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The Holy See vs. RosarioFacts:

Msgr. Cirilos Jr., on behalf of the petitioner and the PRC agreed to sell 3parcels of land to RamonLicup. A condition was agreed upon by the parties whereby an earnest money shall be paid by Licup and thesellers shall clear the said lots of squatters. Licup assigned his rights to Star bright Enterprises. The privaterespondent demanded the undertaking but due to the refusal of the squatters to vacate the land, Cirilos

proposed that the private respondent shall be the one to undertake the eviction or he shall return the earnestmoney. Private respondent counter proposed that it would undertake the eviction but the price of the landshall be decreased. Consequently, the earnest money was returned. Thereafter, without the notice to the

private respondent, the petitioner and PRC sold the lots to Tropicana. Private respondent filed a complaintagainst the petitioner but the latter moved to dismiss the complaint alleging that there is lack of jurisdiction

based on sovereign immunity from suit. But the private respondent argued that by entering into a businesscontract, the Holy See shed off its sovereign immunity. The DFA filed for an intervention on behalf of theHoly See.Issue: 1. Whether or not the Holy See can invoke the doctrine of immunity2. Whether or not the Holy See entered into a commercial transactionHeld:

1. The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign.Through the Papal Nuncio, its Ambassador, it has had diplomatic representation in the Philippines since1957. Moreover, the DFA has already certified the Embassy of the Holy See as a diplomatic mission to theRepublic of the Philippines, exempt from local jurisdiction and entitled to all the rights, privileges andimmunities of a diplomatic mission in the country. Hence the executive branch has already recognized andaffirmed the status of the Holy See. As such, it shall be recognized by the courts so as not to embarrass theexecutive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations.

2 .The Court has distinguished the transactions by a state with private parties as jureimperii and jure gestionis. Jure imperii has been defined as public acts of the government or the exercise of the sovereign activity thereof, while

jure gestion is are those private acts that are usually proprietary and commercialin nature .A state impliedly waves its immunity upon entering into contracts that are commercial or

proprietary in nature. However, mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot bethe ultimate test of it proprietary functions. In the case at bar, the Holy See did not buy and sell the lot in theordinary course of business. In fact, a part of the land, specifically Lot 5-A,was a donation from theArchdiocese of Manila, not for commercial purpose butfor the residence of the Papal Nuncio. The sale of Lot 5-A was not entered into for profit or gain. It merelywanted to dispose off the same because it is impossible or the petitioner to use is for the purpose of donationdue to the refusal of the squatters living on the said parcel of land to vacate it. Hence, the decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal are clothed with a governmental character. The petition was grantedand the civil case against it was dismissed.

ISSUE: Can an extradition treaty be applied retroactively?

HELD: Applying the constitutional principle, the Court has held that the prohibition applies only to criminallegislation which affects the substantial rights of the accused. This being so, there is no absolutely no merit in

petitioner's contention that the ruling of the lower court sustaining the Treaty's retroactive application withrespect to offenses committed prior to the Treaty's coming into force and effect, violates the Constitutional

prohibition against ex post facto laws. As the Court of Appeals correctly concluded, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute. It merely provides for the extradition of persons wanted for prosecution of an offense or a crime which offense or crime was already committed or consummated at the time the treaty was ra tified.

Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion, 322 SCRA 160 (2000)FACTS: On June 18, 1999 the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs arequest for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. TheGrand Jury Indictment, the warrant for his arrest, and other supporting documents for said extradition wereattached along with the request. Charges include:1. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US2. Attempt to evade or defeat tax3. Fraud by wire, radio, or television4. False statement or entries5. Election contribution in name of another The Department of Justice, through a designated panel proceeded with the technical evaluation and

assessment of the extradition treaty which they found having matters needed to be addressed. Respondent,then requested for copies of all the documents included in the extradition request and for him to be givenample time to assess it.The Secretary of Justice denied request on the ff. grounds:1. He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the completion of the evaluation. At that point in time,the DOJ is in the process of evaluating whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant law (PD1069Philippine Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-US Extradition Treaty) have been complied with by theRequesting Government. Evaluation by the DOJ of the documents is not a preliminary investigation like incriminal cases making the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in criminal prosecutioninapplicable.2. The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of the information in the documents.3. Finally, the country is bound to the Vienna c onvention on the law of treaties such that every treaty in forceis binding upon the parties.The respondent filed for petition of mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition. The RTC of NCR ruled in favor of the respondent. Secretary of Justice was made to issue a copy of the requested papers, as well as conducting

further proceedings.ISSUES:1. Whether or not private is respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing

RULING: Yes. Section 2(a) of PD 1086 defines extradition as the removal of an accused from thePhilippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enablethe requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed againsthim in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposedon him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government. Although the inquisitorial

power exercised by the Department of Justice as an administrative agency due to the failure of the DFA tocomply lacks any judicial discretion, it primarily sets the wheels for the extradition process which mayultimately result in the deprivation of the liberty of the prospective extradite. This deprivation can be effectedat two stages: The provisional arrest of the prospective extradite pending the submission of the request andthe temporary arrest of the prospective extradite during the pendency of the extradition petition in court.Clearly, there is an impending threat to a prospective extraditees liberty as early as during the evaluationstage. Because of such consequences, the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conductingan investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially criminal since such technicalassessment sets off or commences the procedure for and ultimately the deprivation of liberty of a prospectiveextradite. In essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation.There are certain constitutional rights that are ordinarily available only in criminal prosecution. But the Courthas ruled in other cases that where the investigation of an administrative proceeding may result in forfeitureof life, liberty, or property, the administrative proceedings are deemed criminal or penal, and such forfeiture

partakes the nature of a penalty. In the case at bar, similar to a preliminary investigation, the evaluation stageof the extradition proceedings which may result in the filing of an information against the respondent, can

possibly lead to his arrest, and to the deprivation of his liberty. Thus, the extraditee must be accorded due

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process rights of noticeand hearing according to Art. 3 sec 14(1) and (2), as well as Art. 3 sec 7the right of the people toinformation on matters of public concern and the corollary right to access to official records and documents.

The court held that the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation, havingconsequences which will result in deprivation of liberty of the prospectiveextradite. A favorable action in an extradition request exposes a person to eventual extradition to a foreigncountry, thus exhibiting the penal aspect of the process.

The evaluation process itself is like a preliminary investigation since both procedures may have the sameresult the arrest and imprisonment of the respondent. The basic rights of notice and hearing are applicable

in criminal, civil and administrative proceedings. Nonobservanceof these rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending caseaffecting their interests, and upon notice, may claim the rightto appear therein and present their side.Rights to notice and hearing: Dispensable in 3 cases:a.When there is an urgent need for immediate action (preventive suspension in administrative charges,

padlocking filthy restaurants, cancellation of passport). b.Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, and the respondent is not prevented from enjoying theright to notice and hearing at a later time (summary distraint and levy of the property of a delinquenttaxpayer, replacement of an appointee)c.Twin rights have been offered, but the right to exercise them had not been claimed.

