Photos placed in horizontal position with even amount of white space between photos and header...
-
Upload
rudolf-oswin-hancock -
Category
Documents
-
view
214 -
download
0
Transcript of Photos placed in horizontal position with even amount of white space between photos and header...
Photos placed in horizontal position with even amount
of white space between photos
and header
Photos placed in horizontal position with even amount of white space
between photos and header
Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-program laboratory managed and operated by Sandia Corporation, a
wholly owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear
Security Administration under contract DE-AC04-94AL85000.
The Nuclear Options: Decision Analysis at the Nexus of Engineering and Policy
Jarret Lafleur, Ph.D.Homeland Security & Defense Systems CenterSandia National LaboratoriesLivermore, California
AIAA Society & Aerospace Technology Technical Committee Meeting
January 13, 2014
2
Presentation Roadmap
About Sandia U.S. Nuclear Policy Context Highlights from Recent Work
Structure for the Nuclear Force Structure Discussion Diversity and Deterrent Force Reliability Cost Estimation Office
4
= NNSA Labs
= Science
= Nuclear Energy
= Environmental Management
= Fossil Energy
= Energy Efficiency & Renewables
Argonne
BrookhavenLawrenceBerkeley
Oak Ridge
Pacific Northwest
Idaho
Los Alamos
Sandia
SandiaAmes
Thomas Jefferson
Fermi
NationalEnergy Technology Princeton
Lawrence Livermore
Stanford Linear Accelerator Center
SavannahRiver
NationalRenewableEnergy
LEGEND
U.S. DOE National Laboratories
5
DOE/NNSA National Security Laboratory Broad mission in developing science and
technology applications to meet our rapidly changing, complex national security challenges
Safety, security and reliability of our nation’s nuclear weapon stockpile
Sandia National LaboratoriesExceptional Service in the National Interest
• Sandia began as the Z Division of Los Alamos in 1945, as a single-purpose engineering organization for non-nuclear systems in nuclear weapons.
• Became Sandia Laboratory in 1948 and a DOE national lab in 1979.
• Today Sandia is a multiprogram lab that engages a broad spectrum of national security issues.
Sandia’s Origin
On-site workforce: 11,200 FY10 regular employees: 8,400
FY10 budget: $2.5B
Technical Staff (3,844) by Degree(End of FY08)
Mechanical Engineering 16%
Electrical Engineering 19%
Other Engineering 15%
Other Fields 17%
Physics 6%
Chemistry 4%Math 2%
Other Science 4%Computing 16%
Top 3 hire fields comprise approximately 55% of technical hires
Disciplines of Most Technical Hires(FY03 – FY05)
Top 5 hire fields are approximately 70% of
technical hires
Top 11 hire fields represent approximately 90% of technical hires
CS CE EE ME
Physics
Chemistry
Chemical Eng
Materials Science Math
Biology Nuclear
Eng Aerospace
Eng
Sandia’s People
6
Sandia’s Five Mission Areas Nuclear Weapons Defense Systems and Assessments Energy, Resources and Nonproliferation Homeland Security and Defense Science, Technology and Engineering
7
9
U.S. Nuclear Policy The U.S. will seek the peace
and security of a world without nuclear weapons Reductions in numbers and role
in U.S. national security strategy May not be reached quickly
As long as nuclear weapons exist, the U.S. will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal, to: Deter potential adversaries Assure allies and partners they
can count on America’s commitments
http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf
U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, 1945-2009Includes active and inactive warheads. Several thousand additional warheads are retired and awaiting
dismantlement. Source: http://www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/nm/nm_book_5_11/docs/NMHB2011.pdf
1
2
10
U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, 1945-2009Includes active and inactive warheads. Several thousand additional warheads are retired and awaiting
dismantlement. Source: http://www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/nm/nm_book_5_11/docs/NMHB2011.pdf
U.S. Nuclear Policy One way the U.S. demonstrates
commitment to the first goal is through constraints on the second goal: No nuclear tests No new warheads or nuclear
military capabilities However, weapons and
platforms continue to age. A number of decisions in the next
two decades on warhead and delivery platform life extension and replacement programs will have a long-term impact on the composition and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear deterrent.
