Piper Impartiality Compassion

8/17/2019 Piper Impartiality Compassion

1/33

Impartiality, Compassion, and Modal ImaginationAuthor(s): Adrian M. S. PiperSource: Ethics, Vol. 101, No. 4 (Jul., 1991), pp. 726-757Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2381662 .

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2/33

Impartiality,

ompassion,

and

Modal

Imagination*

Adrian

M.

S.

Piper

I.

IMPARTIALITY

By using

the term

"modal imagination,"

want

to call

attention

to

a

specific

feature

of

imagination

s we ordinarily

onceive

it.

This is

that

we can imaginenot onlywhat actually xists, uchas thecomputer creen

now

in

front

f me, but also

what

mighthave

existed

n

the

present

or

past,

or

might

someday

exist

in

the future,

uch as

a vintagerestored

1950 Remington

Rand

typewriter.

he term

modal magination

s

ntended

to

remind

us of our capacity

to envision

what

is possible

in addition

to

what is actual.

We need

modal

imagination

n order to extend

our conception

of

reality-and,

in

particular,

of

human

beings-beyond

our immediate

experience

in

the

indexical present;

and

we need

to do this

n orderto

preserve the significance f human interaction.To make this leap of

imagination

uccessfully

s to achieve

not

only nsight

ut also an

impartial

perspective

on our

own and

others' inner

states.

This

perspective

s

a

necessary

condition

of

experiencing

compassion

for others.

This is the

primary

hesis

will try

o defend

in

this discussion.

My strategy

or

defending

this thesis

will be

to offer conceptual

analysis

of

compassion.

Therefore,

although

compassion

is itself

sub-

stantive

moral

concept,

nothing

say

here

carries

ny particular

ormative

commitmento therelativelyentral r peripheral oleI think ompassion

should play

in

a substantive

moral theory. o,

for example, the

analysis

that follows

s consistent

witha substantive

moral theory

hat

advocates

the motivationalpriority

f

moral

duty (or,

for that

matter,personal

loyalty)ver

compassion

when the

twoconflict.

try odevelop

metaethical

*

Work

on this articlewas

supported

by a Woodrow

Wilson

International

Scholars'

Fellowship,

988-89.

It isexcerpted

from hap.

15of a manuscript

n

progress,

Rationality

and the Structuref

the Self."

Earlierversionswere

delivered o thephilosophy

epartments

of WesternMichiganUniversity, ellesley ollege,Purdue University,llinois tateUniversity,

and the University

f Connecticutat Storrs,

nd

at

the

Impartiality

nd

Ethical

Theory

Conference

at Hollins

College.

I am

grateful

for comments

received

on those

occasions

and also to

Owen Flanagan,

Charles

Griswold,Ruth

Anna

Putnam,and the

editors

of

Ethics or

criticismsf earlier

drafts.

Ethics101 (July

1991):

726-757

(

1991 by

The University

f Chicago.

All rights

eserved.0014-1704/91/0104-1039$01.00

726


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3/33

Piper

Impartiality,ompassion,nd

Imagination

727

criteria hat

onstrain he choice of an

adequate substantivemoral

theory

elsewhere.

On the

following nalysis, ompassion involvesmodal

imagination,

empathy, ympathy, dispositionto render aid or mercy, nd what I

will

describe as strict

mpartiality,

orwhich

a conceptual

analysis

lso will

be furnished.

trict

mpartiality

ill be shown to

differ

rom

mpartiality

in

the ordinary

ense, by adheringmore closelythan

impartiality

n

the

ordinary

ense to

the

spirit

s well as to the letterof what

impartiality

in

the ordinary

ense explicitly equires. This is the

secondary thesis

wantto defend.

However, strict

mpartiality ill

be shownto be similar o

mpartiality

in the ordinary ense, in thatbothare metaethical equirements n sub-

stantivemoral

principles

f

udgment

and

conduct,

ather han

substantive

moral principles

hemselves.

n

the ordinary ense, a

substantive

rinciple

is

inherentlympartial

f

it contains no proper names or

rigged

definite

descriptions.

But

an

inherently mpartial

principlemay

be

appliedprej-

udicially

f

it is

applied

only

in

some relevant

circumstances

nd

not

others,

r

applied

to

suitthe nterests f

some

individuals nd

not

others,

or

applied

on

the basis

of

attributes rrelevant o those

explicitly icked

out

by

the

principle.

o,

for

xample,

violate he metaethical

equirement

of impartialityf I apply the principleof hiringthe most competent

candidate for the

ob only

to

the

pool

of candidates

selected

from

a

particular

lub or class or race. This

applicative

notion of

impartiality

s

also

part

of

the

ordinaryusage

of

the

concept.

I

will

be concerned with

impartiality

n

thissense,

in

which it

is the application

rather than the

formulation f the

principle

that s at issue.

In

the applicative ense, to be

impartial

n

one's

udgments to ascribe

an evaluative

redicate

o a

subject

n

thebasis

of

the attributer attributes

thepredicatedenotes ratherthan on the basis of some other, rrelevant

attributewhich one

happens

to value or

disvalue.

Without

knowing

what

the substantive

udgment

is and on what

attributes

t

is

based,

there is

no

way

of

determining

whetheror not one has

judged

impartially.

or

example, my udgment

that

you

would make a

particularly

ntertaining

dinner

guest

is

impartial

f

it

is based on the

high

quality

of

your

con-

versationand social

skills,

nd

biased

if

it is

based

on

your impressive

professional onnections.Without

knowingwhat

it

is

I

am

udging and

on what attributive

asis,

whether

r

not

myjudgment

s

impartial

annot

be determined.

Note that

the

impartiality

f

my

udgment has nothingto do with

whetheror not

I

bear

some

personal

relation to

you,

that

s,

with how

impersonal

I

am

in

making

the

udgment. Thus,

basing my udgment

of

your suitability

s a dinner

guest

on

your professional

connections

does not

require

that be

in

the

process

of

consideringwhether o invite

1.

Adrian

M.

S.

Piper,"Seeing

Things,"

Southern

ournal

f

Philosophyupply. "Moral

Epistemology")29 (1991):

29-60.




4/33

728

Ethics

July

991

you

to

dinner,

r

if

am,

that

desire

ccess

to

your mpressive

rofessional

connections.

There

is

nothing

bout

failing

o stand

n

personal

relation

to you

that

nsures mpartiality

fjudgment,

nd

nothing

bout

standing

in such relationthatprecludes it.2

Similarly,

o treat

thers

mpartially

s to

be

guided consistently

n

one's

behavior

oward

hemby

n

inherently

mpartial,

ubstantive

rinciple

of

conduct,

uch

that

one

acts

as the

principle

rescribes

nd

in

accordance

with

he

attributes

tsevaluative

predicates

denote

and

not

n

accordance

with

ther,

rrelevant

ttributes

ne

happens

to

value

or disvalue.

