Personal Goals, Rationality Perspectives, and the Awareness of Life’s Finitude J. Barndtstadter,...

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Final Decentrations Personal Goals, Rationality Perspectives, and the Awareness of Life’s Finitude J. Barndtstadter, K. Rothermund, D. Kranz, W. Kühn

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Page 1: Personal Goals, Rationality Perspectives, and the Awareness of Life’s Finitude J. Barndtstadter, K. Rothermund, D. Kranz, W. Kühn.

Final DecentrationsPersonal Goals, Rationality Perspectives, and the Awareness of Life’s Finitude

J. Barndtstadter, K. Rothermund, D. Kranz, W. Kühn

Page 2: Personal Goals, Rationality Perspectives, and the Awareness of Life’s Finitude J. Barndtstadter, K. Rothermund, D. Kranz, W. Kühn.

Introduction • Personal goals extend into the future lend meaning

and structure to life. • With the fading of time yet-to-be-lived and the

closing of action paths that relate the present self to a projected future self, future-oriented goals and activities tend to lose their motivating potential.

• The loss of ‘‘future meaning’’ (Reker, et al., 1987) can breed feelings of alienation and depression.

• The terminal phases of life, older people do not differ dramatically from younger groups in life satisfaction, self-esteem, perceived control, and related indicators of subjective life quality (Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999; Rothermund &

Brandtsta¨dter, 2003).

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• The flexibility of the aging self basically hinges on the interplay of two adaptive processes:

(a) on assimilative activities that aim at shaping one’s life and personal development according to personal goals (later life, efforts to prevent or compensate functional deficits)

(b) on accommodative processes by which ambitions and goals are adjusted to situational constraints and changes in action resources (in later life, accommodative processes are driven by losses in various areas of life and functioning, and by the age-inherent shrinking of residual lifetime).

The two adaptive modes are antagonistically related, but can complement each other in concrete episodes of coping; the balance tips toward the accommodative side when active-assimilative efforts turn out as ineffective, or when goals drift off the feasible range.

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Present Study • The present study involves a sequence of studies that

combine correlational and experimental approaches; inter-individual differences in extrinsic-instrumental and intrinsic-valuerational orientations are assessed with different methods

(a self-report questionnaire and an implicit attitude measure). • First, different age groups are compared with respect to

extrinsic-instrumental and intrinsic-valuerational orientations (Study 1) to explore possible mediating mechanisms, then examine to what degree the postulated changes can be experimentally produced by inducing a cognitive focus on death (Study 2).

• Two final experiments serve to replicate and expand the findings, with a particular focus on the moderating role of accommodative flexibility and on implicit evaluative processes (Studies 3 and 4).

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• This research was guided by the following hypotheses that are derived from the dual-process model:

• (1) Increasing age is expected to be associated with a reduction in extrinsic-instrumental goals and with an increase in intrinsic-valuerational orientations.

• (2) This pattern of findings is also expected to emerge for younger people if the finitude of one’s personal life is made salient.

• (3) Accommodative flexibility is assumed to facilitate the proposed age-related and mortality-related changes in value orientations.

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Study 1: Age Related Differences in Extrinsic-Instrumental and Intrinsic-Valuerational Orientations

Method359 participants (168 women, 191 men) from urban area in Southwestern Germany ages between 35-84 years old and they were randomly selected. Occupational status, income level, and education was represented of the general population.In cross-sectional comparison they divided in 5 age cohorts (1: 35-44 N=83, 2: 45-54 N=71, 3: 55-64 N=70, 4: 65-74 N=83, 5: 75-84 N=52) and gender was equal.

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Study 1• Procedure Questionnaire was designed for this study in differences in goal perspectivesThe instrument addresseda) extrinsic-instrumental strivings related to achievement, competence, and powerb) intrinsic-valuerational orientations related to authenticity, intimacy, sprituality, and altruism. Personal importance of each item was rated on a Likert-type scale ranging 0-6 (unimportant-extremely important)

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Study 1 Results • Age effects for the two scales,• Extrinsic-instrumental strivings lose importance over the

age range studied, whereas increasing emphasis is placed on intrinsic-valuerational orientations.

