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PlurinationalDemocracy:StatelessNationsinaPost-SovereigntyEraMichaelKeating

Printpublicationdate:2001PrintISBN-13:9780199240760PublishedtoOxfordScholarshipOnline:November2003DOI:10.1093/0199240760.001.0001

NationsandSovereigntyMichaelKeating(ContributorWebpage)

DOI:10.1093/0199240760.003.0001

AbstractandKeywords

Theconceptsofnationandstatemustbeseparatedconceptually.Nationshouldbeunderstoodasanormativeconceptbasedonaclaimtoselfdetermination.Thisdoesnotmeanthecreationofastate,butrathertherighttonegotiateone'sstatuswithinthestateandconstitutionalorder.Statesovereignty,alwaysadifficultconcept,isbeingtransformedbychangesinthestateandtransnationalintegration.Thisopensupthepossibilityofsharedanddividedsovereigntyasawayofreconcilingnationalityclaims.

Keywords:constitution,nation,nationalityclaims,selfdetermination,sharedsovereignty,state,statesovereignty,transnationalintegration

NationsandNationalitiesThenationalitiesquestionisbothanoldquestionandanewone.ItwasamainpreoccupationofthepoliticsofnineteenthcenturyEuropeassubmergedpeoples,

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especiallyinthelargeempires,assertedtheirnationhoodandtherightofselfdetermination.Thisphaseculminatedinthepeacesettlementsof191822,perhapsthemostcomprehensiveefforttodatetoresolvetheissuebyaligningtheboundariesofnationswiththoseofstates.Thefailureofthissolutionwassoonapparentassuccessorstatesstruggledwiththeimpossibilityofdrawinglinesonmapstoseparatediscretenationalgroups.Afteragenerationinwhichnationalityclaimsweresubordinatedtothegeopoliticalimperativesofthecoldwarandtoanewsystemofimperialdomination,theissuehasreemergednotonlyinthenewdemocraciesbutintheoldstatesofthewest.

Likeearlierwavesofnationalism,thecurrentonehasthrownintoquestionthepoliticalorderwithinandamongstates;ithasalsoconfoundedagenerationofmodernizationtheoristswhosawtheconsolidatednationstateastheendpointofpoliticaldevelopment.Forsome,thisresurgenceofstatelessnationalismstandsincontradictiontothepredominantmoderntrendsofglobalizationandtransnationalintegration,whichmighthaveheraldedtheendofthenationstate,orevenofnationalismitself(Hobsbawm1990).InEurope,itseemscuriouslyatoddswiththeconstructionofanewandwiderpoliticalorder,oftenreferredtoassupranationalism,whichisseenastheculminationoftheverytrendtofunctionalintegrationthatiscreditedwithproducingthenationstate.Morerecentappreciations,however,seethetwotrendsasconsistent,underminingthenationstatesystemfromaboveandbelow,andencouragingminoritiestoexplorenewpossibilitiesforautonomywithintheemergingglobalorder(KeatingandMcGarry2001).

Normativeevaluationsofthenewnationalismalsodiffer.ModernistslikeDahrendorf(1995,2000)seethelarge,consolidatednationstateastheessentialframeworkofdemocracy,liberalism,andsocialsolidarityanddeploreanyreversiontotribalism(Walzer1999).Somepostmodernists,ontheotherhand,celebratetherevivalofparticularismandtheendofaconstrainingandfalseuniversalism,whichmerelyservedasamaskfordomination.Neotraditionalistssimilarlyseekmoreauthenticformsof(p.2) identityandcommunitystrippedofthefalseuniformityofthestate.Agrowingschoolofthought,however,seesnationalityasanenduringformofpoliticalorderandacceptsthattheremaybemultiplewaysofaccessingtheuniversalvaluesofliberalism,democracy,andsolidarity(Kymlicka1995;Tully1995).Thenationstateaswehaveknownitsincethenineteenthcenturyismerelyonewayoforganizingthepolity,andchangesintherelationshipamongterritory,identity,politicalinstitutions,andfunctionmayopenupnewpossibilitiesforthefuture(Keating1998a,2000a).Nationalityasaformofcollectiveidentityisneithermorenorlessnaturalthanothers,andisconstantlymadeandremadeinthecourseofpoliticalexperience.Thecentralquestionofthisbookishowtoaccommodatenationalityclaimswithintheemergingpoliticalorder,whilerespectingtheuniversalprinciplesofliberalismanddemocracy.Thisisnotanattemptatauniversalaccountofhowtoreconcileallformsofcollective,cultural,oridentitybasedclaims.Onthecontrary,Iarguethatnationalityclaimsareaparticulartypeofdemand,requiringspecificformsofrecognitionandaccommodation.

Academicanalyseshavefollowedtwoprincipalapproachestotheissueofnationalityclaims.OneisgroundedinaPlatonicformofuniversalreasoning,whichseekstoidentify

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generalprinciplesforrecognizingclaimstonationalityandselfdetermination.Theotherismorepragmaticandempirical,andconcentratesonconflictresolutionandproblemsolving.Theformerisgiventogeneraltheories,thelattermoretocasestudiesandspecificities.Neitherprovidesanentirelysatisfactoryanalysis.Purelydeductiveanduniversalizingapproachesneverseemtofitallthecases,areabstractedfromtheirhistorical,cultural,andempiricalcontexts(Requejo1998),anddonoteasilylendthemselvestoproblemsolvingwherenationalityclaimsareinconflict.Norisitalwayseasytoseehowsomeoftheseuniversalistargumentscouldbedeployedinpoliticaldebate.Mostpoliticalargumentsareaddressedtothecitizensofapolityandconcernwaysinwhichitmightorganizeitscommonaffairs.Whentheboundariesofthepolityitselfareinquestion,itisdifficulttoseetowhomtheseargumentsareaddressed,unlessweimaginesomenationlessjurychargedwitharbitratingclaimsandassessingarguments.Itisstrikinghowmanytheoreticalworksonselfdeterminationinvoketheinternationalcommunityasarbiter,asthoughthiswerealessproblematicconceptthannationhooditself.Frequentlythestatusquoistakenasamorallyneutralstartingpointwiththeminoritiesportrayedastheexceptionalistsorviolatorsofuniversalorder.Yetanystatusquoembodiesapowerstructure,whichallocatesinfluenceandresourcesinmoreorlessunequalways,andtosubjecttheminoritiestothetestofuniversalnormswhileexemptingthemajorityisitselfaviolationofuniversalvalues.Ontheotherhand,purelyadhoc,pragmaticapproachestothenationalitiesquestionhavetheirproblemstoo.Thereisalargeliteratureonmanagingoraccommodatingnationalityclaimsnotonthebasisofabstract(p.3) idealsbutonsociologicalrealities.Theproblemhereisthatoftenethicaloruniversalprinciplesdisappearaltogetherinfavourofsolutionsthatwork.Consociationalism,forexample,hasoftenbeencriticizedforstiflingdemocraticparticipation,freezingethnicboundaries,andplacingexcessivepowerinthehandsofgroupleaders.

Athirdapproachcombinestherealistone,acceptingthefactanddiversityofnationalism,withtheidealistoneandisguidedbynormativecriteriainaddressingit(Miller2000).Thisinvolvestakingnationalistclaimsseriously,totheextentofpenetratingtheirownlogicandmoralreasoning,inordersubsequentlytoassesstheircompatibilitywithothernormativeorders(Tully1995).Itfurtherrequiresthattheanalystnotsomuchpositionhimorherselfabovetheworldsoastomakesupposedlycontextfreejudgements,butratherstandintheshoesoftheother(Laforest1998)forawhileasthestartofintersubjectivedialogue.

Thisbookfollowssuchanapproach,combiningnormativetheorizingandempiricalanalysis.Itpresentsnationalityconflictsasaformofpoliticstobenegotiatedcontinually,ratherthanasaproblemtoberesolvedonceandforall,afterwhichnormalpoliticscanresume.Nationalityclaimsareaformofidentitypoliticsandhavemuchincommonwithothermanifestationsofthepoliticsofdifference,likemulticulturalismorfeminism.Yetthereisanimportantdifference.Thisisnotbecausethenationcanbeobjectivelydistinguishedasasociologicalcategory;despitethemillionsofwordsexpendedonthistask,ithasprovedimpossible.Ratheritisbecausenationalityclaimshaveaspecialstatus,carryingwiththemamoreorlessexplicitassertionoftherighttoselfdetermination.

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Theseclaimshavebeenbasedonthreegrounds.Forsome,thenationisaselfevidentsociologicalcategory1oranimmanentcommunityoffate.Thiskindofargument,commonamongromanticnationalists,hastendedtofadeinimportanceaswenowknowtoomuchabouthownationsareconstructed.Nationaliststhemselveshavehadtofaceuptosocialanddemographicchange,whichconstantlyreshapesthecontoursofthenation.Theprimordialviewis,moreover,profoundlyundemocraticinitsimplicationssinceithasgivensanctiontopresstheinterestsofthenationagainstthewishesofitspeople.Inanycase,thereisamissinglinkintheconnectionbetweenasociologicalcategoryandthemoralrighttoselfdetermination(Norman1998).

Thetwootherclaims,however,havesurvivedandareexploredinthefollowingchapters.Thesearethatthenationishistoricallyconstitutedasaselfgoverningcommunity;andthatitspeopleseethemselvesasanationandwishtodeterminetheirfutureasacollectivity.2Theargumentthatwe(p.4) cannotderivearightofselfdeterminationfromthefactsofnationality(Norman1998)isthusbesidethepointsinceselfdeterminationispartofthenormativecontentofnationalityitself.3Itisnotthatallclaimstoselfdeterminationareclothedinthevocabularyofnationality.TheSwisscantonsclaimoriginalrightsunderpinnedbystrongidentities,butwithoutresortingtothelanguageofnationhood.4Sincethelatenineteenthcentury,however,thenationalityprinciplehascarriedsuchforcethatclaimstoselfdeterminationhaveusuallyinvokedit.Inthelatenineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturies,forexample,theCatalanmovementmovedrapidlyfromregionalismtonationalism,whiletheBasquemovementdevelopedfromaclaimtoprovincialforalrightstoafullnationalityclaim(HernndezandMercad1981;Colomer1986;delaGranja1995;Gurrutxaga1996;Beriain1999).Acceptanceofthenationasahistoricallyconstitutedcommunitydoesnotcommitustoaformofprimordialism,assomecriticsofnationalismhaveassumed,dismissingnationalistmovementsasinventionsofthenineteenthortwentiethcentury.Nordowehavetogetintofutileandendlessargumentsaboutexactlywhenanationbecamesuch,sincenationsareconstantlybeinginventedandreinvented.Linkingnationalitytotheselfdeterminationclaimalsofreesnationalitiesfromhavingtodemonstratethattoexist,letaloneselfdetermine,theymustsomehowbedifferent,wherenormalityisdefinedbyreferencetotheencompassingstate.Suchargumentshavebeenusedtocatchnationalitiesinalogicaltraptheycannotclaimselfdeterminationwithoutprovingthattheyaredifferent,yetiftheyaredifferenttheyarecondemnedasethnicparticularistsunworthyofselfdeterminationrights.

