Kuroda vs. Jalandoni EO 68, establishing a national War Crimes Ofce, prescribing rules and regulations governing the trial of accused war criminals.In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law that all those persons military or civilian, who have been guilty of planning, preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization, are held accountable therefor. The promulgation of the EO is an exercise of the Presidents power as commander-in-chief of all our armed forces. Re: Philippines is not a signatory of the Hague and Geneva conventions It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva Conventions form, part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principles of international law. In fact, these rules and principles were accepted by the 2 belligerent nations, the US and Japan, who were signatories of the 2 conventions. Such rule and principles, therefore, form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not conned to the recognition of rule and principle of international law as continued in treaties to which our govt may have been or shall be a signatory. Crimes were committed when PH was still under the sovereignty of US. Our sovereignty as a free state entitles us to enforce the right on our own of trying and punishing those who committed crimes against our people. Laurel vs. Misa: The change of our form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during then Commonwealth because it is an offense against the same sovereign people. Manuel Roxas; Judge Advocate General; within ththete ofce of the Judge Advocate General of the Army of the Philippines; maintained direct liaison with the Legal Section General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Power (MacArthur)PERFECTO DISSENTING Enactment of EO 68 constituted usurpation of legislative power. Respondents argued that it was in the exercise of the Presidents emergency powers granted by CA 600, 620, and 671. These CAs cannot be validly invoked. EO was issued on July 29, 1947. Said acts had elapsed upon the liberation of the Philippines from the Japanese forces or at the latest, when the surrender of Japan was signed in Tokyo on Sept. 2, 1945. It has never been the purpose of the National Assembly, in enacting the CAs, to extend the delegation beyond the emergency created by the war as to extend it farther would be violative of the express provision of the Constitution. EO is equally offensive to the Constitution because it violated the fundamental guarantees of the due process and equal protection of the law. It is especially so, because it permits the admission of many kinds of evidence by which no innocent person can afford to get acquittal and by which it is impossible to determine whether an accused is guilty or not beyond all reasonable doubt. (e.g. V.d.5. All purposed confessions or statements of the accused shall be admissible in evidence without any showing that they were voluntarily made)Yamashita vs. StyerTomoyuki Yamashita, commanding general of the 14th army group of the Japanese Imperial Army, was charged before the American Military Commission, despite surrendering as a prisoner of war. The petition (habeas corpus and prohibition) at bar contends that the Military Commission does not have jurisdiction, and that Yamashitas status should be converted back as a prisoner of war. SC decided that the Military Commission has jurisdiction because there was still a state of war. Kookooritchkin vs. SolGen Kookoorictchkin led a petition for naturalization. The hearing was set on December 18, but the province was invaded by Japanese forces on December 14, and the case remained pending until the records were destroyed during the military operations for liberation in March 1945. The case was reconstituted, and the petition granted. Invoked CA 473, as amended by Act 535 Native-born Russian. Refused to join the Bolshevik regime. Became Guerilla ofcer. Married to Filipina, Concepcion Segovia. Denounced Soviet Russia. SolGen questions the granting of his petition.! No documentary or testimonial evidence was introduced to establish the fact that appellee had been lawfully admitted into the Philippines for permanent residence.! Attachment of certicate of arrival is essential to the validity of a declaration.! The undisputed fact that the petitioner has been continuously residing in the Philippines for about 25 years, without having been molested by the authorities, who are presumed to have been regularly performing their duties and would have arrested petitioner if his residence is illega, can be taken as evidence that he is enjoying permanent residence legally. ! Petitioner has failed to show that under the laws of Russia, appellee has lost his Russian citizenship and failed to show that Russia grants to Filipinos the right to become a naturalized citizen therof. The controversy centers on the question as the W/N petitioner is a Russian citizen or is stateless.! Kookooritchkin, as a stateless citizen, is also entitled to naturalization. (We do not do harsh things to each other). Appellee's testimony, besides being uncontradicted, is supported by the wellknown fact that the ruthlessness of modern dictatorship has scattered throughout the world a large number of stateless refugees or displaced persons, without country and without ag. The tyrannical intolerance of said dictatorships toward all opposition induced them to resort to beastly oppression, concentration camps and blood purges, and it is only natural that the notso!fortunate ones who were able to escape to foreign countries should feel the loss of all bonds of attachment to the hells which were formerly their fatherland's. Petitioner belongs to that group of stateless refugees.Nicaragua vs. USColombia vs. Peru Colombia unilaterally decided to grant asylum to a leader of the military rebellion in Peru. Colombia cannot invoke the Havana Convention on Asylum of 1928 (Does not contain any provision conferring on the State granting asylum a unilateral competence to qualify