Perspectives on the Revival of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Regime in the Wake of President...

Perspectives on the Revival of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Regime in the Wake ofPresident Barack Obama's Prague SpeechAuthor(s): Duncan SmithSource: Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 21 (2010), pp. 179-195Published by: Royal Irish AcademyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41413181 .

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Perspectives on the Revival of the Nuclear Non-

Proliferation Treaty Regime in the Wake of President

Barack Obama's Prague Speech

Duncan Smith*

Centre for International Studies, School of Law and Government, Dublin City University

ABSTRACT

The election of Barack Obama as president of the United States promised a shift in the fortunes of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime after a near decade of intransigence and frustration. This article examines what has been achieved in the wake of Obama's speech in Prague in April 2009, where he articulated the goal of a world free from nuclear weapons. Since the Prague speech, the effective norm of the NPT has been re-energised through a number of initiatives, including UN Security Council resolution 1887, the New START agreement and the agreed final document at the NPT review conference in May 2010. However a number of big challenges continue to face the NPT regime, including the nuclear programs of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the continued fallout from the US-India civil nuclear deal. The article concludes that the NPT continues to play a role in creating parameters within which powerful states face some constraints; and, crucially, that the Treaty maintains an international consensus that proliferation of nuclear weapons, even by democratic states, is a threat to global security. However, the NPT has not and will not replace power politics.

INTRODUCTION

Ireland and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) share a long and close association,1 with Ireland a committed supporter of the NPT since it entered into force in 1970, and consistently advocating the policy of a world free from nuclear weapons. In addition to being the first state to both sign and ratify the NPT, Ireland was instrumental in forming the New Agenda Coalition in 1998, which was key to

*The author attended the NPT review conference in May 2010 as a member of the Delegation of Ireland.

'Mohamed I. Shaker, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: origin and implementation 1959-1979 (London, 1980), 'It was in response to Irish endeavours in the United Nations in the years 1958-1961 that a concept of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was laid down in a United Nations General Assembly resolution', 3.

Author's e-mail: [email protected] Irish Studies in international Affairs, Vol. 21 (2010), 179-195. doi: 1 0.33 18/ISIA.2010.21. 179



180 Irish Studies in International Affairs

agreeing the 13 practical steps towards nuclear disarmament at the 2000 NPT review conference, a high point in the history of the NPT. Since the agreed final document of the 2000 NPT review conference,2 the NPT regime entered a near decade of intransigence and inertia. The factors contributing to this included; a combination of increased proliferation challenges and a breakdown in multilateral approaches from the most powerful states, notably the United States. During this period, the majority of NPT states parties floated listlessly in an imagined middle ground; unable to coax the major powers into action whilst not being powerful enough to tackle the proliferation challenges themselves. The result; the functioning of the NPT regime began to show signs of disintegration, most vividly with the failure of the 2005 NPT review conference and the exemption granted to the US-India civil nuclear deal by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 2008. These wounds to the institution of the NPT regime called into question its long-term viability and damaged the strength of the norm created by the NPT.

The election of President Barack Obama in the United States has precipitated a sudden change in atmosphere in nuclear weapons diplomacy. Obama' s April 2009 speech in Prague, where he affirmed the US commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons with a strengthened NPT as the basis for cooperation towards this end, is viewed as a departure point from the decade of inertia.3 Between the Prague speech and the NPT review conference in May 2010, President Obama instigated a number of initiatives to strengthen the NPT regime and to tackle continuing disarmament and non-proliferation challenges. Key to this paper is an examination of how these initiatives have met the current proliferation challenges of Iran and the DPRK; nuclear terrorism, nuclear disarmament, the US-India civil nuclear deal as well as institutional deficits to the NPT itself. To put some perspective on how the events since 2009 fit into the broader context of the non-proliferation regime, the article also analyses the new initiatives in light of the decade of inertia under President George W. Bush.

A lot of the blame for the breakdown in the NPT regime was apportioned to President Bush and his administration. This paper agrees that the Bush administration did largely contribute to a deep freeze in the NPT regime; however, it also recognises the success of ending Libya's secret WMD program and the passing of UN Security Council resolution 1540 during this near decade of intransigence. With this in mind, the paper will examine how much Obama has actually achieved in the period since Prague. This will highlight that Obama has been busy re-energising the NPT regime in a number of areas, including; re-positioning the NPT at the heart of the non- proliferation regime; committing the US to furthering the fight against the perceived threat of nuclear terrorism; and re-engaging earnestly with the UN. This paper will also show that the main proliferation challenges of Iran and the DPRK are being met using the same tools as those under President Bush, whilst the US-India deal remains wholly in place, highlighting that there has been little shift in the US approach to these issues. Finally, Ireland's reaction to the revival in the NPT regime will be analysed, stressing that while Ireland welcomes the new positive atmosphere, it remains circumspect; indicating that many challenges remain for the NPT regime.

2NPT review conferences take place at five-year intervals to review the implementation of the NPT over the previous five years and to set out plans for the upcoming review cycle. Before 2010, the 2000 review conference was the last one to agree a final document. The review conferences do not always reach such an agreement and the failure of the 2005 conference, especially the manner of the failure, cast doubt over the future viabilitv of the Treatv.

3The full text of the speech is available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks- By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague- As-Delivered/ (28 July 2010).



Smith - Perspectives on the Revival of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 181

POST-COLD WAR- AN ENCOURAGING BEGINNING FOR THE NPT REGIME IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

During the Cold War, the dynamics of nuclear proliferation were set against the bipolar security structure, which was buttressed by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The end of the Cold War brought a new international security context, with the United States as the one remaining superpower above a number of existing and emerging great powers. Throughout this upheaval, the NPT remained the primary instrument for combating nuclear proliferation. South Africa joined the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state in 1991, viewing the Treaty as an important step on the road back from an international wilderness. The sudden dissolution of the Soviet Union saw three succession states inherit Soviet nuclear weapons. In a diplomatic effort led by the United States and the new Russian state, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus all returned the nuclear weapons on their territories to the Russian Federation and joined the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states. The accession of South Africa, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus to the NPT in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War helped to frame the NPT as a vital treaty in the post-Cold War context. This was codified at the review and extension conference of the NPT in 1995, which agreed the indefinite extension of the Treaty beyond the 25 years agreed in 1970.4 The 1995 conference seemed, therefore, to cement the NPT as a strong norm for international relations in the post-Cold War era.

