EXHIBITN

Pipeline Tragedies Across the u.s.

572

Dedication Table of Contents -

This publication is dedicated to all thevictims of pipeline accidents and to theirfamilies, with special thanks to Frank andMary King, Katherine Dalen, Bruce Brabec,and Marlene Robinson. Their tirelessefforts on behalf of pipeline refonn aretruly inspirationaL We are also indebted tomany others who have joined the battle forpipeline safety. Three individuals deservespecial mention: Lois Epstein, seniorengineer at Environmental Defense; RobertRackleff, President of the National PipelineRefonn Coalition; and James Pates,Fredricksburg City Attorney. For manyyears, these three worked valiantly to raiseconsciousness on this serious issue.Theirs were the voices crying in thewilderness - and no one was listening.Well, we're listening now and we thankyou for your expertise, hard work, andgracious willingness to share yourknowledge with us. We know that youhave devoted untold hours of your lives toprotect others and the environment, youronly reward the hope of meaningfulchange., It will be a fitting honor to yourefforts and to all those who have joinedyou, if, and when, pipeline safety becomesa reality instead of a myth.

PublisherFuel Safe Washington, a member of the

National Pipeline Reform Coalitioncopyright 2000

EditorAnne Bricklin

Assistant EditorsMarguerite Conti, Susan Harper

Design and LayoutMarguerite Conti

ContributorsNyles Zikmund, The Planet Magazine,

Annette Smith, Robert Rackleff, David Ortman,Deborah McCormick, Terri Magruder,Marguerite Jones, Sabrina Johnson,

Frank James, M.D., Ray Hill,Susan Harper, Waltraud Hannigan. Dan Farrell,

Lois Epstein, David Bricklin, Anne Bricklin,Toji Blad, and Glen Archambault.

IntroductionMajor Pipeline Disasters Since 1996

Pipeline Safety Since 1996:When Congress Acts No One Is Listening

ILLINOIS Citizens Win BattleBut Lose War Against Hazardous Pipelineby Deborah McCormick

Pipeline Nightmares in Maineby Waltraud Hannigan

Tragedy in Bellingham, Washingtonby Frank James. M.D.

Two accidents, two pipeline companies:Disastrous spills and needless tragediesby Anne Bricklin

Terror in Minnesotaby Nyles Zikmlmd

Pipeline Fatalities by State (1984 - 1999)

Pipelines Texas Styleby Marguerite Jones

Deep in the Heart of Texasby Anne Bricklin and Dan Farrell

A Mess in Michiganby Ray Hill

Calling the Office of Pipeline Safetyby Robel1 Rackleff

The Office of Pipeline Safety's Sorry Record

What's Wrong With This Picture?by Anne Bricklin

Innocent Lives Lost, Environments Destroyed

Birth of An Activist, Georgiaby Toji Blad

VERMONT Pipeline Myths versus Realityby Annette Smith

Living on the Pipelin~, Oregonby Glenn Archambault and Terri Magruder

Summary of Pipeline'Accidents by StateHighlights of U.S. GAO ReportNPRC Fact Sheet: Changes Needed

Pipeline Legislation 2000by David Bricklin

Regional Advisory CouncilsProvide Meaningful Oversightby Susan Harper

The Thick Fog of March: Blenheim, New Yorkby Sabrina Johnson

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Cover Photo: (used by permission of San Bernardino Sun Newspaper) This May 25, 1989 pipeline explosion in San Bernardino, Ca., occurredthirteen days after a 69-car freight train derailed. killing four people and damaging the underground gasoline pipeline that ran along the railroadright-oj-way. Damage to the pipe IVas overlooked by Calnev Pipeline Company inspectors who spent less ,than 24 hours on a partial inspection ofthe pipeline. It was quickly reopenedfour days after the train wreck. According to National1i'asportation Safety officials. it was made plain toCalnev by political officials represeming Nevada that it was not acceptable for the pipeline to remain shut down for any length of time. When thepipeline burst, it sprayed over300,000 gallonsofhigh-octane gasoline over the nearby neighborhood. In the ensuing explostion andftre, three peoplewere killed, 31 were injured. and 10 houses burned to the ground After the explosion andftre. the Office ofPipeline Safety belatedly directed Calnevto dig up and replace the pipe.

573

IntroductionMost people, when they see a sign marked "Warning Hazardous Underground Pipeline," never give it a secondthought. Out ofsight is truly out of mind. Yet, pipelines pose aserious threat to safety, public lands, and privateproperty. Pipeline ruptures and leaks cause injuries and death from explosions and fires, contaminate water,crop, residential, and park land, and generate greenhouse gases. Despite this serious threat, the tiny federalagency regulating pipelines (the Department of Transportation's Office of Pipeline Safety, or OPS) has mini­mal safety standards, rarely penalizes companies for violations of its regulations, and federal pipeline lawprohibits states from establishing their own regulations to address the hazards posed by interstate pipelines.This situation is ideal for pipeline companies, but tragic for the public and the environment. The followingcollection of stories includes contributions from around the country, written by people who have dealt with thistragedy in a very personal way - ordinary citizens who have learned firsthand that "out of sight" is hardly outofmind. Butfrrst:

A look back in time to 1986 - Fourteen summers ago a mother and her young daughter die in Mounds View,Minnesota, victims of an horrific explosion caused by an underground gasoline pipeline rupture. Enragedcitizens discover that federal regulations designed to protect the public from such catastrophes are woefullyinadequate. They also learn that lax enforcement and weak penalties levied by the federal Office of PipelineSafety provide little incentive for the pipeline industry to reform. Recommendations are made to Congress butmeaningful reform does not occur.

Fast fonvard to the year 2000 - Three young people have died the summer before, victims of an horrificgasoline pipeline explosion in Bellingham, Washington. Enraged citizens discover that they are sitting on atime bomb - a vast network of aging, poorly maintained hazardous fuel pipelines. They demand reform.Legislation is introduced. Pressure is mounting on Congress to act. Newspapers announce that pipeline reformis at hand. But the awful truth is that nothing much has changed: After intense lobbying from the oil andpipeline industry, Congress appears poised to enact legislation directing the Office of Pipeline Safety to estab­lish safety standards for pipeline companies. However, Congress is leaving the content of those standardsentirely up to OPS, an agency that has consistently failed to adopt standards (despite Congressional mandatesand NTSB recommendations), or when it does act, adopts such weak standards that they are virtually meaning~

less. I After reviewing OPS's sorry record, Congressman John Dingell, of Michigan, noted:

"The focus of our Nation's pipeline safety program and its regulator should be onpreventing the loss of life, rather than on preventing the loss of profit margin toindustly. OPS seems to lack this focus. "2

Recent government reports reveal that the number ofmajor pipeline accidents is increasing every yeqr, yet DPS"has almost eliminated the use offines as an enforcement tool" and at the same time OPS "has consistentlyfailed to fulfill its obligations under the law . ... "3 It is inconceivable to the victims ofpipeline tragedies andto all those who care about the health and safety of people and the environment that Congress is willing tocontinue conducting business as usual, relying on an agency that has clearly demonstrated, time and again, aprofound "inability to regulate." 4

When will the tragedy end . ..

J E.g., OPS regulations don't require pipeline operators to use leak detection equipment but, if they do, such devices should complywith industry design standards. Unfortunately for victims of pipeline accidents, standards don't specify how sensitive leak detectiondevices should be. •2 June 14,2000 letter from Congressman John Dingle, ranking member of the U.S. House Conunittee on Commerce. to RodneySlater, U.S. Secretary of the Department of Transportation, commenting on the abysmal record of the Office of Pipeline Safety.l ~ the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) report on pipeline safety and the Office of Pipeline Safety (GAO/ReED-DO­128) prepared at Representative Dingle's request, issued on June 15, 2000, and the U.S. Office of Inspector General's AuditReport on the Pipeline Safety Program (RT-2000·069), issued March 13. 2000.,~ footnote 2.

574

Major Pipeline Disasters Since 1996

2000

NEW MEXICO· Eleven people died and one remains in critical conditionafteranatural gas pipeline exploded on August 19, 2000, near Carlsbad,New Mexico, showering the victims' campsite with flames. Federal inves­tigators say that the EI Paso Energy pipeline showed significant corrosionand significant wall thinning (50% ofwhat wall thickness should be). This50-year-old pipeline, like fifty percent of U.S. pipelines, cannot be inter­nally inspected for flaws such as corrosion because of obstructing valvesand bends. Older pipelines can be retrofitted (e.g., replacing obstructingvalves without digging up the whole pipeline), but, citing cost issues, thepipeline industry has not done so.*

MICHIGAN· On June 8, 2000, aWolverine Pipe Line Company pipe­line ruptured, spilling 75,000 gallons of unleaded gasoline and forcingthe evacuation of 500 homes in Blackman Township. Local wells werecontaminated and an undetermined amount of fuel went into the GrandRiver.

DELAWARE· An undetected 12-yearpipeline leak at aConectiv powerplant released as much as 600,000 gallons of oil, threatening the nearbyIndian River. The leak could rank as one of Delaware's largest andmay take ye~rs to clean up.

KENTUCKY - On January 27, 2000, a Marathon Ashland Petroleumpipeline ruptured, spilling 490,000 gallons of crude oil, much of it intoa tributary of the Kentucky River from which Lexington, Richmond,and other cities draw their driFiking water. Drinking water is beingshipped in for people whose wells were affected. Officials don't knowhow long it will take to clean up.4he oil.

TEXAS· A27-year-old corroded pipeline, owned by Explorer PipeLine Company burst on March 9, 2000, releasing 600,000 gallons ofMTBE-treated gasoline, contaminating Lake Tawakoni and the watersupply to 10 towns and cities, including one third of Dallas's water supply.Nearby businesses were severely impacted.

MARYLAND· A110,OOO-gallon oil spill fouled stretches of the eco­logically fragile Patuxent River. OPS chargedthat Potomac Electric PowerCo.'s leak-detection monitoring was inadequate and that PEPCO work­ers bypassed meters and pressure gauges. Spill response plans alsorevealed serious deficiencies. The cost of cleanup to date exceeds $50million.

PENNSYLVANIA· ASunoco refinery pipeline spilled over 56,000galloos of crude oil at the John Heinz National Wildlife Refuge onFebruary 5, 2000. The leak was detected by apassing hiker who "no­ticed the smell ofoiL" EPA states that the lack ofacrude oil leak-detectorsensorwas acontributing factor to the spill.

1999

WASHINGTON· Three youths lost their lives on June 10, 1999 whenthe aging Olympic pipeline burst, filling a park in Bellingham with229,500 gallons of gasoline, igniting an explosion and fire. Factorscontributing to the accident: operator error, malfunctioning computersand equipment, and failure to inspect aknown defect.

TEXAS· 440,000 gallons of crude oil spilled from aKoch Co. pipelineon January 8, 1999 in Benavides. This intrastate pipeline spill wasprosecuted by the Texas Attorney General.

1998

GEORGIA· AColonial pipeline ruptured in the Morgan Falls Landfillon March 30, 1998, releasing more than 30,000 gallons of gasoline;clean-up efforts only recovered 17,000 gallons. No alarms were de­tected in the control center to signify that the line had failed.

LOUISIANA· 748,000 gallons of crude oil was released on April 18,1998 from aShell Pipeline Corp. facility in St. James. The spill, which hasbeen attributed to operator error, is still under investigation.

1991

CALIFORNIA· On December 13,1997, asection of corroded pipelineowned by All American Pipe Line Co. ruptured, spilling 541,000 gal­lons of crude oil into the California desert. As of June 2000, OPS couldnot verify if any enforcement action had been taken.

INDIANA· Anatural gas pipeline ruptured on July 21, 1997, near anIndianapolis suburb, igniting afire, killing one person, injuring another,destroying six homes, and damaging 65 others. The probable causeaccording to the NTSB: failure to have adequate controls in place toensure that drilling operations would not cause damage.

INDIANA· AMarathon Pipe Line Co. pipeline ruptured on August 24,1997, spilling 470,652 gallons of crude oil. OPS said the spillwas causedby corrosion in an area of pipe inside aprotective casing that was poorlycoated when installed.

IOWA· On March ii, 1997, 1.2 million gallons of gasoline were re­leased from aWilliams Pipeline Co. facility. The release was causedby a slow leak from a rust hole in a small line inside the company'sfacility.

1996

SOUTH CAROLINA· A Colonial Pipeline Co. pipeline ruptured onJune 26, 1996, where a corroded section of pipe crossed the ReedyRiver, releasing 957,600 gallons of oil into the river and surroundingareas. Estimated cost of damage and cleanup: $20.5 million. Thecause of the spill: inadequate management controls and training.

TEXAS· On August 24, 1996, aKoch Co. pipeline transporting liqUidbutane ruptured, killing two teenagers who drove into the vapor cloudcreated by the rupture. The NTSB determined that the cause of theaccident was the failure of Koch to adequately protect its pipeline fromcorrosion.

TENNESSEE· During amaintenance operation on November 5, 1996,aColonial pipeline released 84,700 gallons of diesel fuel.

*CNBC business news reported that El Paso Energy stock reached a 52-week high on August 23, 2000, and that most U.S. natural gas pipeline stockshave increased about 100 percent in value the past year.

575

So if the problem is this bad, why hasnIt Congress acted?

But they have • ••

In 1996, only two years after adevastating natural gas pipeline explosion in Edison, N.J., the oil industry lobbied CONGRESS sohard to WEAKEN the PIPELINE SAFETY ACT that agroup of congressman sent aletter to President Clinton asking him toveto the bill. Clinton signed it anyway. The bill' eliminated then current requirements that oil and gas PIPELINES be IN­SPECTED EVERY TWO YEARS and that MAINTENANCE WORKERS EARN FEDERAL CERTIFICATION. According to statis­tics from the Federal Office of Pipeline Safety, SINCE THE OIL INDUSTRY'S SUCCESSFUL EFFORT TO WEAKEN THE PIPE­LINE SAFETY ACT in 1996:

.. 1997 was the third highest year for net loss of volume spilled (5,079,228 gallons) since OPS began keepingrecords in 1986

.. 1998 was the worst year for property damages from hazardous pipeline ruptures, spills, and leaks­over $57 million

• 1999 tied for the second worst year for fatalities (4) from pipeline accidents

.. 2000 Is headed for the record books: Six major oil spills in the first six months contaminating drinking watersupplies in Dallas, Lexington, Richmond, and other cities and towns, and forcing the evacuation of 500 homes westof Detroit, Michigan. Two natural gas pipeline explosions in one weekend: Eleven people died near Carlsbad,New Mexico when a50-year-old natural gas pipeline exploded on August 19, 2000. The next day one worker is In­jured and 300 people are evacuated from ashopping mall in Concord, North Carolina when anatural gas pipeline Ishit by abulldozer.

• •• yet when Congress acts, no one is'listening

EIGHT YEARS AFTER CONGRESS MANDATED*" improved PIPELINE SAFETY INSPECTION STANDARDSthe Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) has NOT YET:

• ESTABLISHED THOSE STANDARDS or ESTABLISHED REQUIREMENTS REGARDING:

• The timing and frequency ofpipeline inspections

.. The use of ''smart pigs" (Internal instrumental inspection devices)

EIGHT YEARS LATER: OPS HAS ALSO FAILED TO ISSUE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION REGULATIONS MANDATED BYCONGRESS IN 1992. OPS was required to "identify areas unusually sensitive to environmental damage" by October 1994, and todevelop regulations for pipelines in those areas by October 1995.

OPS HAS FAILED TO ACT ON NEARLY HALF OF THE 49 REQUIREMENTS MANDATED BY CONGRESS SINCE 1988 TOIMPROVE THE SAFETY OF PIPELINES AND ENHANCE OPS's ABILITY TO OVERSEE THE PIPELINE INDUSTRY. OPS also has theworst record of any transportation agency for implementing NationalTransportation Safety Board (NTSB) recommendations. They have notacted on NTSB recommendations calling for more stringent pipeline standards, including one 1987 recommendation on corrosion that couldhave prevented the deaths of two teenagers in Texas in 1996.

*The "Accountable Safety and Partnership Act of 1996."

*"'The "Pipeline Safety Act of 1992."

576

"... despite clear evidence of the potential for significant environ­mental harm, we could not stop it from being built. The creditbelongs, in large part, to the federal Office of Pipeline Safety. J)

Citizens Win Battle,

But Lose the War"Against Hazardous Pipelineby Deborah McConnick

Landowners are at a tremendous disadvantage when a pipeline comes to town. We are akin to thetargets of a stealth bomber that has flown in for the kill, cloaked and undetected. Consider LakeheadPipe Line Company. In March 1996, Lakehead contacted Illinois landowners regarding its plan toconstruct a 100- mile crude oil pipeline, part of a multistate $300 million expansion project. Surely, aproject this size took considerable time to plan - months if not years. However, when Lakeheadofficially swooped into Illinois with a fleet of high-powered lawyers and staff, brimming with studiesand paperwork, and a small army ofoil refiners, trade associations, and expert witnesses poised to cometo Lakehead's aid, landowners got a lousy two weeks to get ready for the first hearing.

Pursuant to illinois law, Lakehead applied for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity, aprerequisite to obtaining the power of eminent domain over landowners who either refused to grantLakehead an easement or failed to agree on compensation. Against tremendous odds, and afterbattling for two years, "Communities Against the Pipeline" (CAP) demonstrated that there wasno need for this pipeline. With donated expert testimony,l CAP was able to prove that the Lakeheadpipeline would not add to the supply of oil, but merely displace oil coming toChicago from other sources. Moreover, the project would have no impact on fuel

prices for consumers. Essentially,Lakehead sought to expand its market andprofits with no benefit to consumers. Yet,Lakehead expected to have the right ofeminent domain over landowners who

refused to cooperate. Even after we won the eminent domain issue, we were scratching our heads overwhy we had ever been placed in that position in the first place. Why didn't the Illinois CommerceCommission (ICC) nix the project before ever involving landowners? The basic facts of the case werethere from the start. Then we looked back at our first meeting with the ICC staff people, and remem­bered how they coveted our expert's maps of interstate pipeline systems. The people who wouldrecommend a decision in the case did not even have basic maps of the pipelines. It was up to avoluntary citizens group to bring a major state agency up to speed on the realities of a largepipeline project.

Yet, even though we were able to prove that this hazardous fuel pipeline was unnecessary (except toenrich its owners) and despite clear evidence of the potential for significant environmental harm, wecould not stop it from being built. The credit belongs, in large part, to the federal Office of PipelineSafety (OPS), the very agency you would expect Gudging by its title) to be in the business of protectingsensitive areas from the harmful effects of unnecessary pipelines.

Instead, we learned that the OPS is little more than a cheerleader for the pipeline industry.When CAP contacted OPS to try and learn more about Lakehead, we were assured that there was littlecause for concern because pipeline accidents were rare and usually preventable by utilizing the "callbefore you dig" systems. These were the same assurances Lakehead was offering at public meetings.In glossy brochures, the pipeline company claimed "Lakehead has an exemplary record for maintain­ing and operating its pipelines."

Freedom of Information requests yielded quite a different story, however. In Lakehead's case,"exemplary" meant 38 pipeline accidents reported to the Department of Transportation between 1985and 1995 (almost 4 per year).

In over 80 percent of those accidents it would have been of no use to utilize the "call beforeyou dig" system because the vast majority of accidents, rather than being caused by third partydamage, were actually caused by things such as failed welds, failed pipe, corrosion, faulty gas­kets and seals, pinhole le~ks, hairline craclts, operator error, faulty or malfunctioning equip­ment, etc.

The largest spill in Minnesota history - a 1.7 million-gallon spill in 1991 - came from a Lakeheadpipeline, as did the second largest, a 1.3-million-gallon spill in 1973.

I The proposed pipeline path crossed the childhood farm of Katherine Miller, wife of Dr. Merton Miller, professor of finance at the University of Chicago'sGraduate School of Business and the recipient of a Nobel Prize in Economics. Without compensation, he researched issues in the case and testified before theIllinois Commerce Commission.

577

Currently, leakdetection devices

used by the oilpipeline industryare incapable ofdetecting slow,

continuous leakswhich can (andhave) released

hundreds ofthousandsof gallons

of hazardousfuel into

groundwater.

A 425,OOO-gallon Lakehead pipeline spill in Bemidji, Minnesota in 1979 was selected by the U.S.Geological Survey Office of Hazardous Waste Hydrology as a research site on the effects of groundwa­ter contamination. And Lakehead's Northern illinois pipeline passes through McHenry County, whichis 100 percent dependent on groundwater for drinking water. Its glacial history makes its sand andgravei soil so vulnerable that it was ranked second out of 102 illinois counties for potential adverseeffects from groundwater contamination.

Federal regulations control siting of interstate pipelines. Yet, the federal Office of Pipeline Safety,despite a mandate from Congress in 1992 to identify areas "unusually sensitive to environmentaldamage" by October 1994, and to develop regulations for pipelines by October 1995, has notdone SO.2 Now, thanks to the OPS's failure to regulate pipelines so as to protect citizens and theenvironment, people in Northern Illinois have an unnecessary oil pipeline running through their landand face the real risk of groundwater contamination of their drinking supplies. With cun-ent pipelineleak detection systems this is a real possibility. Cun-ently, leak detection devices used by the oil pipe­line industry are incapable of detecting slow, continuous leaks which can (and have) released hundredsof thousands of gallons of hazardous fuel into groundwater. Lakehead's 1.7 million-gallon spill inGrand Rapids, Minnesota resulted from a combination of en-ors, including the pipeline operator'sfailure to accurately interpret and respond to signals of a major leak.3

Our story is a case study in winning the battle, but losing the war. Citizens are forced to fight toprotect their property rights, their health and safety, and the health and safety of the environmentagainst an industry that is given free reign to build unnecessary, hazardous pipelines. We succeeded indenying an unnecessary pipeline the right of eminent domain, but we live every day with the failure ofthe federal government to provide meaningful regulation of the pipeline industry. lit

"State of the Art" leak Containment

A leaky section of the Yellowstone Pipeline

(YPL) on the Flathead Indian Reservation in

Montana. Due to the vast amounts of petro­

leum product leaked onto Tribal Lands

(over 216,000 gallons from 1986 to 1993), in

1995 theFlatheads refused to renew YPL's

easement. The Yellowstone pipeline has a

history of numerous other spills in Montana

and attempts to reroute it have met with stiff

opposition. YPL recently withdrew its

application to route the pipeline across

National Forest land.

photo counesy or Tribal Disaster Emergency Services

Yellowstone Pipeline valve leak, Penna, Saunders County,Montana, August, 1993.

, The Army Corps of Engineers could have required an EIS but it did not. despite a reqllest by McHemy County Defenders to do so. In addition, the IllinoisAttorney General was of the opinion that counties were preempted by federal law from requiring compliance with their zoning laws in the siting of pipelines.J The 425,OOO-gallon spill in Bemidji, Minnesota is a perfect example of why it is so important to look behind the safety claims of pipeline companies. Whilepushing their Illinois pipeline project through. Lakehead claimed they had "never contaminated a welL" They contaminated plent)' of groundwater in Minnesotabut in remote areas without wells. o

578

Pipeline Nightmares in Maineby Waltraud Hannigan

Our community fought long and hard to stop the Rumford-Jay Natural Gas Pipeline, a pipelineowned and operated by Portland Natural Gas Transmission Systems (pNGTS). We lost. And now weare living with a time bomb in our front yards.

If a pipeline company ever swoops down into your life, asking, wheedling, telling you to let theminstall apipeline in your area, read our story fIrst. It just might inform and inspire you to fight backwith every ounce of courage and wisdom that you possess. PNGTS's lO-inch high-pressure natural gaspipeline was installed atthe side of the road from Albany, Maine to Jay, Maine, buried in a ditch three­feet deep - in theory at least. In many places they did not get the full three-foot depth because ofledges and huge boulders. Elsewhere, the pipe lies right on top ofboulders with no cushion underneath.The subcontractor who installed the pipeline along a certain five-mile stretch ofrocky terrain expectedto do it in two days. Instead, it took three weeks and many shortcuts were taken, inclUding back fillingwith whatever was handy, including dumping huge rocks on top of the pipe. Many irregularities oc­curred in the installation of this pipeline. One can only guess at the quality of the so-called inspectionsof this project. I

And we live in an earthquake-prone region. We tried to tell them but no one would listen. InJanuary 2000, there were four quakes in this area. Luckily, the line wasn't broken. Who knows,however, what damage may have occurred that could lead to a rupture in the future? When we askedour fire department how much of this valley they could save if an accident or explosion happened, theyanswered, "Probably none."

Nowadays, it's scary to watch the washouts along the pipeline route, a heavily traveled road withhomes close by. Shoulders along the road were supposed to be restored to their original condition, butweren't, and are unsafe. None of the fIll was packed, resulting in many washouts. This makes dliving achallenge; to say the least. Contractors did a poor job of patching the pavement as well. All of us keephaving our vehicles re-aligned because the roadway is so rough. If any of the big transport trucks thatroutinely travel this road were to swerve onto these shoulders, the result could very easily be a rupturedgas line.

The cards were stacked against us from the beginning. With arrogance, lies, and an apparent carteblanche to do as they pleased, PNGTS representatives informed us that they were merely talking to us(about the pipeline) out of the goodness of their hearts. PERC; the Federal Energy Regulatory Com­missio.n, was the only governing body they had to abide by. PERC made the decision about siting;everything else was just a formality.

Boy, were they light on that score. An aloof PERC responded to citizen queries by providing thephone number of some PR person who knew little more about the proposed pipeline than the callersasking questions. PERC then proceeded to ignore EPA findings that backed many of our concerns:Clean Air and Water Act requirements didn't matter, endangered species - who cares? PERC alsoignored its responsibility under the National Environmental Policy Act to consider the full range ofenvironmental impacts, including direct, indirect, and cumulative effects.

When weasked our

firedepartmenthow much

of this valleythey couldsave if an

accident orexplosionhappened,

theyanswered,({Probably

none."

. ;

I Currently, the DOT is trying to repair the ditches along this road, digging on top of the gas line in order to do this. Hopefully, they won't hit the pipe. Onewonders how much protectio~ against damage will exist after they finish the repair by removing about a foot of cover over the pipeline (down to two feet fromthe original three).

579

When determining the pipeline route, PNGTS used outdated maps.My own property never appeared on any maps or on the draft and finalenvironmental impact statements. Safer alternative routes were disre­garded because they were a little more expensive. Warnings by theNational Safety Council concerning placement of pipelines and surround­ing development went unheeded. As a result, many homes in our area liewithin 10 feet of a 1400 pounds psi natural gas pipeline. Our communityended up feeling that all the rules and regulations intended to protectpeople and the environment were mere pieces of paper meant to beignored or simply not enforced.

The law of Eminent Domain was used against us as well. Propertyowners felt exploited and helpless, unsure of their rights under the law.Now, our properties are devalued, despite specious claims by PNGTSrepresentatives that the pipeline would increase values.2

As is typical in these situations, PNGTS claimed that the pipeline wasa question of "need." We were told that the Mead Paper Co. inRumford and the International Paper Co. in Jay "needed" the naturalgas. In reality, the paper companies simply agreed to try it.International Paper converted one machine to use it. And lessthan two years after the pipeline was in, PNGTS doubled theprice of gas charged to the Mead Paper Co. Mead can't affordit and has laid off about 50 workers, with more layoffs expected.The main beneficiaries of this pipeline (other than PNGST)appear to be two power plants currently being built in Jay andRumford. These power plants were never part of the originalpermitting process and most of the electricity generated by themwill be going outside Maine to the New England power grid.So much for the "Public Need and Necessity" requirement.

The moral here is clear: when pipeline companies cry "need"assume the worst: Greed, not need, is the driving force, withoutregard to human or environmental cost.

After everything we've been through, rumors are circulatingabout a second pipeline going in along the same route (to supplyenough gas for the power plants). We hope it's not true. The thoughtof even more environmental damage and danger to our families isfrightful. Every day I watch my children walk over the pipeline tocatch their school bus and feel a great sense offailure. I could notprotect them. Maybe one day we won't wake up because a leak in thepipeline has sucked all the oxygen out of our home.

The outrage runs deep. Our community is at a loss to understandhow our lives have been endangered, our property values diminished,our quality of life impaired, and our environmental and safety concernsblatantly disregarded, all for a poorly ins~alled, hazardous pipelineof questionable need. The time is long pcist due when the horrorsof the pipeline industry cry out for exposure. Meaningfulregulations must be instituted and implemented. Americancitizens and our environment have been harmed enough.•

Myth: National standards are critical for safe operation of interstate pipelines.Facts: There is no reason to believe that stronger state standards which are compatible with federal standards will impede interstatecommerce or decrease pipeline safety. Currently, states can exceed federal standards for intrastate pipelines without any problems.Moreover, because environmental conditions differ dramatically throughout the nation, it makes sense to allow states to exceed federalrequirements as environmental laws do to ensure that all areas are adequately protected. Examples where states might want to exceedfederal requirements include right-af-way management (e.g. to avoid excessive tree-cutting), frequency of testing of pipeline segments, aswell as developing safety-retated design criteria for landslide areas, earthquake zones, etc.

2 When they told us that property values ,vould go up, I asked them to please buy my property. The pipeline was going in along the road only 10 feet from myhome. PNGTS said they were not in the business of buying private property. The only homeowner they compensated already had an oil pipeline runningthrough his property. PNGTS informed him they would be using the same cOITidor for their pipeline and he would end up with the natural gas line only feet awayfrom his new home. He demanded $20,000, the cost of moving his new house. PNOST offered $2,000, threatening to take him to court if he did not accept. Herefused and PONST finally backed down and paid him the $20.000.

580

Tragedy in

Bellingham,

Washingtonby Frank James. M.D.

Olympic pipeline rupture ill Bellingham. JUne 1999 photo courtesy of U.S. Representative.lay Inslec', office, \Vnshincton Stale

In the heart of Whatcom Falls Park a creek flows. Be­neath it lies the Olympic Pipeline. I played in the park when Iwas young. With my three children, I walked along the creekand across the pipeline, thinking that it was a water line to ourtown's water treatment plant. That is, until June 10th, 1999.Everyone in our community can tell you exactly where theywere at 4:55 p.m. on June 10th, 1999. It's like asking some ofus older folks where we were when John F. Kennedy was shot.I was working in a busy clinic near the creek, seeing a youngwoman, a schizophrenic. At 4;:55 p.m. the lights flickered andI felt the ground shake. The lights flickered again and theground shook a second time. My patient bolted for the door.She just ran; she didn't know what was happening.

I went outside and saw a plume of black smoke Iising highinto the sky. What I didn't know at the time and wouldn'tknow for several hours was that, in that instant, things in mycommunity had dramatically changed. In that instant, threeinnocent young people were killed, two ten-year-old boys andan 18-year-old young man. And in that instant, the park - abeautiful place with a wild, raging stream running throughvery old second-growth forest - was turned into an inferno.

One of three youths who died was fishing in the park thatday. He wasn't killed by the explosion or by the flames. Aten-foot high wall ofgasoline vapor rose into the air and moveddown the creek bed. He suffocated in the fumes, fell into thecreek and drowned. His name was Liam Wood. Five daysbefore the explosion, Liam graduated from the same highschool my son goes to. He was a neat kid. He wrote the fol­lowing excerpt in his journal six months before he died:

ctPresently my life is great. I finished

my second-to-last semester of high school

and don't have a care in the world. I've

been living it up and doing the things I

love to do, like fly fishing, snowboarding,

dating, lifting weights, and playing basket­

ball. Other things I really like to do are ice

climbing, whitewater kayaking, hiking, run-

ning, watching movies, spending time with

my friends. I value many things, life being

the first and foremost. I also value good

long-lasting friendships, and courtesy. And I

value honesty and good food. I value our

wilderness areas and all creatures walking

on the earth. I value all people and I value

the diversity and human rights. People that

are important to me are my parents and my

beautiful baby sister, Bailey. 11

Two ten-year aIds were playing in Whatcom Creek Park thatday. And in that instant their futures were lost, wiped out in asingle, fiery explosion. Wade 'King and Stephen Tsiorvas werefourth graders at Kulshan Elementary. The school is located onlya few blocks from where the pipeline broke and about 40 feetfrom where the reconstructed pipeline runs. The kids who attendKulshan have trouble going to school now. They know and theirparents know how close things got that day. They know our com­munity was lucky it was 4:55 p.m. and not 5:30 p.m. when thepipe burst, lucky it was June 10th and not June 15th, because on asunny day later in the month or later in the day, hundreds ofpeoplewould have been in the park.

Stephen and Wade's were not easy deaths. I'm a physician andI'm used to seeing people suffer. But these two boys had 90percent of their skin burned off. And the bad news is they lived.People can live for 10, 12 hours when this happens. As a physi­cian, I also know that there's no fix for it. There's nothing you cando. There is no skin to graft; you can't put 90 percent ofsomeone'sskin back on. Their body fluids ooze out, their

581

photo courtesy of Fronk and Mill)' King

A promising young baseball playel; Wade King hit his firstgrand slam at his Little League game one week before hedied.

intemal organs swell and burst, and they die. But they're alivefor those 10 hours, and they can talk. These two kids talked toFrank King, Wade's father. They asked him what had happenedand what would happen. Frank King told them that everythingwas going to be okay, because he thought that it was.