• In a 2 (Value Domains) x 5 (Age Groups) ANOVA, a significant interaction emerged, p < .001, indicating that age gradients differ for intrinsic-valuerational and extrinsic-instrumental strivings.

• Significant interaction, separate ANOVAs with Age Groups as factor were conducted for the two scales, a highly significant age effect was found for extrinsic-instrumental strivings, p < .001, indicating an age-related decline. For intrinsic-valuerational orientations, a significant age effect revealed an age-related increase, p < .001.

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Study 1 Discussion• Growing tendency with age to shift from extrinsic-

instrumental goals to a more intrinsic, ego-transcending orientation.

• These cross-sectional findings, leave unanswered the question as to the mechanisms that underlie the observed patterns:

The age variable is known to confound age and cohort effects, and more important in the present context – it also confound the amounts of time lived with the amount of time-yet-to-be-lived.

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Study 2: The ‘‘Memento Effect’’

• Explores whether response tendencies in the questionnaire on value orientations are affected when thoughts about death and dying are made more salient.

Method• 371 participants aged 35–84 years (179 women,

192 men). • Subjects were grouped into 5 age cohorts same as

Study 1. • Gender was balanced within cohorts, (no

participant of Study 2 participated in Study 1).

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Study 2• Procedure• Participants completed the goal orientations questionnaire. • Internal consistencies and inter-correlations of the 7-item scales

were similar to Study 1.• Concerns about death and dying (Questions about Death and Dying,

QDD). • The 17 questions concerned (1) how one would deal with a serious

illness; (2) personal preferences of how one would like to die; (3) fears with respect to the end of life; (4) subjective meanings of death and dying.

• This instrument served to induce a ‘‘memento effect’’ in the sense given, the question was whether it would produce shifts in reported goal orientations comparable to the pattern observed in Study 1.

• In the experimental group (N = 189), the QDD was introduced prior to the scales on goal orientations, whereas the sequence was reversed in the control condition (N = 182). The effectiveness of this procedure was checked in a pilot study.

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Study 2 Results • Effects of age and death saliency on intrinsic-valuerational and

extrinsic-instrumental strivings were assessed with a 5(Age Groups) x 2 (Value Domains) x 2 (Death Saliency) ANOVA.

• The Age Groups x Value Domains interaction was again highly significant, p < .001.

• The expected Death Saliency x Value Domains interaction was also significant, p < .05.

• Neither the Age Groups x Death Saliency interaction nor the three-way interaction reached significance ps > .08.

• Replicating the findings of Study 1, opposite age effects were found for intrinsic-valuerational orientations, p < .001; linear increase: p < .001, and extrinsic-instrumental strivings, p < .10; linear decrease: p < .01.

• The main effect of death saliency was significant for extrinsic-instrumental strivings, p < .01; the personal importance of these strivings is deemphasized by participants who in advance had answered the QDD.

• Intrinsic-valuerational orientations were not significantly affected by the death saliency manipulation.

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Study 2 Discussion• The finding of an age-related shift from extrinsic-instrumental to

intrinsic-valuerational orientations was replicated in Study 2. • The findings lend further support to contention that

individualistic-extrinsic strivings are dampened when people see their future as limited in time; the experimental effects of the death saliency manipulation in part reproduce the age effects that were found in Studies 1 and 2.

• Consistent with an accommodation-theoretical account, Study 2 revealed that an experimentally induced narrowing of future perspective first of all induces a tendency to downscale instrumental, future-related goals. As the present data suggest, this effect may not automatically and simultaneously entail a stronger emphasis on intrinsic or egotranscending goals.

• From a developmental point of view, it remains nonetheless plausible that the decentering from individualistic strivings is a necessary precondition that can pave the way toward more intrinsic, value-based orientations.

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Cont.

• A focus on culturally shared values appears to include – at least to some extent – a shift away from individualistic to more community-oriented goals.

• Accommodation theory to the contrary predicts a downgrading of instrumental, achievement-oriented values under conditions of fading action resources and life-time reserves. Under such conditions – whether accompanied by anxiety or not – it may become increasingly questionable whether one will experience or be able to enjoy possible future benefits.

