Philosophical Issues in Contemporary Management

Roberta Dreon

A brief history of the concept

• Adam Smith, An Inquiry into The Nature and Causes of The Wealth of Nations, 1776

• Jeremy Bentham• John Stuart Mill• Alfred Marshall (1885)• Vilfredo Pareto Vito Volterra

What is the economic man made of?

We can generally defined the economic man as a subject or an agent, who acts and makes his

own choices by following his own rational selfishness/egoism.

• But what kind of rationality is involved here?• What kind of selfishness is here at stake?

Some basic assumptions involved in the previous definition

• The subject is supposed to be the most competent/ the exclusive expert of his own interests, that is he should know exactly what he needs and wants.

• The agent is supposed to pursue the maximum realization of his own interests.

• The economic man would act on the basis of a rational calculation of the final amount of utilities he can get from a certain choice.

• He should have a stable and exhaustive amount of preferences.• He is supposed to evaluate every good he desires in terms of

marginal utility – that is he tends to maximize his final amount of satisfaction.

• The economic man is highly competitive and aggressive.• He doesn't take care of the interests of other men.

What about an homo aestheticus or sentimentalis?

• A more complex idea of man and of economic behavior than those of the homo oeconomicus and the theory of rational choice.

• Very often people make their own economic choices only partially on the basis of a rational calculation of the whole amount of the advantages and disadvantages they can get from a certain action. Very often other factors connected with their feelings, emotions, desires and refusals play an important role in the processes of decision-making.

• These kinds of factors are not (or no longer) confined to the alleged private sphere of culture, of the intellectual or spiritual world, in the realm of personal and intimate relationships, by remaining essentially alien to the economic sphere.

• On the contrary, even our economic behavior depends largely on emotional and aesthetic factors.

• By “aesthetic” - the word coming from the Greek aisthesis, sensation – I mean that these factors are related to the senses intended as organs of desires and refusals.

• Daniel Kanheman on pleasure as an experienced (subjectively felt) utility

• Amartya Sen on happiness, freedom and virtue

• “The economic sphere, far from being devoid of emotions, has been on the contrary saturated with affect [..]”

• “Emotional capitalism is a culture in which emotional and economic discourses and practices mutually shape each other, thus producing what I view as a broad, sweeping movement in which affect is made an essential aspect of economic behavior and in which emotional life – especially that of the middle classes – follows the logic of economic relations and exchange.”

Eva Illouz, Cold Intimacies. The Making of Emotional Capitalism, p.23 and p.5

Towards an economization of feelings?

• “Experience Economy” - Gilmore and Pine• “Experiential Marketing” - Bern

H.Schmitt and Mauro Ferraresi

George Akerlof and Robert Shilleron “animal spirits” and macroeconomy

• Confidence• Fairness• Corruption and antisocial behavior• Money illusion• Stories

An open pragmatist laboratory on the emotions

• W.James, What is an Emotion?, 1884• W.James, The Principles of Psychology, 1890• J.Dewey, Emotional Attitudes, 1894• J.Dewey, The Significance of Emotions, 1895• G.H.Mead, A Theory of Emotions from the Physiological

Standpoint, (1894) 1895• G.H.Mead, Emotion and Interest, (from 1896 to 1904?)• G.H.Mead, The Social Character of Instinct (after 1905?)

Emotions in Modern Philosophy (I)

• Feelings and emotions are regarded as something subjective, in the sense that they would belong to the inner being of the individual man. They are supposed to be private.

• This means that economy is legitimized to deal with the public sphere of interests, by pursuing them by means of a rational (that is essentially un-affective) calculation of the total amount of utilities someone can obtain from a certain decision to act.

Emotions in Modern Philosophy (II)

• Emotions are supposed to be subjective, qualitative in character, hence irrational or in principle alien to a quantitative approach.

Economic theories and practices assume the idea that rationality consists in calculations and that a rational choice has nothing to do with the affective sphere of the mind.