Despite these initial post-Cold War successes for the NPT regime, the threats of proliferation by states both party and not party to the NPT has increased over the past two decades. A number of states have crossed the nuclear threshold in this period, with the threat of more to follow. Braun and Chyba argue that 'up until 1990 second tier nuclear states acted cautiously',5 affirming the belief that the NPT acted as an effective norm against open proliferation. This point is proved by non-NPT states such as Israel, India, South Africa and Pakistan, which had each kept their nuclear weapons programs secret. The end of the Cold War allowed for just enough space for proliferation challenges to move from the covert into the open, ending the phase of proliferators acting cautiously. The nuclear tests of India and Pakistan in May 1998 highlighted this new space and challenged the non-proliferation regime unlike any event since it had entered into force. The regime responded to the shocks of the sub- continent's nuclear tests with the agreed document of the 2000 NPT review conference, which included an unequivocal undertaking by the five nuclear weapons states to eliminate their nuclear weapons.6 However, the undertakings agreed at the 2000 review conference, including the 13 practical steps towards nuclear disarmament, would not be implemented as the following decade would represent an era of intransigence and frustration for the NPT regime.

The administration of US President George W. Bush, which included a number of neo-conservative radicals who openly rejected the fundamental premise of the NPT,

4For an analysis of the 1995 review and extension conference see Tariq Rauf and Rebecca Johnson, 'After the NPT' s indefinite extension: the future of the global nonproliferation regime', Nonproliferation Review 3(1) (Fall 1995), 28-42.

5Chaim Braun and Christopher F. Chyba, 'Proliferation rings: new challenges to the nuclear non- proliferation regime', International Security 29 (2) (Fall 2004), 5-49: 7.

6Under the terms of the NPT, states parties should pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and on nuclear disarmament. The five states mandated to have nuclear weapons by the terms of the NPT are the United States, the Russian Federation (formerly the Soviet Union), the United Kingdom, China and France. The non- nuclear weapon states party to the NPT have consistently called on these states, the P5, to accelerate progress towards nuclear disarmament. It is the perceived lack of urgency towards nuclear disarmament which concerns the Non- Aligned Movement and the New Agenda Coalition, along with many states in the Western Group.




was crucial to the breakdown of the NPT regime.7 The Bush administration pulled the United States out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and refused to pursue ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The administration also (unsuccessfully) sought approval from Capitol Hill to fund a new type of 'usable' nuclear weapon; the bunker buster. The perceived disregard by the US for the NPT regime was deemed so serious that many felt the NPT was a dead treaty8 and questioned the very future of the regime.9 It was certainly a bleak period for the NPT regime.

The new US administration in 2009 brought a fresh wind of change which re- energised the NPT regime. Obama's belief in multilateral approaches to international relations and a strong belief in the NPT as the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime very quickly changed the atmosphere of nuclear weapons diplomacy. His speech in Prague, which called for a world free of nuclear weapons, became the moment when the era of NPT regime intransigence ended and the promise of a new era of global partnership began.10 Comparing the approaches of the Bush and Obama administrations throws up some interesting results. Despite differences in how they view the NPT regime there are also similarities in how both approached the proliferation challenges of the DPRK and Iran. Obama has endorsed, though perhaps not overtly, some of Bush's controversial nuclear policies including the US-India civil nuclear deal. Both entered into nuclear arms reduction treaties with Russia within two years of being in office. Perhaps the main difference between the two has been in the atmospheres created by them. Bush's policy of unilateralism was viewed as confrontational, whilst Obama's embrace of multilateral fora and dialogue has been viewed as convivial and constructive. It was this positive approach which allowed for an agreed outcome to the 2010 NPT review conference, though it must be stated that an agreed outcome document does not necessarily equate to victory over existing proliferation and other nuclear challenges. It does, however, succeed in helping to re-establish the NPT as an effective norm against proliferation, a norm which was damaged during the near decade of intransigence.

At the heart of the debate on the NPT during this period was the perception that the 'essential contractual nature'11 of the NPT was in danger of breaking down. Dr Harald Müller highlights the success of the NPT as a norm which 'exerted a considerable influence on the decision of states to terminate nuclear weapons programmes (or not to start them at all)'. Müller asserts that 'normative satisfaction emerges from the promise of the nuclear weapon states to move towards complete nuclear disarmament.' This promise of nuclear weapons disarmament is set out in Article VI of the NIT and combines with other articles of the Treaty to form a bargain; nuclear disarmament in return for non-proliferation with all having access to safeguarded nuclear power for peaceful uses. The failure of the 2005 review conference highlighted a trust deficit between NPT states parties, which in turn had the capability to erode the ability of the regime to act as an effective norm. As Müller states, such an erosion would be 'slow but steady'.12 Another failure to agree a

'George Perkovich, 'Bush's nuclear revolution', Foreign Affairs 82 (2) (2003), 3. 'Michael Wesley, 'It's time to scrap the NPT', Australian Journal of International Affairs 59 (3)

(2005), 283-99. 'Joseph F. Pilat, 'The end of the NPT regime?', International Affairs 83 (3) (2007) 469-82. 10The full text of the speech is available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-

By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague- As-Delivered/ (28 July 2010). "William Walker, 'International nuclear order. A rejoinder', International Affairs 83 (4) (2007), 747-

56. 12Harald Müller, 'Between power and justice: current problems and perspectives of the NPT,

Strategic Analysis 34 (2) (2010), 190-1. Müller highlights 26 states that at one point either considered a nuclear weapons program, conducted feasibility studies, began a nuclear program or indeed fully developed an arsenal and had decided against developing/continuing their nuclear programmes. Müller contrasts this against the relatively very few states that continue to seek a nuclear weapons capability.



Smith - Perspectives on the Revival of the Nuclear Non- Prolife ration Treaty 183

consensus document at the 2010 review conference would have the potential to further damage the norm of the NPT, particularly as many challenges would continue to face the NPT regime whether agreement at the review conference was reached or not. While proliferation challenges to the NPT regime were real - in both the slow pace of P5 disarmament and its inability to dissuade Israel, India and Pakistan from strengthening their nuclear weapons programmes - nonetheless a collapse of the NPT or a weakening of its normative strength would have been likely to make non- proliferation even more difficult to sustain.

