0933–1719/03/0016–0351© Walter de Gruyter

Humor 16–4 (2003), 351–367

Plato on the psychology of humor

CAMERON SHELLEY

Abstract

A reform is needed in the modern account of Plato’s view of humor. Modernscholars have attended mostly to Plato’s negative evaluation of comedyand his emphasis on the malicious and aggressive aspects of humor. In fact,Plato held a more nuanced view of humor and its relation to a person’scharacter. When enjoyed moderately, the playful, incongruous quality ofhumor could benefit a philosophic person like Socrates. Scornful andderisive humor, however, serves only to deepen the hasty and overzealousnatures of comedians and sophists.

Keywords: Plato; Socrates; paidia; incongruity; character; comedy;laughter; philosophy.

Introduction

Where humor is concerned, Plato is perhaps best known for his thorough-going criticism of comedy.1 Certainly, Plato had good reason to be hard onthe comic poets of his day. In The Clouds, the playwright Aristophanes hadportrayed Plato’s mentor and idol, Socrates, as a screwball sophist whoteaches young men many foolish and even dangerous ideas about religionand politics. Plato tells us in the Apology (18d, 19c) that this portrayal wasinstrumental in getting Socrates condemned to death on charges of irreligionand corrupting the youth of Athens. If comedy could strike such a terribleblow to philosophy in general and to Plato in particular, it is small wonderthat Plato objected to it.

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Plato was well aware that comedy is not simply a political or social phe-nomenon. That is to say, in his investigations of comedy, Plato traces thepsychological and physiological mechanisms upon which comedy dependsfor its effects. In particular, Plato says a fair amount about laughter andmalice and how they are combined when we feel amused about a characterbeing derided on stage or a person being ridiculed in public. The resultcan be insalubrious not only for the person being laughed at, like Socrates,but also for the person doing the laughing, since he or she may come toprefer ridicule over reflection even when dealing with matters of utmostsignificance.

With these facts in mind, modern scholars have understood Plato to haveheld an entirely negative view of humor as being always deleterious andnever virtuous. This perception is reflected in the way that humor scholarscite Plato as the forefather of modern theories of humor that highlightits negative aspects. In the current literature Plato is credited with holdingversions of the following modern theories:

1. The superiority theory, by which laughter is brought about by feelingsof superiority over another or by elation at another’s misfortune (seePiddington 1963: 152; Keith-Spiegel 1972: 6–7; and Morreall 1983:4–5);

2. The ambivalence theory, by which laughter is caused by the experienc-ing of incompatible emotions or feelings, such as pain and pleasure(Keith-Spiegel 1972: 10); and

3. The aggression theory, by which humor is construed as a form or mani-festation of aggression or hostility (see Attardo 1994: 18–19), and alsoFreud (1960) and Keith-Spiegel (1972: 5–6).

Yet, viewing Plato through the twin spectacles of his comments on comedyand modern theories of humor may present a distorted picture of his takeon humor. He was certainly critical of humor, but was there truly no virtuein humor in Plato’s eyes?

The most immediate evidence that Plato saw a positive side to humorcomes from his representation of Socrates. In the dialogs, Socrates is oftenpresented exercising an incisive sense of humor. We even find Socrates prais-ing humor on occasion. Consider his response to Hermogenes’ request foretymologies of Dionysus and Aphrodite (Cratylus 406b–c):2

Socrates: Son of Hipponicus, you ask a solemn question. There is a serious[spoudaiôs] and also a facetious [paidikôs] explanation of both these names; the

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serious [spoudaion] explanation is not to be had from me, but there is no objectionto your hearing the facetious [paidikon] one, for the gods too love a joke.

Here we are told two things: (1) that Socrates is about to give a facetiousanswer, and (2) that the gods would approve of such a response. If Socrates,who is typically the very exemplar of philosophical virtue in Plato’s dialogs,can make a joke, then humor cannot be completely evil, one would think.

