Philosophy of John Macmurray

7/26/2019 Philosophy of John Macmurray

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THE POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND

ECONOMIC IDEAS OF

JOHN MACMURRAY

VICTOR DOUGLAS EDNEY

THESIS PCJR Ph.D.

as EXTERNAL STUDENT

by PRIVATE STUDY


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UMI Number: U616007

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ABSTRACT OF THESIS

The title and the table of contents of this thesis, in one respect,

fully convey its contents, substance, and plan. Here is expounded,

surveyed, and critically appraised certain branches of Macmurray' s

thought.

Very little, if any, of either Macmurray or his work has been

written about in this way, if at all. So this thesis is, as it

should be, a unique and original contribution to knowledge and

scholarship.

The prograirme and procedure has been to expound his ideas under

suitable headings according to subject matter, and to follow this -

from time to time - with a relevant appraisement, rather than

intersperse criticism with exposition.

But Macmurray1 s thought is so broad, so encompassing, so diverse

and intricate that it must never be imagined that adequate justice

has been, or could be, done to the subjects contained in the title in

such a short compass. Thus whilst not exhaustively covering the

subject in exposition, which would require at least ten thesis of

this length, it has also not been possible to raise, discuss, and

positively answer numerous questions which frequently come to mind as

we read both the original texts and this exposition of them.

Many, of course, have been raised, researched, met, and

answered. But many more must wait for further researches, and for

more space to consider and probe them.


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The above has had to be made clear for I would not want it to be

thought that this is, and was meant to be, a definitive work in the

selected field of Macmurray1 s ideas.


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Introduction and Biographical Note.......................... 5

Freedom...................................................29

Religion.................... 68

Science................................................149

A r t ................................................... 199

Marxism..................................................251

Philosophy...............................................310

Psychology...............................................395

History..................................................453

A Short Evaluation....................................... 496

Bibliography and Sources.............................. 505

Macmurray's Sources andPossible Sources................... 507


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A NECESSARY INTEOXKTION

For years John Macmurray has been overlooked or almost

deliberately ignored. Yet about 1930 he enjoyed widespread public

and popular allegiance and acclaim for his broadcast talks on

realistic, practical, down-to-earth, philosophy in relation to

contemporary and fundamental problems; problems of such an

intransigent and intractable nature that they are still essentially

the same, still with us, today; and still unsolved. In the early

1940s he was still around and known, especially in association with a

new political party, Commonwealth, which had proclivities towards

moral and social regeneration, and had quite a following. Since that

time, apart from some modest and minority academic attention,

Macmurray has sunk into obscurity and oblivion.

Yet he gave so .much, and has so much to give. This thesis is

written in the belief that much of what he had to say, made explicit,

and taught, is as relevant, meaningful, and indeed downright

essential today as it was when first enunciated. And if originally

enthusiastically heard but coolly unimplemented then, Is nevertheless

worth bringing to the fore to be given a second chance of

consideration and, it is hoped, put into practice.

For although a man of thought, Macmurray' s whole emphasis was on

action and practice. No ivory tower of pure thinking for him. No

withdrawing from the world. Thought is for living, or it is not

worth bothering about.


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What then are some of the ideas Macmurray introduced and

propounded? As with the ideas of every thinker not all are of such

originality and profundity that they need special attention and

consideration. But those of vital and essential interest are the

following. However, first a word of warning. In the readability,

fluency and ease of writing; in the core of the idea; and in the

telling, Macmurray can be, or may seem to be, simple and even

commonplace. You read him, or hear of one of his ideas, and think -

What's all the fuss about; we know of, or are doing, this already.

But this is not so. If you pause, reflect, and look deeply enough,

you will realize that none of his ideas, as given in the following

summary, are yet, nor within an age of becoming, a part of our

general, social, psychological, moral, cr educational ethos. None

have been incorporated into our thought, behaviour, or actions -

public cr personal. In ourselves, and in our society, we are still

thinking, feeling, believing, and doing all the things Macmurray

would wish us not tp think and do. So; be cautious of Macmurray's

easy style and presentation - especially in his popular and best-

known books. Their seeming simplicity belies their originality,

depth, and profundity.

So what are some of the things which, so original yet so out of

step with the general feeling and ideas of those times and these,

Macmurray told, or still has to tell us?

But first -

A Biographical Note.

John Macmurray was b om at Maxwell ton, Kirkcudbrightshire, on

the 16th February 1891. His father, James, was a civil servant; and

the family were deeply religious, a fact for which he says, "he was


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fortunate". (SKR 5). The home was one of Christian piety in the

traditional Calvanism of the Scottish Church. This had a strong

intellectual strain. The Bible was the book both of inspiration and

of reference in case of dispute. There was a distrust and

suppression of emotion, and doctrine was paramount. Macmurray speaks

of the shock he received when he first heard by chance that, in

contrast to science, religion expressed the emotional aspects of

human consciousness. (SRR 5). Hitherto for him religion had been

purely intellectual and the fount of control and discipline.

Macmurray was educated at a local grammar school, but later his

father asked to be transferred to Aberdeen solely for the sake of the

children's education. (SRR 7). At Aberdeen Macmurray went to Robert

Gordon's College.

In the 1890s there was a tremendous upsurge of evangelistic

fervour, much of it springing fran America, and Macmurray's parents

were not unaffected by it. They experimented with several Baptist

sects, eventually becoming Plymouth Bretheren, but still retaining

their Calvanist rigidity (SRR 6). When young, Macmurray's father had

wanted to be a missionary, but the Boxer Movement and parental

commitments had prevented this. Perhaps influenced by this knowledge

Macmurray went, eventually, to Glasgow University specifically to

become a missionary in China. But his enthusiasm for this soon

waned.

But from an early time Macmurray had been a Bible-class teacher,

and continued as an open-air and tent evangelist whilst still at

Glasgow studying. Gradually however, about this time of his life,

although not once in all his years was he ever not totally committed


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to religion, Macmurray began to doubt his own religious sincerity,

and the sincerity of all formal religion. He says (SRR 9), "It is

possible to have a real religious experience coupled with religious

beliefs and practices which are fallacious and undesirable; or to

hold sincerely and convincedly to religious beliefs and practices

with no reality to sustain them". Here we have the beginning,

although as he says he did not fannulate it till much later, of the

whole import and essence of Macmurray' s religious teaching and

outlook. This insight is the root of all that Macmurray has to say

about religion.

But parallel with his long-experienced and deep religious

knowledge and way of life is another interest - science (SRR 10).

This interest began before he had reached his teens. Science came to

him, he says, like a revelation (SRR 10). He wanted to become a

scientist, and although fighting strongly against his schoolmasters

who had insisted on him pursuing the classics, he was eventually

forced to compromise, but became the only student at school, and

later at university, permitted to study science as an extra subject.

Biology, chemistry, and geology were his main science subjects. And

science, either predictably or perversely, was the only university

subject in which he gained a medal 1

At university he was very much taken up with the then widespread

and influential Student Christian Movement. Apart from anything else

"It taught him that religious fellowship could be fun". (SRR 13). In

other words, his religious severity and strictness began to melt and

warm up under the influence of more liberal Christians around him.

He also perceived at this time that "there was no branch of creative

human effort which could not be integrated with Christianity". (SRR


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13).

Further religious and scientific studies taught him four more

things. 1) Firstly; that the theology and scriptual texts, on which

he had been brought up, would not stand up to serious scrutiny or

criticism. Their dogmatism was becoming repugnant to him. 2)

Secondly; religion is not to be identified with theology, nor with

any system of belief or beliefs. (SRR 15. SRR 16/7). 3) Thirdly;

that religion ought to be non-sectarian and interdenominational in

character, and be also missionary and ecumenical in essence, outlook,

and practice. 4) Fourthly; Macmurray reasoned that when a

scientific theory has been proved to be invalid or outmoded you do

not overthrew and renounce science. On the contrary; you pursue it

more avidly. Why then, when a particular religious conception is

shown to be puerile or untenable, renounce religion, as countless

people were doing and are still doing when certain religious beliefs

and dogmas no longer stand-up? "Could we not hope that through

testing and modification we should arrive at a religion which science

need not be ashamed to serve?". This last insight of Macmurray1 s had

an important and profound effect upon the development of his

religious ideas and outlook. It explains how, and why, he is able to

cling fast to his religion despite all his scientific interests, a

position which was very unusual at that time, the first decade of

this century. It reveals, too, why Macmurray insists, against all

the conventional conceptions of it, that religion - to retain its

credibility - must become, and be, empirical.

