Persons and fam rel

7/27/2019 Persons and fam rel

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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

2012 CASES

MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN,Petitioner vs LOUELLA A. CATALAN

-LEE,Respondent.

G. R. No. 183622, February 8, 2012

Facts:

Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly obtaining a divorce inthe United States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a second marriage with

petitioner herein. Orlando died intestate in the Philippines. Thereafter, petitioner filed with the

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City a Petition for the issuance of letters of

administration for her appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Orlando.On 3March 2005, while Spec. Proc. No. 228 was pending, respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of

the children of Orlando from his first marriage, filed a similar petition. Petitioner prayed for the

dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 232 on the ground of litis pendentia, considering that Spec. Proc.No. 228 covering the same estate was already pending. On the other hand, respondent alleged

that petitioner was not considered an interested person qualified to file a petition for the issuance

of letters of administration of the estate of Orlando. In support of her contention, respondentalleged that a criminal case for bigamy was filed against petitioner.the RTC had acquitted

petitioner of bigamy. The trial court ruled that since the deceased was a divorced American

citizen, and since that divorce was not recognized under Philippine jurisdiction, the marriagebetween him and petitioner was not valid. the RTC of Burgos, Pangasinan dismissed the Petition

for the issuance of letters of administration filed by petitioner and granted that of privaterespondent. Contrary to its findings in Crim. Case No. 2699-A, the RTC held that the marriage

between petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was valid and subsisting when she married Orlando.Without expounding, it reasoned further that her acquittal in the previous bigamy case was fatal

to her cause. Thus, the trial court held that petitioner was not an interested party who may file a

petition for the issuance of letters of administration.On appeal, the Court of appeals upheld theruling of the RTC.

Issue:

Whether or not the second marriage the decedent contracted was valid because of the divorce

which the latter acquired.

Ruling:

NO. The Supreme Court had already ruled that under the principles of comity, our jurisdictionrecognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality. This doctrine was

established as early as 1985 in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. wherein the SC said: It is true that

owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine


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nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary

to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which

may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. Inthis case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the

standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.

Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven as the Supreme Court has enunciated in

Garcia v. Recio, to wit: Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, thedocument must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven

by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The

decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreigncountry.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner VS. YOLANDA CADACIO GRANADA,

Respondent.

G. R. No. 187512, June 13, 2012

Facts:

In May 1991, respondent Yolanda Cadacio Granada (Yolanda) met Cyrus Granada (Cyrus)got

married. Their marriage resulted in the birth of their son, Cyborg Dean Cadacio Granada.

Sometime in May 1994, Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment. Yolanda claimed that fromthat time, she had not received any communication from her husband, notwithstanding efforts to

locate him.

After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptivelydead. the RTC subsequently rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as presumptively dead.the

Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this Decision. Petitioner arguedthat Yolanda had failed to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus failed to prove her well-founded belief that he was already dead. However, in an Order datedmthe RTC denied the

motion.

Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to elevate the case to the CA, presumably under Rule 41,

Section 2(a) of the Rules of Court. Yolanda filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the CA

had no jurisdiction over the appeal. She argued that her Petition for Declaration of PresumptiveDeath, based on Article 41 of the Family Code, was a summary judicial proceeding,

in which the judgment is immediately final and executory and, thus, not appealable. On appeal

the court upheld the decision of the RTC.

Issue:

Whether the CA seriously erred in dismissing the Petition on the ground that the Decision of theRTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is immediately final and

executory upon notice to the parties and, hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal

Ruling:


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NO. Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary proceeding for the declarationof presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in

rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to

lack of jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA, the aggrieved party may elevate the matter tothis Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Evidently then, the CA did not commit any error in dismissing the Republics Notice of Appealon the ground that the RTC judgment on the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of

respondents spouse was immediately final and executory and, hence, not subject to ordinary

appeal.

BRIGIDO B. QUIAO, Petitioner, vs.RITA C. QUIAO, KITCHIE C. QUIAO, LOTIS C.

QUIAO, PETCHIE C. QUIAO, represented by their mother RITA QUIAO, Respondents.

G.R. No 176556 , July 4, 2012

Facts:

Respondent Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against herein petitioner

Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido).3 Subsequently, the RTC rendered a Decision declar.ing respondentlegally separated from the petitioner. Thereafter the court ordered a writ of execution on the

properties of the parties. Petitioner questioned the execution since their properties will be

forfeited to their children. The court denied the motion. Not satisfied with the judgement

petitioner filed a motion to reconsider which was subsequently denied. The petitioner then filed apetition to clarify what law would apply to their properties

Issue:

Whether or not the family code applies to marriage solemnized in 1977 and whether It can be

given a retroactive effect as to the profits already earned.

