Pipelines and Hazard Mitigation for Emergency Managers - Draft - 20130208

8/10/2019 Pipelines and Hazard Mitigation for Emergency Managers - Draft - 20130208

1/125

Pipelines and Hazard Mitigation for

Emergency Management

Draft

2/8/2013

Table

of

Contents

TableofContents.................................................................................................................................................... 1

Foreword................................................................................................................................................................. 1

Acknowledgements................................................................................................................................................. 4

Introduction:AnOverviewofPipelines.................................................................................................................. 6

IntegratingPipelinesintoHazardMitigationPlans............................................................................................... 26

AppendixAPipelineSystems............................................................................................................................. 46

AppendixBPhysicalandChemicalPropertiesofPipelineProducts.................................................................. 71

AppendixC

Pipeline

Design

and

Construction

...................................................................................................

91

AppendixDPipelineRegulationsandSafetyPrograms..................................................................................... 95

AppendixFLiquidPetroleumProductsTerminalsandAboveGroundStorageTanks.................................... 118

AppendixGOtherFederalAgencies................................................................................................................ 124

Foreword

PIPARecommendedPracticesandHazardMitigationPlans

FollowingpublicationofthePipelinesandInformedPlanningAlliances

(PIPA)report,PartneringtoFurtherEnhancePipelineSafetyInCommunities

ThroughRiskInformedLandUsePlanning:

FinalReportofRecommendedPractices,inNovember20101,a

communicationteamofrepresentativestakeholdersbeganresearching

howcommunitiesplanforotherhazardsandlearnedofthehazard

mitigationplanningprocess.

Mitigation iscommonlydefinedassustainedactionstakentoreduceoreliminate longtermriskto

peopleand

property

from

hazards

and

their

effects.

Hazard

mitigation

focuses

attention

and

resourcesoncommunitypoliciesandactionsthatwillproducesuccessivebenefitsovertime.Hazard

mitigationstrategiesincludebothstructuralmeasures,suchasstrengtheningorprotectingbuildings

andinfrastructurefromthedestructiveforcesofpotentialhazards;andnonstructuralmeasures,such

astheadoptionofsoundlandusepoliciesorthecreationofpublicawarenessprograms.Someofthe

1ReviewanddownloadthePIPAReportathttp://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/pipa/LandUsePlanning.htm.


2/125

PipelinesandHazardMitigationforEmergencyManagers 2

mosteffectivemitigationmeasuresare implementedatthe localgovernment levelwheredecisions

ontheregulationandcontrolofdevelopmentaremade.

The PIPA Communications Team recognized that the PIPA recommended practices are potential

hazardmitigationstrategies thatstateand localgovernmentscan implement. And,manyof these

actionscanbereadilyandcosteffectivelyimplemented.

TheStaffordAct(PublicLaw93288),asamendedbytheDisasterMitigationActof2000(DMA2000),

provides the legal basis for state, Indian Tribal, and local governments to undertake a riskbased

approachtoreducingrisksfromnaturalhazardsthroughmitigationplanning.TheFederalEmergency

ManagementAgency(FEMA)mitigationgrantprogramsrequireanapprovedandadoptedmitigation

plan for approval ofmitigation grant funding. FEMA offers information and guidance on hazard

mitigationplanninglaws,andregulations,onitswebsite:

http://www.fema.gov/plan/mitplanning/guidance.shtm.

DMA 2000 specifically requires mitigation planning for natural hazards, but not for manmade

hazards.However,

FEMA

supports

those

jurisdictions

that

choose

to

consider

technological

and

manmade hazards as part of a comprehensive hazard mitigation strategy in their respective

mitigation plans. FEMAs HowTo Guide # 7, Integrating Manmade Hazards Into Mitigation

Planning (FEMA3867)2,assumes thatacommunity isengaged in themitigationplanningprocess

andservesasaresourcetohelpthecommunityexpandthescopeofitsplantoaddressterrorismand

technologicalhazards.

PipelinesareManmadeHazards

Gas and hazardous liquid pipelines are constructed by and for pipeline companies for the

transportationand

distribution

of

gas

and

hazardous

liquids.

By

the

nature

of

the

potentially

hazardousproductstheycarry,pipelinesareasourceofpotentialharmtoacommunity,includingthe

population,environment,privateandpublicpropertyand infrastructure,andbusinesses.Pipelines

should be included in the lists of hazards that communities consider when developing hazard

mitigationplans.

Thus, the stage is set and the need is recognized to integrate pipelines into hazard mitigation

planning.

Purpose

Thisdocument

was

created

to

assist

those

involved

with

state

and

local

hazard

mitigation

planning

to

assess the riskofpipelinehazardsand toprovideguidanceonmitigationactions they can take to

reduce this risk. The goal is toprovide emergencymanagers,planners, andothers involvedwith

developinghazardmitigationplanswiththeknowledgeandunderstandingofhowpipelinesoperate,

2FEMAsMultiHazardMitigationPlanningGuidancecanbehelpfulindevelopingandevaluatingplansthatincludethese

hazards. SeeHowToGuide#7(FEMA3867),http://www.fema.gov/library/viewRecord.do?id=1915


3/125


the common products that may be transported through transmission and distribution pipeline

systems,andthepotentialimpacts(risks)ofpipelineincidents.

This document also provides information that can be of value in developing a risk and capability

assessmenttosupportthedevelopmentofapipelinehazardmitigationstrategy. Thisincludesatable

that showsmitigativemeasures ajurisdictional governmentmight consider including in its hazard

mitigationplan

to

address

pipeline

hazards.

Some

actions

may

be

applicable

only

to

state

or

only

to

localgovernments.

Pipelinesafetyisacommongoalandasharedresponsibilityofallstakeholders.TheU.S.Department

of Transportation'sPipeline andHazardousMaterials SafetyAdministration (PHMSA) is the federal

safetyauthorityforensuringthesafe,reliable,andenvironmentallysoundoperationsofournation's

pipelinetransportationsystem.ThroughcertificationoragreementwithPHMSA,statepipelinesafety

agencies may assume some of these responsibilities. State and local governments establish

emergencymanagement programs, development regulations, zoning and permitting requirements

and establish excavation damage laws. (PHMSA) has identified five areas where state and local

governments, through theirauthority,playan important role indevelopingmitigation strategies to

reducetherisksfrompipelinehazards.Theseare:

(1)Pipelineawareness educationandoutreach,

(2)Pipelinemapping,

(3)Excavationdamageprevention,

(4)Landuseanddevelopmentplanningneartransmissionpipelines,and

(5)Emergencyresponsetopipelineemergencies.

ThePIPArecommendedpracticesandthisdocumentweredevelopedforstakeholderinformationin

considerationof

the

risks

associated

with

existing

gas

and

hazardous

liquid

pipelines.

Neither

was

intended to address the sitingor constructionof futurenewpipelines, although some information

relatedtopipelineconstructionmaybeprovided.

Stateandlocalgovernmentsalsohavevaryingauthorityoverthesitingofnewpipelines.Thenumber

ofagenciesand specificpermits required fornewpipeline constructionwillvarydependingon the

route,typeoflandcrossed,orecologicalresourcesimpacted.Allpipelineprojectsmustfollowspecific

federal,state,and localpermittingrequirements.PHMSAdoesnothaveauthorityoverthesitingof

pipelines. Some of the PIPA recommended practices, which address land use and development

mitigationstrategies,maynotbeappropriateforconsiderationinthesitingofnewpipelines.

Our energy pipeline transportation system also includes networks of production, gathering, and

distributionpipelines.However,thePIPA initiativefocusesexclusivelyontransmissionpipelinesand

the PIPA recommended practices are not intended to apply to those production, gathering, and

distributionpipelinesystems.

The PIPA recommended practices also do not specifically address geological exploration and

productionofoilandgasorenvironmentalresourceconservationissuesinpipelinerightsofway.


4/125


5/125


pipelinesontheirproperty,andwheretofindmoreinformation.TheGuidedescribesallthedifferent

typesofpipelines,butmuchofthediscussionaboutpropertyrights,easements,andeminentdomain

ismorepertinentto largetransmissionandgatheringpipelinesthan it istothesmallerdistribution

pipelinesthatdelivergastoourhomesandbusinesses.

TheLandownersGuidewasmadepossibleinpartbyaCommunityTechnicalAssistanceGrantfrom

PHMSA.This

grant

program

provides

local

governments

and

community

groups

with

up

to

$100,000

fortechnicalassistanceintheformofengineeringorotherscientificanalysisofpipelinesafetyissues

andtohelppromotepublicparticipationinofficialproceedings.Youcanlearnmoreaboutthisgrant

program and what other communities have done with this grant money by visiting

www.primis.phmsa.dot.gov/tag/.

Finally, its worth repeating that the PIPA recommended practices afford actions to mitigate

hazardous pipeline risks that local governments can most likely implement readily and cost

effectively.


6/125


Introduction:

An

Overview

of

Pipelines

IntheUnitedStates,energypipelinesareextremelyimportanttooursocialandeconomicwellbeing.

Youmight say that pipelines are the arteries that carry the lifeblood our national economy and

security

Thereare

over

2.5

million

miles

of

pipelines

in

the

United

States4.

Our

national

pipeline

infrastructure

consists of various types of pipeline systems, both onshore and offshore, including approximately

321,000 miles of gas transmission and gathering pipelines, 2.06 million miles of natural gas

distributionpipelines, and 175,000milesofhazardous liquid pipelines.Additionally, there are 114

activeliquefiednaturalgas(LNG)plantsconnectedtoourgastransmissionanddistributionsystems,

andvariouspropanedistributionsystempipelines. Eachyear,morethan66%ofouroil,naturalgas,

andhydrocarbonresourcesaremovedusingthisvastnetworkofpipelines.