Thesetwoarguments,aboutbeingahistoricallyconstitutedcommunityandhavingaconsciousnessofnationhoodandselfdetermination,cannotbereducedtoasinglelogic,andnationalmovementshaveappealedtooneorotheraccordingtocircumstance.Neitheroftheseclaimsisuncontested.Someopponentsregardhistoricrightsasanirrelevanceatbest,arecipeforreactionatworst.Othersdismisstheideaofcollectiveselfdeterminationasaviolationoftheprimacyoftheindividual.Forthemselfrecognitionandselfdeterminationareatbestanextensionofindividualrights,underwhichanygroupofpeoplecanconstitutethemselvesasaselfgoverning(p.5) community(e.g.Beran1998).Atworsttheyarearecipeforanarchy,invitingtheproliferationofspurious

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nationalityclaimsorbalkanization.Manycriticshaveclaimedthatnationalselfdeterminationisanunworkablepropositionsincethenumberofnationsorpotentialnationsintheworldrunsintothousands(Gellner1983;Buchanan1991).Theseobjectionsareusuallybasedonafundamentalcategoryerror,whichidentifiesnationswithethnicgroups,5anerrorIhavediscussedatlengthelsewhere(Keating1996a,2001a;seealsoMiller1995andTamir1991).Thereisasimilarconfusionbetweenstatelessnationsandnationalminorities(Seymouretal.1998).Thelatteraregroupslocatedterritoriallywithinawidernationalitybutwhodonotidentifywithit,oftenbecausetheyidentifywithagroupelsewhere,includingoneinanotherstate.Theyhavethusnotconstitutedthemselvesasadistinctgroupclaimingselfdetermination.

Nationalitymayoverlapwiththesecategories,butitinvolvesmuchmorebywayofsocialstructuresandclaimstoselfregulation.Primordialassertionsregardingtheantiquityofnationsareeasytodebunk,6yetnationscannotmerelybewishedintoexistence,butarebuilt,oftenpainfully,overtime.Theyrequireaminimumofcredibilityinordertomobilizesupport,sustainacampaign,andgetattentionandrecognitionwithinandbeyondthestate.Norarenationalityclaimsforthefrivolous.Renan(1992),whorejectedprimordialistexplanationsofnationality,madeclearthattheyrequireaconstantworkofcreationandrenewal.Thisiscostlyanddivertsenergyfromothertasks.Whileclaimingtherightofselfdeterminationmightappearapurebenefit,itentailsapsychologicalcostandtoleranceofuncertaintyandambiguity,aswesee,forexample,incontemporaryQuebec.Nationbuildingisnotforthefrivolousorthosewhopreferthequietlife.ThefailureoftheItalianNorthernLeaguetocreatethenationofPadania,despitetheavailablerawmaterial,illustratestheproblemsofinventingnations(Biorcio1997).Nationsarenotmereculturalcommunitiesbutalsosociopoliticalentitieswithawiderangeofsocialinstitutionsandasharedpoliticalidentity(Seymour1999),thoughthesedonotneedtocoverthewholerangeofstatelikeactivities.Fearsofbalkanizationmayalsobeoverstated.Itmaybethatitispreciselytheinternationalnormagainstdisruptingstatesandthepressuresbroughtbyhoststatesthemselvesthatconvincesstatelessnationaliststhattheirprojectistoocostlyamorepermissiveattitudetonationalclaimswouldencouragethemtoproliferate.Yetthiswouldstillrequirenationalistleaderstoofferbenefitstotheirfollowersintheformofmaterialrewardsorpsychologicalsatisfactions,andthereisnoreasontobelievethatthiswouldalways(p.6) succeed.7Secessionsarecostlymattersandaremorelikelytostemfromdirethreatsorcrisesthanfrommereopportunism.8

Sonationalityclaimsaretobetakenseriouslyasaformofpolitics,butthereisnouniversalformulaforaddressingthem.Everynationalityclaimwillhaveadifferentbalanceofelements,whichmaychangeovertimeandaccordingtocircumstance.Indeed,partofthenationalityclaimitselfisusuallybasedonthesupposeduniquenessofthenation.Thediversityofbothcasesandclaimsmayconfounduniversalisticorapriorireasoning;yetinaliberalanddemocraticsocietywecannotsimplyabandonuniversalvalues.Suchconsiderationsindicatetheneedtolookatclaimsontheirowntermsbutalsotheircompatibilitywithotherclaimsandprinciples,includingthoseofthestate.ThisformofreasoningissimilartoTully's(1995)conceptionofconstitutionalismwhich,

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drawingonWittgenstein,emphasizesinterpretation,convention,andpluralism,whilerecognizingoverlaps,similarities,andgeneraltypes.Byexaminingnationalityclaimsandconstitutionalpractice,wealsoavoidinventingunnecessaryproblemslikewonderinghowwecouldcopeifeveryethnicgroupintheworldwasalloweditsownstate,orhowauniversalprincipleofselfdeterminationcouldproduceadefinitiveoutcome.Asweshallsee,inthefourstatesdiscussedherethereisareasonablycleardistinctioninpractice,ifnotinprinciple,betweenstatelessnationsandotheridentitygroupings.Takingnationalityclaimsseriouslyintheirowntermsalsofreesusfromanintellectualincubusthathasincreasinglypreventedunderstanding,thatisthemythofthenationstate.Theintegratednationstatehasforsome200yearsmonopolizedourunderstandingofconstitutionalismandforcedotherclaimstojustifythemselvesinrelationtoit;andithasencouragedtheidentificationofselfdeterminationwiththeconstitutionofaseparatestate.Neitherclaimisvalidinalongerhistoricalperspective,and,astheglobalpoliticalorderchanges,thestateitselfisincreasinglydemystifiedanddeconstructed,openingupnewavenuesfornationalaccommodation.

StateandNationInaratherlooseway,thetermsnationandstatearesometimesusedsynonymouslyorcombinedinthecompoundnationstate,atermusedin(p.7) internationalrelationstodenoteasovereignentity,oftenwithoutanyspecificreferencetonationality.IntheFrenchtraditiontheidentityofstateandnationaresoconfoundedthatthetermscansometimesbeusedinterchangeably.9Amorecommonassumptionisthatnationalityclaimsentailaligningtheboundariesofthestateandthenationwheretheydonotpresentlycoincide.Atonetimethisfeaturedamongthedefiningcharacteristicsofnationalismitself(itdoessoinSmith1971,butdisappearsfromhislaterwork).Hobsbawm(1990:910)istrenchant,insistingthatanationisasocialentityonlyinsofarasitisrelatedtoacertainkindofmodernterritorialstate,thenationstate,anditispointlesstodiscussnationandnationalityexceptinsofarastheyrelatetoit.Evennowtherearewriters,especiallyinthedisciplineofinternationalrelations,whoinsistthatnationalityclaimsareclaimstoastateandthat,wherenationalistleadersdisavowthis,theymustcunninglybedisguisingtheirlongtermobjectives;anygoallessthanstatehoodindicatesthatwearedealingwithmereregionalismorethnicassertion.Thisisyetanotherattempttoforcesocialrealityintotheprocrusteancategoriesoftheory.Itisalsoapieceofteleologicalreasoningsincetheclaimforstatehood,theendprocessofnationalistmobilization,definestheprocessitself.Itrulesoutbydefinitionalfiataninvestigationintothecircumstancesinwhichnationalitiesornationalmovementsmightdecidewhethertogoforfullstatehood.Perhapsmostimportantlyofall,itrefusestorecognizesocialrealitiessuchasthefactthatvirtuallytheentirepopulationofScotlandrecognizesScotlandasanationwhileonlyaminoritywantittobecomeastate,ortheexistenceofstatelessnationalismsinseveralmodernstates(Keating1997;Guibernau1999).Canada'saboriginalpeopleshaveassumedthetermnationtoindicatetheirpossessionoforiginalrightstoselfdetermination,butquitereasonablyhavenointerestinstatehoodonWesternlines.Asearlyas1910theCatalannationalistPratdelaRiba(1998)complainedaboutthestoneagepoliticalsciencewhichidentifiedthenationwiththeindependentstate;inmanywayswearestillinthatprimevalera.

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Sheerselfinterestmayinducesomenationstoeschewstatehood.Itcanbeacostlybusinessand,forsmallnationssandwichedbetweenlargeones,ariskyone,asCzechs,Finns,andCatalansknowtotheircost(Puig1998).Mobilizingpopulationstosupportseparatestatehoodandbeartherisksinvolvedisoftendifficult,evenifnationalistleadersdowishastateoftheirown(Hechter2000).Inthesecircumstances,insistingthat,inanidealworld,nationalistswouldliketheirownstateisabitlikesayingthatwewouldallliketopaynotaxesbutstillgetpublicservices;itmaybeadream,butitis(p.8) neitheranobjectivenorapolicy.Myargument,however,goesfurtherthanthis,insistingthatmanynationalitymovementsdonotwantastateontraditionallinesatall,butseekotherexpressionsofselfdetermination.Theextraordinarypersistenceoftheideathatnationalityentailsclaimstostatehoodshowswhatagriptheideaofstatehoodhasonthemodernistimagination,agriponlygraduallybeingprisedloosewiththetransformationanddemystificationofthestateinlatemodernity.

Theobverseoftheargumentisanequallyentrenchedviewthatstateswillalwaysbecomenationsthroughthefragmentationofexistingstatesonnationallines,orbytheassimilationofminoritiesintothecorenation.Empirically,thisisaratherweakargument,sincefewactualstatescanbesaidinconfidencetoencompassasinglenationality,howeverthatisdefined(Connor1978;Stepan1998).Moretheoreticalargumentscentreonmodernizationandtheneedsofliberaldemocracy,collectiveaction,andsocialsolidarity.Arecurrentoneisthatdemocracyrequiresademos,thatisadefinedpeopleinwhichsovereigntycanbeinvestedandwhichcanengageindemocraticdialogueandexchange.Thisdoesnotalwayshavetobeahomogeneousethnicgroupindeedthisargumentisusuallycouchedinthelanguageofcivicrepublicanismbutitdoesneedmarkersofidentityandacommitmenttobelongingtogether.Ifanyonecanoptoutatwill,thencollectivedecisionmakingbecomesimpossible.Commonsymbolsandvaluesandanunderlyingsocialconsensusareneededtosustaintrustsothatsocialgroupscanacceptdefeatonsomeissues,knowingthattheymaywinonothersinthefuture,whileacommonlanguagemaybeessentialforsocialcommunicationanddebate.ItwasthesefeaturesthatJohnStuartMill(1972:392)presumablyhadinmindwhenheremarkedthatfreeinstitutionsarenexttoimpossibleinacountrymadeupofdifferentnationalities.Theimplication,sustainedinotherwriters,isthatempiresandmonarchiescanbemultinationalbutthatdemocraciesmustbeuninational.Hencemultinationalstateswillnotsurvivethetransitiontodemocracy.FrenchJacobinideologytendsinthesamedirection,insistingontheunityofdemocracy,thatinternalandexternalsovereigntymustequallybevestedinaunitarypeople,andthatchallengestotheunityofthestateareathreattorepublicanvirtue.Thereisalargeliteraturetotheeffectthatthenationstatewastheframeworkforliberaldemocracyandthat,whileallnationstateshavenotbeendemocracies,alldemocracieshavebeennationstates(Habermas1998).Morerecently,Miller(1995)(whodoesnot,however,insistthatnationsmusthavetheirownstates)defendsnationalityasawayofsecuringsocialsolidarityandcollectivevalues,withtheunderlyingimplicationthattheseshouldbeachievedthroughastate,andthatthestateshouldinculcateasinglenationalidentity.