Wade's brother was there too. He ran out into the field wherethe boys were; he can-ied Stephen out of the woods and fire.When he went back for his brother he was too hot to touch, toohot to pick up. Wade's dad spent about 45 minutes with the twoburned boys before the paramedics arrived. They were unableto get there sooner because of all the traffic. Brad, the para­medic who responded said,"I've never had anyone or anythingaffect nie like this, ever ... something inside me has been lostforever."

It's just an instant, but it's amazing what happens. Wade'smom is Mary King. Every time I see Mary since the accidentshe shakes and cries. It's been almost a year now and she stillcries. I don't expect that's going to change very soon. Nor do Iexpect my patients who suffered that day to recover any timesoon. One of them is a mountain rescue volunteer. I've seen himonce a month since the explosion. And each time he comes inhe says exactly the same thing, tells me the same stOlY. As hespeaks his pulse races, about 130, and his blood pressure is high.He's had hypertension for a long time, but never as bad as it isnow. He's the one who found Liam's body. When he went by it,he didn't recognize it because it just looked like charred wood.Then, he came back by and saw under the water there was aface. He hasn't been the same since.

Then, there are the mother and her daughter who live nearthe park. They were in their yard that day, playing ball. Andnow, almost a year later, the little girl still won't go to bed by her-

Myth: Pipeline companies are doing everything they can toprevent leaks. Aller all, lost raw materials and products costcompanies money.Facts: Petroleum and petroleum products are relativelyinexpensive materials. Shutting down a pipeline to fix a leak is acostly undertaking. Installing one or more high-performance leakdetection systems (multiple systems serve as backup and detectdifferent types of leaks) can be expensive. So is testing pipelineson a periodic basis. Why should pipeline companies voluntarilypay to detect leaks when they are not required to do so. whendetecting leaks could cost more from pipeline shutdowns than thecost of lost product, cleanup, and governmental penaltiescombined?

self at night. One of my most affected patients is a Vietnamveteran. He was out on the bay that day, fishing. Looking backtoward town, he was absolutely certain that napalm had beendropped on his home. The cloud streaks and flame looked ex­actly like the napalmbombs he'd dropped in Vietnam. He stayedout in the bay for three hours, waiting and watching, uncertainwhat to do.

These people aren't theoretical numbers on a graph. Theyare real human beings suffering. They are Liam, Stephen, andWade. They are the victims of pipeline accidents and spillsoccuning almost daily in our country. The damage to our envi­ronment is real too, the innumerable streams, hills, wetlands,parks, and watersheds, damaged or destroyed every year in pipe­line accidents. The failure to protect our children and our com­munities is a serious one. The battle for pipeline safety is a battlewe cannot afford to lose. Each time we use a car when we couldwalk orbike, each time we decide-how strong aregulation shouldbe, each time we weigh profit versus safety, we are making adecision thathas real consequence's for real people and the placeswhere they live. It

photo courtesy of Klltherine Daten

Stephen Tsiorvas loved life and loved people, and theyloved him back. A selfless child, he never cried orcomplained when, badly burned, he was being transportedto the hospital after the explosion. Instead, his mainconcern was for his friend, Wade. whom he repeatedlyasked about.

582

Two accidents, two pipeline companies

The following incidents highlight the dire need for improved operator training, pipeline maintenance, testing and performance stan­dards, and the ineffectiveness of the federal Office of Pipeline Safety's minimal safety standards, minimal oversight, weak enforcementpolicies, and excessive operator discretion.

Grand Rapids, MinnesotaLakehead Pipe line Co. March 3, 1991 spill

On March 3, 1991, aLakehead Pipe Line Co. pipeline developed cracks near alongitudinal weld that propagated into a64-inch failurein the weld. Due to an electrical problem, apump station was out of operation during the failure, rendering the control center powerlessto start pumps or monitor pressure and flow rate data at the pump station. The initial indication of apotential problem came at 11 :20a.m. Pipeline operators failed to accurately interpret and respond to the signals of amajor leak. Instead, they mistook the indicators foranormal transient phenomenon of pipeline operation called "fluid column separation." As aresult, they actually increased the pressureof oil flowing into the line several times and did not commence ashut down of the pipeline until 12:31 p.m. (one hour and 11 minuteslater). Lakehead did not know the location of the problem until they were notified at 1:43 p.m. by a Northern Minnesota Utilitiesemployee of a large oil release in afield adjacent to Itasca Community College. By then, the oil had migrated down a drain tile thatemptied into the Prairie River about two miles upstream from the Mississippi. A reported 1.7 million gallons of oil leaked from thepipeline, about 20 percent of it ending up in the Prairie River, which fortunately was still covered with ice, containing the damage.

Pipeline accident history - Prior to the Grand Rapids spill, the section of pipeline involved in the Grand Rapids release had ahistory of 24 leaks due to longitudinal seam failure, and nine failures from other causes, or 33 total. From 1985 to 1995, 38 pipelinereleases on the Lakeheadpipeline system were reported to DOT. Over 80 percent of those accidents were causedby factors within thecompany's control: failed welds, failed pipe, corrosion, malfunctioning equipment, and operator error.

August 2000 spill - AccordIng to the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency; on July 22, 2000, a Lakeheadpipeline leaked approxi­mately 20,000 gallons of crude oil into a wetland near Leonard, Minnesota. The cause of the break has not yet been determined,but could not be attrIbuted t~ outside sources because thepipeline is in an inaccessible area of the wetland.

Bellingham, WashingtonOlympic Pipe line June 10, 1999 rupture and explosion

On June 10, 1999, at 3:18 p.m., while shifting batches of fuel in the system, operators at Olympic Pipe Line's Renton control roomexperienced difficulty starting a pump in Woodinville. Computers controlling a series of valves and pumps began acting up. Thisstarted achain of events that led to an abnormal pressure rise at Olympic's new Bayview tank station upstream of Woodinville. Asurgerelief valve, designed to limit such apressure rise, failed to function properly at the Bayview station. That valve had opened and closedmore than 59 times since the station had begun operating the previous,December, but Olympic had never investigated or corrected theproblem. At 3:24 p.m., the Renton control room computer crashed. At'3:28 p.m., an inlet valve at the Bayview station (triggered by thepressure rise) closed against pumps operating at the head of the line, causing apressure surge. Those pumps shut down. Within twominutes, the pressure surge traveled 30 miles north of the valve and burst through athinned pipe wall,* releasing more than 200,000gallons of gasoline into Whatcom Falls Park. Olympic's computers came back up and at 3:46 p.m., apparently unaware of the break,operators restarted the pumps, sending more gasoline into the pipeline. Aleak alarm sounded in the Olympic Control room at 4:29p.m. but Olympic operators, apparently still unaware of the rupture, started another pump, releasing more fuel into the line. Finally, at4:32 p.m., after gasoline had gushed out for more than an hour, another alarm went off, the pumps shut down automatically, andoperators began closing off the pipeline. But it was too late for the victims; two 10-year-old boys were engulfed by flames when thegasoline fumes ignited and ayoung man was drowned in Whatcom Falls Creek alter being overcome by the fumes.

Pipeline accident history- Prior to the Bellingham tragedy; Olympic Pipeline reported 44 spills since 1965, totaling over one milliongallons of hazardous fuel. Since 1985, Olympic pipeline releases have accounted for 65 percent of all liquid fuel spills in WashingtonState.

*Three years before the 1999 accident, Olympic conducted an internal inspection ("pig run") throullh its pipe. including the Whateom section thatultimately burst. The data revealed anomalies at or very close to where the rupture later occurred. Olympic sent someone out to excavate the pipeand provide a visual inspection, however, the inspector thought that access was too difficult and did not do it. One year earlier, Olympic hadreceived notice of construction in the area but failed to ensure that a representative was present during excavation to protect the integrity of its pipe.

583

Disastrous spills and needless tragedies -­

Could these accidents have been prevented? YES.

According to engineering experts, accidents such as the Olympic pipeline explosion and massive Lakehead pipeline spill can beprevented. "There has been a breakdown in management processes at the federal level ... to ensure that pipeline systems aredesigned, maintained, and operated safely . .. both from dilution of regulations and from asubstantial lack of enforcement action,"explains pipeline engineer, Richard Kuprewicz. Environmental Defense engineer Lois Epstein notes that "Federalsafetystandards areminimal,"and that, "critical pipeline design and operations are often entirely at the discretion ofpipeline companies."

What could have prevented pipeline accidents such as the Olympicand Lakehead cases?

Better leak detection systems - Current federal regulations do not require leak detection systems. ''Too many leak alarms in theU.S. are ignored (treated as noise) because of lack of confidence in the leak detection systems. In the Olympic and Lakeheadaccidents, there is clearly a lack of effective leak detection technology that an operator can respond to," says engineer RichardKuprewicz. "Not only are mandatory leak detection systems needed, but the regulations should specify an appropriate level ofperformance," adds engineer lois Epstein.

Better fall safe relief valves - Properly designed, installed, and maintained mechanical safety devices (relief valves) play animportant role in preventing pipeline overpressure. "In the past decade, there has been a conscious move at the federal levelweakening regulations for mechanical fail-safe designs intended to prevent overpressure, as the pipeline industry shifts to cheaper, andusually more complex, electronic/computer safety devices and system interlocks. Pipelines are thus morevulnerable because these morecomplex electronics do fail, as evidenced in the Olympic case," says Kuprewicz.

Belter inspection standards - In 1996, Congress eliminated the requirement that pipelines be inspected every two years. "Con­gress needs to mandate periodic testing, including internal inspection p.e. "smart pigging'1 and/or pressure testing, of oil and naturalgas pipelines to ensure continued safe service, as recommended by the National Transportation Safety Board," says EnvironmentalDefense's Lois Epstein. Standards also need to be setthat define internal inspection devices' (smart pigs) current limited capabilities. "Rightnow, there are no standards, period. The limitations of such inspections are fairly obvious, as evidenced In the Olympic case," saysKuprewicz. "Hydrostatic pressure testing should be required in those pipeline segments with asignificant history of releases such as theLakehead pipeline involved in the massive 1.7 million-gallon spill."

Better maintenance standards - In 1996, Congress also eliminated the reqUirement that maintenance workers earn federal certi­fication. As of 1999, the tiny federal Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) had only 57 field inspectors to police 2.2 million miles of oil andgas pipelines. The Olympic pipeline tradegy is acase study in the effects of poor maintenance and weak regulatory oversight. Justthree months before the Olympic pipeline explosion, OPS inspectors gave Olympic aclean bill of health. After the explosion, however,an OPS investigation revealed that Olympic Pipeline Co. had: failed to adequately test relief valves; failed to respond, investigate andcorrect aseries of unintentional valve shutdowns; failed to maintairy required daily operating records at each pump stati,on; failed tomodify its operations, maintenance and emergency plans when it added anew storage facility; and failed to ensure that elnployees oliduly at the time of the pipeline failure were trained according to federal regUlations.

Other changes needed

fl Allowing states to establish requirements above federal minimums for Interstate pipelines, which do not conflict with federalstandards, in order to meet local environmental and safety needs (e.g., more closely spaced shut-off valves, enhancedinspections and leak detection, better reporting, etc.)

fl Providing states additional enforcement authority and resources to oversee pipeline systems that the understaffed and poorlyfunded federal Office of Pipeline Safety has shown itself incapable of overseeing

.. Upgrading corrosion standards as recommended by the National Transportation Safety Board

fl PrOViding strict liability provisions for releases

584

err r in MinnesotaThe Mounds View Pipeline Explosion

by Fire Chief, Nyles Zikmund

( .

I will never forget my experiences as a volunteer fIrefighter. Iwas awakened that Tuesday morning by the sound of my pager.It was 4:44 a,m. July 8, 1986, and the dispatcher said there weremultiple calls - a street was on fIre in our town, Mounds View,Minnesota. I got out of bed and hurried to the fIre station. Ilived nearby and was one of the first to arrive. From the station,I could see ~ cloud ofblacksmoke over the treetops, but nothingmore. It was still pretty dark. I was apprehensive as we headedtoward the blaze in the fire truck; I had just been promoted toFire Motor Operator and would have to pump at this fIre.

As we came up the cloverleafonto the main highway, I saw ahuge plume ofblack smoke and flames shooting above the trees.I felt even more tense; my adrenaline was surging. The Captainof Engine One from Station One arrived on the scene. He as­sumed command, radioing that the entire street was on fire, andordered our crew to go around the fire to determine the extent ofit. We circled around the blaze and ended up almost three blocksaway. Our truck became the main pumping engine for severalhose lines used to cool down houses threatened by the intenseheat and flames, and to cool down the crews operating thosehoses. The heat was so intense it drove the firefighters back.

Soon, we learned that the cause of the fire was a burst under­ground pipeline and that the productflowing through it was gaso­line. The odor was unmistakable. As we were adjusting thevarious hose pressures and fittings (adjacent departments usedifferent equipment), I remember hearing the next radio trans­mission: two victims had been killed by a fireball.

A mother and her young daughter were awakened by the ini­tial explosion and fIre, which was only two blocks from theirhome. They saw the flames and chose to evacuate through thefront door. Unfortunately, their front lawn was the low point inthe area and had become a collecting point for gasoline fumes.They exited just as the fumes ignited, triggering an explosion,resulting in a horrific deathfor Mrs.;Spano and her daughter. Mr.Spano and the Spano's young son \vere not injured. They choseto exit through the back door. The higher ground in the b!!ckyard did not hold gasoline vapor.

Fourteen years later, I am a fire chief, but this was my fIrstexperience with fire death and it was an emotional moment.Although I didnot actually witness it, justhearing the radio trans­mission describing this horrifying accident brought home thechilling reality of the situation.

We fought to extinguish the blaze but it soon became appar­ent that we could not do so until the source of the fIre was con­tained. However, our misfortunes continued when we discov­ered that the nearest pipeline valve was IO miles away and that itwould take a Williams Pipe Line Company representative 45minutes to get there and shut it off. This was significant be­cause, although the pumps moving the gasoline through the pipe­line had been shut off, the volume of product remaining withinthe eight-inch pipe created enough pressure to con-

tinue fueling the fIre. Ninety thousand gallons of gasoline ig­nited and burned over three city blocks, blowing manhole cov­ers 20 feet into the air, damaging homes, and sending hazard­ous fuel flowing into the storm water drainage system, threat­ening the local watershed. Finally, by 7:30a.m., the valve wasshut off, and the fire nearly extinguished as the last flames wereput out.

Then, what was an emergency event of the greatest magni­tude ever experienced by our fIre department turned into a po­litical event of even greater magnitude. The media, local andfederal politicians, and representatives from state and federalagencies all descended on Mounds View. The police cametoo, to investigate what was, in effect, a homicide.

Hours went by as the Mounds View Fire Department waitedfor officials to arrive from all over the country. We watched asthey argued over who had jurisdiction. Finally, by dusk, theroad above the burst pipe was dug up and the damaged sectionofpipe removed by a welder. We stood by, fire-fighting equip­ment ready, in case the welder's torch ignited any fumes stilllingering in the street or that had seeped inside neighboringhomes. By then, we knew that a newspaper-route car carrierhad accidentally ignited the fuel when she was making her morn­ing deliveries. As she fled her burning car, her legs were se­verely burned. Because the pipeline meandered through aresi­dential area, the consequences of this tragedy could have beenmuch worse, especially ifthe rupture had occurred an hour later,with increased traffic on the roadways.

Fallout from the Mounds View pipeline explosion contin­ued for several years. It took a long time forresidents' fears tosubside. For weeks afterwards, homeowners called the firedepartment, reporting the smell of gas seeping into their homesvia sewer and water lines. And for several years, the firedepartment's annual Christmas Santa Parade, complete withlights flashing and sirens blaring, provoked an unprecedentednegative response in the community. It reminded residents ofthe horrifIc crisis on that Tuesday morning in July.

Following this catastrophe, the citizens of Minnesota weregalvanized into action. A state-run Office of Pipeline Safetywas created after Minnesotans learned that the federal OfficeofPipeline Safety's regulations were woefully inadequate. Thestate submitted the "Minnesota Commission on Pipeline Safety:Findings and Recommendations" to Congress on December1986. Increased state authority to regulate pipelines, better leakdetection systems, and regulations establishing regular pipe­line inspections were among the recommendations included inthat document. Unfortunately, the federal government has beenslow to act on these proposals. Indeed, thirteen years after theMounds View disaster, these same recommendations havebeenmade by the State of Washington, following the tragic pipelineexplosion in Bellingham, Washington, that claimed three younglives...

585

t·

Amother and her youngdaughter were awakened bythe initial explosion and fire,

which was only two blocks fromtheir home. They saw the

flames and chose to evacuatethrough the front door. Unfortu-nately, their front lawn was thelow point in the area and hadbecome acollect,ing point forgasoline fumes. They exitedjust as the fumes ignited, trig-

gering an explosion . , ,

photo by Spring Lake Park-Blaine-Mounds View Fire Department

Firefighters contain a deadly early morning infel1lo inMounds View, Minnesota.

Pipeline Fatalities by State(1984-1999)

•Anatural gas pipelineexploded on August 19,2000, near acampsitenear Carlsbad, NewMexico. Eleven people,including 5children,were incinerated, raisingthe New Mexico pipelinefatalities to 12.

Source: Office of Pipeline Safety

'01:1",

HI os:>()

graphics byThe Planet magazine,originally published

springlsummer2000 issue.

586

Pipelines Texas Style'by Marguerite Jones

Originally, this aging, leaky pipeline,

carried unrefined crude oil, which is not

explosive. Longhorn's plan would send

highly flammable gasoline - [over nine

million gallons ... each day] - flowing

right through our neighborhoods.

Before 1998, my idea of politics was serving on the PTANever in my wildest dreams did I expect to be battling big oil inmy home state of Texas. Then again, never in my worst night­mares did I expect to see my children jump when they heard aplane fly over.head, thinking that it was a pipeline explosion.

It all began when the Austin mayor's office called our el­ementary school looking for a place to hold a Town Meeting.Longhorn Partners I wanted td'restart an aging, 48-year-old,crude oil pipeline, fill it with gasoline and jet fuel and ship it towest Texas. As the newly elected PTA president, I agreed tohelp organize the meeting. Soon, I was calling, writing andcontactingevery school, municipality, state representative, publicofficial, and neighbor who would listen, trying to get the wordout: under Longhorn's proposal, over nine million gallons ofexplosive fuel would pass through Austin each day, within 1,000feet of twenty thousand people, and across the Colorado Riverand the Edwards Aquifer, major Central Texas water sources.The pipeline was within 2 miles of 14 Austin schools and only 2blocks from my children's elementary.

Originally, this aging, leaky pipeline,2 carried unrefined crudeoil, which is not explosive. Longhorn's plan would send highlyflammable gasoline, which dissolves more easily in water thancrude and is much more difficult to recover if spilled,3 flowingright through our neighborhoods. The Lower ColoradoRiver Authority (LCRA) warned that it "pose[d)

perhaps the biggest threat ever to the water supplies of nearlyone million people of the region."4 The Austin Fire Depart­ment estimated that the home closest to a gaSoline spill wouldignite in less than three minutes.5

At the time, our home was only two houses away from thepipeline (which actually runs above ground in places and is sup­posed to be buried 14 inches in others).6 My husband and Ilived there with our three children and my 86-year-old mother,who is blind. The children watched news coverage of pipelineexplosions and their fears grew. One such explosion involved asection of the Longhorn pipeline that exploded in Houston,shooting smoke and flames into the air a few feet from a resi­dential area. We decided to move and now live half a mile awayfrom the pipeline.

Although the pace was brutal (meetings would last hours,sometimes until midnight) my family stood behind me. And tomy surprise, folks started listening to me. Well, not everyone. Itried on two separate occasions to contact Governor Bush's of­fice to ask for his position on this issue. I made two phone calls,one lasting 45 ri1inutes, another 40 minutes. I was put on holdand given the run around. To my knowledge, George W. hasmade no public statement on this very heated issue.7 In COn­trast, the Texas Land Commissioner, Republican DavidDewhurst, has stated he won't grant any easements across statelands until he's assured of the pipeline's safety. I've been toldthat people listen to me because I'm not getting paid and don't

I Some of the biggest names in oil and gas delivery - BP/Amoco Pipeline, Exxon Pipeline, and Williams Pipeline are among the partners. A subsidiary ofExxon Oil Corporation is a "limited liability partner."2 According to the Lower Colorado River Authority (LCRA) this (now) 50-year-old, 700-mile long pipeline has had 19 spills of crude oil since 1971. including aone-million gaUon release in 1979.3 Gasoline shipped would probably contain MTBE as well. an additive that makes gasoline even more soluble and a suspected carcinogen for which federalwater standards provide no mandatory safe level.4 LCRA August 13, 1998 news releaseS Austin Fire Dept. Pre-Planning Estimates6 Afarmer from nearby Del Valle told EPA officials at a Town Hall Meeting that the Longhorn pipeline supposedly buried in his fields is actually exposed. TheAustin area has been in the throes of a bad drought the past two years; area lakes now have 400 to 500 feet of beachfront.7 I recently saw a copy of a letter Governor Bush wrote to a Texas citizen, in which he stated he couldn't get involved because it was a federal issue.

587

belong to any organized group. I can't afford the $45 SierraClub membership dues; my husband is a cabinet service repre­sentative and we live pretty simply - no cable TV, no fancyvacations.

Longhorn Partners certainly Ms plenty of money, though,and they spend it - on newspaper ads, multipage brochures,and on hired guns who make promises about how safe the pipe­line will be. (Although they have refused to prove it with a full­fledged environmental review).8 According to one critic, theycould have builta new pipeline with the money they've spent onpublic relations.9 At first I was naive. I was stunned by thepower ofbigoil in our state. Two Texas congressmen eventhreat­ened to withhold votes on the China Trade Bill if Clinton didn'tweigh in against afull environmental impactassessment. Thank­fully, our local Congressman, Lloyd Doggett, contacted Presi­dent Clinton, who assuredRepresentative Doggett that he woulddo no such thing. Obviously, Longhorn Partners doesn't wantanything of the sort. With a 50-year-old pipe that hasapproximately 5,000 areas ofme­chanical damage and metal loss,and only a few (perhaps dozens)of those defects actually dug upand inspected, who can blamethem?10

Longhorn's arrogance and tac­tics have constantly amazed andinspired me to fight back evenharder. Two of the worst ex­amples occurredin January ofthisyear. A Town Hall Meeting hadbeen called to discuss the EPA'spreliminary finding that re-open- ,ing the pipeline would cause "nosignificant impact" to human andnatural environments. Over 2,000angry citizens showed up to pro­test. 11 Prior to the meeting, Longhorn Partners threatened touse the grandfather clause and put crude oil back in the pipe­line if they weren't allowed to transport gasoline and jet fuel.It's Longhorn's position that, under the grandfather clause, theycould ship crude oil without a full environmental review. Evi­dently, they were trying to scare us.

Later, at the meeting, in an effort to convince us of the sound­ness of their proposal (one of their high-paid PR people prob­ably having realized that threats weren't so effective) they dis­played a large section of clean, shiny pipe, claiming that it was40-year old pipe. Luckily, pipeline opponents presented a pieceof 48-year-old pipe. It was rusted, corroded, and the outercoating was unraveling.

At first I was naiVe. I was stunned by the powerof big oil in our state; two Texas congressmeneven threatened to withhold votes on the ChinaTrade Bill if Clinton didn't weigh in against a fullenvironmental impact assessment.

Apparently, Longhorn Partners had forgotten that some ofus had heard Don Deaver, a licensed pipeline engineer employ­ed for over 33 years by Exxon Pipeline Company, the pipeline'sformer owner, testify at public meetings. Throughout his ca­reer, Deaver worked extensively on this pipeline.

According to Deaver, parts of it were constructed with weld­ing processes known to be unreliable today and a 1994 corro­sion survey showed that over 38 percent of the pipeline did notmeet industry standards for protection. Also, as ofMarch 1999,the old pipeline had been idle for four years and had received

inadequate corrosion protectionfoi some time. According toLonghorn Partners leaks up to20,000 gallons a day and possi­bly larger could go undetectedwith the pipe's current leak de­tection system.12

If a federal court orders anenvironmental impact statement,my work will be far from done.But I won't go away. I will beright in there, making surepeople know what the issues are,and making sure they have theopportunity to comment onLonghorn's claims. I will befighting for the safety of mycommunity and for the safety

of my children. No amount of money or political clout willdissuade me. •

OPS Statistics Rank Texas #1Pipeline Accidents 1984 to 1999 (see page 32)

Number Reported: 1,654Estimated Property Damage: $137,928,961

Fatalities: 46Injuries: 2,190

• Landowners, the City of Austin, the LCRA, and others, filed a lawsuit to get the federal government and Longhorn to provide studies along the pipeline route todetermine the validity of Longhorn's claim of safety. A complete Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was ordered by the judge. In a subsequent settlement,the parties agreed that an Environmental Assessment (EA) would be done first. The draft EA has been completed and the EPA, DOT, and Council on Environ­mental Quality are now evaluating comments (over 6,000) from citizens to decide whether to require a full EIS~

9 Austin consultant Jeff Heckler. as quoted in an article by Walter Cole "A Clash Over Gas," Austill Chronicle 18, /l0. 18 (Jan. 1, 1999)10 This infomation is based on data drawn from tests perfonned on the Longhorn pipeline, fonnaHy submitted by pipeline engineer, Don Deaver, as part of therecord to the government's contractor. Radian. in the Environmental Assessment phase of the Longhorn pipeline dispute.II A few of the many inadequacies of the draft EA commented upon by citizens included the following: one-third of the proposed 34 mitigation measures calledfor further tests of the pipeline, which were not completed; the probabilities of pressure releases were calculated using historical data. despite the fact there wouldbe a significant increase in operating pressures on the pipeline; and, visual inspections of the right-of-way every three days were identified as part of themitigation plan (evidently as an adjunct to the pipeline's leak detection systems). Note: gasoline leaks undergound and large pipeline leaks can occur withinhours much less within 3 days.12 March 28, 1999 presentation by Don Deaver for Austin Public Meeting at Bowie High School on Longhorn pipeline.

588

Arepaired secton of

the Explorer pipeline

which burst in .

March, 2000, releasing600,000 gallons of

MTBE-treated gasoline

near Lake Tawakoni(Texas). Cleanup and

line inspections have

cost $10.5 million

to date.photo courtesy Fl. Worth Sin, Telegram

photo by Rny Hill

Containment booms

placed along

Michigan's GrandRiver in an effort to

contain gasoline

from the June, 2000,

Wolverine

pipeline spill.

589

Deep in the Heart of Texas••••

From 1984 to 1999, the State ofTexas suffered 1,654 pipeline accidents. As aresult, 46 people were killed, 2,200 peoplewere injured, and property damage reached nearly $140 million. About 34 million gallons of product was lost.

On March 9, 2000, the most serious Texas pipeline accident in recent memory occurred. Acorroded section of a27­year-old pipeline operated by Explorer Pipe Line Company ruptured, sending 600,000 gallons of gasoline into EastCaddo Creek. The creek feeds into Lake Tawakoni, from which Dallas draws up to 30 percent of its water supply. Tenother communities also draw most or all of their water from the lake. After the spill, the City of Dallas decided to stopdrawing water from from the lake when tests detected MTBE (Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether), a gasoline additive, atlevels too high for public safety.

MTBE has been classified recently by the U. S Environmental Protection Agency as a potential carcinogen in lowconcentrations. Tests at Lake Tawakoni conducted by the Dallas City Water Department showed MTSE levels rang­ing from 0.67 parts per billion to more that 1,000 parts per billion. Some people can detect MTSE taste and odor attwo parts per billion. Soil samples in the spill area, which drains into Lake Tawakoni when it rains, showed MTSElevels up to 235,000 part per billion. According to the Dallas Morning News, Explorer Pipe Line Company will removeas much as 30,000 cubic yards (about 3,000 dump truck loads) of soil from the spill site. The soil will be stockpiled onplastic tarps until company and city officials decide what to do with it. Two options now under consideration aredisposal of the soil in alandfill and thermal treatment on site.

Water, water everywhere and nary a drop to drink •••

Folks in Texas aren't the only ones worried abouttheir drinking-water supplies. Two other pipeline spills this year alonehave contaminated water supplies in numerous U.S. cities and towns. On January 27, 2000, almost halfamillion gallonsof crude oil ruptured from apipeline owned by Marathon Ashland Petroleum, much of it spilling into atributary of theKentucky River, from which Lexington, Richmond, and other cities draw their water supply. Drinking water is beingshipped into communities with contaminated wells. Residents in Blackman Township, Michigan, their wells contaminatedfrom aJune 8, 2000, pipeline rupture, have been promised city water hookups by the pipeline's owner, Wolverine PipeLine Company. Five hundred homes were evacuated in this town 80 miles west of Detroil as gasoline made its way intounderground drains, the Grand River, and anearby creek.

HopefUlly, none of these communities will share the same fate as Fredricksburg, Va., acity that lost its water supplytwice to oil spills. The first time, in 1980, 94,000 gallons of heating oil polluted the Rappahannock River, the city'ssole water source. In 1989, 212,000 gallons of kerosene leaked into the river and the city's water supply was shutdown asecond time. Colonial Pipeline Company, which operates the pipeline, paid $400,000 damages to the City ofFredricksburg. According to City Attorney, James Pates, that amount did not cover the damage those accidentscaused. When citizens went to the Office of Pipeline Safety with their concerns, Pates discovered that "They toPS]did not have any Interest in helping us. They were more interested in helping the pipeline operators ...." Dismayedby what he learned about pipeline safety and poor regulatory oversight, he has been on amission every since ­working for pipeline reform.

- Myth: Pipeline companies already have"state-ol-the-art" leak-protection technology.Fact: The pipeline industry continues to exaggerate its ability to detect small, slowleaks, which can be catastrophic. On February 12, 2000, a"small" leak was discoveredin Millsboro, Delaware, which has spilled 600,000 gallons of 011 over an 8-12 yearperiod. A56,OOO-galloo 011 spill. in the John Heinz Refuge in Pennsylvania wasdiscovered by ahiker noticing '~he smell 01 011." The EPA charges that the lack of acrude oil leak detector sensor was acontributing factor 10 the spill. Clearly, belter leakdelection systems must be mandated: leak detection shouldn't mean waiting lor oil orfuel to bubble up oul of the ground.

590

A Messin Michigan

by Ray Hill

June 8, 2000 Pipeline SpillTurns Peaceful Neighborhood Upside Down

August 2000 update: Failure ofa faulty weld on a fitting installed 10years ago has been blamed for the recent Michigan pipeline spill.Fourpoor welds in the pipe have been discovered since the accident.Aclass action lawsuit has been filed against Wolverine Pipeline Co.by homeowners concerned about future safe operation of the pipe­line, damage to their drinking water supplies and decreased propertyvalues.

When someone finds out we live in Stone Gate Farms, their next words are usually: "Have yousigned on to any of those lawsuits?"

It doesn't matter whom we're talking with - a co-worker, the man delivering new furniture toour home, our children's preschool teacher, the grocery-store clerk, the three guys in our golffoursome - they all ask the same question.

On June 7, 2000, a pipeline ruptured, spilling more than 70,000 gallons of unleaded gasolineinto a stream running adjacent to our neighborhood. The governor declared a State of Emerge~cyand we were evacuated from our homes for five days. Given 20 minutes to retrieve items from purhomes, we held our breath from the nauseating cloud of gasoline fumes enveloping our neighBor­hood, grabbed our pet goldfish, Swimmy, and a few changes of clothes.

Days later when we returned to our homes, we thought the worst was over. However, it was onlythe beginning. We came home to quite a mess. There was the physical mess - rotting food in ourrefrigerator and freezer - after power was cut off to reduce the risk ofexplosion. Our home sits inhigh ground, but many neighbors had up to three feet of water in their basements because sumppumps did not operate during the power outage. More damaging was the emotional mess. Was ourwell water safe to drink? Has our soil been contaminated? It was very weird having to drive aneight-mile detour to get home from work, and then having to show identification to get throughthree Michigan State Police roadblocks. And once we arrived in our subdivision of two-hundred($150-200,000) homes, it was eerily quiet.

For the first few weeks after the evacuation, parents kept their kids and pets indoors. Instead ofkids bouncing on trampolines or yelling for underdogs on the swing set, we saw only an occasionalhomeowner rinsing out his chest freezer. The only real activity was taking place on the street alongthe southern end of the subdivision bordering the Rives-Blackman drain. Men in jeans and blue T-'shirts were still zipping around on four-wheelers, moving back and fOlth from the stream to truckslabeled with Marine Pollution, EPA, and Hazardous-Material markings.

photo by Ray Hill A pipe redirecting waterfrom Blackman Drain Creek arol/nd agasoline-contaminated pond.

How can you tell

if agasolinepipeline is safe?

The people at

WolverinePipeline

Company say

looking down

from severalhundred feet in

an airplane is

adequate.

Never mind the

pipeline is

16 feet

underground.

591

t\

Ours was a great neighborhood; a desirable place to live. People shovel each others' drivewaysin winter, cut each others' grass in summer, and street parties and five-family garage sales havebecome traditions. In the five years we've lived here, we've watched more than 70 new homes goup, more than tripling the size of the neighborhood. Envious friends say our neighborhood isstraight out of the 1950s and a~k which house is Beaver Cleaver's. We don't want to lose thatneighborhood atmosphere.