Pipelinesarethesafestpracticalmodefortransportinganddistributingthetremendousvolumesof

energyproductsthatweuseonadailybasisacrossourcountry.Alargepipelinecantransportroughly

twomillionbarrelsofgasolineaday.However,likeanyindustrythatdealswithhazardousmaterials

(hazmat), there is always a potential for risk pipeline accidents do occur andwhen an accident

occurs the impactscanbedevastating.Pipelineoperatorsand theemergency responsecommunity

must collectively respond topipeline incidents ina timelyandeffectivemanner toprotectpeople,

property,andtheenvironment.

UnderU.S.DepartmentofTransportation (DOT)pipelinesafety regulations (49CFRSubchapterD,

Parts192.3and195.2),apipelinesystemisdefinedasallpartsofapipelinefacilitythroughwhicha

hazardous liquidorgasmoves in transportation, includingpiping,valves,andotherappurtenances

connected

to

the

pipeline,

pumping

units,

fabricated

assemblies

associated

with

pumping

units,

metering and delivery stations, and storage and breakout tanks. Although typically found

underground, pipelines may also be found aboveground in various places where operational

considerations,suchasatpumpandcompressorstations,orwhereotherconditions,suchasharsh

environmentorgeologicalconcerns,makeitnotfeasibleforthepipetobeunderground.

Inthisdocument,includingtheappendices,thedifferenttypesofpipelinesaredescribed. Thebasics

ofhowpipelinesworkandhowhazardousproductsaretransportedthroughpipelinesarediscussed.

Other topics discussed include pipeline system components, pipeline construction and pipeline

regulation.

Categorizingpipelines

Pipelinescanbecategorizedintoseveraltypes:bytheproductstheycarry,bytheirfunction,andby

whethertheycrosstheboundaryfromonestatetoanother.

Categorizingpipelinesbytheproductstheycarry:

4PHMSAStakeholderCommunicationsWebsite(http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/Index.htm)


7/125


Gaspipelinescarrynaturalgasandothergasesthatareflammable,toxicorcorrosive,suchas

vaporized liquefied petroleum gases (i.e., propane and butane), ethylene, and propylene.

However,sincenaturalgasisthepredominantgastransportedbyandthoughtofwithregard

topipelines,furtherdiscussioninthisdocumentwillmostlyrefertonaturalgas.

Hazardous liquidpipelinescarrycrudeoiland refinedpetroleumproducts suchasgasoline,

dieseland

jet

fuel.

Ammonia

and

liquid

carbon

dioxide

are

also

considered

hazardous

liquids

and are also transported by hazardous liquid pipelines. A hazardous liquid pipeline can

transportbatchesofdifferent typesof refinedpetroleum.Thepipelineoperator schedules

andtracksthecustomer'sbatchorproductthroughthepipeline,trackingtheproductbeing

transported, thevolume,where it isbeing transported fromand to, and theownerof the

product.

Categorizingbyfunction:

Gathering pipelines transport gas and crude oil away from the points of production (i.e.,

wellheads)tofacilitiesforprocessingorrefinementortotransmissionpipelines.

Transmission pipelinesmove gas and hazardous liquids long distances across the country,

oftenathighpressures.

Distribution pipelines are generally smaller lines that take natural gas from transmission

pipelines and deliver it to individual homes and businesses. Distribution pipeline systems

operateatmuch lowerpressuresthantransmissionpipelines. Distributionpipelinesarenot

associatedwithhazardousliquids;distributionofhazardousliquidsisaccomplishedviaother

transportationmodes.

Categorizingbyintrastateversusinterstate

Intrastatepipelines

are

operated

entirely

within

one

state

and

do

not

cross

state

boundaries.

However, some pipelines that cross stateboundariesmaybe classified as intrastate if the

pipelineownershipchangesatthestateline.

Interstatepipelinestransportproductsacrossstateboundaries.


8/125


Naturalgaspipelinesystem.Source:PHMSA

HowPipelinesWork

Gasandhazardousliquidpipelinesworkbasicallyinthesameway. Aproductisputintothepipeline,

pressureisappliedbysometypeofpump,andtheproductisforcedtoflowtowardanareaoflower

pressure. Flowismaintaineduntiltheproductreachesitsdestination. Alongtheway,pressureislost

duetofrictionandheat;boosterpumps(compressorsforgas)locatedalongthepipelineareusedto

boostthepressureandkeeptheproductflowing.

Varioussystemcomponentssuchasvalves,storagetanks,meteringstations,andcitygatestations

areusedtodirect,control,andmeasureproductflow. Productsareextractedorremovedfromthe

pipelineattheirdestinations,wheretheproductsarestored,transferredtoalternatetransportation

modes,orconsumed.


9/125


PipelineControlCenters

Pipelinecontrolcentersare theheartofmodernpipelineoperations. Informationaboutapipeline

system'soperatingequipmentandparametersiscommunicated intothecontrolcenter,whichmay

be

located

hundreds

of

miles

away

from

thephysicallocationofvarioussegmentsof

thepipeline. Controlcenteroperatorsuse

computerizedsupervisorycontrolanddata

acquisition(SCADA)systemstomonitorand

control thepipeline systemoperation.The

SCADA system provides digital and analog

information to controlcenteroperators to

showvariousoperatingparameterssuchas

pipeline

pressure,

temperature,

flow,

alarms,andotherconditionsinthepipeline

fromallofthestationsalongthepipeline.Theseandotherdataare important inputs incontrolling

systemoperation,detectingpossibleleaks,andidentifyingotherproblemsalongthesystem.

MostSCADAsystemsenable thesystemoperator to instantlycheckoperationalparametersatany

location.Inaddition,mostSCADAsystemscandisplayinformationgraphicallysothatitcanbemore

easily understood. If a change occurs, such as the opening or closing of a valve, the shape

representingthatspecificvalveonacontrolcenterdisplayscreenchangesaswell.Remotecontrol

and monitoring may be combined with automatic controls and with field communications and

manualresponses

to

accomplish

the

actions

necessary

to

control

the

system.

Manypipelineoperatorshave their 24hour emergencyphonenumbers routeddirectly into their

pipelinecontrolcenters.Intheeventofapipelineemergency,controlcenteroperatorsmaybeable

toevaluatetheconditionand,ifdeemednecessary,takestepstoisolatetheequipmentorsectionof

pipelinewheretheproblemisoccurring. Thecontrolcentermayalsohavethecapabilitytoopenand

closevalvesremotelyandtotransferproductsbothtoandfromthemainpipelineatmarketingand

distribution facilities. The control center can also dispatch field personnel to address pipeline

emergencies.

Pumpsand

compressors

Pumpsandcompressorsprovidetheforceandpressuretomove liquidandgasproductsthrougha

pipelinesystem.Pumpsarecommonlyassociatedwithhazardous liquidpipelines;compressorsare

typicallyassociatedwithgaspipelines.

Pump and compressor stations house the pumps and compressors and related equipment.

Pump/compressorstationsareplacedatregularintervalsalonghazardousliquidandgastransmission

pipelines (e.g., every 20 to 100miles)where needed to sustain necessary pipeline pressures and


10/125


flows. The number and power of pumps/compressors within a station are selected based on

parameters such as theneededoperatingpressure,product type,distance, and elevationsof the

pipeline.

Pumpsandcompressorsmustbe

provided power through drivers.

Driversmay

be

electric

motors;

diesel, gasoline, or natural gas

fueled engines; or natural gas

fueled turbines. The choices of

the driver units for pumps and

compressorswill depend in part

on the power sources available.

Forexample,pumpsandturbines

fueledbynatural gas canoftenbe found aroundexploration andproductionoperations,whereas

dieselpowered

equipment

is

often

used

in

remote

locations.

Back

up

diesel

generators

are

also

used

aspowersourcesduringpowerfailures.

Valves

Valves are critical andessential components for controlling the flow andpressureofproduct in a

pipelinesystem.

Therearemanytypesofvalvesusedinapipelinesystem. Theyareusedtocontroltherateofflowin

aline,toopenorshutdownaline,ortoserveasautomaticpressurereliefdevices.

Valves

can

be

identified

by

type

or

by

function.

They

may

be

manually actuated, but many frequentlyoperated valves are

equipped with electric, pneumatic, or hydraulic powerdriven

mechanical operators. Some large valves on natural gas

transmissionpipelinesoperate inapowerassistmode, inwhich

gaspressurefromthepipelinepowersasmallmotorthatassists

inopeningandclosingthevalves.

Depending on the type of valve, its location, and the pipeline

operating conditions,a considerableamountof time andeffort

maybe

required

to

close

apipeline

valve

manually

during

an

emergency. For example, in 1994 a fire involving a 36inch

naturalgastransmissionpipelineinEdison,NewJersey,required

emergencyrespondersandpipelineindustrypersonneltoclosea

keyvalvemanually.Workinginanextremelyintenseradiantheat

environment, it took 752 turns of the valves handwheel

operatorand2hourstoclosethevalve.

Emergencyresponse

personnelshouldNEVER

attempttoisolateany

pipelinevalvesonlarge

diametertransmissionor

distributionlinesunless

underthedirectionof

pipelineoperations

personnel.Todosomay

createadditional

operationalproblemsand

safetyconcernsbeyondthe

originalevent.


11/125


Flowratesandpressuresontransmissionlinesandlargedistributionlinesarecontrolledthroughthe

use of automatic or remotelycontrolled valves usually found at pump and compressor stations.