• Time-related concerns should contribute to deemphasizing personal benefits in the person’s selection of goals, and accordingly enhance a disengagement from extrinsic-instrumental orientations.

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Study 3: Imagining the Last Day: Accomodative Flexibility and Shifts in Goal Orientation

• Taken together, the results from Studies 1 and 2 support the assumption that an increased sensitivity to life’s finitude enhances a shift from extrinsic-instrumental to intrinsic-valuerational perspectives.

• Attempts to replicate findings using a different mortality-salience induction. The shift in goal orientations reflects an accommodative process as described in the introductory section, a further aim was to investigate whether the mentioned effects are moderated by differences in accommodative flexibility.

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Study 3 Method• Sample50 undergraduate students (32 female; average age 22.9 years) from the University of Trier participated for partial course credit.• Procedure Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: -In the experimental group, participants were asked to imagine their final day of life and to write down in an open format how they would like to spend that day. -The control group received a different type of aversive scenario that used dental pain as a control topic. After working for 5 min on the scenario tasks, participants completed the scale of accommodative flexibility (FGA; Brandtstadter & Renner, 1990). The 15 items refer to the readiness to flexibly adjust ambitions and goals to given opportunities. Items were rated on a 2 (strongly disagree) to +2 (strongly agree) scale.

Finally, the scales to assess extrinsic-instrumental and intrinsic-valuerational orientations were administered. Internal consistencies and correlations were comparable to the previous studies (p = .05).

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Study 3 Results • Measure created for the postulated shift in

orientations, were computed the difference between the scale values for extrinsic-instrumental and intrinsic-valuerational orientations.

• This aggregated measure was regressed on a group variable coding experimental condition (1 = mortality salience, 0 = control) on FGA, and in a second step on the interaction term for Experimental Condition x FGA.

• Shift in priorities emerges quite clear-cut: Reflecting about the terminal phase of one’s life enhances a predominance of intrinsic-valuerational strivings over extrinsic-instrumental ones ( p < .01).

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Study 3 Results Cont.

• This effect was qualified by accommodative flexibility: It was more pronounced for participants scoring high on FGA (p < .01 for the interaction).

• In accordance with the results of Study 2, the mortality induction primarily affected extrinsic-instrumental strivings: Importance ratings for this domain were lower in the experimental group than in the control condition (p = .08); this effect was amplified by accommodative flexibility (p = .05).

• Intrinsic-valuerational strivings, by contrast, appeared to be only slightly affected in the experimental group (p < .10); again, this effect tended to be moderated by accommodative flexibility (p < .10).

• Across all seven subscales, effects were in the predicted direction.

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Study 3 Discussion• Study 3 replicated the pattern of differential effects

of death salience on value orientations with a different mortality salience manipulation and in a younger sample.

• Imagining the last day of one’s life led to a decrease in extrinsic-instrumental orientations, whereas intrinsic-valuerational strivings slightly increased.

• Mortality-induced shift in priorities was stronger for participants scoring high on accommodative flexibility.

• This finding supports reserachers’ claim, the observed change in goal orientations should be explained by processes of an accommodative disengagement from goals that no longer provide sense and meaning.

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Study 4: Automatic Preferences for Valuerational Over Instrumental Orientations

• As the observations of Studies 2 and 3 suggest, emphasizing self-transcending aspects of authenticity, altruism, and spirituality in the face of limited lifetime resources seems to be only a second response that depends on accommodative dispositions and tendencies.

• Accommodative processes cannot be fully understood as the result of rational deliberation. Disengaging from blocked goals and adopting new meaning perspectives should depend on automatic cognitive-affective mechanisms that set the stage for processes of adjustment and reorientation.

• Experiences of helplessness or loss of control prepare the cognitive system for accommodation by neutralizing an attentional focus on goals and commitments that are no longer relevant, or by enhancing the accessibility of cognitions that support benefit finding and positive reappraisal.

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• Study 4 centered on the assumption that the devaluation of instrumental orientations and a related shift toward self-transcending values is a spontaneous process that is independent of intentional decisions and conscious reflection.

• Following a mortality salience manipulation, the Implicit Association Test used (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz,

1998) to assess shifts in automatic personal evaluations of the categories ‘‘value’’ and ‘‘success.’’