Perhaps Plato was merely giving a faithful portrayal of the lively senseof humor of the historical Socrates while holding his nose at the facetiousremarks. However, in this passage, there is a clue that such is not the case.Here, Plato opposes Socrates’ facetious (paidikôs) behavior to the alterna-tive of serious (spoudaiôs) behavior. If we look carefully at Plato’s treatmentof humor in the dialogs, we will find that such facetiousness is presented asacceptable, even virtuous, when opposed to an excess of seriousness.

There is need of, and room for, a revision in the modern scholarship con-cerning Plato’s view of humor. Overshadowed by his negative commentson comedy, positive aspects of Plato’s treatment of humor have escapednotice. Conditioned by modern theories of humor, the coherence of Plato’sown theory has not been appreciated. To properly revise our view in thismatter, we need to reconstruct Plato’s own view in light of the descriptionthat he gives of it in his writings. This paper presents such a reconstructionby showing how Plato linked humor to the basic operations of the humanmind (or soul) as he understood them. This reconstruction allows for amore balanced and accurate picture of Plato’s theory of humor than is yetavailable.

Laughter and humor

Although he devoted little space to the discussion of it, Plato viewedhumor as the recognition by the intellect of what modern scholars wouldcall incongruity — the special juxtaposition of incoherent concepts.3 How-ever, it would be misleading simply to say that Plato held an incongruitytheory of humor. Rather, Plato saw incongruity as only the intellectual com-ponent of a complex physiological, psychological, and social phenomenon.Comedy, one obvious social aspect of humor, has already been sufficientlytreated above for present purposes. However, it will be useful to begin theelucidation of Plato’s theory of humor with a discussion of its physiological

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side, namely laughter. The distinction between laughter and humor is oftenelided (Provine 2000), but Plato generally held laughter and humor, orincongruity, as distinct but intimately related. As part of this intimate rela-tionship, Plato’s treatment of laughter provides a pattern that is repeatedin his treatment of the intellectual side of humor. To present a clear viewof Plato’s theory of humor, then, we begin with a review of his theory oflaughter.

Laughter and the buffoon

In the Philebus (47c–d), Plato tells us that when we are hungry, we experi-ence a simultaneous mixture of incompatible feelings, namely the pain of anempty stomach combined with the pleasure of contemplating our next meal.Similarly, when we observe something laughable, we experience a simulta-neous mixture of the pain of malice combined with the pleasure of laughter(49a–50a). So, for example, if someone says something ignorant, then weexperience the pleasure of laughing at him because he has satisfied ourmalicious and painful desire to see others suffer. By analogy with the case ofhunger, Plato implies that laughter is good at least insofar as it restores thesoul to a healthy condition by balancing out the ill feeling of malice. Ingeneral, the best bodily condition we can achieve is one in which our painsand pleasures counteract each other, leaving our bodies in a kind of calm,orderly state. Such a state frees the intellect from distractions and allows it toget on with its projects. Laughter is a pleasure that may serve to establishsuch a state.

The problem with laughter, as with eating or drinking, is that it can bedifficult for people to do in moderation. In the Republic (3.388e), Socrateswarns Adimantus that the young men of the ideal city must not be proneto laughter. For ordinarily when one abandons himself to violent laughterhis condition provokes a violent reaction (See also the Republic 10.606c).

Socrates then suggests a prohibition against the depiction of gods ormen overcome by hysterics, lest such displays provoke uncontrolled anddebilitating laughter in the young men looking on from the audience.4 Theexplanation for the potentially violent or uncontrollable nature of laughteris given in the Philebus (52c–d) where all violent pleasures are classed withthe things that are unlimited. Frede (1993: xxxiii–xxix) explains that theunlimited, in this case, refers to things that are without intrinsic degree

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and therefore cannot be reliably measured. In other words, since there is noyardstick, as it were, by which laughter can be measured, it is difficult tolaugh only enough to restore mind and body to order.

The point of Socrates’ warning to Adimantus — a man prone to indulginghis appetites — seems to be that the enjoyment of excessive laughter canlead to a kind of debauchery or gluttony in which laughter is indulged forits own sake. The buffoon Thersites is just such a debauched man (Iliad2.212–43) and Socrates later describes him as having lived the life of an ape(Republic 10.620c). Aristophanes, the comic playwright who lampoonedSocrates, appears to draw a similar rebuke in the Symposium. Havingamused themselves and gotten a laugh, neither man seems to know when it istime to stop.