Thesemayormaynotprovideforcompleteshutoffofthepipeline,asflowcontrol istheirprimary

function.

Intheeventofanemergencyalongatransmission lineor largedistribution line,remotelyactuated

isolationvalves

may

be

used

to

shut

down

the

pipeline.

Depending

on

the

nature

of

the

emergency

and the typeandconfigurationof thepipeline, fieldoperationspersonnelmay stillbe required to

respond and isolate manuallyactuated valves located in closer proximity to the location of the

emergency.

Pressurereliefvalves

Pressure relief valves (PRV) are special types of valves that provide overpressure protection for

pipeline systems and components. These are springactuated valves that open automatically to

relievesystempressurewhenactuatedatapreset limit.Onhazardous liquidpipelinesystems,the

PRVdischarge

is

often

directed

into

abreakout

tank

where

the

liquid

outflow

is

collected.

On

natural

gaspipelinesystems,theoverpressurereliefisventeddirectlyintotheatmosphere.

Emergency respondersare sometimes calledfor reportsof extremely loudnoiseorgaslike

odors intheareaofnaturalgaspipelinecompressorandregulatorstations.Whenactuated,

PRVsongaspipelinesystemscangenerateatremendousamountofnoise,aswellasstrong

odors ifthenaturalgasisodorized.APRVventingtotheatmosphere isperformingproperly,

anditsdischargeshouldneverbeisolatedorrestrictedbyemergencyresponsepersonnel.

Meters(MeteringStations)

Allproducts

entering,

leaving,

and

passing

through

apipeline

must

be

accounted

for

and

measured.

Accurateproductmeasurementisrequiredforproducttransfer,productcustody,leakdetection,and

deliveryschedules.

Metersareusedtomeasureandrecordthequantityorvolumeofproductpassingthroughaspecific

location. Pipeline throughput is defined as the volume of product that goes through a section of

equipmentduringaspecifiedamountof time.Factors thatmayaffectproductvolume include the

temperature,pressure,chemicalcomponents,anddensityoftheproductbeingmeasured.Product

characteristicsarealsocheckedperiodicallywithmanualandautomaticsamplingequipment.

CityGate

Stations

Acitygate isa locationwherenaturalgas isextractedfromatransmissionpipelinesystem intoa

lowerpressuredistributionsystem.Thecitygateistypicallywhereodorant,usuallyachemicalcalled

mercaptan,isaddedtothegas,givingitthecharacteristicsmellofrotteneggs.


12/125


LineMarkers

Since pipelines are usually buried underground, line markers and warning signs are located at

frequent intervals along transmission pipeline rightsofway (ROW). They are also foundwhere a

pipeline intersectsastreet,highway,railwayorwaterway,andatotherprominentpointsalongthe

ROW. Markers warn that a transmission pipeline is located in the area, identify the product

transportedin

the

line,

and

provide

the

name

of

the

pipeline

operator

and

atelephone

number

to

callintheeventofanemergency.

Pipelinemarkersindicateonlythepresenceofapipeline.Theydonotdepictandshouldnotbeused

todetermine theexact locationof thepipeline.Pipeline locationswithinaROWmayvary in their

horizontal location and depth along the length of the ROW. Additionally, theremay bemultiple

pipelineslocatedinthesameROW.

Beforedigging inanareawherepipelinesare located,allexcavators, including thegeneralpublic,

shouldcall811andrequestthatthepipelinesandotherundergroundfacilitiesbeaccuratelylocated

andmarked.

Calling

811

before

digging

is

free

and

is

required

by

state

laws.

ExamplesofPipelineMarkers

MoreinformationongasandhazardousliquidpipelinescanbefoundinAppendixA.

PhysicalandChemicalPropertiesofPipelineProducts

Emergencyplannersdevelopinghazardmitigationplansmustunderstandhowpipelineproductswill

behave(theirphysicalproperties)andhowtheycanharm(theirchemicalproperties).


13/125


NaturalGas

Naturalgas isthepredominantproduct found ingaspipelines.Naturalgas (CH4) isacleanburning

fuelthatconsistsofapproximately94%methane,4%ethane,andtheremaining2%ofothergases,

includingbutane,carbondioxide,nitrogen,andisopentane.Itiswidelyusedasafuelforresidential,

commercial,and industrialpurposes.Compressednaturalgas (CNG)mayalsobeusedasavehicle

motorfuel

in

high

pressure

cylinders.

Somethingstoknow:

Naturalgasisodorless,colorless,andtastelessinitsnaturalstate.Itislighterthanairandwill

rise.

Natural gas isnontoxic,but canpresent inhalationhazards. If releasedwithin an enclosed

area,itcandisplaceoxygenandactasasimpleasphyxiant.

Whenmixedwiththeproperamountofair,naturalgascanburn.Theexplosivelimitsare4to

15% gas in air.A combustible gas indicator (CGI)or flammable gasdetector calibrated on

methanewill

be

required

to

determine

the

concentration

of

natural

gas

vapors

present.

Naturalgasvaporswillquicklyflashbacktotheirsourcewhenignited.

Natural gas fireswill give off tremendous amounts of radiant heat and provide significant

exposureconcerns.

Natural gas that is trapped in enclosed areas or confined spaces can cause a significant

explosionifignited.Ifventilatinganenclosedspace,thehazardmaymomentarilyincreaseas

theair/gasmixturepassesthroughtheexplosiverange.

Althoughnaturalgas canexistas a liquidor gas (atambient temperatures, itwillbe in its

gaseous form; it canbe chilled to 260oF and stored as a liquid),with few exceptions it is

transportedvia

pipeline

in

its

gaseous

form.

Leakednaturalgas trappedunderasphalt,concrete, frozenground,etc.,willmove laterally

fromitssourceviaanypathofleastresistance(e.g.,undergroundconduitsandpipecasings).

Soilthathasbeendisturbedbyexcavationwillallowfortheeasierpassageofnaturalgas.In

addition,certainsoilsmaycauseaddedodorantstobe"scrubbed"fromthenaturalgas.

HazardousLiquids

Hazardousliquidspipelinesmaycarryavarietyofproductswithwidelyvaryingphysicalandchemical

properties. Material safety data sheets (MSDS) for specific products, and emergency response

guidebooksare

good

sources

of

information

for

determining

the

physical

and

chemical

properties

of

hazardousliquidsinpipelines.

Understandingpipelinehazardsrequiresknowingthematerialsbeingtransportedandunderstanding

theirbehavior.Commonproductstransportedinhazardousliquidpipelinesincludecrudeoil,refined

petroleumproducts,andliquefiedpetroleumproducts.

Somethingstoknow:


14/125


Crude oil gathering pipelines may transport sour crudes with high concentrations of

hydrogensulfide(H2S),acolorless,verypoisonous,andflammablegaswiththecharacteristic

foulodorof rotteneggs.Exposure toH2Seven in low concentrationscancausedeath.The

OSHApersonalexposurelimit(PEL)forH2S is10ppmandthe immediatelydangerousto life

andhealth(IDLH)valueis300ppm.

Recentlycrude

oil

extracted

from

bituminous

sands

(also

known

as

oil

sands

or

tar

sands)

hasreceivedalotofmediaattention. Tarsands,atypeofunconventionalpetroleumdeposit,

refer to a mixture of sand, water, clay, and bitumen (which refers to the heaviest of

hydrocarbonmixturesfoundincrudepetroleum).

Bitumenextractedfromtarsandsisaheavy,sticky,viscoussolidorsemisolidformthatdoes

noteasilyflowatnormaloilpipelinetemperatures,makingitdifficulttotransport.Itmustbe

diluted through the addition of a diluent, such as natural gas condensates or naphtha, or

chemicallysplitbeforeitcanbetransportedbypipelineforupgradingintosyntheticcrudeoil

andrefined.Dilutedbitumen(dilbit)sinkswhenreleasedintowaterinsteadoffloatingonthe

toplikecrudeoilsandpetroleumproductstypicallytransportedintheUS.

Gasolineishighlyflammableandiseasilyignitedwhenreleasedintoair. Whenitisat10%of

the lower explosive limit, the atmospheric concentrationof gasoline vapors in air is 1,400

ppm.This isabove the threshold limitvalue/timeweightedaverage (TLV/TWA) for toxicity,

andshouldberegardedasanunsafeenvironment. Inaddition,theTLV/TWAforbenzene is

only 1 ppm. Emergency responders must initially use selfcontained breathing apparatus

(SCBA) until air monitoring results permit the level of respiratory protection to be

downgraded.

Distillates,such

as

diesel

fuel

and

jet

fuel,

are

combustible

liquids

and

produce

fewer

vapors

than gasoline. Diesel andjet fuel vapors are not easily detected with a combustible gas

indicator(CGI)duetotheirlowvaporpressure.

Allrefinedpetroleumproductshavevaporsthatareheavierthanairandaspecificgravityless

than1.0.Vaporswillcollectinlowareas,whilespillswillfloatonthesurfaceofwater.Spills

andvaporsmaymigratelongdistancesthroughdraintiles,sewers,orotherconduits.

Liquefiedgases thatare lighter thanair,suchasanhydrousammonia,will initiallyhang low

andcollectinlowareasuntilthevapors"heatup"andrise.Inaddition,propaneandbutane

vaporswill

extend

beyond

the

visible

vapor

cloud.

All liquidpetroleumproductshave increasedvolatilitywhen releasedunderpressureasan

aerosol. In addition, warm weather can increase the volatility of all refined petroleum

products.

Moredetailedinformationregardingthephysicalandchemicalpropertiesofproductstransportedin

pipelinescanbefoundinAppendixB.