Now, we're learning more than we ever wanted to know about gasoline. Benzene (the carcino­gen in gasoline) does not adhere to soil, but travels in water and air. Officials from the EPA testedthe air for explosive and organic gases at each level of our home before allowing us to move backin. There were nothing but zeros on the gauges. Weeks after the spill, we awoke one morning to theunmistakable stench of gasoline fumes. Talk about panic. The local 911 operator reported about20 calls from our neighborhood. Officials told us the fumes were the result of atmospheric changes,and it may happen periodically during the summer-long cleanup process. It was especially unset­tling to learn that nine days after the spill, the 16-inch pipeline was back in operation. WolverinePipeline officials say they have remedied the problem - a faulty weld - but even two monthslater, the exact cause of the spill has not yet been confirmed by an outside source.

Attorneys have come out of the woodwork. Theyknocked on our doors, sent us mass mailings, and heldneighborhood meetings. Besides the local attorneys, oth­ers came from Detroit and neighboring states, filing suitsin both local and federal court. Even Dr. Kevorkian'sformer attorney filed a lawsuit on our behalf.

My neighbors' response to the spill has been varied.Sonie want the heads ofWolverine Pipeline officials, oth-ers simply want the matter to go away. In some cases,next-door neighbors who were best of friends before the :c

spill are at odds now because ofdiffeIing opinions. There's J'even conflict between some husbands and wives. l'

The entire Jackson community has shown a mixed re- tsponse to our catastrophe. In letters to the editor of ~he

local newspaper, we hiwe been accused of "throwing self-serving pity parties" and have been ac­cused of indirectly dIiving up the cost of gasoline via our lawsuits. Letter after letter told us toforgive Wolverine Pipeline because "accidents happen" and our lawsuits are the worst examples ofgold-digging.

However, as the summer has progressed, Wolverine Pipeline seems to have fewer supporters inour community. Some who wanted to circulate a petition in June thanking Wolverine for tlie mannerin which it addressed our immediate needs, are raising eyebrows at the pipeline's recent actions.

During the height of the spill and evacuation, Environmental Protection Agency officials werevery vocal about their concerns of a mushroom cloud-type explosion should anyone ignite theairborne fumes. However, when Wolverine Pipeline officials met with residents of a nearby com­munity where they are constructing a new pipeline, they said there was absolutely no chance ofexplosion during the Jackson acdident. They also said our water wells were not contaminated by thespill - well, everyone here knows any possible contamination may not show up for months oryears. That's one reason why Wolverine Pipeline is paying for municipal water hookups to nearly600 residents.

Aside from a concern about dropping property values, many residents have signed on to lawsuitsto simply get more answers. The pipeline officials say the pipeline is safe; they recently shut downthe pipeline to fix other faulty welds, but we want more information. They eagerly offered monthsago to share inspection histories and a map of the pipeline path, but nothing has yet been produced.

How can you tell if a gasoline pipeline is safe? The people at Wolverine Pipeline Company saylooking down from several hundred feet in an airplane is adequate. Never mind that the pipeline is16 feet underground. Never mind that there are more accurate tests to gauge pipeline corrosion.Apparently, there's nothing like a monthly flight over Jackson County. When I returned to.my job asa high-school English teacher in late August, people asked about my summer. I just rolled my eyes,and asked if they wanted the whole story or the short story. At the end of my story, they all ask ifwe've joined the lawsuit. I need to pin a button to my lapel reading: "Not yet, we're waiting formore information."

It's been a big mess, and chances are it will only get bigger before it's over.•

Misleading Statement: Giventhe amount of oil transported,pipelines spill only anegligibleamount.Facts: Quantity is nol always themost relevant factor. The ExxonValdez spilled less than 2% ofone day's oil used in the U.S., yetno one claims that that small lossis acceptable because ofwhere itwas spilled and the damage itcaused.

. The south entrance to Stone GateFarms subdivision.

It's been abig mess,

.and chancesare it

will onlyget worse.

592

"There is nowhere today the sense that the Office of Pipeline Safety is in charge . ..or that its regulations, its inspections, its assets, its staffing and its spirit areadequate to the task. " Jim Hall, chair of the National Transportation Safety Board,

at the December, 1999, Association of Oil Pipelines meeting.

Calling the Office of Pipeline Safety

Who's Minding the Pipes?OPS has exclusive jurisdiction over oil pipeline and natural gas regulation. No state or local government can regulate pipelines without OPScertification. In 1999, OPS had amaximum staffing level of 105 people and 57 field inspectors to police 2.2 million miles of pipe, or onefield inspector for every 38,000 miles of pipeline. Compare that to the Coast Guard, with over 42,000 uniformed and civilian personnel tohelp enforce regUlations on the oil tanker, ship, and barge industry.

What Standards?Regulatory standards enforced by the OPS are so vague and few in number that pipeline companies are free to interpret them at their conve- ,nience. Oil pipeline regUlations do not specify any periodic Inspection by pressure testing, internal inspection devices, or by any meansat all, except for visual surveillance of the right of way. Current regulations do not require automatic or remote-controlled shut-off valves, .double-wall pipelines, or line volume and pressure monitors.

Who's Exempt?Nearly one third of all oil pipelines are exempt from federal regulations because they are low pressure or in rural areas, even thoughstudies show that these exempt pipelines spill more than regulated pipelines.

How low Can They Go?Federal standards require thlc~er steel for high-pressure water pipelines than for high-pressure oil pipelines. For example, the 36-inchColonial pipeline that spilled 408,000 gallons of fuel oil into the Potomac River in 1993 was only 0.344 inches thick. The minimum requiredthickness for awater pipeline that-size is 0.485 inches. After all, that water is dangerous stuffI

What Pipes?To date, OPS has no map of the pipeline system it's supposed to regUlate. It rejected aproposal in 1990 to require that pipeline companiesprovide state and local governments with maps of pipelines within their boundaries. DPS has no comprehensive data on the age andcondition of pipelines, on types of pipe used, on the use of protective measures, or on which pipeline companies have better or worse safetyrecords. In short, OPS d.oesn't have aclue about what the safety problems are, where they are, who's responsible, or what to doabout them.

Meaningful Enforcement?OPS investigates only about one in 10 pipeline accidents reported to It - and almost never takes any meaningful action. Even wh,encatastrophic spills happen, OPS enforcement amounts to little more than awink and ahandshake. For example, from 1979 to 19841here vvereover 3,300 oil pipeline accidents that spilled a reported 155 million gallons of oil. Yet OPS collected only $1.4 million In civil penalties- barely 9/1oths of acent per gallon spilled in those 16 years - surely one of the great regulatory bargains of our time. Between 1990 and1998, monetary penalties assessed by OPS decreased 90 percent, at the same time as major pipeline accidents· were increasing four percentayear.

*Those reSUlting in a fatality, injury or more than $50,000 in property damage

Misleading Statement: Pipelines are the safest way to transport petroleum.Facts: There are no studies that show that pipelines are the most environmen­tally safe way to transport petroleum. "Safety" statistics are based solely onhuman death and injury statistics. Oil and liquefied gas pipeline releases can:contaminate drinking water supplies, 'and crop, residential, and pUblic,lands;cause fish kills; break up wildlife habitat by creating pipeline right-of-ways; resultin explosions and fires; and decrease property values because of spills andleaks.

593

Susan Harper, Executive Director, Fuel Safe Washington

"There is no incentive to take corrective actions before accidents occur because thepipeline companies have no fear of the OPS. They know the agency will not do anythingto them."

The Office of Pipeline Safety's Sorry RecordFacts Demonstrate Poor Enforcement, Weak Penalties Not Working

Fines Rarely Imposedr Collected Against Pipeline CompaniesThe federal Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) investigates only about one in ten pipeline accidents reported to it and rarely takes meaning­ful action. Between 1979 and 1984 there were over 3,300 oil pipeline accidents, yet OPS collected only $1.4 million in fines. Between1987 and 1989, OPS collected only $188,000 in fines although 33 million gallons of fuel were spilled in 580 incidents. DOT's Office ofPipeline Safety records show that OPS has not collected any civil penalties since 1997....- Only $15,000 of l~396,OOO proposed penalties (less than four percent) collected

I,'

159 Incidents - 7.4 million gallons of hazardous fuels spilled; only $88,500 In civil penaltiesNone of the 1998 penalties has been collected.

$90,000 in civil penalties proposed; none yet collected according to May 30, 2000 agency records

Heading for the record books -six major spills in the first six months - over two million gallons ofhazardous fuel (2,346,000) released, contaminating drinking water supplies in Dallas, Lexington, Rich·mond, and other cities and towns, and forcing the evacuation of 500 homes west of Detroit, Michigan

Penalties Often Mitigated to Zero: According to OPS, mitigating civil penalties encourages companies to take corrective actions that go beyondthe spill. Although OPS has drastically reduced its use of fines in enforcement actions, it has done so without anyatlempt to determine if this policyis Improving industry compliance and pipeline safety.

The recent $3.2 million fine against Olympic Pipe Line' just proposed by OPS for the Bellingham explosion is more than the total amount assessedby OPS against the entire pipeline industry in the past five years. It compares unfavorably to the $30 million fine levied by EPA against KochIndustries in January, 2000, for spills that occurred between 1990 and 1997.

And it compares very unfavorably to a$4.74 million fine recently levied by the EPA against aformer gas station owner for a1O,OOO-gallon spill thatthe gas station owner failed to clean up. Olympic's 1999 pipeline rupture released over 230,000 gallons of gasoline, killing three youths anddestroying apark, and Atlantic Richfield (ARCO), Texaco and Shell Oil Co. all have big stakes in Olympic Pipeline. (Since the explosion, ARCO hasmerged with BP/Amoco.)

Pipeline spills of any size should receive mandatory fines. If companies pay for polluting, they will take corrective action before accidents happen.

Aging Pipeline System: The lax oversight and weak enforcement by federal regUlators comes at aparticularly bad time. Most of thepipeline system was built in the 1960's and most of it has been in the ground more than three decades -. poorly maintained ormonitored and rusting away. ACalifornia state study found that one out of every five miles of pipeline were built before 1940, and halfof those before 1926. Yet there is no national policy to repair and rebuild this system -- in fact, no federal policy that apipeline everhas to be replaced, no matter how old.

•Prior to the Bellingham accident, Olympic's pipeline spilled almost 821,000 gallons of fuel in 43 incidents, yet this marks the first time OPS has fined Olympic.The fine was also issued just as aCNN special report highly critical of Olympic Pipe Line Co. and OPS aired on national TV. And, judging by past performance,there is no guarantee this underwhelming fine will ever be collected.

G594

• Nearly $1 billion from 1984 to 1999 •almost $60 million per year.

I

Accidents are Increasing . ••Pipeline accidents are increasing on the 2.2 million miles of pipeline carrying hazardousmaterials nationwide. Major pipeline accidents - those resulting in afatality, injury or morethan $50.000 in property damage - have increased four percent annu~lIy since 1989.

OPS statistics! show that since 1986 pipeline accidents have:

, Numbered more than 5,700;Killed more than 325 people;Injured over 1,500 people;Caused millions in property damage;' andLeaked more than six million gallons annually.

What's

Amounts refeased are fncreasfng •••Since 1995, the amount of hazardous liquids released to the environment has increased eachyear. Amounts released per incident have been increasing since 1993, indicating that releasesmay be becoming more serious. Throughout the 1990s, tens of thousands of gallons werereleased from pipelines approximately every other day.

"Numerous 011 pipeline companies are not preventing pollution . .. and the Office of PipelineSafety is not forcing them to do so. The majority of these releases are from corrosion, operationalincidents, and materiaf defects," says Lois Epstein, Environmental Defense engineer. In recentcongressional testimony, she noted that current pipeline safety law "does not make compa­nies Uabfe for refeases, so refeases are going up, while releases from tanker and bargetransport are decreasing as a result of the OJ( Pollution Act of 1990's liability provisions.'e

wrong

ii

IJ

I!

t I

I

with this

Yet, penalties are decreasing •••, At the same lime as pipeline accidents are increasing and amounts spilled are worsening, the

Offfce of Pipeline Safety has drasticaify cut its use of fines as an enforcement tool. In 1990,fines accounted for 49 percent of enforcement actions, but only four percent in 1998. And,according to the agency's own data, the few fines actuaify Issued are Insignificant comparedto pipeline revenues and are rarefy coliected.

1 These numbers are underreported. A March 13, 2000 Inspector General Audit Report on the PipelineSafety Program revealed that OPS reports are flawed due to inadequate Information andlor lack of fUlldisclosure by the pipeline companies. As stated in that report, oOPS does not ensure the accuracy oface/dent data submitted by [pipe/rne] operators." For example, in comparing National TransportationSafety Board reports on eight pipeline accidents with the pipeline operator reports, the In,spector Generalfound that NTSB reported $20.4 million more In damages than five pipeline operators reported to OPS.2 Feb. 3, 1999 pipeline safety hearing before the House Commerce Committee's Subcommittee on Energyand Power. .

IWhlie profits are rising •••You Do the Math: Pipelines are aphenomenally profitable business. In the last two decades, allinterstate oil pipeline companies enJoyed an average annual rate of net earnings, after taxes,of 31'percenf. Natural gas pipelines weren't far behind, In 1998, they averaged net earnings, altertaxes, of 22 percent of revenues. To compare, the median annual return on sales by Fortune 500corporations in those years was 4.2 percent.

Profits Soar As Safety and Maintenance Decline - From 1994 to 1996 Colonial Pipeline (thelargest 011 pipeline company In the U,S.) reduced its engineering services staff by 35 percent,increasing its return on revenues to 28 percent - at the same time it had horrendous accidentsand increased its market share. Regarding such industry downsizing, pipeline regulator DonStursma finds that' .•. much knowledge and experience has been lost." He sees the pipelineindustry as " •.• increasingly dominated by accountants, lawyers and MBAs with no technical, safety,or operations background."

icture?

595

Innocent Lives Lost II II II Environments Destroyed I ••

Wade King (right) at his computer. Outgoing andrambunctious, he was a popular student. His keen senseof humor landed him the starring role in his school's 4thgrade production of The Music Man. Wade and hisfriend, Stephen Tsiorvas (below right), died in the June1999, Bellingham, Washington pipeline explosion.(see related story page 9)

Stephen Tsiorvas (right), as a preschooler, playing in thesand. ''He was the kind of kid who wanted to be in themiddle of everything," explains his mother, KatherineDalen. "He didn't let his juvenile rheumatoid arthritisslow him down. He climbed trees, rode his bike, andplayed football and basebalL" According to his mom,Stephen p~!cked a lot of living into his 10 short years.

photo courtesy ofFronk ond Mory King

Bumed out remnants of a car (left) belonging toBlenheim Assistant Fire Chief, Robert Hitchcock.Hitchcock died from bums he received, and his daughter,who was en route to school the moming a propanepipeline ruptured, received severe bums on her hands andface after she struck a car at the intersection where herfather was directing traffic. Visibility was poor from athick cloud of propane that filled the intersection creatinga catastrophe in this small rural town of 334 residents.(see story page 36)

New Jersey Towering Inferno (left): Texas EasternTransmission Corporation's 36-inch, high-pressurenatural gas pipeline exploded March 23, 1994. Heatfrom the fire ignited rooftops in a nearby apartmentcomplex. One person died and 300 people lost theirhomes and possessions. The National TransportationSafety Board found that the inability of the pipelineoperator to promptly stop the flow of natural gas (arecurring problem in pipeline accidents) contributed tothe severity of the accident.

. photo court"y of AP Wire Service

596

I don't think that! will ever get over the shock of discovering that a 27-year-old oilspill in my neighborhood was not cleaned up. It all began at a neighborhood associa­tion meeting. There, I leamed about a major underground petroleum pipeline locatedin the heart of our community, and that a developer was building homes only 15 feetaway from it. Havingread about the disastrous ColonialPipeline spill in Simpsonville,South Carolina - shutting off Simpsonville's water supply for a week- I was dis­mayed and alarmed that this same pipeline company was operating right in our midst.

It got worse. A longtime resident announced that years ago Colonial's pipe hadleaked oil in our neighborhood. I was led to believe that a cleanup had been com­pleted, but I wanted to know more. If a spill could happen once, it might happenagain. With the developer building so close to the pipeline, learning the history onthe prior spill was important. .

Many calls later, I found someone with the relevant information. I set up an ap­pointment to look at the file. Or'so I thought. When I arrived at the GAEPD GeologicSurvey office and asked for the file on the spill, the geologist pointed to a row ofshelves six feet high. Where did I want to start? I was floored when I realized that allthose bound reports were about my neighborhood's oil spill. I asked him to tell mewhen it happened. He pulled out an assessment report: the "leak" occurred in 1971;Colonial recovered 668 barrels of gasoline product. In 1993 neighbors unhappy withthe cleanup effort complained and Colonial approached GAEPD with a new cleanupplan.

Evidently, the first time around Colonial didn't finish the job. Amap of the moni­toring wells showed the levels of contamination. Twenty-seven years later the levelsof benzene were still high. Nine houses on the map were marked with their formerowners' names. I realized that the neighborhood rumor about a buyout was true, butI doubted whether many current residents knew that so many families had been relo­cated because of the spill. A quick call to the tax assessor's office revealed thatColonial owned nine houses around the spill site, five in my neighborhood and four inan adjacent subdivision.

My illusions about government working for me and about corporate responsibilitywere shattered that day. I became an activist. I studied anything and everything Icould find about pipelines: construction, spills, hazards, benzene contamination, andpipeline regulations. In the past, being fully informed always made me feel better.This time, however, the opposite occurred. The more I read, the more alarmed I be­came. Most of the information I gathered about Colonial Pipeline was about priorspills. My concerns grew - like a tiny leak that turns into a flood.

Initially, I didn't consider myself to be an activist. I started by writing to myCongressman, governmental agencies, and to the Upper Chattahoochee Riverkeeper.I was trying to understand my local spill and to prevent others. When I was intro­duced at a Georgia Conservancy reception as a "rabble-rouser" against the pipeline,

Bi h of an Activistby Toji Blad

597

,

tf;t

~

I realized that it was true: I was now an activist. AFlorida environmentalist advised meto stay focused. He suggested I to write my congressman, citing the single worst en­croachment of Colonial Pipeline that I had witnessed.

It was a hard choice between the pipeline under a childcare center playground andthe pipeline in a nearby landfill with heavy equipment crossing over. The childcarecenter was outside my congressional district, however, so Morgan Falls Landftll be­came my top priority. Congressman John Lewis respond~4-to a letter I sent him outlin­ing the problems with the pipeline at Morgan Falls. He wrote back, aclmowledging myconcerns and attaching copies of letters he had written to GAEPD and the Office ofPipeline Safety, requesting them to look into the matter. Nothing was done, however,and eight months later, the Colonial pipeline under Morgan Falls Landftll broke open.

The initial newspaper article reported that 4200 gallons of gasoline were released.With such a large pipe, however, and the Chattahoochee River so close to the spill, Idrove to the site to see if the release mightbe larger than reported. My suspicions wereconfIrmed: there were over six tanker trucks at the site. A policeman blocking the roadlet me through after I showed him my Fulton County Citizens' Commission for theEnvironment I.D. At the landftll, I spoke briefly to fIremen on the scene, remindingthem of the open flare wells for methane gas. They assured me that they would lookinto shutting them off. The air was heavy with the smell of gas fumes, so I decided toleave what was obviously a hazardous situation.

Then I contacted John Lewis's office. They didn't lmow about the spill yet. I men­tioned that it was too bad the Office of Pipeline Safety had never responded to Con­gressman Lewis's inquiries. His aide assured me that they had. He put me on hold whilehe found the letter: the Office ofPipeline Safety had written back six weeks prior to thespill stating that the site met their requirements. Once again, the Office of PipelineSafety was too complacent regarding pipeline regulation. This time, however, thanksto adequate press coverage, Colonial's cleanup efforts were more extensive than thecleanup still ongoing in my neighborhood. AtMorgan Falls Landfill, they hauled away23,000 tons of trash and soil, and recovered 17,300 of the 38,600 gallons of gasolinespilled. Where, I wondered, was this kind of effort for our neighborhood in 1971?

Later, CongressmanLewis anived at the spill site, along with departmentheads fromthe Office ofPipeline Safety and the DepartmentofTransportation. Even Colonial's topbrass arrived on the scene to inspect the replacement pipe. We all stood togetheramidst the spilled-gas odor. Yes, I was there too, invited because of my letter. Con­gressman Lewis thanked me for writing. My photo standing alongside him and theother dignitaries appeared in his next newsletter. Only now I had a new label: I hadbeen transformed from a "rabble-rouser" to "local leader."

Today, I continue the pursuit of more pipeline regulation to prevent spills and havejoined the bandwagon ofenvironmentalists pursuing energy alternatives. ColoiualPipe­line is creating.contamination thatwill live beyondmy lifetime and possibly my children'slifetime. And it is only one ofmany. There is hqpe, however, ifwe all pitch in. Govern­ment can work for us at our request but we must speak up loud and clear for pipelinesafety now, not thousands of spills later! •

CongressmanJohn Lewis

responded toaletter ...

outlining theproblems with the

pipeline ...He wrote, ..to GAEPD

atld theOffice of

Pipeline Safety,requesting themto look into the

matter.Nothing was done,however, and eight

months later theColonial pipeline

under Morgan FallsLandfill

broke open. j,

598

t

by Annette Smith

The next meeting was not quite as friendly. Vermontersrefused to break up into the one-on-one sessions until

they had achance to ask questons. Areporter was alsopresent, insisting that ... they couldn't keep him out.

"Natural gas is cheap, clean and safe. Once the pipelineis in, you will never know it's there." That's about all theytold us. Over and over, salesmen for New York State Electricand Gas (NYSEG) and Iroquois Transmission Co. told the resi­dents of southwestern Vennont that the high pressure pipelinethey proposed to bury three feet deep for 63 miles inside Ver­mont would be the best constructed and operated pipeline thatcurrent technology allowed. Vermonters learned quickly,however, not to trust the pipeline companies.

Part of a massive billion-dollar energy project proposed forthe State ofVennont and first ...announcedin September, 1998,1the Iroquois segment, which would come into Vennont fromNew York, was an interstate pipeline (and thus under federaljurisdiction). NYSEG's pipeline, however, was intrastate andthus under the jurisdiction of Vennont's permitting agencies.

Prior to filing its application with the state, NYSEG con­tacted towns along the pipeline route, asking for letters of sup­port and for waivers of state filing requirements. Such actionscreated the impression that NYSEG was rushing things and try­ing to subvert Vennont's public processes. Next, NYSEG, afive-.billion dollar publicly-held New York utility, gatheredlists of affected property owners and ~ientout letters "invit­ing" them to meetings, noting that only those on the list wouldbe allowed in.

At the first private-property owner meeting, about 30 prop­erty owners attended, along with an equal number of NYSEGemployees. The employees were dressed in matching shirts withSVNG (Southern Vennont Natural Gas) emblems. After every­one arrived, someone stood by the door, giving the impressionthat nobody could leave. No media were present. Propertyowners in the back row were asked to move and as

the meeting progressed, they realized that gas company employ­ees were sitting in the row behind them, possibly reading prop­erty owners' notes. A video about natural gas was presented,showing how cozy and warm it was, how safe and cheap. Aslide show detailing pipeline construction revealed somethingelse: an ugly swath that would be clear cut and blasted throughremote and pristine property. Finally, a gas salesman gave apitch about how cheap and wonderful natural gas is, even thoughhardly any of the property owners present would ever get natu­ral gas as a result of this project. After the presentation, Ver­monters wanted to ask questions but were not allowed to.

Instead, NYSEG employees broke up the meeting so thatthey could meet with property owners "one-on-one."2 The nextmeeting was not quite as friendly. Vennonters had heard aboutthe way the first meeting was run and refused to break up intothe one-on-one session until they had a chance to ask questions.A reporter was also present, insisting that the meeting was be­ing held in a public school and they couldn't keep him out.

Concerned about NYSEG's business methods and their in­tention to take private property by eminent domain to build apipeline to fuel power plants to produce electricityfor other states, not Vermont, we fonned Vermonters for aClean Environment (VCE). At nine public meetings and a pub­lic forum sponsored by VCE, citizens raised their concerns.Gas company representatives admitted that property valuesalong the pipeline route would decline, "usually for about ayear," but claimed they would corne back. They made asser­tions about how safe the pipeline would be,3 In response to aquery about explosions, NYSEG's marketing salesmanclaimed that problems were rare and you hardly everheard about pipeline accidents. The next day the pipeline

I 1\vo power plants and two different pipelines were to be completed by November 1.2001. In April, 1999, a third power plant in New York State wasannounced as part of the project.

, This "divide and conquer" strategy was something we had heard about from other states. how the gas companies separate property owners. keeping them fromknowing how much others were getting for granting easements.

I They claimed they would install new pipe and inspect every weld, test the pipe hydrostatically before operating it, and that they would visually inspect the lineby walking it and flying over in helicopters from "time to time." They didn't make any claims, however. about testing it after the initial installaJion. ormaintenance claims other than walkovers and fly-overs frOm "time to time,"

599

in Bellingham, Washington exploded, killing three people.4

Further questioning elicited similar cheerful but deceptiveresponses. When we asked, "If the pipeline crosses our land,can we get gas?" NYSEG said "yes, for $5,000 to $10,000."VCE learned, however, that steppiIig down the pressure to serveresidences at below 2 psi costs substantially more. In one town,people were told that they would get a tap for natural gas toserve them and that this would cost $70,000. Regulatorsand people in the industry have advised VCE that this wouldactually cost at least half a million dolIars,s

At another meeting, an NYSEG salesman bragged about whata wonderful company they were, offering a list of phone num­bers and suggesting calls be made to find out how well likedthey were in other communities. veE started making calls. AtNew York's Department of Public Service, the environmentalofficer related that NYSEG had a history ofupsetting landown­ers to such an extent that NYDPS knows to watch them.

Our group also contacted landowners affected byNYSEG's only large gas transmission pipeline project andfound nothing but outrage. We were told: 'They take moreland than they say they will, they don't put it back when theysay they will, they don't put it back the way it was before."Tactics used to acquire easements also enraged property own­ers.6

We also discovered that, ifanything, Iroquois TransmissionCompany's track record was even worse than NYSEG's. Aspart of the proposed project, Iroquois intended to run a lateralline from their major transmission pipeline in New York Stateinto Vermont. Because of numerous environmental violations

for their pipeline construction in the 1990's, Iroquois had reoceived a $22 million fine, the second-largest fme, next to ExxonValdez, everissuedbytheNationalTransportationSafetyBoard.Among other things, Iroquois back filled the pipeline trenchwith huge boulders. Eventually, they pled guilty to felonycharges and people went to jail.

Under its felony plea agreement, Iroquois was supposed tosay in public that it did something wrong, but it had cleaned upits act. At first, that's what Iroquois said in Vermont. ThenIroquois went a bit further and claimed that because they wereunder such scrutiny, they were probably one of the best compa­nies around. By October 1999, an Iroquois salesman told VCE'sexecutive director, "You know we didn't really do anythingwrong; it was a business decision to enter the plea because thelawyers were costing so much." The power plant developer haddelivered almost exactly the same message in a public meetingtwo days earlier.

Although the people of southwestern Vermont do not haveexperience with existing pipelines in our neighborhoods, wehave seen enough of two different pipeline companies toknow that we cannot believe what they tell us. And if wecannot believe them about who will get the gas, how much itwill cost, or what their track record is in other states, howcan we possibly believe them when they tell us that it is safe?And after attending the recent National Pipeline Safety Confer­ence in Washington D.C., we now know that pipeline safety andregulatory oversight are sadly lacking throughout the UnitedStates. VCE will continue to search for the reality behind themyth of the "best constructed and operated" pipelines. 8

Myth: Additional regulations applied on pipeline operators at the federal or state level are "too prescriptive" and would result in a"patchwork" of regulations.Facts: Right now, we have a200,OOO-mile "patchwork" of failing pipelines. Meanwhile, the oil industry continues to balk at everysensible attempt to further regulate pipelines to protect public safety and the environment. The sad facts are that federal regulationson pipeline companies are extremely lax.! In 1996, the House of Representatives passed the "Accountable Pipeline Safety andPartnership Act of 1996" which actually weakened the federal Pipeline Safety Act. As Bob Rackleff, President of the NationalPipeline Reform Coalition said, "Rather than having "prescriptive" or "patchwork" regulations, there is little or no regulation at thefederal level. The oil industry has lobbied legislators to the point that the industry is largely "self-monitoring," using "risk-benefitanalyses" which deem acertain number of fatalities, injuries and spills as acceptable."

Anumber of states (California, Minnesota, New York, and Arizona) have State Offices of pipeline Safety. But states are currentlypreempted by the federal government from taking more prUdent pipeline safety measures.

I In response to a 56,000-gallon crude oil spill on February 7, 2000 in the John Heinz Wildlife Refuge near Philadelphia, Gerald Davis. a spokesman for theSunoco Company, said "we do what is required by law" in regard to leak detection. According to Tony Mercandetti of the Bridge News, what Sunococompany inspectors actually do is a "walkover" every two weeks. These "walkovers" can't detect underground leaks. (Except when, as in this case, the leakis detected by a passerby "noticing the smell of oil,")

4 Since the Bellingham explosion, VCE has learned that pipeline accidents are anything but rare, and that testing of pipelines, once installed, is even rarer andnot regulated under the law.

5 A "gate" valve to step down pressure and infrastructure to serve a town costs at least $500,000.

6 Witnesses related how pipeline operatives would go to elderly residents' homes at night, frightening them with the idea that they might lose their homes andhow these operatives would go to homes just before Christmas when the husbands were at work, offering a check right then and there to the wife. Witnessesalso related how gas company agents would go to area bars at night and brag about how many easements they had gottell that day.

••.• ··11

600

Living on the Pipelineby Glenn R. Archambault Clnd Terri D. Magruder

phOIO by Glenn Archnmb.ull A view of the pipeline from Phoenix, Oregon, during construction.

LIVING ON THE PIPELINE; OWNING OUR DREAM FARM - May 18, 1993

As Glenn was walking on our new farm on our first day of ownership, survey flags and painted fence postsmade a trail to our new neighbor Henry's ranch. He explained to Glenn that a large natural gas pipeline wascoming, a big federal project. It involved 86 miles and 1400 acres ofpublic and private land, through mountains,rivers, streams, and our small Oregon farm. Pacific Gas and Electric (P G & E), the Federal Energy RegulatoryCommission (FERC), state and local government, and the people who sold us the farm all knew about this bigpipeline project and the pending application for a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity giving the pipelinecompany the Power of Eminent Domain and the legal ability to condemn the property. Although the sellers hadbeen informed of the "pending pipeline project" in writing, they did not disclose that information to us. Theshock of being threatened and having our property violated by a for-profit plivate utility company backed byfederal guns and trespassing powers was overwhelming. We found ourselves surrounded by a government sys­tem of intimidation and property-taking without compensation. The pipeline property is located along the entiref!vrth boundary of our farm (approx. 1500 feet). We have not received compensation for the taking of ourproperty and our safety concerns have been ignored. So on that day in 1993 a war started, to learn about thispipeline project and to get our money back. The more we learned about the pipeline industry the more we fearedthe project located next to our home.

BEFORE THE PIPELINE WAS BUILT -1993 to 1995

From the day we took possession of the property, helicopters buzzed overhead and survey teams of every typetrespassed across our little valley. Every day (including holidays), someone from the project wanted to test,measure, or inspect our land, or question, talk to, or threaten us. There were continuous meetings to attend andletters from the pipeline company to answer - an endless demand for our attention. They gotpaid; we did not.We could not leave our farm. Someone always needed to be there to watch out for the animals, property, and ourbelongings. One day we left for a trip to the river. When we returned our 200 sheep were in our "former" frontyard and gardens. The trespassing pipeline employees were not good about closing gates. That was a good day!Bad days? Being informed that our house, barns and belongings would be examined and videotaped by a pipe­line official, and a well test taken. This was being done to protect the pipeline company from lawsuits. With themassive construction project, road building, and dynamite blasts, private property dam\lge would occur. A reallybad day? That's every day in May, 1995. On the worst one, a judge granted "Right of Immediate Possession" byallowing the government and the pipeline company to take our private property without a trial: no terms, nomoney paid, and the nght to use vbIen.. '-\gainst us should we protest or resist.