Ontheotherhand,itisarguedthatnationalityisadivisiveprinciple,anaffrontto

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universalvaluesandsolidarity.Sonationalismfaces,Januslike,intwodirectionsatonce(Nairn1997).Oneschoolofthoughtseeksawayout(p.9) ofthistrapbyseekingtorootthestateinaformofcivicrepublicanismshornofnationalistideology.Thisallowsthemtoportraythelarge,consolidatedstateasbasednotonethnicparticularismbutonaconstitutionalpatriotism(Habermas1992)orcivicnationalism.Thecorollaryisthatminorityorstatelessnationalmovementsmustbebasedonethnicparticularismagainstmodernistuniversalism,backwardandhostiletoprogress.Onthesegrounds,Dahrendorf(1995,2000)andHobsbawm(1992)favourthelarge,consolidatedstateagainstthesmallerstatelessnationasthebasisfordemocracyandsolidarity.Thereisaseriousambivalenceinmostofthesearguments.Habermas'sconstitutionalpatriotismis,insomeversions,aculturallyneutralformoforder;inothersitisidentifiedwithcivicnationalism.Theformerhasbeencriticizedastoothinabasisforpoliticalorderandloyalty;thelatteris,forallitsinclusivevirtues,aformofnationalism.10Theconflationoftheseratherdifferentconceptsallowssomescholarsthentobundleconstitutionalpatriotism,civicnationalism,thecreationofthenationbywill,modernization,progress,andnationalconsolidationintoasingleprinciple,notonlyinhistorybutasanormativeguide,whichmightbesummedupintheprinciplethatbignationsaregoodandsmallnationsarebad.Thisprejudicialformofreasoninghasalonghistory,recallingEngels'sstricturesonstatelessnationsortheolddistinctionbetweenagood,enlightenedwesternnationalismandatribalistic,regressivenationalismoftheeast(Kohn1944;Plamenatz1968).Civicnationalismmaybeahigheridealthanethnicparticularism,buttoassociateitwiththenationalityofthelargestatesisscarcelyjustified.Germannationalitylawis,despiterecentchanges,ethnicallydiscriminatory,yetDahrendorf(1995)picksontheCatalans,whoweremakingmassiveeffortstointegrateincomers,asanexampleofnarrowexclusiveness.Eveninmoreauthenticcasesofcivicnationalism,likeFranceortheUnitedStates,nationalitymaybeopenandethnicallyinclusive,butitisnotculturallyneutral(Kymlicka1995)oramereproxyforcosmopolitanism.Socivicrepublicanismdoesnotnecessarilyleadusoutoftheneedfornationality,andmaybeamerepretextforimposingthemajoritynationalityupontheminorities.

LordActon(1972)turnedtheargumentaboutnationstates,liberty,anddemocracyonitshead,arguingthattheJacobintheoryofonenationonestatewasarecipefortyrannyandabsolutismandtheenemyoffreedom.Thiswasnot,asitisoftenpresented,anattackonthenationalityprincipleitself,sinceActonsoughttoseparatenationalityfromstatehoodanddefendedthemultinationalstateasthebetterguarantorofdemocraticliberty,aswellasofdynamismandsocialprogress.Thedenialof(p.10) nationality,hewrote,thereforeimpliesthedenialofliberty.Thegreatestadversaryoftherightsofnationalityisthemoderntheoryofnationality(Acton1972:268).Theargumentthattheconsolidatednationstateisthepreconditionofdemocracyraisesafurthercontradictioninitself.Whencombinedwiththeprincipleofstatesovereignty,itimpliesthatdemocracywithinthestatewillcoexistwithacompleteabsenceofdemocracyintheinternationalorder(Juregui2000).Giventhepressuresofglobalizationandtransnationalintegrationandinterdependence,thisisincreasinglyanomalous.Sothenineteenthcenturywriterswhosoughttodelinknationalityfromstatehoodfindanechoinmoderneffortstofindnewformulassuchastheplurinationalstate(Miz1999;Requejo1999a)inwhichmultiple

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nationalityclaimscanbeaccommodatedwithinanoverarchingorder.

Theprincipleofselfdeterminationhasalsobecomeconfusedwiththatofthestateasdiscussionsofselfdeterminationrapidlyturntotherightsandwrongsofsecessionandsettingupbreakawaystates.11Itthenbecomesasimplemattertodemonstratethattheprincipleisnotuniversalizablesincetherearemorenationsorpotentialnationsthantherearepossiblestates,thatconcedingtherightwouldleadtopermanentinstability,andthatagreementonborderswouldbealmostimpossible.Forthisreason,internationallawhastendedtoconfinetherighttocolonialsituations.Elsewhereselfdeterminationmeansonlytherightsofexistingstatestotheirintegrity(externalselfdetermination)andtherightofpeopletodemocraticinstitutions(internalselfdetermination).ThisisthemeaningputonitbytheSupremeCourtofCanada(1998)intheQuebecsecessionreference.12Onlybylimitingitsexercisethuscantheprincipleofselfdeterminationbekeptwithinbounds,howevercontradictoryitmightbetoinsistontheselfdeterminationofentitieslikeKuwaitbutrefusestatehoodtothePalestiniansortheKurds.Thereis,however,nologicalreasonwhyselfdeterminationshouldbelinkedtostatehood,apartfromtheentrencheddogmasofsovereigntydiscourse(Mills1998).Anotherwayoflookingatselfdeterminationistoseeitastherighttonegotiateone'spositionwithinthestateandsupranationalorder,withoutnecessarilysettingupaseparatestate.Indeed,thisisthebasisofmostselfdeterminationclaimsinthemodernworld(van(p.11) derValttvanPraageandSeroo1998).13Chapter3discussesthevarietyofclaimsmadeinthestatelessnationsoftheUnitedKingdom,Spain,Belgium,andCanada,andtheirbasisinpopularsupport.

Thereisstillwidespreadresistancetotheideathatselfdeterminationclaimsmayfallshortofstatehood.Halliday(2000)concedesthattheAustroMarxistsintheearlytwentiethcenturyquestionedtheequationofselfdeterminationwithstatehood,butfailstorecognizethatmanycontemporarynationalistsfollowthesameline.Yetthereisnothingintellectuallyinconsistentintheideathatstatelessnationsmayhaverightstoselfgovernmentwhicharelimitedbyreciprocalobligationsandtherightsofothernations,andsofallshortofstatehood.Suchrightscouldincludetheabilitytorenegotiatetheirpositionwithinthestatewithoutleavingitaltogether.Somewritersonsecessionconcedethatitwouldbewiseforastatetoconcededevolutionasameansofassuagingnationalistdiscontent,butrarelyconcedethisasarightforastatelessnation.Thedistinctionbetweengrantingdevolutionasaconcessionfromthestate,andrecognizingitasarightmayappearslightinpracticebut,asweshallsee,itisafundamentalpointofprincipleformanynationalistswhootherwisearepreparedtoforgostatehood.Thisisnottoinviteaproliferationofincompatibleclaimstoauthority.Itisnotacontradictionbutalogicalconsequenceofthedoctrineofselfdeterminationthatitsexercisebelimitedbytheequalrightsofothers(Juregui1997;MacCormick1999b)inthesamewayasrightsofindividualsaremutuallylimiting.14

Theempiricalandhistoricalargumentsabouttheinevitabilityofnationstatesaresimilarlyflawedbyaninadequateunderstanding,orsimplifyingassumptionsaboutstatesandstatehood.PerhapsthemostenduringistheWestphalianmyth,thenotionthatthePeace

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ofWestphaliawhichendedtheThirtyYears'Warin1648inauguratedasystemofsovereignnationstatesinEuropeandsubsequentlytheworld.Asaresult,anationeitherhasastateoritdoesnot,sweepingawaytheambiguousandintermediaryformsofauthoritythathadpreviouslyexisted,togetherwiththenotionofuniversalempire,whetherunderimperialorpapalsway.Infact,oneoftheachievementsofWestphaliawastopropuptheHolyRomanEmpireforanothercenturyandahalfandtoperpetuatethedivisionofGermanyintoamosaicofjurisdictionsofbewilderingvariety(Osiander1994).TheonlyEuropeanstatetomaintainthesameboundariesasithadatWestphaliaisPortugal,whilethepracticalcontentofstatehoodwasestablishedinthecourseofthenineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturies,withthecodificationofcitizenship,theintroductionofpassports,andthedoctrinethatnationandstateshouldbe(p.12)congruent.Rightupuntil1918mostoftheEuropeanlandmasswastakenupbymultinationalstatesandempiresandformostofcentralandeasternEuropeindependentstatehoodwasenjoyedonlybrieflybetweenthewarsandagainsince1989.Nordoestheprocessofmodernizationandeconomicgrowthnecessarilyentailthecreationofnationstates,asoncethought.Recentworkshaveshowntheviabilityundervariouscircumstancesoflargestates,citystates,andleagues(Tilly1975,1990,1994;Spruyt1994).

Morefundamentally,however,theoriesofsecessionalmostneverdiscussthenatureofstatehoodthatfollowssecession,treatingthisasundifferentiatedsovereignty.Yetsecessionmayinvolvetakingornottakingupanynumberofsovereigntyfeatures.Irishnationalistsfoughteachotherin19223overwhetherkeepingthekingasheadofstatewasafundamentalviolationofsovereignty;bothsidesagreedthatpartitionwasanabomination(Jackson1999).Itlaterbecameclearthattheissuewasoflittlepracticalsignificance.ThereisnowbroadagreementaroundtheworldonPalestinianstatehood,butthereareendlessdiscussionsonwhatthiswouldentail.AfewyearsagopoliticianswerediscussingrathercalmlythebreakupofBelgiumintoseparateunitswithintheEuropeanUnion,safeintheknowledgethatneitherbitwouldhaveitsowndefencepolicyorcurrency.QuebecnationalistshaveconsistentlyfavouredanattenuatedformofsovereigntyallowingforcontinuedlinkswithCanada.Chapter5examinesthepanoplyofopportunitiesforstatelessnationsintheemergingtransnationalorderofdifferentiatedandsharedsovereignty.