15/125


PipelineRisks

Risks to thepublic fromhazardous liquid and gas transmissionpipelines result from thepotential

unintentionalreleaseofproductstransportedthroughthepipelines.Releasesofproductscarriedby

pipelines can impact surrounding populations, property, and the environment, andmay result in

injuriesorfatalitiesaswellaspropertyandenvironmentaldamage.

Theseconsequencesmayresultfromfiresorexplosionscausedbyignitionofthereleasedproduct,as

wellaspossible toxicityandasphyxiationeffects.Some releasescancauseenvironmentaldamage,

impactwildlife,orcontaminatedrinkingwatersupplies.Releasescanalsohavesignificanteconomic

effects, such asbusiness interruptions,damaged infrastructure,or lossof suppliesof fuel such as

naturalgas,gasoline,andhomeheatingoil.

Thepotentialconsequencesoftransmissionpipelinereleasesvaryaccordingtothecommoditythatis

released aswell as characteristics of the surrounding area. Gas transmission pipelines transport

natural gas almost exclusively5.Natural gas releases pose a primarily acute hazard. If an ignition

sourceexists,

arelease

of

gas

can

result

in

an

immediate

fire

or

explosion

near

the

point

of

the

release. This hazard is reduced over a relatively short period after the release ends as the gas

disperses. Ifthevaporsaccumulate insideabuilding,thenthehazardmayremain longer6.There is

alsoapossibility that thesizeormovementof thevaporcloudcould result inconsequencesaway

fromthe initialpointoftherelease,butbecausenaturalgas is lighterthanair,thissituation isnot

common.Structuresand topographic features in thevicinityofa releasecanserveasbarriersand

mitigatetheconsequencesofthereleaseforothernearbyareas.

Hazardous liquidpipelines transportagreatervarietyofproducts (includingpetroleum,petroleum

products,natural gas liquids, anhydrous ammonia, and carbondioxide), so the risksofhazardous

liquidpipeline

releases

vary

according

to

the

commodity

involved.

Releases

of

some

commodities

transportedinhazardousliquidpipelines,suchaspropane,poseprimarilyanacutehazardoffireor

explosion, similar tonaturalgas.These commoditieshaveahigh vaporpressure and are in liquid

formwhiletransportedunderpressureinapipeline.However,iftheyarereleasedfromthepipeline,

theywillconverttogasasthepressureisreduced.Someofthesecommoditieshavedensitiesgreater

than air, so they have a stronger propensity to remain near the ground than natural gas,which

dispersesmorereadily.Thebehaviorofthesecommoditieswhenreleasedpresentssomedifferent

challengesformitigation,comparedtootherhazardousliquidsornaturalgas.

Releases

of

other

hazardous

liquids,

such

as

gasoline

and

crude

oil,

have

both

acute

and

more

long

termpotentialconsequences,asthereleasedproductcanspreadoverlandandwater,flowinginto

valleys, ravines, and waterways. This can result in harmful consequences to people and to the

environment, including human injuries or fatalities from fire or explosion, as well as potential

5Averysmallpercentageofgastransmissionpipelinestransportothercommoditiessuchashydrogenandchlorine,as

wellasothergasesthataretheresultofoilrefineryoperations.6Muhlbauer,W.Kent,PipelineRiskManagementManual,1992.


16/125


ecologicaldamageandcontaminationofdrinkingwatersuppliesoccurringsomedistancefromthe

pointofinitialrelease.

Assessingthepotentialconsequencesofreleasesfromspecificpipelinesinspecificlocationsshould

bebasedonapipeline andlocationspecificevaluationofthefollowingfourelements:

1. Which commodity or commoditiesmight be released? A list of commodities potentially

transportedinaspecificpipelinemaybeobtainedfromthepipelineoperator.

2. Howmuch of the transported commoditymight be released? The answer to this differs

at different locations along a pipeline and can be derived from pipeline flow rates, spill

detectiontime,pipeline shutdown time, draindown volume, andother technical factors.

These factorsmaybediscussedwiththepipelineoperator.

3. Where might the released substance go? The answer to this is derived byconsidering

thereleasedcommodity,releasevolume,andpotentialflowpathsover landandwater,as

wellaspotentialairdispersion. Overland flow can be affected by factors such as gas

orliquid

properties,

topography

at

and

near

the

spill

location,

soil

type,

nearby

drainage

systems, andflowbarriers.Similarly,flow inwatercanbeaffectedby thewaterflowrate

anddirectionandproperties of the spilled fluids. Air dispersion can be affected by the

propertiesof releasedvaporsandwinddirectionandspeed.

4. Whatlocationsmightbe impacted?Thisquestionisansweredbyconsideringhowpotential

impacts, includingthermal impacts from fire,blastoverpressurefromexplosion,toxicand

asphyxiation effects, and environmental contamination, could affect locationswhere the

released commodity travels. Planned evacuation routes should be considered when

performingtheseassessments.

Various commerciallyavailablemodelshavebeendevelopedandareavailable to communities to

helppredicttheimpactsofpipelinereleasesonnearbyareas. Thesemodelssupportanalysisofsuch

elements as spill volumes, release paths along land or water, air dispersion patterns, and spill

impactsonhumanhealth,property,andtheenvironment.

Transmission pipeline releases result from a variety of causes, including internal and external

corrosion, excavation damage, mechanical failure, operator error, and natural force damage.

Pipelineswithdifferentcharacteristicsandoperatingenvironmentshavedifferentsusceptibilitiesto

these failurecauses.This results indifferent failureprobabilities fromdifferentcausesatdifferent

pointsalong

the

pipeline.

Inaddition to the lengthsofpipe thatmakeup transmissionpipeline segmentsona rightofway

(sometimesreferredtoaslinepipe),transmissionpipelinesystemsincludeancillaryfacilities,such

aspump stations and tank facilities (for liquidpipelines) and compressor and regulator/metering

stations (for gaspipelines).These facilities areoften adjacentorbeyond the rightofway andon

operatorownedproperty,frequentlyprotectedbysecurityfencing.


17/125


Mostcommunitiesinthevicinityoftransmissionpipelinesarenearrightsofwaywithlinepipeand

not near ancillary facilities. However, some communities may be near these facilities. The

predominantfailurecausesandfailuremodesaredifferentfortheseancillarypipelinefacilitiesthan

thepredominant failure causes and failuremodes for linepipe.Consequently, local governments

should be aware of what parts of a transmission pipeline system are in the vicinity of their

communitiesin

order

to

better

understand

which

pipeline

risk

factors

should

be

addressed

in

their

communities.


18/125


PipelineFailureImpactsExamples

Pipelineincidentsarelowfrequencyeventsbutwhentheydooccur,theimpactscanbedevastating.

Thefollowingsummariesandpicturesofrecent,highconsequenceincidentsareprovidedtodevelop

anunderstandingofthepotentialimpacttothecommunityfrompipelinefailures.

HazardousLiquid

Crude

Oil

Diluted

Bitumen

(Dilbit)

On Sunday, July 25, 2010, at 5:58 p.m., eastern daylight time, a segment of a 30inchdiameter

pipeline(Line6B),ownedandoperatedbyEnbridgeIncorporated(Enbridge)rupturedinawetlandin

Marshall,Michigan.Theruptureoccurredduringthelaststagesofaplannedshutdownandwasnot

discoveredoraddressedforover17hours.Duringthetimelapse,Enbridgetwicepumpedadditional

oil(81percentofthetotalrelease)intoLine6Bduringtwostartups;thetotalreleasewasestimated

tobe843,444gallonsofcrudeoil.Theoilsaturated thesurroundingwetlandsand flowed intothe

TalmadgeCreekandtheKalamazooRiver.Localresidentsselfevacuatedfromtheirhouses,andthe

environmentwasnegativelyaffected.Cleanupeffortscontinueasoftheadoptiondateofthisreport

(July10,

2012),

with

continuing

costs

exceeding

$767

million.

About

320

people

reported

symptoms

consistent with crude oil exposure. No fatalities were reported. For more information visit

http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/summary/PAR1201.html

TalmadgeCreek CleanupcrewsremoveoilandcontaminatedmaterialsfromthestreambanknearMarshall,Michigan


19/125


HazardousLiquidPropane

On November 1, 2007, at 10:35:02 a.m. central daylight time, a 12inchdiameter pipeline

segmentoperatedbyDixie PipelineCompanywas transporting liquid propane at about 1,405

poundspersquareinch,gauge,whenitrupturedinaruralareanearCarmichael,Mississippi.The

resultinggascloudexpandedovernearbyhomesand ignited,creatinga large fireball thatwas

heardand

seen

from

miles

away.

About

10,253

barrels

(430,626

gallons)

of

propane

were

released. As a result of the ensuing fire, two peoplewere killed and seven people sustained

minorinjuries.Fourhousesweredestroyed,andseveralothersweredamaged.About71.4acres

of grassland and woodland were burned. Dixie Pipeline Company reported that property

damagesresulting fromtheaccident, including the lossofproduct,were$3,377,247.Formore

informationvisithttp://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/2009/PAR0901.pdf

Aerialviewofareaimpactedbythepipelineruptureshowingnearbydestroyedhouses.


20/125


GasTransmission

OnSeptember9,2010,about6:11p.m.Pacificdaylight time,a30inchdiameter segmentof an

intrastatenaturalgastransmissionpipelineknownasLine132,ownedandoperatedbythePacific

Gas and Electric Company (PG&E), ruptured in a residential area in San Bruno, California. The

ruptureoccurredatmilepoint39.28ofLine132,atthe intersectionofEarlAvenueandGlenview

Drive.Theruptureproducedacraterabout72feet longby26feetwide.Thesectionofpipethat

ruptured,whichwas about 28 feet long andweighed about 3,000 pounds,was found 100 feet

south of the crater. PG&E estimated that 47.6 million standard cubic feet of natural gas was

released.Thereleasednaturalgasignited,resultinginafirethatdestroyed38homesanddamaged

70.Eightpeoplewerekilled,manywere injured,andmanymorewereevacuated from thearea.

