctly unpromising in the role $or !hich they are chie$ly intended by their authors as a metric o$

advantage that governs the compensatory $ine1tuning o$ the distribution o$ resources so as to ta+e

account o$ persons' vertically diverse capacities to convert resources into valuable $unctionings. @sing a

list o$ capabilities in this !ay involves grading all citi"ens $or their natural aptitudes to!ard each o$ the

capabilities on the list, determining their speci$ic de$icits, and ensuring that these de$icits are duly

neutrali"ed through suitable compensatory bene$its. >ven !ith a large body o$ rules and a large

-- Cf. Sanjay &eddy and homas . 4ogge H?o! 'ot to ount the 4oorI at !!!.socialanalysis.org.-2G Cf. te#t at note 52.

pogge 5#



administrative bureaucracy, this tas+ could not be accomplished in a !ay that is even appro#imately

euitable.-2-

here Nussbaum boldly $aces the challenge o$ constructing an account o$ valuable capabilities, Sen

s+ips the $irst t!o tas+s and then responds to the third !ith a lesson about the virtues o$ partial

orderings >ven i$ !e cannot agree on the !eight to be attached to each valuable capability :or natural

endo!ment;, !e may be able to agree on a certain range !ithin !hich these !eights should lie.-22 Such a

vague agreement !ould not su$$ice $or deciding, !ith respect to each pair o$ participants in some

institutional order, ho! they should be ran+ed in terms o$ overall capabilities or overall endo!ments,

but it may still su$$ice $or the ran+ing o$ some such pairs or even many.

hile this response is true, it is also unhelp$ul. e are see+ing a public criterion o$ social justice that

tells us ho! an institutional order ought to be designed, and also ho! e#isting institutional schemes $all

short and ho! they should be re$ormed. )or this purpose !e need not merely a partial ordinal ran+ing,

but a complete interval ran+ing. e need to +no! !hat positive or negative resource compensation each participant should be entitled to on the basis o$ his or her speci$ic natural endo!ments. As an

institutional order is $ully speci$ic, so is the public criterion o$ justice underlying it. 6$ course, Sen may

reasonably believe that there is a plurality o$ admissible public criteria o$ social justice e#empli$ying the

capability approach. 3ut, $or all Sen has published on this topic, he has done little to!ard ruling out any

candidates !ithin the vast space o$ conceivable capability vie!s. So $ar, !hat he has mainly proposed is

a ne! language. his language indicates that justice reuires compensation $or the naturally dis$avored

in proportion to ho! dis$avored they are relative to some set o$ valuable capabilities. And it also

suggests that such compensation is to be levied on the naturally $avored in proportion to ho! $avored

they are relative to the same set o$ valuable capabilities. 3ut !ithout an account o$ all these capabilities

and their relative !eights, !e cannot say o$ anyone !hether she is naturally $avored or dis$avored, let

alone ho! much she should o!e or be o!ed.-2/

-2- D!or+in seems even more s+eptical !hen he !rites Hhe idea that people should be eual in their capacitiesto achieve these desirable states o$ a$$airs, ho!ever, is barely coherent and certainly bi"arre = !hy !ould that be

good 9 = and the idea that government should ta+e steps to bring about that euality = can you imagine !hatsteps those !ould be9 = is $righteningI :D!or+in %overeign 5irtue, /G2;.

-22 (.g. Sen "neuality #ee$amined , 010, and Sen )evelopment as *reedom, EF.-2/ Sen occasionally suggests that these are matters $or public discussion :e.g. Sen )evelopment as *reedom,--G;. (ndeed they are A public criterion o$ social justice should not be dictated by one man, ho!ever eminent, but should be adopted democratically a$ter broad and vigorous debate. 3ut this point in no !ay disuali$ies Sen$rom participating in such discussion. ?e has argued $orce$ully against resourcist and !el$arist criteria o$ social justice and in $avor o$ the capability approach. So !hy should !e not be allo!ed to learn which capability vie! is being proposed $or discussion and possible adoption by Sen, !ho has thought so very long and hard about thisuestion9

pogge 51



Kou may thin+ that this is an overstatement. Surely it is clear that people !ith severe disabilities do not

belong among the naturally $avored. 3ut do !e really +no! even this much9 Many persons commonly

categori"ed as severely disabled have gi$ts and talents that militate against the judgment that they are

naturally dis$avored. Stephen ?a!+ing, $or e#ample, is seriously handicapped by a motor neuron

disease. 3ut is it clear that he is !orse endo!ed than most others, that justice reuires us to ta# able1

bodied laborers and cler+s in order to help him come as close as possible to their level o$ physicalmobility9