601

PIPELINE CONSTRUCTION - SUMMER 1995

The pipeline was coining! Construction had started 86 miles away and would end in our farm valley. The dayarrived for the crews to cut the fences and clear the land of everything. Glenn walked down the road to see thefence being cut down. He saw cows running and heard sheep crying for their lambs. The sheep dogs weredemanding that the hostile strangers leave, NOW! The construction workers warned us not to resist. The govern­ment had officers down the road. Glenn could see the unmarked cars. We knew that terrible feeling of losing.Construction started that day with a flood; someone had left the irrigation ditch running. From that day forwardwe observed and documented a poorly designed and constructed pipeline being laid into the ground. Pipelinecompanies don't build pipelines, the lowest bidder does! Not the best, but the cheapest materials and equipmentare used. The construction went from bad to worse. The lowest bidder, a Texas contractor, was poorly infonnedabout what Oregon is like. Our valley is composed of clay soil full of rocks and running water. Soon, the wholeconstruction site near our property was muddy, completely flooded with water several feet deep. In the hotsummer sun and mud, the pipeline project became a huge mess. P G & E, the gas transporter, recorded theminimal government standards on paper, but the pipeline was not constructed to those minimal standards. Therewere no on site inspections to monitor the construction and installation of the pipe. The project became a brutalfight to get a paycheck for the average worker: no pipeline meant no pay. We got to know the folks on the job; alot of them were there for months. They told us interesting things: "It (the pipe) would not last five years," saidthe guys boring under the county road. "These people are complete rookies," said the ditch foreman about theroute chosen by pipeline company officials. The right-of-way agent had no previous experience siting a gaspipeline. The Office of Pipeline Safety became involved only after the route was established and the pipelineinstalled. We quickly learned that the government and pipeline officials were incompetent. The constructionworkers were told what to do, no matter how dumb. We contacted our county commissioners and planningdepartment, our state and federal representatives, the Office of Pipeline Safety and FERC. We learned that thesafety of the pipe and its siting were not regulated on site, only on paper by the profit-motivated pipeline com­pany (on average, 22% to 31% profit after taxes). In fact, no one in charge inspected the route at the end of theproject. Ifthey had, they would have found no grass, no brush, no trees - nothing but mud, rocks, worthless soil,and outraged property owners living on the pipeline. -.'

LIVING ON A MAJOR GAS PIPELINE POST CONSTRUCTION -:- 1996 to present

Would you live here? The pipe is located next to our home, barn and machine shed. We are always next to itand don't forget about it. No one from the Office of Pipeline Safety, P G & E, or our local government check thepipeline or talk with us. Not once have we been asked, "What's not safe"? Currently, markers outlining thepipeline route are few to none. There is no recorded survey of the pipeline as it was being laid into the ground.Approximately one year after the pipe was buried, the pipeline company returned to dig it up. They were unableto locate it without the help of our videos showing the pipe being laid in a "lake" of water. The faulty route thatsnakes through our valley has multiple 90-degree turns and crosses under the county road six times in less thanthree miles. Without clear markers or survey infOlmation, there is an increased risk ofaccidental pipe damage. Inthe seven years we have lived with this pipeline, we have learned about the hundreds of mishaps and accidentsassociated with pipelines, the lack of "pipeline safety," the weak government regulations, and about the pipelineofficials who build and operate gas pipelines. People love the products that pipelines deliver and the wealth theygenerate, but most people fear major pipelines and do not want to live where we live, ON THE LINE! •

Myth: The most common cause of pipeline spills is third party damage.Facts: The biggest cause of oil pipeline leaks is corrosion. Third party damage, or damagecaused by people who are not pipeline owners or operators (e.g., damage by abackhoe usedby afarmer), is aserious issue and the most common cause of natural gas pipeline leaks.Three-fourths of aI/ releases from oil pipelines can be prevented by pipeline operators andtheir regulators, while only the remaining quarter are caused by "outside force" (third partyplus weather-related, earthquake, landslide, and vandalism damages).

602

SUMMARY OF PIPELINE ACCIDENTS BY STATESource of Data: Office of Pipeline Safety

These numbers are underreported. The March 13, 2000 Inspector General Audit Report on Pipeline Safetyreveals that OPS reports are flawed due to inadequate information and/or lack offull disclosure by thepipeline companies. These statistics also do not include spills less than 2100 gallons in size, which, evenwith the limited data available, are significant.* One barrel equals 42 gallons.

NUMBER OF PROPERTY GROSS LOSSSUMMARY YEARS ACCIDENTS DAMAGE FATALITIES INJURIES ESTIMATES ••

(In barrels).. . .. ........ .- . .__.._." " .. - ~ _.'

ALABAMA 1984-99 85 $7,193,265 j 8 38 893. _. _. .. - ...... __.. "--"- ..- " ......-" .-. - ._.

ALASKA 1984-99 44 $8,915,500 2 8 818. _. ._.. _.

ARIZONA 1984-99 104 $19,721,357 10 39 .1 7,453.. ....... ---. _... , - ... ~- "--- .. _" . ..- - -- -- .._-- - .. -_._- .- ... _. . -ARKANSAS 1984-99 85 $5,859,205 ; 4 L 19 J 11,078

- --_....

CALIFORNIA 1984-99 495 146,025,303 31 130 .1. 174,605--- -- .- ... _- .. --~, . .~--~.. ~. - - .- -_....-'.- ...... ..- . -_.... "--_... _. ..- .. .......•... . ....... --

COLORADO 1984-99 94 $10,504,958 2 43 41,602. ,.- ..... .... .. ... - --.. .-

CONNECTICUT 1984-99 24 $,6046,210 6 10 1200............ ....-_. ~-'- .. .. _- - .".. ... . - - .-~ ..... ... ---'. ... -_.. -" .-...-.. -_.~.... "-"-' . . .. ~ .- ....- .-... -" .. .... ~ .. -._ ... ... ...

DELAWARE 1986-99 9 $2,140,000 0 1 360

FLORIDA 1984-99 51 $5,027,370 1 5 13 1503

GEORGIA 1984-99 72 $7,659,651 3 27 11005

HAWAII 1986-99 12 $1,197,757 0 2 9949.. ....... _._, ._~. . .~.

......

$2,907.0~~·FR rIDAHO 1985-99 15 3 738

ILLINOIS 1984-99 221 $25,028,074 14 _ I 61 I 78,745.. . _. _.. - ...

INDIANA 1984-99 86 $14,999,683 7 65 82,178

IOWA 1984-99 110 $9,835,071 12 24 184,435..' '--.. , '." _.. . ~ .. .. ' .. --.~. . - ...._.. .-- •• 1 •. . '-'~ - _.... .... , .-

KANSAS 1984-99 232 144,011,252 7 37 99,800

KENTUCKY 1984-99 62 $10,911,496 9 29 6159... . . .. ' . -- ._ ...... ..

LOUISIANA 1984-99 311 $52,242,099 14 85 86,546

J"., ... _.. - ...

MAINE 1990·99 3 $100,000 ° 0 0 1

-... .._..-

MARYLAND 1984-99 52 $87,179,371 2 15 1408-'.'. ,'-' .. ._.. - ~.. --_...... ' ..'~ .. , . _. ..

r.. ._~ '.'~. -.. .

MASSACHUSET 1985-99 I 54 $5,532,675 9 29 1,535ITS

. - -_ .. - ..

MICHIGAN 1984-99 132 $20,851,045 15 54 42,444.. ._. - ._ . - .. _. "-"- .. .. -. .. _.

MINNESOTA 1984·99 85 $7,193,265 8 38 893

MISSISSIPPI 1985-99 87 $11,715,053 15 27 11,507. _ .. _. _., - .. . .... . . " ..

MISSOURI 1984-99 138 $47,275,932 7 27 83,258.-

*The Environmental Protection Agency maintains records on oil spills of 50 barrels or less (2100 gallons) which would pollute naVigable\Vaters. Those records reveal that 16,000 such spills occurred from 1989 to 1998.

** The amounts listed should be considered minimums. Not only are spills 2100 gallons or less not reported, 15% of all petroleum pipelines-low pressure or so-called "gathering Iinp.s" - are exempt from Federal leak-reporting requirements. According to a 1994 Friends of theEarth report, "Crude Awakening,: The Oil Mess in America: Wasting Jobs, Energy and the Environment," by Jack Doyle, every year the oilindustry in America wasted or leaked an estimated 280 million barrels or more of oil equivalent energy - or more than three Exxon Valdezoil spills a day.

603

MONTANA

NEBRASKA

NEVADA

NEWHAMPSHIRE

NEW JERSEY

NEW MEXICO

NEW YORK

1984·99

1984·99

1984-99

1984·99

1984-99

1984-99

60

82

32

7

87

117

145

$4,983,462

$5,536,698

$5,901,618

$286,000

$39,351,725

$10,915,774

$23,214,587

o

2

2

o

4

1

18

7

18

369

o

40

16

85

40,246

29,188

345

2

11,642

50,142

6804

NORTHCAROLINA 1984-99 56 $2,294,980 3 43 9,634

OHIO 1984·99 145 $17,980,285 9 72 42,582

OKLAHOMA 1984-99

PENNSYLVANIA 1984-99

PUERTO RICO 1996-99

R~ODE IS~AND1··1984-99

331

21

201

4

9

$18,810,542

$6,043,600

$39,613,520

$10,030,000

$931,000

13

2

23

66

o

33

3

96

87

4

238,265

1,507

21,006

o

o

SOUTHCAROLINA

1985-99 25 $5,483,500 o 11 38,111

SOUTH DAKOTA 1985·99 26 $5,664,950 2 4 12,225

TENNESSEE 1984·99 71 $19,975,423 3 32 16,532

TEXAS

UTAH

1984-99

1984·99

1654 $137,928,961

32 $3,842,517

46

1 11

798,387

-24,137

VERMONT

VIRGINIA

1985-99

1984-99

6

57

590,000

$15,763,890

2

2

1

16

1

24,571

WASHINSTON 1985-99. ~. - -- ---

IWEST VIRGINIA. 1984·99

47 $10,759,357

52 $2,628,817

5 16

1 24

14,162

8

IWISCONSIN- .

IWYOMING

1984·99 75 $8,879,948

1984-99 102 $8,147,555

11

2

46

13

22,864

85,385

According to OPS: North Dakota doesn't show any spills.**In Ihe 1994 Friends of the Earth report, "Crude Awakening" (see bottom previous page), North Dakota had Ihe following three pipeline spillsfrom 1984 to 1994: 15,000 gallons crude oil (Apri11992); 27,000 gallons gasoline (January 1992); and 1.3 million gallons crude oil (July 1989).

Myth: Pipelines are highly regulated.Facts: Though Congress told the Office of Pipeline Safely (OPS, part of the U.S. Department of Transporation) in 1992 to develop regulations forpipelines to protect the environment, OPS has yet to issue asingle such requirement. Current oil pipeline regulations developed to enhance pipelinesafety have the following serious deficiencies: they do not require periodic testing to ensure pipeline integrity, the oil pipeline regulations for corrosionprotection are minimal, and there are no leak detection requirements for oil pipelines. Rather than strengthening these regulations, in recent yearsOPS has weakened its reporting requirements for oil spills, and has spent alarge portion of its staff resources developing a"Risk ManagementDemonstration Projecr program to reduce governmental.requirements without fUll transparency and input from state pipeline regulators and the pUblic.The pipeline industry contends that it is highly regulated because the rates it can charge are set by the federal government. Nevertheless, oil pipelineindustry profits (net earnings after taxes as apercentage of revenues) were on average 31 %annually since 1980.

604

Highlights of the u.s. General Accounting Office (GAO) Reporton Pipeline Safety and the Office of Pipeline Safety

Issued on June 15, 2000

The recent U.S. General Accounting Office report documents the federal Office of Pipeline Safety's oversight of the pipeline industry. It is not apretty picture. According to Congressman John Dingle, ranking member of the House Committee on Commerce, the GAO's report, togetherwith the Inspector General's Report on Pipeline Safety, " ••• paint apicture of an agency that places disturbing amounts of faith in theIndustry it is supposed to regulate, and is either unable or unWilling to carry out any of its responsibilities under the law. "2 Amongthe most disturbing finding:

II The number of fl!ajor pipeline accidents - those resulting in afatality, injury or more than $50,000 in property damage - increased fourpercent annually between 1989 and 1998. In all, 226 people were killed, more than 1,030 people were injured, and property damagereached $700 million in 2241 major accidents.

II During this period. OPS almost eliminated the use of fines as an enforcement tool - decreasing monetary penalties by more than a 90percent. OPS claims that this strategy allows them to work more constructively with pipeline companies, but the office has made noattempt to determine whether this policy actually improves industry compliance and pipeline safety.

• Despite its role as overseer of the pipeline industry, OPS does not collect comprehensive information on the causes of pipeline accidents.

II OPS is not complying with the law. It has failed to implement 22 of 49 requirements mandated by Congress since 1988 to improve thesafety of pipelines. Ten of these 22 requirements were to be completed by deadlines stated in the statutes and are now between about 5and 11 years past those deadlines.

• OPS has the lowest rate of any transportation agency for implementing National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) recommendations.including issues on which NT?B has reported repeatedly.

• As pipeline accidents are worsening, the tiny, understaffed Office of Pipeline Safety* is discontinuing use of states to help conductinspections of interstate pipelines (*57 field inspectors to police 2.2 million miles of pipeline, or one inspector per 38.000 miles of pipe).

• Without any evidence to support its action, OPS is continuing to move ahead with arisk-based approach to pipeline safety regulation,authorized in the 1996 pipeline legislation. By March 31,.2000, OPS was required to provide an evaluation and make recommenda-tions as to whether risk management principles should be incorporated into the federal pipeline safety program. OPS has not providedthis report nor complied with statutory requirements or its own guid.ance on developing performance measures for the project. Despite aPresidential directive that environmental and safety benefits superior to existing regulatory requirements be shown, many participatingcompanies are not even collecting the data necessary to support an evaluation of the program's safety impacts. Yet, OPS has proposed arule on inspection of pipelines in high consequence areas (that would apply to 87 percent of the nation's hazardous liquid pipelinemileage) which substantially incorporates riSk-management, all without a"... s!lred of credible. quantifiable evidence"3 to show that thismethod achieves evell minimal levels of protection. let alone superior levels. ;

I The GAO report (GAO/RCED·QQ-128) covers the extent of major pipeline accidents from 1989 to 1998, the Ollice of Pipeline Safety's (OPS) implementation of risk managementdemonstration projects authorized by the Accountable Pipeline Safety and Partnership Act of 1996. OPS inspeclion and enforcement efforts since 1996. OPS' responsiveness toslatulory requirements and recommendations from lhe National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), and the current status of the investigation into the June 1999 Bellingham,Washington pipeline explosion.

2 June 14, 2000 letter from Congressman John Dingle to Department of Transportation Secretary, Rodney E. Slater. The GAO report was prepared at the requestof Congressman Dingle.

3Id.

Myth: More regulation is just more regulation; it doesn't assure us that pipelines will actually be made safer.Fact: During the late 1980s and early 1990s, there were numerous accidents in the chemical and energy industries, which resulted in tremendousloss of life and severe environmental contamination. With the passage of the Clean Air Act and implementation of process safety managementLegislation in the early 90s, these industries have been required to improve their management processes, and subsequently their safety records haveimproved significantly. Unfortunately, oil industry lobbyists have succeeded in having liquid fuel transmission pipelines exempted from suchlegislation. .

605

National Pipeline Reform Coalition Fact SheetChanges Needed to Protect the Public and the

Environment from Pipeline Spills and Leaks-

Regulatory Actions That:

•

•

•'"'\

••~..

't

;~f •"

f~ ••

i~

Mandate periodic testing, including internal inspection/pressure testing, of oil and natural gas pipelines to ensure continued safe service, asrecommended by NTSBRequire leak detection with adeadline to do so, including performance standards for leak-detection systems, and remote/automatic shut-off valveswhen releases are detectedEnsure adequate corrosion protection for oil pipelines (recommended by NTSB in 1989 and 1988, the latter after the Lively, Texasexplosion killed two teenagers)Require fail-safe operations and hydrostatic testing for those pipeline segments with asignificant history of rupturesProtect the environment from pipeline hazards, including protection of environmentally sensitive areas (required bylaw, still to be definedbyOPS)Require reporting of smaller/slower releases (the current threshold is too high), better information on release causes, and reporting of leaksto groundwaterCover more types of oil pipelines, including "gathering" pipelines located in oil production fieldsAddress pipelines that have achange in service with appropriate reporting and upgrade standards

Essential Changes to the Pipeline Safety Act:

• Allow states to establish requirements above federal minimums for interstate pipelines, provided these do not conflict with federal stan­dards, in order to meet local environmental and safety needs (e.g., more closely spaced shut-off valves, enhanced inspections and leakdetection, better reporting, etc.)

• Remove the "regulatory reform" cost-benefit provisions since they are designed to slow development of new regulations; other federalagencies do not have such requirements

• Provide additional enforcement authority and resources to state pipeline agencies• Strengthen the citizen suit provisions to facilitate private enforcement actions• Include strict liability provisions for releases• Develop acommunity right-to-know program for pipelines, which includes direct accountability to the pUblic on company actions, to prevent

and mitigate accidents• -Establishregi6hal-advisory councilS to enable pUblic and local government representatives to make substantive recommendations to the

pipeline industry and its regulatorse' Include whistle blower protection provisions for pipeline employees41 Create an ombudsman position within OPS to track and help address public concerns

Mylh: Pipeline safety regulations are 100 costly and time-consuming.Fact: Pipeline companies only measure the additional cents per barrel transported cost when calculating how much new regUlations will cost them.They also resist hydrostatic testing because it forces them to shut down their lines temporarily, and thus lose money. But there are many other "costs"associated with unsafe pipelines. Since 1984, the Office of Pipeline Safety reports that there have been 408 fatalities, over 4000 injuries, and over onebillion dollars in property damage as aresult of pipeline accidents - and there is no accounting of the environmental damage wrought by toxic fuelsleaking from pipelines into aquifers and soils.

The bottom line is that it is cheaper for companies not to maintain pipelines. This needs to change. Koch Industries in Kansas was recently fined $30million by the Environmental Protection Agency for over 300 separate spills of crude oil, gasoline, and other oil products between 1990 and 1997. Thecompany simply waited for the pipelines to fail, rather than testing them. The clean up and repair of the Olympic pipeline explosion in Bellingham hasalready cost more than $20 million. Stiffer penalties and sensible, "ounce of prevention" measures are asmall price to pay to avoid tragedies.

606

A Critique of the Pending Federal Pipeline Legislation:Substance or Show?

by David Bricklin

With few exceptions, the overriding flaw in pipeline "reform" legislation pending before Congress is the continued reliance on theOffice of Pipeline Safety (OPS). Under various proposed bills, OPS could decide:

1) What safety measures will be required;2) The extent of citizen oversight; and3) Whether violators will be sUbject to fines and civil penalties.

Nothing in the legislation is directed at reforming OPS. Given OPS's woeful record, enacting laws that give this poorly performingagency more and more authority is highly unlikely to result in meaningful change.

Integrity Management Program: This could be the centerpiece of apipeline reform bill. It would require pipeline companies todevelop safety programs meeting clearly defined, new and higher standards. But under the proposed legislation, Congress hasnot specified those standards. Rather, these bills uniformly allow pipeline companies to develop their own safety programs. Thesafety programs so developed are to be reviewed by OPS, utilizing standards set by OPS. Past standard-setting efforts by thatagency inspire little confidence that any new standards will be promulgated in atimely manner or that they will be sUfficientlystringent or precise.

Increased Fines: The proposed bills generally increase the maximum fine OPS can assess. Historically, however, the problemhas not been astatutory cap on fines. The problem is that OPS usually does not impose fines at all. Raising the ceiling does notaddress this serious issue.

Increased Civil Liability: As is the case regarding imposition of fines, many of the bills under consideration authorize theDepartment of Justice (DOJ) to seek civil penalties. But these bills all handcuff DOJ. It cannot act unless acase is referred to itby the Office of Pipeline Safety. There is nothing in these bills or otherwise to substantiate the notion that OPS will suddenly startreferring more cases to DOJ for civil prosecution.....

Oversight: Right to Know: Many of the bills generally provide for increased citizen access to information about pipelines. Insome areas, Congress actually takes the next step and mandates disclosure of particular information (e.g., pipeline routes). Butmost of the key information necessary to evaluate acompany's safety program is not specifically identified. Instead, OPS is giventhe responsibility to decide how much detail must be prOVided. Historically, OPS has sided with the pipeline industry andsupported non-disclosure of the most ijertinent information, citing proprietary needs and other similar grounds. .

Oversight: Regional Advisory Councils: Some of the proposed bills include aprovision authorizing OPS to establish RegionalAdvisory Councils (RACs). Well implemented, RACs can be valuable entities providing much needed oversight of the pipelineindustry. But, once again, the bills leave it entirely up to OPS' discretion whether to create these councils. And, even if created,the amount of money prOVided to them is also entirely left up to OPS. Without adequate and substantial funding, RACs cannot beeffective.

Other Significant flaws: Nothing in the proposed legislation requires the pipeline industry to replace old pipes. There is also norequirement that existing pipes be retrofitted to allow for internal inspection of those pipes (with bends and obstructing valves) thatdo not currently allow for internal inspection. The recent deadly pipeline explosion in New Mexico involved acorroded 50-year­old pipe. Internal inspections to detect and correct flaws were not possible. Although routine internal inspections will be reqUiredunder the proposed legislation (for those pipes which can be internally inspected, about 50 percent of U.S. pipelines), if defectsare discovered, there is no standard set for what type of anomaly would require further inspection or corrective action. In thetragic Bellingham, Washington explosion, aknown anomaly found during an internal inspection was never investigated orrepaired. It should be noted that when apipeline is '~ested for corrosion," this may mean only that apipeline's corrosion retardantsystems, which are supposed to prevent corrosion, are being tested. Such atest does not detect existing corrosion.

607

Regional Advisory Councils Provide Meaningful OversightWhat Works: Finding New Ways to Prevent Oil Spills and Pollution

Formed in the wake of the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill, Alaska's Re­gional Citizens' Advisory Councils (RCACs) serve as successful mod­els for Regional Advisory Councils (RACs) nationwide. They were in­troduced in the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA '90) as formally recog­nized organizations with mandated funding that flows directly from theindustries who benefit from their advice. Their mission is to prevent oilspills and pollution from oil transport operations, Alaska's RCACs areunique as public advisory groups because they are: mandated by fed­eral law; well funded; independent from political and economic pres­sure; and assured a high level of access to necessary informationsources (I.e., oil pipeline terminal facilities). With enough money to hiretechnical experts, conduct research, and monitor the oil industry,Alaska's RCACs provide high-quality information, solutions and adviceto the oil industry and the public.

During the 1O-year anniversary of the Exxon Valdez tragedy, the RCACswere praised for their work. Alaska Senator Frank Murkowski

wrote, It, •• the oversight and creativity of the councils have helpedmake Alaska's oil transportation system the best in the world, . , . WithAmerica importing 56 percent of the oil we consume, we need to spreadthe word nationwide about how well citizens' advisory councils haveworked to prevent complacency from undermining the safe transport ofoi!." Praise also comes from the oil industry itself. Bob Malone, Presi­dent of Alyeska Pipeline Services noted, "At Alyeska, we have learnedthat we can create an open environment where people feel comfort­able raising concerns and working together to achieve results, Theproof is in our effort with the citizens' council."

OPA '90 calls on Congress to replicate these successful models. Clearly,the Alaskan RCACs are working. Despite their success in citizen over­sight of the oil industry, there are no other RCACs in the U.S. Pipelinereform advocates are requesting that Congress, during the reauthori­zation of the Pipeline Safety Act, establish Regional Advisory Councilsto focus on pipeline safety.

photo by Charlie Stanton, Fire Coordinator, Schoharie County, New York

The ThickFog of March

Blenheim, NewYorkby Sabrina Johnson

(excelpt from tlie spring/summer 2000 issue ofThe Planet magazine)

Looking south to Blenheim, New York.from New York State Route 30 -this is what the fire department crewsaw as they drove to the scene of thepipeline accident.

Early on March 13, 1990, someone noticed a [propane] leakand called assistant fire chief Robert Hitchcock. He went to thenearest intersecton, about ahalf-mile from the leak, to direct trafficaway from the road. The leak, however, occurred at the top of a .narrow valley above the intersection. The propane became a thickfog, filling the intersection and surrounding area with propane.

Hitchcock's daughter was leaving for school that morning.As she approached the intersection the fog was so thick she couldnot see. She tried t,o stop. She struck Richard Smith's car in frontof her. Soon after the collison the gas ignited. Hitchcock receivedthird degree burns all over his body. His daughter had severeburns on her face and hands. All of the cars stopped in trafficwere on fire, Nine houses and several buildings also caught onfire. Hitchcock and Smith died as a result of their burns. All nine

houses were destroyed. The fire burning at the leak burned allthrough the night, nearly 24 hours, before it finally died out.

Blenheim city supervisor, Bob Mann, said the pipeline rup­tured because repairs during during this time were done improp-erly, causing uneven pressure. .

The town of 334 was unprepared to deal with the situation."I didn't know what was in the pipeline," Mann said. "If we

hadn't had the accident, I still wouldn't know."Mann said the response from the pipeline company was swift

and provided $250,000 above its settlements with people wholost their homes.

"It's easy to look back and see many of the mistakes that weremade by both the town and pipeline company," Mann said. "Ifsuch an incident were to occur again, I know that we are better

608

Burning homes

south of

New York

State Route 30 and

West Kill Road;

the fire

department

was still en

route to the

scene of the

explosion.

photo py Charlie Sianton, Fire Coordinator. Schoharie County. New York

prepared than we were then. However, I also know that we are nowhere near as prepared as we should be."Mann hopes to see many things changed in the near future. He said pipeline testing should be required and fre­

quent, and pipelines should be equipped with an automatic shut-off valve that activates on pressure loss. He said healso feels pipeline companies should infOlm the community when they work on a pipeline.

InfOlming a community about pipeline repairs doesn't mean the community will be prepared for an accident.However, it may grant the opportunity to ask questions and think about possible problems.

According to a report by Pates* titled "Out of sight, out of mind: What every local government should know aboutpipeline safety," roughly 1.8 million miles of gas and liquid pipelines carry hazardous materials to urban areas andthrough environmentally sensitive regions across the country. The nation's natural gas pipeline is about eight timeslonger than its liquid one, extending to almost every street in most cities.

"Every street in most cities" makes this a national problem. Thousands of accidents and hundreds of deaths createa'strong argument for change. More training, more testing and more disclosure need to come forth from this industry,as ignorance and accidents apparently go hand in hand. It is only with education that eradication becomes a possibil­ity.

*James Pates is a Fredricksburg, Virginia city attorney (see related article on page 18).

Rubble fro111­

one ofnine

homes destroyed

after a propane

pipeline exploded

in the rural

town of

Blenheim,

New York.

photo by Charlie Stonton. Fire CU<Jnlimllllr. Schoharie County. New York

609

- Anne Bricklin

photo by Charlie Stanton, Fire Coordinator, Schoharie County. New York

Blenheim, New York residentslook on the aftermath of a

pipeline explosion thatdevastated their community

March 13, 1990.

The eelie scene above looks like something straight out of World War II, not small town America in 1990. It isemblematic of the man-made destmction so prevalent in the last century. We are enteling a new era, however. It is thedawn of the 21 ,I century. We are the most prosperous nation on earth, our technology the envy of the world. It is alsoa time of great challenge. Our oil and gas delivery system depends upon a 2.2-million-mile network of pipelinesrunning under our neighborhoods, parks and schools. This aging, poorly maintained, poorly regulated infrastructureleaks large amounts of hazardous fuel, generating greenhouse gases and contaminating water supplies, wetlands andhabitat on a daily basis. All too often, those releases lead to tragedies like the one in Blenheim, New York. Ourpipeline system symbolizes much of the bad of the past centuly, when the rush to growth and expansion, coupled withgreed, led to waste and pollution. Today we know better. We have the means to fix it. The question remains whetherwe have the will. Wliter George W. S. Trow said it very well, in his in-depth article on the 1989 San Bernardinopipeline explosion: "I learned quite a bit about the scale of things in America while I was reporting this story. We areset up to build. And we are set up to respond to disaster. Wpat we are willing to do to forestall disaster is: very little." I

More than a decade later, Trow's bleak assessment still lings true. But it does not have to be. At a time of unprec­edented wealth and knowledge, we can change the status quo and demand that our pipeline systems are safe, wellmaintained and regulated. Future generations will thank us.

I George W. S. Trow, "A Reporter at Large - Devastation" The New Yorker, 66, no. 36 (1990): 68

610

What Can You Do?

Share this publication with others to raise awareness about the dangers pipelines pose

Call and write your Congre.ssional Representatives and ask them to support the pipeline safety reformsdescribed in this book

Write letters to the editor of your local paper about the dangers pipelines pose

Join the National Pipeline Reform Coalition

The National Pipeline Reform Coalition is a diverse, national network of environmental and safety organiza­tions, local government, and labor unions formed to protect the environment, property, and public safety fromreleases from hazardous liquid and natural gas pipelines, through research, technical assistance, litigation, andadvocacy. An April 2000 conference had organizational and state/local government representatives from 15states, including Alaska, Florida, Illinois, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas,Vermont, and Washington.

Fuel Safe Washington is acoalition of property owners, labor, business, environmental and public safety inter­ests. We are avoice advocating for fuel transportation safety. Our mission is to promote aregional fuel policy thatprotects our environment, safety, and quality of life by:

Improving the sa~ety of pipeline, tanker, barge, truck, and rail fuel delivery systems

Encouraging fuel conservation

Promoting alternatives to hazardous, nonrenewable, fossil fuels

For additional information please visit the following web sites:www.fuelsafewashington.org I www.pipelinereform.org

To obtain additional copies of this publication, please send your request along with a donation to NationalPipeline Reform Coalition, c/o Fuel Safe Washington, PO Box 2635, Seattle, WA 98111.

DANGER

HEALTH WARNINGHarmful or fatal if swallowed

Long-term exposure to vapors has causedcancer in laboratory animals.

• Avoid prolonged breathing of vapors.• Keep face away from nozzle and gas tank.• Keep away from eyes and skin.• Never siphon by mouth.• Do not overfill tank.

fAJl,\ll\f TO UU CAUTIOHIotAY C"AVSf.I£NOU$lK.,NRYOIlUHUl.

611

EXHIBIT 0http://www.dailyastorian.info/main.asp?SectionID=2&SubSectionID=395&ArticleID=71187

Staff raps LNG firm over pipelinePlanners recommend hearing officer deny land-use application for liquefied natural gas project

BvKA TIE WILSONThe DailyAstorian

Clatsop County staff has recommended that Hearings Officer Peter Livingston deny a land-use application to put 41miles of pipeline through the county for the Oregon LNG liquefied natural gas project.

A pUblic hearing for Oregon Pipeline LLC's consolidated land use application began Thursday in Astoria. Theproposed pipeline is 121 miles long and would connect to a natural gas hub in Molalla. Of this, 41 miles wouldcross through Clatsop County at a slant, running in a southeasterly direction from Warrenton, crossing sevendifferent zoning designations and three special overlay zones.

According to the county, natural gas pipelines are allowed in those zones as outright permitted uses or conditionaluses.

The primary issue Clatsop County staff had with Oregon Pipeline's application was that the company's process wasnot clear, especially where the company plans to send the pipeline under Columbia River estuary waters.

Keith Jones, a consultant for the county with Harper Houf Peterson Righellis Inc., a consulting firm based inPortland, Vancouver, Wash., and Bend, said they did not feel the impacts on the estuary (and elsewhere) had beencompletely illustrated.

The company proved they have enough information, he said, but not that they've completed a thorough analysis.

Mike Connors, who works for Oregon Pipeline, said there was some confusion over the county's coderequirements. From what he understood, the county was asking for an impact assessment, but, he said, this is notrequired under the county's Comprehensive Plan and the Land, Water, and Development Ordinance. However, thecompany prOVided more information anyway.

The company sent the addftionai information on tliepipeline's impacts to Livingston and county staff in a letter-typedocument dated June 9. The county did not have time to review this before the hearing. .

Clatsop County Planner Jennifer Bunch said it became apparent during the hearing that the county and thecompany were talking about two different things: impact statement (analysis) versus impact assessment.

It appears to be a fine diUerence, Bunch said. "We'll talk about this and figure it out," she said.

"That is an issue that has to be resolved," said Ed Wegner, county land use planning director, who said the countydoes require an impact statement.

The county also concluded the project did not comply with several goals laid out in the staff report, including thecompletion of a geotechnical report and impact assessment, natural hazards concerns (specifically policies to dealwith erosion and shoreline stabilization), and the line the route cuts through some existing properties.

The company had originally said the route would follow existing easements, rights-of-way and property lines,county staff said in the staff report. A map, however, shows the route cutting straight through and there has beenno documentation that supports the company's original claim, staff said during the hearing.

"It's not as if a lot of thought hasn't been put in about where to route (the pipe)," Connors said. With developmenton the scale proposed by Oregon Pipeline, though, he added, "there isn't any development that avoids any impact."

Oregon Pipeline is part of a suite of companies that make up Oregon LNG, which is funded by the New Yorkholding company, Leucadia National Inc. Oregon LNG has proposed developing an LNG terminal on the Skipanon

1

612

Peninsula in Warrenton.

The terminal project would be located within Warrenton's city limits, but is not part of the pipeline land-useapplication.

As has been the tradition with any public hearing involving LNG, the main meeting room at the JUdge GuyBoyington Building was crammed with people. .

Many of those in opposition to the Oregon LNG project had testified against the NorthernStpr LNG project earlierthis year. -

At this hearing, they were concerned primarily with the proposed route the pipeline would take, how this wouldaffect property values and public safety issues.

Hans Mulder, assistant fire chief with the Elsie-Vinemaple Rural Firl3 District, was the only person to testify duringtime reserved for state agency reports.

The fire district's concerns weren't as much abouthow the pipe went in, but what would happen after it was inplace, he said.

"A natural gas pipeline poses huge risks," Mulder said. Risks that the district, staffed entirely by volunteers,is not ready to take on. They lack both the equipment and the training to deal with explosions or firesresulting from a burst pipe, he said.