Formoreinformationvisithttp://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/summary/PAR1101.html.

Aerialviewofareaimpactedbythe blastandfire


21/125


22/125


NaturalGasDistributionCastIron

OnFebruary9,2011at10:45pm,atragicexplosionoccurredonNorth13thStreetinAllentown,PA.

LocalemergencyrespondersworkedtolimitthespreadofthefirewhileUGIUtilitiescutthrough

reinforcedconcretetoaccessthegasmain.Gasflowtotheleakwascompletelyshutoffat3:40am

thenextmorning.UGIUtilitiesreportedtheleaktotheNationalResponseCenter(NRC)justafter

midnighton

the

9th.

As

aresult

of

the

explosion

and

ensuing

fire,

5people

lost

their

lives,

3people

requiredinpatienthospitalization,and8homesweredestroyed.UGIUtilitieshasestimatedthe

propertydamagefromtherupturetobe$2.5million.Formoreinformationvisit

http://opsweb.phmsa.dot.gov/pipelineforum/factsandstats/recentincidents/allentownpa/

Fireresultingfromgasdistributionpipelinefailure

Pipeline

Regulation

Ultimately the U.S. Congress has responsibility for setting the framework for pipeline safety

regulationsthroughitsestablishmentoflaws.TheU.S.DepartmentofTransportation(DOT),Pipeline

and HazardousMaterials Safety Administration (PHMSA), is primarily responsible for issuing and

enforcingfederalpipelinesafetyregulations.


23/125


TheoverarchingpipelinesafetystatutesthatCongresshaspassedcanbefoundinU.S.Code,Title49,

SubtitleVIII,Chapter601. TheminimumfederalregulationsadoptedbyPHMSAcanbefoundinthe

CodeofFederalRegulations(CFR),Title49,Parts190199.

Pipeline safety regulations cover design, construction, testing, operations andmaintenance. This

includes requirements for damage prevention, public awareness, integrity management, control

roommanagement

and

operator

qualification

programs,

as

well

as

many

others.

Regulations

are

continuouslyreviewedandupdatedasnecessarytoaddressemergingissuesandtechnology.

Through partnershipwith PHMSA, states can assume all or part of the intrastate regulatory and

enforcement responsibility through annual certifications and agreements. Intrastate facilitiesmay

include gas distribution, gas transmission and hazardous liquid transmission pipelines, aswell as

gathering lines, storage fields, and LNG facilities. Themajority ofnatural gas distributionpipeline

system inspections are carried out by state inspectors. The strength of PHMSAs federal/state

partnershipsdirectlyimpactstheintegrityofournation'spipelines.Strongpartnershipsarecriticalto

a successful national pipeline safety program. PHMSAs Stakeholder Communications website

(http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/States.htm)providesinformationregardingstatepipelinesafety

regulatoryagencies,at.

Localgovernmentsarenotallowedtocreateregulationsregardingtheoperationsofpipelines. Also,

it should be noted that there are pipelines that are outside the scope of federal pipeline safety

regulationsadministeredbyPHMSA. Regulatedpipelinesaredefinedbyfederalregulationsfoundin

49CFR191.1,192.1,192.8,195.1,andelsewhereasreferencedinthoseregulations.

Hereareafewoftheregulatedareasthatmayimpactotherpipelinesafetystakeholders.

Mapping pipelines The National Pipeline Mapping System (NPMS)

(www.npms.phmsa.dot.gov)isageographicinformationsystem(GIS). Operatorsarerequired

toannuallysubmitgeospatialdata,attributedata,publiccontact information,andmetadata

pertaining to their federally regulated interstate and intrastate hazardous liquid and gas

transmission pipelines, liquefied natural gas (LNG) plants, and hazardous liquid breakout

tanks.

PublicAwarenessPipelineoperatorsmustconductpublicawarenessprogramstoeducate

thepublic,appropriategovernmentorganizations,andexcavatorson:pipeline locations,use

of onecall notification systems and other damage prevention activities, possible hazards

associatedwith

unintended

pipeline

releases,

physical

indications

that

such

arelease

may

haveoccurred, steps that should be taken forpublic safety in the eventof a release, and

procedurestoreportsuchanevent.

Damage Prevention Pipeline operators must conduct damage prevention programs to

informthepublicandexcavatorsoftheprogramsexistenceandpurpose,provideameansof

receivingandrecordingnotificationsofplannedexcavationactivities,andprovidetemporary

markingofburiedpipelines in theareaofanexcavationactivitybefore theactivitybegins.


24/125


These requirementsmay bemet by participation in qualified onecall damage prevention

systems.

OneCallSystems Onecallnotificationcentersenableallexcavatorstomakeasingle,toll

freecalltothenationalcallbeforeyoudignumber,811,tohavetheexact locationsof

pipelinesnearplannedexcavationareasdeterminedandmarkedtoavoidexcavationdamage

tothe

pipelines.

Some

one

call

centers

also

accept

locate

requests

for

design

and

planning

purposes. Underfederalpipelinesafetyregulations,pipelineoperatorsmustparticipateina

onecallsysteminareaswheretherepipelinesarelocated,ifthatonecallsystemisaqualified

onecallsystem. Insomecases,excavatorsmayberequiredtocontactthepipelineoperator

directly.

EmergencyPreparednessandResponsePipelineoperatorsmustprepareandfollowmanuals

of written procedures for each pipeline system for conducting normal operations and

maintenanceactivitiesandhandlingabnormaloperationsandemergencies. Operatorsmust

establishandmaintainliaisonswithfire,police,andotherappropriatepublicofficialstolearn

the responsibility and resources of each government organization thatmay respond to a

pipelineemergencyandacquaintthoseofficialswiththeoperator'sabilityinrespondingtoa

pipelineemergencyandmeansof communication. Eachoperatorsemergencyprocedures

mustaddressthefollowing,amongotherrequirements,toensuresafetywhenanemergency

conditionoccurs:

1.

Receiving, identifying, classifying, and communicating notices of events which need

immediateresponsebytheoperatorornoticetofire,police,orotherappropriatepublic

officials;

2. Promptly and effectively responding to each type of emergency, including fires or

explosions occurring near or directly involving pipeline facilities and natural disasters

affectingpipelinefacilities;

3. Havingpersonnel,equipment,instruments,tools,andmaterialavailableasneededatthe

sceneofanemergency;

4.

Minimizingpublicexposuretoinjuryandtakingactionstoprotectingpeoplefirstandthen

property;and

5. Notifying fire,police,andotherappropriatepublicofficialsofpipelineemergenciesand

coordinatingwiththempreplannedandactualresponsesduringemergencies.

Regulating

Land

Use

and

Development

near

Pipelines

There isnonational structured framework for regulating landuse anddevelopmentnearexisting

pipelines.This isalso complicated in that federal regulationsdonotprescribe the sizeofpipeline

rightsofway, and pipelines may be installed in public spaces and in

privateeasements.

State and local governments can regulate development near pipelines

with their land use authority. For example, they can enact planning,


25/125


permitting,andzoningregulationsandordinancesgoverningthetypesofstructuresthatcanbebuilt

near existing pipelines, requiring consultationwithpipelineoperators,or establishing a varietyof

other landuse permitting requirements directed at improving safety when developing around

pipelines. However,veryfewstateorlocalgovernmentshaveusedtheirauthoritiestotrytoincrease

safetyaroundpipelines. But,asmoreandmoregrowthoccursaroundexistingpipelines,regulating

suchdevelopment

to

ensure

safety

will

become

increasingly

more

important.

ThePIPAReport7providesrecommendedpracticesforlocalgovernmentsandotherstakeholdersto

consider for reducing risks and improving the safety of affected communities and transmission

pipelinesthroughimplementationofriskinformedlanduseplanning.

Appendix C provides some information regarding pipeline design and construction. However, as

noted above, this document pertains to existing gas and hazardous liquid pipelines and is not

intendedtoaddressnewpipelinesitingorconstruction.

AppendixDprovidesanoverviewexaminationof the laws,regulations,andstandards thatdirectly

influencethe

pipeline

industry.

Included

there

is

discussion

of

non

regulatory

influences

on

pipeline

safety.

7http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/pipa/LandUsePlanning.htm


26/125


Integrating

Pipelines

into

Hazard

Mitigation

Plans

Thissectionprovidesabrieflookattheneedsandbenefitsofincorporatingpipelinesintostateand

localhazardmitigationplans. Forthepurposeofthisdocument,therearefourstepstothehazard

mitigationprocess:

1.

Identifypipelines

and

pipeline

hazards

2.

Performvulnerabilityassessment

3.

Developcapabilityassessments

4. Developmitigationstrategies

Premises

1. Pipelinesaremanmadehazards.

2. Naturalhazardscanpresentrisktopipelines.

3. Pipelinesarecriticalinfrastructure.

4. Publicawarenessinformationforpipelinesneedstobebalancedwithsecuritysensitivity.

5. Pipelinesshouldbeincludedinthedevelopmentofhazardmitigationplans.

PipelinesareManmadeHazards

Gasandhazardousliquidpipelinesareconstructedbyandforpipelinecompaniesforthe

transportationanddistributionofgasandhazardousliquids. Bythenatureofthepotentially

hazardousproductstheycarry,pipelinesareasourceofpotentialharmtoacommunity,includingthe

population,environment,privateandpublicpropertyandinfrastructure,andbusinesses.Pipelines

shouldbeincludedinthelistsofhazardsthatcommunitiesconsiderwhendevelopinghazard

mitigationplans.