In 1913 John Macmurray took his first degree, at Glasgow

University, and in the same year won a Snell Exhibition to Oxford,


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and entered Balliol College in October 1913. But his course was far

from finished when, with the coming of the First World War, he joined

the R.A.M.C. in October 1914. He chose this branch of the Services

because, although not a full pacifist,he had qualmsand reservations

about war and killing not yet fullyworked out. But by 1916 he had

realized, so he says, (SRR 16) that hewas as much a part of the

fighting organisation as if he were inthe front line; so he took a

commission as lieutenant in the 40th. Cameron Highlanders. On leave

in that same year, 1916, he married Elizabeth Hyde. They had no

children. Also in 1916 he was awarded the M.C. Wounded near Arras

early in 1918, he was invalided home, but not discharged for a

considerable time. Indeed, he was allowed to return to Oxford and

took his degree in the simmer of 1919, before he was finally and

officially allcwed to leave the Army. (SRR 16).

Out of his experience in the War Macmurray learned, inter alia,

two things very important to his subsequent thinking. Firstly, the

removal far ever of .the fear of death. This was, and is, "a

tremendous gain in reality; for until we reach it - however we do

reach it - we cannot see our life as it really is, and so we cannot

live it as we should.11 (SRR 18). Secondly, Macmurray learned or

decided to remove himself, and never join again, any Christian Church

or denomination; yet, of course, remaining a full and committed

Christian. It is interesting how this second determination came

about. On leave from France he preached in a North London church

about being on guard against the "war mentality", and of the need for

reconciliation. (SRR 21). On saying this he met with cold hostility

and was shunned by the congregation as he left the church. This left

an indelible impression upon him of the mistakenly, to him,


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nationalistic and limited character of the conventional and orthodox

churches. This vow of non-attachment he broke only in the early

1960s, when he joined fully, after years of admiration going back at

least to the First World War, the Society of Friends.

On the whole Macmurray was, as were so many of his

contemporaries, disillusioned by the War. According to him the only

major result of it, and this was wholly unintended, was the setting

up of communism in Russia. (SRR 19). But not until later did

Macmurray concern himself with Marxism; and this occurred by chance.

He attended a religious conference on "What Is Christianity?" at

which one of the study groups were asked to prepare a contributory

paper on the then rather novel and topical subject of communism (SRR

25). Macmurray, not at that time knowing very much about it,

actually wrote the paper. Instantly, he, in various ways unique to

him, discovered certain unusual - not the commonplace ones -

associations between Christianity and communism. From then on

communism played a big part in his thinking. However, whether he is

to be regarded, or regarded himself, as a communist, is an open

question and is discussed in the relevant chapter later.

No known thinker has especially influenced Macmurray, nor does

he acknowledge any or speak of any indebtedness. He does say (SRR

24) that, like Kierkegaard, he was aroused and stimulated by the

problem of "What is Christianity?" or "Hew to become a Christian".

And he speaks of Martin Buber as one of the "very greatest of modem

thinkers". (SRR 24). If not an existentialist Macmurray is often on

the fringes of it. In "Ten Modem Prophets," (Frederick Muller

1944). J.B. Coates says that "Intellectually, Macmurray has been


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greatly influenced by Bergson", but in all Macmurray's works Bergson

is mentioned only once, and then rather casually.

Discharged frcm the Army, Macmurray resolved to join with

anybody or any organisation to prevent war occurring again. He hoped

to become a member of staff of the newly formed League of Nations

(SRR 22) but this was not to be. Instead, philosophy became his task

and profession for life.

After taking his degree at Oxford he was, in 1919, appointed

John Locke Scholar, and in the same year became a lecturer at

Manchester University. From 1921/2 he was Professor of Philosophy at

the University of Witwatersrand, South Africa. Returning from there

he was made a fellcw and tutor of Balliol College, 1922-1928. During

the early 1930s he gave his very popular B.B.C. talks cn philosophy

and the contemporary world; and this whilst at the University of

London as Grote Professor, 1928-1944. To finish his academic career

he then moved to Edinburgh University as Professor of Moral

Philosophy, 1944-58..

During the years 1953/4 he gave the renowned Gifford Lectures at

Glasgow University. These were published as "The Form of the

Personal" (2 volumes), and refer to one of Macmurray1 s foremost,

exploratory, and pioneering themes, the fruits and development of

which have hardly begun. They foreshadow an area to be defined and

formulated, yet too far ahead for contemporary man, with his

principal interest and obsession in knowing, manipulating, and

exploiting the exterior world, to the neglect of emotional

development and the promotion of true human relationships,

understanding, and mutuality.


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Altogether Macmurray wrote 24 books. Stemming from his

scientific interests his main recreation was gardening. He died on

21st June 1976.

There ends a brief biographical note.

What then were -

Macmurray1s Major Contributions

1) Emotional Reason

Everybody in our society, and indeed throughout Western

civilisation, is conditioned to the idea that thinking can be, or

should be at its best, imbued with reason. Not all thinking is; far

from it. Some of the biggest efforts, and hours of valuable time,

both in private and public life, are taken up with pointing out the

flaws and lack of reasonableness in others, rarely if ever in one's

cwn, thinking and arguments.

Embedded in this idea of satisfactory thinking are the notions

of logic and rationality. They are not the same. But here is not

the place to discuss them. Sufficient if we knew and agree that

thinking includes some reason, or ought to, and the more of it the

better. Most, too, would agree that although rational thinking can

be found in nearly all branches of human knowledge, its most advanced

exemplification, so far, is in the scientific area of enquiry.

Along with this idea it is universally accepted that the enemy

of good and reasoned thinking, the enemy within which prevents it

fran ever becoming good thinking, is emotion; this apart, of course,

from mere structural failings. It is our emotions, we believe, which

keep us fran thinking satisfactorily. Just as we are on the verge of


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thinking successfully feeling intervenes and ruffles reason. We

suspect, too, that feeling interferes with thinking even if we are

unaware of it. It certainly does in other people, when we are only

too pleased to tell them that they are "rationalizing", which despite

the name, means just the opposite of what it might be thought to

mean.

Emotion, according to this widespread view of it, at the best

interpretation we can put upcn it, a-raticnal or a-reasonable. But

beyond this, most would say that our emotions are the seat and fount

of unreason and of irrationality; and that they are incurably so.

The very nature of emoticn is to be thus. This is how it is.

Thought alone has the monopoly, or the possible monopoly, of the

highly commendable and laudable characteristic of reason and

rationality. So says the conventional wisdom.

This is not so, says Macmurray. Nothing is farther from the

truth. Feeling can be as rational, and imbued with reason, as

thought. Like thought it often isnt. But it can and should be.

Reason, as we so mistakenly believe, is not the prerogative of

thinking. Our emotions must be seen to be as equally subject to, and

as much in need of reason, as our thought.

Moreover, Macmurray goes further. "Reason," he says (RE 26) is

primarily an affair of the emotions whilst the rationality of

thought is the derivative and secondary one". He could not make his

point clearer. Emotion is the essence of our being. Thought is

secondary. We are essentially "feelers" not thinkers. Therefore

until we make our feelings as rational as our thought can, at its

best, sometimes be, we can never live satisfactorily. Macmurray

suggests, even if he does not state it outright, that all our


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problems, personal and public, private and social, psychological and

relational, are due to our almost total obliviousness to this fact of

human existence. Western man has got into the cul-de-sac of

obsession with thinking which blinkers him to the need for emotional

growth and emotional objectivity; to the need for emotional reason.