Again,

without

knowing

what

the

substantive

principle

of

conduct

is,

and

on

what

attributive

asis

I am

applying

t,

there

is

no

way

of

determining

whether r not mytreatment ftheother s impartial. o,

for

example,

you

cannot

know

whether

have

treated you impartially

n

hiring

you

for

hejob

unless

you

know,

irst,

hatmy

hoice

s

guided

by

the

principle

of

hiring

the

most

competent

candidate

for

the

ob,

and

second,

that

have

hired

you

because

of

your competence

and

not

because

of

your

club,

class,

or

race.

I

will

be concerned

with

mpartiality

n

this

latter

sense,

in which

t is the application

of

inherently

mpartial

principles

of

conduct

rather

han

principles

f udgment)

that

s

at

issue. My

argument

willbe

that

compassion

is a

substantive

moral

emotion

that

disposes

one

to applythe substantive rincipleofrendering id to theneedyand sat-

isfies

he

metaethical

equirement

f

strict

mpartiality

as

I will

define

t).

Lawrence

Blum's

view

of

mpartiality

iffers

rom

mine

with

respect

to

at east

twoof

these

claims.

First,

lum criticizes

antian

moral

theories

on

the

grounds

that

n

assigning

major

role

to

mpartiality,

hey

hereby

"deny

a substantial

ole

to

sympathy,

ompassion,

nd concern

n

morality

and

moral

motivation."3

lthough

Blum

does

notdefine

what

he

means

by

"compassion,"

he

does say

about impartiality

hat

it

involves

"not

giving

weight

o

one's

own

preferences

nd interests

imply

ecause

they

are one's own,but rathergivingequal weightto the interests f all, ...

favoring

one simply

ecause

of

personal

preference"

p.

44).

Impartiality,

on

Blum's conception,

s

not an

appropriate

equirement

here

friendship

is

concerned

pp.

46-66).

My

argument

will mply

hat,

ike

compassion,

genuine

friendship-as

opposed

to

excessive

dependency

or

insensitiv-

ity-would

be

impossible

without

t.

Second,

Blum's

characterization

f

mpartiality

s

"giving

qual

weight

to

the

interests

of

all,

...

favoring

none simply

because

of

personal

2. Of course,this snottodenythat tanding na certainkindofpersonalrelationship

to

you

may

tempt

me

to

bias

the

application

of

my

substantive

principle

n

your

favor,

e.g.,

f

want

to curry

our

favor

r

avoid

ncurring

our

wrath.

ut

this

s

ust

to

acknowledge

that

mpersonality,

hich

s

a

psychological

tate,

may,

under

certain

ircumstances,

acilitate

adherence

to

impartiality,

hich

s

a

cognitive

norm.

t is

not to

conflate

he

two,

nd

there

is

no

psychological

reason

to

suppose

that

they

must

always

go

hand

in

hand.

I

discuss

this

distinction

t greater

ength

n

"Moral

Theory

and

Moral

Alienation,"Journal

f

hilosophy

84

(1987):

102-18.

3.

Lawrence

Blum,

Friendship,

ltruism

nd

Morality

Boston:

Routledge

&

Kegan

Paul,

1980),

p. 3.

Henceforth,

ll page

references

o this

work

will

be

parenthesized

n the

text.




5/33

Piper

Impartiality,ompassion,nd

Imagination

729

preference"does notclearly

dentify

mpartialitys

a

metaethical ather

than a

substantivemoral

principle.

t

thus leaves

open

the conceptual

possibility f substantive

seudoimpartialist

rinciples which might, for

example,require ne to treat veryonewith similar egreeofdetachment,

or to

distribute esources

in

exactly equal

amounts to

everyone,or to

ascribe to

everyone,

ncluding oneself,

exactly the same predicates,all

regardlessofattributive asis.

These

principleswould prescribe policy

not of

impartiality ut of

indiscriminacy. s substantive

moral principles

theywould be very peculiar,

and

I

know of no

philosopher who holds

any one

of

them.

They

would

also violate the metaethical

principlesof

impartiality

n

udgment and

treatment arlier described, since the

in-

discriminacyftheir pplicationwouldbe inherentlyiasedagainst ertain

cases

identifiably emanding

of

special

consideration

by

virtue of cir-

cumstance.

Blum himselfdoes not

explicitly

escribe the targetof his criticism

in

substantive

pseudoimpartialist erms.

But he does contrastwhat he

thinks

mpartiality equires

with

whathe thinks

ompassionrequireswith

respect to

substantivemoral conduct.

Since compassion is a

substantive

moral concept,

this contrast

uggests hat he views

mpartialitys a sub-

stantivemoral

concept

as well.

I

find

this

nterpretationmplausible

for

the reasons ust mentioned.So I willassume inwhat follows hatwe both

mean to

address the concept of

impartiality s a metaethicalcriterion

for the correct

pplication

of

substantivemoral

principles.

II. MODAL IMAGINATION

Begin by

considering

what our

conception

of

human

beings

would

be

likewithout

he

modal aspect

of

magination.We would be able to

recollect

experiences

and emotions we had

had,

as well

as

mentally

o

envisage

objects, events, and states of affairswe were presently xperiencing.

Images

of

familiarhuman

bodies, stationary

nd

in

motion,

silent

and

audible,

as

well as some of our

intellectual, sychological,

nd

sensory

reactionsto

them,

and our

present

reactionsto

those,

would

be

among

the

items accessible to

memory

and visualization. Our

conception

of

human beings would

consist, oughly,

n

our

sensory

xperience

of our-

selves and

other human

bodies, plus

our

complex

reactions o them.

We

might experience

cravings,

needs, desires,

and

intentions

n

ourselves.

But we could envisage neither

absent objects of

desire nor ourselves

satisfyinghosedesires, ince thiswouldrequireus to magine possibility

of action that

we had not

yetexperienced (of

course,

this s not to

deny

thatwe

might

n

fact

atisfy

hem

nevertheless).

A

nonmodal

conception

of human

beings, then,

would

be one

in

which our

intentional tates

were

experienced

as events withoutforeseeable

consequences.

Nor

could we

envisage

other

people

satisfying

heir

ravings, eeds,

desires,

or

intentions,

or

the same reason.

In

fact,

we

could not

magine

other

people having

these or

any

of the

other inner

experiences

that

constitute ur interiority.houghts,emotions,desires,and sensoryre-




6/33

730

Ethics July

991

sponses

would constitute

part

of our

conception of ourselves, but not

part

of our

conception

of others. Since

each

of

us can experience only

our

own

responses

and not

someone else's,

and

since we could imagine

onlywhatwehad experienced,others' xperiencewould not be accessible

to our imagination t all.

Without

he capacity o envisage eventsor states f affairs therthan

those we ourselves were experiencingor had experienced,we would be

unable to

identify

ur

experiences

in

terms of

universally pplicable

concepts, concepts

that

apply equally

well to classes of events that

may

occur

in

the futureor

might

have occurred

in

the

past,

in

addition to

those

that are

occurring

n

the

present

or

did occur

in

the

past. This

means that, n particular, heconcepts n terms f whichwe understood

even our

own

inner states

would

be

extremely

imited.