the offence with denitive and binding force for the territorial state) and the Montevideo Convention on Political Asylum of 1933 (not ratied by Peru, thus cannot invoked against it) Conditions to grant asylum:1. It can be granted only to political offenders who are not accused or condemned for common crimes and only in urgent cases and for the time strictly indispensable for the safety of the refugee.2. Article 2, Havana Convention: The government of the State may require that the refugee be sent out of the national territory within the shortest time possible; and the diplomatic agent of the country who has granted asylum may in turn require the guarantees necessary for the departure of the refugee from the country with due regard to the inviolability of his person. > Peru had not demanded the departure of the refugee and was therefore not bound to deliver a safe conduct. Was Haya Dela Torre accused of a common crime? No. Military rebellion is not a common crime. It had not been contended by the Government of Colombia that De la Torre was in such a situation at the time when he sought refuge in the Colombian Embassy in Lima > No violent and disorderly action of irresponsible sections of the population. 3 months had already elapsed since the military rebellion. Safety The refugee is protected against arbitrary action by the government, and that he enjoys the benets of the law. New Zealand vs. France France carried out atmospheric tests of nuclear devices. These tests have cause some fallout on the New Zealand territory. According to France, the radioactive matter produced by its tests have been so innitesimal that any fall out would not be a danger to the health of the population of New Zealand. France did not want to submit to the ICJs jurisdiction, but the ICJ granted interim measures to protect New Zealand. Despite this, France continued the tests and New Zealand recorded another 2 fall outs. ICJ has inherent jurisdiction. It is derived from its mere existence as a judicial organ established by the consent of the States, and is conferred upon it in order that its basic judicial functions may be safeguarded. Declarations made by way of unilateral acts, concerning legal or factual situations, may have the effect of creating legal obligations. When it is the intention of the State making the declaration that it should become bound according to its terms, that intention confers on the declaration the character of a legal undertaking, the State being thenceforth legally required to follow a course of conduct consistent with the declaration. An undertaking of this kind, if publicly given, and with the intent to be bound, even though not made within the context of international negotiations, is binding. The intention to be bound is to be ascertained by interpretation of the act. Just as the very rule of pacta sunt servanda in the law of treaties is based on good faith, so also is the binding character of an international obligation assumed by unilateral declaration. In announcing the 1974 series of atmospheric tests would be the last, France conveyed to the world at large its intention effectively to terminate these tests. It was bound to assume that other States might take note of these statements and rely on their being effective.Australia vs. France Declarations made by states, oral or written, are legal obligations.Legality of the Use of Nuclear Weapons The Paquete Habana Capture of the shing smacks and taking the sh they captured as prize of war, were unlawful and without probable cause.Right of Passage (Portugal vs. India) Portugal did not have the right of passage in respect of armed forces, armed police, and arms and ammunition. India had not acted contrary to its obligations resulting from Portugals right of passage in respect of private persons, civil ofcials, and goods in general. When the British became the sovereign in India, Portuguese sovereignty was tacitly recognized in those areas. With regard to private persons, civil ofcials, and goods in general, there existed during the British and post-British periods a constant and uniform practice allowing free passage between Daman and enclaves. That that practice was accepted as law by the parties and has given rise to a right and correlative obligation, India has to grant a qualied right of passage to the alleged territories of Portugal.Prosecutor vs. Tadic International humanitarian law governs the conduct of both international and internal armed conicts. (ARTICLE 5) It is now a settle rule of customary international law that crimes against humanity do not require a connection to international armed conict. IF so, the Security Council may have dened the crime in Article 5 more narrowly than necessary under customary international law. Armed conict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State. (As seen in Article 3) Conditions for Article 3 to apply:1. Violation must constitute an infringement of a rule of international humanitarian law2. Rule must be customary in nature3. Violation must be serious4. Violation of the rule must entail, under customary or conventional law, the individual criminal responsibility of the person breaching the rule.Salonga vs. Executive Secretary Established by treaty Romulo-Kenney agreement not valid because it was inconsistent with the VFA. VFA is constitutional because it is a self-executing agreement, as it only intended to carry out the obligations and undertakings under the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. Medellin vs. Texas When the President asserts the power to enforce a non-self-executing treaty by unilaterally creating domestic law, he acts in conict with the implicit understanding of the ratifying Senate. The non-self-executing character of the treaty constrains the Presidents ability to comply with treaty commitments by unilaterally making the treaty binding on domestic courts. Due to the absence of any legislation regarding these treaties and the lack of any contention that no legislation exists, the SC