Laughter, then, is a bodily pleasure. It is provoked by the pain generatedwhen others gratify our desire to see them suffer misfortune. It is problematicbecause it is always mixed with pain and because it is easily over-indulged.We recognize the sort of people who habitually over-indulge in laughter asbuffoons, like Thersites or Aristophanes.

Humor and incongruity

In Plato’s view, laughter is physiological in the sense of being a bodily func-tion. As a pleasure, laughter is salutary insofar as it balances out the painof malice. However, laughter becomes harmful when it is over-indulged,a result that is exemplified by the buffoon. Humor, on the contrary, is psy-chological in the sense that it involves intellectual processes. Nevertheless,there is a close analogy between laughter and humor: Both comprise a mix-ture of incompatible elements and both may be salutary in moderationbut harmful otherwise. In this section, Plato’s view of the intellectual aspectof humor is presented. This presentation sets the scene for the ensuing dis-cussion of how humor may be healthy or harmful to people depending upontheir psychological constitutions.

The intellect is indispensable for humor because it is the intellect thatprovides for the recognition of incongruities. In other words, the intellectenables us to recognize when two incompatible concepts or ideas have bothbeen applied to one situation. That Plato held such a view of humor may beseen from his consideration of puns in the Cratylus (cf. Ahl 1988 and Brock1990).

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In that dialog, the character Cratylus argues that names and meaningshave a coherent relationship (Attardo 1994: 152–153). In other words,names that are similar phonetically should also be similar semantically,and names that are dissimilar phonetically should be dissimilar seman-tically. Socrates is sympathetic to this view but points out that it does notcorrespond with the facts (Kahn 1973): There are many Greek names thatsound similar but are disparate in meaning. Socrates explains that theconfusion between names and sounds results from a confusion in the mindsof those who originally created the names (Cratylus 439b–c). Socrates says,in effect, that Cratylus’ theory has merit but does not explain the actualstate of affairs because it fails to take into account the historical fact thatthe original givers of names did not understand what they were doing andso did not apply his rule. This discussion leads, arguably, to the conclusionthat Plato accepted Cratylus’ theory as a design principle of language, butone that tends to fail as an etymological principle because of an unhappyhistorical accident.

To clarify matters, let us consider a pun from the Platonic corpus. In oneof the most famous passages in the Republic (6.509b–c), Socrates explains toGlaucon the metaphysical relationship between the objects of knowledgeand the form of the Good:

. . . the objects of knowledge not only receive from the presence of the Good theirbeing known, but their very existence and essence is derived to them from it,though the Good itself is not essence but still transcends essence in dignity andsurpassing power [dynamei hyperechontos].And Glaucon very ludicrously said, Heaven save us, hyperbole can no further go[daimonias hyperbolês].

Plato describes Glaucon’s response as ludicrous, but the reason for thisdescription can be seen only by attending to the pun. Glaucon’s expressiondaimonias hyperbolês is simply a pun on Socrates’ expression dynameihyperechontos: These expressions sound similar but have incongruousmeanings. In view of Cratylus’ principle, the surpassing power of the Goodshould also be a holy hyperbole, but Socrates would surely agree that thesedescriptions are incompatible with each other.5 The applicability of bothdescriptions to the Good is evidently what Glaucon finds so amusing.