THE REVIVAL IN THE NPT REGIME

The key factor in the revival of the NPT regime has been the election of Barack Obama as president of the United States, particularly his speech in Prague on 5 April 2009, in which he stated the United States' 'commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons'.13 The return of the United States to the multilateral fold in nuclear diplomacy led to a series of events and actions which have sought to strengthen the consensus for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. In the wake of the Prague speech, the final preparatory committee for the NPT review conference took place in New York in May 2009. The preparatory committee offered little in the way of substantial progress, due to the combination of Obama' s administration still trying to put flesh on the Prague rhetoric and the rest of the states parties coming to terms with the changed context ushered in by the Prague speech. The preparatory committee did agree an agenda for the 2010 review conference, something the corresponding preparatory committee to the previous review cycle failed to do in 2004. Although substantial recommendations for the 2010 review conference were not agreed, this had more to do with states coming to terms with the new context as opposed to a lack of political will. The qualified success of the preparatory committee placed the institutional framework of the non-proliferation regime on a positive footing for the review conference in 2010.

On foot of the Prague speech, President Obama joined President Medvedev of Russia to convene negotiations towards a successor treaty to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) of 1991, which was due to expire in December 2010. The negotiations towards what would become the New START agreement sought to follow-up the original START agreement plus START II of 1992 and the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT or Moscow Treaty) of 2002. Negotiations dragged beyond the December 2009 deadline before the New START was signed in April 2010. In an effort to combat the continued threat of proliferation, Obama chaired an historic summit meeting of the United Nations Security Council on 24 September 2010. The Security Council was addressed by 13 heads of state including the heads of all five permanent members of the Security Council. The result was resolution 1887, which pledges support for broadening progress on the stalled efforts against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as strengthening disarmament obligations and controlling fissile materials. This was the first time a sitting United States president had chaired a meeting of the Security Council, and given President Bush's disregard for multilateral procedures and the UN in general, Obama succeeded by his very presence to indicate the United States' s new willingness to re- engage with the international community on matters of critical security.

The 2010 United States Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the key nuclear policy document commissioned by each new American president following arrival in office, was released to the public. The NPR under the Bush administration in 2002 was a

13The full text of the speech is available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks- By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/ (28 July 2010).




controversial document which was never fully released. Leaked sections from the 2002 NPR, however, indicate that the United States had drawn up contingency plans for nuclear attack on a number of states, including the infamous 'axis of evil' as Bush referred to it; Iraq, Iran and North Korea. The controversial policy of pre-emptive nuclear strikes was in line with the unilateralist security policies which defined the Bush era and furthered the mood of global insecurity, already keen after the terrorist attacks on 1 1 September 2001. The 2010 NPR was released with much expectation and hype, and set down a new context for any American nuclear strike. It states that the United States will not attack any state in compliance with its NPT obligations.14 This language is aimed at Iran and North Korea, which for differing reasons the United States believes to be in non-compliance with its NPT obligations. The 2010 NPR also called for a moratorium on the production of new nuclear weapons and certain delivery systems, which were advocated in Bush's NPR of 2002. The 2010 NPR certainly re-focuses United States nuclear policy and is a document which gains more favour with the NPT community than its predecessor document of 2002.

A relatively new challenge to the NPT regime, and one certainly not countenanced when the NPT was drafted in the late 1960s, is a nuclear attack at the hands of non- state actors and/or terrorists. In order to meet this challenge, President Obama convened a Nuclear Security Summit in Washington in April 2010. After a two day summit, the United States and 46 other states, mostly states with a nuclear program, agreed a voluntary action plan to secure all vulnerable nuclear material over the coming four years. President Obama deserves credit for revitalising the NPT regime through the initiatives outlined and in doing so taking the majority of the international community with him.

The next section of this paper will set out the key challenges to the regime - Iran, the DPRK, Nuclear Terrorism, the slow pace of P5 disarmament, institutional deficits within the NPT and the US-India civil nuclear deal - and give a perspective on whether the post-Prague events have met these challenges to any degree. Ibis section will also examine any new initiatives brought in by Obama against the initiatives or actions in the period between 2000 and 2008. Although the NPT regime suffered from a lack of political will, measures were taken, some unilaterally, to tackle proliferation challenges. It remains to be seen how the new multilateral activity engages with the actions taken during the Bush era.

IRAN

Iran is party to the NPT and pursues under Article IV of the Treaty the 'inalienable right of all Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.'15 There is severe doubt among many states, particularly the United States, that Iran is genuine in its pursuit of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, as it is believed instead that Iran is intent on developing a nuclear weapons capability. Iran's failure to satisfy IAEA requirements, the secrecy over its nuclear plants and some incendiary rhetoric from President Ahmadinejad in relation to Israel, have all given cause for the international community to be suspicious about the Iranian nuclear program. Iran's civil nuclear program dates back to the 1950s,

14US Nuclear Posture Review 2010, The United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations', Executive Summary, viii. The full report is available at: http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf (14 August 2010). 15 Article IV, 'The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons', Mountbatten Centre for International Studies and James Martin Centre for Non-proliferation Studies (Monterey Institute of International Studies, 1968) NPT Briefing Book 2010, edn, A-l.



Smith - Perspectives on the Revival of the Nuclear Non- Prolife ration Treaty 185

although it was briefly suspended immediately after the revolution in 1979. Pressure began to mount on Iran in 2002 when it was included along with Iraq and the DPRK in President George W. Bush's 'axis of evil'. In August of that year Iran revealed two nuclear sites under construction, one in Natanz and the other in Arak, prompting the IAEA to seek answers from Iran on its nuclear program. This led to a chain of events in which Iran, the IAEA and the EU-3 (UK, France and Germany) engaged in a frustrating process aimed at establishing the truth of Iran's nuclear program. This resulted in the IAEA Board of Governors reporting Iran to the Security Council for non-compliance with its safeguards agreements.16 UN Security Council resolution 1696 (2006) called on Iran to end uranium enrichment and this was followed by three rounds of sanctions; UN Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2007).

