Ph.D. Defense

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Experimentation Tools for Networking Research Mathieu Lacage INRIA, Planète Nov 15th 2010 Lacage (INRIA) Experimentation Tools & Network Research Nov 2010 1 / 55
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Transcript of Ph.D. Defense

Page 1: Ph.D. Defense

Experimentation Toolsfor Networking

ResearchMathieu Lacage

INRIA, Planète

Nov 15th 2010

Lacage (INRIA) Experimentation Tools & Network Research Nov 2010 1 / 55

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Outline

Motivation

Simulated Packets

Direct Code Execution

NEPI

Conclusion

Perspectives

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Protocol evaluation

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Protocol evaluation

Analyticalanalysis

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Protocol evaluation

Analyticalanalysis

Simulator

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Protocol evaluation

Analyticalanalysis

Simulator Testbed

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Protocol evaluation

Analyticalanalysis

Simulator Testbed

Smallscalefield

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Protocol evaluation

Analyticalanalysis

Simulator Testbed

Smallscalefield

Largescalefield

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Protocol evaluation

Analyticalanalysis

In thewild

Simulator Testbed

Smallscalefield

Largescalefield

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Protocol evaluation

Analyticalanalysis

In thewild

Simulator Testbed

Smallscalefield

Largescalefield

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Experimentation contextExperimentation

Realism

Time

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Why ?

I One protocol isolated

-> Multiple protocolinteraction

I Steady state -> Transient behavior

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Why ?

I One protocol isolated -> Multiple protocolinteraction

I Steady state -> Transient behavior

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Why ?

I One protocol isolated -> Multiple protocolinteraction

I Steady state

-> Transient behavior

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Why ?

I One protocol isolated -> Multiple protocolinteraction

I Steady state -> Transient behavior

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Cheaper hardwareHardware

Cost

Time

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ConsequencesMore testbeds

More Field tests

Time

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ConsequencesMore testbeds

More Field testsLess

SimulationsAlone

Time

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ConsequencesMore Testbed+

Simulation

Time

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Downsides

A lot more workI Must master many experimentation

environmentsI Must implement protocols twice

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Downsides

A lot more work

I Must master many experimentationenvironments

I Must implement protocols twice

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Downsides

A lot more workI Must master many experimentation

environments

I Must implement protocols twice

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Downsides

A lot more workI Must master many experimentation

environmentsI Must implement protocols twice

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Objectives

I Run real protocol implementation in simulationI Use simulation as realtime emulator

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ObjectivesSmooth transition simulations/testbed/field tests

I Run real protocol implementation in simulationI Use simulation as realtime emulator

FieldSimulation

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ObjectivesSmooth transition simulations/testbed/field tests

I Run real protocol implementation in simulation

I Use simulation as realtime emulator

Field

RealCode

SimulationSimulation

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ObjectivesSmooth transition simulations/testbed/field tests

I Run real protocol implementation in simulationI Use simulation as realtime emulator

Field

RealCode

Simulation FieldSimulation

RTSim

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Problems

Run real protocol implementation in simulation

I Virtualization of execution environment

I Direct Code Execution

I Setup, deployment, of emulation platforms

I NEPI

I Transparency with other simulation models

I Simulated Packets

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Problems

Run real protocol implementation in simulationI Virtualization of execution environment

I Direct Code Execution

Real Code

Simulation

I Setup, deployment, of emulation platforms

I NEPI

I Transparency with other simulation models

I Simulated Packets

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Problems

Run real protocol implementation in simulationI Virtualization of execution environment

I Direct Code Execution

Use simulation as realtime emulator

I Setup, deployment, of emulation platforms

I NEPI

I Transparency with other simulation models

I Simulated Packets

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Problems

Run real protocol implementation in simulationI Virtualization of execution environment

I Direct Code Execution

Use simulation as realtime emulatorI Setup, deployment, of emulation platforms

I NEPI

RTSim

RTSim

FieldField

DeploymentControl

I Transparency with other simulation models

I Simulated Packets

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Problems

Run real protocol implementation in simulationI Virtualization of execution environment

I Direct Code Execution

Use simulation as realtime emulatorI Setup, deployment, of emulation platforms

I NEPI

In both cases

I Transparency with other simulation models

I Simulated Packets

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Problems

Run real protocol implementation in simulationI Virtualization of execution environment