TheSovereigntyTrapOneofthegreatestobstaclestoaccommodatingnationalitiesandnationalityclaimsisthedoctrineofsovereigntyitself.Atfirstglance,thisisanintuitivelyplausibleidea,thattheremustinanypolitybeanultimatesourceofauthority,priortoandaboveallothers.Oncloserexaminationitisacomplexandinsomerespectsinternallycontradictorysetofpropositions,manyofwhichturnouttobeeithertautologicalorimpracticable.Furtherdifficultiesareraisedbyitscloseconnectionstodefinitionsofthestateandtodoctrinesofselfdeterminationandnationalism.Twointerrelatedissuesinparticularbedevilanalysis,thedistinctionbetweenexternalandinternalsovereignty;andthedifferencebetweenformal,legalconceptionsofsovereignty(dejure),andthesubstantivepowertoactasasovereign(defacto).

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Thedoctrineofexternalsovereignty,thatastatehasnosuperiorintheinternationalarena,underpinsthedominantparadigmininternationalrelationsor,astheymightmoreaccuratelybecalled,interstaterelations.Itisclearthatthismustrefertomorethandefactoindependence,otherwisewewouldnotneedaseparateterm,sovereignty,withitsadditionalnormativecharge.Forsomeanalysts,externalsovereigntyisanintrinsicpropertyof(p.13) statehood,yet,ifthiswereallthatthereistoit,thetermsovereignstatewouldbearedundancy,andwewouldmerelyreplaceoneproblem,howtodefinesovereignty,withanother,howtodefineastate.Othersseeitasaformallegalorconstitutionalprinciplepertainingtocertainstatesandnottootheraspirants,withasharplinetobedrawnbetweensovereignandnonsovereignentities.Ifthisdefinitionisaccepted,thenthereisahugeincentiveforanationtoacquireitsownstateandsovereignstatus,sinceanythingshortofthiswouldappeartobeworthless.Yetitisbynomeansclearhowsuchstatusisgainedandaccepted.Itisallverywelltotalkaboutastatebeingdejureindependent,butifthereisnogloballegalordertoaccorditthisstatus,thenitismeaningless.Ontheotherhand,ifthereisagloballegalordertodetermineclaims,thenit,andnotthestates,mustbetheultimateandthussovereignauthority.MembershipoftheUnitedNationsmightbetakenasanindicationofstatehood,butthisistoorecentaninventiontostandasageneralprincipleandissubjecttoessentiallypoliticalconditions.Ifthecriterionisrecognitionbyotherstates,wearebacktoapurelypracticalcondition,againdeterminedbypolitics,andthedifferencebetweendefactoindependenceanddejuresovereigntyagaindisappears.

Anotherfeatureofexternalsovereigntyisthatitisusuallysaidtobeinalienable.Soastatemightagreetolenditssovereigntytoasupranationalbodybutwillalwaysbeabletotakeitback.Thisappearstobethebasisofmoststates'membershipoftheEuropeanUnion,althoughthereisnoprocedureforwithdrawalinthetreaties.Yettheexperienceofdecolonizationshowsthatstatescansurrenderexternalsovereigntypermanently.TheStatuteofWestminster(1931)abolishedtheUKParliament'srighttolegislateforimperialdominions,andin1982WestminstersurrendereditsrighttochangetheCanadianconstitution.Evenbeforeabolition,itshouldbesaid,thesepowershadbyconventioneffectivelylapsed.TherearethosewhoarguethatEuropeanUnionlawhasitsownsovereigncharacter,orthatthe1997referendummeansthattheScottishParliamentisentrenchedagainstWestminster'ssovereigntypretensions(MacCormick1999a;Walker1998b).Soadvocatesofthedoctrineofexternalsovereigntyareagainthrownbackonargumentsbasedonthepracticalitiesofpowerandpolitics.This,however,istoconverttheconceptfromanabsolutetoarelativeone,sinceastatecouldhavemoreorlessabilityeffectivelytoexerciseitsautonomousauthority.Whilethereareabout200sovereignstatesintheworld,theyvarygreatlyintheirsubstantiveindependence.Indeedwecanimaginecasesinwhichanentitycouldhavemoreeffectivecontrolaspartofawiderfederationthanitwouldifexposedtothevagariesofahostileworldandforcedtobecomeasatelliteofagreatpower.

Thedoctrineofunitaryinternalsovereigntyhasbeenpresentedasadefiningcharacteristicofthemodernstate,contrastedwiththecomplexanddifferentiatedorderoftheMiddleAges,inwhichpowerwasdividedamongtheestatesandbetweenchurch

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andstate.Itisoftenattributedto(p.14) Bodin,who,startingwiththeprinciplethatsovereigntyisindivisible,extrapolatedthistoadoctrineofmonarchicalabsolutism.AtendentiousreadingofhistoryandcontemporarypracticeallowedhimtoassertthattheparliamentaryconstitutionsofplaceslikeAragonorEnglanddidnotmodifymonarchicalabsolutism(Bodin1992).Bodindid,itistrue,believeinmorallimitstothepoweroftheruler,whowastobesubjecttonaturalanddivinelaw,butthisdidnotimplyacorrelativerightofthesubjectstodefyhimwherehebrokethemoralcode.Arulercouldandshouldcontractwiththesubjects,includingestatesandorders,butreservedtherighttochangethelawsunderwhichtheseweremadewherethiswasappropriate(Franklin1992).Otherinterpretationsseetheassertionofsovereigntyassomethingnew,afeatureofthemodernstate.Artola(1999a,b)distinguishesbetweenmonarchies,whichmayconsistofvariousautonomousterritorieswiththeirownsystemsoflaw,andkingdoms,withasinglesystemoflaw.Thelatterbecomesthefoundationofthemodernstatewithitsunitaryconceptionofauthority.Nationalismanddemocracyservedtoreinforceitsince,ifsovereigntyistransferredfromthemonarchtothepeople,thenstateabsolutismacquiresdemocraticcredentials.Ifthatpeopleis,furthermore,construedtobeanation,thenthestatebecomesthemeansofexpressionofaRousseauiangeneralwill.Thiseasilyleadstotheconclusionthatpopularsovereigntyrequirescentralizationanduniformity,theJacobinprincipleofunity.Othersdrawlessdrasticconclusions,arguingthatthestatecanandshoulddecentralizeanddispersepowerinmanyways,butthatitstillretainsultimateauthorityincludingtheauthoritytochangetherules.Thisistheunionistargument,whichweencounterinstatesliketheUnitedKingdomorSpain.

Yettheargumentforunitaryauthoritystandsincontradictiontotheexampleoffederalstatesinwhichtherearecoordinatesystemsofauthority,neitherfullysovereignandneithersuperiortotheother.Defendersofthesovereigntyprinciple,inreply,fallbackontwoarguments.Thefirstisthedoctrineofexternalsovereignty,whichstillappliestofederationssincetheserarelyallowtheirunitstosecede(Hoffman1998).This,however,isreallyanotherquestionsincesecessionisonlyoneexpressionofselfdeterminationandalimitingcase.Anyway,topermitsecessionforcomponentpartswouldimplythattheyweresovereignandwouldmerelybeanotherwayofformulatingtheunitaryorultimatedoctrineofsovereignty.Sharedsovereigntyisadifferentmatter,implyingthatneitherlevelhasunlimitedunilateraloptions.Thesecondresponseistofallbackonthedoctrineofpopularsovereignty,inwhichbothfederalandfederatedunitsaresubjecttoasingledemosorpeople.This,however,raisesthequestionofwhethertheunitarydemosexists.WhilethismightbeaplausibleconditionintheUnitedStates,itismuchmoredifficulttoapplyittomultinationalfederationslikeCanada;indeeditisdifficulttoapplyittomultinationalstatesgenerally(Fossas1999b).

Thetendencytolinksovereigntyintrinsicallytothestate(Hoffman1998)isitselfproblematic,sincethestateisahistoricallycontingentandchangeable(p.15) structureofauthority.Ifsovereigntyisamatterofthestate,thenformalsovereigntythenbecomestheproductofmodernity,whilesubstantivesovereigntywouldhavetobeconfinedtotheconsolidated,functionallypowerfulstateofthelastcenturyorso.Itisnotindeedcoincidentalthatmostofthe(AngloAmerican)juristswhoaretreatedascanonicalbelong

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totheperiod1750tothe1990si.e.therelativelyshortperiodoftheriseandpossibledeclineofthenationstate(Twining1999:222).Norisitbychancethatdiscussionsabouttheendofsovereignty(CamilleriandFalk1992)haveaboundedasthestate'sautonomyandfunctionalcapacityischallenged.Exponentsofthemoreformalconceptionsofsovereigntytendtodismisstheseanalysesimpatiently,arguingthattheyhavenobearingontheissueofsovereigntyinthestrictsense,butthisistosavetheconceptbyemptyingitofanypracticalmeaning.

Sovereigntythereforepresentsaconundrum.Thenotionofabsoluteconceptissociologicallynave(Walker1998a)buttheconceptofrelativesovereigntylookslikeanoxymoron,whiletoidentifysovereigntywithmeredefactopoweremptiesitofthenormativecontentthatisitsessence.Yetthereareotherwaysofthinking,andatraditionofthoughtthatlocatessovereigntyinbodiesotherthanthestate(MacCormick1999a)whoserightsmaynothavebeenextinguishedbytheassertionofunitarystatesovereigntyafterBodin.IfthetermsovereigntyiseithertoorestrictedtotheBodiniandefinitionorhopelesslyloose,wecantalkofnormativeorders(MacCormick1999a),legalpluralism,andmultiplesourcesoflaw.Inthiswayitmightbepossibletodelinksovereigntyfromthestateinanaltogethermoreradicalmanner,byformulatingitasarightofselfdetermination.Hereanentity,whetheritbeapeopleoraterritorialunit,maybesovereignwhereithastherighttodetermineitsownfuture.Thepracticalitiesoftheworld,togetherwiththeirownaspirations,maymeanthatthisdoesnottaketheformofastate,asIhavealreadyarguedmightbethecasewithnations,butthiswouldnotaffectsovereigntyitself.ThisideaunderlaythemusingsofthelateQuebecpremierRobertBourassa,respondingtothedemandforareferendumonsovereigntythat,sinceQuebeckerswereagreedthattheyhadarighttodecidebyreferendumwhethertobecomesovereign,thismeantthattheywerereallysovereignalready.15InChapter2wewillseehowthesealternativeconceptionsofauthorityarerootedintheconstitutionalandpoliticaltraditionsofthefourstates.

TheTerritorialConundrumAcommonfeatureofnationality,asopposedtoothergroupclaims,isthattheyhaveaterritorialbase;statestooareterritoriallyconstitutedentities.(p.16) Territorymayhaveasymbolicimportance,astheactuallocationofthegroupinquestion,orasterrairredenta,alandreallyormythicallylostinthepast.Territoryalsohasafunctionalimportancesincethepracticalexerciseofselfdeterminationdependsonthecontrolofspace.Wethushavetwostructuringfeaturesofnationalityclaims,thatofidentityandthatofterritory,andtheterritorialnationstatehasoftenbeenpresentedasthetriumphofthelatterovertheformer.Oneschoolofthoughtholdsthatinlatemodernity,territoryhaslostbothitsfunctionalimportanceanditspowertomouldidentities(Badie1995).Moderncommunications,migration,economicandculturalglobalization,andthedeclineofthenationstatehavecreatedaborderlessworldandbrokentheconstraintsoftimeandspace.Forsome,thisdeterritorializationofsocialandpoliticalliferepresentsareversalofstatebuilding,unleashinguncontrollableidentityclaims.Forothers,itprovidesahopethatthedemonsofnationalitymaybeexorcizedforgood,andopensupnewpossibilitiesforpoliticalorderbeyondthestate.Universalvalueshavespreadto

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herald,ifnottheendofhistory,thenatleasttheendofsharpdifferencesinthebasicprinciplesunderlyingthesocialorder.