Since the Prague speech, it is very difficult to identify any discernible change in how the NPT regime has tackled the Iranian challenge. Soon after taking office, President Obama did offer to talk with Iran 'without preconditions' 17 about its nuclear program, but this offer was rebuffed. That brief olive branch moment passed and the nuclear diplomacy between Iran and the NPT regime quickly returned to being tense, fractious and suspicious. Between 2001 and 2008, the Iranian issue was dealt with through six-part negotiations'8 and through the multilateral fora of the IAEA or enforcement of penalties for non-compliance through UN Security Council resolutions. This method has more or less continued through 2009 and into 2010. The revelation by Iran that it was constructing a second enrichment plant near the holy city of Qom in September 2009 was further proof that Iran has been less than honest in its representations to the IAEA or to the international community. In response to the Qom revelation, the IAEA Board of Governors passed a resolution on 27 November 2009, recalling all previous UN Security Council resolutions passed in response to Iran's nuclear program since 2006. A further IAEA report dated 18 February 2010 stated that Iran has not provided the necessary co-operation to permit the agency to confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is for peaceful purposes.19 The matter was returned to the UN Security Council, which passed even more stringent sanctions against Iran in resolution 1929 (2010).

The process of IAEA declaring Iran to be non-compliant and the UN imposing sanctions mirrors the approach taken during the pre-Prague period. There was an attempt to stop these latest rounds of sanctions being passed through a diplomatic effort involving Brazil and Turkey. In a deal brokered by Brazil and announced by all three states on 17 May 2010, Iran agreed to send low enriched uranium to Turkey in return for enriched fuel for a research reactor. Despite a number of states including the Arab group welcoming this agreement, the UN Security Council decided it was too little, too late and pressed ahead with resolution 1929.

There is little doubt that Iran' s recent track record of failing to live up to promises regarding fuel swaps and inadequate engagement with the IAEA made it easier for the Security Council to disregard the Brazilian deal. There is very little to suggest that the revival in the NPT regime has changed how the regime reacts to the ongoing Iranian challenge. The regime has continued to tackle the Iran issue through a combination of IAEA pressure and, when that fails, UN Security Council resolutions

16See: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-14.pdf (20 August 2010). "See: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jan/21/barack-obama-iran-negotiations (13 August

2010). 18Six-part negotiations on Iran s nuclear program include the EU-3 (UK, France and Germany) and

the United States, Russia and China. Negotiations continue periodically between the six parties and Iran.

19For more information see: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2010/gov2010- 10.pdf (20 August 2010).




and sanctions. The US still targets Iran with its policy and rhetoric, albeit in a more subtle manner than it did under George W. Bush. The Nuclear Posture Review does plan contingencies for a nuclear attack on a state not in compliance with its NPT obligations, of which Iran is in a group of two (with the DRPK). The language used in the 2010 NPR is less inflammatory than the 'axis of evil' rhetoric used in 2002, though it still gives pointed reference to Iran. Despite more nuanced language the sudden revival in the NPT regime has not met the Iranian challenge with any new instruments or policies.

DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)

The DPRK was never a comfortable member of the NPT, implored as it was at the time to join by the Soviet Union in 1985. It came as no surprise that, after years of carrot and stick-style bargaining with the US and others over its nuclear program, the DPRK withdrew from the NPT in 2003. The withdrawal of the DPRK from the NPT presented the regime with an unusual problem, as never before had a state invoked the withdrawal clause under Article X of the Treaty to leave the NPT family. An initial reaction was to dispute the merits of the DPRK' s withdrawal on the grounds that it had not invoked the terms of Article X correctly. The text of Article X reads that a state needs to give three months notice to all other states parties and the UN Security Council of its intention to withdraw from the Treaty.20 Debates about whether the DPRK withdrawal fell within the terms of Article X became peripheral when in October 2006 the DPRK conducted its first nuclear weapon test (the DPRK would test another weapon in May 2009). This test came after the DPRK launched several missile tests in July of 2006, which prompted the UN Security Council to impose sanctions on the state and demand that it suspend its ballistic missile tests. Although both the missile tests and the nuclear weapons test had mixed results, the mere fact that the DPRK became the first state to withdraw from the NPT and then test a nuclear device dealt a severe blow to the integrity of the NPT regime and highlighted the lack of adequate enforcement mechanisms in the Treaty.

The proliferation challenge posed by the DPRK has arguably become more acute since the Prague speech. Against this backdrop of deteriorating relations with South Korea, the DPRK launched a long-range missile it claimed contained a communication satellite in April 2009, prompting criticism from the UN Security Council. In response to this criticism, the DPRK walked out of six party talks aimed at ending its nuclear program, which had been on again and off again since the DPRK withdrew from the NPT in 2003. The DPRK followed this by conducting a second underground nuclear weapons test in May 2009, prompting the ire of the international community. In response to the international criticism, the DPRK has stated publicly its willingness to return to six party talks, however as of the present this willingness has not transferred into action. During this period relations with South Korea continued to deteriorate with the sinking of the South Korean warship the Cheonan in May 2010, a source of tension and recrimination on both sides of the 58th parallel.

The secrecy of the DPRK regime, plus the complex relationship it shares with South Korea, ensure that the challenge of the DPRK nuclear program will not be resolved easily. The post-Prague improvement in atmosphere has not affected the DPRK situation and it has continued on its trajectory of the last 20 years by playing cat and mouse with key actors in the region. There has been little shift in how the NPT regime has tackled both the DPRK and Iranian challenges. The rhetoric has changed, as there is no more talk of an 'axis of evil' and the US NPR has softened

20 Article X, 'The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons'.




its language, which, however, still contains pointed reference to both states. Apart from a softening of language, the regime continues to use the same instruments and architecture that it used in the pre-Prague period. The UN Security Council has played a major role in the challenges both under Bush and again under Obama. Multilateralism, whether backed up by hard or soft US rhetoric, remains the predominant tool to tackle both the DPRK and Iran. It remains to be seen whether Obama' s stronger commitment to multilateral approaches yields greater success than with President Bush. So far the results are not markedly different.