concludes that the Avena judgment is not automatically binding domestic law. The general rule is that judgment of foreign courts awarding injunctive relief , even as to private parties, let alone sovereign states, are not generally entitled to enforcement. While treaties may comprise international commitments, they are not domestic law unless Congress enacted implementing rules or the treaty is self-executing.Texaco vs. Libya L Doctrine of specically affected states. Libya promulgated decrees purporting to nationalize all of the rights, interests and property of Texaco in Libya granted to them jointly under 14 Deeds of Concession. The Companies objected to the decrees and claimed that such action by the Libyan Government violated the terms and conditions of their Deeds of Concession. The Companies requested arbitration. The Sole Arbitrator held that (a) the Deeds of Concession are binding on the parties, (b) by adopting the measures of nationalization, the Libyan Government breached its obligations arising under the Deeds of Concession and (c) the Libyan Government is legally bound to perform the Deeds of Concession and to give them their full force and effect. Libya argues that with respect to nationalization, municipal law should govern and not international law. Several UN G.A. resolutions were invoked by both parties. Thus the court had to look into the legal value and validity of such resolutions and their binding effect to the parties.Legal value of resolutions to be determined on the basis of the circumstances under which they were adopted & analysis of the principles they state. The legal value of the resolutions which are relevant to the present case can be determined on the basis of circumstances under which they were adopted (ex. voting pattern) and by analysis of the principles which they state.Resolutions in order to be binding must be accepted by the members especially those specially affected. With respect to the rst point, the absence of any binding force of the resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations implies that such resolutions must be accepted by the members of the United Nations in order to be legally binding. In this respect, the Tribunal notes that only Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962 was supported by a majority of Member States representing all of the various groups. By contrast, the other Resolutions mentioned, and in particular those referred to in the Libyan Memorandum, were supported by a majority of States but not by any of the developed countries with market economies which carry on the largest part of international trade.Distinguish between those stating an existing right & those introducing new principles. The appraisal of the legal value on the basis of the principles stated, it appears essential to this Tribunal to distinguish between those provisions stating the existence of a right on which the generality of the States has expressed agreement and those provisions introducing new principles which were rejected by certain representative groups of States and having nothing more than a de lege ferenda (what the law ought to be); value only in the eyes of the States which have adopted them; as far as the others are concerned, the rejection of these same principles implies that they consider them as being contra legem (against the law). With respect to the former, which proclaim rules recognized by the community of nations, they do not create a custom but conrm one by formulating it and specifying its scope, thereby making it possible to determine whether or not one is confronted with a legal rule. As has been noted by Ambassador Castaneda, "[such resolutions] do not create the law; they have a declaratory nature of noting what does exist"Resolution 1803 reects the state of customary lawbased on adoption of majority of states & opinio juris. On the basis of the circumstances of adoption mentioned above and by expressing an opinio juris communis, Resolution 1803 (XVII) seems to this Tribunal to reect the state of customary law existing in this eld. Indeed, on the occasion of the vote on a resolution nding the existence of a customary rule, the States concerned clearly express their views. The consensus by a majority of States belonging to the variousrepresentative groups indicates without the slightest doubt universal recognition of the rules therein incorporated, i.e., with respect to nationalization and compensation the use of the rules in force in the nationalizing State, but all this in conformity with international law.Cambodia vs. Thailand Who has sovereignty over the region of the Temple of Preah Vihear. It is an ancient sanctuary and shrine located on the borders of Thailand and Cambodia. It stands on a high land, belonging to the eastern sector of the Dangrek range of mountains that constitutes the boundary between the two countries Cambodia to the south and Thailand to the north. In dependence was granted to Cambodia in 1953. Before that date, she was part of the French Indo-China. As such, her foreign relations were by France. The present dispute originated in the boundary settlements made in the period from 1904 to 1908, between France and Siam. It is clear from the record that the publication and communication of the 11 maps referred to earlier, including the subject map, was given wide publicity. The map was communicated to the Siamese government. They did not do so, either then or for many years, and thereby must be held to have acquiesced. (Merely adopted a passive attitude) (Unaware of the error) Plea of error cannot be allowed as an element vitiating consent if the party advancing it contributed by its own conduct to the error, or could have avoided it, or if the circumstances were such as to put that party on notice of possible error The Siamese authorities knew it was the work of French topographical ofcers to whom they had themselves entrusted the work of producing the maps. They accepted it without any independent investigation, and cannot therefore