http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf
11
The U.S. Nuclear Triad
Air Land Sea
Source: http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=82
B-2 Spirit
Source http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=83
B-52 Stratofortress
Source: http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=113
LGM-30G Minuteman III
Source: http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/n87/today/ssbn.html
Ohio-Class Ballistic Missile Submarine
Source: http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/trident-ii-d5-fleet-ballistic-missile--fbm-.html
Trident II D5Fleet Ballistic Missile
B61 Bomb
B83 Bomb
Air LaunchedCruise Missile
12
Recent Cases for Triad Leg Elimination
So
urce
: http
://ww
w.n
orth
ropg
rum
ma
n.co
m/a
na
lysis-cen
ter/othe
r-pu
blica
tions/
asse
ts/triad
-mo
no
gra
ph.p
df
So
urce
: http
://ww
w.g
lob
alze
ro.org
/en
/us-n
uclea
r-policy-co
mm
ission
-rep
ort
Source: http://csis.org/blog/should-we-eliminate-nuclear-subs
Rationale• Russia overflight
precludes non-Russia ICBM use
• ICBMs invite high risks of nuclear use based on rushed decision-making
Rationale• Of any other diad,
ICBM/SLBM is most similar in deterrent value and stability to the triad
• The U.S. is already on a path toward such a de facto ICBM/SLBM diad
Rationale• SSBN-X expected to
cost nearly $350 billion over 50 years
• Survivability is maintained by the aggregate of the air and land legs
• In likely nuclear use scenarios, capable nuclear offense is more important than a survivable defense
Air Land
Sea
Johnson et. al., Mitchell Inst. / Northrop Grumman, 2009 Cartwright et. al., Global Zero, 2012
Jacobs, CSIS, 2012
14
?
Triad Analyses: A Typical ApproachBrainstormed Force Structure #1
e.g., “Field the optimal U.S. nuclear force structure for the 21st century.”
Brainstormed Force Structure #3
Brainstormed Force Structure #2
Challenge: How to judge one alternative against another?Here, each evaluation was coupled with an implicit definition of objectives.
Pros Cons
Evaluation
Pros Cons
Evaluation
Pros Cons
Evaluation
Broad Objectives
15
A Formal Decision Analysis Approach
Broad Objectives
Brainstormed Force Structure #1
Brainstormed Force Structure #3
Brainstormed Force Structure #2
Structured CriteriaNote: Structuring objectives into criteria is not synonymous with specifying their relative importance.
How well does each alternative perform with respect to each criterion?
Evaluatione.g., “Field the optimal U.S. nuclear force structure for the 21st century.”
16
A Formal Decision Analysis Approach
What is an underlying, unifying value hierarchy for U.S nuclear force structure decisions?
Structured CriteriaNote: Structuring objectives into criteria is not synonymous with specifying their relative importance.
17
Literature Value Hierarchy Analysis
Note: This work makes no judgements on the validity of authors’ arguments. It examines only the structure of the arguments’ perceivable value hierarchies.
18
A Possible Unifying HierarchyStrategic Nuclear Force
Evaluation Criteria
CostsRisksCapacity to Promote Peace
19
A Possible Unifying HierarchyStrategic Nuclear Force
Evaluation Criteria
CostsRisksCapacity to Promote Peace
Non-Nuclear Defense and Security
Credible Deterrence via Nuclear Weapons
Limiting and Reducing Nuclear Weapon Proliferation
“So today, I state clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons … [but] make no mistake: As long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary …”
President Barack Obama, April 2009
20
A Possible Unifying HierarchyStrategic Nuclear Force
Evaluation Criteria
CostsRisksCapacity to Promote Peace
Non-Nuclear Defense and Security
Credible Deterrence via Nuclear Weapons
Limiting and Reducing Nuclear Weapon Proliferation
Resilience
= Additional lower tiers exist
During-Conflict Action
Pre-Conflict Restraint Encouragement
Denial of Benefits
Imposition of Costs
During Crisis
Strategic
Means
Ends
Cross-Cutting Means Accuracy
PenetrabilityCommand and Control IntegrationForce EndurancePromptness
RangeNumber of Deliverable WeaponsThird-Country Overflight Avoidance
Military Capability Destruction
Near-Term DamageLong-Term Damage
Survivability
Political Leadership DestructionIndustrial Capacity DestructionPopulation Destruction
Note: This hierarchy adopts the decomposition of deterrence from the Dec. 2006 DoD Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept.