Pipelinefailuresarelowfrequency,highconsequenceevents. Asevidencedbyseveralhighprofile

pipelineincidentsoverthelastseveralyears,pipelinefailurescan:

resultinseriousinjuries,includingfatalities;

result in environmental impacts, such as the pollution of waterways and drinking water

sources,andthecontaminationofenvironmentallysensitiveareas;

destroyormakeuninhabitableresidencesandotherstructures;and

impacttrafficflowsanddisruptlocalandregionaleconomies.

Pipeline failures can also impact local community resources. Emergencymedical servicesmay be

needed, aswell as government services including:emergency responders (police, firefighters, and

hazardousmaterials),trafficandcrowdcontrol,evacuations,infrastructureexpertise,barricadingand

utilitysupport.Othergovernmentaldepartmentsmayberequiredforemergencytaskingaswellto

assistwithlongertermissuesofsupportandrecovery.Groundandwatercontaminationmayrequire

cleanupoperationslastingfromdaystoyears,whichcouldfurtherimpactgovernmentalresources.


27/125


A pipeline leak or rupture can create the following hazards depending on the product being

transported:

1.

Fire and explosion Natural gas, highlyvolatile liquids (HVLs), and other refined petroleum

productsareflammableandcombustible. Dependingontheenvironmentandcharacteristicsof

therelease,explosionscanoccur. Naturalgas,ifleakedundergroundcanfollowpathsofminimal

resistance,such

as

other

utility

line

cavities,

and

migrate

inside

residences

and

other

structures.

2. Air dispersion of hazardous vapors Toxicity and asphyxiation effects can impact health and

safety.TheseresultprimarilyfromspillsofHVLs,butcanalsobeasignificantproblemforgasoline

and other refined products and some crude oil, due to hydrogensulfide (H2S) and benzene

components.

3.

OverlandspreadofhazardousliquidproductHazardousliquidproductscanspreadoverground

surfaces. This includespaved parking lotswith curbs, streets, culverts, anddepressions in the

earth.

4. WaterwaytransportWaterwaysmaycreatepathwaysforspilledliquidproductsandflammable

vapors

to

travel

close

to

populated

areas,

drinking

water

sources,

and

wetlands.

Storm

drains

can

beinterconnectedwithstreamsandcancreateapathforflammableorcombustibleliquidsand

heavierthanairvapors.

In2011therewere284significantpipelineincidentsforallpipelinetypescombinedintheU.S.8This

includes: 139 hazardous liquids pipeline incidents; 82 gas transmission incidents; 2 gas gathering

incidents;and61gasdistribution incidents. Combined, these incidents resulted in15 fatalities,60

nonfatalinjuries,andwellover$327millioninpropertydamage. Thesenumbersarecomparableto

recenttenyearaveragesforthesame impacts,althoughthetenyearaverageforpropertydamage

exceeds $467million. In 2010, property damage for pipeline incidents combinedwas over $1.3

billion.

There isnoquestionthatthese incidentsalsoresulted inunaccounted impactsto localeconomies,

such as lossof supply for customers, the closingofbusinesses, and the closureof transportation

modesforthecommunitiesinwhichtheyoccurred,andbeyond.

NaturalHazardsCanPresentRisktoPipelines

Natural forcedamage is cited as the causeof comparatively fewerpipeline incidents thanmost

other pipeline failure causes. However, natural force damage (natural hazards) can and does

resultinsomerelativelylargescalepipelinefailuresduetothepotentialforextremelylargeand

unpredictableforces

to

act

upon

pipelines

and

their

associated

facilities.

PHMSAcompilesdatareportedbypipelineoperatorsregardingpipelineaccidentsandincidentsand

theircauses. Incidentsattributed tonatural forces includedamage reportedas the resultofearth

movement, lightning, heavy rains and flood, temperature, high winds, and other natural force

8Source:PHMSASignificantIncidentsFilesApril30,2012


28/125


damage. Thefollowingtablesreflectnaturalforcedamageincidentsreportedforallhazardousliquid

andgastransmissionpipelinesforthetenyearperiodof20022011.

Table1.HazardousLiquidPipelinesNaturalForceDamage

HAZARDOUS LIQUID PIPELINES - NATURAL FORCE DAMAGE 2002 -2011

Reported cause of incidentNumber ofincidents

% of allincidents

Fatalities Injuries Property damage% of property

damage from allincidents & causes

EARTH MOVEMENT 16 1.3% 0 0 $69,702,045 3.1%

HEAVY RAINS/FLOODS 17 1.3% 0 0 $207,680,909 9.3%

LIGHTNING 22 1.8% 0 0 $28,217,747 1.2%

TEMPERATURE 18 1.4% 0 0 $8,645,177 0.3%

HIGH WINDS 14 1.1% 0 0 $264,498,153 11.9%

OTHER NATURAL FORCE DAMAGE 1 0.0% 0 0 $511,550 0.0%

Sub Total 88 7.1% 0 0 $579,255,584 26.1%

Table2.

Gas

Transmission

Pipelines

Natural

Force

Damage

GAS TRANSMISSION PIPELINES - NATURAL FORCE DAMAGE 2002 -2011

Reported cause of incidentNumber ofincidents

% of allincidents

Fatalities Injuries Property damage% of property

damage from allincidents & causes

EARTH MOVEMENT 16 2.1% 0 0 $13,357,106 0.9%

HEAVY RAINS/FLOODS 70 9.2% 0 0 $309,365,109 22.6%

LIGHTNING 7 0.9% 0 0 $1,964,670 0.1%

TEMPERATURE 2 0.2% 0 0 $483,571 0.0%

HIGH WINDS 10 1.3% 0 0 $114,830,215 8.4%

OTHER NATURAL FORCE DAMAGE 3 0.4% 0 0 $2,354,121 0.1%

Sub Total 108 14.2% 0 0 $442,354,793 32.3%

During this period no fatalities or injurieswere reported as a result of these pipeline incidents.

However,thepotentialforseriousinjuryandfatalitieswaslikelypresentineveryincident. And,the

amountofpropertydamageattributeddirectlytothepipelinefailuresissignificant.

Emergencymanagementorganizationsandpipelineoperatorswillfacesomeofthesamechallenges

fromnaturalhazardevents, including:the inabilitytouseroadstoaccesstroubleareasandcontrol

points(suchaspipelineshutoffvalves);theinabilityofcriticalpersonneltoreachneededareas;out

ofservice and ineffective communication channels;unresponsive control channels; lost,damaged,

andinaccessible

response

equipment;

conflicting

and

confusing

information

being

received;

and

the

increasedneedtosurveyaffectedareas. Thesearebutafewofthecomplicationsthatcanarise.

Pipeline failures resulting from and in conjunction with natural hazard events can significantly

complicate and compound the response to and recovery from such events. Coordination among

emergencymanagementorganizationsandpipelineoperatorsiscriticalandmustbeconsideredboth

beforeandduringnaturalhazardevents.


29/125


PipelinesareCriticalInfrastructure

The energy transportation network of the United States consists of over 2.5 million miles of

pipelines that are vital to the transportation of critical energy supplies. These pipelines are

operated by approximately 3,000 companies, large and small. IntheU.S.thereareabout500,000

milesofhazardous liquidandgastransmissionpipelines(includingfederallyregulatedgasgathering

pipelines).

Pipelinesconnectandsupplyenergyfuelstocriticalinfrastructuresuchasairportsandpowerplants.

U.S.industriesrelyonrawmaterialssuppliedbyandderivedfromlargevolumesofcrudeoil,refined

petroleumproducts,andnaturalgasdeliveredbytransmissionpipelines.Asignificantpercentageof

the economic benefits from our core national industry sectors, including food products,

pharmaceuticals, plastics and resins, industrial organic chemicals, and automotive,would not be

possiblewithout oil and natural gas energy and related feed stocks transported by transmission

pipelines.Commercial and residential customersusenaturalgas for spaceheating,waterheating,

andcooling.

Pipelinedisruptionscanhaveeffectsthatripplethroughoutlocalandregionaleconomies,and,atthe

mostextreme,can impactand thenationaleconomyandnationalsecurity.Minordisruptionsmay

result in localized increases in thepricesofgasoline,diesel fuel,homeheatingoil,ornaturalgas.

Prolonged disruptions could result in widespread energy shortages and the inability of some

manufacturerstoproduceproductssuchasplastics,pharmaceuticals,andmanychemicalsthatrely

onoilandnaturalgasasmanufacturingfeedstock.Inthecaseofanextremedisruptionofpipelines,

Americantransportationandmanufacturingcouldbehalted,homesandbusinessescouldgocoldfor

lack of natural gas or heating oil, and energy for vital defense usemay begin to limit American

defensecapabilities.

PublicAwarenessofPipelineInformationMustBeBalancedwithSecuritySensitivity

Althoughmuch information aboutpipelines ispublicallyaccessible, certain securityrelated and/or

proprietaryinformationaboutpipelines, informationthatcannotbesharedwiththepublic,maybe

neededforemergencymanagerstomakeinformeddecisionsduringthemitigationplanningprocess.

Accesstosuchneededinformationwillrequirediscussionswiththepipelineoperators.

PHMSAhasdevelopedthePipelineInformationManagementMappingApplication(PIMMA)foruse

by pipeline operators and federal, state, and local government officials. The application contains

sensitive pipeline critical infrastructure information. Recognizing the publics need to know the

location of transmission pipelines, theNPMS Public Viewer allows users to access pipelinemaps

withoutdisclosingsensitivepipelineinformation.