Kou may thin+ that Stephen ?a!+ing is a rare and special case, that most persons !ith physical

conditions li+e his cannot meet their o!n special needs !ithout receiving compensatory help. 3ut !here

this is true, ( !ould respond, it is o$ten true on account o$ the social injustices highlighted by intrinsic

and e#trinsic discrimination complaints (nstitutional schemes treat their diverse human participants

uite uneually and, in particular, e#clude some o$ them $rom important public $acilities = $rom the

spheres o$ politics, la!, health care, education, employment, consumption, travel, culture, sports, or

entertainment, $or e#ample. orrecting such unjust e#clusionary practices !ill o$ten bring the +ind o$

progress that capability theorists are demanding.-20

Still, the resourcist approach remains vulnerable on t!o counts. here are, $irst, a small number o$ adults

!ho, even in the most inclusive and other!ise $avorable social environment, cannot possibly meet their

o!n most basic needs.-25 6n a resourcist vie!, they have a justice claim to resources euivalent to !hat

others have :in terms o$ education and vaccinations, perhaps;, but no justice claim to additional

compensatory resources. (n a moderately a$$luent society, it is certainly morally imperative that such

persons be $ed, clothed, bathed, sheltered, and cared $or in a digni$ied !ay. And it !ould be no more

unjust to appropriate public $unds $or such a purpose than it !ould be unjust to appropriate public $unds

$or any other morally compelling end. Still, resourcists cannot concede !hat capability theorists !ill

insist on that such persons have a justice claim to compensatory resources. hey can spea+ o$ duties o$

humanity or solidarity instead. >ven i$ these duties are uite stringent, they are also imper$ect in t!o

respects hey do not correlate !ith rights, and they do not prescribe that society ma+e every $easible

e$$ort to!ard compensating natural disabilities. apability theorists, by contrast, $ace a serious di$$iculty

in limiting the social cost o$ the compensatory justice claims they postulate. hether they endorse an

eualitarian, prioritarian, or su$$icientarian criterion, such theorists must conclude that, so long as

additional e#penditures and accommodations can still help raise the lo!est level o$ capability

achievement :belo! the threshold, i$ the vie! is su$$icientarian;, such e#penditures and accommodations

-20 Such as the $ree provision o$ guide dogs discussed near the end o$ section 2.

-25 Cf . >va )eder ittay -oveAs -abor0 (ssays on Women, (uality, and )ependency :Ne! Kor+ &outledge-;, discussing the condition o$ her daughter Sesha.

pogge 52



are reuired by justice. 6n their account, justice commands inde$inite increases in e#penditures on those

!ith the greatest capability short$alls, provided only that such additional e#penditures can still

meaning$ully improve the capabilities o$ at least one such person.-2

here are, second, e#tremely harsh natural environments !here a man !ith a higher metabolic rate

cannot meet his e#tra $ood needs simply by moderating his discretionary spending a bit or by !or+ing a

little overtime. (n such a conte#t, decent people !ill ma+e every e$$ort to ensure that the man !ill have

enough to eat. hey !ill do so as a matter o$ basic human solidarity, reali"ing that, given his

constitution, he simply cannot survive on the $ruits o$ his o!n labor. 3ut does he have a justice claim to

such support, can he demand it as a matter o$ right9 7isten to !hat such a justice claim !ould sound

li+e H( have a higher metabolic rate than you all. As a conseuence, ( need 5G percent more $ood each

day to be eually !ell nourished. Si# hours o$ labor are needed to produce this additional $ood. Kou $ive

there$ore o!e it to me as a matter o$ justice to !or+ an e#tra hour each day along !ith me to produce the

e#tra $ood ( need.I ($ this is not a plausible claim, then !e should recogni"e, ( thin+, that there are moral

reuirements that, ho!ever stringent and categorical, are not demands o$ justice. his recognition !ould

remove both vulnerabilities o$ the resourcist approach.