Inpractice,mattersarealotmorecomplicatedthanthis.Theconnectionsamongfunction,representation,andinstitutionshavebeentransformed,butratherthandestroyingterritory,thishasfavouredtheemergenceofneworrediscoveredterritorialspacesabove,below,andbeyondthestate(Keating1998a).Politicalinstitutionsstillrestuponaterritorialbasis,andpoliticalmobilizationandrepresentationarestilloverwhelmingterritoriallyorganized,whateverthetheoreticalpossibilitiesofdoingotherwise.ControloverterritoryhasbecomemoreratherthanlessimportantforgoverningandpublicpolicyforacomplexofreasonswhichIhavediscussedelsewhere(Keating1998a,2001a).Territoryhasalsobecomemoreimportantasabasisforpoliticallegitimacywiththeemergenceofnewpoliticalspacesbeyondandbelowthenationstateasaresultoftransnationalintegration,especiallyinwesternEurope.Whathasdisappearedisthemonopolyofthestateindefiningterritoryanditsmeaning,andthenewdispensationpresentsamorecomplexmosaic,inwhichmultipleterritorialidentitiesandsystemsofactioncoexist.Thishasprovidedanewcontextforstatelessnationsandculturalcommunitiesandfortheinterplaybetweenidentityandterritory.

Latemodernityhasseenacertainconvergenceofvalues,ifnotaroundtheglobe,atleastacrosstheadvancedcapitalistsocietiesofNorthAmericaandEurope.Yetinaparadoxicalwaythishasgeneratednewformsofterritorialnationalconflictandresurrectedoldones.Politicallegitimacyincreasinglyrequiresabasisinuniversalliberalvalues,ratherthanclaimstoparticularism,andinconsequencestatelessnationalistmovementshaveoftenshiftedfromclaimsbasedonethnicityanddistinctness,towardsamoresecularized,civic,andinclusiveconceptionofnationalitybasedonasharedterritorialsociety.Itmightbethoughtthatthisshift,correspondingtotheusualsociologicaldefinitionsofmodernization,wouldmakeaccommodation(p.17) easierandremoveabsolutistclaims.Infact,itsometimesmakesaccommodationmoredifficult,sincestatelessnationalmovementsarenowmakinggeneralclaimstoselfgovernmentandautonomoussocialregulation,ratherthanspecificculturaldemandswhichmightbemetbypolicyconcessionslimitedtotheculturalsphere;theyaremakingrivalclaimstobeglobalsocieties(Langlois1991a,b).Theyarecontestingthestate,therefore,initsownphysicalterritoryandnormativespace.Anewpoliticsofnationalismhasemergedinwhichterritorialsocietiesarereinventedandrediscovered,below,beyond,andacrossthestatesystem(Keating2001a).Claimstoselfdeterminationarereformulatedandplacedinthecontextoftheemergingtransnationalorder.ThisisamodernexampleofdeTocqueville'sparadoxinwhichaccommodationbecomesmoredifficultassocietiesbecomemorealike(Dion1991).

Theseclaimsareinthemselvescomplex,andrarelyfallintosimpleschemas.Thecaseofthehomogeneous,territoriallyconcentratednationalminorityseekingindependentstatehoodisthelimitingexceptionNorwayandIcelandintheearlytwentiethcenturywouldbeexamples.Morecommonismultipleidentity,inwhichpeoplefeelattached,withvaryingdegreesofstrength,tomorethanonenationalidentity.Theseidentitiesmaybe

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nested(Miller2000)sothatanindividualmayfeelScottishandBritish,CatalanandSpanish,orQubcoisandCanadian.Agreatdealofintellectualefforthasbeenputintosolvingthisapparentenigma.Manyobservershavetriedtofindadifferenceinkindbetweenthetwoidentities,assigningthemdifferentfunctionsandroles.Sothestateidentitymaybeseenasprimarilypolitical,whiletheminornationalidentityisaculturalone.Suchadivisionofrolesisindeedfoundwidelyandmayexplain,forexample,theintegrationoftheScotsandWelshintotheUnitedKingdomformuchofthenineteenthandtwentiethcenturies,ortheaccommodationofQuebectoCanada.Aslongasstatesaccommodateculturaldifferencesthroughpublicpolicyorallowadegreeofautonomyinmatterssuchaseducation,thennationalidentitiescanbecontained.YetmulticulturalismofaNorthAmericantypedoesnotaddresstheissueofnationalidentity,which,aswehaveseenissomethingmore,carryingnormativeideasofselfdeterminationandthescopeofpoliticalauthority(Doyle1999);hencethefallacyofexpectingtheQubcoisoreithercommunityinNorthernIrelandtosettleforrecognitionasaculturalminority.16Anotherwayofreconcilingthemistoinvestpoliticalmeaninginthestatelessnationality,withthestatebeingmerelyapoliticalsuperstructureoverlyingnationalitiesbelowit,sustainedatbestbyakindofcivicpatriotism.Kymlicka(1995)thusclaims(wronglyinmyview)thattheSwisscanonlyfeelapatriotismtoSwitzerland.SomeQuebecnationalistsandaboriginalactivistswouldconverttheCanadianfederationintoamereholding(p.18)companyforcertainfunctionalcompetencesandthemanagementofexternalities.

Neitherstrategyofdenationalization,however,doesjusticetothefacts,andasapoliticalstrategytheyfailtotakeaccountofthewayinwhichdifferentspherescanbecomepoliticizedandrepoliticizedaccordingtoprevailingcircumstances.Inanycase,fewpeopleseemtomakesuchfineandpedanticdistinctionsaboutthefunctionsoftheirvariousidentities.Citizensareoftenpreparedtoinvestintwoormorepoliticizednationalidentities,towhichtheygiveequalmeaningandforce.Furthercomplicatingmattersisthatthesetypesofmultipleidentityareusuallyfoundonlyincertainpartsofthestate.SoapersonfromMadridcanbeSpanishonly,whileanativeofBarcelonamayfeelbothSpanishandCatalan.SomeonefromOntariomayfeelCanadianandnothingelse,whilehercompatriotinMontrealfeelsprimarilyQubcoisandisCanadianonlyindirectlythroughQuebec'smembershipofthewiderstateandnation.

Yetanothercomplicationisthatsomestatelessnationalitiesareterritoriallyintegratedwhileinothersidentityandterritorycoincidelesswell.Atoneextremearenonterritorialethnicminorities,likeEuropeanJews,Muslims,Gypsies,orthevariousethnicgroupsoftheUnitedStates.Inpracticethesehavetendednottomakebroadclaimsforselfdeterminationbuthavelookedfortoleranceandculturalaccommodation.Attheotherextremearepurelyterritorialmovements,seekingtobuildterritorialsystemsofactioninthefaceoftheglobalmarket;someofthesehavelittleculturalorhistoricalbasis,andareconventionallyclassifiedasregionalratherthannational.Inbetweenaremovementswhichcombineidentityandterritoryinthreeways.Insomecases,theterritorialandtheculturalidentitybasescoincide,asinScotland;herewehaveaterritoriallyintegratednationality.17Inothers,asingleterritoryiscontestedbytwogroups;thesearethedividedsocieties.Inathirdtype,asinglegroupspillsoverstateoradministrative

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boundaries;thesearetransstatenationalities,whichmaybeirredentist,asinIreland,orstateless,asintheBasqueCountry.TheclaimsoftheindigenouspeoplesofNorthAmericacombineethnicprinciplesofrecognitionwith

Table1.1.SupportBasesofTerritorialorNationalityMovementsNonterritorialgroups

Territoriallyintegratednations

Dividedsocieties

Transstatenations Purelyterritorialmovements

Onegroup,noterritory

Oneterritory,oneidentity

Twoidentities,oneterritory

Twoterritories,oneidentitygroup

Nogroupidentity

(p.19) territorialclaimsandareevenmoredifficulttofitintoconventionalschemesofsovereignty.

Soapartfromtheterritoriallyintegratednationalities,thearchitectonicillusion(Brubaker1998)thatonecanadapttheterritorialstatetofitthenationisafutileexcerciseonlyguaranteedtomakepeoplemoreunhappywiththeirlot.Itisawellknownargumentagainstsecessionthatittendstocreatenewminoritieswithinthesecedingstates.Partitionofsecedingterritoriestocreateethnicallyhomogeneousenclavesrarelysolvestheproblem,butmerelycreatesnewminoritieswhileviolatingtheterritorialintegrityofexistingunits.Thisisyetanotherreasonfornotidentifyingselfdeterminationwithsecession.Yetdeterritorialization,allowingformsofautonomynotbasedonterritory,doesnotalwayshelpeither.Nationalidentitiesarecloselytiedtoterritory(Nogue1991)evenwherethegroupandtheterritorydonotneatlycoincide,asthecaseofNorthernIrelanddemonstratessovividly.Soidentityandterritory,whileinterlinkeddonotalwayscoincide,sothatoftenneitherpurelyterritorialnorpurelynonterritorialsolutionswillwork.

Itisoftenarguedthatifastatelessnationhasarighttosecedefromitshoststate,thenanygroupwithinithasanequalrighttosecedefromthenewstate.Secessionshaveindeedoftenprovokedpartitionofthesecedingterritory.Yettheseare,arguably,verydifferentissues.Partitionofasecedingterritoryignorestheterritorialprinciplealtogether,whichisadifferentmatterfrombreakingupastatealongexistingterritorialboundaries.Theargumentthatanygrouphasanequivalentrighttosecedeis,further,basedontheoldconfusionofethnicgroups,statelessnations,andnationalminorities.ThereisabigdifferencebetweenanationalgroupinglikethepeopleofQuebec,andminoritieswithinitwhichhaveneverasserteddistinctnationalityclaims.TheindependenceofQuebecorofIreland,therefore,doesnotfinditspracticalormoralequivalentinthepartitionofthoseterritoriesonethniclines.Ontheotherhand,withinasecedingnationtheremaybepeoplewhoseprimarynationalloyaltyistothehoststate,andthesemaylegitimatelydemandcontinuedrecognitionofthistie.Thisisanotherreasonforavoidingtheabsolutesofindependentstatehoodwithitsimplicationthatoneidentitygrouphasamonopolyoftheterritory.