2. Whether or not this entitlement constitutes a breach of the legal commitments and obligation of thePhilippine Government under the RP-US Treaty?

No. The U.S. and the Philippines share mutual concern about the suppression and punishment of crime intheir respective jurisdictions. Both states accord common due process protection to their respective citizens.The administrative investigation doesnt fall under the three exceptions to the due process of notice andhearing in the Section 3 Rules 112 of the Rules of Court.

3. WON there is any conflict between private respondents basic due process rights and the provisions of the RP-US Extradition treaty

RULING: No. Doctrine of incorporation under international law, as applied in most countries, decrees thatrules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to national legislative acts.Treaty can repeal statute and statute can repeal treaty. No conflict. Veil of secrecy is lifted during trial.Request should impose veil at any stage.

Judgment: Petition dismissed for lack of merit.

Kapunan, separate concurring opinion:While the evaluation process conducted by the DOJ is not exactly a preliminary investigation of criminalcases, it is akin to a preliminary investigation because it involves the basic constitutional rights of the personsought to be extradited. A person ordered e xtradited is arrested, forcibly taken from his house, separated fromhis family and delivered to a foreign state. His rights of abode, to privacy, liberty and pursuit of happiness aretaken away from hima fate as harsh and cruel as a conviction of a criminal offense. For this reason, he isentitled to have access to the evidence against him and the right to controvert them. Puno, dissenting: Case at

bar does not involve guilt or innocence of an accused but the interpretation of an extradition treaty where atstake if our governments international obligation to surrender to a foreign state a citizen of its own so he can

be tried for an alleged offense committed within that jurisdiction. Panganiban, dissenting: Instant petitionrefers only to the evaluation

KHOSROW MINUCHER vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARTHUR SCALZOMarch 6, 2009 by raquel

FACTS:Khosrow Minucher, an Iranian national and a Labor Attach for the Iranian Embassies in Tokyo, Japan andManila came to the country to study in 1974 and continued to stay as head of the Iranian National ResistanceMovement.In May 1986, Minucher was charged with an Information for violation of Republic Act No. 6425, DangerousDrugs Act of 1972. The criminal charge followed a buy-bust operation conducted by the Philippine policenarcotic agents in his house where a quantity of heroin was said to have been seized. The narcotic agents

were accompanied by private respondent Arthur Scalzo who became one of the principal witnesses for the prosecution.In August 1988, Minucher filed Civil Case before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for damages on thetrumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo. ISSUE:WON private respondent Arthur Scalzo can be sued provided his alleged diplomatic immunity conformablywith the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations RULING:The SC DENIED the petition. Conformably with the Vienna Convention, the functions of the diplomatic mission involve, the representationof the interests of the sending state and promoting friendly relations with the receiving state. Onlydiplomatic agents, are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity from civil and criminal suits. Indeed, themain yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled to immunity is the determination of whether or not he performs duties of diplomatic nature. Being an Attache, Scalzos main function is toobserve, analyze and interpret trends and developments in their respective fields in the host country andsubmit reports to their own ministries or departments in the home government. He is not generally regardedas a member of the diplomatic mission. On the basis of an erroneous assumption that simply because of thediplomatic note, divesting the trial court of jurisdiction over his person, his diplomatic immunity iscontentious. Under the related doctrine of State Immunity from Suit, the precept that a State cannot be sued in the courtsof a foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary international law. If the acts giving rise to a suit arethose of a foreign government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, butacting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign fromsuit without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The

proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under themaxim par in parem, non habet imperium that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdictionover one another. The implication is that if the judgment against an official would require the state itself to

perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay thedamages decreed against him, the suit must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not

been formally impleadedA foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as itcan be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state. The consent of the host state isan indispensable requirement of basic courtesy between the two sovereigns.The buy-bust operation and other such acts are indication that the Philippine government has given itsimprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United StatesDrug Enforcement Agency. In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-

buyer during the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against

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Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties.

PAUL JOSEPH WRIGHT vs. CA, G.R. No. 113213 August 15, 1994Australia and the Government of the Philippines in the suppression of crime, entered into a Treaty of Extradition on the 7th of March 1988. The said treaty was ratified in accordance with the provisions of Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution in a Resolution adopted by the Senate on September 10,1990 and became effective 30 days after both States notified each other in writing that the respectiverequirements for the entry into force of the Treaty have been complied with. Petitioner contends that the

provision of the Treaty giving retroactive effect to the extradition treaty amounts to an ex post facto lawwhich violates Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Can an extradition treaty be applied retroactively?

HELD: Applying the constitutional principle, the Court has held that the prohibition applies only to criminallegislation which affects the substantial rights of the accused. This being so, there is no absolutely no merit in

petitioner's contention that the ruling of the lower court sustaining the Treaty's retroactive application withrespect to offenses committed prior to the Treaty's coming into force and effect, violates the Constitutional

prohibition against ex post facto laws. As the Court of Appeals correctly concluded, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute. It merely provides for the extradition of persons wanted for prosecution of an offense or a crime which offense or crime was already committed or consummated at the time the treaty was ra tified.

G.R. No. 99358 January 30, 1995DJUMANTAN, petitioner,vs.HON. ANDREA D. DOMINGO, COMMISSIONER OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION, HON.REGINO R. SANTIAGO and HON. JORGE V. SARMIENTO, COMMISSIONERS BUREAU OFIMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION, respondents . QUIASON, J.:This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with preliminary injunction, toreverse and set aside the Decision dated September 27, 1990 of the Commission on Immigration andDeportation (CID), ordering the deportation of petitioner and its Resolution dated January 29, 1991, denyingthe motion for reconsideration.

IBernard Banez, the husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as a contract worker.On April 3, 1974, he embraced and was converted to Islam. On May 17, 1974, he married petitioner inaccordance with Islamic rites. He returned to the Philippines in January 1979.

On January 13, 1979, petitioner and her two children with Banez, (two-year old Marina and nine-month old Nikulas) arrived in Manila as the "guests" of Banez. The latter made it appear that he was just a friend of thefamily of petitioner and was merely repaying the hospitability extended to him during his stay in Indonesia.When petitioner and her two children arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport on January 13, 1979,Banez, together with Marina Cabael, met them.Banez executed an "Affidavit of Guaranty and Support," for his "guests," stating inter alia , that:

That I am the guarantor for the entry into the Philippines of Mrs. Djumantan, 42 yearsold, and her two minor children, MARINA, 2 years old, and NIKULAS, 9 months old, allIndonesian citizens, who are coming as temporary visitors.That I am willing to guaranty them out of gratitude to their family for the hospitality they

have accorded me during the few years that I have stayed in Indonesia in connection withmy employment thereat.That I guaranty they are law abiding citizens and I guaranty their behavior while they arein the Philippines; I also guaranty their support and that they will not become a publiccharge.That I guaranty their voluntary departure upon the termination of the authorized staygranted them by the Government ( Rollo , p. 41).