4.4 "#e (olitical Im+ort of t#e "ransition to a ,a+a)ilit% etric

apability theorists are pleased that their language and approach have been rapidly and !idely adopted

during the -Gs in academic discourse as !ell as in international organi"ations and nongovernmental

organi"ations. 6ne main success typically mentioned in this conte#t is the $act that the @nited Nations

Development 4rogram :@ND4; has designed its statistical tables to $ocus not on countries' per capitagross domestic products :JD4s;, but on their score on the ?uman Development (nde# :?D(;, a

capability metric !or+ed out in collaboration !ith Amartya Sen, !ho served as a consultant to the

@ND4.-2E

7oo+ing more closely at this success, !e $ind that the ?D( does not sho! the superiority o$ the

capability approach. here are t!o singly su$$icient reasons he ?D( does not constitute a plausible

metric $or normative assessment :e.g., !ithin a criterion o$ social justice;. And the ?D( is inconsistent

!ith the o$$icial intent o$ the capability approach, !hich supposedly inspired it.-2 3ut note that this is true only so long as the debate is restricted to criteria o$ social justice !hose interpersonalaggregation $unction is eualitarian or prioritarian or su$$icientarian or some hybrid o$ any t!o o$ these or o$ allthree. 6ther aggregation $unctions might achieve a more plausible tradeo$$ bet!een the interests o$ persons !hosecapabilities are very lo! and very e#pensive to raise and the interests o$ the other participants.

-2E Sen identi$ies himsel$ as the $ather and principal author o$ the ?D( in Amartya Sen, HA decade o$ ?umanDevelopment,I +ournal of 2uman )evelopment - :2GGG;, -E12/ at 22. See also Sen )evelopment as *reedom,#vi, E, /-F$. n. 0-< and similarly Nussbaum Women and 2uman )evelopment , EG. 3oth Sen and Nussbaumma+e clear that, !hile they regard the ?D( as a success$ul step in the direction o$ a $ully adeuate capabilitymetric, they also believe that $urther !or+ remains to be done.

pogge 53



resourcist criterion mandating an institutional order under !hich they !ould be guaranteed a $air share

o$ educational resources.-/G

Primary, %econdary, and Tertiary (nrollment . his component re$lects resourcist thin+ing that

education is an important good $or human beings, and that the moral assessment o$ any institutional

order must be sensitive to the availability o$ this good to the persons living under it.

3)P per capita. his component, too, re$lects resourcist thin+ing = in $act, it re$lects the implausible

resourcist thin+ing o$ten targeted by capability theorists. )or !hat is used here, once again, is an

aggregate $igure that completely ignores the distributive pattern ho! uneually a country's social

product is distributed among its citi"ens. (n countries !here a concern to reduce poverty and ineuality

is at odds !ith the optimal economic gro!th strategy, this component o$ the ?D( thus encourages policy

ma+ers to pursue e$$icient economic gro!th !hile paying no attention at all to euity concerns.

( conclude that o$ the $our ?D( components, t!o are plainly resourcist. And three ?D( components are

aggregative in a !ay that = especially in poor countries = is highly disadvantageous to the naturally

dis$avored to those !hose li$e e#pectancy is most e#pensive to e#tend, to those !hose literacy is most

e#pensive to achieve, and to those least able to succeed in a :typically ruthlessly competitive; economy

geared to!ard ma#imi"ing JD4 gro!th. his contradiction bet!een the theory o$ the capability

approach and its ?D( instantiation = in regard to li$e e#pectancy, adult literacy, and per capita JD4 =

is obvious.-/- So one !onders ho! it can go unnoticed, both in the vast literature advocating the

capability approach, in !hich re$erences to the ?D( are commonplace, and in the literature speci$ically

on the ?D(.-/2

A $urther obvious $la! in the ?D( is that it aggregates $irst !ithin each component and then across

components. As a conseuence, a country's ?D( score is not in$luenced by !hether ineualities in its

$our components mitigate or aggravate one another. his is implausible. An institutional order is surely

more unjust i$ these ineualities aggravate one another, that is, i$ those !ith the lo!est li$e e#pectancy,

those !ho are illiterate, those !ho lac+ schooling, and those !ith the lo!est incomes are al!ays the

-/G Cf . 4ogge #eali/ing #awls, -E/1F-.-/- Note -2 sho!s a similar contradiction bet!een the capability approach and its JD( implementation in regardto li$e e#pectancy. (n addition, the JD( aggregates its three measures o$ gender ineuity :li$e e#pectancy at birth,education, and income; !ithout regard to !hether these ineuities mitigate or aggravate one another A societydisplaying substantial ineuities in all three dimensions scores no !orse on the JD( i$ all three ineuities $avormen than it !ould do i$ some ineuities $avored one se# and some the other :@ND4 2uman )evelopment #eport

;<<;, 255$.;.