Means vs. Ends Metrics
21
A Possible Unifying HierarchyStrategic Nuclear Force
Evaluation Criteria
CostsRisksCapacity to Promote Peace
Non-Nuclear Defense and Security
Credible Deterrence via Nuclear Weapons
Limiting and Reducing Nuclear Weapon Proliferation
Resilience
= Additional lower tiers exist
Scenario #1
During-Conflict Action
Pre-Conflict Restraint Encouragement
Denial of Benefits
Imposition of Costs
During Crisis
Strategic
Means
Ends
Scenario #2 Scenario #3 Scenario #4 Scenario #5
Cross-Cutting Means Accuracy
PenetrabilityCommand and Control IntegrationForce EndurancePromptness
RangeNumber of Deliverable WeaponsThird-Country Overflight Avoidance
Military Capability Destruction
Near-Term DamageLong-Term Damage
Survivability
Political Leadership DestructionIndustrial Capacity DestructionPopulation Destruction
Philosophy: Overall deterrence can be considered a “portfolio” of specific deterrences.
22
How is such a hierarchy useful?
Provides list of criteria to address in a balanced, complete argument
Offers guidance on which criteria are logical components of others
Provides simple mental model of objectives, enhancing communication
Provides a pathway for quantitative, multi-objective decision analysis
Provides list of criteria authors should have addressed in a balanced, complete argument
Offers guidance on whether authors are arguing about competing criteria at the same logical tier
Helps isolate sources of disagreement between arguments
Provides visibility into which objectives the authors valued more highly than others
For the Policy Advocate For the Policy Analyst
Increased Risk of Common Mode Failure
Increased adversary risk
Diversity and Technical Risk
24
Component Diversity
Increased Development & Production Costs
Increased Cost of Surveillance, Maintenance
Cost
Notional Enterprise
Risk and CostEnterprise Risk
Highly Common Highly Diverse
Ava
ilable a
t:h
ttp://w
ww
.defen
se.g
ov/new
s/nucle
arwea
pon
spolicy.pd
f
“As the stockpile ages and becomes both smaller and less diverse … there is inevitably less flexibility to adjust for technical failures that could arise … Mitigating technical risk, therefore, will cause us in the near term to … seek to preserve diversity of warhead types in the overall stockpile.”
“[LEP options for the W-78 ICBM warhead] study will consider, as all future LEP studies will, the possibility of using the resulting warhead also on multiple platforms in order to reduce the number of warhead types.”
Diagram excerpted from McDowell and Walker,
“Lifecycle Opportunities and Challenges with an Interoperable Warhead
Approach”, Sandia National Laboratories
25
Triads, Diads, and Interoperability
Warhead Interoperability Decisions
Triad vs. Diad Decisions
Nuclear Force Diversity
Risk of Technical Failure
Can quantitative methods further inform these decisions?
influence
influences
influence
Reliability engineering encompasses a set of tools and techniques that describe the probability that a system is functional over a given time interval.
Deterrent Force Reliability: The probability that at least one form of a credible nuclear deterrent force is functional at a given time.
Deterrent Force Unreliability: The probability that at least one form of a credible nuclear deterrent force is not functional at a given time.