At first hearing, this notion may not sound radical and

revolutionary. Modem psychology, you may say, has been around for

some time and this has said quite a lot about the emotions. But

reflect upon Macmurray's contention; allow it to penetrate and

permeate your awareness, and you will soon come to realize its

startling originality and perceptiveness. It calls far nothing short

of a complete shift of emphasis, and a redirecting of our way of

life, of our values, and of our way of seeing things. Only thus will

we find the path that may lead us out of the immense difficulties and

problems of this present age of man.

As with all these introductory sections, only the barest minimum

has been given concerning Macmurray's thought. A much fuller

exposition and justification, in this case, is given in the chapter

on Macmurray's psychological thought. But there can be no doubt that

the concept of Emotional Reasons has been Macmurray' s greatest,

penetrating, and most profound contribution and insight into this

fundamental and important aspect of our living. Some may have hinted

at the notion; others intuitively or vaguely discerned it. But only

Macmurray has made it explicit.


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2) The Personal

This is Macmurray's most major contribution after Bnotional

Reason. In fact, emotional reason, although important in its own

right can be seen, when both are known and fully comprehended, as a

vital element of the Personal. Here again, when you first come to

understand what the personal is, nothing is more tempting than to say

- "Bosh! We've known that all our lives. What is it but another

name for the spiritual. We certainly don't need to be told about it

as if it were some important discovery like Copemicumism or

electricity".

But look around you. Hew many people do you know who are living

Personally? Are you living thus, except far very brief, unintended,

and discontinuous periods each day?

What is the Personal? The Personal is the third order. We are

all familiar with orders. The basic, because most ubiquitous and

extensive, is the material order. This includes all the physical

aspects of existence - the Earth, atoms, things, the basic substances

of our bodies, to name but some. The essence of this order is

fixity, rigidity, regularity, uniformity, usually a certain

persistency and permanency, behaving always according to fixed laws;

passivity, unfreedom, non-self-directing or self-reproducing,

egoless; all the qualities we associate with thingdem.

The second order is the organic. Here are included all plants,

trees, fish, bacteria, insects, animals, and certain aspects of man.

The essence of this order is sentience, drives, desires, will to

survive, adaptability, procreation, conditioned response, life cycle,

and inevitable individual extinction.


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And then coming through, existing upon and as it were,

creatively emerging from the first two is the third carder, the

Personal. I say "emerging from" as this is the best way to depict it

at this stage of our exposition and understanding. But Macmurray

believes the Personal to be the most basic and fundamental of the

three. But more elaboration and discussion of this in the text later

on.

What is the essence of the Personal? Freedom, openness,

creativity, intention, self-consciousness, objectivity, rationality,

reason; and just as important - as we are all, car can be, or should

be, all Personal together - interdependence, mutuality, relatingness,

and the most advanced and satisfactory of these and of the Personal,

fellowship, friendship, and love. The Personal can never be imposed.

It cannot be implemented by law, social order, politics, force, cr

administration. The attainment of it, of its very nature, must be

from choice, and of self-volition.

As you will ncw> recognise, the Personal has been around a long

time. Macmurray argues with considerable justification, that Jesus

discovered the Personal. If nothing else it has been Implicit in

religious teaching - especially those of Christianity - for

centuries. But. as with Qnotional Reason, what Macmurray has done is

to give it a form and definition, a sort of philosophical and logical

acceptability; he has brought it down to earth. We were conscious of

it before; he has made us self-conscious of it. And by doing this

never again can it be something vague, something you by accident,

choice, education, or cultural environment heed and attend to or not.

He has identified it, articulated it, and named it. From now on

nobody who understands what Macmurray has made explicit about the


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Personal, however sceptical of regarding man as anything but a highly

complex, involved, and computerised animal, can not intend to live in

the Personal. If you do not you are, as it were, degrading your own

existence.

Before you came to the last paragraph, and the reference there

made to it, it is highly inprobable that you could have read these

introductory remarks on the Personal without the word and concept of

religion arising in your mind. Far the Personal, as so empirically

defined by Macmurray, for the first time in the history of human

thought and awareness is, for him and I believe for us all from now

on, because of Macmurray' s insights and articulations, is to be

associated, if not absolutely coincidentally and oo-existently, with

religion.

So, to Macmurray we owe the explication of the Personal.

3) Religion

Without being "religious", at least not in any visible,

conventional, or recognizable sense, religion is the all-important,

all-including, thing for Macmurray. There are few branches of human

learning and culture about which Macmurray does not have plenty to

say and threw enlightenment upon. Science, art, psychology, thought,

economics, politics, communism, philosophy, ethics, and society all

receive considerable attention, some even commanding whole books of

exposition and discussion. But mingling and intermingling through

all is Macmurray's penchant, his thing, that which he perceives as

the essential factor of humanness, the ground of all living -

religion. With such permeation and penetration we cannot help but


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get the feeling that religion is natural, not that Macmurray ever

mentions the word in this context. But that is what he consciously

or unconsciously, intentionally or unintentionally, is conveying.

And whether this is his open intention or not, from this perception

of naturalness and religious normality, an extremely important and

far-reaching effect occurs; at least for those who are prepared to

understand and heed what Macmurray is saying.

One problem troubles countless people today, try as they may to

brush it aside. It is - Hew to be religious. Millions of sceptics,

agnostics, atheists, secularists, and humanists are, at heart even if

not overtly, yearning to be religious. And countless people who are

ostensibly religious, believing, and orthodox, and within the fold

are, whether openly seen to be or not, confronted by the same

problem. Either they have their doubts, witness the mental and

intellectual struggles of so many bishops; or they are vaguely aware

of shortcomings in their behaviour, practices, relationships,

approaches, and attitudes. And yet another group, and a very large

one indeed, especially amongst the young, are those trying every

cult, from fringe religious organisations, the occult, astrology,

spiritualism, evangelism, the maharishi, and Scientology to drugs,

addictions, pot, and pops - to name but a fewl Everywhere, people

knowingly and unknowingly are trying desperately, almost frantically,

and in however a substitute fashion, to be religious, yet to no

satisfactory, real, and happy effect. All is phoney, false,

ephemeral, and unsatisfying in the long run, if not in the short.

Why is there this intense seeking? There are three reasons.

Firstly; the important, even if not the sole, roots of our Western

society are in Christianity. Therefore if for any cause, perhaps for


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example because of the effects of science and technology, the link

with our roots is broken or partially severed, there must inevitably

be a widespread feeling of voidness and loss; not so much a feeling

of longing for what was as a disorientation, especially as those

things which are most intrinsic, vital, and sustaining in our lives,

namely values, become unstable as a result.

Secondly; the same applies to individual lives, not merely to

society in general. Countless numbers of people alive today were

reared directly, or in the lengthening shadow of Christianity, even

if it was only a conventionalised Christianity exemplified by church-

going or by school assembly. To many it was more, of course. The

loss of this, shrugged-off with indifference by many, cannot but be

felt, even if unadmitted. Something, however vague and

unidentifiable, has gone from their lives.

Thirdly; and here we come to what no doubt Macmurray would call

the essential reason; the reason which exists apart from both general

history and individual experience. And to understand this fully we

must recall the last section of this introduction; the Personal. We

are, you remember, made to be Personal. To be Personal is what we

are, or what we must become. Only thus can we be ourselves. We are

things, and often have to exist as such; we are creatures and must

act organically. But superimposed on all this, and indeed making it

very difficult far us, is the Personal. And it is in this order that

we must intend to live and be.

New the area especially relevant to the Personal is that of

religion. Religion exists, hcwever inadequately, gropingly, or

unconsciously, to promote the Personal. Because, therefore, however


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seriously or however reluctantly and superficially we are and must

pursue the Personal, we are self-evidently, all and every one of us,

religious and involved with religion. It is of our very essence.