now plead any error vitiating the reality of their consent. When the Prince arrived there, he was ofcially received there by the French Resident for the adjoining Cambodian province, on behalf of the Resident Superior, with the French ag ying. The prince could not possibly have failed to see the implications of a reception of this character. This case demonstrates that the signing of the map by Thai ofcials is a positive act that constituted estoppel. The temple is situated in territory under the sovereignty of Cambodia. Corfu Channel Albanian ships red at Royal Navy Ships (UK) while the latter was crossing the Corfu Channel after they had conducted an inspection of the area. Another two ships of the UK struck mines and sustained damages. UK claims that the mines were placed by Albania. The Albanian Government constantly kept close watch over the waters of the North Corfu Channel; Albanian Government never noticed anyone about the mines in its waters; had look outs. > COURT: The laying of the mineeld could not have been accomplished without the knowledge of the Albanian government. The Albanian Government had the obligation to warn ships about the mines, based on: (1) elementary considerations of humanity, (2) principle of the freedom of maritime communication, and (3) every states obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other states. Sovereignty over the Corfu Channel: the ICJ declared that the Corfu Channel was an international highway therefore Albania can only regulate the passage of war ships and not prohibit them altogether. The sovereignty of Albania was not violated. The ICJ ruled that the mine-clearing operations conducted by the Royal Navy Ships was illegal because it was unauthorized by the Albanian Government. UK failed to respect territorial sovereignty in international relations when it conducted the mine-clearing operations as it was executed contrary to the consent of the Albanian government, not consented by the international mine clearance organization, and it was not an innocent passage by the Royal Navy Ships. TAKE NOTE OF THE 3 INCIDENTS (Albania is responsible for the 2nd incident, UK did not violate sovereignty during the 1st, UK violated sovereignty during the 3rd)Chorzow Factory The German empire had a contract with a company, where the company undertook to establish for the Reich and forthwith to begin the construction of a nitrate factory at Chorzow, Upper Silesia. Subsequently, Poland and Germany signed a Convention concerning the Upper Silesia of Geneva (Geneva Convention). A Polish was then delegated with the full powers to take charge of the factory, thus, causing the end of the contract between Germany and the companies. Germany brought action in behalf of the companies against Poland for the taking of the companies in violation of the Geneva Conventions.State s espousal of claims on behalf of its nationals. International law does not prevent one State from granting to another the right to have recourse to international arbitral tribunals in order to obtain the direct award to nationals of the latter State of compensation for damage suffered by them as a result of infractions of international law by the rst State.Reparation = indemnity for damages caused. It is a principle of international law that the reparation of a wrong may consist in an indemnity corresponding to the damage which the nationals of the injured State have suffered as a result of the act which is contrary to international law.In estimating the damage caused by an unlawful act, only the value of property, rights and interests which have been affected and the owner of which is the person on whose behalf compensation is claimed, or the damage done to whom is to serve as a means of gauging the reparation claimed, must be taken into account. The damage suffered is equivalent to the total value - but to that total only - of the property, rights and interests of this Company in that undertaking, without deducting liabilities.The reparation due by one State to another does not however change its character by reason of the fact that it takes the form of an indemnity for the calculation of which the damage suffered by a private person is taken as the measure. The rules of law governing the reparation are the rules of international law in force between the two States concerned, and not the law governing relations between the State which has committed a wrongful act and the individual who has suffered damage. The damage suffered by an individual is never therefore identical in kind with that which will be suffered by a State; it can only afford a convenient scale for the calculation of the reparation due to the State.Reparation, dened. The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act - a principle which seems to be established by international practice and in particular by the decisions of arbitral tribunals - is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe-out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed.When restitution not possible, then reparation. Restitution in kind, or if this is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind would bear; the award, if need be, of damages for loss sustained which would not be covered by restitution in kind or payment in place of it - such are the principles which should serve to determine the amount of compensation due for an act contrary to international law.Reparation, as applied in this case. This conclusion particularly applies as regards the Geneva Convention, the object of which is to provide for the maintenance of economic life in Upper Silesia on the basis of respect for the status quo. The dispossession of an industrial undertaking (which is prohibited by the Geneva Convention) then involves the obligation to restore the undertaking and, if this be not possible, to pay its value at the time of the indemnication, which value is designed to take the place of restitution which has become impossible. To this obligation, in virtue of the general