Reliability Block Diagram: A graphical representation of how the
components of a system are structured with regards to the system’s state of functionality.Series System
S1 S2
Parallel System
S1
S2
𝑅𝑠𝑦𝑠=𝑟1𝑟2 𝑅𝑠𝑦𝑠=1−(1−𝑟 1)(1−𝑟 2)
“Easy” to break
More difficult to break
or Deterrent Force Failure Probability
𝑅
𝑅
Symbol
(= 1–R)
Deterrent Force ReliabilityTerminology and Background
26
Today’s Force Structure
ICBM
SSBN
NN NEP
W87
NN NEPW78
NN NEP
W88
NN NEPW76
B-2
NN NEP
W80
NN NEPB83
NN NEP
B61
B-52
𝑅0.001=2.04×10−12
Deterrent Force Reliability
27
ALCM
SLBM
Deterrent Force Failure Probability vs. Single-Element Failure Probability Assumption
vs.𝑅 𝑟
(notional)
Deterrent Force ReliabilityEx. Reduced-Diversity Triad
ICBM
SSBNNN NEP
Warhead
NN NEP
Warhead
B-2
NN NEP
W80
NN NEPB83
NN NEP
B61
B-52
𝑅0.001=6.10×10−12
28
ALCM
SLBM
NN NEP
Warhead
vs.𝑅 𝑟
Deterrent Force Failure Probability vs. Single-Element Failure Probability Assumption
(notional)
Ex. Reduced-Diversity Triad, 1 IW (Land)
ICBM
SSBNNN NEP
Warhead
NN NEP
Warhead
B-2
NN NEP
W80
NN NEPB83
NN NEP
B61
B-52
𝑅0.001=6.09×10− 12
Deterrent Force Reliability
29
ALCM
SLBM
Deterrent Force Failure Probability vs. Single-Element Failure Probability Assumption
NN NEP
IW
vs.𝑅 𝑟
(notional)
(notional)
Ex. Reduced-Diversity Triad, 1 IW (Sea)
ICBM
SSBNNN NEP
IW
NN NEP
Warhead
B-2
NN NEP
W80
NN NEPB83
NN NEP
B61
B-52
𝑅0.001=2.05×10−12
Deterrent Force Reliability
30
ALCM
SLBM
Deterrent Force Failure Probability vs. Single-Element Failure Probability Assumption
NN NEP
Warhead
vs.𝑅 𝑟Properly chosen interoperability may maintain the deterrent force reliability of today’s force structure, even with reduced warhead diversity.
(notional)
Leg Elimination Options
ICBM
SSBN
NN NEP
W87
NN NEPW78
NN NEP
W88
NN NEPW76
B-2
NN NEP
W80
NN NEPB83
NN NEP
B61
B-52
Deterrent Force Reliability
31
ALCM
SLBM
Deterrent Force Failure Probability vs. Single-Element Failure Probability Assumption
Technical risks avoided through warhead interoperability investments may be dwarfed by technical risks accepted in a triad leg elimination decision.
500 times higher than baseline triad
vs.𝑅 𝑟1,000,000 times higher than baseline triad
1,000 times higher than baseline triad
33
Cost Estimation Office Compared to previous
decades, constrained federal budgets have produced heightened awareness of cost considerations in weapon system development trade studies.
Sandia is leading development of a parametric cost estimation capability for early-phase weapon life extension program cost trades.
“A central finding of the book is that government officials [over the past six decades] made little effort to ensure that limited economic resources were used as efficiently as possible so that nuclear deterrence could be achieved at the least cost to taxpayers. While the costs of individual programs were debated from time to time, the near total absence of data documenting either annual or cumulative costs of the overall effort made effective democratic debate and oversight all but impossible …”
Brookings Institution Press, 1998
Sample Modern Parametric Cost Estimation Tools:
Aerospace & Defense InteractionsJanuary February March April
Jan. 23, 2013 El Segundo, CAAerospace CorporationConcept Design Center Concurrent Engineering Group
Jan. 22, 2013 Pasadena, CANASA Jet Propulsion LaboratoryTeam X Concurrent Engineering Group
March 26, 2013 Pasadena, CANASA Jet Propulsion LaboratoryCost and Risk Analysis Workshop
April 24, 2013 Washington, DCDoD Cost Assessment & Program EvaluationAdvanced Systems Cost Analysis Organization
Jan. 11, 2013 Dallas, TXLockheed Martin Aeronautics ADP (Skunk Works) Cost Est. Group
34