The immature expressions of religion manifested so far have, quite

naturally, "turned off" millions of people in today's world. But

this does not in any way detract from our need for religion.

We can see now why countless are wondering how to be religious.

And why the important contribution Macmurray has made to religion is

that, whether totally acceptable or not, he has given us the clue as

to hew we can recognize that, despite all our own ideas, and the

ideas of the contemporary world, we are and must live in a religious

context. We are religious whether we recognize it or not, for it is

the most natural and normal thing for all men to be. We are

Personal, and religion is the area, the ambience, of the Personal.

Macmurray makes it possible for us to be religious again, and

possibly at a more advanced, maturer, stage than before. Macmurray

has metamorphosed religion. By discovering this, by showing religion

to be as normal and as natural a part of human existence as thinking,

breathing, and relating, he has gone a long way to making unbelievers

religious again; and believers less eager to portray religion as

something special, spiritual, sacred, and supernatural; something

only for the "elect" and chosen and thus putting everybody else off.

Religion for Macmurray is simply living Personally.

4) Freedom

Apart from religion Macmurray, throughout his works, has more to

say about freedom than anything else. It is a major and important

conception of his, and he brings much original thought to it. And


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where he is not original he, as perhaps we have come to expect by now

of him, puts an emphasis on some aspect almost ignored in

contemporary thought and action.

The important contribution Macmurray makes regarding freedom is

that he deepens and broadens our awareness and apprehension of it.

Ask most people, not merely the man in the street but those in the

more educated and higher controlling and influencing strata of

society, what they understand by freedom, and they will give some

sort of political answer possibly extended to include rather vague

references to such social matters as freedom of the press and freedom

of assembly. One thing is certain. You can be sure nothing will be

said about psychological freedom, that is freedom of the emotions and

of the self.

Yet this is Macmurray's greatest concern when the question of

freedom arises. Moreover, he links the two. Structural and

institutional freedom, that is political and social freedom, may be

there for all to benefit from, but none can satisfactorily benefit

unless they are personally free; that is, free in themselves and in

their emotions. In a sense, political freedom, except formally and

without any real meaning and substance, cannot exist without personal

freedom. This is because the most unfree, yet energetic and vigorous

members of society - the pcwer lovers - will take over, and do take

over, even in a democracy. They then subtly and insidiously

manipulate the feeling of the numerous and the majority but less

power-driven of the people. Thus in a "free" society most people are

unfree.


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Hew has this situation arisen? Because, says Macmurray, we have

freed thought but not emotion. Freedom of thought started about five

hundred years ago, and from tentative and opposed beginnings

progressed to its greatest expression in science. The essence of

scientific thought is freedom and reality. Without preconceptions or

dogmatism and authority, it operates in freedom, seeking solely for

what is, not for what it would wish to be. Science is the prime

example of what all freedom, contrary to popular conceptions of it,

must contain; and that is discipline. The discipline of relating

itself, whatever the cost - in human pride, vanity, or dignity - to

reality.

But although we have freed thought, and thus related it to

reality and shifted its centre of balance from "in here" to "out

there", from subjectivity to objectivity, to our immense advantage

thought-wise, we have not freed our emotions. And remember, as

Macmurray so pertinently reminds us - indeed, he might be said to

instruct us, so oblivious is contemporary society to the fact - that

the essence of our living is our emotional life. Our emotions are

the vital, essential, part of ourselves. Not only does all

experience come by and through our emotions, feelings, and senses,

but all our evaluations, and hence our choices are determined by our

emotions and not by our thinking.

Earlier we considered the importance of emotional reason and

growth. No less an aspect of this, for Macmurray, is the freeing of

emotion. Yet in this area we are enchained, biased, and as unfree

and unreal as thought was in its pre-scientific era. Only as we

bring the same freedom to our emotional life can we grow and develop

into satisfactory, personal, human beings. The irony is that the


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cannon ethos tells us that we are free, mainly because we enjoy

constitutional freedoms. Moreover, many people, probably the

majority, think that more money and more material possessions would

make them more free. Considering Macmurray's ideas on personal,

emotional, and psychological development and freedom, additional

possessions have very little to do with freedom essentially.

Macmurray gives interesting and cogent reasons and historical

analysis as to why we are in this state of emotional unfreedom.

This introductory section can only hint at Macmurray's

penetrating and valuable contribution to our understanding of

freedom. Much more will be elaborated upon in the relevant chapter.

But enough has been given to indicate the insight Macmurray has

brought to this vital topic, and of the importance of what he has to

say about it.

5) Monism

Of all the five major tendencies or advocacies considered in

this introduction, Macmurray's monisn is the least heightened,

focused, reinforced, and re-expounded by him. The other ideas have

each been encapsulated in one or more books, devoted more or less

exclusively to their subject matter. Not so his monism. Yet it

pervades all his writings and thought. If one thing is the essence,

if not the substance, of Macmurray, it is this.

Macmurray is the foremost monist of our time. He may not be the

foremost in advocacy and intention, arguing, expounding, and

defending his case in the most detailed, logically reasoned, and

extended way. That, as we have come to knew, is not Macmurray's


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method. For him the proof of the pudding is in the eating (or should

we say, in the experiencing) not in an inspection, analysis, and

admiration of the list of ingredients, however brilliant and

convincing these may be.

Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that Macmurray

unquestionably considers the world as one, and merely by reading him

we totally and automatically feel this to be so. Very subtly, or

though not consciously or deliberately, and certainly with no

ulterior motive, Macmurray through his writing and the consequent

shifting and redirecting of feeling which we experience, is able to

bring about a change in us imperceptibly; and without the doubtful

necessity of logical argument we become monists. Through him, and

the way he writes, we see and experience the point, and the need of

so being.

Why is monism, and to be monist, so important? Because, both in

ourselves and throughout Western civilisation, if not in all extant

civilisations and cultures, we are divided. Now sometimes, and at

different times in history, division or centrifuged interests and

farces are necessary for growth, or at legist as an essential catalyst

and precursor to growth. At other times unifying, centripetal,

monistic, interests and directions are essential to promote and

create cohesion, both within ourselves and in society at large.

Indeed, such monism may be essential to survival. Of such an era is

the one in which we are now living.

It was Plato who first divided our consciousness, reinforced by

Descartes the father of the modem world, philosophy-wise. Since

then we have been bedevilled by dualism, and even by pluralism.

Existence, the world, man, thought, politics, and religion must have


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or perhaps in the light of Macmurray we ought to say, "are seen by us

to have" - two or more sides or aspects. Obvious examples of dualism

are inexhaustible, but here are some to remind us; mind and matter,

body and soul, left and right, heaven and hell, science and religion,

will and passion, reason and emotion, spiritual and temperal, either

or. And examples of pluralism are; mind, body, and spirit; the

trinity; and social classes - upper, middle, and lower. Nobody can

say that dualism is not an inbuilt feature of our way of perceiving

the world, life and ourselves.

But, inconceivable as it may seem to us, conditioned as we are

by the structure of Western thinking and perceiving process, we do

not have to see things in this way. They are merely categories we

have created in the human mind, mainly for our seeming convenience.

And its effects have reached a dangerous stage as we well knew.

According to Macmurray, since primitive times, only one people have

been totally and naturally monist; the Jews of the Old Testament.

His admiration for them, in this respect, is immense. This example

of monism forms for Macmurray one very important aspect (about half,

if one can roughly apportion it) of his "clue" to history. For

monism to appear so important speaks far itself in Macmurray's

thought.

If monism, if to be a monist, is so important for us, how are we

to achieve it? Descartes said, "I think, therefore I am." Here lies

the root of all our troubles and divisions. Thought, thinking, is

not the essence, the core, of our being. Thought is only

instrumental, a means to an end. It can never be anything of itself.

It can never be ultimate. It can never cause us to experience


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reality.