PHMSAsdataaccesspolicyfortheNPMSrestrictsstate,regionalandlocalgovernmentmapsasregards

releasetothepublic.Mapsmayshowonlythepipelinesinasinglecountyandmustbeata1:24,000or

coarserscale. ApipelinemapatacoarseenoughscaletodisplaytheentirecontiguousUSonan8.5x11

printoutmayalsobereleased. Otherwise,themapmustbemarkedFor Official Use Only (FOUO) andnot

redistributedoutsideofworkingpartners. Forinternalworkingpurposes,state,regionalandlocal


30/125


governmentsmayincorporatepipelinedataintotheirGISormappingsystemsinaccordancewiththelevelof

datatheyareprovided.ThedatasharingrestrictionsaresignedbytherequestorbeforeNPMSdatais

released.

Pipelinesshouldbeincludedinthedevelopmentofhazardmitigationplans

Stateandlocalcommunitiestodayaresusceptibletoavarietyofnatural,technological,andsocietal

hazards. It is importantthat theydevelophazardmitigationplanstounderstand thehazardsthey

face and develop appropriatemitigative actions. Theymust evaluate the hazards, and take into

considerationtheatriskpopulations,buildings,transportationroutesandkeyfacilities.

Communitieshaveanobligationtounderstandtheriskstheyface.Knowledgeoftheserisksallows

themtomakeinformeddecisionsabouthowtomanagetherisksanddevelopneededcapabilities.

HazardMitigationPlanningforPipelinesVulnerabilityAssessment

Hazard evaluationsmust take into consideration the atrisk populations, buildings, transportation

routes

and

key

facilities.

As

noted

in

the

Threat

and

Hazard

Identification

and

Risk

Assessment

(THIRA)Guide9:

Riskiscommonlythoughtofasaproductofathreatorhazard,thevulnerabilityofacommunity

orfacilitytoathreatorhazard,andtheresultingconsequencesthatmayimpactthecommunity

orfacility. Byconsideringchangestotheseelements,ajurisdictioncanunderstandhowtobest

manageitsriskexposure.

TheTHIRAGuideprovidesa comprehensiveapproach forcommunities to identifyandassess risks

andassociated impacts. Itbroadens the factorsconsidered intheprocess, incorporatingthewhole

communitythroughouttheentireprocess,andaccountsforimportantcommunityspecificfactors.

In assessing natural andmanmade hazards, emergencymanagement organizations maywant to

develop:

1. Ageneraldescriptionofthehazards

2. Information regarding historical occurrences and impacts (natural hazard events, pipeline

failures)

3.

Identification of location(s) of the hazards (e.g., floodplains, tornadoprone geography,

pipelinelocations)

4. Estimatesof theprobabilitiesofoccurrence (e.g.,annually,once in fiveyears,once inone

hundredyears)

5. Vulnerabilitiesofeachjurisdiction

6. Vulnerabilitiesofgovernmental(stateandlocal)andothercriticalfacilities

7.

Estimatesofpotentiallosses(dollarvalue)foreachjurisdiction

9ThreatandHazardIdentificationandRiskAssessmentGuide,ComprehensivePreparednessGuide(CPG)201,First

Edition,April2012,U.S.DepartmentofHomelandSecurity.

http://www.fema.gov/library/file?type=publishedFile&file=cpg_201_thira_guide_final_040312.pdf&fileid=b8f77f90

7e6511e18178001cc456982e


31/125


8. Estimatesofpotentiallosses(dollarvalue)forgovernmentalandothercriticalfacilities

9. Determinationsofthepotentialforlifehazardandresponserequirements

Todevelopacomprehensiveassessmentofthethreatsandhazardsfacingthecommunity,pipelines

and the potential impacts of pipeline failure incidents should be included. Only by inclusion of

pipelines in the development of hazard mitigation plans can communities identify feasible and

effectivemitigation

actions

to

address

hazardous

threats

to

pipelines

and

risks

to

the

community

resulting frompipeline incidents. TheTHIRAtoolkit10

lists theU.S.DepartmentofTransportations

PipelineandHazardousMaterialsSafetyAdministration(PHMSA)asadatasourceforinformationon

theNationspipelinetransportationsystemandhazardousmaterials.

ConsequencesofPipelineFailures

Annual,statespecificandcompositestatisticsonpipelineaccidents,theirconsequences,andcauses

canbereferencedfromthePHMSAwebsiteatwww.phmsa.dot.gov.Historicalpipelineincident

informationisalsolocatedonthatsite.Themajorcausesofpipelineaccidentsasreportedby

PHMSAsOffice

of

Pipeline

Safety

include:

corrosion,

excavation

damage,

incorrect

operation,

material/weld/equipmentfailure,naturalforcedamage,andotheroutsideforcedamage.

NationalPerspectiveonPipelineRisk

PHMSApublishedareportonpipelineriskin201011

inconjunctionwiththe

releaseofthePIPAReport12. ThepurposeofthePipelineRiskReport isto

assist local governments and developers in better understanding pipeline

risksandtoprovideacontextfortheuseofthePIPArecommendedpractices

fordevelopmentnearhazardous liquidandgastransmissionpipelines. The

PipelineRisk

Report

offers

comparisons

of

the

frequency

of

incidents

involvingdeathor injury resulting fromhazardousmaterials releases from

differenttransportationmodesover20052009.

StateorLocalPerspectiveonPipelineConsequences

Togainaperspectiveonpipelinerisk,oneapproachistoidentifywhereintheaffectedareapipelines

arelocated.Additionally,thepipelinemileagewithinanareacanbeoverlaidwithotherhazardsthat

couldaffectorcouldbeaffectedbypipelinefailures.

10ThreatandHazardIdentificationandRiskAssessmentGuide,ComprehensivePreparednessGuide(CPG)201,

Supplement1:Toolkit,FirstEdition,April2012,U.S.DepartmentofHomelandSecurity.

http://www.vmasc.odu.edu/downloads/CPG_201_SUPP_1_THIRA_Guide_Toolkit_FINAL_040312.pdf11

BuildingSafeCommunities:PipelineRiskanditsApplicationtoLocalDevelopmentDecisions.October,2010.

http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/publications/PIPA/PIPAPipelineRiskReportFinal20101021.pdf12

PartneringtoFurtherEnhancePipelineSafetyInCommunitiesThroughRiskInformedLandUsePlanning:FinalReport

ofRecommendedPractices.PipelinesandInformedPlanningAlliance.November17,2010.

http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/publications/PIPA/PIPAReportFinal20101117.pdf#pagemode=bookmarks


32/125


Illustrationofmappingtransmissionpipelinemileageprofiles.

Source:VirginiaDepartmentofEmergencyManagement

Anotherapproachistoleveragehistoricpipelineincidentdataforspecificstateorlocaljurisdictions.

Pastperformance cannot accurately reflect future incidents sincemany factors could changeover

time,butsuchdatacanprovidetrendlinesthatpointtotheneedformitigationstrategies.


33/125


Reference:http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/reports/safety/VA_detail1.html

HazardMitigationPlanningforPipelinesCapabilityAssessments

As inanyplanningprocess, it is importanttotrytoestablishwhichgoals,objectivesand/oractions

are feasible, based on an understanding of the organizational capacity of those agencies or

departments taskedwith their implementation.A capability assessmenthelps todeterminewhich

mitigationactionsarepracticaland likely tobe implementedover timegivena localgovernments

planningand regulatory framework, levelofadministrativeand technical support,amountof fiscal

resourcesandcurrentpoliticalclimate.

FundingCapabilities

Funding

to

assist

state

and

local

governments

to

adequately

develop

mitigation

programs

that

will

completelyaddresspropertiesat risk isgenerallyachallenge. However,PHMSAhas severalgrant

programsthatmayprovideassistanceinthisarea13.Itishopedthatasawarenessoftheneedforand

benefitsofhazardmitigation forpipelines increases,due inpart to implementationof thehazard

mitigationplan, agencieswill incorporate appropriatemitigation strategies into existingprocesses

andprograms.Pipelineoperatorsmayalsobeasourceofpipelineawarenesspromotionalmaterials,

13http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/DamagePreventionGrantsToStates.htm


34/125


emergencypreparednesstraining,andcharitablecontributions foremergencyresponseequipment

oradditionaltraining.

PHMSAFederallyFundedPrograms

Technical Assistance Grants (TAG) PHMSAs TAG program awards enable local

governments,

communities

and

groups

of

individuals

to

obtain

funding

for

technical

assistanceintheformofengineeringorotherscientificanalysisofpipelinesafetyissuesand

help promote public participation in official proceedings (universities are not eligible).

Enhancinghazardmitigationplans forpipelineswouldbeaneligibleactivityunder theTAG

program. The grant opportunity typically opens around January/February and is awarded

aroundSeptembereachyear.Theamountofanygrantmaynotexceed$100,000forasingle

grantrecipient.CFDANumber20.710.Authorizedunder49USC60130.

State Damage Prevention Grants (SDP) The purpose of these grants is to establish

comprehensive stateprogramsdesigned topreventdamage toundergroundpipelines in

statesthat

do

not

have

such

programs

and

to

improve

damage

prevention

programs

in

states that do. The amount of any grant may not exceed $100,000 for a single grant

recipient.CFDANumber20.720.Authorizedunder49USC60134.