Classical Pragmatism and the Emotions

• The pragmatist approach to emotions is basically characterized by a continuistic or non-dualistic attitude, which completely rejects the dichotomies between

(A) mind and body, (B) emotion and cognition, (C) private and social

The traditional conception of the emotions (I)

1. Emotions are mental or psychic states2. Emotions can be expressed outside the mind

of their owner by bodily means3. The bodily expressions of the emotions are

standardized, universal expressions

The traditional conception of the emotions (the process)

1. Perception of some fact2. The perception causes the emotion, that is a

mental affection3. The emotion causes the bodily changes,

allowing it to be communicated to other persons

James’ thesis

• The perception of an exciting fact gives rise to some (deep) bodily changes

• The emotion consists in the bodily changes being felt while they take place – “our feelings of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion”

“we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble”

• James’ dualistic parallelism in The Principles of Psychology

• Can James’ theory of the emotion being charged with reducionism?

• A more moderate version of the thesis: Body, emotion and cognition

• James’s conception of the nervous system:Res extensa versus body as “sounding board of

the environment”

The “no mind-stuff” argument

Is the mind simply vanishing in James’ account or is James working

out a different idea of the mind?

The role of the other men in our emotive life

• Human environment as distinctively social – (Again, can we simply charge James with reductionism?)

• The connection between our emotive reactions to the other persons and our moral sense of what is right or wrong.

How to demonstrate the thesis?

James on complete anesthesia

Darwin on the emotions

The Expression of Emotions in Men and Animals, 1872

The bodily expressions of the emotions are evolved and are endowed with an adaptive meaning

• The bodily expressions of the emotions would have had their genesis in those emotive processes which could be useful to protect the organisms and/or to prepare them to act.

• The visible expressions of the emotions would have acquired a crucial communicative function: that of displaying to the other members of a social group the mental states of the individual.

Darwin’s basic assumption

• Darwin had no doubt that the so-called expressions of the emotions derived their functional value in being the outer communication of essentially inner states.

• “I need hardly premise that movements or changes in any part of the body,-- as the wagging of a dog's tail, the drawing back of a horse's ears, the shrugging of a man's shoulders, or the dilatation of the capillary vessels of the skin, -- may all equally well serve for expression.” (Chapter 1)

Chapter I

“I WILL begin by giving the three Principles, which appear to me to account for most of the expressions and gestures involuntarily used by

man and the lower animals, under the influence of various emotions and sensations. [1] I arrived, however, at these three Principles only at the close of my observations. They will be discussed in the present and two following

chapters in a general manner”

Darwin’s three principles to explain the emotions

1. The principle of serviceable associated habits: expressive habits being acquired during one’s own experience, when revealing themselves as useful, will be inherited by the offspring (Lamarkianism?).

2. The principle of antithesis: certain expressions would have been selected because distinctively being opposed to other ones, hence because being endowed with communicative clarity.

3. The principle of the direct action of the nervous system (independently from will and from previous habits): in the absence of other traceable causes, some expressions will be derived from the direct discharge of an over-excited nervous system.

At the beginning of Chapter I about the first principle

“I. The principle of serviceable associated habits.-- Certain complex actions are of direct or indirect service under certain states of the mind, in order to relieve or gratify certain sensations, desires, &c.; and whenever the same state of mind is induced, however feebly, there is a tendency through the force of habit and association for the same movements to be performed, though they may not then be of the least use. Some actions ordinarily associated through habit with certain states of the mind may be partially repressed through the will, and in such cases the muscles which are least under the separate control of the will are the most liable still to act, causing movements which we recognize as expressive. In certain other cases the checking of one habitual movement requires other slight movements; and these are likewise expressive. “

.. at the end of the same chapter.

“We have now, I think, sufficiently shown the truth of our first Principle, namely, that when any sensation, desire, dislike, &c., has led during a long series of generations to some voluntary movement, then a tendency to the performance of a similar movement will almost certainly be excited, whenever the same, or any analogous or associated sensation& c., although very weak, is experienced; notwithstanding that the movement in this case may not be of the least use. Such habitual movements are often, or generally inherited; and they then differ but little from reflex actions. When we treat of the special expressions of man, the latter part of our first Principle, as given at the commencement of this chapter, will be seen to hold good; namely, that when movements, associated through habit with certain states of the mind, are partially repressed by the will, the strictly involuntary muscles, as well as those which are least under the separate control of the will, are liable still to act; and their action is often highly expressive. Conversely, when the will is temporarily or permanently weakened, the voluntary muscles fail before the involuntary”.