For

example,

no

quantity

of

recurrences

of

certain kinds

of

emotional state would be

sufficient

o

lead us to formulate he conceptof love,or fear,

or

anger,

or

oy

as we

actually

understandthose

concepts,

because the

application

of

each

extends

past

the

experiences

we have

actually

had

forward

nto

a possiblefuture nd backward nto

a

counterfactually ossible past. So

not

only

would

others'

inner

states be imaginatively naccessible to us

but our

insight

nto our

own

would be

almost

nonexistent,

r

at least

extremely rimitive.We wouldexperienceourinner tates s wedo subtle

changes

in

the weather

for

which

we

have

no

words.

Without

the

concepts

that denote

at

least our

own

inner

states,

ur

capacity

o

reason

about them or others-to draw

analogies, nferences,

and conclusions,

or to make inductive

empirical generalizations

bout

them-would be

correspondingly rippled.

For

example,

we

might

be

able

to

juxtapose

two or more

experiences

we had

had,

and

perhaps

even note

the

differences

nd similarities

mong

them. But we could

supplyno term to any analogy thatrequiredus to positan experience

thatwas

in

some

respect

unlike

any

we had had.

So,

in

particular,

could

not draw

any analogy

between

any experience

I

had had and one

you

mighthave. Because yourhaving

n

experience

s not

tself

n

experience

I

would havehad,

I

would have

no

basis

on which o

conceive hepossibility

of

your having

an

experience

at all.

Thus

I

might xperience

the

piano

landing

on

mytoe, resultant hooting ains

n

mytoe, and myselfjumping

up

and down

holding myfoot,

he

surrounding

isual

horizon

rising

nd

falling accordingly.

But from

myobservation

of the

piano landing

on

your oe and your umping up and down holding your foot, would fail

to

supply

the

corresponding ensations

of the

piano's landing

on

your

toe,

the resultant

hootingpains,

or

yourjumpingup

and

down. Because

I

experiencedmy

own

behavior

ntirely irst-personally

nd

yours ntirely

third-personally,

would be unable

to

detect the relevant similarities

between

my

behavior and

yours.

would

lack

the

imaginative

basis

on

which to

make

even the

simplest

nference

from

he

one to the other.

The resultwould be

a

primitively

elf-centered

nd

narrowly

oncrete

conceptionof human beings, in which the most vivid and memorable




7/33

Piper

Impartiality,

ompassion,nd Imagination

731

eventswere

ntrinsicallyied

to

our

sensory xperience

of

others s

mobile

physicalbeings,

and

our

intellectual

nd emotionalresponses to it

and

them.This conceptionwould be

primitivelyelf-centered

n

that he

criterion

of significancen evaluatingand judging our own and others'behavior

would be

some

function f

our own

visceralresponse to

them: the psy-

chological uality

f our

reaction,

or

xample;

or

itsdegreeof

pleasantness

or

vividness;

or the

ability

of that

behavior to arrest our

attention.

A

primitivelyelf-centeredonceptionof

others s not

necessarily selfish

conception

of

them, since

it

does not

necessarily valuate and

judge

others'behavior

with

respect

to the satisfaction f

one's own

needs and

interests.

primitivelyelf-centeredonception s,

rather,

ne that

valuates

and

udges another's behavior

n

accordance withthe

centrality

f one's

own

experience:

other

people

are more

or

less

important

r

valuable,

and theirbehavior more or

less

interesting

r

worthy

f

note, nsofar s

theyviscerally

move one-in

whateverdirection-to a

greater

or

lesser

degree.

A

primitively elf-centered onception of

others reverses the

psychologically nd

morally

ntuitive

rder

of

events

n

moral

appraisal:

ordinarily

t

s

supposed

that

we are moved

by

an eventor

action or state

of affairs ecause it s

significant.

n

agent

who

holds

a

primitively

elf-

centered

onception

of

others

regards

n eventor actionor

stateof affairs

as significant ecause she is moved byit.

The conception of

human beings that resulted from

a

nonmodal

imaginationwould also be

narrowly

oncrete

n

that

our

view of

ourselves

and others

would be neither nformednor

nflamed

y mplicit,

entative

suppositions regarding

our

or their nternal

motivations, houghts,

r

emotional

states;

by hopes

or

expectations

about our or

their future

behavior;

or

by speculations

on

possible courses

of

action

revealed

by

our or their

present

behavior.

We can assume for the sake of

argument

that our own

motives, houghts,

nd emotional stateswould be

experi-

entially ccessible to us in some conceptually imitedway, perhaps as

schematic

conjunctions

of

images.4

But we would lack the

capacity

to

speculate

on

the

conceptual

identity

f those states

n

ourselves, ust

as

we would lack

the

capacity

to conceive them

as

being

of

any

sort at

all

in

others.

Nor

could we

plan

for the

future, spire to achieve goals, or

consider alternative

ourses

of

action we

might

take. Our

mental

lives

would be

restricted

o

experiencing

ur

present

nner

states nd remem-

beringpast ones, and observing thers' ehavior

nd reacting o its mpact

on us.

Our socialrelationswould be correspondinglyereft. ommunications

about

plans, hopes,

dreams,

or desires would be

nonexistent,

s would

4.

I

make this oncession o

non-Kantians nlybecause considerations f space preclude

more extended

argument

to the effect hat without modal

imagination

and bona fide

concept

formationwe would have

no first-personal

ccess

to our motives,thoughts, r

emotional states t all. Nothing of

consequence formy argument urns n thisconcession.

I take up this ssueingreaterdetail n

"Xenophobia and Kantian Rationalism," hilosophical

Forum in press).


http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


8/33

732

Ethics

July

991

the

corresponding

dimensions

of

personal

character

these

intentional

states

xpress.

The very

deas of sharing

one's

thoughts,

eaching

agree-

ment,or achievingunderstandingwith

nother

would

be

unintelligible.

Such

relations

might

be

somewhat

more

vividto

sensation

without

he

intervention

f suppositions

and

expectations

bout

the other.

But

they

would

also be

harsher,

bleaker,

and

inchoate.

They

would

lack

the

sig-

nificance

nd depth

conferred

byour

implicit

resumption

f

potential.

They

would

lack

the

richness

of mutual

insightconferred

by

shared

emotions

nd thoughts.

And

there

would

be no

place

in such

relationships

for

he

mutualcontentment

nd familiarity

orne

of a

common

worldview

or value

commitment,

r for

the

cooperative

behavior

that

makes

them

possible.

Many

of

us have

occasionally

experienced

primitively

elf-centered

and

narrowly

concrete

relationships,

whether

as

object

or as subject.

Ordinarily

we

think

of them

as

unsatisfactory

nd

without

future,

nd

we try

o improve

or

move

past them.

