Pipelines study – final report

European Commission, DG EnvironmentIndustrial Emissions, Air quality & Noise Unit

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Background

Recital 13 of Directive 96/82/EC requires EC to study need for action

JRC Study 1999 identified several gaps – Proposal for a Directive prepared but not materialized

• Focus on transmission (not distribution)

• SMS for all operators, including performance measures for monitoring the SMS

• Prevention of third party interference through information system

• Other Seveso type provisions 2

Background

2006 Study on "Safety of oil and gas pipelines (transport sector)" conclusions

• Main cause of accidents is third party interference

• Self-regulation is valuable

• PIMS (Pipeline Integrity Management Systems) are essential

• Need for regulatory controls of third party interference

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Background• 2008 UNECE Safety Guidelines and Good Practices for

Pipelines – Recommendations

• System of permits and land use planning procedures• Regulatory framework to control third party

interference• Pipelines designed, constructed and operated in

accordance with recognized national and international standards/guidelines

• Pipeline management system (PMS) • Other Seveso type recommendations

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Objectives 2011 Study (COWI)

• Assess current coverage of pipeline safety in national and/or EU legislation

• Identify gaps

• Propose policy options to close gaps

• Assess impacts

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EU Pipelines network

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Hazard potential

• 1989 - former SU - sparks from two passing trains detonated gas leaking from LPG pipeline• 645 fatalities

• 2004 - EU Belgium Gishlenghien accident 2004• 24 fatalities• 132 injuries• 100 mio € damage costs

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Review of accident/incident history

• Decreasing incident rate = continued safety management improvements

• Third party interference = main cause (for gas about 50 % and for oil about 30 %) - followed by construction defects and corrosion

• Expected annual number of incidents 40-50

• Average damage per incident 0.39 mio €

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Legislative benchmark studyPrevention

• Adequate distance to population concentrations

• Inspection/maintenance to ensure mechanical integrity

• Safe working requirements close to high pressure pipelines and availability of pipeline location GIS data

• Restricted access to pipeline route in case of high-vulnerability surroundings

Mitigation

• Rapid leak detection capability and efficient means to stop flow

• Emergency plans

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Conclusions legislative benchmark

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Options for improvement

Non legally binding options

• Recommendations

limited costs/impact

• Reporting and benchmarking

limited costs

Would allow better monitoring

Keep focus on safety 11

Options for improvement

Legally binding options

• Scope - all pipelines or exclude gas distribution

• General safety provisions or specific technical safety measures

• Modify Seveso III or Separate Directive

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Comparison of options

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Conclusions

• Legislative action could increase protection level and reduce incident frequency

• Net benefits are however unlikely from a cost/benefits perspective

• Incidents statistics is not sufficiently comprehensive (lacks info on i.e. severity and causes of incidents and the development over time) to conclude on whether actual level of protection is sufficient 14

•Thank you for your attention!

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