As "guests," petitioner and her two children lived in the house of Banez.Petitioner and her children were admitted to the Philippines as temporary visitors under Section 9(a) of theImmigration Act of 1940.In 1981, Marina Cabael discovered the true relationship of her husband and petitioner. She filed a complaint

for "concubinage" with the Municipal Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan against the two. This case was,however, dismissed for lack of merit.On March 25, 1982, the immigration status of petitioner was changed from temporary visitor to that of

permanent resident under Section 13(a) of the same law. On April 14, 1982, petitioner was issued an aliencertificate of registration.

Not accepting the set-back, Banez' eldest son, Leonardo, filed a letter complaint with the Ombudsman, whosubsequently referred the letter to the CID. On the basis of the said letter, petitioner was detained at the CIDdetention cell. She later released pending the deportation proceedings (DEP Case No. 90-400) after posting acash bond ( Rollo , pp. 15-16). Thereafter, she manifested to the CID that she be allowed to depart voluntarilyfrom the Philippines and asked for time to purchase her airline ticket ( Rollo , p. 10). However, she a change of heart and moved for the dismissal of the deportation case on the ground that she was validly married to aFilipino citizen ( Rollo , pp. 11-12).In the Decision dated September 27, 1990, the CID, through public respondents, disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Board of Commissioners finds thesecond marriage of Bernardo Banes to respondent Djumantan irregular and not inaccordance with the laws of the Philippines. We revoke the Section 13(a) visa previouslygranted to her ( Rollo , p. 23).

Public respondents denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in their Resolution dated January 29, 1991( Rollo , pp. 31-33).Hence, this petition.We issued a temporary restraining order, directing public respondents to cease and desist from executing or implementing the Decision dated September 27, 1990 and the Resolution dated January 29, 1991 ( Rollo , pp.34-36).On September 20, 1994, Leonardo C. Banez manifested that his father died on August 14, 1994 and that heand his mother were withdrawing their objection to the granting of a permanent resident visa to petitioner ( Rollo , pp. 173-175).

IIPetitioner claims that her marriage to Banez was valid under Article 27 of P.D. No. 1085, the Muslim Code,which recognizes the practice of polyandry by Muslim males. From that premise, she argues that under Articles 109 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, Article 68 of the Family Code and Article 34 of the MuslimCode, the husband and wife are obliged to live together and under Article 110 of the Civil Code of thePhilippines, the husband is given the right to fix the conjugal residence. She claims that public respondentshave no right to order the couple to live separately ( Rollo , pp. 5-7).When asked to comment on the petition, the Solicitor General took the position that the CID could not order

petitioner's deportation because its power to do so had prescribed under Section 37 (b) of the ImmigrationAct of 1940 ( Rollo , pp. 57-74).

IIIWe need not resolve the validity of petitioner's marriage to Banez, if under the law the CID can validly deport

petitioner as an "undesirable alien" regardless of her marriage to a Filipino citizen. Therefore, to be firstresolved is the question on petitioner's immigration status, particularly the legality of her admission into thecountry and the change of her status from temporary visitor to permanent resident. Upon a finding that she

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was not lawfully admitted into the country and she did not lawfully acquire permanent residency, the nextquestion is whether the power to deport her has prescribed.There was a blatant abuse of our immigration laws in effecting petitioner's entry into the country and thechange of her immigration status from temporary visitor to permanent resident. All such privileges wereobtained through misinterpretation.

Never was the marriage of petitioner to Banez disclosed to the immigration authorities in her applications for temporary visitor's visa and for permanent residency.The civil status of an alien applicant for admission as a temporary visitor is a matter that could influence theexercise of discretion on the part of the immigration authorities. The immigration authorities would be lessinclined to allow the entry of a woman who claims to have entered into a marriage with a Filipino citizen,who is married to another woman ( Cf. Shiu Shin Man v. Galang, 3 SCRA 871 [1961]).

Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose presence is deemed inimical to the publicinterest is as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entry into the country(Annotations, 8 ALR 1286). this right is based on the fact that since the aliens are not part of the nation, their admission into the territory is a matter of pure permission and simple tolerance which creates no obligationon the part of the government to permit them to stay (3 Am. Jur. 2d. 72).The interest, which an alien has in being admitted into or allowed to continue to reside in the country, is

protected only so far as Congress may choose to protect it (United States ex rel. Kaloudis v. Shauhnessy 180F. 2d. 489).There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the right to be admitted, much less to begiven permanent residency, in the Philippines.The fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not withdraw her from the operation of the immigrationlaws governing the admission and exclusion of aliens (United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shauhnessy, 338 US537 94 L. Ed. 317, 70 S. Ct. 309 [1950]; Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 US 460 56 L. Ed. 1165, 32 S. Ct.734 [1912]; Annotations, 71 ALR 1213). Marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino husband does not ipso

facto make her a Filipino citizen and does not excuse her from her failure to depart from the country upon theexpiration of her extended stay here as an alien (Joaquin v. Galang, 33 SCRA 362 [1970]).Under Section 9 of the Immigration Act of 1940, it is not mandatory for the CID to admit any alien whoapplies for a visitor's visa. Once admitted into the country, the alien has no right to an indefinite stay. Under Section 13 of the law, an alien allowed to stay temporarily may apply for a change of status and "may beadmitted" as a permanent resident. Among those considered qualified to apply for permanent residency if thewife or husband of a Philippine citizen (Immigration Act of 1940, Sec. 13[a]). The entry of aliens into thecountry and their admission as immigrants is not a matter of right, even if they are legally married to Filipinocitizens.

IVWe now address the issue raised by the Solicitor General that the right of public respondents to deport

petitioner has prescribed, citing Section 37(b) of the Immigration Act of 1940.Said Section 37(b) provides:

Deportation may be effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of paragraph (a) of thissection at any time after entry, but shall not be effected under any clause unless the arrestin the deportation proceedings is made within five years after the cause for deportationarises. Deportation under clauses 3 and 4 shall not be effected if the court, or judgethereof, when sentencing the alien, shall recommend to the Commissioner of Immigrationthat the alien be not deported (As amended by Rep. Act No. 503).

Section 37(a) of the said law mentioned in Section 37(b) thereof provides:The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigrationafter a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation ascharged against the alien:1) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act by means of false and misleadingstatements or without inspection and admission by the immigration authorities at a designating port of entryor at any place other than at a designated port of entry.

2) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act, who was not lawfully admissibleat the time of entry;3) Any alien who, after the effective date of this Act, is convicted in the Philippines and sentenced for a termof one year or more for a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years after his entry, is soconvicted and sentenced more than once;4) Any alien who is convicted and sentenced for a violation of the law governing prohibited drugs;5) Any alien who practices prostitution or is an inmate of a house of prostitution or is connected with themanagement of a house of prostitution, or is a procurer;6) Any alien who becomes a public charge within five years after e ntry from causes not affirmatively shownto have arisen subsequent to entry;7) Any alien who remains in the Philippines in violation of any limitation or condition under which he was

admitted a non-immigrant;8) Any alien who believes in, advises, advocates or teaches the overthrow by force and violence of theGovernment of the Philippines, or of constituted law and authority, or who disbelieves in or is opposed toorganized government, or who advises, advocates, or teaches the assault or a ssassination of public officials

because of their office, or who advises, advocates, or teaches the unlawful destruction of property, or who is amember of or affiliated with any organization entertaining, advocating or teaching such doctrines, or who onany manner whatsoever lends assistance, financial or otherwise, to the dissemination of such doctrines;

9) Any alien who commits any of the acts described in Sections forty-five and forty-sixof this Act, independent of criminal action which may be brought against him: Provided ,That in the case of an alien who, for any reason, is convicted and sentenced to suffer bothimprisonment and deportation, said alien shall first serve the entire period of hisimprisonment before he is actually deported: Provided, however , That the imprisonmentmay be waived by the Commissioner of Immigration with the consent of the DepartmentHead, and upon payment by the alien concerned of such amount as the Commissioner may fix and approved by the Department Head, and upon payment by the alien concernedof such amount as the Commissioner may fix and approved by the Department Head (asamended by R.A. No. 144);10) Any alien who, at any time within five years after entry, shall have been convicted of violating the provisions of the Philippine Commonwealth Act Numbered Six hundred andfifty-three, otherwise known as the Philippine Alien Registration Act of 1941 (nowRepublic Act No. 562), or who, at any time after entry, shall have been convicted morethan once of violating the provisions of the same Act;11) Any alien who engages in profiteering, hoarding, or black-marketing, independent of any criminal action which may be brought against him;12) Any alien who is convicted of any offense penalized under Commonwealth Act

Numbered Four hundred and seventy-three, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Laws of the Philippines, or any law relating to acquisition of Philippinecitizenship;13) Any alien who defrauds his creditor by absconding or alienating properties, to

prevent them from being attached or executed.Under clause 1 of Section 37(a), an "alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act bymeans of false and misleading statements or without inspection and admission by the immigration authoritiesat a designated port of entry or at any place other than at a designated port of entry" is subject to deportation.The deportation of an alien under said clause of Section 37(a) has a prescriptive period and "shall not beeffected ... unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five years after the cause for deportation arises" (Immigration Act of 1940, Sec. 37[b]).Congress may impose a limitation of time for the deportation of alien from the country (Costanzo v.Tillinghast, 287 US 341 77 L. Ed. 350, 53 S. Ct. 152 [1932]; Guiney v. Bonham [CA 9] 261 F. 582, 8 ALR 1282).In Board of Commissioners (CID) v. Dela Rosa , 197 SCRA 853 (1991), we held that under Section 37(b) of the Immigration Act of 1940, the deportation of an alien may be barred after the lapse of five years after the

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cause of deportation arises. Justice Feliciano, in his dissenting opinion, qualified the broad statement of thelaw as follows:

Examination of the above quoted Section 37 (b) shows that the five (5) year limitation isapplicable only where deportation is sought to be effected under clauses of Section 37 (a)other than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12; that where deportation or exclusion is sought to beeffected under clauses of Section 37(a), no period of limitation is applicable; and that tothe contrary, deportation or exclusion may be effected "at any time after entry."

Justice Davide, in his dissenting opinion, clarified: Note that the five-year period applies only to clauses other than 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of paragraph (a) of theSection. In respect to clauses 2, 7, 8, 11, and 12, the limitation does not apply.In Lam Shee v . Bengzon , 93 Phil. 1065 (1953), the alien admitted that she had gained entrance into the

Philippines fraudulently by making use of the name of a Chinese resident-merchant other than that of her lawful husband. The Court, however, held that she could no longer be deported "for the simple reason thatmore than 5 years had elapsed from the date of her admission."The right of public respondents to deport petitioner has prescribed.Petitioner was admitted and allowed entry into the Philippines on January 13, 1979 on the basis of false andmisleading statements in her application and in the other supporting documents submitted to the immigrationauthorities. Leonardo C. Banez first complained with the CID on November 19, 1980 about the manner

petitioner was admitted into the country and asked for her deportation ( Rollo, pp. 77-78). After the EDSARevolution, he sent a follow-up letter to the CID requesting action on his 1980 letter-complaint ( Rollo, p. 78).Tolling the prescriptive period from November 19, 1980, when Leonardo C. Banez informed the CID of theillegal entry of petitioner into the country, more than five years had elapsed before the issuance of the order of her deportation on September 27, 1990.In their Comment, public respondents urged that what is barred under Section 37(b) is the deportation of analien and claimed that what they ordered was not the deportation of petitioner but merely the revocation of Section 13(a) which refers to the visa previously granted her ( Rollo , p. 102).The "arrest" contemplated by Section 37(b) refers to the arrest for the purpose of carrying out an order for deportation and not the arrest prior to proceedings to determine the right of the alien to stay in the country.When public respondents revoked the permanent residence visa issued to petitioner, they, in effect, orderedher arrest and deportation as an overstaying alien.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the temporary restraining order issued on June 4, 1991 isMADE PERMANENT.The Decision of the Board of Commissioners dated September 27, 1990 revoking the issuance of the

permanent resident visa to petitioner and the Resolution dated January 29, 1991 are REVERSED.SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 139465. October 17, 2000]SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional

Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ, respondents.

On January 18, 2000, by a vote of 9-6, we dismissed the petition at bar and ordered the petitioner to

furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant him areasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence .[1]

On February 3, 2000, the petitioner timely filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. He assails thedecision on the following grounds:

"The majority decision failed to appreciate the following facts and points of substance and of value which, if considered, would alter the result of the case, thus:

I. There is a substantial difference between an evaluation process antecedent to the filing of an extradition

petition in court and a preliminary investigation.II. Absence of notice and hearing during the evaluation process will not result in a denial of fundamentalfairness.III. In the evaluation process, instituting a notice and hearing requirement satisfies no higher objective.IV. The deliberate omission of the notice and hearing requirement in the Philippine Extradition Law isintended to prevent flight.V. There is a need to balance the interest between the discretionary powers of government and the rights of an individual.VI. The instances cited in the assailed majority decision when the twin rights of notice and hearing may bedispensed with in this case results in a non sequitur conclusion.VII. Jimenez is not placed in imminent danger of arrest by the Executive Branch necessitating notice and

hearing.VIII. By instituting a 'proceeding' not contemplated by PD No. 1069, the Supreme Court has encroachedupon the constitutional boundaries separating it from the other two co-equal branches of government.IX. Bail is not a matter of right in proceedings leading to extradition or in extradition proceedings." [2]

On March 28, 2000, a 58-page Comment was filed by the private respondent Mark B. Jimenez,opposing petitioners Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.