In the

scenario

I have

been

en-

visioning,

n which

modal

imagination

f

alternative ossibilities

s

fore-

closed,

even

the

conceptual

possibility

f movingpast

such

dead-end

relationships

would

be

foreclosed

as

well.

Virtually

ur entire

ability

o

think

about

and

understand

our

experience,

both of

ourselves

and

of

others,as well as our abilityto coordinate our behavior withothers

presuppose

the

functioning

f

modal

imagination.

Those inclined

to

Cartesian

skepticism

bout

the

existence

of other

minds

need

to be

re-

minded

of

the

centrality

f

modal

imagination

to the

functioning

f

human social

and

mental

ife.

And their

verificationist

earsneed

to

be

metwith

a

reminder

ofwhat

that

ife

would

be

like

without

t.

III. SELF-ABSORPTION

AND

VICARIOUS

POSSESSION

Next consider two extremesof imaginativeobject. At one

end

of

the

spectrum,

there is

the

kind one effortlessly

alls

to

mind

with

no

cue

beyond

hat

f a momentary

ssociation

r verbaldescription.

or

example,

I now ask you

to imagineyourself

ising

fromyour

seat,

flapping

your

armsvigorously,

nd sailing

loft.

t

probably

oes

not require

very

much

mental

concentration

or

youto

activate

he

required

visual

magery

nd

subliminal

ensations;

the mere

verbal

description

may

suffice.

owever,

easy

come,

easy go.

Virtually

ny

actual

internal

or external

cue

will

suffice

o banish

that

fantasy:

he ringing

f thetelephone,

your

shifting

inyourchair,or somethingyoureadherethatmomentarilyatchesyour

attention.

Call this

a

surface

bject

f imagination.

At the

otherend

of

the

spectrum,

epthbjects

f

magination

all

forth deeper

psychological

investment

f energy

nd

attention.

hey

occupy

a

larger

proportion

f

one's waking

consciousness,

and

may

either replace

or

vividly

nhance

reality

s one experiences

it. For

example,

I

read

a first-person

ccount

by

a

battered

wife

of her

experiences,

and

my

emotions

as well

as

my

thoughts

re

fully

ngaged,

not

only

as

I

am

reading

but

afterward

s




9/33

Piper

Impartiality,

ompassion,

and

Imagination

733

well.

My

imaginative

reconstruction

eplaces

reality s

I

am

absorbing

her

story

nd

altersmy

viewof

the

world

afterward.

Most

imaginative

objects ie somewherebetweenthese two.

Clearly

this

taxonomy

of

imaginative

bjects s

far

from

xhaustive.

Nor

does it sort

maginative

bjects

nto

those

we

visualizeand

thosewe

conceive

in

some

more

abstract or

schematic

sense:

I

may be

deeply

involved

in

imagining

the

outlines

of my

cosmological

theory

of the

universe, r

only

momentarily

istractedy

the

visual

mageofthe

groceries

I

must

purchase

on

the

way

home.

Whereas

nonmodal

imaginationpre-

cludes

imaginative

onceptualization,

modal

imagination, s

already ug-

gested,

supplements

rationality

o

produce it.

Nor does thedistinction etweendepth and surfaceobjects of mag-

ination

classify

uch

objects by

content:

Penrod

Scofield

was

so

fully

engaged

bythe

first-described

antasy

hat

even

Miss

Spence's

repeated

shouting

scarcely ufficed o

returnhim

to

the

reality

f

the

classroom.

Rather, mean to

distinguish

mongsuch

objects f

magination

ccording

to

the

degree of

one's

momentary

xperiential

nvolvement n

them.

Some such

objects

hold us

in

their

grip,

while

others

lide

over

the

surface

of our

awareness

while

barely

disrupting

ur

emotional

nd

psychological

state at all.

Sometimes

we treat

as

objects

of

surface

magination hose we

are

called

upon

to

treat n

depth.

For

example,

charitable

concerns

often

bulk

mail

letters o

potential

ontributors hat

describe

n

vivid

detail

the

plightof

those for

whom

they

wishto

garner

support.

Upon

receiving

these

mailings, ne

skims

he

letter,

arely

registeringhe

import

of

the

words,

before

tossing

t in

the

trash.

Conversely,

we

may treat

n

depth

imaginative

objects that

are

more

deserving

of

surface

treatment. or

example,one

may

die a

thousand

deaths

magining

n

excruciating

etail

the possibility hat one may fluba line the next timeone presentsa

paper.

The

vividness of

this

scenario

may overwhelm one

with

such

serious

anxiety

r

depression

that

t

nterfereswith

one's

sleep

patterns.

In

both of

these

cases,

something

has

gone

awry.

n

the

first, ne's level

of

imaginative

nvolvement

s,

at

least on

the

face of

it,

insufficiently

responsiveto

another

person's real

crisis-a

predicament hat

demands

a

considered

and

fully

ttentive

esponse.

In

the

second

case,

one's level

of

imaginative

nvolvements

excessively

esponsive

o

an

inconsequential

possibility

hat

can

be

prevented

easily

e.g.,

by

rehearsing few

times

beforehandone's

delivery

f the

paper).

Naturally,

ach of

these

inappropriate

maginative

esponses

could

be

directed

toward

the

other

maginative

bject.

It

may

be,

for

example,

that

one is so

engaged

in

dying

a

thousand

deaths

while

reading

about

the

plight

of

the

disadvantaged

that

one can

scarcely

collect

oneself

sufficiently

o

take out

one's

checkbook.

Alternately,

ne

may

treat

so

offhandedly

he

possibility

f

flubbing

line

in

one's

paper

that

one

neglects ven to

review

the

arguments

herein,

much

less

rehearse

one's




10/33

734

Ethics July 991

delivery f them. n each

of these

cases,

one's

level

of

involvementwith

the imaginativeobject is either

too deep or too

superficialrelative to

other,more pressing, onsiderations.

What

considerations? he first

xample,

n

which

one

fails

o

register

the importof another person's

serious crisis, uggests

he violationof a

moral normof conduct, that

one should be responsive rather than in-

sensitiveo another's uffering.ut in

the second through

ourth xamples,

some different

equirementof proportion eems to have

been violated.

For instance, responsivenessto

another's suffering hat is so excessive

that

t

incapacitates

one from

cting

does not

seem

to exhibit

ny

of

the

familiarmoral

defectsof character.We pity person who

has a nervous

breakdownin response to the political tortureof her countrymen;we

do not

condemn her. What all of

these examples have

in

common is

instead the violationof certain

psychologicalorms.

n

each

of them,the

balance between preserving he

unityand rational

ntegrity

f

the self

against external

violation,

on

the one hand, and

maintaininga self-

enhancing

connection and

receptivity o external nput, on

the other,

has been destroyed.5 n each, the

nvolvement f the self n

ts maginative

object

is

inappropriate because

it

fails to recognize and

respect the on-

tological boundaries either of

the self

or of

the

imaginative bject. As a

rough first pproximation of

necessary though possibly

not sufficient)

criteria f

appropriate

nvolvement, propose the following:

An

appropriate

evel of involvement

n

an

imaginative

bject

rec-

ognizes and

respects

both

A.

the psychological

oundaries of one's self s an

acting ubject

and

B.

the

psychological

oundaries

of

the other's elfas

an

acting

subject.