So, Plato evidently thought of puns as violations of Cratylus’ theory of thecoherence of names and meanings. A somewhat more general account ofhumorous incongruity is presented, albeit briefly, in the Laws (2.669b–70c)

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where Plato gives a description of laughable images. The Athenian Strangerexplains that images of any kind are fashioned well only if they includeeverything appropriate to what they represent. Images that mix appropriateand inappropriate elements are laughable. He thinks particularly of musi-cians who set masculine lyrics to feminine tunes or choreographers who havehuman characters perform the movements of animals. In modern terms, wemight think of a story about the warlike Achilles wearing a dress (Metamor-phoses 13.162ff), or of an actor scratching his armpits and hooting likea chimpanzee while eating a banana. Each of these images is humorousbecause each presents incongruous elements as if they belonged together.Unfortunately, the Athenian Stranger explains, human artists are regret-tably prone to combining incongruous elements in the images they create(2.669c–d). We can see that this account fits nicely with Plato’s accountof puns outlined above because Plato considered names to be images ofthe things named (Cratylus 439a). In a pun, widely divergent things arepresented as if they belong together because of the similarity in their“images” or names.

As the intellect provides the understanding of ideas, it provides therecognition of incongruous combinations of ideas as well. So, in Plato’sview, the intellect is indispensable for the generation and appreciation ofhumor. However, a crucial question for Plato remains unaddressed: Doesan appreciation of humor serve a person well or ill? In parallel with thetreatment of laughter above, this question may be answered by consideringhow exactly humor affects a person and what sort of persons exhibit thehealthy or unhealthy forms of humor.

Humor and psychology

In the Republic (4.435b–42a), Plato argues that the soul consists of threeparts, namely the intellectual, spirited, and appetitive parts. Furthermore,there are three types of people, each of whom is ruled by a different part(9.581c).6 The philosopher is ruled by the intellectual part and thereforeloves knowledge above all. The spirited person is ruled by the spirited partand therefore loves honor and victory above all. The appetitive person isruled by the appetites and loves money above all else because it facilitateshis pursuit of food, drink, and sex.

We have already used the term buffoon to denote the sort of man whoover-indulges in laughter. Here, we continue the analogy with humor and

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examine how each of the philosophic, spirited, and appetitive persons dealswith incongruity. The enjoyment of humor for good or ill is dictated by whatsort of person is doing the enjoying. In other words, different kinds of peoplefind different sorts of things funny, but one such sense of humor is healthywhereas the others are unhealthy. When we have understood how humorparticipates in the psychology of different sorts of people, we will haveachieved a reasonably complete understanding of Plato’s view of humor.

The philosophic person

We have seen that, according to Plato, humor depends upon images thatcombine elements that do not properly belong together. The main problemwith such images, Plato argues, is that they tend to perpetuate confusion —that is, we are apt to mistake such confused images for an accurate pictureof reality. A philosophic person seeks to eliminate confusion and understandreality as it truly is, not merely as it appears. What, then, is there in humorfor a philosophic person to legitimately enjoy? Plato gives us at least tworesponses.

First, his sense of humor alerts the philosopher to the presence of con-fusions. In the Euthydemus (277d–8c), Socrates points out that the screwballdebaters Euthydemus and Dionysodorus have befuddled their victimssimply by conflating two senses of the word learn. He compares their proce-dure to pulling a stool from under someone who is about to sit down in orderto laugh as that person sprawls on the ground. Obviously, a philosopherwould not indulge in such a puerile stunt. However, a philosopher still needsa sense of humor so that he does not perpetrate a similar sort of prank onhimself through a confused usage of words in speech or thought.7 This lessonseems to be the import of Socrates’ remark in the Cratylus (406c) that thegods love a joke. That is, they recognize and enjoy the fact that languagethrows ambiguities into the path of inquiry. The love of knowledge is com-patible with an appreciation of humor because humor alerts the philosophicperson to a confusion in thinking. He may then enjoy the prospect of clearingthe confusion up. Humor can thus be an aid in philosophical inquiry.

This problem of funny and confusing images occurs with more gravity inthe Phaedo (115c–e) when Socrates himself laughs — for the only time inPlato’s dialogs — at Crito’s question about how they should bury Socratesafter he has been executed. Socrates reiterates that, after death, his soul willhave departed and thus nothing essential to Socrates will remain (115d–e):

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. . . when I am dead I shall not stay, but depart and be gone. That will help Critoto bear it more easily, and keep him from being distressed on my account when hesees my body being burned or buried, as if something dreadful were happening tome, or from saying at the funeral that it is Socrates whom he his laying out orcarrying to the grave or burying. Believe me, my dear friend Crito, misstatementsare not merely jarring in their immediate context; they also have a bad effect uponthe soul.