I Direct Code Execution

Use simulation as realtime emulatorI Setup, deployment, of emulation platforms

I NEPI

In both casesI Transparency with other simulation models

I Simulated Packets

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Problems

Run real protocol implementation in simulationI Virtualization of execution environment

I Direct Code ExecutionUse simulation as realtime emulator

I Setup, deployment, of emulation platforms

I NEPI

In both casesI Transparency with other simulation models

I Simulated Packets

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Problems

Run real protocol implementation in simulationI Virtualization of execution environment

I Direct Code ExecutionUse simulation as realtime emulator

I Setup, deployment, of emulation platformsI NEPI

In both casesI Transparency with other simulation models

I Simulated Packets

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Problems

Run real protocol implementation in simulationI Virtualization of execution environment

I Direct Code ExecutionUse simulation as realtime emulator

I Setup, deployment, of emulation platformsI NEPI

In both casesI Transparency with other simulation models

I Simulated Packets

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ns-3 Contributions

I ns-3: 300 KLOCI Wrote about 80 KLOC

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ns-3 Contributions

I ns-3: 300 KLOC

I Wrote about 80 KLOC

Wimax

TCP

Mesh

UDP/Ipv6

MPI

AODV OLSR

Uan Bridge

Spectrum

Csma PointToPoint

Core

Wifi

UDP/IPv4/ARP

Mobility

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ns-3 Contributions

I ns-3: 300 KLOCI Wrote about 80 KLOC

Wimax

TCP

Mesh

UDP/Ipv6

MPI

AODV OLSR

Uan Bridge

Spectrum

Csma PointToPoint

Core

Wifi

UDP/IPv4/ARP

Mobility

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Scientific Contributions

Simulated packetsI More CPU efficient than other simulatorsI Automatic conversion simulation/network format

Direct Code ExecutionI 10x more CPU efficient than other DCE

frameworksI Large applicability scope

NEPII Unified experiment descriptionI Automated deployment

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Scientific ContributionsSimulated packets

I More CPU efficient than other simulatorsI Automatic conversion simulation/network format

Direct Code ExecutionI 10x more CPU efficient than other DCE

frameworksI Large applicability scope

NEPII Unified experiment descriptionI Automated deployment

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Scientific ContributionsSimulated packets

I More CPU efficient than other simulators

I Automatic conversion simulation/network formatDirect Code Execution

I 10x more CPU efficient than other DCEframeworks

I Large applicability scopeNEPI

I Unified experiment descriptionI Automated deployment

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Scientific ContributionsSimulated packets

I More CPU efficient than other simulatorsI Automatic conversion simulation/network format

Direct Code ExecutionI 10x more CPU efficient than other DCE

frameworksI Large applicability scope

NEPII Unified experiment descriptionI Automated deployment

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Scientific ContributionsSimulated packets

I More CPU efficient than other simulatorsI Automatic conversion simulation/network format

Direct Code Execution

I 10x more CPU efficient than other DCEframeworks

I Large applicability scopeNEPI

I Unified experiment descriptionI Automated deployment

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Scientific ContributionsSimulated packets

I More CPU efficient than other simulatorsI Automatic conversion simulation/network format

Direct Code ExecutionI 10x more CPU efficient than other DCE

frameworks

I Large applicability scopeNEPI

I Unified experiment descriptionI Automated deployment

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Scientific ContributionsSimulated packets

I More CPU efficient than other simulatorsI Automatic conversion simulation/network format

Direct Code ExecutionI 10x more CPU efficient than other DCE

frameworksI Large applicability scope

NEPII Unified experiment descriptionI Automated deployment

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Scientific ContributionsSimulated packets

I More CPU efficient than other simulatorsI Automatic conversion simulation/network format

Direct Code ExecutionI 10x more CPU efficient than other DCE

frameworksI Large applicability scope

NEPI

I Unified experiment descriptionI Automated deployment

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Scientific ContributionsSimulated packets

I More CPU efficient than other simulatorsI Automatic conversion simulation/network format

Direct Code ExecutionI 10x more CPU efficient than other DCE

frameworksI Large applicability scope

NEPII Unified experiment description

I Automated deployment

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Scientific ContributionsSimulated packets

