Pipeline Safety Mnagmnt
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Transcript of Pipeline Safety Mnagmnt
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Pipeline Safety Management
UK Operators views on working with the Regulator
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Pipeline Safety Management Pipeline Safety Factors which affect pipeline safety Management and Legislation Current & future issues Working with the Regulator
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What is Pipeline Safety?
PSR: Purpose is to ensure the safe management and operation of pipelines.MAHPs identify hazards, evaluate risks, systems in place to manage risks at all stages of the life cycle
Safety: risk of pipeline failure must be ALARP. Integrity must ensure pipeline is fit for purpose to meet operational needs with adequate safety margin
Integrity: Quality and condition
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PipelineFailures-UK
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Yarm - 1971
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Bushey Heath - 1984
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Palaceknowe - 1993
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Pipeline Failures - UK
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PipelineFailures-USA
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Edison, New Jersey, 1994
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Carlsbad, New Mexico, 2000
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Greenville, Texas, 2000
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Sandy Springs, Georgia, 1998
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Pipeline Failures - USA
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Pipeline Incident Statistics
Repair 4 0.75
Leaks Major 0.045
Total 0.6 (0.48) 0.33
Ruptures (0.046) 0.011
Casualties 0.16 (0.0) 0.0
IncidentFrequency per 1000km years
Benchmark UKOPA
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Overall Incident Frequency
Leaks per 1000 km.yr
Period Egig Ukopa
1970 to 1993 0.57 0.34
1970 to 1998 0.48 0.28
1994 to 1998 0.21 0.06
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Pipeline Safety Conclusions:
Pipelines are safe Need to use relevant data to evaluate risks UKOPA database is relevant to UK pipelines Data is sparse, so predictive techniques are required
to predict failure frequency
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What Affects Pipeline Safety?
Most Common Failure Mechanisms: Corrosion Fatigue 3rd Party Activity (external interference) Material & construction defects Natural events (ground movement)
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UKOPA Fault Database
Development of Overall Frequency
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UKOPA Fault Database
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What affects pipeline safety?
Conclusions: Failure mechanisms are known Risk of Failure must be predicted Management systems must target risk to
ensure it is ALARP
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Management and Legislation
Controls for reduction of risk of failure Operator Management Systems Pipeline Safety Legislation
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Engineering Management
IntegrityDamage Mechanism
Design Construction
Awareness, information, surveillance andSupervision procedures.
InspectionCond. Monitoring
Pressure Cycle countingInspection
SurveillanceStrain monitoring
O&M
InspectionQATesting
Material/ConstructionDefect
Standards &Specifications
RouteWall thicknessProtectionDepth of cover
3rd Party Activity
CoatingC.P.
InspectionCorrosion
Fatigue S-N Criteria
Special Procedures,Reinstatement
Route, StressGround Movement
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PIPELINE SAFETY MANAGEMENT
Hazard Identification
Trainingand
Competencies
HS&ESafetyMngt
Performance Data and Fault Reports
Integrity(Control &
Maintenance)
EngineeringRequirements
RiskEvaluation
Risk Levelsand
Mitigation
I&SRisk
Audit
Roles & Responsibilities / Procedures & Instructions
Accidents and
Incidents
Reviewand
Revise
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PIPELINE SAFETY MANAGEMENT
Hazard IdentificationHS(G)65
Trainingand
Competencies
HS&ESafetyMngt
Performance Data and Fault Reports
Integrity(Control &
Maintenance)
RiskEvaluation
Risk Levelsand
Mitigation
Accidents and
Incidents
Reviewand
Revise
Planning &Implementation
EngineeringRequirementsPolicy
Roles & Responsibilities / Procedures & InstructionsOrganising
I&SRiskMonitoring
Audit
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Operator Systems
Management Systems
Design OperationInspection
and Maintenance
RecordsEmergencyProcedures
Modifications
Constructionand
Commissioning
Trainingand
Competency
Standards, Specifications, Tech. Procedures, Instructions
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PIPELINES SAFETY REGULATIONS 1996MAPD
Safety Management
Management Systems
Design OperationInspection
and Maintenance
RecordsEmergencyProcedures
Constructionand
CommissioningPoliciesand
Procedures
Rolesand
ResponsibilitiesModifications
Trainingand
Competency
Standards, Specifications, Tech. Procedures, Instructions
Audit Arrangements
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Management and Legislation Conclusions:
PSR 96 provides a framework to secure the safety of pipelines throughout their life cycle, taking into account different levels of hazard.
PSR 96 provides a goal setting regime which enables selection and development of different approaches to achieve a safety level.
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Current and Future IssuesAmendments to PSR 96 (Testing of pipeline emergency plans, absolute vs reasonably practicable duties)EU Pipeline Safety Instrument (LUP legislation, information to the public)
Hence we need an open relationship with the Regulator in order to develop a practical legislative framework which maintains the existing safety record
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Working with the Regulator Current and future issues are open to
interpretation There is no established compliance record
So we need: Common understanding Reasonable, practical approach Transparency
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Issue: Testing of Pipeline Emergency Plans
Regulator requirements:
Demonstration that plan is adequate
Operator concerns:
Requirements are open to wide interpretation
Joint Work (Operators/LAs/HSE):Define ScopeIdentify preferred method of testingDevelop ACoP
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Issue: One Call System
Operator concerns:
Reg 15 is not effective
Regulator requirements:
Compliance with Reg15
Joint Work:Develop effective method to reduce 3rd party hitsDevelop efficient and cost effective implementation routeInvolve all buried service operators
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Issue: Pipeline Risk AssessmentOperator concerns:
Not consistent use by all parties of methodologies and data
Regulator requirements:
Validated methodologies and data
Joint Work:Agree consistent and transparent methodologies(risk and ALARP)
Agree use of representative dataAgree transparent criteria
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Issue: Land Use PlanningRegulator requirements:
Public safety
Operator concerns:
Decisions not transparent and may not be justified
Joint Work: Risk based consultation zones for all products Transparent, justified inner, middle and outer zones Clear evaluation of allowed/not allowed developments, including risk and economic factors.
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Issue: Provision of Information Operator concerns:
What information to whom and how?
Security
Regulator requirements:
Public awareness and safety
Joint Work:Identify information and parties Agree mechanism for provision of informationRecognise security issues
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Working with the Regulator Conclusions
MHSC Working Group on Pipelines (WGP) now allows forum for discussion and joint working
WGP Working Party Risk Assessment is developing a programme of work for consideration
HSE provides advice and input to UKOPA Working Groups
Future? Open discussions and joint work to establish agreed/accepted
approaches/methodologies/data for all aspects of pipeline legislation Common understanding of base issues Mutual respect for Regulator and operator positions
Pipeline Safety ManagementPipeline Safety ManagementWhat is Pipeline Safety?Pipeline SafetyWhat Affects Pipeline Safety?What affects pipeline safety?Management and LegislationManagement and LegislationCurrent and Future IssuesWorking with the RegulatorIssue: Testing of Pipeline Emergency PlansIssue: One Call SystemIssue: Pipeline Risk AssessmentIssue: Land Use PlanningIssue: Provision of InformationWorking with the Regulator