The fire district officially covers around 30 square miles. In reality, the coverage is more like 500 square miles sincethey answer calls in the forestry land as well.

Access to water is just the beginning of the problems Mulder foresees. If a problem happens down by the river,firefighters could simply pump the river. But if something happens farther in, perhaps in more isolated areas,the district will have to bring the water with them.

"If it blows up, it's not just going to be fire," Mulder said. It's going to be a big boom that could take downtrees and houses, he said.

There was not enough time to hear all the testimony so Livingston announced that the hearing will continue June25, starting at 5 p.m. at the Judge Guy Boyington Building, 857 Commercial St., Astoria.

If all the testimony is heard at that time and the company and county staff also have time to respond, the hearingwill close.

If not all the testimony is heard, a third session would be held July 8 at 1 p.m. at the Judge GUy Boyington BUilding.

Written comments may be submitted to the Community Development OffiCi? at 800 Exchange St., Astoria.

The entire application and accompanying documents are available on the Clatsop County website,(www.co.c1atsoD.or.US). The application file can also be viewed at the Transportation and Development Servicesoffice, 800 Exchange St., Suite 100 during normal business hours.

(Emphasis Added)

2

613

20071004-5081 FERC PDF (Unofficial) 10/04/2007 04:52:07 PMEXBIBITP

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~ !~l;1.1 H.j:.~ J" ..\, t.H.\t {, \:, ; l.k dl~ ",! n·, \at ~(H{Tf f ~)f',t.l (H: ( :. 'It't~ tlAY, OjU:.~ .f)1\!

PREPARED BY THEE STAFFOF THE OREGON DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

.october 4} 200·7

2

614

20071004-5081 PERC PDP (Unofficial) 10/04/2007 04:52:07 PM

JORDAN COVE LfQUEP(iEO NATURAL GAS TiERiMl1\tAL

ON THE NORTH SPIT O;f~ COOS BAY, OREGON

The'Oregon Department of Energy (ODOE) issues this Safety Advisory Report on behalf of the State ofOregon pursuant to section 311(d) of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (the Act). The report conlZerns theapplication to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) by Jordan Cove Energy Project LP, (jCEP)to construct a Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) import terminall with an assodated natural gas pipelineapplication submitted by Pacific G.as Connector Pipeline L.P. (peGP). The Jordan Cove Terminal wO.uis pelocated in Coos County, Oregon on the North Spit of Coos Bay, near the dties of .Coos .gay and North Bend.Jordan Cove ftJ.ea Its a~plication wlth·FERC·on September 4,2007.

The Act allowS' the state·to file ali advisory report that identifies \lst~te and local safetY.c.pnSfd~ra.t10nS'1 within30 dqys of the date tlieapplllXltion 'is' filed. ihe "safetY" information solltltea fn tfteadvisOty report lslargety.repetitlVe of Information that Jordan Cove Itself provides in Its ·appllcaUon to HERe in itstermlnsl appliCationand in Its Waterway Suitabfllty Assessment (WSA) to the Coast Guard. It is infOrmation that Jerdan COve'alsomust provide In its emergency response plan to be developed In cOnjunction with the Coast Guard, the st:ite,and appropriate local jurisdictions prior to any construction.

The State of Oregon has been intimately Involved in reviewlng and commel'ltingonJor.aan Cove!gpre'"flilng. and application resource reports,and is Invo1ved with the Coast Guara in rev.lewing the~rOjed~S W~A, To tileextent tMt the State, disagrees Wlththt:; informcition Jordan·Cove hps.pr0vl~e9 :or will, pr'l).v,lde :0.1'1 saf~1iy issuesin those venues" the state will purSue corrections or chanQes· through the abcNe-review processes. Fer .example, the WSA s\Jbmltted by' Jordan Cove does not reflect the most reGent clislf;ussions''!;le.tweell JeEP,ODOE, local response· a.gendes and otlTler stateagencles"regarcling the area's emergeney respof;lsecapabilities and the proper allocation of augmented resourc~s. The Department will work With the COastGuard, other state agencies and local jurisdictiOns to correct the information under the WSA process.

The State considered providing FERC with specific scenarios for evaluating acddental or intentional r.eleasesof LNG from a vessel or the facility itself, Again, however, such scenarios playa ro1e bo.th in theWSAand Inthe forthcoming emergency response planning. Moreover, based on recent Commission approvals.of.lNGterminal projects, the state believes theFERC will find that the risk of any potential LNG release $Ceharlo>canbe reduced to an acceptable minimum.

i

On June 15, 20061 FBRCat:1proved three new LN.G terminal pr{jj~cts: Sempra!s P'~rtArth{;lr LNG in P..ortAithurl

Texas; Cheniere's Creole TraillNGin cameron Parish, Louisian'q~ and BP America Rreductlon C0rilpanyrsCrown Landing LNG in Logan Township In New Jersey. The language in the CommIssion's Creole "fraildecision about the risk of an acc(dental LNG release is mirrored in the other two decisions:

Based on the extensive operational experience of LNG shlp!'Jing, the structural sesignof anLNG vessel, and the op.erational controls imposed by the Coast Guard and the local pilots} acargo containment failure and subsequent LNG spill from a vessel casualty - collision,grOUnding, or alUslon - Is highly unlikely. For sImilar reasons, an aecldent Involving theonshore LNG Import tar.minalls unlikely to affect the pUblic. As a resultl the'fEISdetermlhetiJthat the risk to the public from acddental causes Is negltglble.

Further, the language In the Commissionfs Creole Trail decision about the riskofa.n Intentional LNG release isalso mIrrored In the other two decisions:

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20071004-5081 FERC PDF (Unofficial) 10/04/2007 04:52:07 PM

Unlike accidental causes, historical experience provides little gUidance In estimating theprobability of aterroFist attack on an LNG vesseler onsRefe stor.agefacll~ty~ Fora' mew'.LNGimport terminal pr.oposal having a large volume of energy transp:oltetfand,stored"nearpO,pulated ar~s, the perceivedthreat.ofa terrorist attac~ls a seriouscon~em oHne l~eql

population and T&iuires that resources be directed to mitigate p0ss1ble attack paths. If theCoast Guard issues a Letter of RecommendatIon finding the waterway suitable for LNGmarine traffic, the operational restrictions that would be imposed by the Lake Charles Pilotson LNG vessel movements through this area, as well as the requirerrtel'lts -that the CoastGuard would impose, would minilfllle the possibility of a, hazardous eventoccurr.ing along the­vessel transit area. While the risks associated with the transportation of any hazardous cargocan never be entirely eliminated, we are confident that they can be reduced t{) minimal levelsand that the public will be well protected from harm.

The Department notes that FERC staff reached a slmllar conclusion regarding the proposed BradwoodLanding project. On August 17, 2007, FERC staff Issued the Draft Environmental Impact Statement fBEIS)for Btadwood Landing. The above two paragraphs appear, in neatly ideriticallanguage, in that OEIS as well.DEIS at p.ES-6. .

For the above reasons, in this advisory report the State ptovldes largely broad safety pGlicy statementsao0.utthe proposed Jordan Cove project along with a limited amount of specific, technical comments. In addition,the State of Oregon incorporates by reference the safety comments included In previous filings to,the FERCdocket, including PF06-25.

Although the application ttl FERC Is limited in scope to the LNG terminal and associate~ pipeline, we GOOsiderthe risks from a release of LNG on the inlet to ,be among the most signifIcant sat,ety:,concerns a~otiated vitrh

. the facility. The safety of the LNG terminal Is strongly connected to the questlqn of,safety on the Inletena Inthe Gommul'1ities that the LNG carriers must pass. We expect FERC toadGlress Issues and concerns raised' bysta'kehoJders in those communities and'to consider the safety ofthose €0mmuntt~esin determining whetherto approve, and-if so, how to condItion the LNG terminal and associated pipeline.

Each of the state and local agendes in Oregon, whether or not they <::ontrlbuted to this Cldvrsory rep'ort,reserve their right to file additional joint or separate comments and/or eyidence on sa'few,and other issues~

State of Oregon General Policy Comments

1. ~R.C should req.uifean appUeant to committo 100 percent :of the safety and security 'COstsdire(;ttyassodated with the LNG vessel transits, the fa'eilit'{, and the p~peUne.

Under Section 311(e)(2)) an emergency response plan (ERP}to be developed pr.lor to constructfonmustinclude a cost-sharing plan that Includes a "description of any direct cost relm~ursements that tfI'eapplicant agrees to provide to any State and local agencies with r-esponsibiilty'fbrsecurlty and safew atthe LNG terminal and in proximity to vessels that selVe the faCility." The State understands andappreciates that JeEP has agreed thus far to pick up the costs of most safety and security needs that thecompany has identified as necessary. However, the local jurisdictions are not In a position to declitatetheirown limited funds to any LNG safety and security measures that may be r.equired. In addition, localjurisdictions may not agree with an applicant about the level of resources r-equired. An applialnt shouldfirst be required to pay for an adequate assessment of safety and security needs and then pay for allinfrastructure, planning, drilling and other associated costs identified in an ERP agreed to by the stateand local jurisdictions. Conditions proposed In the DEIS for Bradwood landing would require,a Cbs.t­Sharing Plan to be filed with FERC prior teO initial site preparation. How.eyer, the DEIS Is silent OIl Whatpercentage of costs, if anYI could be borne by state or local jurisdictions. ShO\1ldF-ERC not rcequiretne'applltant to' commit to: 100 percent ofthe costs, FERC should' eX15lalh rts authority f<:ir imposing s~cncosts

on local jUrisdictions and the state.

2. The safetyjsecurity. zones pro.posed for the vess.el in transit and t~e v.essel at dock must

4

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be.sufficiently ealculated and justified. the applicant or Coast Guard m.ust thoroUShlyexplain any changesto those zones that might accompany·heightened:national S.I3GUfity aswell as any resulting Impacts.Some area residents have expressed concern that the safety/security zones will be so large thatrthey·WJ/I."shut down" traffic on the COos eay Inlet or access to recreational and commerclal fishing, ~rabbfng andharvesting of other seafood products near the proposed terminal site•. Others have e~pressed concernthat the safety/security zones will be too small, sized to avoId the above Concern rather than foradequate safety protection. Moreover, residents of the small communities on the Eastern shore of theInlet have expressed concern that the potential for an emergency affecting their communities isconsidered acceptable primarily because of the small size of these commuriitii.:s. Any zones proposedshould provide a rationale for their size.

3. FERC should require an applicant to complete an acceptable ERP prior to any Commissiondecision on an application and tn conjunction with the COast Guard's validatron oftheWaterway Suitability Assessment.Under Section 311(e)(1){ FERC will not require Bradwood to cr~te an ERP until after a positive decisionby FERC and just before any final approval to begin construction. However, to the ement that JCEP's WSArelies on the creation of a satisfactory emergency response,plan to ensure that the Coos·Bay Il'\let Issuitab.le for LNG, that ernergency response plan must beavaUable for review prior to any decisions onboth the WSA and the FERC application. Again learning from the 8radwood Lan(jJng experlence, tlterecommended cQnditions in the DEIS would require the applicant for that facmtytodevelop,the.J~RP priorto construction, but after FERC's decisIon to approve the project. (Draft Conditions, 62 and 63 at p..S-BO.)It would be illogIcal for either the Commission or the Coast Guard to decide that LNG Is safe fur theregion without knowing first if a suitable emergency response plan can be enacted along the vesse1 routeand at the facillty.

In Resource Report 11 of the application, section 11.3.1, JCEP states that It will develop 'manuals,procedures and plans that address safety and security In accordance with estab.lished regulations. Otherthan NVIC 05-05, we have not found 'regulatlons that prOVide detailed gUidance

4. The applicant's ERP must be developed in full cooperation with stateandlocaJ authorities.Emergency response planning must be an integrated, carefully developed effort that Involv.es ev.ery entitythat Is potentially affected by the LNG import terminal. .

5. rhe applicant's ~~J) must sufficiently and accurately characterize the emergency responsecapabilities along the vessel transit route and near the facility, inc!uding·respon·setimes. ThePlan must mitigate for any safety gaps.

Thus far, the state and local jurisdictions have not reached agreement.as to whichjurlsdictlon will haveprimary responSibility and authority in the event of an acdsent or intentional breach. Agreement alsohas n9t been reached on the resource gaps, and proper allocation of supplemental resources. The USCGand FERC should not find that the waterway Is suitable until it is known that these issues have beenresolved.

6. The applicant's. ERPmust inclUde aU p.otentiaUY iiff$te:d communities;along the LNG vesselroute and neal' the terminal in a comprehensive, thoroughly pUbli'dze:d. watrting· system.Any community located within one of the three Sandia zones of Imj)act must be considered In emergencyresponse plans, InCluding access to a reverse 911 system aYld·slrens.

1. The applitat'lt's ERP must ac-count for potential populatiot'l lheresse due to' t<>urism.The Coos Bay area population Increases significantly during high tourism season. Depending on thelocation of those visitors, the Influx may bring challenges for LNG emergency response education as wellas LNG ship transit education. The Department is particularly· concerned aboutaccess and safe'egress

l

because U.S. highway 101 is the only major route in or out of the area, and it 'becomes congested duringpeak hours in high tourist season.

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20071004-5081 FERC PDF (Unofficial) 10/04/2007 04:52:07 PM

8. Any FERC authorization for an LNG terminal and associated pipeline in 0regon must fullycomply with Oregon state and local laws and regulations; including energy fa:eilitys.itirtglaws. .In particular, the state of Oregon requires large energy facilities to provide a :bond: or .letter of'cre:qibifuJensure that the prQposedsite can be restored to a useable, non-haZarS01JS ~oncliti()n. We Gonsider thebond or letter of credit to be a safety precaution againsta potentially abandoned orothefWise vaGatedsite. Thus farl the applicant does not appear to have addressed this issue In it~ application materials.

State of Oregon Specific comments

Seismic DesignThe Department is particularly concerned about the potential for tsunami. Recent statements by DOGAMIfollOWing the 2005 tsunami in Sumatra indicate that maximum tsunami height could be up to 20 feet higherthan previously thought. In discussion with DOGAMI staff stationed at NewpQrt, Oregon, we have been toldthat deepening the channel would tend to increase maximum tsunami height, FERCshould require· that thedesign basis tsunami takes Into account the height increase caused by dredging the channel.

Hazard IdentificationHazards potentially affecting the public are discussed In Resource Report 11 arid Its·attachments. As.r-equiredby NFPA 59A, Bradwood landing used the LNGFIRE and DEGADIS ctldes to calculate thermal radiation andvapor dispersion from the design basis spill. Resource report 11 ihdudes isopleth drawings and input de~ksfor these calculatlo'fls at Attachment ilA. We assume but could not verify that intentional spills wereassumed, since they likely bound any aecident scenario.

We note that thermal radiation maps in attachment 11A appear to be centered at the tanks and the d0Ck,Because the accident or intentIonal spill could just as easlly happen at the carrier during the eight milevoyage from the mouth ofCCos Bay to the terminal, the thermal radiation maps and vapor dispersion m.apsshould be shown at all poInts along-this voyage. For the JGEP, the nearestaffected: popJ;1latibrl. ·is· in'o$t'likely'not near the terminal but rather the small.communities 6n the eastern sHore of the 'Inlet, and the·residi;lncesIn North B.end in the pony Slough area as the ship approaches theterminal.

Th~ safety discussion in Resource Rep0rt 11 appears to rely heavily on the 2004 sandia Report, andparticularly on the Zones of Concern tdentified in that report anddted in NVIC 05-05. H0wever, resQurcereports 1 and 10 of JeEP's application state that the terminal will be designed to accommoGiate ships withcapacity over 200,000 m3• The zones of<:oncern in the Sandia report were based on' ships smaller than150,000 m3• FERC's recommendation for this project should be conditioned on ships no larger than'thoseassumed in any heat flux and vapor dispersion calculation,

The assumption of pure methane is probably riot repr~set'ltative of, aGtuaJ car~o and may not be conservative.In public meetings, JeEP has disclosed that product could come from a variety of produd.il1'g· natiOI1$i ·lnGludil1gsome where the LNG has a higher concentration of natural gesliq!Jids such as propane. Some ofthesehigher-weight hydrocarbons have higher potential for vapor dispersion than pure meI:hane, We expect FERCto verify that conservative assumptions were used in NfPA 59A required calculations. The EIS for this projectsho.uld explain how these assumptions were made and why they are the most consefVatlve~

Quality AssuraMeIn our SafetY Advisory Report for Bradwood Landing, dated June 2006/ ODOE Induded extensive commentson the need for a rigorous. Qualit¥ Assurance program that wouid be subject to regulatory 'review pr%r to.start of construction. We note that the BradwQod DEIS does not include a diScuS$I~n of such a pf0gram, andwe renew the recommendation and incorporate our comments from tnatJyne 2006 report··inw,this·one. TheState e>q)ects the Commission to describe and Impose a condition requiring: JCEP to adopt'8 ffgorous anacomprehensive quality ass()ran~ program applicable during both construction and operation of'tfue irnl'l0rtterminal.

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20071004-5081 FERC PDF {Unofficial} 10/04/2007 04:52:07 PM

Safety IssuesThe state of Oregon has revleweq the Safety Advisory Report 01'1 the proposed LNGterminal at the Port ofLong Beach Issued by the California Energy Commission (CEC). That report r.elles .Iargely on material takenfrom two readily avallable reports: (1) the SaAdia Labs' November 2004: report "Guldal1ce on ~skAnalysis

and Safety Implications of a Large Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Spill Over Water' (SsndlaReport) ancl(2)Richard Clark's "LNG Facilities in Urban Areas."

The safety significant events listed in Sandia and Clark and .quoted In the CEC advisory report could 'apply toany terminal at any locati0n and need not be repeated ill this report. However1 we agree with eEe that the 5kw/m2 Is described in the Sandia Report 85 "the permissible level for emergency operations lasting severalminutes with appropriate clothing" (Table 6, p.38). This is the lowest heet flux shown In the thermalradiatIon maps provided in Attachment !lA. Because the people occupying the nearest residences (those onthe eastern shore of Coos Bay and the Pony Slough section of North Bend) do not have the appropriateclothing or emergency training/ thermal radiation calculations should show the point at which worst case heatflux will permit safe evacuation, possibly re{Juiring more than "several minutes" and without appropriateclothing or emergency training. The CEe adViSOry report at p. 15 suggests 1.5 KiN/m2

, J.CEP sho.uld :calculatethe dlstanceto this heat flux for adesign basis event at JeEP aaq Issue a figure shOWIng the results. A'S·not~d

previously, JeEP should Calculate this distance not just at the terminal but along the eIght mile tr,lp from themouth of the bay.

Emergency Response CapabiHttes near the Facility location

The State appreciates that peRC has prOVided draft guidance fJ:lr preparing the required ERP for an LNGImportterminal. However/ the State remains concemed that the gUidance will be viewed byapplkants as anupper limit on their responsi\>i1ity for ensuring the safety of surroundiFlgcommunities. The State views theguidance as just that: guidanC€l and urges FERC to affirmatively state that the ERP must a<;idi'€ss. allidentified emergency situatio.ns, and that all cests attributable to Insuring public saf\Stymustbe bomebytheappllcant. Furthermore, th.e State remains concerned about the effect of Impasse·duth1g negotiations for theERP and urges the Commission to adopt a dear, expeditious process for addressing disagreements betweenthe applicant and state and local governments.

Finally, whatever criteria are used to gener-ate the ERP, FERC should make the .process as transparentto thepublic as possible/lnduding the essential.elements of an emergency plan. Although the details of theWSAand ERP are withheld from public disClosure, information regarding measures to protect the public during adesign basis event should be a part of public outreach and should be available before the issuance of a FERCconstruction permit.

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Shell's Sakhalin IT LNG project:Impacts of LNG production

2002 project design included a LNG jetty of 1,400 m length, and around 160,000 m3 of dredging2003 project design (imally implemented) involved a LNG jetty that was 800 m in length, requiringaround 1,680,000 m3 of dredging. Final amount of dredging was about 2 million m3.(2 million cubic meters is equal to 2.6 million cubic yards)

What Avina Bay looked like BEFORE dredging work and dumping of dredged m.aterials••.••

620

Cont:What Avina Bay looked like BEFORE dl'edging work and dumping ofdredged materials.•..•

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Aniva Bay - the same area AFTER....

The 2 pictures below were done in Aniva Bay, a year after dumping on the area, which, accordingSEIC, should not have any negative impact (sedimentation) fl'om the dumping zone.Now this area is almost an undenvater desert.

622

Bruce Campbell1158 26th St. #883Santa Monica, CA 90403

----- Original Message -----FrQni:;Bruce:GamObell ',:::~hi:; ">);;'!;:;;0~~;;;:L\,)?:J;!i:H;;:~/'~;i'·)~;/:\'~/;' y,ett:,:,S'>': ~,\ /j:: ';;:~';;;L: .. .> .. ><: :,',To: Jody McCaffreeSent: Thursday, June 17, 2010 12:10 PMSUbject: Comments re: recent comments of PCGP Land Use Coastal Zone Coos County Permit Application(File # HBCU-1--01)

June 16th, 2010

Coos County Planning Department250 N. BaxterCoquille, OR 97423 ,

Re: Comments regarding recently submitted comments on PCGP Land Use Coastal Zone Coos CountyPermit Application (File # HBCU-IO-01)

Dear Planning Department:

It is apparent to me from reviewing earlier as well as recently submitted documents, that theConditional Use Permit must be denied by Coos County Planning. This is due to the obvious negativeimpacts on the environment and on local residents which PCGP construction, use, and maintenancewould bring, but also due to the incompleteness of the application, and the fact that it does not abide byrelated legal requirements! The recent Cascadia Wildlands submission summarizes these points verywell.

Cascadia Wildlands also hits the nail on the head in regards to pointing out that what may beadequate as far as meeting legal requirements on private lands along the proposed PCGP route do notsuffice in regards to activities and impacts on the largest landowner along the PCGP route within CoosCounty -- the Bureau ofLand Management. As pointed out, the Oregon Forest Management Plan doesnot cover BLM lands, plus there have been many shifts in recent times regarding guiding regulationson BLM land. CW pointed out that BLM's WOPR (Western Oregon Plan Revisions) was adopted inDecember 2008, but then was withdrawn by the Department ofInterior on July 16th, 2009. It waswithdrawn due to the bad science involved, due to BLM not being able to meet their legal mandateswith that plan, and due to the WOPR being developed hand-in-hand with the bogus Northern SpottedOwl Recovery Plan from the George W. Bush era which was tossed out since it clearly was not basedon valid scientific analysis. CW was also correct in their contention that thus it is insufficient to citesome sections in Jordan Cove's LNG FElS (and that document should not have been incorporated byreference in a wholesale manner) since it was presuming that the WOPR was going to be guidingmanagement on BLM lands in the region (as well as other inadequacies).

Rather than the Oregon Forest Management Plan guiding activities on BLM land, recall that theWOPR tried to withdraw about 2.5 million acres of Western Oregon BLM lands from the NorthwestForest Plan -- but the rejection ofthe WOPR in July 2009 means that the Northwest Forest Plan is nowonce again the guiding document in regards to activities which may occur on BLM lands within therange of the Northern Spotted Owl. Thus, management on BLM land must allow for sufficient wildlifehabitat, must protect water quality, as well as provide for other needed ecosystem services. Veryserious and expensive mitigation measures would be needed to get anywhere close to abiding by legal

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regulations in regards to construction, use, and maintenance of the PCGP through BLM lands in CoosCounty (as well as on other BLM lands along the pipeline route).

Also related to the Northwest Forest Plan, CW rightly pointed out that a judge reinstated the NFPrequirement that Survey and Manage for species be conducted on federal forestland within the range ofthe Northern Spotted Owl. Thus, these surveys must be conducted (since PCGP construction wouldsurely bring logging and ground-disturbing activities to BLM land within the Northwest Forest Planzone) before considering this application (unless the conclusion is rejection of the application), andmost likely some species would be found in some areas which would likely result in are-routing ofthepipeline in some areas. Thus, since we are not talking about the final pipeline route in regards to thisconditional use permit application, the application must be rejected. Please conduct the survey andmanage on the BLM lands to which the requirements apply, figure out a superior route in some areas,and submit the final proposed pipeline route rather than such an incomplete document!

Judge Pechman (as pointed out on page 2 of CWI~ comments) allowed for clear exemptions to thesurvey and manage requirements, but it is clear that a lineal pipeline resulting in significant loggingand stream-disturbing activities on BLM lands along the proposed PCGP route do not meet any of thecriteria which allow for exemptions. And CW pointed out that Judge Pechman's decision regardingwhat areas must undergo Survey and Manage (as well as what areas could be exempted from therequirements) was still in place as ofa 2009 court decision -- and thus likely still in place or we likelywould have heard about a succeeding case on that matter.

Another fine point by CW was on page 3 oftheir recent comments which discuss how the currentPCGP proposal would illegally degrade endangered species reserves while also violating the AquaticConservation Strategy. Please do not even consider the application for the PCGP (other than theoption ofoutright rejection) until BLM completes all their surveys and paperwork and can prove theyare following legal requirements under the Northwest Forest Plan.

Under the "Fire" section in CWls comments, it was pointed out that Staff concluded that there wouldnot be a likelihood of an increase in fire due to the pipeline. I cannot see how that conclusion wasreached, and CW (as well as the Western Environmental Law Center did more thoroughly in theircomments) was correct in pointing out that Staff was discussing fire potential from the pipeline itself,rather than discussing the contribution ofthe pipeline corridor to the likelihood offaster and morecatastrophic spread of wildfire. Indeed, WELC points out that the pipeline corridor is perfect -­unfortunately perfect for spreading wildfire from ridge to ridge by increasing the probability ofwildfire, the intensity ofwildfire; and raising suppression costs to battle wildfires (as well asendangering the safety of some fire-fighting personnel). There were other fine points regarding ladderfuels and fine slash and fire danger relating to scattering some debris along pipeline corridor -- pointswhich I brought up also in earlier comments to the FERC.

Another fine point by CW was that there is no allowance for a corridor of greater than 50 feet underthe Coos County zoning code. I furthermore agree that areas referred to as "Uncleared Storage Areas"and "Temporary Extra Work Areas" need to be specified and give the time frame for how long theareas and material would be present on those sites. For instance, how many of the USAs and TEWAswould violate the 50 foot setback requirements from bodies ofwater, and such info needs to beprovided before any consideration of any action except rejection of the application for the PCOP?

It strains belief that PCOP is claiming that they are a "public utility project" and thus should haveenvironmental regulations relaxed so that, for instance, the requirement for maintaining 50 foot buffersof riparian vegetation does not apply. First, Coos County residents (and possibly no Oregon residents)

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will not be served by the PCGP. Second, the main company which would receive the natural gas is theprivate investor-owned utility Pacific Gas and Electric. Thus, I agree once more with CW that theconditional use permit should not allow for relaxing of environmental regulations due to thispreposterous claim that the PCGP is a "public utility project."

Another good point by CW (as well as by other commenters including NMFS) involves the woefullack of information in regards to hydrostatic testing of the PCGP. What water will be used from whatsources for what portions of the pipeline, and where will this water end up? What chemicals andheavy metals would get into the environment due to hydrostatic testing? Let us get site-specific anddiscuss likely locations for hydrostatic testing, and the likely impact on site-specific erosion and thussedimentation ofnearby watercourses, on various species, and on the spread ofnon-native speciesincluding the Port Orford Cedar root rot disease.

The National Marine Fisheries Service re-submitted some applicable comments during the recentcomment period regarding the proposed conditional use permit. NMFS points out in mid-2009 thatmany environmental concerns from their December 2008 submissions have not been addressed. Someof their key points were: A. the southern distinct population of the eulachon (Thaleichthys pacificus)was proposed for listing as a threatened species under the federal Endangered Species Act (74 FR10857) -- since this species occurs in both Coos Bay and the Pacific Ocean, will protections for thisspecies result in any shift in pipeline route or activities?; B. ifthe option of recovering Natural GasLiquids is to proceed, apparently it would be necessary to get a defunct rail line up and running again,yet such activity and related impacts are not discussed in the documents; C. it appears to NMFS thatthe earlier planned fish exclusion screens with fixed water delivery system to hulls of ships have beenessentially abandoned -- just because the Coast Guard pointed out some regulatory problems with thedesign does not mean that such screens should not proceed and be implemented; D. will the applicantever respond to the repeated call by NMFS to thoroughly assess all toxic chemicals which may befound in stormwater from Jordan Cove to be discharged into Coos Bay?; E. there continues to be alack of a complete mitigation plan for the damage which would occur to eelgrass, sub-tidal lands, andstream crossings due to the proposed PCGP -- when will such mitigation plans be developed, andshould not this information be thorough and turned in before any consideration of allowing theconditional use permit to allow construction of the PCGP? F. NMFS has some good points regardingthe fact that a mere 40 trees per acre is insufficient to produce a reasonable amount of large woodydebris to watercourses. Clearly, we do need as precise estimates as possible in regards to the likelynumber of snags and downed wood to be removed in the proposed project, which would help elucidatewhy the 40 trees an acre amount is definitely inadequate to have decent structure within streams tofacilitate reproduction of native salmonid species.

The Western Environmental Law Center and other commenters have pointed out that the FERCapproval of "certification of public convenience and necessity" is "on hold", and thus it seems clearthat agencies and companies related to the PCGP project do not (at least at this time) possess any landcondemnation authority, and thus it would be illegal to approve the conditional use permit applicationsince this is one of the elements in which the application is incomplete. WELC pointed outconvincingly that the distinctions involved with the Shrock Farms v. Linn County case have nothing todo with consideration of this application for construction, use, and maintenance of the PCGP.

A particularly good point raised by the FLOW group is in regards to the proposed HorizontalDirectional Drill to allow the pipeline to cross the Coos River. There is a serious concern with failureof such a crossing within this conservation management unit, and there can be serious toxic impactsfrom such a failure. Not only is the bentonite clay carcinogenic to humans, but its impact on fish andother species ofthe food chain need to be seriously considered before any' consideration of approval of

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the conditional use permit. This HDD drilling lubricant and sealant can cause serious problems aspointed out by FLOW's quoting ofthe Oregon Department ofFish and Wildlife in regards todeleterious impacts ofbentonite clay in failed HDD drillings. FLOW quotes the Application as sayingthat, "construction will use appropriate measures to minimize impacts; all impacts will be mitigated."This sounds like it was written by an attorney, rather than by biologists who understand the difficultyof mitigation particularly if there was a toxic release ofbentonite clay due to a failure of HDD drillingat the Coos River crossing. For instance, while there mayor may not be some sincerity in BritishPetroleum and the U.S. government trying to mitigate damage from the oil gush in the Gulf ofMexico,surely they must realize they should have had contingency plans to prevent such a leak, and they arelikely still pondering how to assist various species in various habitats. Murphy's Law is in effect inOregon, so we need mitigation plans and contingency plans up front, rather than relying on somecorporate lawyer's conclusion that of course appropriate measures will be taken and that all impactswill be mitigated.

FLOW notes that the Oregon Department of State Lands has indicated concern about impacts ofpipeline construction within Coos Bay a~ld related turbidity problems and impacts on species. NeitherNMFS nor Oregon state environmental agencies have determined that there are adequate mitigationmeasures in the applicant's plans for pipeline construction activities.

lody McCaffree made a fine point about the presumptuousness ofclaiming that the sizable PCGP isa "low-intensity utility" and then claim that all pipeline-related activities would abide by legalrequirements within zoning districts 11-NA and 13A-NA.

WELC has some well-ordered contentions that should be emphasized -- while providing good back­up evidence for these contentions. These are that 1. the conditional use permit application does notcomply with CCZLDO regarding landowner consent; 2. the proposed activities are not permitted inForest (F) zones CCZLDO 4.8.300; 3. the proposed activities are not permitted in Exclusive FarmUse (EFU) zones; 4. the surrounding uses to the proposed pipeline are too vaguely presented toqualify under Rural Residential zones related to CCZLDO 4.2.400 and 4.2.900(7); 5. there isinadequate evidence to garner a public utility exemption for riparian vegetation removal -- or that it isthe "minimum necessary" vegetation removal (relating to CCZLDO 4.4.400 and 4.5.180.

Several other quick points are that there needs to be a lot more information about "existingaquaculture" which would give a better idea how such operations could be impacted by pipelineconstruction/use/maintenance activities, that pipelines are NOT on the list of allowed uses in the CoosBay Estuary Management Plan, and that the PCGP proposal does not meet the legal criteria underZLDO Section 4.5.285 regarding management objectives for District 7-D.

Due to these important points and others raised in recent submissions to the Planning Department, Ijoin the call for the rejection of the conditional use permit application related to the Pacific COllilectorGas Pipeline for the coastal area portion of the route for this pipeline. Thank you for your attention tothese and other submitted concerns.

Sincerely yours,

Bruce Campbell

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Coos County Planning k.:partmentCoos County Courthouse Annex, Coquille, Oregon 97423

Mailing Address: 250 N. Baxter, Coos County Courthouse, Coquille, Oregon 97423Physical Address: 225 N. Adams, Coquille, Oregon

(541) 396-3121 Ext.210FAX (541) 756-8630 /TDD (800) 735-2900

planning@co.coos.or.usPatty Evemden, Planning Director

DATE:

TO:

FROM:

RE:

June 14, 2010

Board of Commissioners

Jill Rolfe, Administrative Planneri

File # HBCU-l0-0l Pacific Connector Pipeline

There was testimony that was mailed directly to the Hearings Officer so they did notget included in your original packet; therefore, please replace your cover sheet titled"Testimony Received between the dates of May 21, 2010 to June 10, 2010" andinclude items 24, 25 and 25a as attached to this memo.