So, the statement that “Socrates is being buried” is a misstatement because itconfuses the body of Socrates with his soul. Each goes by the same name, butthey are very different things in Socrates’ view. Socrates himself finds thisconfusion funny and then cautions against letting the joke stand unclarified.Persevering in this confusion of body and soul is likely to prompt the over-throw of reason in favor of immoderate grief or dread, a distinctly unhealthyresult in Plato’s view.

In addition to alerting him to a potentially harmful confusion, a philo-sophic person may enjoy humor because, when ambiguities do crop up, ithelps him to persevere in the search for truth. This attitude is evident inGlaucon’s response to Socrates’ difficult description of the Good (mentionedpreviously). Glaucon’s pun is not ridicule directed against the obscurityof Socrates’ assertion. It is a signal that, although he does find Socrates’description of the Good to be confusing, he is willing to explore it. That is,Glaucon’s joke is not meant to silence Socrates but to request clarificationor review. The use of humor to signal the need for clarification shows thatGlaucon is being patient in the face of a difficult line of inquiry. Thisincident indicates how humor and philosophy can exist harmoniously withinthe same person.

In certain respects, the humor of a philosopher is a cultivated form ofhis youthful playfulness (paidia). Such playfulness is regularly associatedwith both humor and the potential for intellectual achievement in Plato’sdialogs. Young men, it is often noted, are especially playful and exhibit agreat fondness for comedy as a result (Republic 3.397d; Laws 2.658d). Also,young men exhibit playfulness in their delight in humorous wordplay, pack-ing and unpacking incongruous readings of sentences in speech (Philebus15d–e; see also the Republic 7.539b–c). If given proper philosophical train-ing, youths can learn to moderate and preserve this playfulness into adult-hood, where it will serve them well in the manner indicated above. Wheneducated by ignorant teachers, however, the playfulness of youth yieldsto excessive seriousness, usually in the pursuit of money or power as willbe seen shortly.8

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The appetitive person

In Plato’s view, the philosophic person is naturally just because he hasan ordered soul; that is, his intellect rules his appetites and combativespirit (Republic 4.441e–2b). In other persons, the appetitive or spirited partsrule over the intellect, meaning that these people are unjust due to theirdisordered souls. In the last section, we saw that humor presents pitfallsfor the disordered person, such as Crito, who was unclear on what wouldbecome of Socrates after his execution. Having shown how, in Plato’s view,humor can be healthy and virtuous in the preeminently intellectual person,we must now see how humor can be unhealthy in other sorts of people. In thissection, we examine how humor figures in the soul of a person ruled by hisappetites.

The typical appetitive person loves money because the more moneyhe can get, the more food, drink, and sex he will have. The lust for moneyinduces a reckless hastiness that manifests itself in the tendency to ridiculeor scorn. In the Laws (8.831c–e), the Athenian stranger argues that the hasteof the appetitive person arises from the passion for wealth, which leaves aman not a moment of leisure to attend to anything beyond his personalfortunes. So long as a citizen’s whole soul is wrapped up in these, he cannotgive a thought to anything but the day’s takings. Any study or pursuit thattends to that result everyone sets himself eagerly to learn and practice; allothers are laughed to scorn.

Kings and tyrants are prime examples of appetitive people (Theaetetus174e). Think of Thrasymachus, the tyrannical man of appetites, who callsSocrates “little snotty nose” instead of answering a question from him(Republic 1.343a). Poets provide another good example (Laws 7.801a–b):the Athenian Stranger tells us that poets, who pray for wealth, are trulyridiculous since obtaining it would simply reinforce their avarice andcorrupt their souls still further.