A

and

B

apply

to cases

in which

one's

imaginative

object

is another

subject.

They

also

apply

to cases

in

which it is

not,

on

the

assumption

that

one's

level of involvement

n

the

object

itselfhas

consequences

for

other

subjects.

The

application

of

these

criteriacan be illustrated

by

reconsidering

he

preceding

examples

in

its

ight.

The first ase described

above,

in

which

a

written

description

of

others'

misfortunes

carcelyregisters

n

one's

consciousness,

much less

moves one to

action,

violates

B,

for

n

tone fails o

recognize

he

existence

of the other's ubjectivityltogether. his brand ofself-absorptionomes

closest to the

primitively

elf-centered

nd

narrowly

oncrete view of

others described

n

Section

II.

In

this

case, however,

the mental

repre-

sentations f others' nner states xist at least as surface

objects

of

imag-

ination,while one's

own

are

depth objects.

One

regards

other

people

as

5.

I

discuss this

ssue at greater

ength

n

"Two Conceptions of the Self,"

Philosophical

Studies 8 (1985):

173-97, reprinted

n

Philosopher's

nnual

8 (1985): 222-46,

and in

my

"Pseudorationality,"n Perspectivesn

Self-Deception,

d.

Brian

McLaughlin and Amelie 0.

Rorty Berkeley:University f CaliforniaPress, 1988), pp. 297-323.




11/33

Piper

Impartiality, ompassion,

and Imagination

735

mere furniture

n

the externalenvironment

nd is without a

visceral

comprehension

f their

nternal onscious states.When

we lack a visceral

comprehension

of what we read, the text

n

question s a

conjunctionof

emptywords withoutpersonalmeaningto us. Our intellectual rasp of

the material s

mpeded by

a failure f

the modal imagination

hose words

are intended to

spark.

By

contrast, he second case described

above,

in

which one

cannot

sleep

for

nxiety

t the

possibility

f

flubbing

line

n

one's

paper,

violates

A. Here the mere possibility f

an event that s

temporally xternal to

the

self

n

its

present tate nvades that selfto the

point

of

disrupting

ts

internal

quilibrium. hat

internal quilibrium tself s treated s

a surface

objectof magination,whereas the envisionedpossibilitys a depth object.

In

such cases, one's preoccupationwith

external events or

anticipated

externalevents s so

all-encompassing

hat

one failsto notice one's own

internal

discomfort t all. This is an abdication of

the present elf to an

anticipated

future

cenario.

The third ase,

n

which

ne experiences he

agony

of the

unfortunate

one is

reading

about to

such

an

extentthatone is rendered

ncapable

of

action,

also

violates

A,

for

here,

a

spatiotemporally

xternal event is

allowed

to

invade the self

n

its

present

state

to

the

point

of

disrupting

its nternal quilibrium. n this ase, one appropriatesothers' xperience

of

suffering

ntothe self nd

replacesone's

own

responses

with t.

Whereas

a visceral

comprehension

of others'

suffering

may

motivateone to

act,

the appropriation of

their experience as a

replacement

for

one's own

renders ameliorative ction

impossible. Couples

who have

experienced

the

contagious effects

f

one

partner's

bad mood

may recognize this

phenomenon.

Taking action to

help a sufferer equires one to

make a

sharp

distinction etween one's own

inner state

and

the sufferer's. th-

erwiseone abdicates one's actual self o the maginedselfof thesufferer.

Finally, he

fourth ase,

in

whichone is

oblivious

o

the

consequences

for

others

of

one's

neglect

to

prepare

for a

future

ontingency

f

one's

own

behavior,

violates

B,

for

n

it

one

fails o

respect

the

validity

f

other

people's

normal

expectations.

This case treats one's

audience's inner

states-their

justified

xpectations

f a

certain tandardof

performance,

their

assumptions

and

hopes

of intellectual

ialogue

or

edification-as

surface

objects

of

imagination,

whereas one's own inner

state-of con-

fusion,

oblivion,complacency,

presumption, loth,

or

self-indulgence-

is a depth object. In thissortof case one failsto imaginewithsufficient

vividness he difference

etween thers' nner tates nd one's

own.

Indeed,

one identifies thers'

nner states

with

one's own. Like

the

first,

hiscase

illustrates

species

of

self-absorption

hat

approaches the primitively

self-centered nd

narrowly

oncrete view described earlier as

resulting

from lack or

failure

of

modal

imagination.

In

general,

then,

an

inappropriate

evel of

imaginativenvolvement

that

violates

A

tends to abdicate the

actual, present

self

to

the

imagined

object.

Call

this a state of vicarious

ossession.

ne can be

vicariously




12/33

736

Ethics July

991

possessed

by

the thought

of an actual

or possible

external

event as

well

as by

that of another person's

inner

states. The possession

is

vicarious

rather

than

actual

because

abdication

of the

self

is in part

voluntarily

effected.) y contrast, n inappropriate evelof maginativenvolvement

that

violates

B

tends to express

a failure

to imagine modally

the

object

as separate

from he

self ltogether.

his draws

one closer o the

primitively

self-centered

nd

narrowly

oncrete

perspective

earlier

described.

Call

this

a state

of

self-absorption.

Vicarious

possession

and self-absorption

reboth

a matter

fdegree,

and

each

can take a variety

of imaginativeobjects.

I

may

be

so self-

absorbed

in

my

experience

of your

discomfort

s

I

conceive

t that

am

completely nsensitive o yourdiscomfort s you experience it in fact:

obsessed

with

reassuring

you

that

your

recentauto

accident

s not

likely

to reoccur,

I

fail

to notice

that

my

repeatedly

broachingand

dilating

upon

the

topic only

increases your

anxiety.

Conversely,

may be

so

vicariously

ossessed

by your

conception

of

me as

I

envision

t that

am

completely

nsensitive

o the

discomfort

t actually

auses me to

conform

to it: inspired

to feats

of strength

y

the conception

of me as physically

powerful

imagineyou

tohave,

I

pull

unnoticed

nd

uncounted muscles

lifting

he heavy

objects of

which, so

I imagine,

you think

me

capable.

In all such cases, one is self-absorbed y one's own inner state fothers'

have little mpact

on

it,

nd

vicariously

ossessed

by

another's

nner state

if

one's

own has little

mpact

on it.

Someone

who is

self-absorbed

has

too little magination

egarding

xternals,

whereas one

who isvicariously

possessed

has

too much.

Vicarious

possession

nd self-absorption

re also

relative

o the actual

psychological

boundaries

of the

particular

elf in

question.