And this is where Macmurray turns the tables, and consequently

revolutionizes our way of seeing things. Macmurray instead of

saying, "I think, therefore I am", would say, "I act, therefore I

am". But even this is not complete enough for him. Reality is

Personal - remember? - and the Personal includes us all. Therefore

the ultimate phrase, the ultimate expression of being for Macmurray

is, "We act, therefore we are". In this conception of action lies

the clue to Macmurray's monism. For, although thinking can be

divided an action, at any one particular moment, can never be

divided. It can only be one thing. For some reason, to be discussed

later, Macmurray calls this paramountcy of action "agency"; we are

"agents". But perhaps this whole aspect of his thinking could best

be called Actionism. Macmurray's monism exists through and by the

fact that he is an Actionist. We are here to do, not to dream or

wish.

What "to act" means is elaborated upon at length. It includes

the very important conception of "intention", which plays a very big

part in Macmurray's psychology and philosophy.

Enough has been said to illustrate how important monism is for

Macmurray; and of hew essential it is, both in ourselves and in our

world, to be undivided and seamless. He has shewn how, by redressing

the balance between thought and action, we can achieve this.

Macmurray's monism, and of how to be monistic, is certainly one of

his foremost conceptions - and a means of saving the world. For,

although unsaid, this no doubt is one of Macmurray's major objects.


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A Final Note

The foregoing brief introductory sections have been written with

two things in mind.

Firstly; to introduce, in an easy way, a few of the major ideas

of John Macmurray.

Secondly; to awaken, arouse, and stimulate interest in an

important writer and thinker who has much to say of great relevance

for us today, yet who has been almost totally neglected.

No attempt has been made at this stage to appraise or criticise

the ideas presented. In your mind, as you have read, some doubts,

questions, and even antipathies, will inevitably have arisen. Each

chapter following contains several sections of criticisn and

appraisement; and a final chapter will attempt to summarise and

evaluate overall Macmurray's place, contribution, relevance,

influence, and shortcomings.


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FREEDOM

Relevant Books

Freedom in the Modem World. (FMW)

Conditions of Freedom. (CF)

Philosophy of Communism. (PC)

Introduction

Macmurray has many diverse and varied ideas on freedom. It is

not easy to bring total coherence to them, or to incorporate them

exhaustively into one system. Although a man of reason and

rationality Macmurray was not predominantly a man of logic or proof,

not a man to totally and exhaustively justify what he was saying.

Nor was Plato - far from it. Yet he was not criticised on these

grounds.

This does not mean that Macmurray's views on freedom - or,

indeed, on anything else - are inconsistent or incongruent; at least,

not beyond the inevitable and acceptable limits of any thinker. But

as in all Macmurray's work and intentions, proof of anything said or

believed is in the living of it, not in verbal substantiation and

argument. Truth is to be found in living, not in and through

thinking. Thinking plays a valid and valuable part to this end, but

it is feeling which gives us our values and it is values which

determine our life and living - not intellectual thinking. "Thought

is only verifiable in action." (PC 26).

Such an outlook is quite against Western tradition, especially


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since the end of the Middle Ages and the caning of the Modem era;

and since Descartes. Of this period, science is its prime, although

by no means sole, manifestation. In philosophy, probably only

existentialism challenges this. Even Pragmatism is thought-*

orientated.

Thus, what Macmurray is really trying to do is to shift the

whole emphasis of Western thinking and ideas. This is like trying to

lift a twenty ton rock with, and on, one human shoulder. And if

followers or acknowledgers are any indication of one's success and

influence, Macmurray has - at least to date - failed miserably. At

best, one can say he has gone unheard. Maybe the coming of the

Permissive Society in the 1960s was in some way, hcwever indirect,

the result of Macmurray's work. But a lot of study and research

would be necessary to trace it to him (even as but one factor in a

complex situation). And nobody has even attempted or suggested it

yet.

But there can be no doubt that this major shift of life-

emphasis, away from thought to feeling and consequent improved

action, was a very prominent and important theme and intention of

Macmurray's. It is perhaps unfortunate that Macmurray's style -

except in the three more academic books - is so "easy" and fluent, so

readable, that people understand it, or think they do, as they read

without bothering to find reflection and questioning as to meaning

necessary. If he were more obscure, and had to be worked at, he

would be more revered. I remember a student in one of my classes

saying of another lecturer (with slight intended amusement, but

nevertheless meant), "He must be a good lecturer, I don't understand


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a word he says!"

If Macmurray had the obscurity of Hegel he might well have

superseded him by now. For he is certainly attempting as major a

task as Hegel (or Marx).

But now for freedom. And first of all - what, according to

Macmurray, is:-

The Origin of Freedom

Why do we seem to want freedom? Why has it been a major theme

and intention of modem man? From whence does this idea in us come

from? ....................................................

It might be noted in passing that although the books listed at

the head of this chapter are obviously, by their titles, the ones

most devoted by Macmurray to this subject, freedom is often referred

to throughout his works. It is a major theme.

Macmurray attributes freedom to two sources.

1 ) Firstly; to Christianity. "Christianity implanted in us the

desire for freedom of life". (FMW 48). And again. "The driving

force belcw the development of Europe has always been the struggle

for freedom and the clue to that struggle lies in Christianity."

(FMW 48). (And more generally Macmurray speaks of this influence in

CF 35).

One further special exemplification of this contention is given.

Science, claims Macmurray, is our most notable area of freedom

attained so far. It results from freedom of thought. And the

required underlying freedom necessary far its production came not, as

is usually contended, from the Greeks, but from Christianity with its

insistence can truth and light. To illustrate this Macmurray quotes


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from the New Testament, (FMW 38). "This is the condemnation that

light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than

light because their deeds were evil". For full discussion of this

see FMW 37/41.

So Christianity is a major source of the idea of, and need for,

freedom.

2) Secondly: freedom is of man's essence, man would not be

man had he not this urge and need for freedom. To quote CF 16.

"There is a sense in which freedom is absolute. It is the sense in

which freedom is the. defining character of Man;, the property which .

sets us apart from the rest of creation and fixes a gulf between us

and the highest of the animals.".

Macmurray then, in acceptable but nevertheless his own meaning

and interpretation of words and terms, puts forward - or at least

implies - three ways of being. These are:-

To act.

To behave.1(see CF 16/17).

To react.

Material things behave. Living things react. But only man

acts. (There is much more about this, and of the freedom and types

of morality these three ways of being respectively evoke, in the

chapters and pages of FMW 175/210, but I do not think it especially

relevant to develop them at this point. See later in this chapter.)

To act means to form an intention and seek to realise it (CF

16). To act is to be free. As Agents - one of Macmurray's most

major concepts - we are concerned not with what exists or is, but

with what will be i.e. with the future and our intentions for it.

The past is fixed and unalterable. The present is merely the point


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of action. Only in our intention for what is to be are we free.

"The future is the field of freedom" (CF 17). The only way to deny

that freedom is of our essence is to assert that we never, nor can,

act (but only behave or react).

Beside acting and agency another unique feature of man, as

equally important and of the essence of freedom, is the Personal,

also discussed later at length in this thesis.

So there are Macmurray's two main ideas - Christianity and

essence - as to why man has, wants, needs, seems to be involved with,

freedom.

(Rather than wait to the end of each chapter, I shall from time

to time interrupt the exposition to make an appraisement and

evaluation. The first occasion for this is now).

Appraisement (1)

1 ) Without being able to substantiate it in detail, I do myself

feel that Christianity has been a major source of freedom. But

surely Macmurray could give a better quote frcm the New Testament

than the one he has given. Moreover, there must be many quotes he

could give frcm the same source. To those unfamiliar with

Macmurray's works one might reasonably say that Christianity, as it

has come down to us, is a restricting, inhibiting, influence - not

one of freedom. But Macmurray recognises this, especially in the

realms of feeling and emotion (but not in the area of thought) and

has given for this a rather interesting reason. This will have to be

fully discussed later in an appropriate context. Sufficient to say

here that Macmurray contends that the Christianity we have and know


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is not the original and real Christianity introduced by Jesus. It

has all the hall-marks of the culture and attitudes of Ancient Rome.