LIBYA

While the Iran and DPRK challenges are ongoing, President Bush can at least point to one proliferation success from his time in power. In 2003 Libya, a long-time member of the NPT in name - if not in spirit - agreed to the dismantlement of its secret WMD facilities and accepted the IAEA's Additional Protocol, seen as the gold standard of nuclear inspections. The success of ending Libya's nuclear program can be attributed to a number of reasons. Libya's history of supporting terrorism put it firmly in the sights of an aggressive United States whose president had divided the world into those who 'are with us' or 'with the terrorists'.21 The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrated to the world that the US was willing to take strong military action against those it perceived as threats. It has also been suggested that Libya had grown weary of its expensive WMD programs22 and viewed this period as the right time to return from pariah status. The success of ending Libya's WMD programs is not a success of the multilateral system, rather a success of strong US (and UK) foreign security policy. Supporters of unilateralist approaches to solving security challenges can point to Libya as a definite success. Despite continued efforts within the UN Security Council, Iran and the DPRK continue to move their nuclear programs inexorably forward with their nuclear weapons programs. It remains to be seen whether lessons can be drawn from the Libyan case, which is, however, worthy of praise as a successful example of reverse-proliferation.

NUCLEAR TERRORISM

The threat of a nuclear attack from a terrorist or trans-national group was not conceived when the NPT entered into force in 1970, though since the terrorist attacks of 9/1 1 the perceived threat of a nuclear terror attack has increased.23 The greater dissemination of nuclear knowledge added to this perception, whilst the actions of the AQ Khan network24 further heightened the fear. To counter the threat of nuclear terrorism the US led the creation of two initiatives under President Bush; the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear

21 Speech by President George W. Bush to the joint sessions of Congress on the 20 September 2001. Available at: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html (1 September 2010).

22Sarah J. Diehl and James Clay Moltz, Nuclear weapons and non-proliferation: a reference handbook (Contemporary World Issues Series, 2nd edn, 2008), 28.

23There is strong scientific scepticism regarding the level of nuclear threat from a transnational or terrorist group. It is not within the scope of this paper to examine how likely a nuclear attack from these sources is; rather, this paper does agree that the 'perceived' threat has increased. Proof of this heightened awareness of a perceived threat is in the initiatives implemented by President Bush and others post- 9/1 1, and that these initiatives were either continued or supplemented by President Obama.

24Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan is a Pakistani nuclear scientist who confessed m 2004 to providing Iran, the DPRK and Libya with technologies and information to help build nuclear weapons. The belief that Khan was motivated by anti-Western, pro-Islamic personal ideology in addition to financial gain worried many that he or another like him could supply nuclear weapons technology to terrorist groups.




Terrorism (GICNT). The PSI was launched in May 2003 by President Bush and is a voluntary group of states 'committed to using diplomatic, military, intelligence- related, and other measures to prevent shipments of WMD and associated technologies by land, air and sea.'25 The PSI is currently endorsed by 95 states;26 although it has many high-profile critics including Iran, China and the DPRK, who question the legality of the PSI equating the provisions of the initiative with piracy on the high seas.

In order to further support the PSI from within the UN framework, the US proposed UN Security Council resolution 1540 to establish for the first time binding obligations on all UN member states under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to take and enforce effective measures against the proliferation of WMD, their means of delivery and related materials. Although not universally implemented, UNSC resolution 1540 has received widespread praise as a strong non-proliferation tool within current international frameworks. It also brought into sharper focus the nuclear threat from non-state actors. President Bush's perceived disregard for the UN process has ensured that he has received little recognition for the success of UNSC resolution 1540. Conversely, Obama's chairing of the UN Security Council meeting, which adopted UNSC resolution 1887, has received widespread praise as the resolution seeks 'a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the goals of the NPT, in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all.'27 The meeting was attended by the heads of state of all five permanent members of the Security Council and possessors of nuclear weapons. The heads of state of China, the UK and Russia weighed in behind the strong message of resolution 1887 and the broader message of nuclear disarmament. President Sarkozy of France delivered a more sobering statement, unwilling to back Obama's call for a world free of nuclear weapons and instead wanting to focus on the 'real world' issues of proliferation challenges in Iran and the DPRK.28 France's reluctance to join calls of a world free from nuclear weapons is unsurprising but at the same time does not prove a reluctance to work within the new positive atmosphere created by Obama. Rather, it demonstrates a disregard for this new mood of optimism. It was a terse reminder that acute challenges still remain to be faced.

The GICNT was launched by the US and Russia in July 2006, complimenting the UN International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism of 2005. 29 The mission of the GICNT is to strengthen the global capacity to prevent, detect and respond to nuclear terrorism through multilateral activities that strengthen the plans, policies, procedures and inter-operability of partner nations. With membership currently at 81 states,30 GICNT can be considered successful in terms of garnering support from other states. The PSI and GICNT represent two US sponsored initiatives of the Bush era that commanded broad though not complete international support. Obama's US Nuclear Security Summit in April 2010 brought together 46 states to agree a communiqué for a four-year plan to secure all nuclear materials. Paragraph seven of the communiqué recognises the role and contribution of, among other instruments, the GICNT in combating nuclear terrorism through the securing of nuclear materials. The PSI, a more controversial instrument, was not

"Diehl and Moltz, Nuclear weapons and nonproliferation, 27. 26 As at 1 July 2010. 27 Maintenance of international peace and security: nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament , resolution 1887/2009, available at: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/523/74/PDF/ N0952374.pdf?OpenElement (30 August 2010).

28See: http://www.un.Org/News/Press/docs//2009/sc9746.doc.htm (3 August 2010). 24Diehl and Moltz, Nuclear weapons and nonproliferation, 30. 30 As at 1 July 2010.




mentioned in the communiqué. The recognition of the GICNT, which has nearly twice the amount of signatories than the Nuclear Security Summit communiqué, highlights the utility of certain instruments that were agreed during the decade of intransigence under Bush. Again, it is too early to measure the success of the US Nuclear Security Summit and although the ambition of the document is lofty, there is no clear plan as to how its goals will be achieved. A cynical reading of the US Nuclear Security Summit would be that Obama is merely trying to place his own fingerprint on the issues of securing nuclear weapons and the threat of nuclear terrorism. Bush's initiatives still remain in place and are now part of the international security architecture, whilst Obama has not attempted to roll back either the PSI or GICNT.