The self

is

always

constituted

by

(among

other

things)

the

particular

social

and

culturalnorms instilled n the process of socialization s well as by

the

values,

goals, and

practices

that

distinguish

t both

as an

individual self

and as

a member

of a

specific

social community.6

o what counts

as

vicarious

possession

or self-absorption

or one

self

might

be a

healthy

expression

f another elf's

central

nterests

r commitments.

or

example,

a self unconditionally

evoted

to the

problem

of

feeding

the

starving

n

India

would satisfy he

above

criteria

f

t

were Mother

Teresa's

but

would

violate

A if

t were

Faye

Wattleton's;

self

preoccupied

by

memories

of

its

own past experiences

might

satisfy

hese

criteria

f

it were

James

Baldwin'sbutwould violate B if t wereRichardNixon's.The boundaries

of some selves

circumscribeprimarily

ther-directed

r self-sacrificial

ideals,

whereas

those

ofotherscircumscribe

rimarily

elf-directed

nes.

Perhaps

the

more

numerous and

familiar

elves-those

that

ement

most

human communities-contain

both,

in

proportions

varying

with their

roles

and

positions

n

the community

s well

as their

personal

aptitudes

and

inclinations.

We must

first

now these

facts about

their

ndividual

6.

I

say

more about

this

n "Two

Conceptions

of the Self."




13/33

Piper

Impartiality,

ompassion,

and

Imagination

737

commitments

nd

relationsto

the

surrounding

community

n order

to

ascertain

whether

any particular

self

is

vicariously

possessed,

or

self-

absorbed,

or

both.7

Next will rguethatwhenthe maginativebject s another's uffering,

a

compassionate

response

is the

mean

between

these

two

extremes.

IV. COMPASSION

An involvement

with

another

person's

inner

states

as an

imaginative

object

requires

more than

thatone verbally

scribe

ertain rives,

eelings,

and

thoughts

n order

to

explain

her

behavior.

To

do

only

this

much

would be

to treat

those

states

as a surface

object

and so violate

B.

In

addition,trequires hat ne empathicallyxperience hosedrives, eelings,

and thoughts

s one

observes

herbehavior.

To

empathize

ith nother

s

to comprehend

viscerally

he

inner state

that

motivates

he

other'sovert

behavior

yexperiencing

oncurrently

ith hat

ehavior

correspondingly

similar

nner state

oneself,

as

a direct

and

immediate

quality

of

one's

own condition.

Empathy,

n

turn,

requires

an

imaginative

nvolvement

with he

other's

nner tate

because

we must

modally magine

to ourselves

what that

state

must

be as

we observe

her

overt

behavior,

n

order

to

experience

it

in

ourselves.

These inner tates re not tobe identifiedwith hoseone experiences

in

reaction

to her behavior-for

instance,

as

I

experience

gratitude

n

reaction

tomy nterpretation

f

your

action

as beneficent.

nstead,

they

are

the inner

states

that constitute

ne's interpretation

f her

behav-

ior-for

instance,

s

I

empathically

xperience

subliminal

ensations

of

pain

in

interpreting

our

wincing,

grimacing,

nd

putting

your

hand

to

7. Cases in which

valuable

contributions

o theworld

are

offset

y neglect

of loved

ones at home furnishnumerous illustrations f selves unbalanced by self-absorptionn

some areas

and vicarious

possession

in others.

Take Paul Gauguin,

who

abandoned

his

family o

go off

to the South

Seas

to paint.

His psychological

profile

givesclear

evidence

of self-absorption,

oth

in his

neglect

of his family

nd

in

the patent

racism

and sexism

of

his attitudes oward

the subjects

of

his

painting.

On the

other

hand,

his

obsession

with

the

sland culture

of Tahiti

and of his own

role n t might

e viewedas

evidence

of

vicarious

possession,

n his abdication

to itof the

self

formed

by

his

prior, ongstanding

ocial

and

familial commitments.

Merely

his central

and overriding

commitment

o his

art

by

it-

self-independently

of the psychological

nd socialattractions

f hisadopted

as compared

to

his

original

environment-cannot,

I

think,

be cited

as evidence

of one or the

other,

since such a commitmentmighthave existed ndependently for concurrently ithboth.

There

are

other

such cases,

such as

Dickens's Mrs.

Jellyby

n

Bleak

House:

"'Mrs. Jellyby

... devotesherself

ntirely

o the public.

She

has devoted

herself o

an extensive

variety

of

public

subjects

at

various times

and is at present(until

something

else attractsher)

devoted

to the

subjectof

Africa.'

.. 'Mr. Jellyby

.

. is . . . merged-in

themore

shining

qualities

of his wife.' Her eyes]

had a curious

habit of seeming

to look

a

longway

off.

As

if .. they could

see nothing

nearer than

Africa "

chap. 4).

It

appears

that

Mrs. Jellyby

is

self-absorbed,

n that she is

unable

to imagine proximate

others

(children,

husband,

friends)

s selves separate

from herself;

and vicariously

possessed

by the

numerous

and

transient

auses

to which she

devotes

all her

energies.

am

grateful

o Ruth

Anna

Putnam

forraisingthesecases fordiscussion.




14/33

738

Ethics

July

991

your

forehead. The claim is that an involvementwith another person's

inner tate s an imaginative bject s mutually nterconnected

ith ne's

ability o experience empathically n inner state

similarto

that

which

one ascribes to the other as an interpretationfher behavior.8

How similarone's own state or condition must be to the other's n

orderto count as a case of empathydepends on the proportional

elations

betweenthe ntensity nd qualityof i) the other's elf nd her condition,

and (ii) one's own self-conception nd

one's

own

condition.9

f

you are

being disemboweled by a charging bull and

I

experience

in

response

only

the

mildesttwinge

n

my gut, probably

m not

empathizingwith

your

condition.

Similarly

f

you

are

mildly pprehensive

about

your

first

driving esson whereas I am beside myselfwithpanic. These responses

of mine fail to count as

empathic

because

they

are too

different

rom

your

actual inner state to enable me

validly

to

attribute hem

to

you.

The more radically get it wrong when imagining he

analogue of your

inner state nmyself, he less I succeed inunderstandingyours.The less

I

succeed

in

understanding yours, the more the coordinationof our

actionsmust

depend

on convention

r

force

r

detailedverbal

greement.

And the more we mustdepend

on

these factors

o

coordinate ur actions,

the more closely

we will

approximate

dead-end

relationship

f the

kind

earlier described.Empathy requiresnot onlya richmodal imagination

but

an

approximately ccurate

one as well.

How does one achieve empathy withouthaving had

first-personal

direct

xperience

of

that tate

one

attempts

o

approximate

maginatively

oneself

We

can

only peculate

on

the

extent

o

which

ome

such external

perceptual cues,

such as the

sight

of

another

person

laughing

with

oy

or

grimacing

n

pain,

or the

sound

of a

baby crying,

mightfunction s

biologically ngrained

stimuli to

which we

are

biologically

disposed to

8. That understanding notherperson's

nner

taterequires

one's

empathic xperience

of it may seem to

be a

very trong pistemic

claim. It

implies

that

understanding

nother

person's nner tate as opposed to merely xplaining

t-

is dependent n a felt sychological

connectionwith he other n a way thatunderstanding nonpsychological ourse

of events

or state

of

affairs

s

not.