On April 5, 2000, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Allow Continuation and Maintenance of Actionand Filing of Reply. Thereafter, petitioner filed on June 7, 2000 a Manifestation with the attached Note327/00 from the Embassy of Canada and Note No. 34 from the Security Bureau of the Hongkong SAR Government Secretariat. On August 15, 2000, private respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion for Leaveto File Rejoinder in the event that petitioner's April 5, 2000 Motion would be granted. Private respondent alsofiled on August 18, 2000, a Motion to Expunge from the records petitioner's June 7, 2000 Manifestation withits attached note verbales. Except for the Motion to Allow Continuation and Maintenance of Action, theCourt denies these pending motions and hereby resolves petitioner's Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.

The jugular issue is whether or not the private respondent is entitled to the due process right to noticeand hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.

We now hold that private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluationstage of the extradition process.

First . P.D. No. 1069 [3] which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty provides the time when anextraditee shall be furnished a copy of the petition for extradition as well as its supporting papers, i.e. , after the filing of the petition for extradition in the extradition court, viz :

"Sec. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing; Service of Notices . - (1) Immediately uponreceipt of the petition, the presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as practicable, summon the accused toappear and to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order . . . Upon receipt of the answer, or should the accused after having received the summons fail to answer within the time fixed, the presiding

judge shall hear the case or set another date for the hearing thereof.

(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be promptly served eachupon the accused and the attorney having charge of the case."

It is of judicial notice that the summons includes the petition for extradition which will be answered bythe extraditee.

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There is no provision in the RP-US Extradition Treaty and in P.D. No. 1069 which gives an extraditeethe right to demand from the petitioner Secretary of Justice copies of the extradition request from the USgovernment and its supporting documents and to comment thereon while the request is stillundergoing evaluation . We cannot write a provision in the treaty giving private respondent that right wherethere is none. It is well-settled that a "court cannot alter, amend, or add to a treaty by the insertion of anyclause, small or great, or dispense with any of its conditions and requirements or take away any qualification,or integral part of any stipulation, upon any motion of equity, or general convenience, or substantial

justice." [4]

Second . All treaties, including the RP-US Extradition Treaty, should be interpreted in light of theirintent . Nothing less than the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to which the Philippines is a

signatory provides that "a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose ."[5] (emphasissupplied) The preambular paragraphs of P.D. No. 1069 define its intent, viz :

"WHEREAS, under the Constitution[,] the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,cooperation and amity with all nations;

WHEREAS, the suppression of crime is the concern not only of the state where it is committed but also of any other state to which the criminal may have escaped, because it saps the foundation of social life and is anoutrage upon humanity at large, and it is in the interest of civilized communities that crimes should not gounpunished;

WHEREAS, in recognition of this principle the Philippines recently concluded an extradition treaty with theRepublic of Indonesia, and intends to conclude similar treaties with other interested countries;

x x x." (emphasis supplied)

It cannot be gainsaid that today, countries like the Philippines forge extradition treaties to arrest the dramaticrise of international and transnational crimes like terrorism and drug trafficking.Extradition treaties providethe assurance that the punishment of these crimes will not be frustrated by the frontiers of territorialsovereignty. Implicit in the treaties should be the unbending commitment that the perpetrators of these crimeswill not be coddled by any signatory state.

It ought to follow that the RP-US Extradition Treaty calls for an interpretation that will minimize if not prevent the escape of extraditees from the long arm of the law and expedite their trial. The submission of the private respondent, that as a probable extraditee under the RP-US Extradition Treaty he should be furnished acopy of the US government request for his extradition and its supporting documents even while they are stillunder evaluation by petitioner Secretary of Justice, does not meet this desideratum. The fear of the petitioner Secretary of Justice that the demanded notice is equivalent to a notice to flee must be deeply rooted on theexperience of the executive branch of our government. As it comes from the branch of our government incharge of the faithful execution of our laws, it deserves the careful consideration of this Court. In addition, itcannot be gainsaid that private respondents demand for advance notice can delay the summary process of executive evaluation of the extradition request and its accompanying papers. The foresight of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes did not miss this danger. In 1911, he held:

"It is common in extradition cases to attempt to bring to bear all the factitious niceties of a criminal trial atcommon law. But it is a waste of time . . . if there is presented, even in somewhat untechnical formaccording to our ideas, such reasonable ground to suppose him guilty as to make it proper that he should be

tried, good faith to the demanding government requires his surrender ."[6] (emphasis supplied)

We erode no right of an extraditee when we do not allow time to stand still on his prosecution. Justice is bestserved when done without delay.

Third . An equally compelling factor to consider is the understanding of the parties themselves to theRP-US Extradition Treaty as well as the general interpretation of the issue in question by other countrieswith similar treaties with the Philippines . The rule is recognized that while courts have the power tointerpret treaties, the meaning given them by the departments of government particularly charged with their negotiation and enforcement is accorded great weight .[7] The reason for the rule is laid down in Santos III v.

Northwest Orient Airlines, et al. ,[8] where we stressed that a treaty is a joint executive-legislative act whichenjoys the presumption that "it was first carefully studied and determined to be constitutional before it wasadopted and given the force of law in the country."

Our executive department of government, thru the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and theDepartment of Justice (DOJ), has steadfastly maintained that the RP-US Extradition Treaty and P.D. No.1069 do not grant the private respondent a right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of anextradition process. [9] This understanding of the treaty is shared by the US government, the other partyto the treaty. [10] This interpretation by the two governments cannot be given scant significance. It will be

presumptuous for the Court to assume that both governments did not understand the terms of the treaty theyconcluded.

Yet, this is not all. Other countries with similar extradition treaties with the Philippines haveexpressed the same interpretation adopted by the Philippine and US governments. Canadian [11] andHongkong [12] authorities, thru appropriate note verbales communicated to our Department of Foreign Affairs,

stated in unequivocal language that it is not an international practice to afford a potential extraditee with acopy of the extradition papers during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. We cannot disregardsuch a convergence of views unless it is manifestly erroneous.

Fourth . Private respondent, however, peddles the postulate that he must be afforded the right to noticeand hearing as required by our Constitution. He buttresses his position by likening an extradition proceedingto a criminal proceeding and the evaluation stage to a preliminary investigation.