THE SLOW PACE OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

Threats to the NPT do not just come from proliferation challenges. The slow pace of disarmament by nuclear weapon states has led to much disquiet from a number of states within the NPT. At the core of the NPT lies a simple bargain: non-nuclear weapon states agree to refrain from developing nuclear weapons whereas the five declared nuclear powers at the time of signing the NPT in 1968 agreed in good faith to move towards nuclear weapons disarmament. In addition, all states would be entitled to the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes without discrimination. It can be argued quite convincingly that the non-nuclear weapon states (with a small number of high-profile exceptions) have lived up to their end of the bargain. In his support of this argument, Müller highlights no fewer than 26 states 'which once explored the idea of moving towards nuclear weapons, conducted feasibility studies, targeted weapon research or even development, or produced nuclear weapons (or inherited them after the decay of the Soviet Union)' and which have decided against developing a weapons capability in favour of abiding by the terms of the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state.31

A criticism from many states including the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) is that the five states mandated by the NPT to maintain nuclear weapons have failed to adhere to their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty to pursue nuclear disarmament. Pressure from the NAM, NAC and others is not applied evenly to the P5 as even within that group of five there is a two-tiered level of nuclear power. The United States and Russia still retain over 90 per cent of the world's nuclear weapons, amounting to approximately 25,000 deployed and non- deployed warheads between them. The arsenals of France, the UK and China are a lot smaller, with each state retaining an arsenal ranging from 150 to 300 warheads. The three states with the smaller nuclear arsenals argue that they retain just enough weapons to provide minimum deterrence and that the onus is on the US and Russia to bring their arsenals in line with the nebulous threshold of 'minimum deterrence'.

Historically, the US and Russia have responded to the responsibility of being the states with the largest nuclear weapons that have signed a series of bilateral limitation or reduction treaties stretching back to the 1960s. These include the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT or Moscow Treaty) agreed by Presidents Bush and Putin in 2002. The Moscow Treaty was criticised as being only a minor reduction on levels agreed in previous START agreements. The New Start agreement signed by Presidents Obama and Medvedev equates to a more significant reduction in deployed nuclear weapons to approximately 1,550 warheads each, a 30 per cent reduction on levels agreed in the Moscow Treaty.32 The New START supersedes all

31Harald Müller, 'Between power and justice', 189-201. 32See: https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/NewSTART (28 August 2010)




previous bilateral agreements between the two leading nuclear powers and has been broadly welcomed as a step in the right direction towards nuclear disarmament. To coincide with the opening of the 2010 NPT review conference, the US released details of the number of warheads in its stockpile (5,113). This effort towards transparency is another positive step in improving the relationship between the US and the rest of the NPT states. This transparency represents a departure from the Bush era, which did not even release to the public its Nuclear Posture Review nor release sensitive information such as nuclear weapons numbers. This, along with the New START agreement, will go some way towards fixing the trust deficit created by the Bush administration.

NPT INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES

The NPT itself continues to be challenged by an uneven implementation of its own obligations. At the 1995 review and extension conference, the indefinite extension of the Treaty was agreed by the states parties. To reach this agreement, a deal had to be struck with the Middle East states angered at the continued possession of nuclear weapons by Israel and the seemingly benign acceptance of this fact by the Western powers. To sate the anger of the Middle East states, the resolution on the Middle East was agreed and called for inter alia a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction.33 The resolution also called for the universal adherence to the NPT by all states in the region; a pointed reference to Israel which remains outside the NPT. Progress on this Middle East resolution was not forthcoming over the next decade. The agreed document in 200034 somewhat overcame the lack of progress up to that point but the collapse of the 2005 review conference was attributed to, among other things, failure to agree progress on the Middle East resolution. Attitudes within the region were hardened after the experience in 2005 and, led by Egypt as chair of the Non- Aligned Movement, the 2010 review conference was arrived at, intent on reaching agreement to progress on the Middle East resolution. Such was the Middle East's anger on this issue; failure to achieve progress would no doubt have led to a collapsed review conference, something unconscionable to the US administration, which was intent on achieving a successful conference.

The political capital invested by the US, along with a constructive approach by key states, led to an agreed text on the Middle East resolution, calling for a regional conference to take place in 2012 under the auspices of the UN Secretary General. The text includes a mention of Israel by name and a concession to the Middle East states by the US, which, although regretted by President Obama,35 demonstrates the extent to which he has invested in the success of the NPT regime. The agreed final document to the 2010 review conference contains three forward-looking action plans on disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the so-called three pillars of the NIT. It is an important document as it represents a consensus of support for the institution of the NPT and multilateral approaches to the nuclear issue. It is the single biggest departure from the period of inertia, highlighted by the failed review conference in 2005. To a great extent it draws a line under the bad atmosphere

33NPT Briefing Book, 2010 E-2. 34The full text of the 2000 agreed document from the 2000 NPT review conference is available at:

http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/revcon2000/docs/2000FD.pdf (31 August 2010). 35 'We strongly oppose efforts to single out Israel, and will oppose actions that jeopardise Israel's national security', Statement by the president on the Non-Proliferation Treaty review conference, full text available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statement-president-non-proliferation- treaty-review-conference (30 August 2010).




created by Bush and restates both the importance of the NPT and the need for forward movement of the regime. However successful the NPT review conference was in achieving an agreed document, other events between 2001 and 2008 still serve to weaken the regime; notably the ground-breaking US-India civil nuclear deal.

US-INDIA CIVIL NUCLEAR DEAL

Arguably the heaviest blow to the NPT regime occurred between 2005 and 2008 when the United States entered into a civil nuclear cooperation agreement with one of the three NPT holdout states; India.16 The United States, the steward of the NPT regime and 'the actor most needed to rally others to strengthen the regime, instead spoke and acted in ways that undermined cooperation rather than encouraged it.'37 The US-India deal, brokered by President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in July 2005, resulted in the granting of an exemption deal for India from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 2008. The central bargain to the US-India deal exempts nuclear suppliers from previous restrictions on nuclear cooperation with India, opening up the Indian market to the sales of reactors, fuel, dual-use items and related nuclear software. India assented to the public declaration of its nuclear facilities and to place all its civilian nuclear facilities under the advanced safeguards agreement called the Additional Protocol.