The connection between haste and scornful humor also appears in theRepublic (5.457b) where Socrates notes that many people would laugh athis proposal to allow the female guardians of the ideal city to train nakedlike the males (a common practice in classical Greece). He adds that, inlaughing at this proposal, those people would “pluck the unripe fruit oflaughter.” The term unripe is not explained in the passage, but it stronglysuggests that his ridiculers would be acting prematurely, that is, in haste.Socrates does tell us that such people look to the wrong “pattern ofabsurdity” (Republic 5.452d–e), meaning that they see incongruity in

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women acting like men only because they have never bothered to thinkthrough the philosophical rationale suggesting that this practice would be agood one.

In the Theaetetus (172c–e), Plato contrasts the hastiness of the appetitiveperson with the leisurely but tenacious nature of the philosophic person.Socrates explains that, whereas professional speakers employ debatingtricks, deceit, and ridicule to obtain money, philosophers are willing to taketheir time in the pursuit of truth. This contrast with the philosophic personaffirms the disordered nature of the appetitive person and the ridicule thathis disorder drives him to exercise.

In the appetitive person, the intellect is ruled by the appetites. Thus,although such a person is able to recognize incongruities, he allows himselfno time to consider whether he is real or merely apparent. Assuming thateveryone is as concupiscent as he, he is most sensitive to the incongruity ofactivities that yield no profit. In particular, the appetitive person is disposedto ridicule the philosophic person because the latter labors hard withoutmuch material gain. But, since he so ardently hastens to worsen and notimprove his own soul, the appetitive person himself is manifestly ridiculousin the eyes of the philosopher.

The spirited person

In a spirited person, the combative spirit rules and drives him to valuehonor and victory over others above all else. As in appetitive persons, thispsychological disorder gives rise to an unhealthy trait, namely excessiveseriousness (spoudês). This trait is accompanied by ill humor and contrastsdirectly with the playfulness of the philosophic person.

In the Philebus (49b), Socrates says flatly that we laugh at people who arein some sense weaker than we are, thus confirming that humor may accom-pany the feeling of superiority. The Thracian slave who laughs at thephilosopher Thales (Theaetetus 174a–175b) provides a simple example.Thales was observed by the woman as he fell into a ditch while walkingabout in the evening to observe the stars. She evidently thought herselfsuperior to him because, unlike him, she kept her eyes on the road. Cer-tainly, there is an incongruity in seeing such an erudite man make suchan apparently simple misstep. However, her priorities are misplaced since,according to Plato, observing the stars is far preferable to observing theground. Astronomy, above all other empirical occupations, is mostly likely

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to lead us to a grasp of how the world truly is (Timaeus 47c). So, it is reallythe Thracian woman who is ridiculous for priding herself on studying theroad instead of the heavens.

The most typical example of a spirited person is the rhetorician whoseeks victory in the law courts. Such a person is notorious in Plato’s writingsfor constantly rehashing the stereotype of the clumsy philosopher to winarguments against philosophic persons (see Nightingale 1995: 178–80).The exemplar, par excellence, is the orator Callicles who tells Socratesominously (Gorgias 486a–c):

If anyone should seize you or any others like you and drag you off to prison,claiming you are guilty when you are not, you realize that you would not knowwhat to do, but would reel to and fro and gape openmouthed, without a word tosay, and when you came before the court, even with an utterly mean and rascallyaccuser, you would be put to death, if he chose to demand the death penalty.

Callicles already demonstrated, perhaps unwittingly, that he is potentiallyjust such “an utterly mean and rascally accuser” and clearly relishes theprospect of laying Socrates low through ridicule. The spirited man’s desirefor this ultimate victory over the philosopher is reiterated in the Republic(7.517a), where Socrates explains that philosophers only appear to beridiculously clumsy in disputation because, once again, they seek truthinstead of triumph.

Of course, it is the spirited person who is the truly clumsy one, as canbe seen when the philosopher engages him in dialectical discussion. Socratesdemonstrates this reversal in his description of how a legal eagle (suchas Callicles) would fare in discussing philosophical matters (Theaetetus175c–d):9

. . . when that small, shrewd, legal mind has to render an account [of justice], thenthe situation is reversed. . . . Lost and dismayed and stammering, [the rhetorician]will be laughed at, not by maidservants or the uneducated — they will not see whatis happening — but by everyone whose breeding has been the antithesis of aslave’s.