We are not persuaded. An extradition proceeding is sui generis . It is not a criminal proceeding whichwill call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.To begin with, theprocess of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused .[13] Hisguilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule,constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot beinvoked by an extraditee especially by one whose extradition papers are still undergoing evaluation. [14] Asheld by the US Supreme Court in United States v. Galanis :

"An extradition proceeding is not a criminal prosecution, and the constitutional safeguards that accompany acriminal trial in this country do not shield an accused from extradition pursuant to a valid treaty." [15]

There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminal proceeding. An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial. [16]In contradistinctionto a criminal proceeding, the rules of evidence in an extradition proceeding allow admission of evidenceunder less stringent standards .[17] In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires

proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction [18] while a fugitive may be ordered extradited "upon showing of

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the existence of a prima facie case." [19]Finally, unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executoryupon being rendered final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual extraditable butthe President has the final discretion to extradite him. [20] The United States adheres to a similar practicewhereby the Secretary of State exercises wide discretion in balancing the equities of the case and thedemands of the nation's foreign relations before making the ultimate decision to extradite .[21]

As an extradition proceeding is not criminal in character and the evaluation stage in anextradition proceeding is not akin to a preliminary investigation, the due process safeguards in thelatter do not necessarily apply to the former. This we hold for the procedural due process required by agiven set of circumstances "must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the governmentfunction involved as well as the private interest that has been affected by governmental action ."[22] The

concept of due process is flexible for "not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the samekind of procedure." [23]

Fifth . Private respondent would also impress upon the Court the urgency of his right to notice andhearing considering the alleged threat to his liberty "which may be more priceless than life." [24] The supposedthreat to private respondents liberty is perceived to come from several provisions of the RP-US ExtraditionTreaty and P.D. No. 1069 which allow provisional arrest and temporary detention.

We first deal with provisional arrest. The RP-US Extradition Treaty provides as follows:

"PROVISIONAL ARREST1. In case of urgency, a Contracting Party may request the provisional arrest of the person sought pendingpresentation of the request for extradition . A request for provisional arrest may be transmitted through thediplomatic channel or directly between the Philippine Department of Justice and the United StatesDepartment of Justice.2. The application for provisional arrest shall contain:

a) a description of the person sought; b) the location of the person sought, if known;c) a brief statement of the facts of the case, including, if possible, the time and location of the

offense;d) a description of the laws violated;e) a statement of the existence of a warrant of arrest or finding of guilt or judgment of conviction

against the person sought; andf) a statement that a request for extradition for the person sought will follow.

3. The Requesting State shall be notified without delay of the disposition of its application and the reasons for any denial.4. A person who is provisionally arrested may be discharged from custody upon the expiration of sixty (60)days from the date of arrest pursuant to this Treaty if the executive authority of the Requested State has notreceived the formal request for extradition and the supporting documents required in Article 7." (emphasissupplied)

In relation to the above, Section 20 of P.D. No. 1069 provides:

"Sec. 20. Provisional Arrest .- (a) In case of urgency, the requesting state may, pursuant to the re levant treatyor convention and while the same remains in force, request for the provisional arrest of the accused, pendingreceipt of the request for extradition made in accordance with Section 4 of this Decree.

(b) A request for provisional arrest shall be sent to the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation,Manila, either through the diplomatic channels or direct by post or telegraph.

(c) The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation or any official acting on his behalf shall upon receiptof the request immediately secure a warrant for the provisional arrest of the accused from the presiding judgeof the Court of First Instance of the province or city having jurisdiction of the place, who shall issue thewarrant for the provisional arrest of the accused. The Director of the National Bureau of Investigationthrough the Secretary of Foreign Affairs shall inform the requesting state of the result of its request.

(d) If within a period of 20 days after the provisional arrest the Secretary of Foreign Affairs has not receivedthe request for extradition and the documents mentioned in Section 4 of this Decree, the accused shall bereleased from custody." (emphasis supplied)

Both the RP-US Extradition Treaty and P.D. No. 1069 clearly provide that private respondent may be

provisionally arrested only pending receipt of the request for extradition . Our DFA has long received theextradition request from the United States and has turned it over to the DOJ. It is undisputed that until today,the United States has not requested for private respondents provisional arrest. Therefore, the threat to privaterespondents liberty has passed. It is more imagined than real.

Nor can the threat to private respondents liberty come from Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069, which provides:

"Sec. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing, Service of Notices.- (1) Immediately upon receiptof the petition, the presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as practicable, summon the accused to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order. [H]e may issue a warrant for theimmediate arrest of the accused which may be served anywhere within the Philippines if it appears to the

presiding judge that the immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will best serve theends of justice. . .

(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be promptly served eachupon the accused and the attorney having charge of the case." (emphasis supplied)

It is evident from the above provision that a warrant of arrest for the temporary detention of the accused pending the extradition hearing may only be issued by the presiding judge of the extradition court upon filingof the petition for extradition. As the extradition process is still in the evaluation stage of pertinentdocuments and there is no certainty that a petition for extradition will be filed in the appropriate extraditioncourt, the threat to private respondents liberty is merely hypothetical.

Sixth. To be sure, private respondents plea for due process deserves serious consideration involving asit does his primordial right to liberty. His plea to due process, however, collides with important stateinterests which cannot also be ignored for they serve the interest of the greater majority. The clash of rights demands a delicate balancing of interests approach which is a "fundamental postulate of constitutionallaw." [25] The approach requires that we "take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interestsobservable in a given situation or type of situation." [26] These interests usually consist in the exercise by anindividual of his basic freedoms on the one hand, and the governments promotion of fundamental publicinterest or policy objectives on the other .[27]

In the case at bar, on one end of the balancing pole is the private respondents claim to due process predicated on Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which provides that "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law . . ." Without a bubble of doubt, procedural due process of law lies at the foundation of a civilized society which accords paramount importance to justice and fairness. Ithas to be accorded the weight it deserves.

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This brings us to the other end of the balancing pole. Petitioner avers that the Court should give moreweight to our national commitment under the RP-US Extradition Treaty to expedite the extradition to theUnited States of persons charged with violation of some of its laws. Petitioner also emphasizes the need todefer to the judgment of the Executive on matters relating to foreign affairs in order not to weaken if notviolate the principle of separation of powers.

Considering that in the case at bar, the extradition proceeding is only at its evaluation stage, thenature of the right being claimed by the private respondent is nebulous andthe degree of prejudice hewill allegedly suffer is weak, we accord greater weight to the interests espoused by the government thruthe petitioner Secretary of Justice. In Angara v. Electoral Commission , we held that the "Constitution has

blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the

judicial departments of the government."[28]

Under our constitutional scheme, executive power is vested in thePresident of the Philippines. [29] Executive power includes, among others, the power to contract or guaranteeforeign loans and the power to enter into treaties or international agreements .[30] The task of safeguardingthat these treaties are duly honored devolves upon the executive department which has the competence andauthority to so act in the international arena .[31] It is traditionally held that the President has power and evensupremacy over the countrys foreign relations .[32] The executive department is aptly accorded deference onmatters of foreign relations considering the Presidents most comprehensive and most confidentialinformation about the international scene of which he is regularly briefed by our diplomatic and consular officials. His access to ultra-sensitive military intelligence data is also unlimited. [33] The deference we give tothe executive department is dictated by the principle of separation of powers. This principle is one of thecornerstones of our democratic government. It cannot be eroded without endangering our government.