I More CPU efficient than other simulatorsI Automatic conversion simulation/network format

Direct Code ExecutionI 10x more CPU efficient than other DCE

frameworksI Large applicability scope

NEPII Unified experiment descriptionI Automated deployment

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Outline

Motivation

Simulated Packets

Direct Code Execution

NEPI

Conclusion

Perspectives

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Requirements

I Transparent conversion to/from real bytesI CPU and memory efficiencyI Fragmentation/ReassemblyI Simulation-only dataI Pretty printingI ExtensibilityI Robust Application Programming Interface (API)

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Related Work

Two approaches

I Packet is list of headers: GTNetS, OMNeT++,SSFNet

TCPIP PayloadMAC

I Packet is buffer of bytes: Yans, GloMoSim

TCPIP PayloadMAC

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Related Work

Two approachesI Packet is list of headers: GTNetS, OMNeT++,

SSFNet

TCPIP PayloadMAC

I Packet is buffer of bytes: Yans, GloMoSim

TCPIP PayloadMAC

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Related Work

Two approachesI Packet is list of headers: GTNetS, OMNeT++,

SSFNet

TCPIP PayloadMAC

I Packet is buffer of bytes: Yans, GloMoSim

TCPIP PayloadMAC

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Pros and Cons

List BufferFragmentation, Reassembly XConversion real bytes XSimulation-only data XPretty printing XCPU, memory efficiency X

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Our solutionPacket as buffer of bytes

I Fragmentation, ReassemblyI Automatic conversion to/from real bytes

TagsI Simulation-only data

MetadataI Pretty printing

Copy On Write (COW)I CPU, memory efficiency

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Our solutionPacket as buffer of bytes

I Fragmentation, ReassemblyI Automatic conversion to/from real bytes

TagsI Simulation-only data

MetadataI Pretty printing

Copy On Write (COW)I CPU, memory efficiency

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Our solutionPacket as buffer of bytes

I Fragmentation, ReassemblyI Automatic conversion to/from real bytes

TagsI Simulation-only data

MetadataI Pretty printing

Copy On Write (COW)I CPU, memory efficiency

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Our solutionPacket as buffer of bytes

I Fragmentation, ReassemblyI Automatic conversion to/from real bytes

TagsI Simulation-only data

MetadataI Pretty printing

Copy On Write (COW)I CPU, memory efficiency

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Performance evaluation

Micro-benchmark scenariosI ReceptionI ForwardingI TransmissionI Re-transmission

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Relative speedup

ns-3 OMNet++ GTNetS YansReception 1.00 1.98 2.25 3.07Transmission 1.00 2.13 1.78 2.16Forwarding 1.00 2.83 1.92 2.44Retransmission 1.00 1.92 1.70 4.76

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Contributions

More CPU efficient than other simulators

Transparent support for real network bytes

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Contributions

More CPU efficient than other simulators

Transparent support for real network bytes

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Contributions

More CPU efficient than other simulators

Transparent support for real network bytes

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Outline

Motivation

Simulated Packets

Direct Code Execution

NEPI

Conclusion

Perspectives

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The manual approachGlobal variables

static int g_var;g_var ++;

static int [100]g_var_array;g_var_array[current_id ()] ++;

Redirect system calls

clock (); dce_clock ();

Re-implement all system calls

clock_t dce_clock (void) {return Simulator::Now ().GetMicroSeconds ();

}

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The manual approachGlobal variables

static int g_var;g_var ++;

static int [100]g_var_array;g_var_array[current_id ()] ++;

Redirect system calls

clock (); dce_clock ();

Re-implement all system calls

clock_t dce_clock (void) {return Simulator::Now ().GetMicroSeconds ();

}

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The manual approachGlobal variables

static int g_var;g_var ++;

static int [100]g_var_array;g_var_array[current_id ()] ++;

Redirect system calls

clock (); dce_clock ();

Re-implement all system calls

clock_t dce_clock (void) {return Simulator::Now ().GetMicroSeconds ();

}

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The problem

Manual modifications: does not scaleI Painful to do onceI Impossible to do for software updates

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Related work

Network Simulation CradleI Automated source modifications for C codeI Hard to extend to C++

