Article 37-51FOREIGN MARRIAGEEdgar San Luis v. Felicidad Sagalongos, G.R. No. 134029, February 6, 2007514 SCRA 294 Civil Law Family Code Retroactive Effect of Article 26 of the Family CodeFACTS: During his lifetime, Felicisimo San Luis (Rodolfo San Luiss dad) contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos. He had no children with Felicidadbut lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992. Upon death of his dad, Rodolfo sought the dissolution of their Felicisimos conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993, Felicidad filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Rodolfo claimed that Felicidadhas no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee. Felicidad presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2 Article 26 of the Family Code.Rodolfo asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate Felicidads bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256.ISSUE:Whether or not Felicidad may file for letters of administration over Felicisimos estate.HELD:The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimos surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of Felicidadand Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. InGarcia v. Recio,the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody ofthe document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.With regard to Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated inGarcia,however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.The case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.

Van Dorn vs. Romillo, 139 SCRA 139139 SCRA 139 Civil Law Application of Laws Foreign Laws Nationality Principle Divorce Obtained AbroadFACTS: In 1972, Alice Reyes, a Filipina, and Richard Upton, an American, married in Hong Kong. However, in 1982, Uptonobtained a divorcedecreein Nevada, USA. Later, Reyes married Theodore Van Dorn.In 1983, Upton filed a civil case against Reyes in Pasay City. Uptonwas petitioning that he be granted management rights over a property in Manila (The Galleon). It was his contention thatthe divorcedecreethey obtained abroad do not apply to properties in the Philippines, hence, despitethe divorce, Reyess property in the Philippines remained conjugal with Upton. Judge Manuel Romillo, Jr. agreed with Upton. The judge ruled thatthe divorcedecreeissued by the Nevada court, a foreign court, cannot prevail over the declared national policy of the Philippines which prohibits divorce.ISSUE:Whether or notJudge Romillo, Jr. is correct.HELD:No. UnderArticle 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality (nationality principle). Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case,the divorcein Nevada Uptonfrom the marriage from the standards of American Law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.Thus, pursuant to his national law, Uptonis no longer the husband of Reyes. He would have no standing to sue as Reyess husband as he is not entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is bound by the decision of his own countrys court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.Further, the SC declared, Alice Reyes van Dornshould not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

Pilapil vs. Somera, 174 SCRA 653, June 30, 1989FACTS: Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The petitioner then filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983.The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983.ISSUE:Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.HELD: The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