Instead,weneedtounpacktheconceptsofnationandstate,andexploreformsofself

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determinationotherthanclassicalstatehood.Nationalidentitiesarenotalwaysmonolithicandexclusive.Theybecomesointimesofpoliticalconflictandpolarization,butatothertimespeopleareabletolivewithseveralidentities.ItisforthisreasonthatIusethetermplurinationalism,whichincludestheideathatindividualscanhaveseveralidentities,ratherthanmultinationalism,whichimpliesdistinctnationalcommunitieslivingtogether.18Ifpeopledoindeedhavepluralnationalidentities,thenwe(p.20) canthinkofbuildingpoliticalunitsunderpinnedbynationalsentimentatdifferentlevels,ratherthanseekingtoreservetheconceptofnationalityforjustone.Justaboutanyjurisdictionwecanimaginewillhavenationalmajoritiesandminorities,buttheminoritieswillatsomehigherorlowerlevelbeabletoconstituteamajority.Nairn(2000)fallsbackonanoldargumentinseeingthiskindofpluralisticidentityaspossibleonlyinempiresandnotindemocraciestheargumentrecallstheliberalcasefornationalismdiscussedabove.Atbest,Nairnconcedesthatdualidentitymayworkforintellectuals,butnotforthemasses.19Ifthisweretrue,theoutlookwouldbegrimindeed.Fortunately,however,thereareotherwaysofthinkingabouttheidentityandaboutthestateitself,keepingtheideasofterritoryandidentityasfundamentalbuildingblocks,butcombiningthemtosuitthecircumstances.

RethinkingtheStateOnealternativetraditionbearsdirectlyontheissueofstatelessnationsandterritorieswithintheboundariesofconsolidatedstates,althoughithasuntilrecentlybeensubjecttolittlesystematicthoughtoranalysis,andoftenconsideredlittlemorethanahistoricalcuriosity.RokkanandUrwin(1983)distinguishfourtypesofterritorialregime.Twooftheseareuniforminconception.Theunitarystateiscentralizedanduniform;mechanicalfederalismdividespowerbetweenthecentreandthefederatedunits,butthereisstillarecognizablecentreandfederalismisintroducedfromabovebyconstitutionalmeans.Theothertwoaremultiform.Theunionstateisavariantontheunitarystructurewherethecentredoesnotenjoydirectcontroleverywhere.Incorporationofpartsofitsterritoryhasbeenachievedthroughtreatyandagreement;consequentlyterritorialintegrationislessthanperfect.Whileadministrativestandardizationprevailsovermostoftheterritory,theunionstructureentailsthesurvivalinsomeareasofvariationsbaseduponpreunionrightsandinfrastructures(RokkanandUrwin1983:181).Thefourthcategory,organicfederalism,isreallytheapplicationofthesameideainfederalstates.Itisconstructedfrombelow,theresultofvoluntaryassociationbydistinctiveterritorialstructures,whichretaintheirseparateinstitutionaloutlineswithwidediscretionarypowers.Thisschema,developedasthebasisforatypologyofEuropeanstates,raisesmanyquestions.Onemightask,forexample,whetheritisessentialthatmechanicalfederalismbeintroducedfromabove;thiswasnotreallythecaseinthe(p.21)foundationoftheFederalRepublicofGermanyin1949.Wemightaskwhethertheunionstateandtheorganicfederationaretwoseparatecategoriesandinsteadchoosetoseetheunionprincipleassomethingthatcanoperatewithineitherfederalornonfederalstates.RokkanandUrwin'sapproachisbehaviouristandinstitutional,andtheydonotbroachnormativequestionsorissuesofsovereignty.Nonetheless,theydidtapintoakeydifferenceintheconstitutionofstatesandthematterofthesourcesoflegitimacyandnormativeorder.TheideaoftheunionstatehasstruckachordinScotland,whereitis

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consistentwithearlierformulationsoftheUnitedKingdomasaunionorincorporatingunionratherthanaunitarystate,astheWestminsterdoctrinewouldhaveit(Mitchell1996).Toputmattersslightlydifferently,thedominantinterpretationoftheunitaryUKconstitutionasnecessarilycentralistisatoddswithitsabilitytoaccommodatepluralityandsustainasymmetricalformsofgovernment(Walker2000).AsimilardebateisunderwayinSpainandCanada.

AnearlierformulationoftheideacomesfromGeorgJellinek(1981),whointhenineteenthcenturycoinedthetermfragmentsofstate(Staatsfragmente).Hecriticizedthedominantdoctrineofthetimethattheonlyunitsofjurisdictionwerestatesandprovincessubmittedtostates,arguingthattherewasawidearrayofentitiesinbetween.Therewerestates,definedasterritorieswiththeirownterritory,subjects,andgovernment.Someweresovereignandindependent.Otherswerenonsovereignbutcountedasstatesbecause,equippedwiththenecessaryfacultiesandusuallypossessingthetitleofkingdom,republic,orwhatever,theycouldeasilycontinueiftheparentstatedisappeared.OnesuchexamplewasBavaria.Attheotherextremewereprotectorates,territorieswiththeirownterritoryandsubjectsbutnogovernment,suchasBosniaHercegovinaandAlsaceLorraine.Fragmentsofstatewereterritorieswhichhadtheattributesofstatesbutonlyinpartialformand,lackingthecompleteinfrastructure,couldnotcontinuewithouttheparentstate.SotheAustrianLnderhadtheirownlawsandparliamentsbutnotexecutivepower;IcelandhaditsownconstitutionbutwasgovernedbyaDanishminister;Croatiahadmuchoftheequipmentofastate,butlackeditsowncitizenshipanditsgovernmentwasnominatedbyHungary.FinlandwasmorecontentioussincesomepeopleconsidereditanonsovereignstatewhileJellineksawitasafragmentwithintheRussianEmpire.Fragmentsofstateinturncouldbedividedintostrongerandweakercategories,ofwhichJellinekoutlinedfour.Intheweakest,thecentrecreatesandchangestheconstitutionsofunits;inthenext,theunitshavelimitedpowersovertheirownconstitutions;inastrongerform,theconstitutionsoftheunitscanonlybechangedbytheirownlaws;inthestrongest,theunitshavefullconstituentpower,abletochangetheirinternalconstitutionatwill.Fragmentsofstatethushavevariousdegreesofinternalsovereignty.Theydonothaveexternalsovereignty,butmayenjoycertainoftheinternationalprivilegesofstatessuchasmembershipoftheInternationalPostalUnion.

(p.22) ThereismuchtoquestioninJellinek'scategories,whichperhapsbetrayanexcessivelegalformality,buthetooispointingtoanalternativetraditionofsovereigntyandauthorityfromthatofthestatistschool.ThethemeispickedupbyCarens(2000:66),whowritesoftheinstitutionalincompletenessofnationswithinmultinationalstatessincenonation,noteventhemajority,canclaimalloftheeconomic,socialandpoliticalinstitutionsasitsown.Suchthinkingwasandstillisdismissedbythosemodernistswhoequatetheunitaryoruniformstatewithprogressandseesuchspecialfeaturesasquaintrelicsofthepast,atbestcolourfulcuriosities,atworstbastionsofreaction.Asnationstatehascomeunderpressurefromglobalization,territorialrestructuring,andprivatization,however,ithasbeenincreasinglydemystifiedideologicallyanditslegalunderpinningshavebeenquestioned.Juristshaverediscoveredtheideaoflegal

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pluralism(MacCormick1999a),andhistorianshaveenteredthefraywithrevisionistinterpretationsoftheprocessofstateformationanditsnormativebasis.

LessonsoftheHabsburgEmpirePerhapsthemostcompleteexampleofacomplexstateistheAustroHungarianEmpire,inspirationofmuchofJellinek'swork.Atonetimeitwascommontocharacterizetheempireasaprisonhouseofnationalities,eachwantingtoescapeandsetupitsownstate.Asthesystemfacedpressuresfordemocratization,popularpoliticsinevitablytookanethnicnationalistformsothattherecouldbenolegitimatebasisforanoverarchingauthority.Thecasethusillustratestheincompatibilityofthemultinationalfederationwithdemocracyandmodernization.Thereisacertainamountofhindsightinthisview,sincetheempiredidindeedcollapseintonationalstates.ThereisalsoanoftenunconsciousextrapolationfromtheexperienceofwesternEuropewherethetriumphofthenationstateoverpreviousformsofcomplexorderisseenasnotonlycontemporarywith,butintrinsicallylinkedto,modernization.NowthatthefailureofthenationstatemodelinsoutheasternEuropeissoapparentandthemodelitselfismoregenerallyinquestion,lessdeterministicaccountsofthehistoryofmultinationalconglomerates,includingeventheOttomanEmpire(Keyder1997),havegainedcurrency.

TheAustroHungarianEmpirewasasystemofextraordinarycomplexityandasymmetry.Asinothermultinationalstates,therewasnonameforthecorepart,whichhasnecessitatedclumsyexpressionslikeCisleithenianAustria(Kann1977).Elsewhereterritorieshadbeenacquiredinpiecemealfashionandoftenallowedtokeeptheiroldinstitutionsandprivileges.Thesehistoricopoliticalentitiesorcrownlandsthusmaintainedadegreeoforiginalsovereignty(Jellinek1981),withtheirownestatesordiets.ThePragmaticSanctionof171223,providingfortheimperialsuccession,recognized(p.23) theseperatelegalexistenceofCroatiaSlavonia;theHolyRomanEmpire;theFreeCityofFiume;Transylvania;andHungary,allundertheoverarchingrealordynasticunion(Kann1977).EstatesalsosurvivedintheCzechlandsofBohemia,Moravia,andSilesia.Hungarywastreatedasaseperatekingdom,withitsowntariffsandrailwaysystemandadministrationinthehandsofcountryboards.Afterthefailedrevolutionsof1848therewasaphaseofcentralization,butfromthe1860sViennastartedtorelaxcontrol.Dietswererestoredin1861,althoughreducedtolocalgovernmentstatus.TheAusgleichof1867gavethekingdomofHungaryalargedegreeofindependence,andin1869ameasureofhomerulewasextendedtothePolishregionofGalicia(Wank1997).AsimilarcompromisewithinHungaryrecognizedtheautonomyofCroatia,withcomplexprovisionsforaffairsconcerningthewholekingdomtobemadebytheHungarianparliamentaugmentedbyaCroatiandelegation.ProposalsforasimilarcompromiseintheCzechlands,however,failedtoprogressuntilitwastoolate.TheAustroHungarianunion,aformofsovereigntyassociation,allowedHungarytorunitsownaffairswhilethecommonaffairsoftheempireweremanagedbyjointcommissions.AlthoughHungary'streatmentofitsownminoritieswaslessthangenerous,thesettlementallowedtheHungariansmorepowerandinfluence,aswellasalargerterritory,thantheycouldeverenjoyasanindependentstate,aseventsafter1919showed.Theunion,indeed,hasoftenbeenreferredtoasapossiblemodelforother

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binationalstatesandwasthefirstpreferenceofSinnFinintheearlytwentiethcentury.