WeavesI Automated textual assembly modificationsI Invalid assumptions about compiler-generated

codeCOOJA

I Automated memory virtualizationI Slow

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Related workNetwork Simulation Cradle

I Automated source modifications for C codeI Hard to extend to C++

WeavesI Automated textual assembly modificationsI Invalid assumptions about compiler-generated

codeCOOJA

I Automated memory virtualizationI Slow

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Related workNetwork Simulation Cradle

I Automated source modifications for C codeI Hard to extend to C++

WeavesI Automated textual assembly modificationsI Invalid assumptions about compiler-generated

code

COOJAI Automated memory virtualizationI Slow

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Related workNetwork Simulation Cradle

I Automated source modifications for C codeI Hard to extend to C++

WeavesI Automated textual assembly modificationsI Invalid assumptions about compiler-generated

codeCOOJA

I Automated memory virtualizationI Slow

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ns-3 DCE

Executable and Linkable Format (ELF) loaderI FastI Automated memory virtualizationI Automated system call redirection

Userspace system callsKernelspace system calls

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ns-3 DCE

Executable and Linkable Format (ELF) loaderI FastI Automated memory virtualizationI Automated system call redirection

Userspace system calls

Kernelspace system calls

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ns-3 DCE

Executable and Linkable Format (ELF) loaderI FastI Automated memory virtualizationI Automated system call redirection

Userspace system callsKernelspace system calls

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Loader Performance

Scenario:

Linux

UDP/IP

PointToPointLink

Linux

UDP/IP

PointToPointLink

kernelspace DCE kernelspace DCE

Linux

UDP/IP

kernelspace DCE

udp-perf

userspace DCE

udp-perf

userspace DCE

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Loader Performance

Packets perwall clocksecondvsNumber ofnodes

100

1000

10000

100000

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

Coojans-3

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Loader Performance

Memory(bytes)vsNumber ofnodes

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

35000

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

Coojans-3

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System Performance

Packets perwall clocksecondvsNumber ofnodes

1000

10000

100000

1e+06

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20

dce-nonedce-user

dce-user+kernel

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Tested programs

Binary Missing functions/sbin/ip 24/bin/ping 2/bin/traceroute 5/usr/sbin/zebra 42/usr/sbin/ospfd 43/usr/sbin/mip6d 38

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Untested programs

Binary Missing functionsccnd 11/usr/sbin/httpd 18

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Contributions

10x more efficient than existing alternatives

Larger scope than existing alternativesI Userspace: ping, traceroute, quagga, etc.I Kernelspace: Linux IP, TCP, etc.

Potential usecases:I Debugging platform: single debugger controls

all protocol instancesI Development platformI Test platform

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Contributions

10x more efficient than existing alternativesLarger scope than existing alternatives

I Userspace: ping, traceroute, quagga, etc.I Kernelspace: Linux IP, TCP, etc.

Potential usecases:I Debugging platform: single debugger controls

all protocol instancesI Development platformI Test platform

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Contributions

10x more efficient than existing alternativesLarger scope than existing alternatives

I Userspace: ping, traceroute, quagga, etc.I Kernelspace: Linux IP, TCP, etc.

Potential usecases:I Debugging platform: single debugger controls

all protocol instances

I Development platformI Test platform

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Contributions

10x more efficient than existing alternativesLarger scope than existing alternatives

I Userspace: ping, traceroute, quagga, etc.I Kernelspace: Linux IP, TCP, etc.

Potential usecases:I Debugging platform: single debugger controls

all protocol instancesI Development platform

I Test platform

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Contributions

10x more efficient than existing alternativesLarger scope than existing alternatives

I Userspace: ping, traceroute, quagga, etc.I Kernelspace: Linux IP, TCP, etc.

