Physical Security Measures

s piracy attacks have become increasingly more organised, determined and co-ordinated. so toohas the need for counter-measures to be more

elaborate, inventive, robust and specific to the vulnerabil-ities of each vessel. Despite the recent success in adoptinga structured and layered approach to defending a vessel,there are still some maritime security providers that con-sider the presence of their security teams on board to besufficient. In the current climate that is no longer accept-able, and shipping companies, CSOs and vessel Mastersare looking to deployed security teams to effect a struc-tured series of physical barriers and countermeasures de-signed to complement existing procedures.

Physical countermeasures are obviously the most visualto any potential attacker, and that visual impact as a de-terrent should not be underestimated. Piracy ActionGroups (PAGs) are looking for vulnerable, slow movingand ill-prepared targets. Given a choice in a busy ship-ping lane such as the Internationally Recommended Tran-sit Corridor (IRTC), pirates will choose the vessel theyconsider the easiest to board quickly. However, recentevidence suggests that piracy attacks have become moresustained, with increased resolve and adaptability fromthe pirates which has resulted in inadequate physical de-fences being breached.

The use of motherships and the expansion of the pirates

area of operations to up to and beyond 1000nm East ofSomalia and into the northern Arabian Sea has providedthem with a much wider window in which to attemptboarding (up to one hour sustained attack), and thereforephysical countermeasures need to be increasingly robustand effective. Identifying how best to mitigate the risk ofpirates boarding the vessel is best achieved during a pre-transit security survey/assessment, with recommenda-tions detailed prior to the vessel’s departure to High RiskAreas. Procurement, fabrication and preparation of ma-terials are best sourced in good time, and not at the latestpossible port of embarkation. Materials such as razorwire are notoriously expensive in the countries tradition-ally used for the security teams’ embarkation ports, suchas Port Suez, Muscat and Galle. Some agents are knownto exploit unprepared teams by supplying inappropriateand poor quality materials. A pre-transit security auditcan identify how best to fabricate systems, to deploy de-fensive measures such as razor wire, fencing and stan-chions that complement the security team’s pro-activerole at defending the vessel, the Ships Security Plan andSOPs.

On a large vessel with a long, low freeboard (such as abulk carrier or tanker) the physical security measures cantake up to three days to prepare and construct. Special-ized, more vulnerable vessels (such as cable layers, sur-vey vessels, dredgers etc), will be more of a challenge and

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could take longer. It may be that a lot of the preparationcan be achieved by the crew under the supervision of theSSO prior to the security team boarding the vessel, espe-cially if they have made a number of High Risk Area(HRA) transits previously. However, it is essential thatthe security team has time to work with the SSO and Mas-ter in implementing the ships’ security plan and co-ordi-nating the physical counter-measures to best effect. Theinvolvement of the crew in the construction of thesemeasures has a secondary and important role in buildingconfidence, making them feel they are an integral part inthe overall solution. The physical counter-measuresshould be designed so that there is a continuity with othersystems, anti-piracy procedures and the SOPs put inplace. This can only be achieved with close liaison be-tween the Security Team and the Master/SSO of the ves-sel.

Below are a number of examples of what kind of physicalcountermeasures can be developed to make boarding ex-tremely difficult and unattractive to would-be attackers.Should they manage to get on board, then there shouldbe a series of defensive layers based around securing thevessel’s superstructure. That might include blocking orremoving external stairwells, as well as other means out-lined later. The intention is to impede, delay, disrupt anddisorientate the pirates as much as possible and, regard-less of whether the security team is armed or not, there islittle point in not deploying all means possible.

Figure 1

Figure 2

As we’ve previously highlighted, specific vessels with keyvulnerable characteristics need an imaginative approachto best maximise the deployment of physical counter-measures. The following example of a small, slow mov-ing chemical tanker at 7.5 knots with a freeboard of lessthan a meter was considered ‘category A’ vulnerability.However, using properly sourced and quality materialswithin a well thought out plan we constructed physicalcountermeasures which gave an overall confidence to theMaster and his crew, and the transit was successful.

Figure 3

Figure 4

Example: Multiple layers of razor wire securely attached andinterconnecting make a formidable barrier. The ‘hot stream’ sys-tem onboard added to the visual effect, and made any potentialboarding attempt even more difficult.