So; to go back to this point in the appraisement. It would have

been better if Macmurray had substantiated his assertion with more

and relevant evidence.

2) Regarding his second reason for man's need for freedom i.e.

that it is of our essence, the fact that you cannot prove it, or

bring overwhelming evidence to support it may, of itself, be

sufficient indication of it probably being true. But we must not

confuse the "unknown" (which the future is) with the "free"). The

future is definitely unknown, but is it open and free? Much of it

e.g. movement of the planets, to give but one obvious example, must

already be part of a deterministic and unfree chain. Is our own

individual future any the less determined?

However, if we take Macmurray's ideas, and incorporate them in

our cwn lives, thoughts, emotions, actions, and relationships we do

find ourselves becoming "freer". No doubt other "systems" (of the

right kind) will produce this effect too. So, in experience and

practice, it would seem that freedom can be enlarged by each one of

us; and, as it is enlarged, we feel more adequate, satisfactory, and

effective persons. Thus, through living, Macmurray's contentions

that to be free is of our human essence, would seem to be "proved" as

far as it can be. And proved by the method of proof Macmurray all

along advocates, namely action and living, not thinking. Speaking of

the rejection of idealism, and the acceptance of the principle of the

unity of theory and practice, Macmurray says, "they involve the

belief that all theory must seek verification in action and adapt


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itself to the possibility of experintent. They make a clean sweep of

all speculative thought on the ground that the validity of no belief

whatever is capable of demonstration by argument. They involve a

refusal at any point to make knowledge an end in itself, and equally,

the rejection of the desire for certainty which is the motive

governing speculative thought. The demand for personal certainty is

only the ideal reflection of the demand for personal security and

that demand is the psychological basis of the struggle for power

between individuals, classes, nations and empires." (PC 63).

End of Appraisement (1 )

The Paradoxical Position of Man Concerning Human Freedom

Freedom may be of man's essence; it may be absolute (as

Macmurray expresses it CF 16). But equally, Macmurray says, it is

relative - which means that, although made for freedom, although

freedom is of our nature, we are not always free, able to be free,

nor even, in many cases, to want to be free.

As we would expect Macmurray (CF 17) quoted Rousseau's famous

dictum "Man is b o m free, yet everywhere he is in chains". But, to

misquote, what I think Macmurray should have said (to be more in line

with his thinking) is "Man is b om to be free, but everywhere he is

still emotionally in chains".

We experience this relativity of freedom in many ways. When,

for example, we fall short of what we would be, or know ourselves to

be capable of. And again; in the conflict of conscience versus

impulse (see CF 17). All other creatures are always themselves, but


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man's nature is not fixed and predictable. To illustrate this

Macmurray quotes St. Paul, " - it doth not yet appear what we shall

be". We are always becoming. We are ourselves yet always we are

reaching out to be what is, as yet, not ourselves. So this is the

paradox of human freedom. Our freedom is at once both absolute and

relative.

But then there is a second paradox concerning human freedom. Or

if not a paradox then at least a very marked proviso concerning the

first, (see CF 18/20). We profess to desire freedom but fear to be

free.

On hearing this phrase one is reminded of a book with the same

theme written after Macmurray's ideas had been published, namely,

"The Fear of Freedom" by Erich Fromm. This is very relevant to the

point. What is this fear of freedom? Perpetually - it is not a

once-for-all choice and done with it - we are each confronted by a

choice, freedom or security. And most of the time, "inhumanly" and

"sub-personally", we choose security. This then is the second

paradox of freedom. We are bom to be free yet out of fear we shun

it. Yet, and here is the essence of the paradox, we can only be

ourselves when going for freedom, therefore only in freedom can we be

secure.

Going for security in preference to freedom can lead only to

frustration, and to the destroying of ourselves. "If we aim at

security we aim at the impossible, and succeed only in multiplying

the occasions of fear, and magnifying our need far security. There

is no security for us except in choosing freedom. For our insecurity

is our fear, and to choose freedom is to triumph over fear". (CF 20).


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As we shall come to understand as we go along, fear is another

important theme throughout Macmurray's writings. The desire for

security is based on fear. Fear is a negative emotion. It either

shrivels us up and leads into a withdrawal frcm life and people; or;

it puts into us a mighty urge to power, to conquer all and sundry, to

master all imagined enemies and sources of fear.

But it never succeeds. In jungle and instinctive conditions

fear is necessary, proper, and propitious. At the human, personal,

level it is disastrous. Most of all - and very much to the point

here - it is a major source of our unfreedom.

It is interesting to ask in passing - why is fear such a big

"thing" with Macmurray? Is its discernment a rational, objective,

analysis on his part? Or is he somewhere, somehow, a 'fearful, fear-

filled' person? We cannot tell. But a slight hint might be gleaned

frcm the following - perhaps. "The free man is the man who takes

responsibility for his cwn life before God and his fellows. Is it

any wonder that when we are faced with the challenge of freedom, our

fear is usually more than a match for its attractiveness; and that we

seek, far the most part, to escape the demand that it makes upon us?

This, at least, is my experience; and that our capacity to deceive

ourselves in this matter is of extreme subtlety." (CF 19). Does

this give us a clue or not?

So this is the paradox, concerning freedom, in us. Freedom is

of our essence as men, as human beings, as persons. However, we are

not yet free (or only partially so, and each of us has acquired

different degrees of freedom, of which we may lose or gain more)

because 1) of our inbetween and transitory state as man. 2) of

fear(s) in us, evoked by, probably, this very transitory condition in


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which we find ourselves, and of our consequent need for security.

Very awkward isn't it I - but very cleverly analysed by Macmurray.

What is Freedom?

As we would expect, all of Macmurray's ideas of freedom are not

concerned with their ontological, philosophical, or theoretical

aspects, but with their manifestations in life and action. So; in

practical, psychological, and dcwn-to-earth terms what, for

Macmurray, is freedom?

After years of study I believe I know - and am able to summarise

- what Macmurray meant by freedom. But a serious first half-a-dozen

readings of his ideas on the matter (one reading will not bother

you!) will lead you into a miasma of seeming anomalies, even

contradictions; one moment he seems to regard freedom as "doing as

you please" absolutely; the next he says that he does not mean this

at all - so "don11 misunderstand him"!

Moreover, when you do understand him (or think you do), one of

the terms essential to his conception of freedom, namely "reality",

is extremely difficult to comprehend in this context of freedom.

However, as I say, I believe I knew what he means; but others

may have a different interpretation, or at least a different

emphasis.

Let us start by quoting some of Macmurray's definitions or

delineations of freedom:-

To do as we please without restraint or hindrance. (FMW 172).

To express one's cwn nature in action. (FMW 170).

To act freely is to act without restraint. (FMW 167).


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In the absence of personal reality freedom is just impossible.

(FMW 168).

Free action is spontaneous action. (FMW 170).

Free action flows frcm our own nature. (FMW 170).

Freedom is spontaneity. (FMW 170).

Communism is therefore the necessary basis of real freedom. (PC 80).

The free man is the man who takes responsibility for his own life.

(CF 19).

Only a real person can be free. (FMW 171 ).

To be free means not to be under restraint. (FMW 169).

Freedom depends upon our inner condition. (FMW 172).

It is obviously untrue to say that we are free to do as we please, if

we don't know what we want to do. (FMW 172/3).

Even a real person cannot be free in the face of unreal persons. (FMW

173).

And to paraphrase other relevant quotations

Unfreedom is to be still in the bondage of tradition and authority.

(FMW 53).

Undisciplined thought is never free. (FMW 53).

It is only in friendship that we ever find ourselves completely, and

so be completely free. (FMW 174).

To act freely is to take a decision and accept the consequences.

(CF 19).

Let me try to collate the above, and bring some cohesion and

coherence to what may seem a disparate and sometimes incongruent set


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of assertions. And others could be added, equally as amorphous I

From the above quotations it will be seen that the key words,

apart from freedom itself, are:-

Spontaneity.