In other words, rhetoricians attend only to single instances of justice or injus-tice — who did what to whom and what retribution is called for. Philosophersare unconcerned with this sort of bickering and appear ridiculous to rhetori-cians for this reason. But philosophers see the rhetoricians as the ridiculousones since rhetoricians attempt to dispense justice without being able to givea defensible account of what justice is. The real incongruity, then, is that the

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legal oratory that the spirited person spouts in pursuit of courtroom victoriesand feels to be so elegant is really just confused nonsense — and that is trulyfunny.

That excessive seriousness causes the spirited person’s tendency to ridi-cule is confirmed in the Laws (11.934d–6b), where Socrates draws a dis-tinction between humor in earnest (spoudês) and humor in jest (paidia) (seealso the Republic 3.396e). Humor in earnest — essentially insults and namecalling — is described as an angry passion provoked by disputation. Thosepeople who indulge in it are reduced by it to the condition of beasts. Incontrast, humor in jest is laudable, both in the street and in the theater.Furthermore, such playfulness is recommended to the philosophic personin the Philebus (30e) as a relief from an excess of seriousness, a point towhich we will return shortly. The temptation to respond in kind to angryridicule is underlined in the Republic (7.536a–c) where Socrates himselfnearly falls into it after recalling all the ridicule to which spirited peopleroutinely subject philosophy.

In the spirited person, the desire for honor and victory rules the intellect.Spirited persons are able to recognize incongruities but, because of theirover-serious dispositions, they see humor only in the failure of attempts toachieve or preserve honor and distinction. As a result, their humor amountsto mere invective, whether plain or dressed up for the law courts. In the latterforum, they attack philosophic persons by trotting out the stereotype of theclumsy philosopher, reeling and gaping openmouthed. In the eyes of thephilosopher, of course, such immoderate love of distinction is humorousbecause the prize is not worthy of the zeal with which it is pursued.

Conclusion

The modern view of Plato’s treatment of humor is informed largely by hiscritical judgment of comedy and the natural desire to compare Plato’streatment to current theories of humor. Thus, modern humor scholars tendto say of Plato that he held versions of the superiority, ambivalence, andaggression theories of humor. In view of the comments made above, wecould also add the incongruity theory to this list. Although this approach toPlato does not produce explicit mistakes, it does leave us with a fracturedpicture of Plato’s thinking on the subject of humor.

For Plato, humor is not something that can be treated in isolation. Sincehumor arises from the confusion of ideas in the intellect, it inevitably has

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important philosophical implications. In particular, humor has significantethical implications since a person’s sense of humor conditions the healthof his soul, and vice versa. So, we cannot comprehensively answer thequestion What is humor in Plato’s view? without also answering the questionWhat good is humor in his view?

In Plato’s view, humor arises from the confusion of incoherent ideas in theintellect. To a philosophic person, whose intellect is preeminent over hisappetites and high spirits, humor is an alarm bell that draws attention tosome conceptual difficulty. He may then enjoy the prospect of clearing it up.To an appetitive person, a situation is humorous if it decreases rather thanincreases someone else’s opportunity for material gain. (Of course, if thesituation decreases his own opportunity for material gain, then it is tragic.)To a spirited person, humor means that someone else has lost honor or powerwhen he might have gained or preserved it. Each sort of person enjoysa different kind of incongruity, depending upon the state of his soul.Consequently, a person’s sense of humor is a kind of window on his soul.Amusement at conceptual difficulties indicates that a person has a just,ordered soul. Scorn or vituperation at the apparent failings of others indi-cates that a person has an unjust, disordered soul. Plato’s view in this regardis appealing; moreover, even if he is mistaken, his concern for the ethicalside of humor is worthy of our emulation.

In addition to signifying the order of the soul, humor can play a part incultivating a just disposition. Plato argued that the playfulness of youths(paidia), of which humor is a manifestation, should be cultivated in theireducation so that they might become philosophic people upon maturity.Failure to cultivate the playfulness of the young results in its overthrow byexcessive seriousness (spoudês), leading to excessively appetitive or spiritedadults.