On the second principle: Chapter I

“II. The principle of Antithesis. -- Certain states of the mind lead to certain habitual actions, which are of service, as under our first principle. Now

when a directly opposite state of mind is induced, there is a strong and involuntary

tendency to the performance of movements of a directly opposite nature, though these are of no use; and such movements are in some cases

highly expressive”.

Chapter II on the second principle

“We will now consider how the principle of antithesis in expression has arisen. With social animals, the power of intercommunication between the members of the same community, -- and with other species, between the opposite sexes, as well as between the young and the old, -- is of the highest importance to them. This is generally effected by means of the voice, but it is certain that gestures and expressions are to a certain extent mutually intelligible. Man not only uses inarticulate cries, gestures, and expressions, but has invented articulate language; if, indeed, the word invented can be applied to a process, completed by innumerable steps, half-consciously made. [...] An animal when going to attack another, or when afraid of another, often makes itself appear terrible, by erecting its hair. thus increasing the apparent bulk of its body, by showing its teeth, or brandishing its horns, or by uttering fierce sounds”.“As the power of intercommunication is certainly of high service to many animals, there is no a priori improbability in the supposition, that gestures manifestly of an opposite nature to those by which certain feelings are already expressed, should at first have been voluntarily employed under the influence of an opposite state of feeling. The fact of the gestures being now innate, would be no valid objection to the belief that they were at first intentional; for if practiced during many generations, they would probably at last be inherited”.

The principle of the direct action of the nervous system (Chapter I)

“III. The principle of actions due to the constitution of the Nervous System, independently from the first of the Will, and independently to a certain extent of Habit. -- When the sensorium is strongly excited, nerve-force is generated in excess, and is transmitted in certain definite directions, depending on the connection of the nerve-cells, and partly on habit: or the supply of nerve-force may, as it appears, be interrupted. Effects are thus produced which we recognize as expressive. This third principle may, for the sake of brevity, be called that of the direct action of the nervous system”.

On the third principle (Chapter III)“We now come to our third Principle, namely, that certain actions which we recognize as expressive of certain states of the mind, are the direct result of the constitution of the nervous system, and have been from the first independent of the wild, and, to a large extent, of habit. When the sensorium is strongly excited nerve force is generated in excess, and is transmitted in certain directions, dependent on the connection of the nerve cells, and, as far as the muscular system is concerned, on the nature of the movements which have been habitually practiced. Or the supply of nerve-force may, as it appears, be interrupted. Of course every movement which we make is determined by the constitution of the nervous system; but actions performed in obedience to the will, or through habit, or through the principle of antithesis, are here as far as possible excluded. Our present subject is very obscure, but, from its importance, must be discussed at some little length; and it is always advisable to perceive clearly our ignorance”.

.. but be careful!

“Finally, so many expressive movements can be explained, as I trust will be seen in the course of this volume, through the three principles which have now been discussed, that we may hope hereafter to see all thus explained, or by closely analogous principles. It is, however, often impossible to decide how much weight ought to be attributed, in each particular case, to one of our principles, and how much to another; and very many points in the theory of Expression remain inexplicable”.

Darwin on the Continuity of the Species

• Emotions would not be exclusively human, but would be the result of life evolution.

• The expressions of emotions would not be connected to the action of dedicated muscles, specially created for that particular use.

Universalism and Innatism

• According to Darwin there are 5 basic kinds of emotions with 5 corresponding basic forms of visible expression; they are common to all men and women.

• These basic emotions are: anger, fear, sadness, disgust and joy/pleasure.

• (Basic) emotions are independent from the different cultural contexts, they are innate.

