Perspectives and Recommendations for the Natural Gas Industry

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John B. Vorderbrueggen, PE

Chief, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Investigations

WRGC August 19, 2014

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A Short Quiz

The NTSB “10 Most Wanted List” is

A. Candidates for the next NTSB Chairman

B. Best restaurants in DC

C. Board Advocacy Priorities

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A Short Quiz

The NTSB 2014 budget is

A. $55 Million

B. $87.5 Million

C. $103 Million

D. $137 Million

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A Short Quiz

The PHMSA 2014 budget is

A. $45 Million

B. $118.6 Million

C. $210 Million

D. $260.5 Million

Hazmat Division

Pipeline Division

2014 budget

Administration’s 2015 proposal

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The NTSB Board MembersAugust 2014

Hon. Christopher A. Hart Acting Chairman

Hon. Robert L. Sumwalt

Hon. Mark R. Rosekind

Hon. Earl F. Weener

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Natural Gas Pipeline Accidents

Cleburne, Texas

Sissonville, West Virginia

Birmingham, Alabama

Manhattan, New York

Enterprise Products Operating, LtdNatural Gas Transmission Pipeline Rupture and Fire Cleburne, TexasJune 7, 2010

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Accident Summary

• 36-inch diameter carbon steel

• 1050 psig MAOP

• 950 psig Operating pressure

• 3rd Party damage

• 1 Fatality

• 6 Injuries

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Improper pipeline locate work

• Two parallel pipelines – 30 feet apart

• November 2009 locate tickets for electric utility design phase− Energy Transfer pipeline marked

− Enterprise pipeline not marked

• Only one pipeline on survey map

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Improper pipeline locate work

• June 2010 locate tickets for construction− Energy Transfer pipeline marked

− Enterprise pipeline not marked on three attempts to find the construction site

• Ticket closed – “all clear”

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Improper pipeline locate work

• Second ticket issued three days later− Locator and contractor presumed it was

a duplicate of first

• Ticket closed – “all clear”

Locator never surveyed the right-of-way on four visits

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Improper pipeline locate work

Accident date• Marked Energy Transfer pipeline

• Mowed right-of-way

• Contractor moved dig marker to increase distance from the marked pipeline…

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Improper pipeline locate work

DIRECTLY ABOVE THE UNMARKED ENTERPRISE PIPELINE

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The NTSB Probable Cause

• Contractor power auger punctured the unmarked buried pipeline

• Contributing factors− No permanent pipeline markers

− Pipeline locator did not mark pipeline before excavation work

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Closeout Actions

• Enterprise Products Ltd. improved the locate ticket procedure and technician training

• Final Accident Brief issued September 9, 2013− No recommendations issued

Columbia Gas TransmissionPipeline RuptureSissonville, West VirginiaDecember 11, 2012 12:41 pm

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Accident Summary

• 20-inch diameter carbon steel, 0.281 inch wall thickness

• 1,000 psig MAOP

• 929 psig Operating pressure

• Installed 1967

• “Not piggable”

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Pipeline Integrity Management

• Three parallel, interconnected lines− 30-inch diameter in HCA

− 26-inch diameter in HCA

− 20-inch diameter (not in HCA)

• Interstate highway does not count

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The NTSB Probable Cause

• External corrosion of the pipe wall − deteriorated coating

− ineffective cathodic protection

• Corrosion not detected− Not inspected or tested since 1988

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Contributing Cause

• Rocky backfill degraded corrosion protection

• Shutdown delay− SCADA alarms and alerts

configuration delayed controller response

− No automatic shutoff or remote control valves

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Key Findings

• Automatic SCADA trend data alerts would improve recognition of system problems

• Line would have required integrity management had highway proximity to pipeline been included in HCA decisions

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NTSB Recommendations

• Columbia Gas Transmission− Implement a process for determining

alarm and alert setpoints and response actions

− Provide system trend data and assign alarm function to critical trend variations

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NTSB Recommendations

• PHMSA− Add principal arterial roadways such

as interstate highways to “identified sites” for HCA determination

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Columbia Gas Corrective Actions• Conducted inline inspections on the

non-HCA 20-inch pipeline

• Performed close interval survey

• Reassessed the pipeline coating using AC and DC voltage gradient testing

• SCADA instrument upgrades on looped systems

Ongoing Investigations

Birmingham, Alabama Manhattan, New York

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Birmingham, Alabama• Alagasco

• December 17, 2013 2:30 am

• Cast iron distribution line (1951)

• 25 psig MAOP

• 19 psig operating

• 1 Fatality

• 4 injuries

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Manhattan, New York (Harlem)• Consolidated Edison

• March 12, 2014 9:30 am

• 8-inch cast iron/plastic distribution line (1890 / 2011)

• 8 in wc MAOP, 6 in wc operating

• 8 Fatalities

• 48 injuries

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Test Your Alertness - Just Before Lunch!

My closing comment on the NTSB annual budget quiz was:

It is Not Enough!

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John B. Vorderbrueggen, PE

Chief, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Investigations

202-314-6467John.vorderbrueggen@ntsb.gov