This claim

is

not as radical as it

may

seem at first.

n

Sec. II

I

argued

that modal

imagination

f another

person's

nner states s a

way

of understanding

the other

person

is the norm

in

most human

interactions,

without

which

they

all would

have a verydifferent ast. In this section t transpires hat modal imagination equiresnot

merely hatwe envision

he

other's nner tate

n

order to understand

t

but that

we viscerally

comprehend whatwe envision as well. This is no cause for alarm. The implications hat

there hen mustbe much about otherpeople that ranscends

ur

relatively arochial

powers

of understanding; hatwe thenmustwork uite

hard n order

to achievethatunderstanding,

of anyone; and thatmanyhuman nteractionsre corrupted y failure f thatunderstanding

should not be surprising nd should not be news.

I

discuss the consequences of moral

corruption nd the failure f motivational nderstanding t greater ength

n

"The

Meaning

of

Ought'

and the

Loss

of Innocence"

(invitedpaper

on

ethics

delivered to the

American

PhilosophicalAssociation astern DivisionConvention,Atlanta,

December

1989),

abstracted

in

Proceedingsf heAmerican hilosophical ssociation 3 (1989): 53-54.

9.

I

discuss the notion of a self-conception,

nd

distinguish

t from

a

conception of

the self, n "Two Conceptionsof the Self" and in "Pseudorationality."




15/33

Piper

Impartiality,

ompassion,

and

Imagination

739

respond

empathically.

Or we may

see

another

behave

in a certain

way

oftenenough,

and

in

a

sufficiently

ide

variety

f

circumstances,

hat

we

develop

an

empathic

appreciation

of

her

motives

hrough

nference,

analogy, or induction. Sociopaths are characterizedby, among other

things,

he

inability

o

respond

in theseways;

and

we

do

not

yet

know

whether

heirdisability

s

primarily

ocial

or

biological

n

origin.

However,

it is at

least

clear

thatforms

of creativeexpression

such

as

music,painting,

poetry,

fiction,

nd

first-person

arrative

ccounts

enhance

our ability

o

imagine

modally

nother's

nner states,

ven

if

we

have

had

no such

first-personal

xperience

ourselves.

Fresh

combinations

of

mages,

words,

metaphors,

nd

tonal

progressions

nable

us

to

construct

an imaginative isionthatmay n turncausallytransformrenlargeour

range

of emotional

responses.

Claims

that

one

cannot

understand,

for

example,

what

t s

like for

a woman

to be raped

ifone

is a

man,

or

what

it is

like

for

a black person

to be

the object

of

racial

harassment

f

one

is white,

have

the virtue

of

refusing

to

appropriate

the

singularity

f

another's

experience

into

one's

necessarily

imited

onception

of

it.

But

they

re

too

often

based

on

a simple

ackof

interest

n

finding

ut

what

it

s likethrough

xploring

he

wide

variety

f iterary

nd artistic

roducts

designed

precisely

o

instruct

s about

these

things.'0

t is

not

surprising

tofind failureof modal imagination fanother's nnerstatespreceded

by

a

failure

f

curiosity

bout

them

or to find self-centered

nd

narrowly

concrete

view

of others

accompanied

by

a

lack

of interest

n the

arts.'

1

How can

we

know

how accurate

our empathic

responses

are?

We

cannot,

ince

we

have

no

way

of

comparing

nterpersonally

urown

first-

personal

experiences-even

our first-personal

xperiences

of

another's

inner

state

as we

modally

magine

it-with

the other's

nner

state

tself.

A fortiori,

e

have

no way

of

comparing

nterpersonally

wo

such

first-

personal stateswithrespectto qualityor quantity.Nevertheless,we may

make rough-and-ready

stimates

f theaccuracy

f our

empathic

esponse

by gauging

the

other's

reaction

to

those

of our

own actions

motivated

by

it. We

may

be

motivated

o respond

verbally

r

behaviorally

n

such

a

way

that

the other's

response

to

our

words

or actions

tells

us

whether

or

not

they

expressed

genuine

insight

nto

the

other's nner

state

as

we

empathically

magined

t.

Or we

may

simply

sk

whether

he

conjunction

10. These creativeproductsmay nstructne aboutanother's nner tatesbydepicting

what

t would

be

like for oneself

to

have those

states

or,

alternately,

what

twould

be

like

if

one

were

the other

and

had

them.

But

they

id

in the cultivation

f

one's

capacity

for

empathy

to

the extent

that

they

ultimately

nable one

to

understand

viscerally

what

it is

like for

the other

to

have

them.

That

is,

they

atisfy

oth

A and

B above.

11. Obviously,

we

can confirm to

varying

egrees)

whether

r

not

a

person

genuinely

empathizes

with

another onlyby

looking

at the

behavior

that

nner

state s presumed

to

motivate.

ut words

nd

deeds alone

constitute

either

necessary

or sufficient

equirement

of

empathy

tself,

ince

they

might

mask

the

clever

dissembler,

manipulator,

r

sociopath.

There is

no

necessary

ink between

the behavior

taken

as

evidence of

empathy

and the

innerstatethat s empathy.




16/33

740 Ethics July 991

of words,phrases,

imiles,metaphors,

nd

colloquial

expressionswe used

in order to describe it

is, in fact, ccurate, and correctour description

and

so

our

understanding ccording

to the other's response. The deep

philosophical problemsof private anguage, otherminds,and solipsism

do not necessarily ngender correspondingly eep

practical problems

when the effort o understand another

is

committed,persistent,

nd

sincere.

And, of course,

that we cannot know with certainty ow accurate

our empathic responses

are

does not

imply

that there s no fact of the

matter bout this,or, therefore, hat we cannot approximate

empathic

accuracy

to

varying egrees

whetherwe know with

certainty

hatwe are

doing

so or not.

In

what follows

I

will often

speak

of an

(accurate)

empathicunderstandingf or insightnto another'snner tate, s though

such a thing

s

possible.

This reflects

my

belief hat

t

s,

even ifwe

cannot

know with certainty hat

t is, or how it is.

By contrast

with mpathy, o sympathizeith nother s to

be

affected

by

one's visceral

comprehension

of the other's

nner

state

with

similar

or

corresponding

tate of one's own,

and to take a

pro

attitude oward

both fthe state s

positive

nd a con attitude oward

hem f t s

negative.

In

order to feel sympathyor nother's ondition,

ne mustfirst iscerally

comprehendwhat that condition s. Therefore,sympathy resupposes

at least a

partial capacity

forempathy.