Theseselfgoverningestatesanddietswerebasedonlylooselyonethnicaffiliationsincetheiroriginswerehistoricalanddynastic.Inanycase,ethniccriteriaforselfgovernmentwouldhavebeendifficulttoapplyinaregionandatatimewhenethnicidentitieswereratherfluid.TheHungarianpatriot,Kossuth,wasofSlovakorigin,evenifhedidclaimthathecouldnotfindSlovakiaonthemap.AttheSocialDemocraticCongressheldinPraguein1913,theleaderoftheCzechfactionwascalledNmeth(whichisCzechforGerman)whiletheleaderoftheGermanfactionwascalledCzech(Macartney1934).RuthenianscouldbeclassifiedasPoles,Russians,orUkrainians,dependingonstrategicconsiderations.Somegroups,liketheSlovenes,ontheotherhand,maintainedasenseofidentitywithoutinstitutionsoftheirown;lackingthestatusofahistoricopoliticalentitytheyhadnodefinedterritoryorcapacityforselfgovernment.Overlargepartsoftheempirenationalitygroupsweremixed,orelseonemightpredominateinthecitiesandanotherinthecountryside.Languagewasanothermatterandcausedsomeseriousconflictsinanageofincreasingeducationandexpandingliteracy,buttherewerewaysofhandlingthisshortofsecession,aswasshownwiththeestablishmentofseparateschoolboardsinBohemia(1873)andMoravia(1991).

Thereisawidespreadtendencyintheliteraturetoseethesearrangementsasdoomedtofailurebecausetheywerepremodern,undemocratic,andan(p.24) obstacletoprogress.Thisargument,whichfindsaparallelinwesternEuropeandelsewhere(seeChapter2)takesseveraldifferentforms.Forsome,estatessystemsareinherentlytiedtosocialprivilegeandincompatiblewithmodernadministration.A.J.P.Taylor(1948:113)notedthatthenonhistoricnationalitieslackedanurbanmiddleclassandeverywhereacceptedtheallianceofthelocalnobility.EventheHungarianmovementtalkedahistoric,legallanguagerepellenttomodernliberalism.ThisfoundanechointheenlighteneddespotismoftheeighteenthcenturyHabsburgsandtheireffortstocentralizetheempire.Yettherewasaliberaltraditionofcrownlandselfgovernment,whichwasanimportantelementintheRevolutionof1848.Othersinsistthatdemocratizationcouldonlybeachievedthroughreformingthesystemofselfgovernmentonethniclines.Giventhelocationofthevariousgroups,itisnotclearhowthiscouldhavebeendonewithoutforcedtransfers(orethniccleansing,inmodernparlance),andinanycaseitwasimpossibletodefinethegroupsauthoritatively.Othershavearguedthatitwouldhavebeenpossibletodemocratizetheoldestatessystems,whileprovidingforlanguageandotherrightsforcommunitieswithinorstraddlingacrownland.Proposalscanvassedinthelatenineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturyinvolvedcombinationsofterritorialselfgovernment,ethnicandlinguisticselfgovernment,andtheprincipleofpersonalnationalityinwhichindividualsandnotgroupswouldbethebasicunit.ThesocialdemocratKarlRennerproposedasystemofeightterritorialGuberniatoreplacethecrownlands,witheightculturalcouncilsbasedinViennadealingwithlanguageandculturalmattersacrossthewholeofCisleithenia.

Reformproposalswerestymiednotbytheinherentdifficultiesofplurinationalgovernment,butbypoliticalsabotage.Oneelementwasatendencyfortheimperial

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centretomanipulateethnicandnationalistpoliticsthebettertopreserveitsownpower.TheHabsburgsplayedthenationalitiesoffagainsteachother(Stourzh1991),andintheearlynineteenthcenturyMetternichwasgiventoencouragingoreveninventingprovincialtraditionstodefuseoppositionfrombothcentreandperiphery(A.J.P.Taylor1948).Atthesametime,someoftheminoritiesshowedthemselvesextremelyintoleranttotheirowninternalminorities.Hungarywascommittedtotheunitarynationstatemodel,constantlysoughttoreducelocalrights,andfrom1876intensifieditsprogrammeofMagyarization.ThePolesofGaliciarefusedtorecognizetherightsoftheRutheniansunderthecompromiseof1914(Kann1977).Thethirdproblemwasthetendencyofoutsidepowers,notablyGermanyandRussia,tointerferepurportedlyonbehalfoftheircoethnics(GermanspeakersandSlavs).

Inspiteofallthis,separatisttendencieswerecontaineduntiltheFirstWorldWar.WhilethePolesclearlyaimedatrestoringanationalindependenceandstatehoodtheyhadpreviouslyenjoyed,leadersofthesmallernationalitiesinparticularsawtheempire,orsomeformofbroaderfederation,astheirbestprotectioninadangerousworld.Somealsosawthe(p.25) futilityoftryingtodrawethniclinesonmaps.Indeed,theAustroHungarianmodelwasaninspirationtootherstatelessnationalistmovements,includingtheoriginalSinnFinandtheCatalanmemorialofgrievancesof1885(Fusi2000).TheCzechleadersMasarykandBenesremainedhomerulersuntiltheFirstWorldWar,supportingindependenceonlyasafinalresort.UntilthennationalistshadpreferredalargedegreeofhomerulecombinedwithanenhancedCzechinfluencewithintheempire(Macartney1969;Hertz1944;Kann1977).Prudentialargumentsalsoplayedapart.AsThomasMasarykexclaimedin1909,WecannotbeindependentoutsideAustria,nexttoapowerfulGermany,havingGermansonourterritory(Sked1989:2234).Historywastoprovehimright.TheSlovenes,inanequallyexposedposition,concentratedontheirculturalrevivalandtheestablishmentoftheirowncrownland.Theydidnotpressforthebreakupoftheempire,certainlynotforindependence(Sked1989),andonlylateonweretheydrawnintopanSlavicideas.Thesocialdemocratsfearedthepowerofethnicnationalismtodividetheworkingclass,anduntilaverylatestagetheytoofavouredkeepinganoverarchingframework;onlyin1918didasectionofthemacceptBauer'sproposalsfornationalselfdetermination(Macartney1969).Somecontemporaryobserversoftheearlytwentiethcenturysawmattersimproving(WickhamSteed1914),andwhilenationalitytensionswereapermanentfeatureofpoliticallife,therewaslittlebeliefinthedestructionoftheempire(Sked1989).WhatultimatelydeterminedthetriumphofthenationstateprinciplewasthecollapseofimperialauthorityintheFirstWorldWarandthedesperateneedfornationalleaderstogainthesecurityofstatehood,andinternationalrecognitionandguarantees.FurtherimpetuswasgivenbyWoodrowWilson'sdoctrineofnationalselfdetermination,evenifthedoctrineitselfwasalittleincoherentandinconsistentlyapplied(deBlas1994).Theoutcomewasaseriesofnationstatesbasedontheillusionthatgeography,nationality,andsovereigntycancoincide.

Subsequentexperiencehasshownthefutilityofthisproposition.CzechoslovakiafelltoGermanirredentismandlatertoSovietexpansionism.Yugoslaviabrokeupinthe1940sandagainthe1990s.PolandwasdividedandonlyreinstatedaftertheSecondWorldWar

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followingforciblepopulationtransfers.WiththeendofthecoldwarthereisabroadagreementthatthefutureofsoutheasternEuropecanonlybereassuredthroughanewtransnationalorder.Thereisnothinginevitableabouttheevolutionofthenationstate,andthecollapseoftheAustroHungarianEmpiredoesnotsuggestotherwise.Thenationstate,animportfromwesternEuropeselectivelyencouragedbythevictorsof1919,wasafailure.TherearemorepromisingtraditionswithinthehistoryofthewesternpartofEuropeaswellasinthecentralempiresthemselves,andtherearewaysofconductingpoliticsthatmakenationalityissuesmanageablewithoutreducingthemalltothequestionofsecessionandstatehood.

(p.26) Nations,Nationality,andtheStateWhatemergesfromthisdiscussionisaratherfluidsetofconceptsanddoctrines.Nationalityisusedintwosenses:inanarrow,restrictedsensetorefertocitizenshipofastate;andinaweakersensetodenoteabroadculturalaffiliation.ThisiswhatallowsScotstowriteScottishinthelineinahotelregisteraskingfornationality,andBritishinthelineaskingforidentityofpassport(totheconfusionofforeignclerks,whowanttowriteEnglishforboth).Nationalityinthissecondsenseisquitecompatiblewithmembershipofamultinationalstate.Itdoescarrythenormativeimplicationofagrouprighttoselfdetermination,buttheexactpoliticalimplicationswilldependontheaspirationsofthegroupandthepoliticalcircumstances.IntheAustroHungariancase,thesewereverydiverse.TheideaofnationalitymightalsocarrythefreightMiller(1995)putsonitasaprincipleofsolidarityandreciprocitybut,again,thiscantakeavarietyofforms.Nationsimilarlyhasarangeofmeanings,fromthosethatidentifyitwiththestate(asintheUnitedNations)tolooserculturalandsocialconceptions(Seymour1999).TheSpanishconstitution,bydefinitionalfiat,reservesnationforthestatebutleavesnationalityforthecomponentparts,withoutdelimitingtheseatallprecisely.IntheUnitedKingdomthetermnationisusedindifferentlyforthewholestate,forBritain(England,Scotland,andWales)andforthecomponentpartsindividually.InCanadaaboriginalpeopleshaveincreasinglyassumedandbeenaccordedthetitleofFirstNations.Thissemanticconfusionshouldatleastputpaidtoanyideathatnationsandstatescouldeverbecoterminous.Ithasthepositiveadvantageofallowingforthecoexistenceofdifferentdegreesofnationalconsciousnesswithinasharedpolity;indeedthissemanticdissonanceisanintegralpartofplurinationality.Whenthemajoritynationalityconstitutesitselfasthetitularnationalityofthestate,orthestatenationalityisinterpretedasunitary,thenthisgeniusislost.Itisequallylostwheretheoverarchingframeworkorregimeexperiencesacrisisorcollapse.TheimplosionoftheAustroHungarianEmpirein191819leftnationalitieslittlechoicebuttosecurethemselvesthroughstatehood.TheSovietUnioncollapsed,notattheperipherybutatthecentre,butitwasthenationalrepublicsthatfilledthevacuum.ThefinalcollapseoftheSpanishEmpirein1898triggerednationalistdemandsaroundtheperiphery.Yugoslavia'sbreakdowngaveitsremainingnationalitieslittlechoicebutsecessionandstatehood.Whatthesefragmentscollapsedintowasaformofnationalsovereigntyassociatedwithstatehoodbutrestingonfragileintellectualfoundations.

Twokeyconceptswillguidemuchoftheremainderofthebook.Thefirstis

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plurinationalism,20thecoexistencewithinapoliticalorderofmorethanone(p.27)nationalidentity,withallthenormativeclaimsandimplicationsthatthisentails.Plurinationalismismorethanmultinationalism,whichcouldrefertothecoexistenceofdiscreteandseparatenationalgroupingswithinapolity.Underplurinationalism,morethanonenationalidentitycanpertaintoasinglegrouporevenanindividual,openingupthepossibilityofmultiplenationalitieswhichinturnmaybenestedormayoverlapinlesstidyways.Theverymeaningofnationalitycanvaryaccordingtothegrouporindividualandcanbemoreorlesschargedwithpoliticalcontent.Fromthiswecanexploreconceptssuchastheplurinationalstateandthepossibilitiesofdemocracyinaplurinationalorder.Itfollowsthatwecannotmakeasimpleonetoonecorrelationofnationalitywiththestate,norproposesecessionasasolutiontonationalityconflictsintheillusionthatthiswilldothetrick(Bashai1998).