The Philippines also has a national interest to help in suppressing crimes and one way to do it is tofacilitate the extradition of persons covered by treaties duly entered by our government.More and more,crimes are becoming the concern of one world. Laws involving crimes and crime prevention are undergoing

universalization. One manifest purpose of this trend towards globalization is to deny easy refuge to a criminalwhose activities threaten the peace and progress of civilized countries. It is to the great interest of thePhilippines to be part of this irreversible movement in light of its vulnerability to crimes, especiallytransnational crimes.

In tilting the balance in favor of the interests of the State, the Court stresses that it is not rulingthat the private respondent has no right to due process at all throughout the length and breadth of theextrajudicial proceedings. Procedural due process requires a determination of what process is due, when itis due, and the degree of what is due. Stated otherwise, a prior determination should be made as towhether procedural protections are at all due and when they are due, which in turn depends on theextent to which an individual will be "condemned to suffer grievous loss ."[34] We have explained why anextraditee has no right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. Asaforesaid, P.D. No. 1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty affords an extraditee sufficientopportunity to meet the evidence against him once the petition is filed in court . The time for the extraditeeto know the basis of the request for his extradition is merely moved to the filing in court of the formal

petition for extradition. The extraditee's right to know is momentarily withheld during the evaluationstage of the extradition process to accommodate the more compelling interest of the State to prevent escapeof potential extraditees which can be precipitated by premature information of the basis of the request for hisextradition. No less compelling at that stage of the extradition proceedings is the need to be more deferentialto the judgment of a co-equal branch of the government, the Executive, which has been endowed by our Constitution with greater power over matters involving our foreign relations. Needless to state, this balanceof interests is not a static but a moving balance which can be adjusted as the extradition process movesfrom the administrative stage to the judicial stage and to the execution stage depending on factors that willcome into play. In sum, we rule that the temporary hold on private respondent's privilege of notice andhearing is a soft restraint on his right to due process which will not deprive him of fundamental

fairness should he decide to resist the request for his extradition to the United States. There is no denial of due process as long as fundamental fairness is assured a party .

We end where we began. A myopic interpretation of the due process clause would not suffice to resolvethe conflicting rights in the case at bar. With the global village shrinking at a rapid pace, propelled as it is bytechnological leaps in transportation and communication, we need to push further back our horizons andwork with the rest of the civilized nations and move closer to the universal goals of "peace, equality, justice,freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations." [35] In the end, it is the individual who will reap the harvestof peace and prosperity from these efforts.

WHEREFORE , the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. The Decision in the case at bar promulgated on January18, 2000 is REVERSED. The assailed Order issued by the public respondent judgeon August 9, 1999 is SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on August 17, 1999is made PERMANENT. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25 is enjoined from conducting further

proceedings in Civil Case No. 99-94684.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 148571. September 24, 2002]GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, petitioner,

vs. Hon. GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN, Morales, and Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42;and MARK B. JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARIO BATACAN CRESPO, respondents.

D E C I S I O NPANGANIBAN, J.:

In extradition proceedings, are prospective extraditees entitled to notice and hearing before warrants for their arrest can be issued? Equally important, are they entitled to the right to bail and provisional libertywhile the extradition proceedings are pending? In general, the answer to these two novel questions isNo. The explanation of and the reasons for, as well as the exceptions to, this rule are laid out in thisDecision.

The CaseBefore us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to void and set aside

the Orders dated May 23, 2001 [1] and July 3, 2001 [2] issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,Branch 42. [3] The first assailed Order set for hearing petitioners application for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Respondent Mark B. Jimenez.

The second challenged Order, on the other hand, directed the issuance of a warrant, but at the sametime granted bail to Jimenez. The dispositive portion of the Order reads as follows:WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the [Court] finds probable cause against respondent Mark Jimenez. Accordingly let a Warrant for the arrest of the respondent be issued. Consequently and taking intoconsideration Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, this Court fixes the reasonableamount of bail for respondents temporary liberty at ONE MILLION PESOS (Php 1,000,000.00), the same to

be paid in cash.Furthermore respondent is directed to immediately surrender to this Court his passport and the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation is likewise directed to include the name of the respondent in its Hold DepartureList. [4]

Essentially, the Petition prays for the lifting of the bail Order, the cancellation of the bond, and thetaking of Jimenez into legal custody.

The FactsThis Petition is really a sequel to GR No. 139465 entitled Secretary of Justice v. Ralph C. Lantion. [5]

Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty ,[6] the United States Government, through diplomatic

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channels, sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16, 1999, supplemented by Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and 0809 and accompanied by duly authenticated documents requesting the extraditionof Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, thesecretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action,

pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1069, also known as the Extradition Law.Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary

Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25 .[7] The TRO prohibited the Department of Justice(DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition. The validity of the TRO was, however,assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before this Court in the said GR No. 139465. Initially, the Court -- by avote of 9-6 -- dismissed the Petition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish private respondent copies of theextradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file acomment and supporting evidence. [8]

Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, this Court issued its October 17, 2000Resolution .[9] By an identical vote of 9-6 -- after three justices changed their votes -- it reconsidered andreversed its earlier Decision. It held that private respondent was bereft of the right to notice and hearingduring the evaluation stage of the extradition process. This Resolution has become final and executory.

Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America, represented by thePhilippine DOJ, filed with the RTC on May 18, 2001, the appropriate Petition for Extradition which wasdocketed as Extradition Case No. 01192061. The Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on April 15,1999. The warrant had been issued in connection with the following charges in Indictment No. 99-00281CR-SEITZ: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States and to commit certain offenses in violation of Title 18US Code Section 371; (2) tax evasion, in violation of Title 26 US Code Section 7201; (3) wire fraud, inviolation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1343 and 2; (4) false statements, in violation of Title 18 US CodeSections 1001 and 2; and (5) illegal campaign contributions, in violation of Title 2 US Code Sections 441b,441f and 437g(d) and Title 18 US Code Section 2. In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition

prayed for the issuance of an order for his immediate arrest pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069.Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed before it an Urgent

Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion, [10] which prayed that petitioners application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing.