Potential usecases:I Debugging platform: single debugger controls

all protocol instancesI Development platformI Test platform

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Outline

Motivation

Simulated Packets

Direct Code Execution

NEPI

Conclusion

Perspectives

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Objective Scenario

Simulated links/networksI ns-3 simulation models XI Realtime scheduler XI Tap device X

Light weight Virtual MachinesI Linux Network Namespaces X

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Objective Scenario

VLCServer

RouterWifiAP

WifiSTA

Router

VLCClient

Simulated links/networksI ns-3 simulation models XI Realtime scheduler XI Tap device X

Light weight Virtual MachinesI Linux Network Namespaces X

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Objective Scenario

VLCServer

RouterWifiAP

WifiSTA

Router

VLCClient

Simulated links/networksI ns-3 simulation models XI Realtime scheduler XI Tap device X

Light weight Virtual MachinesI Linux Network Namespaces X

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Objective Scenario

VLCServer

RouterWifiAP

WifiSTA

Router

VLCClient

Simulated links/networksI ns-3 simulation models XI Realtime scheduler XI Tap device X

Light weight Virtual MachinesI Linux Network Namespaces X

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Easy Deployment

ProblemI Tap/VM creation and setupI Coherent IP address assignment across

simulation and VMsI Coherent IP forwarding tables across

simulation and VMsSolution

I Automate everythingBUT

I Need global view of experiment topology

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Easy DeploymentProblem

I Tap/VM creation and setup

I Coherent IP address assignment acrosssimulation and VMs

I Coherent IP forwarding tables acrosssimulation and VMs

SolutionI Automate everything

BUTI Need global view of experiment topology

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Easy DeploymentProblem

I Tap/VM creation and setupI Coherent IP address assignment across

simulation and VMs

I Coherent IP forwarding tables acrosssimulation and VMs

SolutionI Automate everything

BUTI Need global view of experiment topology

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Easy DeploymentProblem

I Tap/VM creation and setupI Coherent IP address assignment across

simulation and VMsI Coherent IP forwarding tables across

simulation and VMs

SolutionI Automate everything

BUTI Need global view of experiment topology

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Easy DeploymentProblem

I Tap/VM creation and setupI Coherent IP address assignment across

simulation and VMsI Coherent IP forwarding tables across

simulation and VMsSolution

I Automate everything

BUTI Need global view of experiment topology

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Easy DeploymentProblem

I Tap/VM creation and setupI Coherent IP address assignment across

simulation and VMsI Coherent IP forwarding tables across

simulation and VMsSolution

I Automate everythingBUT

I Need global view of experiment topology

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Related Work

I Emulab Tcl: ad hoc, hard to generalizeI OMF Ruby: unclear how to extend it to model

complex topologiesI OMNeT++ NED: hard to ensure correctnessI SSF DML: hard to ensure correctnessI Geni RSPEC: hard to ensure correctnessI Geni Omnispec: hard to ensure correctness

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Related Work

I Emulab Tcl: ad hoc, hard to generalize

I OMF Ruby: unclear how to extend it to modelcomplex topologies

I OMNeT++ NED: hard to ensure correctnessI SSF DML: hard to ensure correctnessI Geni RSPEC: hard to ensure correctnessI Geni Omnispec: hard to ensure correctness

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Related Work

I Emulab Tcl: ad hoc, hard to generalizeI OMF Ruby: unclear how to extend it to model

complex topologies

I OMNeT++ NED: hard to ensure correctnessI SSF DML: hard to ensure correctnessI Geni RSPEC: hard to ensure correctnessI Geni Omnispec: hard to ensure correctness

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Related Work

I Emulab Tcl: ad hoc, hard to generalizeI OMF Ruby: unclear how to extend it to model

complex topologiesI OMNeT++ NED: hard to ensure correctness

I SSF DML: hard to ensure correctnessI Geni RSPEC: hard to ensure correctnessI Geni Omnispec: hard to ensure correctness

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Related Work

I Emulab Tcl: ad hoc, hard to generalizeI OMF Ruby: unclear how to extend it to model

complex topologiesI OMNeT++ NED: hard to ensure correctnessI SSF DML: hard to ensure correctness

I Geni RSPEC: hard to ensure correctnessI Geni Omnispec: hard to ensure correctness

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Related Work

I Emulab Tcl: ad hoc, hard to generalizeI OMF Ruby: unclear how to extend it to model

complex topologiesI OMNeT++ NED: hard to ensure correctnessI SSF DML: hard to ensure correctnessI Geni RSPEC: hard to ensure correctness