-/2 )or a thorough revie! o$ the criticisms that have been made o$ the ?D(, see ate &a!orth and David Ste!artHritiues o$ the ?uman Development (nde#I $orthcoming in Sa+i+o )u+uda 4arr and A.. Shiva umar, eds. #eadings in 2uman )evelopment0 Concepts, &easures and Policies for a )evelopment Paradigm :Ne! Delhi6#$ord @niversity 4ress 2GG/;.

pogge 55



global economic gro!th (neuality increased at a /.G0 percent average annual rate during the -G1E

post1old1ar globali"ation period and it increased at a 2.0E percent average annual rate during the

entire -G1E postcolonial period = $aster than the 2.- percent average annual increase in the last

colonial period :--/1G; and much $aster than the -.0- percent average annual increase during the

heyday o$ colonialism :-F2G1--/;. (t appears that, as ineuality increases, the strong become ever more

capable o$ tailoring the rules to their o!n advantage.

e see here a great bene$it o$ the resourcist approach. (t is in the space o$ resources, not that o$

capabilities, that persons and countries put $or!ard competing claims. o be sure, this competition is not

a simple constant1sum game !here one party can gain only as much as others are losing. Still, most o$

the global rules negotiated in international con$erences have $easible alternatives that !ould be better $or

some and !orse $or others. (n particular, the economic ground rules negotiated !ithin the orld rade

6rgani"ation :6; have plausible alternatives that !ould have been better $or the global poor and

!orse $or the rich countries, !ho have managed to insist on the !orld!ide recognition o$ property rights

in seeds and drugs as !ell as on various grand$athering clauses that allo! them to protect their mar+ets

by imposing special uotas, tari$$s, and anti1dumping duties and by providing large subsidies to

domestic producers :especially in agriculture;.-/F

Among economists, these issues = ho! global ineuality is steadily increasing and ho! global

institutional arrangements are e#acerbating poverty and ineuality = are taboo. (n $act, the @ND4 too+

heavy $la+ $or printing the simple statistic cited t!o paragraphs bac+. 3y comparing countries in terms

o$ their ?D( scores, the @ND4 no! avoids such unpleasantness. (ts tables o$ countries and their ?D(

scores :ranging $rom Nor!ay's G.02 to Sierra 7eone's G.2E5; are o$ merely ordinal signi$icance and

thus provide no in$ormation about ineuality or ineuality trends. ?D( scores convey no sense o$ !hat

li$e is li+e $or the majority o$ people in a poor country. And they encourage the thought that each

country is solely responsible $or its o!n development = !hich thought is rein$orced by omnipresent

tal+ o$ states achieving or not achieving the @N Millennium argets

:!!!.un.orgPmillenniumPdeclarationPares552e.htm, article -; !ith the rich countries at best mentioned

only as potential donors o$ aid.-/

-/F "bid., Jeneral (ntroduction. >uropean co!s, $or e#ample, are subsidi"ed at about O-,GGG per co! per year:!!!.guardian.co.u+PcountryParticlePG,2E/,EF5E,GG.html;.

-/ @ND4 2uman )evelopment #eport ;<<;, v, 2, -0, -E$, 2-12, /-, and so on. he deep errors perpetuated by$ormulating appeals to the rich countries in terms o$ aid, donations, trans$ers, assistance, and redistribution arediscussed in homas . 4ogge H8Assisting' the Jlobal 4oorI $orthcoming in Deen . hatterjee, ed. The (thics

of ssistance0 &orality and the )istant 'eedy :ambridge ambridge @niversity 4ress 2GG/;. hile the @NMillennium goals and their discussion in the @ND4 2uman )evelopment #eport s rein$orce this error, the latterhave also $eatured compelling chapters on ho! economic policies by the rich countries and internationaleconomic rules pushed through by them have had devastating e$$ects in the developing !orld. See e.g. @ND4 2uman )evelopment #eport ;<<9 :6#$ord 6#$ord @niversity 4ress 2GG-;, chapter 5, and @ND4 2uman

pogge 5



he -Gs have been a stunning $ailure in terms o$ global poverty reduction. Despite a huge post1old1

ar peace dividend-0G and unusually strong economic gro!th, the rich countries have drastically

curtailed their $oreign aid-0- and used their bargaining po!er to impose highly uneven terms o$ trade on

the poorer countries.-02

he result o$ the ruthless use o$ their vastly superior e#pertise and bargaining po!er is plain to see in

almost any metric >ven the @S government allo!s that H!orld!ide /0,GGG children under age $ive die

daily $rom hunger and preventable diseases.I-0/ hese are 22 percent o$ all human deaths, -2.0 million

annually.-00 ith adults included, easily one third o$ all human deaths are $rom poverty1related causes.-05