The Theory of Emotion

John Dewey 1894-1895

The open laboratory goes on ...

• References to James• References to Mead (see note 14)

Dewey’s declared goal ...

“In the following pages I propose, assuming Darwin's principles as to the explanation of emotional

attitudes, and the James-Lange theory of the nature of emotion, to bring these two into some organic

connection with each other, indicating the modifications of statement demanded by such

connection”.

Dewey’s crucial point is to make divergencies and strong points explicit.

... and the general problem to be overtaken

• Darwin’s dualism:“The necessity of bringing the two theories together may be seen from the fact that the very phrase 'expression of emotion,' as well as Darwin's method of stating the matter, begs the question of the relation of emotion to organic peripheral action, in that it assumes the former as prior and the latter as secondary”.• (James’s dualism)• “Professor James himself does not seem to me to have

adequately realized the inconsistency of Darwin's principles, as the latter states them, with his own theory”.

The psychologist’s fallacy“Physiologists agree that there are no muscles intended primarily for purposes of expression. A psychological translation of this would be that there is no such thing (from the standpoint of the one having the experience) as expression. We call it expressions when looking at it from the standpoint of an observer — whether a spectator or the person himself as scientifically reflecting upon his movements, or aesthetically enjoying them. The very word 'expression ' names the facts not as they are, but in their second intention.[4] To an onlooker my angry movements are expressions — signs, indications; but surely not to me. To rate such movements as primarily expressive is to fall into the psychologist's fallacy: it is to confuse the standpoint of the observer and explainer with that of the fact observed. Movements are, as matter of fact, expressive, but they are also a great many other things. In themselves they are movements, acts, and must be treated as such if psychology is to take hold of them right end up”.

On Darwin’s principle of the serviceable associated habits: what are they useful for?

• “At this stage I wish to point out that in the case of 'serviceable associated habits,' the principle of explanation actually used, whatever the form of words employed, is that of survival, in the form of attitudes, of acts originally useful not qua expressing emotion, but qua acts — as serving life”.

• “The reference to emotion in explaining the attitude is wholly irrelevant; the attitude of emotion is explained positively by reference to useful movements”.

The case of laughing

“This, however, is only preparatory to the question of the specific 'sign' of joy, the laugh. How is that to be brought under this principle of being an actual portion of a useful activity? Why should the excitation, admitting that it affects the vocal organs, manifest itself in this form? [..] Though the result of considerable observation, it can be briefly summed up. The laugh is by no means to be viewed from the standpoint of humor; its connection with humor is secondary. It marks the ending (that is, the attainment of a unity) of a period of suspense, or expectation, all ending which is sharp and sudden”.

About Darwin’s third principle: a functional approach

• “My proposition at this point is that the phenomena referred to the principle of direct nervous discharge (the response to an idiopathic stimulus) are cases of the failure of habitual teleological machinery, through some disturbance in one or more of the adjusted members of the habit”.

• “My proposition, I repeat, is that all such idiopathic discharges, possessing emotional quality, are in reality disturbances, defects, or alienations of the adjusted movements. While not immediately teleological in the sense that they themselves are useful, they are teleologically conditioned. They are cases of the disintegration of associations (co-ordinations) which are serviceable, or are the use of means under circumstances in which they are totally inappropriate”.

“This is but to say, from the psychological side, that all normal emotion of terror has an object, and involves an attitude towards that object; this attitude, under the given circumstances, perhaps not being useful, nay, being harmful, but yet the reproduction of an attitude or, rather, a mixture of attitudes which have been useful in the past. The uselessness of the attitude is due to the fact that some feature in the stimulus (the situation or object) awakens its appropriate reactions, but these do not coordinate with the reactions aroused by other features of the situation. The pathological emotion is, as Mr. James calls it, the objectless emotion, but its content is controlled by the active attitudes previously assumed towards objects, and, from its own standpoint, it is not objectless; it goes on at once to supply itself with an object, with a rational excuse for being”.

Reaffirming a revised functional, teleological perspective

• Dewey recognizes and reinforces the importance of the functional interpretative key for understanding emotions’ behavioural aspects: as stated by Darwin, we have to read them according to their telos, to the goals they are aiming at.