When the passage plan involves long distances offshore(a south/north passage from South Africa up the eastcoast of Somalia for example), the threat posed by pirategangs using motherships then becomes the key consider-ation. Coalition/military response or support is unlikelyto be ‘immediate’, and the Ship’s Security Plan (SSP) forthat passage should consider the possibility of a sustainedattack. In such a scenario more robust physical defencesare required, and time spent designing, fabricating andconstructing those defences is time well spent. Stanchionsfitted so that the defences reach outboard are more effec-tive in preventing boarding. PAGs have developed meth-ods to easily breach razor wire that is simply secured tothe handrail. The examples in figures 5, 6, 7 and 8 illus-trate best appropriate use of materials on a 220 meter bulkcarrier.

Figure 5

Figure 6

These defences are constructed vertically and attached bymeans of a ‘D’ ring to the bottom railing, allowing themto be lowered into place and secured for the HRA transit.They can also be easily retracted in high seas, thereforeminimising the risk of damage. Smaller stanchions se-cured by wire and turn-buckles are also effective and pro-vide a better platform for the razor wire than merelyattaching it to the handrails.

Figure 7

Figure 8

Fire hoses are another visual indicator to the pirates thatprecautions have been taken. They are rarely more thana nuisance factor when deployed singularly, but concen-trated at vulnerable areas (such as the quarter) andrigged correctly can act as a deterrent and impede access.Ballast pumps and fire monitors can also be used to createa water ‘curtain’ and form a useful part of layered de-fences. Mannequins are a complete waste of time.

Figure 9

The defence of the vessel’s superstructure is equally asimportant as part of the layered countermeasures. Thephysical countermeasures aren’t limited to the defence ofthe main deck, and if they are breached that is only thefirst of many hurdles the pirates should encounter. Thesuperstructure, accommodation and bridge are where theship’s crew are located, and therefore the target for thepirates seeking hostages. The main deck, port and star-board quarters need specific attention as they are the mostcommon access onto the vessel by attackers. The super-structure should be locked down with only one point ofaccess (in case of a ships emergency to the life boats) andall other access doors and stairways either blocked or re-moved. Below are specific examples of how the super-structure section can be blocked denying access frommid-ships or forward.

Figure 10

Figure 11

The pirates are well known to be skillful and extremelydetermined. Once onboard they will try to make theirway to the bridge as soon as possible in order to take thecrew hostage. They are very accomplished at scaling thedeck levels and know that the quicker they can take com-mand of the vessel, the less effective a coalition/warshipresponse will be. Therefore anything that contributes toslowing down and impeding their entry into the super-structure or bridge needs to be deployed. They might in-clude, but are not restricted to:

• Greasing up external pipes• Lifting walk way grills• Removing and blocking stairwells,• Extra layers of razor wire • Securing portholes and external doors.

Figure 12

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Physical countermeasures, constructing barriers, and de-ploying all means available to make the vessel look as for-midable and as unattractive as a target as possible are allimportant. However, they are not the only factor in mit-igating against a successful pirate attack. The initialsourcing and procurement of the materials can be expen-sive, but for vessels making regular trips through highrisk areas (not limited to the Somalian coastline, i.e. WestAfrica, Malacca Straights and the South China Seas), thematerials required can be washed down, stored on boardand re-used for future passages.

While constructing the defences, consideration should begiven to access to lifeboats and muster points for a shipemergency. At no point should defences restrict the ac-cess and launch of the life boats.

aving invested a lot of time, effort, resources andexpense into constructing the defences, the next consideration is how best to defend them. A se-

curity team from a military background, with experiencein anti-piracy and maritime operations, are best placed toprovide an active role in the defence of the vessel. Passivemeasures are an absolute requirement, but pirates are farmore likely to disengage from an attack if there is a de-termined demonstration and willingess to defend the ves-sel from those on board. The debate on whether to deployarmed security teams still continues, but the success overthe last three years of Private Contract Armed SecurityPersonnel (PCASP) is undeniable. The security team’srole is not to find a solution to the entire piracy problemin the region, but to deliver the best possible defence forthat vessel and the crew they have been tasked to escortthrough the High Risk Area. Pirate tactics are alwaysadapting, and recently there have been a number of ex-amples where the PAG has continued and sustained itsattack, in the knowledge that there is an armed securityteam on board and willing to engage the team in a fire-fight.