>ven the orld 3an+'s highly uestionable method o$ counting the poor sho!s that, bet!een -FE and

-F, the number o$ poor has not declined relative to the orld 3an+'s absurdly lo! international

poverty line o$ O-Pday and has even increased by some -G percent relative to its O2Pday line (n -F, the

orld 3an+ counted nearly -.2 billion people as living belo! O-Pday, /G percent belo! this line on

average, and it counted 2.F billion people as living belo! O2Pday, 0/ percent belo! this line on

)evelopment #eport ;<<;, /- Hglobal trade is highly regulated, !ith the po!er$ul holding s!ay and the playing$ield $ar $rom level.I-0G A$ter the end o$ the old ar, the developed countries !ere able to reduce their military e#penditures $rom 0.- percent o$ their combined JD4s in -F5 :@ND4 2uman )evelopment #eport 9::B :Ne! Kor+ 6#$ord@niversity 4ress -F;, -E; to 2.2 percent in -F :@ND4 2uman )evelopment #eport ;<<< :Ne! Kor+6#$ord @niversity 4ress 2GGG;, 2-E;. ith their combined JD4s at O20,5/ billion :@ND4 2uman )evelopment

#eport ;<<;, -/;, their -.1percent annual peace dividend came to about O0E billion in the year 2GGG.-0- Aggregate 6DA $or 2GG- !as O5-.0 billion :!!!.oecd.orgP>NPdocumentPG,,>N1document1-51nodirectorate1

no1-2120/F1-5,GG.html;, do!n $rom O5/.E billion in 2GGG :@ND4 2uman )evelopment #eport ;<<;, 2G2; andO5.0 billion in - :@ND4 2uman )evelopment #eport ;<<9, -G;. he @S has led the decline by reducing6DA $rom G.2- to G.-G percent o$ gross national product in a time o$ great prosperity culminating in enormous budget surpluses. :(n coming years, 6DA is set to increase in the a$termath o$ September -- = the $igure $or2GG- already includes a special OGG million @S disbursement to!ard stabili"ing 4a+istan.; Despite acommitment made at the -5 orld Summit $or Social Development to allocate 2G percent o$ 6DA to basicsocial services :!!!.un.orgPesaPsocdevP!ssdPagreementsPpoach5.htm, hapter 5, Article FF:c;;, only F percent orO0 billion are actually so allocated :!!!.oecd.orgPpd$PMGGGG/GGGPMGGGG/-//.pd$, able 2;. he remainder isspent to bene$it agents more capable o$ reciprocation = domestic $irms, $or e#ample, or strategically importantgovernments. hese priorities are evident !hen one loo+s !here 6DA goes (ndia, !ith more poor people thanany other country, receives 6DA o$ O-.5G annually $or each o$ its citi"ens< the corresponding $igures are O02.EG$or the "ech &epublic, O50.5G $or Malta, O.5G $or yprus, OE.G $or 3ahrain, and O-/2.0G $or (srael :@ND4

2uman )evelopment #eport ;<<;, 2G/15;, !hich have -- to 0G times the JD4 per capita o$ (ndia :cf . note -/0;.yprus, Malta, and (srael are listed as high1income countries :ibid ., 2EG;.

-02 See 4ogge World Poverty and 2uman #ights, $or details.-0/ @nited States Department o$ Agriculture .%. ction Plan on *ood %ecurity :!!!.$as.usda.govPicdPsummitPpressdoc.html;, -, iii.-00 he @ND4 suggests that today there may actually be -0.E million annual child deaths in the developing !orld:@ND4 2uman )evelopment #eport ;<<;, 2;. his !ould be over 2 percent o$ the total annual death toll o$55.E million. Cf . orld ?ealth 6rganisation The World 2ealth #eport ;<<9 :Jeneva ?6 4ublications 2GG-<!!!.!ho.intP!hrP2GG-;, -00.-05 "bid ., Statistical Anne#, able 2 :-001;.

pogge 5!

Pogge-Can the Capability Approach Be Justified

Documents

Transcript of Pogge-Can the Capability Approach Be Justified