principles of international law, must be added that of compensating loss sustained as the result of the seizure. The impossibility of restoring the Chorzw factory could therefore have no other effect but that of substituting payment of the value of the undertaking for restitution; it would not be in conformity with the principles of law or with the wish of the Parties to infer from that agreement that the question of compensation must henceforth be dealt with as though an expropriation properly so called was involved. (Some notes on the case from BP v. Libya: The Chorzow Factory case is the leading case on the proposition that restitutio in integrum restoration to original condition is a recognized remedy of International Law. However, the judgment is not authority on the point, for the Claimant (the German Government) did not claim restitutio in integrum, and anything the Court stated on the availability of that remedy is obiter.)Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company- That a corporation has a juridical personality distinct from its shareholders is a general principle of law. [Case was about corporate personalities (Canada) vs. shareholders (Belgium)Belgium has no jus standi]- Where one of the parties involved is a municipal entity, such as a CORPORATION, reference may be made to relevant principles of municipal law. Evidence is also part of international law. The BTLPC, was incorporated in Toronto (Canada) for the purpose of creating and developing an electric power production and distribution system in Catalonia (Spain). It formed a number of subsidiary companies, of which some had their registered ofces in Canada and the others in Spain. Some years after the rst world war Barcelona Traction share capital came to be very largely held by Belgian nationals. The servicing of the Barcelona Traction bonds was suspended on account of the Spanish civil war. After that war the Spanish exchange control authorities refused to authorize the transfer of the foreign currency necessary for the resumption of the servicing of the sterling bonds. Eventually, the company was declared bankrupt. Belgium led an application with the ICJ against the Spanish government seeking reparation of damages claimed to have been caused to the Belgian national shareholders of the company.Municipal law applied to international law. In the eld of diplomatic protection, international law was in continuous evolution and was called upon to recognize institutions of municipal law. In municipal law, the concept of the company was founded on a rm distinction between the rights of the company and those of the shareholder. Only the company, which was endowed with legal personality, could take action in respect of matters that were of a corporate character. A wrong done to the company frequently caused prejudice to its shareholders, but this did not imply that both were entitled to claim compensation. Whenever a shareholder's interests were harmed by an act done to the company, it was to the latter that he had to look to institute appropriate action. An act infringing only the company's rights did not involve responsibility towards the shareholders, even if their interests were affected. In order for the situation to be different, the act complained of must be aimed at the direct rights of the shareholder as such (which was not the case here since the Belgian Government had itself admitted that it had not based its claim on an infringement of the direct rights of the shareholders).General Rule: State of the company can seek redress. International law had to refer to those rules generally accepted by municipal legal systems. An injury to the shareholder's interests resulting from an injury to the rights of the company was insufcient to found a claim. Where it was a question of an unlawful act committed against a company representing foreign capital, the general rule of international law authorized the national State of the company alone to exercise diplomatic protection for the purpose of seeking redress. No rule of international law expressly conferred such a right on the shareholder's national State.Exceptional circumstances. The Court considered whether there might not be, in the present case, special circumstances for which the general rule might not take effect. Two situations needed to be studied: (a) the case of the company having ceased to exist, and (b) the case of the protecting State of the company lacking capacity to take action.As regards the rst of these possibilities, the Court observed that whilst Barcelona Traction had lost all its assets in Spain and been placed in receivership in Canada, it could not be contended that the corporate entity of the company had ceased to exist or that it had lost its capacity to take corporate action. So far as the second possibility was concerned, it was not disputed that the company had been incorporated in Canada and had its registered ofce in that country, and its Canadian nationality had received general recognition. The Canadian Government had exercised the protection of Barcelona Traction for a number of years. If at a certain point the Canadian Government ceased to act on behalf of Barcelona Traction, it nonetheless retained its capacity to do so, which the Spanish Government had not questioned. Whatever the reasons for the Canadian Government's change of attitude, that fact could not constitute a justication for the exercise of diplomatic protection by another government.It had been maintained that a State could make a claim when investments by its nationals abroad, such investments being part of a State's national economic resources, were prejudicially affected in violation of the right of the State itself to have its nationals enjoy a certain treatment. But, in the present state of affairs, such a right could only result from a treaty or special agreement. And no instrument of such a kind was in force between Belgium and Spain.BP vs. Libya Also looked into the voting patterns to determine the binding effect