• However Dewey, differently from Darwin, connects the bodily changes to human movements or actions as answering to a given environmental context. They do not answer to an alleged interior state of mind, of which they had to be the mere external expressions (this was Darwin’s mistake).

Different ways of speaking about bodily changes

• “Summing up, we may say that all so-called expressions of emotions are, in reality, the reduction of movements and stimulations originally useful into attitudes.

• But we note a difference in the form and nature of the reduction, and in the resulting attitudes [..]”

• “The cases of failure bring us to the breakdown of co-ordinations habitually useful, to their alienation, or to reciprocal disturbance of their various factors, and thus to the facts usually subsumed under the idiopathic principle. In this progression we have a continually changing ratio of the vegetative to the motor functions”.

Summing up and looking forward

“In a preceding article I endeavored to show that all the so-called expressions of emotion are to be accounted for not by reference to emotion, but by reference to movements having some use, either as direct survivals or as disturbances of teleological coordinations. I tried to show that, upon this basis, the various principles for explaining emotional attitudes may be reduced to certain obvious and typical differentiae within the teleological movements. In the present paper I wish to reconsider the James-Lange, or discharge, theory of the nature of emotion from the standpoint thus gained; for if all emotions (considered as 'emotional seizures,' Affect or ' feel,' as I may term it) are constituted by the reflexion of the teleological attitude, the motor and inorganic discharges, into consciousness, the same principle which explains the attitude must serve to analyze the emotion”.

A first definition

• “Emotion in its entirety is a mode of behavior which is purposive, or has an intellectual content, and which also reflects itself into feeling or Affects, as the subjective valuation of that which is objectively expressed in the idea or purpose.

• This formula, however, is no more than a putting together of James' theory with the revision of Darwin's principles attempted in the last number”.

What are the problems with James’ theory?

• James’ concepion of emotion lacks the meaning which an emotion is charged with: “Hope, fear, delight, sorrow, terror, love, are too important and too relevant in our lives to be in the main [12] the 'feel' of bodily attitudes which have themselves no meaning. If the attitude is wholly accidental, then the emotion itself is brute and insignificant, upon a theory which holds that the emotion is the 'feel' of such an attitude”. (EA)

• James’ incautious statement: “I can but think that Mr. James' critics have largely made their own difficulties, even on the basis of his 'slap-dash' statement that ‘we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble’”. (SE)

• The bodily feeling as an abstraction from a more complex experience: “he is not dealing with (16) emotion as a concrete whole of experience, but with an abstraction from the actual emotion of that element which gives it its differentia -- its feeling quale, its 'feel’. As I understand it, he did not conceive himself as dealing with that state which we term 'being angry,' but rather with the peculiar 'feel' which any one has when he is angry, an element which may be intellectually abstracted, but certainly has no existence by itself, of as full-fledged emotion-experience”.

The behavioral component:the emotion as “readiness to act in certain ways”

“(I) It is a disposition, a mode of conduct, a way of behaving. Indeed, it is this practical aspect of emotion which common speech mainly means to refer to in its emotional terms. When we say that John Smith is very resentful at the treatment he has received, or is hopeful of success in business, or regrets that he accepted a nomination for office, we do not simply, or even chiefly, mean that he has a certain 'feel' (17) occupying his consciousness. We mean he is in a certain practical attitude, has assumed a readiness to act in certain ways”.

The behavioral component involves a sort of proto-evaluation

“We certainly do not deny nor overlook the 'feel' phase, but in ordinary speech the behavior side of emotion is, I think, always uppermost in consciousness. The connotation of emotion is primarily ethical, only secondarily psychical”.

The intentional character of an emotion

“(2) But the full emotional experience also always has its 'object' or intellectual content. The emotion is always 'about' or 'toward' something; it is 'at' or 'on account of' something, and this prepositional reference is an integral phase of the single pulse of emotion; for emotion, as well as the idea, comes as a whole carrying its distinctions of value within it”.