I Geni Omnispec: hard to ensure correctness

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Related Work

I Emulab Tcl: ad hoc, hard to generalizeI OMF Ruby: unclear how to extend it to model

complex topologiesI OMNeT++ NED: hard to ensure correctnessI SSF DML: hard to ensure correctnessI Geni RSPEC: hard to ensure correctnessI Geni Omnispec: hard to ensure correctness

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NEPI Object Model

Functional unit / BoxAttributesTrace sourcesConnectorsConnection checkingHierarchical

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NEPI Object Model

Functional unit / Box

AttributesTrace sourcesConnectorsConnection checkingHierarchical

Example:I IP stackI TCP stackI Ethernet card

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NEPI Object Model

Functional unit / BoxAttributes

Trace sourcesConnectorsConnection checkingHierarchical

Example:I IP checksumI IP forwarding

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NEPI Object Model

Functional unit / BoxAttributesTrace sources

ConnectorsConnection checkingHierarchical

Example:I Out packetsI In packets

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NEPI Object Model

Functional unit / BoxAttributesTrace sourcesConnectors

Connection checkingHierarchical

Ethernet

IP

dev

node

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NEPI Object Model

Functional unit / BoxAttributesTrace sourcesConnectorsConnection checking

Hierarchical

Ethernet

IP

Ethernet

dev

node node

app

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NEPI Object Model

Functional unit / BoxAttributesTrace sourcesConnectorsConnection checkingHierarchical

Ethernet

Switch

Ethernet

node node

Node

dev

cablecable

port0 port1

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Objective Scenario

VLCServer

RouterWifiAP

WifiSTA

Router

VLCClient

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NEPI Representation

Mobility

WifiNet

Device

Node

ARPICMPIP

TapNodeInterface

Node

FDNetDevice

Mobility

FDNetDevice

YansWifiPhyYansWifiPhy

Delay

YansWifiChannel

Loss

Nist Nist

WifiNet

Device

Manager

ApMac

Node

ARPIP ICMP

Manager

StaMac

TapNodeInterface

Node

ns-3 NetNsNetNs

VlcVlc

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Global IP topology

net2net1net0 Wifi Ap Wifi Sta FdFdTap Tap

n1n0 n2 n3

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Demo screenshot

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Contributions

An integrated experimentation environmentI Unified experiment descriptionI Entire workflow supportI Automated deploymentI Strong coherency checking

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Outline

Motivation

Simulated Packets

Direct Code Execution

NEPI

Conclusion

Perspectives

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Papers Published

I “Yet another network simulator”, Proceedings ofthe 2006 workshop on ns-2

I “NEPI: using independent simulators,emulators, and testbeds for easyexperimentation”, SIGOPS Operating

Systems Review

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Papers Published

I “Yet another network simulator”, Proceedings ofthe 2006 workshop on ns-2

I “NEPI: using independent simulators,emulators, and testbeds for easyexperimentation”, SIGOPS Operating

Systems Review

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Papers Published

I “Yet another network simulator”, Proceedings ofthe 2006 workshop on ns-2

I “NEPI: using independent simulators,emulators, and testbeds for easyexperimentation”, SIGOPS Operating

Systems Review

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Papers in progress

I “The ns-3 network simulator: experiencelearned”, Software Practice & Experience

I “Direct Code Execution”, Networked SystemsDesign and Implementation

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Papers in progress

I “The ns-3 network simulator: experiencelearned”, Software Practice & Experience

I “Direct Code Execution”, Networked SystemsDesign and Implementation

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Activities

ChairI NSTools 2007

TPCI WNS3 2009, 2010, 2011I Simutools 2008,2009

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Simulated Packets

More CPU efficient than other simulators

Transparent support for real network bytes

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Simulated Packets

More CPU efficient than other simulators

Transparent support for real network bytes

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Direct Code Execution

10x more CPU efficient than other DCE frameworks

A robust implementationI Userspace and kernelspace protocolsI C,C++ protocolsI ABI compatibility for userspace protocols

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Direct Code Execution

10x more CPU efficient than other DCE frameworks

A robust implementationI Userspace and kernelspace protocolsI C,C++ protocolsI ABI compatibility for userspace protocols

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NEPI

An integrated experimentation environmentI Unified experiment descriptionI Entire workflow supportI Automated deploymentI Strong coherency checking