The reasons given for the US-India deal coming to fruition include; the US wishing to counter the emergence of China as an economic and military rival to the United States and the desire to see the upwardly-mobile democracy of India more fully welcomed into the international fold through cooperation in the field of nuclear materials. Whatever the true motivations behind the deal, there is no doubt that the principles of the NPT regime were severely damaged. The damage to the regime was most evident during negotiations among the NSG members on whether to grant an exemption to the US-India deal in September 2008. The NSG operates by consensus so agreement was needed by all members in order to open up the Indian market to nuclear commerce. Consensus was eventually agreed but only after middle-power states with a strong affinity to the NPT and multilateral approaches to security issues, such as Ireland, Austria and New Zealand, were pressured to join consensus by the powerful nuclear states wishing to engage in nuclear commerce with India.

The US-India deal serves as a template for similar civil nuclear deals between NPT states and non-members. In 2010 China and Pakistan wished to agree a deal for the former to sell two nuclear reactors to the latter, another of the three nuclear hold-out states. There is a valid argument that Pakistan poses a greater threat for sideways or vertical proliferation than India does, especially after the revelations of the AQ Khan network. However, Pakistan and India are both non-states party to the NPT, and any agreement with a non-state party by a member violates the core bargain of the Treaty. In this regard it is irrelevant whether one state is viewed as a 'good proliferator' and another is viewed as a 'bad proliferator'. In the build up to the 2010 NSG plenary in Christchurch, New Zealand, the US raised objections to a proposed China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation deal. The US argued that a proposed China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation deal would unlikely gain consensus approval as it would have to be consistent with existing non-proliferation obligations.38 The US' s credibility in arguing this position is questionable; however, that is not to say it will not win out

36The other two holdout states from the NPT are Israel and Pakistan. 37George Perkovich, 'Global implications of the US-India Deal', Daedalus 139 (1) (Winter 2010),

20-31: 21. 38See: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/14/AR2010061404680.

html (1 September 2010).




and block the China-Pakistan deal. As evidenced in 2008, power politics has the final say in nuclear diplomacy and the US remains the most powerful actor in this arena. Whether the China-Pakistan deal goes ahead or not, the NPT will still be damaged. For the US to exercise its influence to deny the China-Pakistan deal whilst continuing cooperation with India, the charge of hypocrisy and unfairness can be levelled at the key actor in the NPT regime.

Perhaps more worrying for both state and non-state supporters of the NPT regime was the lack of attention the US-India deal received at the 2010 NPT review conference, where the deal was not mentioned once in the final document. The final document of the 2010 review conference, which is the responsibility of the conference president and reflects to his knowledge what transpired during the conference,39 did not dedicate one sentence or comment to the US-India deal. Two contesting deductions can be drawn from this; one, the US-India deal commands broad agreement and support and therefore no discussion on the issue was needed, or more likely, the issue was so divisive that consensus for the conference may not have been reached, resulting in another failed review conference. India's absence from the NPT review conference, as well as the absence of the state with most grievance with the US-India deal, Pakistan, ensured that negotiations on the issue were deftly avoided. It was not in keeping with the mood of the 2010 review conference, or indeed the will to reach an agreement, for the US-India deal to be discussed. This is not to say the issue has disappeared, and as highlighted by the developing China-Pakistan relationship, there will continue to be fallout from the US-India deal.

IRELAND AND THE REVIVAL

Ireland has a long and distinguished relationship with the NPT, the genesis of which is traced back to a number of resolutions introduced by Ireland to the UN General Assembly in the late 1950s and early 1960s.40 Ireland was recognised for its early efforts in the General Assembly as being the first state to both sign and ratify the NPT on 1 July 1968. Since then Ireland has acted as an unofficial guardian of NPT values and can be seen as an unofficial litmus test to gauge the health of the NPT. It was Ireland, along with a number of other middle powers,41 that created the New Agenda Coalition in 1998 as a direct response to the sub-continent nuclear tests on May 1998 and to tackle the perceived slow pace of nuclear disarmament. The high water mark of the New Agenda Coalition achievement came at the 2000 NPT review conference when the group was instrumental in brokering agreement on the 13 practical steps towards nuclear disarmament, which formed part of the final document. Although the NAC has continued to play a strong advocacy role within disarmament and non- proliferation fora, its overall influence has failed to reach the high point of the 2000 NPT review conference. The NAC' s influence at the 2010 review conference was somewhat marginal in comparison to that of 2000. There is no doubting Ireland's

39NPT review conference 2010, Final Document, 2, available at: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/ legal/npt/revcon2010/DraftFinalDocument.Ddf (10 August 2010).

"•"Mohammad I. Shaker supports the view that Ireland was integral to the genesis of the NPT in his reference tome on the origins and implementation of the NPT, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 3; cited in Richard Sinnott, 'Ireland and the diplomacy of nuclear non-proliferation: the politics of incrementalism', Irish Studies in International Affairs 6 (1995) 59-78: 59-60, 'It was in response to Irish endeavours in the United Nations in the years 1958-1961 that a concept of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was laid down in a United Nations General Assembly resolution. This concept served as a guide to successive steps within and outside the United Nations with intention of arresting the proliferation of nuclear weapons' .

41The NAC was launched by Ireland along with Brazil, Egypt, Mexico, New Zealand, Sweden and Slovenia (Slovenia pulled out of the NAC soon after).



Smith - Perspectives on the Revival of the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty 193

commitment to the core bargain of the NPT over the course of its history and as such Ireland's position on the contemporary NPT regime debate is worthy of examination.