Ruling:

First, let us determine what governs the couple's property relation. From the record, we can

deduce that the petitioner and the respondent tied the marital knot on January 6, 1977. Since at

the time of the exchange of marital vows, the operative law was the Civil Code of the Philippines(R.A. No. 386) and since they did not agree on a marriage settlement, the property relations

between the petitioner and the respondent is the system of relative community or conjugal

partnership of gains.

Thus, from the foregoing facts and law, it is clear that what governs the property relations of thepetitioner and of the respondent is conjugal partnership of gains. And under this property

relation, "the husband and the wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property
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and the income from their work or industry." The husband and wife also own in common all the

property of the conjugal partnership of gains.

Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and the respondent's marriage theoperative law is already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable

law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned isArticle 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. The latter

provision is applicable because according to Article 256 of the Family Code "[t]his Code shallhave retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in

accordance with the Civil Code or other law."

MAKATI SHANGRI-LA HOTEL AND RESORT, INC., Petitioner, vs. ELLEN

JOHANNE HARPER, JONATHAN CHRISTOPHER HARPER, and RIGOBERTO

GILLERA, Respondents.

G.R. No. 189998, August 29, 2012

Facts:

Christian Harper came to Manila on a business trip, He checked in at the Shangri-La Hotel and

was billeted at Room 1428. He was due to check out on November 6, 1999. In the early morningof that date, however, he was murdered inside his hotel room by still unidentified malefactors.

Upon notice of his death his wife Respondents Ellen Johanne Harper and Jonathan Christopher

Harper the widow and son of Christian Harper contacted Rigoberto Gillera their authorizedrepresentative in the Philippines. They filed a suit against the petitioner on the ground that the

murderer succeeded to trespass into the area of the hotels private rooms area and into the room

of the said deceased on account of the hotels gross negligence in providing the most basic

security system of its guests, the lack of which owing to the acts or omissions of its employeeswas the immediate cause of the tragic death of said deceased. On trial, the court granted the

petition and awarded damages. Petitioner Makati Shangrila Hotel opposed the decision on the

ground that there is no competent evidence to support that the respondents were the heirs of thedeceased.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondents presented sufficient evidence to prove that they are the heirs of

the deceased.

Ruling:

Yes. Under Art. 172 of the Family Code, the filiation of legitimate children shall be proved byany other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, in the absence of a record of

birth or a parents admission of such legitimate filiation in a public or private document duly

signed by the parent. Such other proof of ones filiation may be a baptismal certificate, a judicialadmission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his


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pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses and other kinds of proof admissible

under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. By analogy, this method of proving filiation may also be

utilized in the instant case.

In this case has respondents presented several documents, like the birth certificates of Harper and

respondent Jonathan Harper, the marriage certificate of Harper and Ellen Johanne Harper, andthe probate court certificate, all of which were presumably regarded as public documents under

the laws of Norway. Such documentary evidence sufficed to competently establish therelationship and filiation under the standards of our Rules of Court.

CHARLES GOTARDO, Petitioner, vs. DIVINA BULING, Respondent.

G.R. No. 165166, August 15, 2012

Facts:

Respondent met Petitioner on December 1, 1992 at the Philippine Commercial and IndustrialBank where she had been hired as a casual employee, while the petitioner worked as accounting

supervisor.The petitioner started courting the respondent and later became sweethearts.

Sometime in September 1993, the petitioner started intimate sexual relations with the respondent

in the formers rented room. The sexual encounters occurred twice a month and became morefrequent in June 1994; eventually, on August 8, 1994, the respondent found out that she was

pregnant. When told of the pregnancy, the petitioner was happy and made plans to marry the

respondent. However the petitioner backed out of the wedding plans. The respondent then filed acomplaint for breach of promise to marry. Later, however, the petitioner and the respondent

amicably settled the case. The respondent gave birth to their son Gliffze on March 9, 1995.When

the petitioner did not show up and failed to provide support to Gliffze, the respondent sent him a

letter on July 24, 1995 demanding recognition of and support for their child. When the petitionerdid not answer the demand, the respondent filed her complaint for compulsory recognition and

support pendente lite. The court granted the provisional remedy but dismissed the case forinsufficiency of evidence that the petitioner is the father of Gliffze. On appeal, the court of

appeals reversed the decision of the RTC.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error when it set aside the RTCs findings and

ordered the petitioner to recognize and provide legal support to his minor son Gliffze.

Ruling:

No. the court is correct. One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through therecord of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of filiation in a

public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the

open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate or illegitimate child, or any other

means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.32 We have held that such other proof ofone's filiation may be a "baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which [his]

name has been entered, common reputation respecting [his] pedigree, admission by silence, the
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[testimonies] of witnesses, and other kinds of proof [admissible] under Rule 130 of the Rules of

Court. In this case, the respondent established a prima facie case that the petitioner is the putative

father of Gliffze through testimony that she had been sexually involved only with one man, thepetitioner, at the time of her conception.38Rodulfo corroborated her testimony that the petitioner

and the respondent had intimate relationship

Arabelle Mendoza v. Republic of the Philippines and Dominic Mendoza,

G.R. No. 157649. November 12, 2012.