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Impact

Instrumental in creating anI ActiveI GrowingI Open source

Simulation communityI Contributors > 80I Hundreds of usersI > 30 papers by users

2 sigcomm’091 sigcomm’10

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ImpactInstrumental in creating an

I ActiveI GrowingI Open source

Simulation community

I Contributors > 80I Hundreds of usersI > 30 papers by users

2 sigcomm’091 sigcomm’10

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ImpactInstrumental in creating an

I ActiveI GrowingI Open source

Simulation communityI Contributors > 80

I Hundreds of usersI > 30 papers by users

2 sigcomm’091 sigcomm’10

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

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ImpactInstrumental in creating an

I ActiveI GrowingI Open source

Simulation communityI Contributors > 80I Hundreds of users

I > 30 papers by users2 sigcomm’091 sigcomm’10

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

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ImpactInstrumental in creating an

I ActiveI GrowingI Open source

Simulation communityI Contributors > 80I Hundreds of usersI > 30 papers by users

2 sigcomm’091 sigcomm’10

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Outline

Motivation

Simulated Packets

Direct Code Execution

NEPI

Conclusion

Perspectives

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Tracing with DCE

I Need to recompile for tracing changesI Ideal workflow:

I Trace function foo in bar.ccI Trace line 122 in bar.ccI Trace variable foo at line 144 in bar.cc

I BUT, not Java: no introspection

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Tracing with DCE

I Need to recompile for tracing changes

I Ideal workflow:I Trace function foo in bar.ccI Trace line 122 in bar.ccI Trace variable foo at line 144 in bar.cc

I BUT, not Java: no introspection

Lacage (INRIA) Experimentation Tools & Network Research Nov 2010 52 / 55

Page 138: Ph.D. Defense

Tracing with DCE

I Need to recompile for tracing changesI Ideal workflow:

I Trace function foo in bar.ccI Trace line 122 in bar.ccI Trace variable foo at line 144 in bar.cc

I BUT, not Java: no introspection

Lacage (INRIA) Experimentation Tools & Network Research Nov 2010 52 / 55

Page 139: Ph.D. Defense

Tracing with DCE

I Need to recompile for tracing changesI Ideal workflow:

I Trace function foo in bar.cc

I Trace line 122 in bar.ccI Trace variable foo at line 144 in bar.cc

I BUT, not Java: no introspection

Lacage (INRIA) Experimentation Tools & Network Research Nov 2010 52 / 55

Page 140: Ph.D. Defense

Tracing with DCE

I Need to recompile for tracing changesI Ideal workflow:

I Trace function foo in bar.ccI Trace line 122 in bar.cc

I Trace variable foo at line 144 in bar.cc

I BUT, not Java: no introspection

Lacage (INRIA) Experimentation Tools & Network Research Nov 2010 52 / 55

Page 141: Ph.D. Defense

Tracing with DCE

I Need to recompile for tracing changesI Ideal workflow:

I Trace function foo in bar.ccI Trace line 122 in bar.ccI Trace variable foo at line 144 in bar.cc

I BUT, not Java: no introspection

Lacage (INRIA) Experimentation Tools & Network Research Nov 2010 52 / 55

Page 142: Ph.D. Defense

Tracing with DCE

I Need to recompile for tracing changesI Ideal workflow:

I Trace function foo in bar.ccI Trace line 122 in bar.ccI Trace variable foo at line 144 in bar.cc

I BUT, not Java: no introspection

Lacage (INRIA) Experimentation Tools & Network Research Nov 2010 52 / 55

Page 143: Ph.D. Defense

Dynamic instrumentation

I Locate code in memoryI Parse dynamic loader data structuresXI Parse debugging information

I Insert assembly hooksI Simple case (not thread-safe) XI General case harder

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Dynamic instrumentation

I Locate code in memory

I Parse dynamic loader data structuresXI Parse debugging information

I Insert assembly hooksI Simple case (not thread-safe) XI General case harder

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Page 145: Ph.D. Defense

Dynamic instrumentation

I Locate code in memoryI Parse dynamic loader data structuresX

I Parse debugging informationI Insert assembly hooks

I Simple case (not thread-safe) XI General case harder

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Dynamic instrumentation

I Locate code in memoryI Parse dynamic loader data structuresXI Parse debugging information