But

once

one has achieved an

empathic nterpretation

f the other's

behavior,

sympathy s,

of

course,

not

the

onlypossible

esponse. may nterpret our

behavior s

murderous

rage withthe help of

my empathic experience

of it,and react witheven

greater revulsion against

it

for

that reason.

Whereas

sympathy mplies

one's emotional accord

with he other's nner

state, mpathy mpliesonly

one's visceral

comprehension

of it. That an

interpretation

f another's

inner state

requires

an

empathic imaginative

nvolvementwith

t does

not mean itrequiresone's concordant reaction to itas well.

An

empathic

imaginative nvolvementwith

another's inner states

treatsthose states as

depth

rather

than surface

objects

of

imagination.

It is an

application

f modal imagination o a particular

indof maginative

object, namely,

human

subject,

nd to a

particular uality

of that kind

of

object, namely,her

inner states.

To

entertain

nother's nner state as

a

surface

object

of imagination

s also an exercise of modal

imagination,

and therefore

might

uffice or mere

verbal

ascription

f inner statesto

explain nother's ehavior.But it s nsufficientor mpathic nderstanding

of that

behavior.

An involvementwith another's nner states as

an im-

aginative object requires

that one

empathically xperience

those states

as well.

An

inappropriate

nvolvement hatviolates

A,

that s,

vicarious

pos-

session,

has this feature to an excessive

degree.

In

the

case

of

vicarious

possession by

another

person's

inner

states,

one

treats

one's own

inner

states as surface

objects

and the

other's inner states as

depth objects.

Here

is

what t means to

appropriate

he other's

xperience

s one

imagines

it into one's self and replace one's own with t:




17/33

Piper

Impartiality,ompassion,nd Imagination 741

1. one empathicallyexperiences the other's feelings as one

imagines them to the exclusion of

one's own reactions o them i.e.,

a case of

being

"out of

touch

with

one's feelings");

2. one is sopreoccupiedwithmaginingwhat heother sthinking

that one's

own

thoughts re temporarily uppressed; and

3.

one's

actions reflect ne's conception of the other's wishes

or desires as to how one should act or what should be

done.

In

general, to be vicariously ossessed by another person's inner states

means that one's own sentience,

rationality, nd agency are suppressed

in

favor

of the

other's as one

empathically magines

her to be. This

constitutes n abdication of one's self

to another as one imagines her.

By contrast, n inappropriate

nvolvement hat violates

B,

that is,

self-absorption,acks this featureentirely.When another's nnerstates

are treated s surface

objects

n

deference

to one's own

as

depth objects

of

imagination,

he constituents f

one's

interpretation

f her

behavior

are

empty

words at best

assuming

one bothers o

interpret

er

behavior

at

all).

Terms such as

"headache,"

"grief,"

r

"starvation" ail to elicit n

one

any correspondingempathic response

altogether.

This is one

state

of

mind

that makes it

easy

to toss the

letter

from he

charitable oncern

into

the

trash.The moral termfor thiscondition s

"callousness,"

nd it

constitutes sacrifice f another's nner states s one conceives them to

one's

absorption

n

one's own.

The contrastbetween both of

these brands

of

inappropriate mag-

inative nvolvement nd an appropriateone is that

n

the

atter ase,

one

manages

to retainthe

empathic

experience of the other's nner state nd

the

reactions

that constitute

ne's own

simultaneously

nd with

equal

vividness,

n such a

way

that neither

A

nor

B

is violated. One holds two

equally

vivid

and sharplydistinct xperiences-one's

own

response

and

the

other's s one

empathically magines

t-in mind

simultaneously.

n

appropriate maginativenvolvementn another's nner state ssymmetrical

with

respect

to the relation between that state and one's own.

Now it

might

eem

that nsofar s

this s

possible,

t would

engender

agent paralysis.

t

might

seem that to

imagine empathically

o oneself

another's nner state with

vividness

qual

to one's direct

xperience

of

one's

own would be to be torn between

being

motivated o

act by the

other's nner

state as

one

empathically

magines

t and

being

motivated

by

one's own inner

state as

one

directly xperiences

t.

If I

empathically

imagine you

to

experience embarrassment t the same

time

nd with he

same vividness s I directly xperienceschadenfreude nresponse,then

it

appears

that neither

motivational

tate overrides he

other

n

my

con-

sciousness.

Then

what

spurs

me to act at all?

However,

this

difficulty

s more

imagined

than real.

First,

hese two

states

may

be

equally

vivid without

being equally

intense.

The

vividness

of

an

object

or

statedepends on its

perceptual (not necessarilyvisual)

clarity

nd on the

sharpness

of its

sensory

detail. The

intensity

f

a

state

depends

rather

on

the

strength

f

tscausal

impact

on

one.

For

instance,

your heady pride

of achievement

may

meet

with

only

faint nthusiasm




18/33

742

Ethics

July1991

inme.

Yet

may

empathically

magineyour

heady

pride of

achievement

no

less

vividly

han

I

directly

xperience

my own

faint

enthusiasm

for

it.

Second,

that

experience

simultaneouslynd

with

qual

vividness

wo

differentmotivationalstates does not implyany further imilarity f

structure

etween them. A

structural

eature

that

my own

inner

state

has and

that

my

mpathic

magination f

yours

acks s a

direct

onnection

to

myown

capacity

for

gency.

Whereas

I

can

empathically

magine

your

inner

state,

cannot

spur

you to

action

on the

basis of

my

imaginative

involvementwith

t.

By

contrast,my

direct

experience

ofmy

own

inner

state n

response

can

spur

me

to action

on the

basis of

my

maginative

involvementwith

t.

Essential to

the

boundaries

that

enable me

to dis-

tinguishmyselffromyours,hence to satisfy and B, is thenatural ink

between

my

self

and

my

action

that s

missingbetween

your

self

nd

my

action or

between

my

self

and

your action.

It is

only

when

thisnatural

ink

s

weakened that

violationsof

A or

B

occur. For

example,

whena

child s

repeatedly old

that

he feels

what

her

caretakers hink

she should

feel

instead of

what

she

does

feel,she

may

earn

to

suppress

awareness

of her

own

responses

and

replace

them

in

imagination

with

thers

hat re

prescribed o

her.This

habitof

thought

encouragesvicarious

ossession.

Alternately,

hen

others

egularlyssume

responsibilityora child'sactionsand shieldherfrom heirhuman con-

sequences,

she

may

fail

fully

o

develop

the

capacity

o

imagine

modally

others'

responses

to

them as

independent

of

her own

wishful

hinking

about

them.

This habit

of

thought

encourages

self-absorption.

oth

of

these

cases

involve a

conflation f

one's

own inner

states

with

those of

others,

nd so a

severance of the

natural ink

betweenone's

own

thought

and

one's

actions. In

the first

ase,

of

vicarious

possession,

one's own

action is

guided

by

another's

conception,

as one

empathically

magines

it,ofone's own innerstate. Such a case can lead to agentparalysiswhen

I

empathically

magineyour

conception

of

my

nner

state to

be at

least

as

motivationally

ompell

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