Thank you and let us know if you have any questions.

627

Testimony Received between the dates of May 21,2010 to June 10, 2010, Page 1

, -, -, ,,' - " - " " , '

Date Writtenitem Testimony # of

# Received From Description/Title pages

typed testimony titled "Land Use Hearing (File # HBCU1 May 25,2010 Ron Sadler 10-01) Supplemental Testimony" 6

Comments on Pacific Connector Gas Pipeline (PCGP)Land Use Coastal Zone Coos County Permit

2 June 7, 2010 Cascadia Wildlands Application (File # HBCU-10-01) (typed) 8

John B. Jones, III and Julie Application # HBCU-1 0-01 Pacific Connector Gas3 June 8, 2010 Jones Pipeline (typed) 2

Philip John Keizer, Jr.,4 June 9, 2010 M.D. MS (no title) typed letter addressed to Andrew Stamp 2

Bay Area Chamber of5 June 9, 2010 Commerce HBCU-10-01 (typed letter on letter head) 2

Cover Letter titled Coos County Applications forFriends of Living Oregon Pacific Connector Gas Pipeline Project (with

6 June 9, 2010 Waters (FLOW) attachments as listed) 2State of Oregon Agency Comments on Draft

Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS). Dated6a FLOW December 2008 122

State of Oregon Agency Comments on Final6b FLOW Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS). June 2009 65

Comments of National marine Fisheries Service6c FLOW (NMFS) on FERC DEIS. December 2008 166d FLOW Comments of NMFS on FERC FEIS. June 2009 5

Comments on NMFS on Biological Assessment. June6e FLOW 2009 10

Documents related to recent massive failure ofWilliams pipeline in Appomattox, Virginia in

6f FLOW September 2008. 8

Mr. and Mrs. Timothy Application # HBCU-10-01 Pacific Connector Gas7 June 9, 2010 Pearce Pipeline (typed) 2

William and Maryann Pacific Connector Gas Pipeline Application # HBCU-8 June 9, 2010 Rohrer 10-01 (typed) 1

I 1

File N. HBCU-10-01 (typed)

E-mailed testimony titled PCGPJune 10 2010 - 'I Jeff & Christie Meacham IJune 10, 2010 I Paul (Mike) Washburn I9

10 ,~""C'

Cover Letter titled Coos County Application for Pacific11 June 10, 2010 FLOW Connector Gas Pipeline Project, HBCU-10-01 1

11a FLOW FLOW Coos Co. Comments June 9, 2010 11

11 b FLOW Excerpt, FERC Authorization PCGP December, 2009 4,12 June 10, 2010 Mark Whitlow Cover Letter 3

2002 coos County Decision (HBCU-02-04) approving12a Mark Whitlow County's application for a 12-inch natural gas pipeline 49

628

Testimony Received between the dates of May 21,2010 to June 10, 2010, Page 2

2009 Douglas County decision approving the 7.31 mile12b Mark Whitlow segment of the PCGP project in Douglas County 98

Summary of the legislative history of OAR 660-006-0025 regarding utility facilities allowed on forest-zoned

12c Mark Whitlow lands. 6Portion of a final decision of the Energy Facility SitingCouncil (EFSC) approving the COB Energy Facility in

12d Mark Whitlow Klamath County 24Copy of the relevant portion of the Natural Gas Act

12e Mark Whitlow ("NGA") 2Letter dated June 1,2010 from Derrick Welling P.E.,

responding to questions raised at the hearing12f Mark Whitlow regarding geotechnical issues 30

Letter dated June 3, 2010 from Jared Ellsworth P.E.,Project Engineer for Pacific Connector, responding to

groundwater quality, shallow wells and seeps12g Mark Whitlow potentially affected by the Pacific Connector Project 4

Letter dated June 4, 2010, from Randy Miller CEP,responding to environmental concerns in aquatic

12h Mark Whitlow areas 192Letter dated June 8,2010 from Rodney Gregory

addressing feasibility of acquiring necessary right-of-12i Mark Whitlow way for the pipeline. 1

Letter dated June 8, 2010 from Rodney Gregoryaddressing potential pipeline impacts to forest

practices, pipeline corridor fires hazards, and theavailability of homeowners insurance to proximate

12j Mark Whitlow residential owners. 5

Letter dated June 9, 2010, from Robert H. Ellis Ph.Dproviding a determination of project consistency with

12k Mark Whitlow the natural resource capabilities of Haynes Inlet 127Letter dated June 9, 2010 from Randy Miller CEP

identifying the state and federal environmental permitsrequired for the aquatic portions of the project and

their relationship with applicable CBEMP standards,and providing his professional opinion that it is feasible

for Pacific Connector to obtain the necessary state121 Mark Whitlow and federal permits 10

hand written testimony titled "My comments on13 June 10, 2010 Don Wisely proposed LNG pipeline" and news articles 2

Comments regarding Pacific Connector Pipeline landWestern Environmental use application HBCU-10-01 (Conditional Use

14 June 10, 2010 Law Center Approval for Pacific Connector natural gas pipeline) 39

Typed testimony titled "To the Attention of Hearings15 June 10,2010 Elizabeth C. Matteson Officer - Andrew Stamp" 2

1" ~-'''"''',-, ,,~_.- .'. _.- _. ---'.. -"'--.'-"~'-,,",,'-'.'''',''''-'''<'-~ ""'C_'_"""""'''''_'''''' __'' ,-r'-""', "",/-:,:',':',',',',"00"-"-.':, •.,,_:1'--' '-'- .. ... ' - -,--,-_._".,-~,.,~ •... '? ..., .'- -~.,._.•." .•._< ....._-.,...

June 10, 2010

June 10, 2010

June 10, 2010

Jake Robmson

Messerle & Sons

Typed testimony titled "HBCU-10-01"

Typed testimony titled "HBCU 10-1".. -",.,.O',.,-.-,-,." ,,_,.',__,-,,,.. ,. ··F····'

Typed testimony titled" HBCU-10-01 - PacificConnector Gas Pipeline Application)

629

Testimony Received between the dates of May 21,2010 to June 10,2010, Page 3

Typed testimony titled "Comments on Pacific19 June 10, 2010 Derrick Hindery, Ph.D. Connector Gas Pipeline 2

Typed testimony titled "Pacific Connector Conditional20 June 10, 2010 Harry & Holly Stamper Use Permit Application File # HBCU-10-01" 20

John & Mary Margaret21 June 10, 2010 Munchrath written testimony titled "To whom it may concern" 1

Confederated Tribes of Conditional User Permit for approval to allow a 49.7-Coos, Lower Umpqua and mile natural gas (LNG) terminal on the north spit of

22 June 10, 2010 Siuslaw Indians Coos Bav with the Douglas portion of the pipeline 3

Titled" Application #HBCU 10-01- Pacific Connector23 June 10,2010 Jody McCaffree Gas Pipeline 239

23a Jody McCaffree Exhibit Ai - map 123b - part 1 Jody McCaffree Exhibit A2 part 1 - map 123b - part 2 Jody McCaffree Exhibit A2 part 2 - map 1

24 June 14, 2010 Seymour Glasssman Dated May 22 addressed toAnd~ 2

Dated May 25 addressed to Andrew Stamp (titled)Coos County Planning Commission Hearing Pacific

25 June 14,2010 Dr. Robert Fischer Connector Pipeline 1attached Civil No. 03-1697-HO Lead Case Sierra

25a Dr. Robert Fischer Club, et al 13

630

RONSADLER

Planning DepartmentCoos County Courthouse250 N. BaxterCoquille, Oregon 97423

May 21, 2010

R'Er- r: n!f= D··n ~J.Jbt 'tv ",,= J

MAY 2 5 2010

COOS C~.\J;···;TV

Pll\~~t\ltN(~ D0:?;···.;:·~~(i /: £"_~\~T

POBox 411North Bend, Oregon 97459

ronsad@uci.net

LAND USE HEARING (FILE # HBCU-IO-Ol

SUPPLEMENTAL TESTIMONY

I have previously submitted written and oral testimony in this case.

During the Applicant's Rebuttal phase at the hearing on May 20, a matter came up that Ifeel warrants further discussion.

A participant at the hearing had offered oral testimony regarding his concern thatinstalling the pipeline across the floor ofthe bay might re-activate pollutants buried in thebottom sediments.

His concerns have merit.

Research has shown that Coos Bay contains a number of introduced contaminants,including several chlorinated hydrocarbons. Chlorinated hydrocarbons are extremelyworrisome in that, once introduced into an ecosystem, they are not broken down bynatural processes and persist in their original form almost indefInitely. While they are notmetabolized and inactivated, they can be removed from cycling through the food chainby, for example, becoming sequestered and buried in bottom sediments. SignifIcantdisturbances ofbottom sediments, such as by trenching and burying a new pipeline,release these contaminants to once again re-enter the food cycle where they essentiallyhave the effect of increasing the dosage to which living elements are exposed.

For a more comprehensive and documented discussion ofthese points, please see myprevious testimony in the Jordan Cove Marine Docking Berth land use hearing includedherewith as Enclosure #1.

Reacting to these concerns during the Rebuttal phase, the Applicant's stated they wouldbe sampling the sediments along the pipeline route across the bay. They stated that anunspecifIed standardized evaluation process would be used which apparently refers to the

631

protocol used by the Corps ofEngineers.

That is all well and good, but one thing is highly probable. The results of the testing willalmost certainly show some level ofcontaminants occurring at sub-lethal doses.

It is at this point that the logic of attempting to complete the land use approval process inthe absence ofa viable Environmental Impact Statement begins to disintegrate.

Let's assume, for the sake ofargument, the sediments show a few parts per billion (Ppb)each ofpolychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs).Apparently nothing to worry about, these are small amounts and any releasedcontaminants would be washed away with the next outgoing tide. Based on the recordcurrently before the Board ofCommissioners, the decision would no doubt be to go aheadand approve the pipeline installation as this small amount ofpersistent organic pollutantsrecycling through the food chain should not cause any apparent bad effects.

If a viable EIS were available, in the section entitled "Affected Environment" (missingentirely, by the way, from the Jordan Cove FEIS), we would find that juvenile Chinooksalmon currently swimming in the Coos Bay estuary carry 25 ppb ofPCBs and 300 ppbofPAHs in their bodies. We would learn that juvenile salmon and their preybioaccumulate chlorinated hydrocarbons whenever they become available in the foodchain with detrimental effects on their immune systems which results in increased diseasesusceptibility (Enclosure 1). In addition, at some level, genetic effects begin to appear.In addition, rather than being flushed away on the next tide, we would learn that particlessuspended in the water column in parts of Coos Bay can take as long as 48 days to beflushed from the estuary (Enclosure 1).

At this point, from a land use approval perspective, it would be apparent that a rubberstamp approval ofthe project would not be warranted, as the possibility exists theplanned project could move us closer to a threshold which could initiate irreversiblecatastrophic impacts on the bay ecosystem. However, the unknown probability ofthishappening would cause a reluctance to cancel the project out ofhand.

At this point, it would be logical to refer back to the EIS once again and turn to thesections on "Need for the project" (also missing from the Jordan Cove EIS) as well as thesection which gives a balanced and complete side-by side comparison ofthe proposedproject and all reasonable alternatives (yet again, missing from the Jordan Cove EIS).

The rationale of a logical land use decision could be developed as follows:

- If the need was dire and immediate, and iffew viable alternatives wereavailable, it would not be arbitrary or capricious to knowingly accept theenvironmental risks to the estuary and approve the pipeline in order to better servethe greater societal needs.

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- Ifthe need was speculative and future oriented, and if there were viablealternatives in place or readily available, it would not be worthwhile to risk thereal possibility but uncertain probability oftriggering catastrophic impacts to theestuarine ecosystem and the pipeline would not be approved.

ill my estimation, the interplay ofa valid and complete EIS within the County land useapproval process is absolutely essential in this case given the importance and possiblelong-term implications ofthe decision to be made.

I understand the legal constraints placed on the Hearing Officer by the existing Countyland use approval process. I also understand this to be a somewhat arcane processprobably inadequate to function adequately in today's managerial climate.

I find that the Oregon Progress Board essentially agrees with this premise: "The State'sexisting environmental data collection and management system must be improved toeffectively measure ecological conditions, trends or risks. Measuring ecologicalconditions, trends, and risks is fundamentally different from the problems Oregon'senvironmental programs were initially established to address. Resolving them willrequire new approaches....." (Oregon State ofthe Environment Report 2000, StatewideSummary, page 3).

I ask that you apply your best creative efforts to find a way to postpone the land useapproval decision until such time as it can be more fully and logically considered withinthe context ofa viable and objective Environmental Impact Statement. I believe theenvironmental risks involved fully justify your efforts in this area.

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Ron SadlerPO Box 411NorthBend,OR 97459

Email: ronsad@uci.netPhone: 541-759-4790

In the matter of: Coos County Land Use HearingJordan Cove Marine Docking Berth

September 17, 2007Coquille, Oregon

Testimony ofRon Sadler:

It is critical to remember, as was stated in a U.S. Department ofInterior report, that CoosBay is truly an ecosystem and one modification or activity could start a chain reactionwhich could affect the whole, resulting in severe damage to certain natural resources. 1

The displacement, handling, and disposition ofapproximately 6,000,000 cubic yards ofexcavated and dredged material from the bottom and shoreline ofthe bay is certainly anactivity that has great potential to do significant damage to marine life in the estuary,especially salmonid fish populations. This potential for damage is especially worrisomegiven what the sediments involved may contain.

Samples taken at various points in the Coos Bay estuary have shown concentrations oftoxic materials in bottom sediments exceeding levels at which ecological effects arenoted. These toxins include Tributyltin, arsenic, copper, lead, mercury, nickel, zinc,polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PARs), ,and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs).2

In addition, there are ongoing inputs ofmaterials that may contribute to the accumulationoftoxins in bottom sediments. In the year 2000, for example, there were inputs totaling2,470 pounds ofar$enic, chromium, zinc, copper, and mercury released in Coos County.3

Further, the Coos Bay estuary receives unknown amounts ofaliphatic organochlorines,chlorinated dibenzofurans, chlorinated phenols, and metabolites of each, as a by-productofthe release oftreated municipal wastewater. Looking further back in time, 40 yearsago there was a pulp mill located 011 the bay at Empire. Its outfall ofwastewatet enteredthe bay untreated via a pipe located in the middle ofthe shipping channel. The resultingoutflow resulted in a linear "dead zone" extending towards the mouth ofCoos Bay. Thetypes and amounts of toxins residing in the deep sediments at this location have not beeninvestigated to my knowledge.

The various chlorinated organic cornpounds mentioned above are known as POPs ­persistent organic pollutants. At the molecular level, they are extremely stable alld

'# ~, .la34

virtually indestructible by natural processes. In some instances, polymer chains may bebroken by natural processes, but may recombine to form new compounds (metabolites)even more toxic than the originals.

Most appropriate to this discussion, then, is the fact that toxic material such as metals,PCBs, PARs, etc. once released into the environment can remain unchanged forthousands ofyears. They are not biodegraded into more benign substances. Theycontinue to cycle through the ecosystem raising havoc until they become no longeravailable to the flora and fauna through the process ofsequestration.

In an estuarine ecosystem, the primary mechanism for sequestering toxins results in thembeing locked up by becoming buried in or attached to bottom sediments. There theyremain out ofreach ofmost organisms until some disturbance releases them to re~enter

the food chain once again.

This is not a perfect process, however, as evidenced by conditions as they exist in CoosBay today. Juvenile Chinook salmon in the Coos Bay estuary presently carry about 300ppb ofPAR metabolite concentrations in their bodies. They also carry about 25 ppb ofPCB concentrations. As testimony to the longevity ofthese types oftoxins, they alsocarry about 9 ppb ofDDT concentrations, a fu1130 years after its use was banned.4

It is well established that sediments in estuaries sequester and act as repositories forcontaminants. It has also been shown that juvenile salmon and their prey bioaccumulatechlorinated and aromatic hydrocarbons, when they become available in the food chain,with detrimental effects on their immune systems which results in increased diseasesusceptibility.5 Given current baseline loadings of toxins in juvenile salmon, how muchroom exists for additional inputs oftoxins before critical thresholds are crossed?

The dynamics oftidal flows in estuaries are often viewed in simplistic terms. It istempting to think of a cloud of murky water, with its associated toxins, created bydredging being carried out of sight and out ofmind by the next out-going tide. This isnot realistic, however. Studies have shown that a particle suspended in the water columnin parts of Coos Bay can take as long as 48 days to be flushed from the estuary.6

.

Given the serious and potentially catastrophic effects that could negatively impact thesalmonid productivity of the Coos Bay estuary, it appears premature and inappropriate toapprove the construction ofthe marine docking berth at this time.

Several key elements of information essential to an informed and rational decision appearto be missing at this time. A viable decision process would require the following:

1. An intensive sampling ofall areas proposed for dredging or excavation, to thefull depth ofplanned disturbance, to determine the types and concentrations ofall toxins expected in the spoils.

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2. A detailed and explicit disposal and/or storage plan for all dredged andexcavated material, with explicit requirements to prevent water or wind bornere-deposition in the estuary.

3. A risk assessment detailing an estimation of the net effects ofunavoidablereleases of sequestered toxins on salmonid productivity.

I ask that this information be gathered and analyzed before further action is taken on themarine docking berth proposal.

FOOTNOTES

1. USDI, "Natural Resources. Ecological Aspects. Uses and Guidelines for the Management ofCoosBay", L. B. Day, June, 1971, pg. 128.

2. NOAA, "Preliminary Natural Resource Survey. Coos Bay, December 12, 1997, pg. 11.3. EPA, "Toxic Release Inventory, Coos County. Oregon", 20004. Dr. Mary Arkoosh, National Marine Fisheries Service, Newport, Oregon, 2000.5. Dr. Mary Arkoosh, "Effect ofPollution on Fish Diseases: Potential Impacts on Salmonid Populations",

Journal ofAquatic Animal Health, Vol. 10, June 1998, pp. 182-190.6. Arneson, "Seasonal Variation in Tidal Dynamics. Water Quality and Sediments in the Coos Bay

Estuary", OSU Masters Thesis, June, 1976.

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ascadia WildlandsPO Box 10455 • Eugene, OR 97440 • 541.434.1463 (tel)· 541.434.6494 (fax) • info@cascwild.org

June 3,2010

Planning DepatimentCoos County Comihouse250 N. Baxter, Coquille, Oregon 97423

,lUi'! C (; ;

\'\ I

RE: Comments Orr Pacific Connector Gas Pipeline (pCGP) Land Use Coastal ZoneCoos County Permit Application (File# HBCU-10-01).

Coos County Planning Conifilission:

Please consider these comments from Cascadia Wildlands in yom' decision on theconditional use approval to allow a 49.7-mile natmal gas pipeline cOlmecting the JordanCove liquefied natural gas (LNG) temlinal on the north spit of Coos Bay with theDouglas County pOliion of the pipeline.

We ask the Planning Commission to deny the conditional use application due to itsadverse impacts on the environment and on local citizens, and the fact that the applicationis incomplete and does not meet the code criteria.

1. Northwest Forest Plan

TIns pipeline will violate the requirements of the Northwest Forest Plan on BLM lands,which will have a ilegative impact to federal ForestlY Operations on 27%1 ofthe forestedmiles of the pipeline. The BLM is the largest forest landowner in the Coos Countypipeline route where Forestly Operations must provide for adequate wildlife habitat,protect water quality and other ecosystem services.

The proposed use would "force a significant change in, or significantly increase the costof, accepted ... forest practices,,2. The NOlihwest Forest Plan is what determines theaccepted forest practices on BLM land, not Oregon's Forest Management Plan. The"management activitieS" that would be disrupted relative to federal uses are broader thanmanagement activities on the private lands the pipeline crosses. County approval of theexisting pipeliile right-of-way will force a significant change, and significantly increasethe cost of, accepted forest practices of the Northwest Forest Plan.

1 Staff Report pa~e 12 reports that out of S9,47 miles of Forest Land the pipeline crosses in CobS County,10.75 miles is on BLM~managed land.2 Criteria Section 4.8.400 A.

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The BLM management their land along the pipeline right-of-way under Northwest ForestPlan3 (NWFP) requires the BLM to survey for rare plant and animal species beforeground disturbing activities can begin. If surveyed species are found, they should beprotected. Known as Survey and Manage (S&M)4, surveys must be done in all forestsover 80 years of age. Since the BLM has not yet completed the surveys according to the2001 S&M regulations, the BLM and PCGP do not yet know what impacts the pipelinewould have as it crosses public lands.

On December 17,2009, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washingtonissued an Order in Conservation Northwest et at. v. Rey, et at., No. 08-1067 (W.D.Wash.) (Coughenour, J.), granting Plaintiffs' motion for pa11ial summary judgment andfmding a variety ofNEPA violations in the BLM and USFS 2007 Record ofDecisioneliminating the Survey and Manage mitigation measure. Previously, in 2006, the DistrictCourt (Judge Pechman) had invalidated the agencies' 2004 RODs eliminating Survey andManage. Following the District Court's 2006 ruling, parties to the litigation had enteredinto a stipulation exempting certain categories of activities from the Survey and Managestandard (hereinafter refened to as "Pechman Exemptions").

Judge Pechman's Order from October 11,2006 directs: "Defendants shall not authorize,allow, or permit to continue any logging or other ground-disturbing activities on projectsto which the 2004 ROD applied unless such activities are in compliance with the 2001ROD (as the 2001 ROD was amended or modified as ofMarch 21,2004), except that thisorder will not apply to:

(a) Thinning projects in stands younger than 80 years old;(b) Replacing or removing culverts for temporary roads;(c) Some types ofriparian and stream improvement projects; and(d) Some hazardous fuel treatments where prescribed fire is applied.

Lineal pipelines are not included in this exception. Following the Court's December 17,2009 rcling, the Pechman exemptions are still in place. Because the PCGP applicationentails regeneration harvest, logging in stands over 80 years old, extensive road buildingand trenching, the project does not meet any of the Pechman Exemptions.

Therefore, this project cannot proceed until Surveys are done on BLM lands inaccordance with the 2001 Survey and Manage ROD, and found species protected. TheFERC LNG referenced Survey and Manage using the now illegal 2003 Survey protocols,which did not require surveying for many of the species the 2001-ROD requires. Oncethe proper surveys are done for all required species, the final pipeline route could need tobe modified. It is pointless to grant the application now, not knowing what final routewill be taken.

3 The Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (FSEIS) on Management ofHabitat for Late­Successional and Old-Growth Related Species Within the Range of the Northern Spotted Owl (USDA andUSDI1994). Northwest Forest Plan. Page C-44 The 2001 Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (FSEIS) for Amendments to the Surveyand Manage, Protection Buffer, and other Mitigation Measures Standards and Guidelines in Forest Serviceand Bureau of Land Management Planning Documents Within the Range of the Northern Spotted Owl

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Another major change in BLM lands that should be considered by Coos County is thechange in the BLM's overall management plan. The application incorporates the FERCLNG Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) by reference. This FEIS basesenvironmental impacts on the Western Oregon Plan Revision (WOPR) land allocationson BLM lands (including BLM lands in the CZMA). The WOPR, a new managementplan adopted by BLM in December 2008, was withdrawn on July 16, 2009 by theDepartment ofInterior. Therefore the LNG FEIS needs to be supplemented with impactsto BLM lands managed under the 1995 Northwest Forest Plan before a final decision canbe made to allow the pipeline to be built. The FERC LNG FEIS is incomplete and cannotbe referenced in this application. When complete information is referenced, it will likelyresult in a change in the right-of-way.

Another step required by the BLM is an amendment of the BLM's 1995 ResourceManagement Plan to allow a pipeline that would otherwise illegally degrade endangeredspecies reserves and violates the Aquatic Conservation Strategy. The BLMhas not yetstarted this process, and when it does so, it could take another year to approve a finalpipeline route and determine mitigations for destroying salmon, spotted owl, and marbledmurrelet habitat. This would result in even more pipeline relocations.

Since the land can only be used as permitted5, all of these changes in the right-of-way

location will require the County to go through this permitting process again. Therefore, itis premature to grant the application based on the existing right-of-way. It makes nosense to approve an application before those plans and re-routes are finalized.

2. Safety

Before the commissioners grant this application, safety ofcounty residents who live nearthe 49.7 miles must be considered.

Rural areas have weaker pipeline safety standards that PCGP has to follow. Federalpipeline regulations define most people in Southern Oregon as in a "Class 1 locationarea" because home density is less than 10 homes within 660 feet, along a mile of thepipeline. This is also true through most ofthe 50 miles though Coos County. In Class 1locations, only a minimum of 10% ofthe welds are required to be inspected or tested,compared to non-rural areas where up to 100% ofthe welds are inspected by techniquessuch as X-ray. Also ofconcern in rural areas is that thinner pipes are permitted, andvirtually no internal inspections are required on the pipeline once it is in the ground.6

These and other weaker regulations for Class I areas mean safety is being compromisedby the PCGP just because Coos County is rural.

The PCGP pipeline will be installed and maintained by Williams Pipeline. On September14,2008, a Williams's natural gas 36" pipeline exploded in an urban neighborhood in

5 Criteria Section 3.3.3006 CFR Title 49, Part 192, Transportation of natural and other gas by pipeline: Minimum Federal SafetyStandards: <http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgiltitextttext-idx?c=ecfr&sid=b024b0040734d9320fdb3a1 c1 aeaf3e1&rgn=div5&view=text&node=49:3.1.1.1.3&idno=49#49:3.1.1.1.3.2.9.3>

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Texas. A huge explosion erupted into a fireball that demolished two homes and blisteredsiding on homes 400 yards away7. If it could happen in 2008 in Texas to a Williamspipeline, it could happen in Oregon.

The 49.7 miles in Coos County has the unique geological features of the rugged Coastalmountain ranges which has steep and unstable slopes, clay soils, rocky terrain, andearthquake potential. Safety-wise, constructing this pipeline throtlgh this area isquestionable at best, ifliot foolhardy.

The application failed to consider how many families along the 49.7 miles will be"boxed-in" by the pipeline, with no access or escape route except over the pipeline.Accidents happen, vandalism happens, leaks happen. For rurall'esidents that are trappedbehind afaulty pipeline, accidel1ts could be fatal, especially since the gas is unordorized.

The County should consider other impacts to HIraI families, slIch as their ability to buildnew structures near the pipeline, above or below ground, impacts to wells, pasul1'es, andfamily forest lands. Because ofweaker pipeli11e regulations in rural areas, the pipelinel;ight-of-way will violate criteria section 4.8.400 B.

3. Fire

The StaffReport found that the pipeline would not significantly increase fire hazard. Theapplicant and the staffonly considered the fire hazard from a potential release of gasfro111 the pipeline. They failed to consider how the pipeline corridor alone could influencethe spread ofwildland fire. A clearcut cOlTidor containing only dry, flammable brush,cOlIld spread a wildfire though Coos County forests at a speed greater than without theylearcut corridor, and thus disrupt Forestry Operations on all land ownerships within theCoos County pipeline corridor. .

This application will "significantly increase fire hazard or significantly increase firesuppression costs".8 The pipeline clearcut right-of-way could. act like a wick and spreadwildland fire fmiher along the right-of-way path from its source; ang thm; to the adjoiningforests, faster than if the right-of-way did not exist. This increased fire risk is a safetyissue to local residents, and a potential increase in fire-suppression cost.

There is an abundance of science that backs tlp this claim. For instance, the WEEP reportfor the 2002 Tiller fire, (near the pipeline route in the South Umpqua watershed)detelmined that "The YOl111g vegetation, including plantations, experienced adisproportionately high amount of stand.,replacement mortality caused by crown fires ascompared to older, unmanaged forests ... Plantations had a tendency to Increase the rateof fire spread and increase the overall area ofstand-replacement fIre effects by spreadingto neighboring stands.,,9 The pel}1etually young vegetation of the pipeline right-of-way,

7 www.newsadvance.com/lna/news/locallarticle/some appomattox residents return home after explosion/839218 Criteria Section 4.8.400 B.9 Wildfire Effects Evaluation Project. UNF. March 2003 Page 4.

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similar to a plantation, will also increase the rate of fire spread, this time following theyoung vegetation, bringing fire along the pipeline route and into adjoining forests.

Numerous scientific studies have documented that tree plantations or young vegetation,because they lack the resistant prowerties of native forests, have a tendency to bum hotterin forest fires and spread quicker.1 The vegetation and young trees in the pifeline right­of-way is dense, packed close together, making them more inclined to bum.1 Theincreased susceptibility offorest openings, such as the pipeline route, to severe fire is alsodue to the fact that they have warmer, windier and drier conditions than natural forests. 12In a study of fire severity in northwest California, researchers found that tree plantationsof any age were "more receptive to combustion" than other forests. The study found:

...tree plantations had twice the burn severity ofclosed-canopy forests. Fire severitytended to increase with plantation age... Plantations ofany age are more receptive tocombustion than co-occurring forests in our study area. Because plantations are oftenestablished following high-severity fire, a self-reinforcing relationship is possible. Anecological analog may exist where exotic species invade and become abundantthrough positive feedback with fire. Plantations in or study area have grown to coverabout one-third of the roaded area burn in 1987, increasing the likelihood of futurepositive feedback effects. In concert with climate change, these landscape dynamicsprovide reason to expect the trend of increasing fire size to cOIitinue, especially inroaded areas. 13

Plantations have similar properties to the pipeline conidor - dry, sunny, dense vegetation.The study "found high fire severity in plantations" and "found that plantations andadjacent vegetation burned more severely than natural forests.,,14 While PacificConnector might remove the vegetation within the right-of-way occasionally, it will bethere more often then it won't be there.

Another reason the pipeline route can act as a wick, spreading wildland fire quickly, isthat vegetation removal will leave behind tons offme fuels, exasperating the fire danger.All ofthis violates criteria section 4.8.400 B.

4. Right-of-Way exceeds 50-feet.

Right ofways over 50 feet are not allowed under county zoning codel5• The code makes

no distinction between temporary and permanent right-of-ways. PCGP will require at

10 For instance: DellaSala, D.A., D.M. Olson, S.E. Barth, S.L. Crane and SA Primm. 1995. Forest health:moving beyond rhetoric to restore healthy landscapes in the inland northwest. Wildlife Society Bultetin 23(3):346-356. Ingalsbee,T. 1997. Fires burn hotter in tree farms. Headwaters Forest News 7(2):10-1111 Frost. E.J. and R. Sweeny. 2000. Fire Regimes, Fire History and Forest Conditions in the Klamath­Siskiyou Region: An Overview and Synthesis of Knowledge. Available at:<http://www.worldwildlife.org/forests/attachmentslfireJeport.pdf. . .12 Countryman, C.M. 1955. Old-growth conversion also converts fire climate. Fire Control Notes 17(4):15-19.13 Odion, Frost, Strittholt, Jiang, DellaSala, Moritz. Conservation Biology Vol. 18, No.4, Aug. 2004. Patternsof Fire Severity and Forest Conditions in the Western Klamath Mountains, Ca. Pg. 933-93414 OCUon, Frost, Strittholt, Jiang, DellaSala and Moritz. Conservation Biology Vol. 18, No.4, Aug. 2004.Patterns of Fire Severity and Forest Conditions in the Western Klamath Mountains, California. Pg. 93515 Criteria Section 4.8.300(F)

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least a 95-foot right-of-way to build the pipeline. Potentially a 300' right-of-way (100' oneither side of the 95-foot right-of-way) is needed in certain areas.

95-feet is needed to give access to heavy equipment digging the pipeline trench, and later,this width will again be needed when repairing the pipeline. A 95-feet wide clearcut willbe needed through all forested areas, and re-clearcut in the event a repair is needed thatinvolves digging up the pipe (which is fairly common). The applicant never admitted thatthe 50-foot limit would be almost doubled.

In areas that are very steep, or where the pipeline will turn, a 150'-wide clearcut would berequired, interfering with significant forestry operations for decades, or centuries,depending on the purpose of the forestry operations. In some areas, "Temporary ExtraWork Areas" (TEWAs), sometimes acres wide, would need to be taken from thelandowner and clearcut. In other areas, strips up to 100' wide on either side of the 95'wide clearcut would need to be taken from the landowner so that slash, rocks, and otherdebris from digging the pipeline trench could be permanently stored, called "UnclearedStorage Areas". While the application implies that Uncleared Storage Areas are"temporary", in fact, right-of-way debris like tree stumps and boulders will be storedthere permanently, permanently rendering the land unusable for other purposes, likeforestry operations.

These right-of-ways in excess of 50' are needed by PCGP to install, maintain and repairthe pipeline for the life of the pipeline, and could be taken by eminent domain ifthelandowner does not agree. Years from now, if a part ofthe pipeline needs repairing,PCGP can again ''take'' a 95' or 150' wide strip ofland and rip up any trees planted orother so-called mitigations outside of the 50' wide right-of-way. The criteria requires a50' wide right-of-way limit16

• This application requires far more and thus is not allowedunder the current zoning code provisions.