I Insert assembly hooksI Simple case (not thread-safe) XI General case harder

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Dynamic instrumentation

I Locate code in memoryI Parse dynamic loader data structuresXI Parse debugging information

I Insert assembly hooks

I Simple case (not thread-safe) XI General case harder

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Page 148: Ph.D. Defense

Dynamic instrumentation

I Locate code in memoryI Parse dynamic loader data structuresXI Parse debugging information

I Insert assembly hooksI Simple case (not thread-safe) X

I General case harder

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Page 149: Ph.D. Defense

Dynamic instrumentation

I Locate code in memoryI Parse dynamic loader data structuresXI Parse debugging information

I Insert assembly hooksI Simple case (not thread-safe) XI General case harder

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Page 150: Ph.D. Defense

Dynamic instrumentation

I Locate code in memoryI Parse dynamic loader data structuresXI Parse debugging information

I Insert assembly hooksI Simple case (not thread-safe) XI General case harder

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Page 151: Ph.D. Defense

Multi-threaded Scheduler

Conservative algorithm implemented:I Fully transparent for usersI Measurable speedupI Thread-safety is easyI Efficient thread-safety is hardI Can we build more efficient thread-safety ?I Can we use optimistic algorithm transparently ?

Transparency is key !

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Multi-threaded Scheduler

Conservative algorithm implemented:

I Fully transparent for usersI Measurable speedupI Thread-safety is easyI Efficient thread-safety is hardI Can we build more efficient thread-safety ?I Can we use optimistic algorithm transparently ?

Transparency is key !

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Page 153: Ph.D. Defense

Multi-threaded Scheduler

Conservative algorithm implemented:I Fully transparent for users

I Measurable speedupI Thread-safety is easyI Efficient thread-safety is hardI Can we build more efficient thread-safety ?I Can we use optimistic algorithm transparently ?

Transparency is key !

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Page 154: Ph.D. Defense

Multi-threaded Scheduler

Conservative algorithm implemented:I Fully transparent for usersI Measurable speedup

I Thread-safety is easyI Efficient thread-safety is hardI Can we build more efficient thread-safety ?I Can we use optimistic algorithm transparently ?

Transparency is key !

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Page 155: Ph.D. Defense

Multi-threaded Scheduler

Conservative algorithm implemented:I Fully transparent for usersI Measurable speedupI Thread-safety is easy

I Efficient thread-safety is hardI Can we build more efficient thread-safety ?I Can we use optimistic algorithm transparently ?

Transparency is key !

Lacage (INRIA) Experimentation Tools & Network Research Nov 2010 54 / 55

Page 156: Ph.D. Defense

Multi-threaded Scheduler

Conservative algorithm implemented:I Fully transparent for usersI Measurable speedupI Thread-safety is easyI Efficient thread-safety is hard

I Can we build more efficient thread-safety ?I Can we use optimistic algorithm transparently ?

Transparency is key !

Lacage (INRIA) Experimentation Tools & Network Research Nov 2010 54 / 55

Page 157: Ph.D. Defense

Multi-threaded Scheduler

Conservative algorithm implemented:I Fully transparent for usersI Measurable speedupI Thread-safety is easyI Efficient thread-safety is hardI Can we build more efficient thread-safety ?

I Can we use optimistic algorithm transparently ?Transparency is key !

Lacage (INRIA) Experimentation Tools & Network Research Nov 2010 54 / 55

Page 158: Ph.D. Defense

Multi-threaded Scheduler

Conservative algorithm implemented:I Fully transparent for usersI Measurable speedupI Thread-safety is easyI Efficient thread-safety is hardI Can we build more efficient thread-safety ?I Can we use optimistic algorithm transparently ?

Transparency is key !

Lacage (INRIA) Experimentation Tools & Network Research Nov 2010 54 / 55

Page 159: Ph.D. Defense

Multi-threaded Scheduler

Conservative algorithm implemented:I Fully transparent for usersI Measurable speedupI Thread-safety is easyI Efficient thread-safety is hardI Can we build more efficient thread-safety ?I Can we use optimistic algorithm transparently ?

Transparency is key !

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Thank you !

Questions ?

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