Ireland was one of many states frustrated by the inertia since 2000. The political will that Ireland has always contributed to the NPT regime was not being reciprocated by key players, particularly the United States. This heightened Ireland's concern for the threat of proliferation risks from the DPRK and Iran. Minister for Foreign Affairs Brian Cowen's speech to the conference on disarmament (CD) in March 2004 articulated Ireland's concerns in these areas one year before the collapse of the 2005 NPT review conference.42 Ireland was among many states left utterly frustrated by the collapse and by the deep freeze in multilateral diplomacy on the nuclear issue. The exemption granted by the Nuclear Suppliers Group to the US-India civil nuclear deal further compounded Ireland's sense of frustration and anger. Under intense pressure from the United States and other nuclear weapons states, Ireland eventually joined the consensus along with the other members of the NSG and granted an exemption for nuclear trade to be undertaken with India. Ireland's initial reluctance to join the consensus for a deal43 with an NPT holdout state is in keeping with the long-standing Irish position of supporting the NPT and its core bargain. The agreement by Ireland to the exemption, albeit under the most intense political pressure, does leave a minor black spot on Ireland's otherwise excellent reputation for NPT faithfulness.

Ireland has broadly welcomed the new mood created by the Prague speech but it is also circumspect. Minister for Foreign Affairs Micheál Martin made speeches to both the CD and the 2010 NPT review conference, which taken together give a good picture of Ireland's position in the post-Prague era. Minister Martin welcomed the 'fresh US leadership' and the 'signals from the nuclear-weapon states that they are willing to make progress on disarmament.' He also cited the UN Security Council meeting of 24 September and the (then upcoming) US Nuclear Security Summit as 'encouraging developments'.44 In his speech to the NPT review conference, Minister Martin warmly welcomed the signing of the New START agreement as an 'important advance on the international disarmament front.'45 However, in both his speeches to the CD and the review conference, Minister Martin re-emphasises the threats posed by Iran and the DPRK. This highlights the circumspection demonstrated by Ireland to the current revival in the NPT regime.

CONCLUSION

The position of Ireland perhaps best sums up the post-Prague period for the NPT regime; improved atmosphere and positive steps, with many big challenges still to be faced. In terms of the overall history of the NPT regime, the period since the Prague speech has been very short, and it remains too early to speculate whether the recent positive atmosphere and encouraging steps will lead to further substantial progress for the NPT regime. There have been concrete steps forward such as the New START agreement and the re-positioning of the NPT at the centre of the regime. The substantive success of the NPT review conference in 2010 will be judged at the review conference in 2015; however, the mere fact that the 2010 conference agreed on a document is a success in itself. It is proof that there is consensus agreement

42See: http://www.foreignaffairs.irlgov.ie/home/index.aspx7icb25817 (1 September 2010). 43'Concern as US-India nuclear deal goes through', Disarmament Diplomacy 88 (Summer 2008),

available at: http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd88/88news04.htm (29 August 2010). "See: http://www.dfa.ie/home/index.aspx7ids83337 (1 September 2010). 45Speech by Minister for Foreign Affairs Micheál Martin to the NPT review conference 3 May 2010,

available at: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/revcon2010/statements/3May_Ireland.pdf (10 August 2010).




among NPT states parties to work within the NPT framework towards tackling proliferation challenges and pursuing disarmament. It also reaffirms the norm of the NPT at the centre of the non-proliferation regime. This was not the case in 2005 and demonstrates that attitudes have changed. The issue of the Middle East resolution at the review conference is further proof that there is political will among all parties to push the NPT regime forward. The US administration supported this resolution despite the annoyance caused to Israel. The difference between 2005 and 2010 was that the appetite for agreement was such that barriers which had existed since 1995 were overcome for the greater good of breathing new life back into the NPT regime. This highlights Perkovich's assertion that, 'The non-proliferation regime is a key structure of the nuclear order that most people in the world would rather not live without' .46

The acid test for the regime, however, will be how it copes with the challenges that continue to threaten it. Within three years of the NPT being indefinitely extended in 1995, both India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in what equated to an affront to the NPT regime. Conversely, during the near decade of deadlock under President Bush, Libya ended its secret WMD programs and agreed to the additional protocol and UN Security Council resolution 1540 was passed. The point is that a strong NPT regime does not in and of itself equal success, whilst a damaged NPT regime does not necessarily mean that certain non-proliferation successes won't occur. It is easy to dismiss the period 2000 to 2008 as an era when the United States ran rough shod over the NPT regime, whilst it is just as easy to declare that the Obama administration has ushered in a new period of nuclear enlightenment in which the whole world will join hands and move together to an age free from nuclear weapons. As always, the truth is more complicated and lies somewhere in between these two statements. What is true is that there is an improved atmosphere within the NPT regime and positive steps are being taken. The attitude of the unofficial leader of the NPT regime, the US, has been one of inclusiveness and openness for those wanting to seek a strong NPT regime. However it is the actions of this regime, now in an improved and re- energised condition, which will determine how successful this revival in nuclear weapons diplomacy will be.

This revival has brought newer instruments into the debate such as a Nuclear Weapons Convention, which received considerable attention at the 2010 review conference and is in UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon's five-point plan to rid the world of nuclear weapons.47 That such instruments are now entering the debate in a real way augurs well for achieving the ultimate goals of the NPT. While detractors will always point to the few states that hold nuclear weapons, optimists should be encouraged by the majority of those that continue to uphold the norm created by the NPT, a norm which was strengthened by the agreed outcome at the 2010 review conference. Although the actions of a few powerful states may inhibit progress at times, there has always been broad political will for a world free from nuclear weapons. Ireland has been, and will continue to be, at the forefront of this. As a state strongly supportive of the NPT regime, Ireland has with others welcomed the post- Prague period, while allowing that there are many challenges still to be faced and overcome.

This review of recent developments in nuclear weapons diplomacy - an issue in which Ireland has historically played a proud role - indicates the ongoing interactions between the NPT as a powerful norm in world politics, in either strengthening nuclear non-proliferation, or as in the case of the US-India deal, turning a blind eye when other interests dominate. Despite the intense media

■"■Perkovich, 'Global implications of the US'. 47See: http://www.un.org/sg/articleFull.asp?TID=105&Type=Op-Ed (9 September 2010).



Smith - Perspectives on the Revival of the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty 195

coverage of the threat of nuclear terrorism, and despite ongoing proliferation threats, the NPT continues to play an important role. It has not and will not replace power politics, but it does create parameters within which powerful states face some constraints. Crucially, it maintains an international consensus that proliferation of nuclear weapons, even by democratic states, is a threat to global security.



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