PCGP admits that the right-of-way outside ofthe 50' width is a significant long-term"take" ofpeople's lands and forest conditions. Although forested areas located outside ofthe permanent maintenance corridor, which were cleared during construction, would berevegetated and allowed to regenerate to their original state, it would take multipledecades for these areas to reestablish to pre-construction conditions; therefore, impacts inthese areas are considered 10ng-termP

5. Application is inadequate in other ways

The application failed to give the acres of"Temporary Extra Work Areas" (TEWAs) ineach land-type. The Planning Commission should know how many extra forested acresneed to be clearcut and how many extra grazing land acres need to be disturbed forTEWAs. The application states TEWA's will be "reclaimed", but it could be decadesbefore the soil compaction and other disturbances are restored.

15 Criteria Section 4.8.300(F)17 LNG EIS 4.4-37

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The application discloses that TEWAs will more likely be placed on very steep sideslopes in forested locations. This increases the likelihoodoflandslides from the pipelineclearcut corridor, as clearcut slopes have twice the probability ofmanagement-causedlandslides. IS

Likewise, the number ofUncleared Storage Area (UCSA) acres have not been disclosedin the application. UCSAs are not cleared ofoverstory trees, but they are cleared ofunderstory trees and brush, have soils compaction because of heavy equipment use, andalso can take decades to recover brush and soil cQnditions. UCSAs might never fullyrecover because the forest debris stored there will remain there permanently, such aslarge stumps and boulders.

For TEWA's, FERC has given an exemption for the 50' set-back for almost allwaterbodies on the pipeline19

• FERC also gives an exemption in the EIS so that everyUncleared Storage Area (UCSA) can violate the 50' setback requirement. The CoosCountY application fails to disclose how many of the TEWAs and UCSAs will violate the50' setback for waterbodies.

Mitigations offered are also inadequate. The application claims that only 30 feet centeredover the pipeline will be maintained as a cleared corridor through forested areas. Theremaining 20 feet of the permanent right-of-way as well as the disturbed temporaryconstruction easement will be reforested. What the application doesn't say is that anytimethere is a pipeline problem, all the mitigation is ripped up, the replanted trees are cutdown, the sediment barrier are taken up, and the so-called "temporary constructioneasement" is used again. As happened recently on the Medford lateral, a small subsidenceor underground landslide, caused many feet of that pipeline to be uncovered. Any of the49.7 miles ofpipeline through Coos County could also be uncovered at any time in thefuture, over and over again. All trees and sediment barriers and other mitigations will beremoved, impacting streams, fmm land and forest land.

The application failed to fully describe the pipeline hydrostatic testing procedures andimpacts. The company will use millions ofgallons ofwater to pressure test the pipeline,and then discharge the water into a sub-watershed different from where it was collected.This has the potential to spread disease, kill fish, and cause soil and stream-bank erosion.The application failed to describe a safe, plentiful source ofwater for hydrostatic testing,or a safe way to discharge the millions of gallons ofwater to prevent soil erosion andspreading ofdisease. This is especially important to consider in this area ofPort OrfordCedar root rot, which spreads in water and mud transferred from an infected watershed toan uninfected watershed.

PCGP claims this is a "public utility project", and as such enjoys relaxation ofenvironmental protections, such as the 50-foot riparian vegetation protection.

This is not a public utility project. No gas generated in Coos County will be exported. No

16 Oregon Department of Forestry. 199819 FERC LNG DEIS 4.3-38

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gas imported from overseas is to be delivered to the public in Coos County, thqs CoosCounty will receive no economic or service benefit from reducing environmentalprotections in the riparian zone. Instead, Coos County residents will just receiveenvironmental problems, such as lower fish populations that have economically sustainedthe county, with no public benefit. In fact, Coos County residents are giving up theirenviron.mental protections and their land for the benefit ofRussian 01' other Foreign gascompanies. None of the county residents ate expOlting their own products. Thecouditional use permit should not waive the 50-foot riparian vegetation set backrequiremeneo 01' other waivers allowed a "public utility project".

The goal of the American people is to reduce or eliminate our dependence on foreignimports of fossil fuels. LNG is counter to this goal, bringing gas in from places likeRussia. Therefore, ifthe United States meets our goal to eliminate our dependence forenergy from foreign governments, this pipeline will be useless.

The application claims that the gas supplied by this pipeline is "necessalY for publicse1'vice,,21. We disagree. This does not comply With Criteria defi.nition ofnecessalY forpublic service. There is hot a need fo1' LNG in Oregon. In reality, there is far lessdomestic demand for LNG than PCGP discloses in their application. For instance, theapplication failed take into a.ccount the Ruby pipeline a 42-inch natui'al gas transmissionpipeline beginning at the Opal Hub in Wyoming and terminating at Malin, Oregon, thesame location as the PCGP pipeline. Ruby is designed to serve Northern California also,with an initial capacity ofbetween 1,300 and 1,500 :MMcf/d22, Once the Ruby pipeline isbuilt, bringing prolific supplies ofdomestic natural gas to the California market, we haveno need to increase our energy dependence on foreign governments, making this PCGEpipeline applicati.on unneceSSalY.

In conclusion, Cascadia Wildlands 1'equest paliy standing in the proceedings, for thereasons stated above. The pipeline's route through Coos County impairs our mission toprotect and restore the watersheds of the Coquille river basins and to reduce globalwarming impacts on our climate.

Francis Eatherington

Cascadia WildlandsP.O. Box 10455Eugene, OR 97440

frallcis@cascwild.org 541~643-1309Please send responses to Our field office at:886 Raven Lane, Roseburg, OR 97471

20 Criteria Section 4.8.750 1121 Criteria Section 2.1.200. Utilities22 Nqrthwest Gas Association 2008 Outlook, http://www,nwg13.org/pub-,docs/gasoutiook08.pdf, p. 25.

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John B Jones, III and Julie Jones89056 Whiskey Run Lane

Bandon, OR 97411541.;.347-2528

jules2030@verizon.net

Coos County Planning Dept.250 N. BaxterCoquille, OR 97423

Re: Application # HBCU-10-01Pacific Connector Gas Pipeline

Dear Mr. Andrew Stamp and Coos County Planning Dept:

fUN r' 201[)

June 7,2010

We are writing out of concern with the proposal by Pacific Connector GasPipeline to cross 383 water bodies in Coos County per the Pacific Connector'sClean Water Permit Application that was submitted to the Army Corps in May of2009. Now, the Final EIS on page 4.5-84 states The Pacific Connector pipelinewould cross and affect 249 water bodies. There appears to be a significantdifference in the number of water body impacts here. Which is it? And why thechange, since the route has not changed?

We were wondering how the LNG tankers could possibly enter into and out ofCoos Bay with all the special security exclusion zones around LNG tankers andnot have any adverse impacts to the current ships using the harbor for theshipment of wood chips and logs. This would adversely affect an already viablebusiness and commerce for the harbor. There already exists a 1,500 footexclusion zone on either side of LNG tankers th~t coulq extend two miles in frontof LNG tankers and one mile behind that would also threaten our commercialchip andlQgging ships that enter here and devastate the local fishermen. Therewould too many restrictions on the mouth of the port for access for fishermen,tourists, sailing vessels and recreation in the bay.

These LNG pipes that would cross forest zoned lands, private family farms, CoosBay Wagon Road Grant Lands (whose timber sales go into the County Fund),estuary, Watershed, natural habitats for marine and wildlife, and oyster bed farmsare too significant of major impacts. There is a large variety of threatened andendangered species that call home to Coos Bay. This pipeline would degrade thecritical habitats and streams for salmon and numerous other species by the footprint of the pipes below the water and on land causing potential land slides andsediment run off into the water bodies.

1

645

Re: Pacific Connector Gas Pipeline Application# HBCU-10-01

What about releases of LNG? Just think of the fire hazard. The hazard zone forthis pipeline is approximately 900 feet in circumference from the center of thepipe. This would take into account 1,800 feet across. These impacts areimmense. A fire could devastate our forests, family farms and spread so quicklygiven the dry season and remote locations of some the LNG pipe areas. Look atthe mess we have in the Gulf of Mexico. Accidents happen. Releases of LNGinto our Bay, rivers, creeks, streams, forests and estuaries would devastate thebiological ecosystem that nurseries 1,OOO's or more of critical fish and animalhabitat. The devastation to Clausen Oyster Farm submerged tide flats couldpotentially put the family out of business. The unknowns are too many and LNG'shigh ignition potential being so volatile is much too risky for our area.

Why would we want an LNG terminal in our port and a gas pipeline to serve onlythose in California? There are no benefits to the residents of Oregon. The longterm impacts are too over powering and far too great for this small county toabsorb. Please deny Jordan Cove Terminal and the pipeline application. We lookfOlWard to hearing from you.

Cc: Andrew H. Stamp, Atty at Law4248 Galewood StreetSuite 16Lake Oswego, OR 97035

2

646

Philip John Keizer, Jr., MD, MS2300 N.14th StreetCoos Bay, OR 97420

Andrew StampCoos County Planning Department250 Baxter StCoquille, OR97423

June 8, 2010

Dear Mr. Stamp:

JUN 0 D 2010

As you suggested during the May 10th hearing, I have reviewed the informationsubmitted by the applicant just prior to the hearing and I do not find a comprehensiveEmergency Response Plan (ERP). Paragraph 68 on page 84 ofDocket No. CP07-441-000,et al. states the ERP shall be filed with the Secretary for review and written approval bythe Director ofOEP prior to initial site preparation. I assume this to mean the ERP hasnot yet been drafted. The ERP is a vital component and should not be put offuntil thelast moment and then pushed through in haste. A case in point is the Shoreham NuclearPower Plant built on Long Island, NY. The plant was nearly completed when it wasdetermined the ERP was inadequate. This resulted in significant delays to the project andeventual conversion ofthe plant to fossil fuel instead of nuclear fuel at great expense tothe local rate payers. We can avoid a similar travesty by planning ahead. The ERP shouldbe finalized before Coos County gives any permission or permits to proceed with theproject.

Also listed are minimum requirements ofthe ERP. While these requirements are goodthings to consider, they fall short ofa complete list of minimum requirements. Theseappear to be more directed to the ships and the terminal than the pipeline. I do feel thatthe pipeline, terminal and vessels are mutually dependent upon each other. Like

I

conjoined twins sharing a vital organ, none' would survive without the others. Therefore,a comprehensive ERP would include all three.

The ERP should outline a clear chain ofcommand in order to avoid confusion betweenvarious local, county, state and federal agencies. Coordination should be made with localham radio operators. Clear escape routes need to be established for evacuation ofthepublic. This is ofgreat concern for people living and working near the pipeline whichcould easily cut off exit routes in the rural areas. The pipeline should also be directedaround the rural residential areas to avoid this specific problem. Analysis needs to bemade on effects ofweather and different scenarios need to be considered for variousPasquill categories. Emergency drills should be planned annually. These should includeall groups, not just the pipeline and terminal staff.

647

Multiple system failures need to be considered. For example, what if the pipe breaks atone of the control valves. What if the remote safety valve control system fails. What ifthe monitoring system fails, etc.

During the hearing, you asked me what I thought a worst case scenario would be. I havenow had more time to think about it. There are likely several different scenarios whichcould be consideredj and for emergency planning and drills, different scenarios should beplayed out. While these are unlikely events, they are still possible and it is prudent toprepare for the worst so as to be best able to handle any actual emergency situation.Having thought out and planned for a low probability, high consequence event leaves usbetter prepared for a higher probability and lower consequence event. And, ifthe worsthappens, we have a plan.

As for the LNG portion, the original analysis was assuming 12,500 m3• I believe FERC used23,000 m3. The proposed volume is 148,000 m3. A leak from the terminal was assumed tobe limited to 10 minutes at full preSSUl'e. Any analysis is only as good as the assumptionsmade. It only stands to reason that ifthe full volume of LNG was to be lost and theappropriate weather conditions existed, a far worse disaster would be upon us and theproposed safety zones would be too narrow.

One possible worst case type scenario would be an earthquake causing multiple pipelinefailures, breach and loss ofthe full volume ofLNG in the terminal and an approachingLNG vessel. The earthquake could also disrupt communications. Bridges could be outprohibiting traffic along highway 101 both north and south. A bridge failUl'e or pipelinesecondary fire could close highway 42. Multiple secondary fires would start in bothresidential areas as well as in the forests. Fires from the terminal and vessel could disablethe airport, Coast Guard Air Station and the North Bend Fire Department. Residentialfires could trap physicians, nurses, EMTs, and other emergency responders. Fires couldtrap students at North Bend High, North Bend Middle and Sunset Middle Schools. Thisis just one possible scenario and other equally bad or perhaps worse could be considered.

My purpose today is not to compose a complete ERP and worst case scenarios, but ratherto point out this has not yet been done. Therefore, I urge you to rule against this projectbased upon inadequate emergency planning and to require a comprehensive ERP beforereconsidering the application. The applicant has demonstrated a past practice ofsubmitting voluminous material just before deadlines. This impedes the public reviewprocess. Therefore, I further suggest public notification ofthe ERP completion and apublic comment hearing after reasonable time for the public to review the document. Weare, after all, the people living with or perishing from this project.

Sincerely,

Philip John Keizer, Jr., MD, MS

648

June 9,2010

Patty Evernden, Planning DirectorCoos County Planning DepartmentCoos County Annex201 N. AdamsCoquille, OR 97423

RE: HBCU-l0-0l

Ms. Evernden:

PI

JlJN n~) 2U1U

The Bay Area Chamber of Commerce supports the conditional use request byPacific Connector Gas Pipeline to allow a 49.7 mile natural gas pipeline connectingthe Jordan Cove LNG terminal on the North Spit of Coos Bay with the DouglasCounty portion of the pipeline. The Chamber endorses the pipeline route of theapplicant which considers the social, environmental and economic impacts it willhave, while treating landowners fairly and with respect.

We find the Coos County Planning Department staff report on HBCU-l0-0l waswell written, with a good analysis and proposed conditions which adequatelyaddress the public good. We support the conditions as specified within that .report and urge the approval of the requested coniditional use permit.

Coos Bay is Oregon's largest costal deep-draft harbor and its economic value tocommerce in Southern Oregon is currently underutilized. With the demise of ournatural resource based economy, over the last 30 years, our county consistentlyranks among the highest in the state for unemployment. This $1 billioninvestment in our area will directly benefit the entire sbuthern Oregon region.The additional $19 million in property taxes will help provide needed servicesacross the county.

145 Central Avenue • Coos Bay, Oregon 97420(541) 266-0868 • Fax: (541) 267-6704

www.oregonsbayarea.org 649

The Bay Area Chamber of Commerce is a non.:.profit; professional businessorganization made up of the Coos Bay, North Bend, and Charleston communities.The Chamber works for a healthy economic climate of good jobs, capitol creationand efficient government. The Chamber's strength lies in the number anddiversity of its membership. With over 650 members strong representing everyaspect of this area's economy, we use their vast collective experiences and energyto make a positive difference in our community.

Thank you for this opportunity to participate in this process for this importantpermit.

Lucinda DiNovoPresidentBay Area Chamber of Commerce

650

Friends of Living Oregon Waters (FLOW)P.O. Box 2478 Grants Pass, OR 97528

(503) 890-2441

Coos County Planning Department250 N. BaxterCoquille, OR 97423

HECE!\IEDJUN () 9 2Ulu

"'> • coos COUNTYH..f-\I'JNING DEPi\RTMENT

Re: Coos County Applications for Pacific Connector Gas Pipeline Project

(Submitted via email and mail)

Dear Coos County Planning Department and Hearings Officer:

We submit these attachments in support of previous comments on behalf of

Friends of Living Oregon Waters (FLOW), which has members who live, work, and

recreate in the vicinity of the Jordan Cove LNG terminal and Pacific Connector Gas

Pipeline.

Several of these documents were referenced in written comments submitted on

May 20,2010. Additionally, the Hearing's Officer requested that the comments

submitted by the State of Oregon regarding the project be provided in full. We have also

provided comments of the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) regarding the

project.

Documents included in this submittal:

1. State of Oregon Agency Comments on Draft Environmental Impact Statement

(DElS). December 2008.

2. State of Oregon Agency Comments on Final Environmental Impact Statement

(FElS). June 2009.

3. Comments of National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) on FERC DElS.

December 2008.

4. Comments ofNMFS on FERC FElS. June 2009.

5. Comments ofNMFS on Biological Assessment. June 2009.

6. Documents related to recent massive failure of Williams pipeline in Appomattox,

Virginia in September 2008. (Print one original with color photos).

1

651

Additionally, FLOW and other community members and organizations plan to file

additional comments before Thursday, June 10.

Sincerely,

Monica Vaughan,

FLOW

P.O. Box 2478

Grants Pass, OR 97528

2

652

THEODORE R. KULONGOSKI

GOVERNOR

Decep1ber 4; 2008

Ms. Ki_~~lher1y D. ]3~$e, SecretaryFederal Ellergy Regu.latory Commission888 First Sf. NE, fun lAWashington DC 20426

Re: Q01tlmellts oftlle State ofOregollDraft Environmental Impact StatementJoi'dan Cove Energy Project, LP Docket No. CP07-444Pacific Connector Gas Pipeline, LP Docket Nos. CP07-441, CP07-442 aild CP07-443

Pe~w Secretary Bose:

At my direction, State ofOregon natural resource agencies have been engaged in arc'"iew ofthe proposed Jordan Cove Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) import terminal and theaSsociated Pacific COlmector Ijipelille. Oregon's comments on the braft Envirolinlental ImpactStatement for these projects are attached. My primary motivation fol' a detailed stilte review ofthis document was to ensure that state standards Md concerns are addressed by the developer andthe Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

As Gove1'1lor ofthe State ofOregoll, I believe that locilting an LNG import terminal inOregon 1)1U8t be supported by a comprehensive review oran potentialiinpacts ofthe facility intIle State. That is the function ofthe Jordan Covetpacific Connector DEIS. In this regard, Iconclude that the Jordan CovelPacific Connector DEIS is incomplete and fla\ved in a number ofrespects, as more fully explained below and in the attached comments. '

Qregol1 has al). effeCtIve systeni for siting latge ~netgy facilities that balances the n~ed fol'JWW (;u~rgy reSOl.lfCeS effectively with environmental protectional1d adequate safety standards.That siting process involves all interested Oregon natural resourceagellcies in the review of anyfacility. As a result of Oregon's unified siting process, state natural resource agencies haveattained a high level ofexpeltise tn evaluating applications 811d contdbuting not only to theanalysis Ofthe enviromnental hnpacts but also to the design arid adoption of appl'opi'iatemitigation meilsures. Even though Oregon's energy facility siting process for LNG tennfnals iscurrently preempted by the Energy Policy Act of 2005, as result of this experience and expeliise,Oregon is uniquely situated to provide comments on this proposed facility.

STATE CAPITOL,SALf:M 97301-4047 (503) 378-3111 FAX (503) 378-4863 ny (503) 378-4859

\YIWW. GOVERNOR, STATE. OR. US

653

Ms. Kimberly D. Bose, Secretarypecetnber 4, 2008Page Two

The State retains permitting atlthoi"ity dV<:<l' LNG tei"minals in the areas ofwater qUality,a:ir quality, coastal zone management and in cases wlwre sff.ite approval is needed for .construction of tenninals or appUlienunt stmctures on state lands. In many instances the DEIS isthe best evidence abolll the applleant's plans for compliance with these federally delegatedprogl:ml1s-. In their CoiUlllents, the QregOll agencies iilVolved have identified deficiencies thatpresent hut'dles to the ultiinate approval of the project by those Mencies.

As the specific commetlts will reflect, many conclusions in the DEIS are founded OIl

assertion.s and unenforceable promises, hot on sound science, compteh~ilsive analysis a1id~itipideal facts. The Commissioil should bot 111ake a decision t6 Iicens<:< tIllS- LNG tenninal 011t1}einadequate envirolUnental teeOl'd cUlTel1tIy befote the COmlnissio:n.

It is well-established that the final HIS, as the foundatiQn for the licensingdecision byFERCt hiust be cOlliplete. Thus, anyillitigation plan or other clOC1l1Ueilt that Will be l'eIied on byFERC to detennine that the facility meets liceilsing cliteda must be included in the DEIS atl-d¢Irculated for mel3.ilingful review before adoption of the final EIS. Furthennore, such plans anddocuments must be referenced in liCense conditions in the final decision. The State ofOregonhas asked twice for an extension of the puplic comment period to allow the applicants to submiteOlliplete i11f01111atioll and the mitigation plans called for in the DElS. FERC has chosen not toptovide that n1inimum level ofpublic review. The only remedy will be a suppleniental DElS.

As flU c:xal11ple oIthe fna~eqtHiCYbfthe OEis to support aae¢isioh, lal'ge PQrtjQilsofthemit1@tiOll for habitat, wetlands, archeological impact, landslide protection and emergencyplalllung are still unknown. Indeed, many suppOliing documents for the decision will bePi'oduced after the oppOtiullity for C01mnent on the DEIS has closed. This is a fundamentalptocess flaW. 11'etom11lend delaying the Final Envir01Ulleiltal Impact Statet11i:~lit (FEIS) until thetettninal desigt.l a11d pipeline 1'oute are finalized, mitigation pteUl$ with i1)ctrics are written, andem~rgency l'esponse protocols (Jan pe defined; and afteL' illtere~ted paliies have had allopportunity to comment of the efficacy of those plans. I fuliher reconunend that when the FEISis pi'esElllted, it clearly pi'esent the i'equired inf011llation used to develop and alticulate measurablepi"oject specific conditions that demonstrate how the facility would meet Oregon's statidards.FERC l.11ust ptovide adequate assurance that the facility will be constructed, operated,maintained, and decommissioned aSl'equircd by Oregon's Energy Facility Siting standards.

Liquefied Natul'al Gas ternlitlals also introduce a range ofrelatecl issues assoCiated withilatural gas pipelines that cany LNG from tenninals to serviCe ateas, sometimes at gt:eatdl$fallces. The sodal and envirQllmelltal impacts ofthese pipelines are of as tm;tch concem to theState a~ the terminals themselves. Accordingly, sJate agencies have also identified and evaluatedthe environmental and social impacts of these pipelines through federal and state permittingprocesses. Further, because pipeline companies who obtain a FERC license have the power of

654

Ms. Kimberly D. Bose, SecretaryDecember 4, 2008Page Three

eminent domain, I have insisted that that power be used carefully and with the utmost respect forproperty rights. That includes fair compensation and full mitigation of impacts to propeliyowners, as well as recognition ofneed to be responsive to citizens concems and public requestsfor information and maps of these pipeline projects. I have communicated these expectations topipeline project sponsors and will continue to monitor progress in this mattei',

Jordan Cove and Pacific Connector have provided evidence that the proposed project willoffer substantial economic benefits to the local community, including:

• Ellhancedcapacity for Coos Bay ~oml11erce (!lew bar pilots, new tugs);• Increased tax revenues for Coos, Douglas, Jackson, alld Klamath Counties;• Terminal constructions jobs (average monthly workforce of430, peak of 929);• Pipeline construction jobs (peak workforce of 1,844 with average 3 to 8 month job)• Operational jobs (39 permanent local hires for the teoninal, 5 for the pipeline)

Those ccon01nic benefits iuust be balatlced ,vith the environmental impacts of the facilityarld pipeIil1e.

I highlight the following major concerns regarding the DEnS, which ate addressed innl0re detail in the accompanying comments.

a. The need for the facility has not been establisIled and the alternative analysis isinadequate. The DEIS does not adequately ailalyze market data and natural gas supply trends tosupport the claim by the developers that additional supplies of LNG are needed in the PacificNorthwest. Nor does the DElS contain a comprehensive alternatives analysis that takes a hardlook at othCl' alte111atives include no action, energy conservation, expansion ofexistinginfi'astructure, and potential new sources of natural gas. The DEIS fails to adequately address anychange in the need for the project, given that FERC has already conditionally approved an ii11pOrtte11ninal in Oregon at Bradwood Landing,

b. tl~e bEls ll~eds to demonstrate that the proposed locatiou oCthe tel'Illinal complieswith Federal Aviation Administration requirements. The proposed tenninal and LNGstotage tanks appear to be located within, or very close to, a horizontal distance ofone mile fi'OlUthe ends ofthe Soutlnvest Oregon Regional Airport runways, contrary to 49 CFR 193.2155(b).Most ofthe altemative locations proposed in the DEIS are well within that distance. There is nodiscussion in the DEIS ofheight requirements in the vicinity of the airport either. I am veryconcemed about the safety of the citizens of North Bend and Coos Bay, given the terminals'close proximity to an airpOli. Through a Connect Oregon II grant, Oregon has made aninvestment in the Coos County Airpolt District of $624,000 for the construction of the first airtraffic control tower at the Southwest Oregon Regional Airport. This investment will create

655

Ms. Kil1lberly D. Bose, Secl'etaryDecember 4, 2008Page Four

mOre accesS ~11!:l opportunity for econo1i1ic development in the region. The DEIS needs toaddress those safety COllc;el11S; any impacts on the airport and must demonstrate that the temlinalfacility can comply with Federal Aviation Administration requirements.

C,. ..... liilil~lir I;a$¢$; tb¢ nElS depends on assertions thatniitigatioll win be proVided, buttile d~taii~ oftJle mitigatiou arc unknown. The State ofOregol1 is deeply troubled by theCommiss-ion's process and the lack of infonnation contained in the DElS for a project of thisinagnitude. In the previous LNG import tenninalmatter in Orego11 (Bradwood Landing)? PERCdefen'ed detailed consideration ofenvlronmei1tal hnpacts and hoW they would be mitigated l,lhtil\Vella.fter (he DElS cOi1lll1ent period e~lded. In order to be effective, a 1i1itigatiOl1lu?a.sure ll1\lstbe supported by analytical data. demonst1'ating why it will ~onstitutfll,m adequate buffer again$tthe neg~tive imp(j,cts that l11ay resylt £1'0111 the authorized a9tivHy. FERC's reliance on its Officeof Energy Projects to modify approved operations does not provide ellough l)h')tectioll under thisstandard. The public must be able to i'eView; in advance, hOw specific measures will bringpl'ojects into compliance with ehvironmentill staiidards. Because the details for mitigation areI)1js$ing, neithet the State nor the Commission can presul11e the mitigation Will be feasible oreffective.

d. The proposed project '''ouid have adverse b11lHtds on ail' and Watel- quality ~iIld

'wildlife habitat in the Coos, Coquille, Umpqua Rogue Illig Klamath watel'she<J.s, Prolioseddredging for the tenllinal, fuming basin and pipeline construction will Cause damage toWatershed function, water quality ~md sensitive species and habitats, and these impacts h,;we notbeen adequately evaluated or addressed in DEIS. Supply ships ami vaporizers will contli.bute airpollutants. Cumulative impacts need to be thoroughly ahalyzed. The 379 Sil'CaUI crossiiigs and230 miles ot'pipeline with associated 16sS of riparian vegetation will have impacts 611 Watei'quality_ .

The projyct will <:llso impact 594 acres ofCategory 1h.~bitats that will be either removed otlitodified by constlUctiOl1 impacts. Category 1 habitat is "ineplaceable, essential habitat for afish 6j' \vildlife species, population, ot a uliique asseinblage ofspecies and is limited 011 either aphysiographic province or site-specific basis, depending on the individual species, population oruniqlle assemblage." 1his Categoty 1habitat consists of: 561 acres ofconiferous old growth andlate successional forest (a 1'01ti011 ofthis acreage with spotted owl and marbled munclet use); 24acres ofvemal pool wetlands; 6 acres of mature oak woodlands; and 3 actes ohare plant ilabitat.Undel' Oregon law, ifil11pacts to Category 1habitat calhiot be avoided, the project cannot beapproved...

Yet PERC only proposes the applicants deyelpp a mitigation plan that way include a fundto compensate for the Project's temporal and permanent riparian vegetation and aquatic hripacts

656

Ms. Kilnberly D. J3ose; Sectetal'YDecember 4, 2008Page Five

fi'Olll constmction and operation of the project. This and other proposed mitigation Ineasures arewholly inadequate to offset the damage that will be done.

~. The DErS does ltot adequately recog1iiie tbe state's Nile itt cn1Cl'gencyprcparcdness; No ellfotceable cOlnmitment has beel1l118de for Emergency Response resollrcesnecessary to operate at the proposed facility; nor were safety and secUl'ity impacts to the localCQinWlunities adequately assessed. Astatement in the DEIS defen'ing this issue to localrespol'lders is iIiadequate.

f. The .QEIS must contain mitigation recommendatiol1s requiring Jord~ul Cove tou1itigflte C02 emissions and to provide financial assurance to retire the facility. A detailed

, e11ghieeti!lg estimate ofsite retirement costs should beh~quired aM assui'allce gained that thosec()sf$ will he covered, before FERC iSS\leS a Final EIS. Without that ass\H'al1cc, the State has noprof¢9tf<m against ban1a.uptcy or abandolJnlent of the facility.

In summary, I believe that the state and the Commission must fairly address all thebenefits811d costs associated with LNG. For the Commission to make LNG siting decisi01ls in a,;acuum without the best available illfol111ation fll1d scientific data does a huge disservice to thepeople of Oregon. UltiInately, the decision to sHe terminals j"equites the fiJll el1gagement of thefederal government, the state and the communities where facilities are proposed. Only byworking together tlu'ough the siting, environmental assessment and pennitting processes can wemake sound decisions about the appropriateness ofany proposed LNG terminal.

I look forwal'O to YO\lr resbl\ltiort of OtegOli's cOl1cerhs.

Si!lCerely,

(/"TWA/ ~THEODORER.K~GOS~Govemor

TRK:uW:jbEifcldsures

657

Oregon State Agency CommentsJordan CovelPacific Connector DEIS

December 4, 2008

TABLE OF CONTENTSclick on agency name to go directly to comments

1. OREGON DEPT. OF ENERGY 2

2. OREGON DEPT. OF ENERGY - EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNING 6

3. OREGON DEPT. OF PARKS AND REC, SHPO 17

4. OREGON WATER RESOURCES DEPARTMENT 17

5. OREGON DEPT. OF FISH & WILDLIFE 21

6. OREGON DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 42

7. OREGON DEPT. OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 46

8. OREGON DEPT. OF GEOLOGY AND MINERAL INDUSTRIES 75

9. OREGON DEPT. OF LAND CONSERVATION &DEVELOPMENT - CZMA 85

10. OREGON DEPT. OF STATE LANDS 94

11. OREGON DEPT. OF FORESTRY 96

658

Jordan CovelPacific Connector DEISOregon Agency Comments12-4-08

Oregon State Agency CommentsJordan CovelPacific Connector DEIS

1. Oregon Dept. of Energy

NEPA requires agencies considering "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality ofthe human environment" to prepare and issue an environmental impact statement. The statementshall provide full and fair discussion ofsignificant environmental impacts and shall informdecision-makers and the public ofthe reasonable altematives which would avoid 01' minimizeadverse impacts or enhance the quality of the human environment. NEPA further demands theagency takes a 'hard look' at the potential environmental consequences ofthe proposed action.

The DEIS as it cUlTently stands, is flawed and legally deficient because it fails to rigorouslyexplore alternatives, includes an inadequate environmental assessment of the impacts of theproposed project and fails to adequately address cumulative impacts. The overall level ofdetailin the DEIS is woefully inadequate. Much of the DEIS contains only general inf01mation aboutenvironmental and resource effects. There is little or no linkage between the factual informationsupporting the FEIS and the conclusions in the document. Because ofthe lack ofadequateSupp011ing inf01mation in the DEIS, the FERC has required imp01tant environmental informationto be provided before the end ofthe comment period. As outlined in the November 21,2008letter from Mike Grainey, Director of Oregon Department ofEnergy to FERC SecretaryKimbel1y Bose, much of that inf01mation has not been provi~ed before the end ofthe commentpel'iod~ The comment period has now come to.an end and still much of that information has notbeen submitted or was finally submitted just today without any time for review. Hence, anadequate consideration ofall those aspects has thus far evaded necessary public comment.

The DEIS itself is incomplete and flawed as outlined in prior comments. It cannot be cured byissuance ofan FEIS. FERC must issue a revised Supplemental DBIS with an opportunity forfurther public comment.

Purpose and Need (section 1.3)

FERC nevel' actually explains what the pUlpose and need ofthe project is. Instead FERCdescribes the objectives of the project as:

• Provide a new access point fol' overseas LNG supplies through a new LNG importterminal located on the southern Oregon coast that can accommodate industry-standardLNG carriers;

2659

Jordan CovelPacific Connector DEISOregon Agency Comments12-4-08

• Provide a new source ofnatural gas to Pacific Nol1hwest, nOlihern Califomia, andnOlfuern Nevada markets to diversify the supply sources for these markets to meet futuredemands; and

• Serve multiple markets through an interstate pipeline with interconnections with new andexisting pipeline infrastructure.(see DEIS 1.3)

As stated in our July 10, 2008 letter to Governor Kulongoski, we stand by the conclusions in ourMay 7 report to the governor on demand; for future natural gas in Oregon, an evaluation ofalternatives,. and an assessment ofthe life cycle carbon emissions compared to coal and non.:.LNGsources.

• Oregon will continue to need increased supplies ofnatural gas for theforeseeable future, in part because ofpopulation growth.