In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearingon June 5, 2001. In that hearing, petitioner manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trialcourt allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. In hisMemorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to

post bail in the amount of P100,000.The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on June 15, 2001. Thereafter, the court

below issued its questioned July 3, 2001 Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. [11] After he had surrendered his passport and postedthe required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the challenged Order dated July 4, 2001.[12]

Hence, this Petition .[13]

IssuesPetitioner presents the following issues for the consideration of this Court:

I.The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amountingto lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first hearing a potential extraditee before issuingan arrest warrant under Section 6 of PD No. 1069.

II.The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amountingto lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail and in allowing Jimenez to go on provisionalliberty because:

1. An extradition court has no power to authorize bail, in the absence of any law that provides for such power.2. Section 13, Article III (right to bail clause) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and Section 4, Rule 114(Bail) of the Rules of Court, as amended, which [were] relied upon, cannot be used as bases for allowing bailin extradition proceedings.3. The presumption is against bail in extradition proceedings or proceedings leading to extradition.4. On the assumption that bail is available in extradition proceedings or proceedings leading to extradition,

bail is not a matter of right but only of discretion upon clear showing by the applicant of the existence of special circumstances.5. Assuming that bail is a matter of discretion in extradition proceedings, the public respondent received noevidence of special circumstances which may justify release on bail.6. The risk that Jimenez will flee is high, and no special circumstance exists that will engender a well-founded belief that he will not flee.7. The conditions attached to the grant of bail are ineffectual and do not ensure compliance by thePhilippines with its obligations under the RP-US Extradition Treaty.8. The Court of Appeals Resolution promulgated on May 10, 2001 in the case entitled Eduardo T.

Rodriguez et al. vs. The Hon. Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 17, Manila, CA-G.R. SP No. 64589, reliedupon by the public respondent in granting bail, had been recalled before the issuance of the subject bailorders. [14]

In sum, the substantive questions that this Court will address are: (1) whether Jimenez is entitled tonotice and hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be issued, and (2) whether he is entitled to bail and to

provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending. Preliminarily, we shall take up the alleged prematurity of the Petition for Certiorari arising from petitioners failure to file a Motion for Reconsiderationin the RTC and to seek relief in the Court of Appeals (CA), instead of in this Court. [15] We shall also

preliminarily discuss five extradition postulates that will guide us in disposing of the substantive issues.The Courts Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.Preliminary Matters

Alleged Prematurity of Present PetitionPetitioner submits the following justifications for not filing a Motion for Reconsideration in the

Extradition Court: (1) the issues were fully considered by such court after requiring the parties to submittheir respective memoranda and position papers on the matter and thus, the filing of a reconsideration motionwould serve no useful purpose; (2) the assailed orders are a patent nullity, absent factual and legal basistherefor; and (3) the need for relief is extremely urgent, as the passage of sufficient time would give Jimenezample opportunity to escape and avoid extradition; and (4) the issues raised are purely of law. [16]

For resorting directly to this Court instead of the CA, petitioner submits the following reasons: (1)even if the petition is lodged with the Court of Appeals and such appellate court takes cognizance of theissues and decides them, the parties would still bring the matter to this Honorable Court to have the issuesresolved once and for all [and] to have a binding precedent that all lower courts ought to follow; (2) theHonorable Court of Appeals had in one case [17] ruled on the issue by disallowing bail but the court belowrefused to recognize the decision as a judicial guide and all other courts might likewise adopt the sameattitude of refusal; and (3) there are pending issues on bail both in the extradition courts and the Court of

Appeals, which, unless guided by the decision that this Honorable Court will render in this case, wouldresolve to grant bail in favor of the potential extraditees and would give them opportunity to flee and thus,cause adverse effect on the ability of the Philippines to comply with its obligations under existing extraditiontreaties. [18]

As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a higher court will not prosper unless the inferior courthas been given, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors imputed to it. This rule,though, has certain exceptions: (1) when the issue raised is purely of law, (2) when public interest isinvolved, or (3) in case of urgency. [19] As a fourth exception, the Court has also ruled that the filing of amotion for reconsideration before availment of the remedy of certiorari is not a sine qua non, when thequestions raised are the same as those that have already been squarely argued and exhaustively passed upon

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by the lower court. [20] Aside from being of this nature, the issues in the present case also involve purequestions of law that are of public interest. Hence, a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with.

Likewise, this Court has allowed a direct invocation of its original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari when there are special and important reasons therefor. [21] In Fortich v. Corona [22] we stated:[T]he Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly[before] it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant. This has beenthe judicial policy to be observed and which has been reiterated in subsequent cases, namely: Uy vs.Contreras, et. al., Torres vs. Arranz , Bercero vs. De Guzman , and, Advincula vs. Legaspi, et . al . As we havefurther stated in Cuaresma :x x x. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowedonly when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the

petition. This is established policy. x x x.Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the present petition in theinterest of speedy justice and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put an end to the presentcontroversy which, as correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked national interest because of themagnitude of the problem created by the issuance of the assailed resolution. Moreover, x x x requiring the

petitioners to file their petition first with the Court of Appeals would only result in a waste of time andmoney.That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher interests of justice is well-entrenched inour jurisprudence. We reiterate what we said in Piczon vs. Court of Appeals: [23]

Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided. Time and again, this Court has suspended its own rulesand excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so require. In theinstant petition, we forego a lengthy disquisition of the proper procedure that should have been taken by the

parties involved and proceed directly to the merits of the case.In a number of other exceptional cases, [24] we held as follows:

This Court has original jurisdiction, concurrent with that of Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals,over petitions for certiorari , prohibition, mandamus , quo warranto and habeas corpus , and we entertaindirect resort to us in cases where special and important reasons or exceptional and compelling circumstances

justify the same.In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important issue of bail in extradition

proceedings, we deem it best to take cognizance of the present case. Such proceedings constitute a matter of first impression over which there is, as yet, no local jurisprudence to guide lower courts.Five Postulates of Extradition

The substantive issues raised in this case require an interpretation or construction of the treaty and thelaw on extradition. A cardinal rule in the interpretation of a treaty or a law is to ascertain and give effect toits intent. [25] Since PD 1069 is intended as a guide for the implementation of extradition treaties to which thePhilippines is a signatory ,[26] understanding certain postulates of extradition will aid us in properly decidingthe issues raised here.

1. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime. First , extradition treaties are entered into for the purpose of suppressing crime [27] by facilitating the

arrest and the custodial transfer [28]

of a fugitive[29]

from one state to the other.With the advent of easier and faster means of international travel, the flight of affluent criminals from

one country to another for the purpose of committing crime and evading prosecution has become morefrequent. Accordingly, governments are adjusting their methods of dealing with criminals and crimes thattranscend international boundaries.

Today, a majority of nations in the world community have come to look upon extradition as the major effective instrument of international co-operation in the suppression of crime . [30] It is the only regular systemthat has been devised to return fugitives to the jurisdiction of a court competent to try them in accordancewith municipal and international law. [31]

An important practical effect