In the Platonic dialogs, this picture of humor emerges most clearly fromPlato’s portrayal of Socrates and his detractors. The latter, unable or unwill-ing to answer Socrates thoughtfully, resort to ridiculing him with versionsof the old clumsy wise man stereotype. Through his portrayal of Socrates’humor, Plato shows that he does not object to people having a sense ofhumor, but only to their hasty or zealous misuse of it to cut off philosophicinquiry. As for the appropriate occurrence of humor in intellectual inquiry,consider an example from the Philebus (30e), in which Socrates obtainsan answer from Protarchus on one issue (order is always caused by reason)by quizzing him on another apparently unrelated one (the cosmos wasordered by an intelligent mind):

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[Socrates asks Protarchus if he has now grasped the resolution to their firstinquiry through the resolution of the second.]

Protarchus: Yes, I grasp it completely, though indeed I hadn’t realized you hadgiven it.

Socrates: Well, Protarchus, sometimes playfulness is a relief from seriousness.

Socrates’ behavior here indicates two things. First, he acknowledges thehumor in addressing one topic by talking about a seemingly unrelated one.Second, he allows that this kind of humor is at least sometimes acceptable,even conducive, to philosophic ends.

Finally, the overhaul of our understanding of Plato should not be exag-gerated. Plato was very critical of humor, as scholars are well aware. Hedoes not present humor as a thing to be pursued for its own sake. Humor issimply a symptom of the regrettable fact that we are often confused in ourthinking. This confusion leads to disorder, which leads to more confusion. Inan ideal world, there would be no confusion and therefore no disorder and nohumor. However, we are not in an ideal world and so humor, when exercisedmoderately, can aid us in our efforts to sort things out.

University of Waterloo

Notes

Correspondence address: cam_shelley@yahoo.ca1. On Plato’s treatment of comedy, see Greene (1920), Brock (1990), and Nightingale

(1995: 172–192).2. All translations quoted in this paper come from the collection made by Hamilton and

Cairns (1963) unless otherwise noted.3. On the modern incongruity theory, see Raskin (1985) and Attardo (1994).4. Plato breaks this rule himself in the Laches (183c–184c) where he relates a farcical

sea battle that leaves two crews of combatants rolling on their decks, helplessly hyst-erical. See Tessitore (1994). Perhaps Plato illustrates the debilitating effects of suchside-splitting laughter to induce the reader to frown upon it.

5. This pun has been routinely missed, as is evident from Shorey’s translation (above),which just makes Glaucon’s response sound like nonsense. Burkert (1985: 325) statesthat Glaucon’s joke is an indication from Plato that his doctrine of the Good is notsensibly expressible, i.e., that it is a rhetorical appeal to mystery. Ferber (1993) arguesthat Glaucon takes Socrates’ description of the Good as a dirty joke.

6. In the Timaeus, Plato seems to present many more parts to the soul, associated withdifferent internal organs. Thus, Plato’s theory of psychology is a moving target. Never-theless, we will not go far wrong in adhering to the tripartite scheme, which dominatesmost of Plato’s writings on the soul.

366 C. Shelley

7. Aristotle gives a similar assessment of puns in On Sophistical Refutations (1.33); seeCooper (1922: 224–39) .

8. Note also that ignorant and over-serious adults cannot be educated without the mod-erate consumption of alcohol, to restore their disused playfulness, under the guidance ofa philosophically trained teacher (Laws 2.671b–c). The Symposium is an example ofsuch an education session for adults, at least until the immoderately drunk Alcibiadesarrives at the party.

9. See also Socrates’ remarks on the political speechwriter in the Euthydemus (306c).

Thanks to Joe Novak for comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Earlier versions werealso presented at the International Society for Humor Studies Conference, University ofCentral Oklahoma, 9 July 1997, and also at the colloquium of the Department of Philo-sophy, University of Waterloo, 28 November 1997. Thanks also to the Perseus Project forits helpful research tools. This research was supported by the Social Science and HumanitiesResearch Council of Canada.

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