• Natural gas sources inNorth America, mainly from western Canada andthe Rockies, are likely to provide natural gas at less cost than natural gas fromany of the LNG terminals cUl1'ently proposed in Oregon,

• Natural gas from NOlfu America has less life-cycle carbon dioxide impactsthan LNG.

Oregon Dept. ofEnergy, Oregon Dept. ofJustice, and Jordan Cove Energy Project are cUll'ently(Nov. 2008) developing a Memorandum ofAgreement that addresses C02 emissions andstandards for the eventual retirement ofthe facility. Our intent is to have enforceable conditionsin place that emulate the Oregon standards that would be in place but for the Energy Policy Actof2005. Standards for these conditions are found in Energy Facility Siting Council rules, OARChapter 345, Division 22.

Note: DLCD and DEQ also commented on the needfor LNG

Alternatives (page 3M 25)

PERC has already conducted an alternatives analysis on the Jordan Cove Project that detelminedthat "[t]here are no clear environmental advantages of the Jordan Cove LNG Project ovel' theBradwood Landing Project; therefore, it is not a preferable alternative." Bradwood LandingFEIS 3-271. FERC acknowledges that: "The purpose of the Bradwood Landing LNG Project isto provide up to 1.3 Bscfd ofnatUl'al gas to markets in the Pacific Northwest through new sourcesof imported LNG, Therefore, the Bradwood Landing LNG Project could be an alternative to theproposed JCE & PCGP Project.'· Jordan Cove DEIS 3-25.

PERC never actually reaches a conclusion on whether the Oregon LNG or Bradwood Landingproposals would 01' would not be an environmentally preferable system altemative to the Jordan

1 Northern Star Energy LLC and Bradwood Landing LLC, FERC Docket Nos. CP06M 366, CP06M

376, CP06-377, CP06-365 (hereinafter Bradwood Landing)3

660

Jordan CovelPacific Connector DElSOregon Agency Comments12-4-08

Cove Project. FERC simply describes the projects and never makes a detelmination. Instead,FERC suggest that it is "unclear ifthe Bradwood Landing LNG Project could meet all oftheobjectives of the JCE & PCGP Project, because it would not directly connect to the Avista LDCsystem serving southern Oregon." Jordan Cove DEIS 3-25. The stated goal ofa projectnecessarily dictates the range of 'reasonable' alternatives, and an agency cannot define itsobjectives in unreasonably narrow terms. FERC is impermissibly defining the project inunreasonably narrow terms by apparently rejecting an altemative ifit cannot meet the preferredaltematives specifications. This is not a proper alternatives analysis. Connecting with the AvistaLDC system is not the purpose and need of the project.

FERC also notes "ifnatural gas were to be provided by the Bradwood LNG import terminal tomarkets in northern Nevada 01' northern California, it would have to be transported longerdistances through the existing G1N system than the Pacific Connector pipeline." DElS 3-25.Yet, FERC has not conducted an analysis ofwhether transport through existing systems ispreferable to the creation ofa new 230 mile long new pipeline. .

FERC has in a sense satisfied the "need" for the Jordan Cove Project by its approval oftheBradwood Landing project. FERC has essentially made its altemative selection already. FERCmust explain in the DElS why there is still a need for another LNG import terminal facility, givenFERC's approval ofBradwood. FERC lllust explain why, ifit prefers Jordan Cove, that Projectis now environmentally preferable to Bradwood Landing. FERC cannot simply approve each ofits import tenninal alternatives piece-meal while at the same relying on the same needjustification.

FERC Alternatives (page 3-1).

FERC's alternatives analysis is impelmissibly constrained by its selection criteria. The FEResevaluation criteria for selecting potentially reasonable and environmentally preferablealtematives include whether they: are technically feasible, reasonable, and practical; offersignificant environmental advantage over the proposed project; and meet the objectives of theproject~ as described in section 3.1. DEIS 3-1. As described below, FERC has impermissiblyand repeatedly relied upon the project description to reject alternatives, rather than the stated goalofthe project. Moreover, FERC relied upon its own selection criteria ("offering significantenvironmental advantage over the proposed project") to remove alternatives fi'om Rutherconsideration before even conducting the requisite environmental analysis. Those cursOlYdismissals, unsuppOlted by agency analysis or fact, do not satisfy PERC's NEPA duty to considera reasonable range ofalternatives.

The alternatives analysis fails to incorporate accurate information about other projects that mayprovide natural gas at lower cost to the region. Realistically, FERC must conduct a detailedcomparative analysis ofLNG import terminal and pipeline projects currently proposed in theregion and the potential for domestic supply and pipeline altematives. Such an analysis isnecessary to determine whether the Jordan Cove project and pipeline represents a superior

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facility from an economic, environmental and social perspective.

FERC has not satisfied its obligation to consider a true no-action alternative before deciding toallow the Project to proceed.. FERC states "it would be purely speculative to predict the resultingeffects and action that could be taken by other suppliers or users ofnatural gas in the region aswell as any associated direct and indirect environmental impacts." DElS 3.1.1. As a result,FERC does not conduct that analysis. A general statement about uncertainty does not satisfy theprocedural requirement that an agency take a hard look at the environmental effects ofan action.While FERC might explain specific projections with reference to uncertainty; it may not rely ona statement ofunceliainty to avoid even attempting the requisite analysis. See id. Freshconsideration ofa no-action alternative in this case is consistent with the agency's obligation totake a meaningful look at the environmental consequences of the proposed action at a point earlyenough to conttibute to the decisionrnaking process, and not simply "rationalize 01' justifYdecisions already made." 40 CFR § 1502.5;

FERC fails to consider the altemative ofpostponing action until an environmental analysis hasbeen completed on the othel' LNG or pipeline projects proposed in Oregon. By postponing actionpending finther study, FERC could then conduct a comparative regional analysis to determinewhich alternative best meets the needs ofthe Pacific Northwest with the least environmentalimpacts. The failure to examine this viable altelnative renders the entire environmental impactstatement inadequate.

FERC has impermissibly conflated the no-action alternative and the postponed action alternative.No-action and postponed action will have different impacts and should have been treated asseparate alternatives.

DEIS 3.1.1.3. The analysis ofrenewable energy sources is fundamentally flawed because it doesnot make'a comparison ofthe Project to a pOltfolio ofconservation and altemative sources.Instead, FERC compares the amount ofenergy each alternative energy source could separatelyproduce to the Project in order to reject them (e.g. "At this rate, thousands ofacres ofsolarcollectors would be needed." DEIS 3-8; "...it would take 4,337 wind turbines to produce anequivalent amount ofelectricity that could be generated using the total capacity ofthe natural gasfl.-om the JCE & PCGP Project." DEIS 3-8 - 3-9). Those altemative energy sources are notoperating in a vacuum. A reasonable alternative is an energy p01tfolio consisting ofa variety ofdifferent alternative energy sources. FERC's alternative analysis must reflect that reality andhence must conduct further analysis on a portfolio of alternative energy projects as a reasonablealternative to the Project.

DEIS 3.1.3.6. The Coos Bay terminal site alternatives are not true altematives because theycould never support an LNG telminal. They are located within a horizontal distance ofone milefrom the ends ofthe Southwest Oregon Regional Airport runways, contrary to 49 CFR193.2155(b). FERC needs to select actual alternative terminal locations.

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Cumulative Impacts IDEIS 4.13)

A cumulative effects analysis must provide a useful analysis ofthe cumulative impacts ofpast,present, and future projects. It must not only describe related projects but also enumerate theenvironmental effects of those projects. It should provide adequate data of the time, place, andscale and explain in detail how different project plans and harvest methods affect theenvironment. It must consider the interaction ofmultiple activities and cannot focus exclusivelyon the environmental impacts ofan individual project.

Here, the DEIS does not include an adequate discussion ofthe direct effects ofany ofthecumulative impacts it identifies. FERC must do more than merely state that past projects-contributed to environmental harms. Nor does the DElS contain the requisite level ofdetailedexplanation. The DElS contail).s a table summarizing cumulative effects in broad terms, but itdoes not offer quantified or detailed data about those effects. DElS Tables 4.13.1-1 and 4.13.1-2.Nor does it list 01' discuss past activities- only Current 01' Proposed Activities. Generalstatements about possible effects and some risk do not constitute a hard look absent ajustification l'egarding why more definitive information could not be provided. The DElS DOEsnot supply sufficient data ofthe time, type, place, and scale ofpast, present and future activities.

Even ifFERC is unable to indicate with any great degree ofceltainty the results of the variousprojects because the cumulative effects analysis requires an agency to predict future conditions,uncertainty is an inherent part ofthe process. Therefore, a general statement about unceliaintydoes not satisfy the procedural requirement that an agency take a hard look at the environmentaleffects ofan action. Although FERC might explain specific projections with reference tounceliainty, it may not rely on a statement of uncertainty to avoid even attempting the requisiteanalysis.

The DElS is paliicularly inadequate in looking at past effects. NEPA requires adequatecataloguing ofrelevant past projects in the area. The DElS must give a sufficiently detailedcatalogue ofpast, present, and future projects, and provide adequate analysis about how theseprojects, and differences between the projects, are thought to have impacted the environment.FERC's DElS fails to describe past activities and previous environmental harms caused by thesepast activities in sufficient detail to promote an informed assessment ofenvironmentalconsiderations and policy choices by the public and agency personnel upon review ofthe DEIS.

The DEIS fails to take a hard look at the cumulative effects ofseveral pipeline crossings withinparticular watersheds, many of which are §303(d) listed. Ifstreams are not meeting standardsnow, it is unclear how impacts on riparian and upland vegetation from pipeline placement andmaintenance would affect them. The cumulative impact ofall crossings ofstreams (permanentor intennittent) whether through Horizontal Directional Drilling (HDD), alternative 01'

conventional construction techniques, on temperature and sediment impacts within the variouswatersheds has not been adequately addressed. The cumulative impact from these tributaryimpacts on the already temperature-impaired lower rivel'S is also not analyzed.

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2. Oregon Dept. of Energy - Emergency Response Planning

After completing the review ofthe FERC DEIS for JCEP, you will fInd that these comments areconsistent with those made for FERC's DEIS for Bradwood Landing. Like the BradwoodLanding DEIS, the JCEP DEIS' also recognizes the need to develop an emergency response planand a cost-sharing plan to ensure funding to state and local agencies fOl' project-specific safetyand security management costs. Unfoltunately, both DEIS' fail to provide ODOE permitconditions to ensure that the final JCEP Emergency Response Plan meets state standards forprotecting the health and safety ofOregonians in the event ofan LNG emergency at the terminalor along the 12-mile transit route involving the vessel.

ODOE's primary concern is that without specific guidelines enforceable by permit conditions fordeveloping the emergency response plan and a cost-sharing plan, FERC will create a processflaw that opens the door for LNG developers in Oregon to submit a final Emergency ResponsePlan and receive FERC approval without the necessary equipment, systems, and personnelresources to implement the plan putting the lives ofOregonians at risk.

Here are some specific concerns and recommendations to FERC's JCEP DEIS:

4.12.5 LNG Carrier SafetyPage 4.12.40 - FERCRecommendation: Throughout the lite ofthe facility, Jordan Cove shouldensure that the facility and any LNG carrier h'ansiting to andfrom the facility comply with allrequirements setforth by the Coast Guard Captain ofthe Port Sector Portland, including al1l'iskmitigation measure in the WSR,

ODOE Concern: While the U.S. Coast Guard's (USCG) WSR focused on the navigation safetyand matitime ;security risks posed by LNG mat'ine traffic, and the measures needed to responsiblymanage risks ;for the proposed project, the WSR provides no guidelines to re-evaluate these risksand the impacts to the community should JCEP decide to expand or make other changes to theproject.

ODOE Recommendation: ODOE recommends FERC include as a condition ofthe permitlanguage in section 4.12.5 that states: Throughout the life of the facility, Jordan Cove shouldensure that the facility and any LNG cat1ier transiting to and from the facility comply with allrequirements set forth by the Coast Guard Captain ofthe P0l1 Sector Portland, including all riskmitigation measure recommended in the WSR. This includes working with COTP and theOregon Depm1ment ofEnergy (ODOE) to assess potential impacts to state and local emergencyresponse capabilities, resources, and activities as a result of the proposed project change 01'

expansion, LNG developers will cover all costs incurred by ODOE and local emergencyresponse organizations as a result of the proposed expansion or change. Propose expansion andchanges to the project include, but is not limited to:

a. Increases to the current shipment schedule

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b. Increasing the CUlTent carrier vessel sizec. Increases to the CUlTent emergency planning zonesd. Constructing additional LNG storage tanks on sitee. Expanding CUlTent dockside capabilitiesf. Other as appropriate

4.12.6 Emergency Response and Evacuation PlanningPage 4.12.42 - FERCRecommendation: Jordan Cove should develop an Emergency ResponsePlan (including evacuation) and coordinate procedures with"the Coast Guard,' state, county, andlocal emergencyplanning groups; fire departments; state and local law enforcement,' andappropriate federal agencies. This plan should include at a minimum:

a. Designatedcontacts with state and local emergency response agencies;b. Scalable proceduresfor the prompt notification ofappropriate local officials and

emergency response agencies based on the level andseverity ofpotentialincidents.

c, Procedures for notifying residents and recreational users within areas ofpotential hazard;

d. Evacuation routes/methodsfor residents and other public use areas that arewithin any h'ansient hazard areas along the route ofthe LNG marine h'afjic;

e. Locations ofpermanent sirens and other warning devices; andf. An "emergency coordinator" on each LNG carrier to activate sirens andother

warning devices.The emergency response plan should be filed with the Secretaryfor review and written approvalby the Director ofOEPprior to initial sitepreparation. Jordan Cove should notifY the FERCstaffofallplanning meetings in advance and shouldreportprogress on the development ofitsEmergency Response Plan at 3-month intervals.

onOE Concern: ODOE commends FERC f01' requiring the JCEP to complete and receiveapproval by the Director ofEOP on their emergency response plan prior to initial sitepreparation. FERC should require this of all developers proposing to build LNG impoliterminals in Oregon.

UnfOl1Unate1y, FERC's minimum guidelines for developing an LNG emergency response plan isvague and omits many clitical elements ofemergency response planning found the FederalResponse Framework and Oregon state standards and guidelines for emergency preparedness,response, and recovery for nuclear, biological, chemical, and all-hazard emergencies.

onOE Recommendation: Section 4.12.6 on Emergency Response and Evacuation Planningshould read: As a condition ofth~ permit, Jordan Cove should develop an Emergency ResponsePlan (including evacuation) and coordinate procedures with the Coast Guard; state, county, andlocal emergency planning groups; fire departments; state and local law enforcement; and

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appropriate federal agencies. This plan should include at a minimum:

a. Designated contacts with state and local emergency response agencies;b. Scalable procedures for the prompt notification ofappropriate local officials and

emergency response agencies based on the level and severity ofpotentialincidents.

c. Procedures for notifYing residents and recreational users within areas ofpotentialhazard;

d. Evacuation routes/methods for residents and .other public use areas that are withinany transient hazard areas along the route of the LNG maline traffic;

e. Locations ofpermanent sirens and other warning devices; andf. An "emergency coordinator~' on each LNG canier to activate sirens and other

warning devices.g. Thirty days following the issuance ofa FERC pelmit, LNG developers will

provide a comprehensive fire and response plan for the impolt terminal fm' aDOEand local emergency response organizations review and approval. The planmustmeet state and National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standards for a four­minute response to a 1st Alarm Fire at an industrial facility as shown in Table7.2.1 below. The proposed plan will include a resource list which details thelocation and number offacilities, personnel, equipment, and apparatus provided,and other peltinent information as appropriate.

Table 7.2.1 - - Required Resources for a "Medium-Hazard Occupancies" Response. Thisincludes apartments, offices, mercantile and industrial occupancies not normally requiringextensive rescue or fhe-fighting forces.

• At least 3 pumpers• I ladder truck (or combination apparatus with equivalent capabilities)• Other specialized apparatus as may be needed or available• No fewer than 16 fire fighters, 1 chiefofficer, 1 safety officer, and a Rapid

Intervention Team (4 - 5 fire fighters on standby at event scene).

Note: Refer to Volume 1 - NFPA Handbook, 19u1 Edition, Chapter 2, Section 7, Organizing forFire and Rescue Services.

Upon state and local approval ofthe plan, all personnel, training, facilities, equipment, systemsand supplies provided to ensure effective fire and rescue response to the import tenninal must bein place prior to consbuction and maintained throughout the life of the project by the LNGdeveloper.

a. Prior to construction, LNG developers will provide a comprehensive marinefuefighting plan for ODOE and local emergency response organizations reviewand approval. This proposed plan will be consistent with U.S. Coast Guard andstate standards and requirements for responding to shipboard fires and other LNG

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carrier events along the transit route. The proposed plan will also include aresource list which details the location and number ofpersonnel, equipment, andapparatus provided, and other pertinent information as appropriate. Upon stateand local approval of the plan, all personnel, equipment, and resources providedto marine firefighting must be dedicated to LNG response, in place pdor tooperation and maintained throughout the life ofthe project by the LNG developer.

b. Prior to construction, LNG developers will provide a comprehensive shore-sidesecurity plan for ODOE and local emergency response organizations review andapproval. The proposed plan will assess and identify additional local lawenforcement personnel and resources needed, ifany, as a result of the project.This includes, but is not limited to LNG developer expectation oflocallawenforcement to conduct shore-side patrols, provide traffic control duringevacuations, and respond to reported suspicious activity from 911 calls or thosecaptured on security cameras as the LNG carrier is in the channel and at theimport terminal. Upon state and local approval of the plan, all personnel,equipment, and resources provided to enhance security on shore must bededicated to LNG response, in place prim' to operation and maintained throughoutthe life ofthe project by the LNG developer.

c. Pdor to construction, LNG developers wil~ provide a comprehensive water-sidesecurity plan for ODOE and local emergency response organizations review andapproval. The proposed plan will assess and identify additional local lawenforcement personnel and resources needed, ifany, as a result ofthe project.This includes, but is not limited to LNG developer expectation oflocallawenforcement to conduct water-side patrols and enforce LNG vessel security andexclusion zones along the channel and at the impOlt terminal. Upon state andlocal approval ofthe plan, all pel'sonnel, equipment, and resources provided toenhance security on the water must be dedicated to LNG response, in place priorto operation and maintained throughout the life of the project by the LNGdeveloper.

d. Prior to construction, LNG developers will provide a comprehensive publicwaming system plan for the region for ODOE and local emergency responseorganizations review and approval. The proposed plan will include the followingalert and notifications systems, but is not limited to:

• Reverse 911 (24-Port) System for the host county - The system will include thefollowing capabilities: high volume calling; compatible with majOl' mappingsystems; E911 data ready; multiple devices (recorded voice messages, textmessages to wireless receivers, and digital pages); geo-dimensional calling; fullnetworking capabilities; off-site back-up notification; remote launching capability;and other capabilities as appropriate.

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• Sirens - Outdoor siren system throughout the entire transit route covering all threezones ofconcern up to the imPOlt terminal. The system will include the followingcapabilities: multiple high intensity warning signals; live and digital voicemessaging with flat frequency response from 200 - 2000 Hz for clear voicereproduction; 360-degree coverage with no sound variation in the horizontal plane(106 to 125 dBc at 100ft/30m); continued emergency operation regardless ofprimary power outages, and other capabilities as appropriate. LNG developers willinclude a map ofthe proposed number and locations ofsirens showing the coveragearea ofeach proposed siren for state and local review and approval.

• Reader Boards - Reader boards located along the highways in the host county toprovide event information, direct traffic, and facilitate evacuations. LNGdevelopers will include a map of the proposed number and locations ofreader'boards for state and county approval. Reader board specifications must beconsistent with the Oregon Department ofTransportation reader boards locatedthroughout the state.

Upon state and local approval ofthe plan, all equipment and systems provided to enhance thehost county's public warning system must be in place, tested, and operational prior to importterminal operation and maintained throughout the life of the project by the LNG developer.

a. Prior to constluction, LNG developers will provide a comprehensive plan for aremote gas detection system for the region for ODOE and local emergencyresponse organizations review and approval. The proposed plan will include a listwith a breakdown ofall proposed fixed and portable gas detectors and designatedlocations for the equipment. The plan will include infOlmation about thefollowing systems, but is not limited to:

• Fixed Gas DetectOl's - Fixed gas detectors will be provided in all high risk andhigh population areas alohg the entire transit route in the host county. Fixed gasdetector capabilities will include remote wireless operations and the ability toprovide readouts in multiple locations.

• Portable Gas Detectors - LNG developers will provide three layers ofpoliable gasdetectors. 1) All emergency responder vehicles in the region will be provided amethane gas detector. 2) Methane gas and oxygen meters will be assigned to allfire tiucks, and 3) Multi-meters will be provided to hazardous materials responders.

Upon state and local approval of the plan, all fixed and pOltable gas detectors and systemsprovided must be in place, tested, and operational prior to imPOlt tellninal operation andmaintained throughout the life ofthe project.

a. Prior to consttuction, LNG developers will provide a comprehensive plan for an

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interoperable communications system for the region for ODOE and localemergency response organizations review and appl'Oval. The proposed plan willbe compatible with state and local communications capabilities and include thefollowing systems, but is not limited to:

• Repeaters and Cell Towel's - Specify the number ofrepeaters and cell towersneeded to ensure uninterrupted cell and radio coverage along the entire transit routeto the import·tel'minal~ covering all three zones of concern. LNG developers willpl'Ovide a map of the proposed repeater and cell tower locations showing the.coverage ai..ea ofeach proposed repeater and cell tower location for state and localreview and approval. .

• Incident Command - Specify the number and locations ofintrinsically safehandheld radios to be provided to fire~ law enforcement, and other responders to anLNG mishap. Include information on FCC licensing requirements and proposedfrequencies, antenna system, base station console, and other pertinent infOlmation.

• Emergency Operations Centers - Multiple federal, state, and local emergencyoperations centers (EOCs) may be activated in response to an LNG mishap. EOCssupport the incident command. LNG developers will specifY the primary andredundant backup communications systems to be used to ensure uninterruptedcommunications between the import telminal and the federal, state, and localEOCs. This includes, but is not limited to a dedicated phone system, videoteleconference system, satellite phones, Internet, e-mail, and other technology asappropriate.

Upon state and local approval of the plan, all equipment and systems provided to enhance theregion's interoperable communications system must be in place, tested~ and operational prior toimport terminal operation and maintained throughout the life ofthe project by the LNGdeveloper.

a. Prior to construction, LNG developers will provide a comprehensive plan fOl'upgrading and equipping the host county primary EOC fo1' state and local emergencyresponse organization review and approval. The proposed plan will ensure adequatework space for affected federal, state, and local emergency responders rep0l1ing to theEOC jointly responding to LNG emergencies at the import tenninal or along thetransit route.

ODOE also requires the host county EOC to be located outside ofthe three zones of concern. Ifthe host countis EOC is within the three zones of concern, LNG developers will work with thehost county to complete one of the following tasks:

a; Relocate the EOe to a facility outside ofthe three zones of concern. The relocated12

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EOC will be equipped to accommodate affected federal, state, and local emergencyresponders reporting to the EOC jointly responding to LNG emergencies at the importterminal or along the transit route.

b. Pre-designate an altemate EOC and ensure this location has sufficient work space toaccommodate affected federal, state, and local emergency responders reporting to theEOC jointlyresponding to LNG emergencies at import telminal 01' along the transitroute. This includes equipping the pre-designated alternate EOC with the samecapabilities as the primary EOC to ensure a seamless transition to the alternate EOC ifa LNG mishap prevents the use ofthe primmy county EOC. Pre-designating andequipping an alternate EOC ensures the host county can maintain direction andcontrol of local protective actions and decisions, providing a sustained responsethroughout the duration ofan LNG event.

Upon state and local approval ofthe plan, the facility, equipment and systems must be in place,tested, and operational prior to import terminal operation and maintained throughout the life ofthe project by the LNG developer.

a. Prior to construction, LNG developers will provide a comprehensive plan for pre­designating and equipping a Joint Information Center (TIC) for ODOE and localemergency response organizations review and approval. The proposed plan willidentify a location for the TIC outside ofthe three zones ofconcern. The proposedplan will ensure adequate space and equipment for conducting news conferences. Theproposed plan will also ensure adequate work space for public information officersfrom federal, estate, and local emergency response organizations reporting to the TICto coordinate the release of emergency infOlmation and instructions.

The PUl'P0s~ of the JIC is to ensure the coordination ofevent information among the federal,state, and local agencies responding to the event. The goal is to provide a consistent message tonews media and the public. The TIC will be the location for news conferences;' coordinatingnews releases from responding federal, state, and local jurisdictions as well as the LNGdeveloper; addressing public and media inquiries; and other public information activities asappropriate. Failure to provide a central cleming house to manage the receipt and disseminationofemergency information may result in misinformation, inconsistent information, andunconfirmed infOlmation getting out to the public and news media creating public panic,confusion, and mistlUSt.

Upon state and local approval ofthe plan, the facility, equipment and systems must be in place,tested, and operational prior to import terminal operation and maintained throughout the life ofthe project by the LNG developer.

a. Thirty days following the issuance ofa FERC pelmit, LNG developers will provide acomprehensive training plan for ODOE and l~cal emergency response organizations

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review and approval. The proposed training plan allows state and local organizationsthe ability to detelmine whether the project's training program is adequate forpreparing tbis region's emergency responders and decision-makers for an LNGemergency at the import terminal and along the transit route. The proposed trainingplan will include, but is not limited to:

• Construction ofan LNG Fire Training Center in the host county - It is more costeffective to build an LNG training facility locally and bring in instructors fromTexas A & M or other accredited training institutions than to send fire fighters totraining in Texas or elsewhere in the country, LNG developers will work with stateand local emergency respondel's to determine location and facility design andlayout.

• Type oftraining to include, but is not limited to: 1) Incident Command System; 2)facility security; 3) oil & hazmat spill response; 4) LNG for fire fighters, emergencyresponders, and law enfor~ement; 5) marine fire fighting; 6) general LNG training;7) advanced LNG ftre fighting; 8) hospital training; 9) tabletops, drill, andexercises and other training as appropriate.

• Schedule oftraining detailing the type of training, required training hours, andnumber ofanticipated trainees from LNG developers, state, and local agencies,

Upon state and local approval of the plan, the facility, insttuctors, equipment and systems mustbe in place, tested, and operational prior to construction and maintained throughout the life of theproject by the LNG developer.

a. Thirty days following the issuance ofa FERC permit, LNG developers will providefunding to the host county for hiring a full-time County LNG Planner & FireResponse Coordinatol'. The position description for the County LNG Planner & FireResponse Coordinator will include 1) drafting the county LNG emergency responseplan; 2) working with first responders to prepare for LNG vessel arrivals anddepattures; 3) working with first responders, the state, and LNG developers toconduct plan review, coordinate training, exercises, public outr~ach> and 4)pelforming other LNG emergency preparedness activities as appropriate, The CountyLNG Planner & Fire Response Coordinator must be hired and trained prior toconstruction. Funding for this position will be maintained throughout the life of theproject by the LNG developer.

b. Prior to constructioJ.l, LNG developers will provide a comprehensive plan to addressbum victims as a result ofan LNG emergency at the import telminal or along thetransit route for ODOE and local emergency response organization review andapproval. The plan will be consistent with the capabilities outlined in the Burn MassCasualty Plan for the Oregon Burn Center at Legacy Emanuel Hospital. Specifically,

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LNG developers will provide area hospital(s) with the personnel and resourcesnecessmy to implement the Burn Mass Casualty Plan's 72 Hour Bum Plan - Care ofBum Patients in a Non-Bum Hospital. This includes, but is not limited to:

• Identifying resources and procedures necessary for treating burn victims ifimmediate transfer to a regional bum center is not feasible. This includes ongoingresuscitation and care.

• Identify medical supplies, pharmaceuticals, and equipment needed to support atriage station capable ofn'eating 5 victims with severe bums. This includes pre­packed medical resources.

• Communications capabilities including 800 rnhz trunked radio and web-basedclientlsel'Ver applications to coordinate communications between the event sceneand the Columbia Memorial Hospital and serve as the patient information trackingmechanism in events involving multiple burn victims.

• Staffing requirements for care ofburn patients in a non-burn hospital.

• Upon state and local approval ofthe plan, the facility, personnel, equipment andsystems must be in place, tested, and operational prior to impOlt terminal operationand maintained throughout the life of the project by the LNG developer.

c. LNG developers will provide timely notifications (within 15 minutes ofevent onset)to ODOE in the event ofan incident at the impOlt telminal and along the transit routewith potential impacts to the health and safety ofsite workers, the public or theenvironment. This includes security threats and any other event that may generatemedia attention.

LNG developers will maintain ongoing communications with and provide event information todecision-makers at the ODOE EOC throughout the duration ofan emergency. This includes, butis not limited to information about the emergency classification, facility conditions, LNG release,mitigation measures taken, vessel information, meteorological data, protective actionrecommendations, maps, and other pettinent emergency infOlmation as appropriate.

d. LNG developers will work with ODOE and local emergency response organizationsto maintain program readiness. This includes ensuring that the state and localdecision makers and responders are prepared to respond to an LNG crisis at theimpOlt terminal and along the transpol1 route. This includes:

• Plan Update - Coordinate the review and update ofemergency responseplans at all levels annually or as needed. Revisions will include improvementsidentified through training, drills, and exercises.

• Drills and Exercises - Schedule and coordinate drills and exercises as

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needed.

~ Annual Tabletop DIm - To talk through the LNG developer response as well asfederal, state, and local responses to an LNG emergency at the import terminal andalong the transit route.

~ Annual Full Scale Exercise - To evaluate the actual response capabilities ofLNGdevelopers and federal, state, and local emergency response organizations asdiscussed in the Tabletop Drills. For full-scale exercises, LNG developers willwork with ODOE to establish an Exercise Planning Team. This Team will includerepresentatives from the LNG developer, U.S. Coast Guard, ODOE, countygovernment, and local emergency response agencies as appropriate. The ExercisePlanning Team will develop the exercise objectives and limitations, the extent-of­play, and the scenario. All information pertaining to drill and exerci~e scenariosare t~ be kept under the custody ofthe trusted agent for each organization and notto be released to participants. The Team also organizes control and critique oftheexerCIse.

~ Qualterly Communications Exercises - Testing LNG developers' initialnotification methods with offsite federal, state, and local emergency responseagencies. This includes primary and backup communications methods.Communications exercises can run in conjunction with qumterly impolt terminaldrills.

g. LNG developers will work with ODOE and county governments to ensure LNGpublic outreach is conducted in host communities and throughout the state asneeded. This includes but is not limited to:

• Public meetings or workshops• Presentations to community and business groups, elected officials,

schools, and other audiences as appropliate• News Media• Provide pre-plinted materials about JCEP and LNG to libraries, schools,

businesses, government offices, and other locations as appropriate. Thisincludes but is not limited to brochures, fact sheets, and calendars.

• Other public outreach activities as appropliate

Safety Hazards (DEIS 4.12) - DOE appreciates the modeling the applicant has recentlyperformed on tsunami risks to the telminal facility. However, the model currently provided isinadequate, because it "does not demonstrate the impact to an LNG tankel' in the slip. Theapplicant should explain what would likely happen to an LNG tanker in the slip or explain whyan LNG tanker could never be in the slip when a tsunami hits. The applicant should also explainhow it expects to respond upon receiving notice ofa potential tsunami.

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The DEI8 fails to discuss the risk ofanchor strikes to the pipeline as it crosses watelways,palticularly Coos Bay. If the applicant proposes to somehow prevent boats from anchoringabove the right ofway, the method for doing so, and the impacts to recreational and commercialwaterway users and the environment, need to be discussed in detail.

3. Oregon Dept. of Parks and Rec, SHPO

. From Susan White, 8&0: liThe cultural resource survey and evaluation is still on-going, so ourcomments only pertain to what has been submitted to us thus far. I do not anticipate anotherdraft ofthe cultural resource evaluation report prior to December 2nd, so unless I submitsomething else in the meantime, this would be the SHPO comments regarding the archaeology ofthe project. 1I

The comments (which were sent directly to Paul Flledman in July 11,2008 letter from SHPO)are in the form of

• a cover letter and table responding to resource report #4 - Cultural Resources(Attachment #1) and

• "trinomial table II showing various historic and prehistOllc sites and theil' potentialeligibility for National Registry ofHistOlic Places listing (Attachment #2).

4. Oregon Water Resources Department

The Oregon Water Resources Depmtment (OWRD) is concemed that despite several contactswith project representatives, there seems to be a very limited understanding or acknowledgementof Oregon Water Law. This is apparent in the numerous comments regarding water use. We arewilling, and encourage, meetings with the applicant to discuss these issues and explore optionsleading to their resolution.

Section 2.1.4.3 Service Water Systems. Pg 2-32 Water for Terminal operations will be suppliedby Coos Bay NOlth Bend Water Board (CBNBWB). No issues

Section2.1.3.5 Ballast and Cooling Water Pg. 2-11 20 - 50 million gallons of water per shipwith through a proposed screen system and floating filtered water system. On-shore diversions ofwater jor Ballast and Cooling use will require apermit, storage ojwater on landfor Ballast andCooling use will require apermit.

Section 2.1.4.3 Service Water Systems. Pg. 2-32 Hydro-test tank water, Fire pond water fl'OmCBNBWB system. Unless obtainedfrom a Municipal supplier, water used in the processing of

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