Thesecondkeyconceptispostsovereignty,referringtotheendofstatemonopolyofultimateauthority.Theclassicdoctrineofsovereigntyhasalwaysbeenintellectuallyproblematicand,inthemodernworld,isbecomingincreasinglyuntenable.Onereasonistheideologicaldemystificationofthestateandthedeclineofdeference.Sincesovereignty,withitsextraordinaryclaimstoauthority,requiredbothdeferenceandacertainsuspensionofdisbelief,ithasbecomemoredifficulttosustain.Ithasbeenchallengedbytheemergenceofnewnormativeordersaboveandbelowthestate.Tonamebutthree,thesewouldincludeinternationalhumanrightsdoctrineandpractice;theriseoftransnationalorganizations;andtheadvanceofclaimsfromstatelessnationsandminorities.Statesovereigntyhasalsobeenputinquestionbyanewintellectualinterestin,andrespectfor,culturalpluralismandmultipleidentity.Thereisanincreasedquestioningofwhatthepostmodernistscallmetanarratives,whichtiethewholeofhumanexperiencetogetherintoasingleframework,andagrowinginterestindiversity.Prophetsoftheendofhistoryapart,scholarsaremorelikelytoacceptthatthevarioussocialandpoliticalsystemsoftheworldarenotunitedinsingleteleologyanddonotalwaysfittogetherlikepartsofasinglemachine.Finally,theerosionofthefunctionalautonomyofthestate,evenasthepublicdomainhasexpanded,hasputinquestiontherealityofsovereignpower(Creveld1999).

Thisraisesdelicatequestionsofterminologyandrisksinterminablesemanticdebate.Ifwefollowthosewhoinsistthatsovereigntyisindivisibleandinheresonlyinthestate,thenperhapsweareinanerawheresovereigntyhasceasedtoexist.Yettoarguethuswouldrisklosinganybasisforlegitimateauthority.Inmyusage,postsovereigntydoesnotmeantheendofallprinciplesofauthority.Ratheritmeansthatsovereigntyisdispersedanddivided(Juregui2000).Walker's(2001)termlatesovereigntycapturesmuchthesameidea,referringtotheexistenceofmultiplesourcesoflegalorder,withouthierarchyandnotreducibletoasingleprinciple.Thetermpostsovereignalsoreferstopoliticaldemandsandmovementsthat(p.28) embracethisideaandsowantnottoestablishasovereignstatebuttoinsertthemselvesintothenewcomplexwebsofauthority.

Nationalitydemandsandnationalismcanthusbelessthanthedemandforaseparate

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statebutmorethanarequestfordevolutionwithinacontinuingsovereignstate.Thenewcontextprovidesmultiplewaysoffulfillingnationalityclaims,onceweacceptthattheycannotbetreatedasabsolutesandthattheymustbethesubjectofcompromise,asareotherformsofpolitics.Postsovereigntyisnottobeconfusedwithtermpostnationalism,althoughthisoftenseemstorefertothesamething(Kearney1997;Shaw2000).Postnationalismwouldimplythatnationshavedisappeared,aproblematicnotioninaworldwherenationalismseemsifanythingtohavegrowninimportance.Whathaschangedisthedemandthatnationsshouldalwayshavetheirownstates,itselfaproductofthehigheraofthenationstateduringthelatenineteenthandmuchofthetwentiethcentury.Somytermpostsovereigntyseemsmoreapt.

IntheremainingchaptersIseektounpacktheideasofsovereignty,nationality,andselfdetermination,insearchofwaysinwhichtheirseeminglyincompatibleimperativesmightbereconciled.Thefocusislessonabstractreasoningthanonpoliticalpractice.Forthisreason,theemphasisisonfourplurinationalstates,theUnitedKingdom,Spain,Belgium,andCanada,liberaldemocracieswhichhaveaddressedtheissueindifferentways,andontheemergingtransnationalorderinEurope.Theneedtoengageinsomedetailedanalysisprecludestheexaminationofalargernumberofcases,butIhaveattemptedtofocusonconsistentthemesanddrawcontrastsandcomparisons.Thelessonsdrawnmightbeofwiderapplication,bearinginminddifferencesincontext.Thecentralargumentisthatinaworldinwhichstatesovereigntyisincreasinglyquestioned,thenationalitiesissueisonceagainposed;butthatnewanswersareavailable.Beforelookingforwardtoaworldbeyondsovereignty,however,wemustfirstlookback,toplaceargumentsaboutstatehoodandsovereigntyintheirhistoricalcontext.

Notes:(1)Claimsthatitisabiologicalorracialcategoryhavelongsincebeendiscredited.

(2)Thisapproach,recognizingthenormativecontentoftheterm,getsawayfromattemptssuchasKymlicka's(1995),todistinguishbetweenmultinationandpolyethnicstatesonthebasisofthewayinwhichpeople'sancestorsarrived,asthoughwecouldeverarriveatascientific,letaloneapolitical,consensusonthatissue.

(3)Cairns(2000:28)isthusrighttoseethesignificanceoftheassumptionofthetermnationonthepartofCanada'saboriginalpeoples,thatitdistinguishesthemfromthecategoryofethnicminorities,placesthemintermsofstatusonalevelwiththetwofoundingBritishandFrenchpeoples...justifies...Aboriginalparticipationattheconstitutionmakingtable.Laterinthebook,though,Cairnsperhapsinveststhetermnationwithanexcessivelyseparatistmeaning.Carens(2000)readsthesamesignificanceintotheuseofthetermFirstNations.

(4)Kymlicka(1995)isincorrecttosaythatSwitzerlandisnotanationbecauseofitsculturaldiversity.Thisisonceagaintoconfuseculturalidentity,ethnicity,andnationality.KymlickadoesnotsaywhetherthenationswithinSwitzerlandcorrespondtothelanguagegroupsorthecantons.Infact,Switzerlandhasthreesubnationalcleavages,bylanguage,byreligion,andbycanton,whichdonotalwayscorrespond.

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(5)Evenscholarswhocanseethatnationstatesarenotnecessarilyethnicallyhomogeneousofteninsistonapplyingtheethniclabeltostatelessnationsasamatterofdefinitionratherthanempiricalfinding,thusconcludingthattheycouldnotbethebasisforpoliticalorder.

(6)Thisisnottheplacetoenterintotheoldargumentaboutprimordialismversusconstructioninnationality.

(7)Beiner(1998)comesclosetosayingthatnationswillbefabricatedfromnothingassoonasweacceptthenotionofselfdetermination.Norman(1998)claimsthatatleast5,000groupsintheworldcouldtakeupsucharight;yethelaternotesthatmobilizingforselfdeterminationistheworkofgenerations.Claimsabouttheexistenceof5,000,orwhatevernumber,ofnationsorpotentialnations,alsomadebyErnestGellner(1983)andWalkerConnor(1978),confuseethnicgroups,whichmayundercertaincircumstancesconstitutethemselvesasnationsandsubjectsofselfdetermination,withnationsthemselves.

(8)Norman(1998),inordertomakethethreatofinfiniteproliferationcredible,hastoimagineaninternationalregimesuchasanallpowerfulUnitedNationswhichcouldupholdthesecessionand,presumably,protectitfrompredators,aprospecthehimselfadmitsishighlyimprobable.

(9)TheFrench(Qubcois)translatorofmyearlierbookNationsagainsttheStaterefusedtocallitNationscontrel'tat,sincethatwouldappearacontradictioninterms.Healso,untilcorrected,usedthetermsnationandtattodenotestateandnation,indifferently.By2000,however,itwaspossibletopublishabookunderthetitleLaNationdanstoussestats(Dieckhoff2000).

(10)TwoBasquecriticshave,moreover,criticized.Habermas'sconceptofconstitutionalpatriotismisexcessivelybasedonaGermanywhich,whileexorcizingthedemonsofaggressivenationalism,retainedacitizenshipbasedonethnichomogeneityandneverfaceduptothequestionofhowtointegratenonEuropeanincomersintotheconstitutionalpatrioticorder(LasagabasterandLazcano1999).

(11)Freeman(1999)andMoore(1998a)appeartotreatitthus.Buchanan(1991)recognizesthattherecanbeotherformsofaccommodationforculturalandterritorialminoritieswhichmayalsoallowforselfdetermination.

(12)TheSupremeCourt'sargumentwas,however,ambiguous.ItdeclaredthatAstatewhosegovernmentrepresentsthewholeofthepeopleresidentwithinitsterritory,onabasisofequalityandwithoutdiscrimination,andrespectstheprinciplesofselfdeterminationinitsowninternalarrangements,isentitledtotheprotectionunderinternationallawofitsterritorialintegrity(SupremeCourtofCanada1998,Article130).Hereselfdeterminationseemstomeandemocracyandnondiscrimination,implyingthattherecanbenodemocraticrighttosecessioninademocracy.Onthisreading,theBritish

Nations and Sovereignty

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governmentiswrongtoconcedetherightofsecessiontoScotland.

(13)ThisbookrecordstheproceedingsofaconferenceinBarcelona,includingrepresentativesofstatelessnationsfromallpartsoftheworld,inwhichtherewasuniversalagreementthatselfdeterminationdidnotnecessarilyentailthecreationofaseparatestate.

(14)Selfdeterminationmustthereforebeseenasapoliticalprincipleratherthanaright,withitsabsolutistimplications.

(15)Thisshowsatleastthattautologicaldefinitionsofsovereigntycanplaybothways.

(16)AnexampleisDerrienec(1995),whowouldtreatQubcoisidentityinthewaytheFrenchThirdRepublicdealtwithCatholicism,byeffectivelyprivatizingitandtakingitoutofpolitics.

(17)Thefacileanswerthatsuchterritoriesareethnicallyhomogeneousisaninstanceoftheprimordialisterrorandbegsthequestionofhowandwhytheydevelopedaterritoriallyintegratednationality.

(18)Cairns(2000)takesissuewiththeCanadianRoyalCommissiononAboriginalPeoplesonthegroundsthattheiruseofthetermmultinationalfederationsuggestsdiscretenationsratherthanasharedenterprise.WhetherornothiscriticismoftheCommissionisright,Iagreethatthetermdoessuggestrathersharperlinesofdemarcationthanmyconceptofplurinationalism.

(19)Onemightturnthisclaimonitsheadandarguethatitispreciselytheintellectualswhotormentthemselveswithquestionsaboutwhethertheycanhavemorethanoneidentity.

(20)IhavederivedthisfromtheadjectiveplurinacionalusedintheSpanishhistoricalnationstorefertothecomplexityofnationality.Thismightbetranslatedasmultinational,butthatwouldlosesomeofthemeaningandrichnessoftheSpanishoriginal.