VOID MARRIAGEGomez v. Lipana, GR. No. L23214, June 30, 1970FACTS: The defendant-appellant, Joaquin P. Lipana,contracted twomarriages: the first with Maria Loreto Ancino in 1930 and the second with Isidra Gomez y Aquino in 1935. At the time of the second marriage the first was still subsisting, which fact, however, Lipana concealed from the second wife.On December 17, 1943 the spouses of the second marriage acquired by purchase a piece of land in Cubao, Quezon City, for the price of P3,000.00. The Torrens title for the property (Transfer Certificate No. 25289 of the Register of Deeds for Quezon City) was issued on February 1, 1944, in the name of Joaquin Lipana married to Isidra Gomez. On July 20, 1958 Isidra Gomez died intestate and childless, and survived only by her sisters as the nearest relatives. On August 7, 1961 Ofelia Gomez, judicial administratrix of her estate, commenced the present suit, praying for the forfeiture of the husbands share in the Cubao property in favor of the said estate. Reliance is placed on Article 1417 of the old Civil Code, the Spanish text of which provides:La sociedad de gananciales concluye al disolverse el matrimonio o al ser declarado nulo.El conjuge que por su mala fe hubiere sido causa de la nulidad, no tendra parte en los bienes gananciales.The society of joint property concludes after the marriage dissolves or on having been declared void. The conjuge that for his bad faith will have been a cause of the nullity, will not have part in the community properties.The trial court, ruling that the second marriage was voidab initioand that the husband was the one who gave cause for its nullity, applied the aforequoted provision and declared his interest in the disputed property forfeited in favor of the estate of the deceased second wife.In the present appeal by the defendant he attributes two errors to the trial court: (1) in allowing a collateral attack on the validity of the second marriage and in holding it to be bigamous and voidab initio; and (2) in holding that Article 1417 of the Spanish Civil Code is applicable in this case.ISSUE: WON a collateral attack on the validity on the second marriage in holding it to be bigamous and void ab initio.WON that Article 1417 of the Spanish Civil Code is applicable in this case.HELD: Yes. The party who challenges the validity of the second marriage can be challenged collaterally. There is no suggestion here that the defendants 1930 marriage to Maria Loreto Ancino had been annulled or dissolved when he married Isidra Gomez in 1935, and there is no proof that he did so under the conditions envisioned in sub-section (b). the burden is on the party invoking the exception to prove that he comes under it; and the defendant has not discharged that burden at all, no evidence whatsoever having been adduced by him at the trial. Indeed, he contracted the second marriage less than seven years after the first, and he has not shown that his first wife was then generally considered dead or was believed by him to be so.On the second issue, the conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage was dissolved by the death of the second wife; and there has been no judicial declaration of nullity except possibly in this very action, filed after dissolution by death had taken place and when Article 1417 of the Spanish Civil Code was no longer in force.Even though the said provision was no longer in force it is still presumed, with respect to the spouse who acted in bad faith, that neither the marriage nor the conjugal partnership ever existed, and hence such spouse has no right to share in the conjugal properties; but this legal effect of such presumption derives from the premise that Article 1417 is still in force, and in any event is of doubtful application if it would be in derogation of and to the prejudice of the right of the other spouse of the first marriage in the conjugal partnership formed thereby, which includes properties acquired by the husband during its existence.The only just and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the second wife to her husband, and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage.The decision appealed from is reversed and the complaint is dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.

Ninal vs. Bayadog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000FACTS: Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3 children namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the guardianship of Engrace Ninal. 1 year and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. They instituted an affidavit stating that they had lived together for at least 5 years exempting from securing the marriage license. Pepito died in a car accident on February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was void for lack of marriage license.ISSUES:1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of Pepitos marriage after his death?HELD: The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. They cannot be exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5 years because from the time of Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void.Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights. It can be questioned even after the death of one of the parties and any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.

Villanueva v. CA, 505 SCRA 564FACTS: In April 1988, Orly married Lilia before a trialcourt judgein Puerto Princesa. In November 1992, Orly filed to annul the marriage. He claimed that threats of violence and duress forced him to marry Lilia. He said that he had been receiving phone calls threatening him and that Lilia even hired the service of a certain Ka Celso, a member of the NPA, to threaten him. Orly also said he was defrauded by Lilia by claiming that she was pregnant hence he married her but he now raises that he never impregnated Lilia prior to the marriage. Lilia on the other hand denied Orlys allegations and she said that Orly freely cohabited with her after the marriage and she showed 14 letters that shows Orlys affection and care towards her.ISSUE:Whether or not there is duress and fraud attendant in the case at bar.HELD:The SC ruled that Orlys allegation of fraud and intimidation is untenable. On its face, it is obvious that Orly is only seeking to annul his marriage with Lilia so as to have the pending appealed bigamy case [filed against him by Lilia] to be dismissed. On the merits of the case, Orlys allegation of fear was not concretely established. He was not able to prove that there was a reasonable and well grounded reason for fear to be created in his mind by the alleged intimidation being done against him by Lilia and her party. Orly is a security guard who is well abreast with self-defense and that the threat he so described done against him is not sufficient enough to vitiate him from freely marrying Lilia. Fraud cannot be raised as a ground as well. His allegation that he never had an erection during their sexual intercourse is incredible and is an outright lie. Also, there is a prolonged inaction on the part of Orly to attack the marriage. It took him 4 and a half years to file an action which brings merit to Lilias contention that Orly freely cohabited with her after the marriage.