PHMSAPipelineSafetyProgramOneCallGrants OnecallGrantsaredesignedtoprovide

funding to state agencies inpromotingdamageprevention, including changeswith their

state underground damage prevention laws, related compliance activities, training and

publiceducation.Stateagenciesthatparticipateinthepipelinesafetyprogramareeligible

toapplyforonecallgrantfundingonanannualbasis,withamaximumrequestamountof

$45,000per state.AStatemayprovide funds receivedunder this sectiondirectly toany

onecall

notification

system

ifthe

State

substantially

adopts

the

Common

Ground

Best

Practices.CFDANumber20.721.Authorizedunder49USC6106.

PipelineOperatorContributions

Pipelineoperatorspublicawarenessprogramsarerequiredbyfederalregulationstocomplywith

the American Petroleum Institute (API) Recommend Practice (RP) 1162, Public Awareness

Programs for Pipeline Operators. Appendix D of RP 1162, Detailed Guidelines for Message

DeliveryMethods,MediaSectionD.2.6CharitableContributionsbyPipelineOperatorsprovides:

While contributions and civic causes are not in themselves a public awareness effort,

companiesshouldconsiderappropriateopportunitieswherepublicawarenessmessagescan

beconveyedasapartoforinpublicityofthecontribution.Examplesinclude:

Contributionsofgasdetectionequipmenttothelocalvolunteerfiredepartment

Donationoffundstoacquireorimprovenaturepreservesorgreenspace

Sponsorshiptothecommunityartsandtheatre


35/125


Supportofscholarships(especiallywhentodegreeprogramsrelevanttothecompanyor

industry)

Sponsorshipofemergencyresponderstofiretrainingschool

StateProgramsandCapabilities

Thefollowing

state

agencies,

officials,

and

programs

may

have

either

direct

or

indirect

roles

in

hazard

mitigation inastate.Theseagenciescanplayakeyrole inreducingrisksfrompipelinehazards ina

stateandinimprovingtheeffectivenessofmitigationactivities.

EmergencyManagementDepartment

The primarymission of a states emergencymanagement department is to protect the lives and

property of the states citizens from emergencies and disasters, by coordinating state emergency

preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation programs. The responsibility is to ensure a

comprehensive,efficientandeffectiveresponsetoemergenciesanddisastersthroughoutthestate,

includingprovidingassistanceintheabsenceoffederalaid.Inthisrolestateemergencymanagement

departmentsareusuallychargedwithsupportingmitigationplanning.Stateemergencymanagement

departmentsmay alsoworkwith theU. S.EnvironmentalProtectionAgency (EPA)and their state

partnersonoilspillresponsedrills.

StateFireMarshal

Thestatefiremarshalisthemostseniorfireofficialinthestate.Statefiremarshals'responsibilities

vary from state to state, but they tend to be responsible for fire safety code adoption and

enforcement,fireandarsoninvestigation,fireincidentdatareportingandanalysis,publiceducation,

and advising state governors and legislatures on fire protection. Some state fire marshals are

responsiblefor

fire

fighter

training,

hazardous

materials

incident

responses,

wild

land

fires

and

the

regulation of natural gas and other pipelines. Most state fire marshals are appointed by state

governorsorotherhighrankingstateofficials.

StateDepartmentofTransportation(DOT)

StateDOTsareresponsibleforbuilding,maintainingandoperatingstateroads,bridgesandtunnels,

includingrepairsandreplacementsrequiredafternaturaldisasters.Inaccordancewithrequirements

of theFederalHighwayAdministration,stateDOTs routinely factor floodhazards intotheplanning

anddesignoftransportationinfrastructure. Insomecasesseismichazardsarealsoconsidered.

Stateand

Territorial

Environmental

Agency

State and territorial environment agencies have major responsibility for the environmental

consequencesofaccidentsanddisasters.These agenciesplay amajor role inhazardousmaterials

containment, testing,andabatement,andprovideoversight to thejointpermittingprocesses that


36/125


overseeanyactivitywithpotentialimpactstorivers,streamsorwetlands.14.Theymayalsoregulate

gasfracturingandtheassociatedwaterneeds.

LocalCapabilities

With respect toaddressingpipelinehazards, localjurisdictionscontrol landuse throughcodesand

ordinances,

planning,

zoning,

and

permitting.

These

local

governmental

functions

are

enabled

through state and federal laws and regulations, and can contribute significantly tomitigation of

pipelinehazards.Localjurisdictionalprogramsarealsoextremelyrelevantasstateagenciesgenerally

manage state facilities in amanner that is consistent and complementaryof local comprehensive

planningandzoning.

Useofuniformstatewidebuildingcodesisgenerallyrequiredforallnewconstructionandsignificant

building repairsor additionswithinmost cities, counties and towns.Many localhazardmitigation

strategiesreflectlocallanduserequirementsandbuildingcodesandmaycontributesignificantlyto

mitigatingpipelinehazards.

Followingare

some

typical

means

by

which

local

jurisdictions

control

land

use

and

development.

Comprehensivecitywideandcountywideplansarepreparedby localplanningcommissions

andaddressthephysicaldevelopmentof landwithinajurisdictionsboundaries.Thesemay

beenhancedor supportedby sectorplans. Thesemayalsobe supportedby, forexample,

generalplans,tenyearplans,growthpolicyplans,utilitiesplans,andmajorroadplans,

Zoning ordinancesprovide for thepublichealth, safety,morals,andgeneralwelfareof the

citizensofajurisdiction,andsecure for them thesocialandeconomicadvantages resulting

fromanorderlyplanneduseofthe landresourceswithinthejurisdiction. Theyareusedto

regulateand

restrict

the

location

and

use

of

buildings,

structures,

and

land

for

residence,

trade, industry,andotherpurposes. Theyrestricttheheight,numberofstories,andsizeof

buildingsandotherstructures,andthesizeofyards,courts,andotheropenspacesonalotor

tract. Theyprovidedefiniteofficiallanduseplansforpropertypubliclyandprivatelyowned

within the jurisdiction. They help to guide, control, and regulate the future growth and

developmentof thejurisdiction inaccordancewithdevelopmentplans,andprovide for the

administrationandotherwisecarryingoutofsuchplans.

Land subdivision and development ordinances are prescribed by statute. They generally

provide for theharmoniousdevelopmentof thejurisdiction and itsenvirons, including the

coordinationofroadswithinthesubdividedland,withotherexistingorplannedroads,orwith

the stateor regionalplan,orwith theplansofmunicipalities inornear the region. They

provideforadequateopenspacesfortraffic,light,airandrecreation;fortheconservationor

production of adequate transportation, water, drainage and sanitary facilities; for the

avoidanceofpopulationcongestion. Theyalsoprovidefortheavoidanceofsuchscatteredor

14CleanWaterAct,Section401,PermitsandLicensesCertificationandSection404,Regulations.

(http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/rulesregs/)


37/125


prematuresubdivisionoflandaswouldinvolvedangerorinjurytohealth,safetyorprosperity

by reasonof the lackofwater supply,drainage, transportationorotherpublic services,or

wouldnecessitateanexcessiveexpenditureofpublic funds for the supplyof such services.

Theyalsocontrolthemannerinwhichroadsshallbegradedandimproved,andwater,sewer

andotherutilitymains,piping,connectionsorotherfacilitiesshallbeinstalled.

Building

codesare

sets

of

rules

that

specify

the

minimum

acceptable

levels

of

safety

for

constructedobjectssuchasbuildingsandotherstructures.Themainpurposeofbuildingcodes

istoprotectpublichealth,safety,andgeneralwelfareastheyrelatetotheconstructionand

occupancyofbuildingsandstructures.Abuildingcodebecomeslawofaparticularjurisdiction

whenformallyenactedbytheappropriateauthority.

Buildingcodesareusuallyacombinationofprescriptive requirements thatspelloutexactly

how something is tobedone, andperformance requirementswhichjustoutlinewhat the

required levelofperformance is. Inrecenthistory,thetrendhasbeenforbuildingcodesto

movetomoreprescriptiverequirementsandlessperformancerequirements.

Themajor

model

building

codes

used

in

the

United

States

are

developed

by

the

International

Code Council(ICC), which has 14 sets ofinternational codes, including, for example,

theInternationalBuildingCode(IBC),theInternationalResidentialCode,theInternationalFire

Code, the International Energy Conservation Code, the International Plumbing Code, the

InternationalMechanicalCode,andothers.

Floodplain management provisions for development within a regulated floodplain have

typicallybeenaddressedbystandaloneordinancesadoptedforvoluntaryparticipationinthe

NationalFloodInsuranceProgram(NFIP).ThedesignatedNFIPcoordinatingagencyofalocal

government may find benefit in discussing potential oil spill consequences with pipeline

operators.The

data

from

this

program

may

inform

pipeline

operators

of

locations

where

floodingismorelikelytoimpactpipelines.

Regional Cooperative Developmentoccurswhen thephysical landuseof an areaextends

beyondtheboundariesofasinglejurisdiction. Anexampleofthiswouldbethedevelopment

or extension of new interstates, railways, and airports. Pipelines cross jurisdictional

boundaries. Arraignmentsandlocationsareoftennegotiatedbyallstakeholdersinvolved.

PipelineHazardMitigationStrategies

PHMSA has identified five mitigation strategies wherein state and local governments have the

authorityto

reduce

the

risk

of

pipeline

hazards.

They

are:

Pipelinemapping,

Pipelineawareness educationandoutreach,

Excavationdamageprevention,

Landuseanddevelopmentplanningneartransmissionpipelines,and

Emergencyresponseplanningforpipelineemergencies.


38/125

PipelinesandHazardMitig

Pipelines and Hazard Mitigation for Emergency Managers - Draft - 20130208

Documents

Transcript of Pipelines and Hazard Mitigation for Emergency Managers - Draft - 20130208