Reality. Real.

Personal reality.

Friendship.

Own nature.

Inner condition.

Discipline.

Responsibility.

Using, where necessary, these words and concepts, what might be

said to be Macmurray's ideas cn freedom - in a summary?

To be free means to be spontaneous, untrammelled, unrestrained -

even unreflecting. (In "Persons in Relation" Macmurray strongly

contrasts these two action and reflection - alternating and

essential phases of life.) To be free means immediacy and

instantaneousness. It means living and acting creatively at a point

of time.

But whilst spontaneity is essential to freedom, not all

spontaneous action is free. Far frcm it; indeed very little of it

is. Externally, and more important internally, we are constrained,

unfree, and inhibited - and this without necessarily having the

psycho-analytic connotation.

What, then, must accompany spontaneity in order for our actions

and our selves to be free? Four things:-

Reality.


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Discipline.

Intention.

Friendship.

As we saw earlier Maanurray says that only real persons can be

free. And so important is this idea of "real" and "reality" that the

second part of "Freedom in the Modem World" is called Reality and

Freedom, and five chapters (pp. 116/166), plus many other references,

are devoted to it.

Reality might be said to be anything, and our ideas about it.

"Anything" can be everything external to ourselves, all other people,

even our own bodies with both their attributes and efficiencies,

their defects and deficiencies. Included in the tern "ideas" are

thought i.e. ideation, and feeling, and evaluation.

Now we can only live freely, and be free, if our ideas, in

relation to what is not ourselves, are true i.e. if they coincide.

If they do not coincide, then we cannot be free. To give an

outlandish example. If my ideas and feelings are such that I persist

in the "unreality" of believing that carbon-monoxide will serve just

the same purpose as oxygen in my breathing I shall not be here long,

let alone be freeI But extreme and ridiculous as this example may

seem countless people, and all of us sometime in our lives and

thinking (however much we may think otherwise) have ideas which do

not coincide with reality. And to that degree we are unreal and -

more to the point of our present consideration - unfree. We cannot

act in terms of what is.

All this seems to me a secular and rational description of a

situation which used to be religiously stated as (speaking of God)

"His service is perfect freedom". In other words; one important


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aspect of freedom, if not all of it, is to discover what is out

there, how it works, and then fit yourself in with it. If you don't

you will always be tangled and twisted-up; in other words, unfree.

The area in man where this conception of Macmurray's has been

best illustrated is in scientific thinking. All the time we thought

we knew about the world; all the time we wove imaginative fantasies

about it, we really got nowhere. But once, from the 15th. century

onwards, we worked on our ideas about the external world in terms of

reality we not only got on much better in finding solutions to

problems, but to the degree that our knowledge was based on reality,

so equally did we become free. And regarding thought - not emotion

and evaluation for the moment - the more we really knew, the freer we

shall increasingly become.

It is important to note a very pertinent point made by Macmurray

(FMW 53) - and, incidentally, to see where another of our "words"

fits in - concerning the above. Thought was increasingly freed from

the 15th century onwards, freed frcm the fixed, rigid, traditional

ideas of the Middle Ages. But although this thought was freed it was

highly disciplined thought. Freedom, in this context, did not mean

wild, uncontrolled, bizarre, thinking. On the contrary; only by

relating it totally, through discipline, to what was, did it become

successful, and enlarge freedom.

The need to relate it to reality, imposed a necessary discipline

of its own. "The free thought that has unravelled the mysteries of

the natural world is not and cannot be undisciplined thought, which

is never free." (FMW 53) .." It is disciplined by the world with

which it deals, by testing its conclusions against fact." (FMW 53).


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The importance of Macmurray's pressing of this point will appear

later when we come to consider freedom, not of thought, but of

feelings, and the discovery of values.

Earlier I spoke, paraphrasing Macmurray, of the absolute and the

relative aspects of freedom. Another way in which freedan is

relative for Macmurray concerns intention and the ability to fulfil

that intention. (See CF 21). Freedom entails responsibility for

yourself i.e. knowing what you want to do. If a man's wants are

negligible he does not need much power to fulfil than; and to that

degree he is soon free. But if a man has immense desires and

ambitions he has got tobe very important, and command a great amount

of power to even begin to fulfil them. "But our freedom also depends

upon what we want to do. For it is no limitation upon a man's

freedom that he has not the power to do something thathe has no

desire to do". (CF 21).

"We can increase our freedom, therefore, by limiting our

desires. The free man is the man whose means are adequate to his

ends." (FMW 21 ). This reminds me of a very pertinent remark of Henry

James. "I call people rich when they're able to meet the

requirements of their imagination." (The Portrait of a Lady p. 196).

Thus we can increase our freedom in two ways: -

1) By reducing our desires.

2) By increasing our power to achieve them.

But our chances at the present time of achieving more freedom

are remote. Our power over the environment has increased out of all

proportion and expectation; but as this has happened our perception

of what we want, or could have, have increased even greater. Thus we

are less free! On the other hand; to reduce desire (as did the


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saints) in order to enlarge personal freedan has gone out of fashion.

But presumably for our own happiness, and personal and emotional

growth, it might be worth trying again. "The increase of power is an

increase of freedom only if our demands remain relatively stable.

But this is what they will never do if left to themselves. Plato saw

this more than two millenniums ago. In the Republic he pointed to

the fact that though animal desires can be easily satisfied, desire

in man is insatiable. For when the natural needs of men are

supplied, new desires appear for more elegant and more complicated

satisfactions, until the resources available are too few for the

demands upon them: and in this he found the origin of war.

The very spectacle of increased resources breeds a corresponding

proliferation of desires; and if this process is uncontrolled,

desires always grow faster than the power to satisfy them; for their

increase is rooted in the creativeness of the imagination. If, then,

we double our resources while we treble our demands upon them we do

not increase our freedan. We diminish it. There is no need for

astonishment that the vast increase of our resources in the last

generation has gone hand in hand with a loss of human freedom. The

two variables - the moral and the technological - must both be

considered. Self-control is as imperative as the control of nature

if freedom is to be increased or even maintained." (CF 22/3). (See

also CF 21/2 for very relevant remarks concerning these points).

The Three Modes of Freedom

Even as - we saw this earlier - there are three ways of being,

so there are three corresponding freedoms. These are:-


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1 ) The freedan of material things, we recognise this when we say

that things make a "free" fall to the ground if left to their own

desires and "volition". (For a full exposition and discussion of the

points merely stated here see FMW chapters 8 and 9).

This first type Macmurray calls mechanical freedom.

2) The freedom of living organisms. The essence of their

freedom is to grew, respond, and adapt themselves to their

environment. (FMW chapters 8 and 10).

3) The freedom of persons. "Personal reality expresses itself

in spontaneous objectivity. (BMW 182). This means we are free - or

freest - when we relate to, and live in connunion with, that which is

not ourselves. (FMW chapters 8 and 11). The most advanced and

satisfactory state of this condition is in our relationships with

other human beings. Thus only in friendship can we find true, or

perhaps we should say real, freedom.

"To realize ourselves we have to be ourselves to make ourselves

real. That means thinking and feeling really, for ourselves, and

expressing our own reality in word and action. And this freedom, and

the secret of it, lies in our capacity for friendship." (FMW 219).

Thus, being essentially personal by nature, we achieve the

maximum freedom we are capable of, and can knew, in friendship - and

better and wider still, in the extension of this which is community.

The whole of chapter 3 of "Conditions of Freedom" is taken up with

the analysis and development of this contention of Macmurray's. "The

prime condition of freedom lies in the character and quality of human

relations". (CF 31).

Whilst not a perfect exposition of Macmurray's ideas on "What is


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Freedom?", I hope I have given enough, and got it together enough, to

show that at least I have some understanding of what he is, or at

least intends to be, saying.