of the GA resolution. Specic performance doctrine was not applicable in this case.BP Exploration Company (BP) had a contractual agreement with the Government of Libya (Libya), which allowed BP to operate in Libya for the extraction, processing and export of petroleum. The area in which BP was allowed to operate was called Concession 65. However, Libya, in December 1971 passed the BP Nationalization Law, which nationalized the operations of BP in Concession 65, restoring to the State ownership of all properties, rights, assets and shares in the operations conducted in the said area, and then transferring these to a new company, the Arabian Gulf Exploration Company. As a result of the Nationalization Law (which was rapidly implemented) BPs operations in Concession 65 were brought to a complete halt and its staff were immediately excluded from the premises and facilities. The Arabian Gulf Exploration Company had taken over Concession 65.Applicable law in the case. Clause 28 of the concession agreement provides that should dispute arise, the applicable law shall be the principles of the law of Libya common to the principles of international law, and only if such common principles do not exist with respect to a particular matter, will resort be made to general principles of law. In the event that international law and Libyan law conict on the issue, general principles of law should apply to resolve the question.The governing system of law is what the clause expressly provides, that in the absence of principles common to the Libyan and International law, general principles of law, including those that may have been applied by international tribunals, should apply.Specic Performance not applicable here. In the decisions of tribunals, while arbitral tribunals can declare awards which include the declaration of specic performance against a recalcitrant party, their powers and jurisdiction to do so rest carefully on the parties consent. Examined in the light of general principles of law, the legal systems analyzed here offer different solutions to the problem. Thus these municipal systems of law profess allegiance to two divergent principles on the question. It is therefore NOT POSSIBLE to hold that under general principles of law an agreement fundamentally abrogated by one party continues in force and is to be specically performed indenitely until the innocent party terminates it, for under English and American law the sole remedy is damages and in others specic performance does not lie against the State.It is clear then, that there does not exist a uniform general principle of law that an agreement continues in effect after being repudiated by one party but not the other, and there is no uniform principle which provides that specic performance is a remedy available at the option of an innocent party.Restitutio in integrum not applicable again. As to restitutio in integrum, while it has been claimed, especially in the form of physical restoration, no tribunal has ever prescribed the remedy with regard to such property or parties as in these proceedings. The concept has rather been employed at times as a principle for assessing the amount of damages due for breach of an international obligation.The impossibility of restitution and specic performance. The claim would not even be realistic; such an action, which has the effect of turning back the clock would upset the current situation too profoundly and would have unforeseeable practical consequences. Furthermore, if awarded now and the contract would still be allowed to exist indenitely, the amount would be so great it would be absurd.A rule of reason therefore dictates a result which conforms to international law, evidenced by state practice and the law of treaties, and to governing principles of English and American contract law. The conclusion is thus: when by exercise of sovereign power a State committed a fundamental breach of a concession agreement by repudiating it through a nationalization of the enterprise and its assets in a manner which implies nality, the concessionaire is not entitled to call for specic performance by the Government of the agreement and reinstatement of his contractual rights, but his sole remedy is an action for damages.Payment of Damages. Under Public International Law, the norm is the payment of damages. Under the applicable systems of law, BP is entitled to damages arising from Libyas wrongful acts. The principle of compensation is also recognized in the BP Nationalization Law.Saudi Arabia vs. Arabian Oil The government of SA made a concession agreement with ARAMCO, which includes the exclusive right to transport oil which it had extracted from its concession area in Saudi Arabia. Subsequently, Saudi Arabia concluded another concession agreement with Mr. Onassis and his company (Saudi Arabian Maritime Tankers) which gave the latter a 30-year right of priority for the transport of Saudi Arabian oil. Determine what rights were conferred on the oil company by the Aramco concession agreement exclusive right of transportation by sea was not included within the expectations of parties. Aramco has exclusive right to:1. Search for petroleum2. Extract oil3. Rene petroleum and produce its derivatives4. Transport petroleum, sell it abroad, and dispose of it commercially. To transport means to carry from one place to another persons or things. It can apply to land, water, or sea transport. Principles of interpretation:1. Interpretation by circumstantial evidence2. Teleological interpretation of the contract3. Restrictive interpretation4. Rule contra preferentum (Contract of adhesion) The principle of acquired rights is one of the fundamental principles both of public international law and of the municipal law of most civilized states. Decision: Aramco enjoys exclusive rights these rights cannot be taken away from it by the government by means of a contract concluded with a second concessionaire, even if that contract wereequal to its own contract from a legal point of view.