It is also worth noting that it is in the security team’s owninterest to ‘go the extra mile’ in defending the vessel. Itis well documented that no vessel has yet been takenwhile an armed security is onboard, and we desperatelyhope this statistic continues because the dynamics wouldchange very quickly if a vessel with armed guards wassuccessfully hijacked. They would not be treated in thesame manner as a captured crew, and would probablyraise the tempo of any negotiated release...at best! It istherefore very important that the security team are al-lowed to conduct their immediate actions knowing that

the ship’s crew are fully mustered and accounted for inthe citadel. Therefore a well equipped citadel and care-fully planned citadel procedures are key to the SOPs, re-gardless of whether an armed security team is deployedor not.

Category ‘A’ Vulnerability

Some vessels, by the sheer nature of their characteristics,are more vulnerable to attack. Those engaged in specialisttasks (such as surveying, dredging or towing), or with alow top speed and a low freeboard, make them a poten-tially favourable target. The example below (figure 15)requires both well thought out defences and an armed se-curity on board. It would be foolhardy, and totally irre-sponsible, if the ship owners/operators did notcommission a pre-risk survey on such a vessel.

Figure 15

Defending the Defences

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Ultimately, the ‘stand alone’ dedicated escort patrol boatprovides the elite security solution for specialist vesselsand cruise liners. There are maritime security providerswho operate patrol boats throughout the region.

Figure 16

Until recently, the various military initiatives and assetsin the area (EUNAVOR, NATO, CTF150 and UKMTO) allpublicly discouraged the use of armed security teams, butour experience is that we have always had a good work-ing understanding and relationship when reporting andregistering with them. The IMO now recognises thatshipping operators are increasingly looking toward the‘armed solution’, and have (while still not endorsing theuse of PCASP) have issued a revised document on guide-lines in contracting armed providers (MSC.1/Circ.1405/Rev.1 and MSC1/Circ.1406/Rev.1).

Just to highlight the importance of structuring the ShipsSecurity Plan (SSP), physical security measures, briefingsand drills, I’ve included examples of what can happenwhen the pirate gangs get the upper hand. The photosbelow illustrate two important yet separate elements.Firstly, security measures are expensive. There is an extrawork burden on the Chief Officer, fitters and crew, withconsiderable logistical efforts from the shore-based man-agement. However, these considerations become insignif-icant when the pirates get the upper hand, especiallybecause of the human psychological trauma caused bybeing exposed to a prolonged hostage situation.

Figure 17 Figure 18

The pirate gangs were ruthless and, having successfullyboarded this vessel, they were unable to identify thecitadel and therefore take any of the crew. Frustrated athaving their efforts thwarted, they set about trying to sinkthe vessel by setting it on fire, an attempt no doubt, toforce the crew to surrender. The crew stuck to their pro-cedures and the pirates had to abandon the vessel beforemilitary intervention. It also illustrates that the proper ex-ecution of the citadel drills is an essential element of theSSP.

Watch Keeping

Figure 19

The early detection of a possible pirate attack remains thebest defence against a successful attack. Vigilance on be-half of the crew, dedicated anti-piracy sentries and secu-rity teams on a 24-hour basis is the first and mostimportant step in mitigating against the risk of a success-ful piracy attack. Early detection allows the OOW/Masterand security team to evaluate the risk and initiate theships anti-piracy procedures. If a pirate ‘commander’ ob-verses a ship which is maintaining a visual level of alert-ness and demonstrating a degree of timely response to(his) suspicious activity, then he is more likely to targetanother vessel and your ship may not be attacked.

The overwhelming evidence is that if proper SOPs are es-tablished, drilled and exercised, if suspicious activity isacted upon early and the vessel demonstrates a willing-ness to defend itself, then a piracy attack will not be suc-cessful. It is essential and should be stressed in a separatebrief to watch-keepers the critical importance of early de-tection and techniques of effective watch-keeping, soeveryone is clear as to their duties and responsibilities. Itis simply not enough for crew to be safe if they are tofunction properly and carry out their duties, they mustperceive themselves to be safe as well. For all crew notinvolved in bridge watches and ‘locked down’ in the su-perstructure, they must be confident that those given theresponsibility of watch-keeping are vigilant and doingtheir job.