Appraisement (2)

1 ) Regarding the paradox of freedom in which man finds himself,

probably Macmurray's analysis, in principle, is right. Man's

position for long, at least in or according to religious circles, has

been recognised as one of in-betweeness. "We are a little lower than

the angels." "We are fallen creatures." Philosophy, however, seems

not to over-favour this view - not at least to my knowledge. All

arguments in this area seem rather either/or; some philosophers

contending that we are free; others that we are not. In this matter

perhaps Macmurray introduces a realistic note into the discussion.

Even Rousseau's dictum, perhaps for rhetorical effect, seems of the

black and white, absolute, type.

2) As regards the fear aspect. I am sure much of this is true.

But whilst Macmurray seems to suggest that the choice has

continuously to be made between security and freedan, I am not so

sure about this. There seems to me to be permanently negative people

in whose lives fear, in a multiplicity of forms, pervades. Whilst

others are not fear-enveloped. But, of course, even the most

positive and free-loving person may sometimes be accosted by doubts

and fears.

3) Macmurray (CF 19) makes the interesting point that history

reveals not a struggle of man for freedom, but a struggle to avoid

it! This is a clever volte-face; not a usual interpretation of


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history. But it is not wholly true. We are intending always to be

free; over the last few hundred years anyway. Whether we are or not

is another matter.

On the other hand, it does seem that innumerable people do

depend upon, or are looking for, some form of external authority,

leader, oracle, god-figure, saviour, prophet, religion, or ideology;

and to the degree that they are dependent psychologically upon any of

these, and other similar preps, they are unfree, and desire

unfreedom. And must retain so. Perhaps at first there is a struggle

not to be free - as witnessed in the opposition to the ideas of

Copernicus, Darwin, and Freud - but freedom eventually seems to

triumph; at least, so far.

4) We continue new with an appraisement of Macmurray's ideas of

what Freedom is, or of how it manifests itself.

As already hinted, it is a pity Macmurray does not "get it

together" more. To have to try and understand bits and pieces in a

piecemeal fashion, and make some total coherence of it is quite a

task. Be this as it may, I feel that Macmurray is on the right

track. What other writer or thinker has given such valuable

attention to freedom in the way Macmurray has? Nobody that I knew

of. Some religious writers, with an axe to grind, are perhaps saying

the same sort of thing but Macmurray, religious as he might be

basically, discusses freedom in contemporary and secular terms. We

all talk of freedom, from the heads of state to the humblest office-

boy, but apart from political freedom - which is only a very small

part of it, important as that may be - nobody discusses freedom,

tries to understand, nor attempt to enlarge it. On the contrary.

Everybody thinks, wrongly, that they have got it! All except


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Macmurray.

Macmurray's idea of freedom and its relation to reality is

important. Science, as he suggests, proves it. Only as we rightly

know what we have to contend with, external to ourselves, can we act

propitiously, and thus be free. If we do not know reality there must

be a great deal of hit and miss about our responses and behaviour.

The external and the internal grew together i.e. at the same

time and out of the same experiences. As we come to know reality so

we become more real inside, and thus more free. To this whole set-up

I have always given the name - although Macmurray never mentions or

suggests it - maturity. But maturity, as we shall try to understand

it in this context, has not a great deal to do with maturity, and the

mature person, as we commonly understand it in our society today.

Today's mature person is one who has swallowed and embodied all

of the contemporary main-stream values. He is self-sufficient,

materialistic, has a family intending to go to university or some

other prestiged and advantaged training, professes to care far others

but really doesn't care a darrm, holds responsible positions

irrespective of any moral considerations these positions ought to

raise and be concerned with; is an IQist, and actively promotes the

interests of himself and the various limited groups with which he is

associated, totally oblivious to the interests of other persons and

groups, or of the interests of the community as a whole. In other

words; absolutely different from Macmurray's idea of a real and free

per sen!

Maturity, as I would have it understood, means and entails a

great deal of objectivity in thought and consequent actions; much


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less subjectivity, whether of self or groups; belief in, and the

practice of, emotional and relational growth - not the static, self-

complacent , negative, self-indulgent belief that we are what we are,

and that we feel what we do, and nothing will or could change it.

Maturity, too, requires social interest, cne-mandan, caring - a sense

of - and a strong belief and intention that men, all men are personal

beings, and that we can live satisfactorily only if we promote this

end.

If, as I believe, Maanurray meant all these and other similar

things by his concept of reality, and its importance for freedom,

then I think he would be better understood if at least the inner, the

subjective, the felt, side of reality was called maturity, instead of

calling it "being real". But then, if he called it maturity it would

inevitably be misunderstood! Incidentally, after all his writing and

chapters on reality and being real, his description of a "real"

person (FMW 256/7, and to some extent subsequently - to page 166)

seems nothing short of ludicrous! Surely our knowledge of whether a

person is real or not comes from an acquaintance with his

personality, mind, attitudes, and values. In other words, we must

have some knowledge of him from his speech and actions. But

Macmurray, for some reason I have never been able to fathom, seems to

think that you can go into a room of people and, by just looking,

pick out the real ones!

This is surely nonsense - the nonsense of mysticism and

intuition, which frcm evidence elsewhere you would have thought

Macmurray utterly despised and rejected. Even if some people do have

a noticeable aura of calmness and appeal, which sets them apart in a

crowd, from experience we knew that usually their minds are trivial,


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their attitudes trite, their character thoroughly selfish and self-

promoting, their morals non-existent, and eager only to exploit their

own attractiveness.

Perhaps you might assume that Macmurray was unconsciously

projecting his own type of personality and ability to stand out in a

crowd by some essence or emanation. Far from it. When I met him in

1971, I was surprised - after reading his works and the person that

comes through - to find him relatively insignificant and generally

lacking in any special attraction or charisma. So perhaps if it was

not projection which made him have this unreal idea of the perceiving

of real persons, it was an unconscious wish or compensation factor.

Whatever it was, it certainly produced a strange, inconsistent, and

unfortunate anomaly.

Regarding other points as to what freedom is; there is much

truth in the idea of freedom depending upon our needs and desires.

Aldous Huxley's ideal - at least in one period of his life, circa

1946 - was the "non-attached" man. This followed and exemplified, of

course, in a modem context the religious ideas of many before him,

as Huxley himself acknowledged - both in title and content - in his

work "The Perennial Philosophy". Much of Eastern philosophy

especially Buddhism, so advocated by Schopenhauer in recent times

(advocated but not practised!), believes that a satisfactory human

state can be reached only by a reduction, or even an obliteration, of

desires and wants.

Thus we have, presumably, the paradox of a man in prison - with,

needless to say, the right attitude - being the freest man on earth;

or as free as a man outside who is enslaved by his desires. But if


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carried to extremes this approach to freedom entails a complete

withdrawal from life. Where then would come the real freedom, as

advocated by Macmurray, found only in the "personal", and in

friendship and comnunity? So whilst recognising that we can enlarge

our freedom by reducing wants, Macmurray - it would seen - cannot

believe in going the whole way, for this would banish freedom, and

the possibility of it, altogether; or at least the freedom Macmurray

so earnestly advocates.

5) Is friendship, which includes fellowship and is extended to

community, the area and condition of human life where we do, or can,

achieve freedom? Freedom, by the way, is far Macmurray more

important, satisfactory, and worthy of humanity, than happiness. "We

recognise this when we honour those who have been ready to sacrifice

happiness, and even life itself, for freedom's sake." (CF 16).

Being quite gregarious myself - if not fanatical about it - I am

inclined, from my own life and experience, to regard this as true.

All permanent, or even tendencies to, withdrawal I regard as rather

pathological. The saints i.e. those that did, I find strangely odd

and not to be admired. Melancholics and isolates in mental hospitals

cannot be regarded as enviable nor the sanest amongst us. People who

choose to live alone seem to be missing out to me however happy and

contented they may profess to be. The classical example is George

Gissing in his semi-autobiographical "The Private Papers of Henry

Ryecroft". It is not possible for me to believe that his so

Philosophy of John Macmurray

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