Facts:

Petitioner and Dominic met in 1989 after a month of courtship, they became intimate and theirintimacy ultimately led to her pregnancy with their daughter whom they named Allysa Bianca.

They got married on her eighth month of pregnancy. They merely relied on their parents for

support. After a few years both parties started working but on September 1994 the petitioner

discovered that the dominic was having an illicit relationship with his co-worker Zaida. Thisaffected their relationship to the point of having to sleep in different rooms of their house. In

November 1995, Dominic gave her a Daihatsu Charade car as a birthday present. Later on, heasked her to issue two blank checks that he claimed would be for the cars insurance coverage.

She soon found out, however, that the checks were not paid for the cars insurance coverage but

for his personal needs. Worse, she also found out that he did not pay for the car itself, forcing herto rely on her father-in-law to pay part of the cost of the car, leaving her to bear the balance of

P120,000.00. To make matters worse, Dominic was fired from his employment after he ran away

with P164,000.00 belonging to his employer, for which he was arrested and incarcerated. After

petitioner and her mother bailed him out of jail, petitioner discovered that he had also swindledmany clients some of whom were even threatening petitioner, her mother and her sister

themselves. On October 15, 1997, Dominic abandoned the conjugal abode because petitioner

asked him for time and space to think things over. A month later, she refused his attempt atreconciliation, causing him to threaten to commit suicide. At that, she and her family

immediately left the house to live in another place concealed from him.

On August 5, 1998, petitioner filed in the RTC her petition for the declaration of the nullity ofher marriage with Dominic based on his psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family

Code. The Office of the Solicitor General opposed the petition. RTC ruled in favor of the

petitioner. CA reversed the decision

Issue:

Whether or not dominic is psychologically incapacitated.

Ruling:

NO. The court ruled that It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically

incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to

perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor an adverse integral

element in the respondents personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from
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complying with his essential marital obligations must be shown. The pronouncements in

Santos and Molina have remained as the precedential guides in deciding cases grounded on the

psychological incapacity of a spouse. But the Court has declared the existence or absence of thepsychological incapacity based strictly on the facts of each case and not on a priori assumptions,

predilections or generalizations. Indeed, the incapacity should be established by the totality of

evidence presented during trial, making it incumbent upon the petitioner to sufficiently prove theexistence of the psychological incapacity. To entitle petitioner spouse to a declaration of the

nullity of his or her marriage, the totality of the evidence must sufficiently prove that respondent

spouses psychological incapacity was grave, incurable and existing prior to the time of themarriage.

Even if the expert opinions of psychologists are not conditions sine qua non in the

granting of petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, the actual medical examination was tobe dispensed with only if the totality of evidence presented was enough to support a finding of

his psychological incapacity. This did not mean that the presentation of any form of medical or

psychological evidence to show the psychological incapacity would have automatically ensured

the granting of petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. What was essential, we shouldemphasize herein, was the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the partys

psychological condition. But where, like here, the parties had full opportunity to present theprofessional and expert opinions of psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability

of the alleged psychological incapacity, then the opinions should be represented and be weighed

by the trial courts in order to determine and decide whether or not to declare the nullity of themarriages. It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all other cases they try, must always base

their judgments not solely on the expert opinions presented by the parties but on the totality of

evidence adduced in the course of their proceedings.

Republic v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo de Quintos jr.

G.R. No. 159594. November 12, 2012.

Facts:

Eduardo and Catalina were married on March 16, 1977 in civil rites solemnized by the Municipal

Mayor of Lingayen, Pangasinan. The couple was not blessed with a child due to Catalinas

hysterectomy following her second miscarriage. On April 6, 1998, Eduardo filed a petition for

the declaration of nullity of their marriage,citing Catalinas psychological incapacity to comply

with her essential marital obligations and cohabitating with another man abandoning him and

their adopted child. Catalina did not oppose but submitted an answer. The regional trial court

granted the petition of Eduardo. Upon appeal of the OSG the CA reversed the decision of the

lower court.

Issue:

1. Whether or not Catalina is psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital

obligation

2. Whether or not Abandonment constitute psychological incapacity.


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Ruling:

1. No. Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an

incapacity or inability totake cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and

is not merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligationsor ill will. It consists of: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of

marriage; (b) the inability must refer to the essential obligations of marriage, that is, the

conjugal act,the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, and the

procreation and education of offspring; and ( c ) the inability must be tantamount to a

psychological abnormality. Proving that a spouse failed to meet his or her responsibility

and duty as a married person is not enough; it is essential that he or she must be shown to

be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness.

2. No. Abandonment was not one of the grounds for the nullity of marriage under the

Family Code. It did not also constitute psychological incapacity, it being instead a groundfor legal separation under Article 55(10) of the Family Code.

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