• The IAT is a response time measure that was specifically designed to assess spontaneous evaluations that cannot easily be influenced by controlled processes and strategies.

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• Researchers hypothesized that increasing the salience of cognitions related to death and dying would lead to a spontaneous devaluation of concepts related to personal success and to a related preference for value concepts that transcend the personal horizon.

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Study 4 Method• Sample • 86 undergraduates (69 female; average age 21.3 years)

from the University of Trier participated for partial course credit.

• Procedure • Experiments were conducted in individual sessions that

lasted 20 min. • Prior to the IAT procedure, participants completed the

scale of accommodative flexibility. • In the mortality salience condition, participants in addition

completed the QDD. • Participants were asked to work on a computer task that

was apperantly unrelated to the questionnaires. • The computer task was a personalized version of an IAT

with the target categories ‘‘success’’ and ‘‘value,’’ and the attribute categories ‘‘I like’’ and ‘‘I don’t like.’’

Page 24: Personal Goals, Rationality Perspectives, and the Awareness of Life’s Finitude J. Barndtstadter, K. Rothermund, D. Kranz, W. Kühn.

• Ten different adjectives were chosen to represent each of the target categories (success: motivated, efficient, successful, famous, persistent, etc.; value: honest, generous, just, idealistic, etc.).

• 8 nouns of positive and negative valence were selected to represent the target categories ‘‘I like’’ (e.g., security, nature) and ‘‘I don’t like’’ (e.g., conflict, noise), respectively.

• Avoided using attribute stimuli with extremely positive or negative valence, and participants were instructed that there were no right or wrong categorizations with regard to the ‘‘I like’’ versus ‘‘I don’t like’’ dichotomy, and that were only interested in their personal evaluations. Therefore, no error feedback was given after categorizations of attribute stimuli (Olson & Fazio, 2004).

Page 25: Personal Goals, Rationality Perspectives, and the Awareness of Life’s Finitude J. Barndtstadter, K. Rothermund, D. Kranz, W. Kühn.

• IAT effects were computed as the difference in mean response latencies between the two combined blocks (I like/success vs. I don’t like/value minus I like/value vs. I don’t like/success).

• Positive values on the IAT effect score reflect faster responses for assignments of ‘‘I like’’/‘‘value’’ and ‘‘I don’t like’’/‘‘success’’ to the same response, compared to the opposite response assignment.

• Put differently, positive values are supposed to indicate an automatic preference for intrinsic-valuerational strivings.

• Response times for attributes did not enter into the computation of effect scores because assignment of attribute stimuli to categories was not fixed due to the personalized variant of the task.

Page 26: Personal Goals, Rationality Perspectives, and the Awareness of Life’s Finitude J. Barndtstadter, K. Rothermund, D. Kranz, W. Kühn.

Study 4 Results • Response latencies were 103 ms faster for response

assignments in which the categories ‘‘value’’ and ‘‘I like’’ were assigned to the same response key (M = 742 ms) than for the reversed assignment (M = 846 ms), p < .001.

• This finding indicates that automatic personal evaluations of the category ‘‘value’’ were generally more positive than for the category ‘‘success.’’

• The main effect for experimental condition was significant, p < .05, indicating that automatic preference for value over success was more pronounced after mortality salience (M = 121 ms) than in the control group (M = 86 ms).

• The mortality salience manipulation led to a large increase in relative preference for ‘‘value’’ among participants scoring high in FGA, but no such increase was found for participants with low FGA scores.

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Study 4 Discussion• The present results suggest that an increased

awareness of life’s finitude enhances an intrinsic, value-based evaluative focus; it is particular theoretical interest that this accommodative effect surfaces already on an automatic cognitive affective level which does not involve rational deliberations or explicit reflections about death and dying.

• In the previous study, the effect of mortality induction on evaluative focus was moderated by accommodative flexibility.

• This conforms to general proposition that accommodative dispositions enhance the disengagement from instrumental strivings and the reorientation toward intrinsic, self-transcending goals under fading life-time reserves.

Page 28: Personal Goals, Rationality Perspectives, and the Awareness of Life’s Finitude J. Barndtstadter, K. Rothermund, D. Kranz, W. Kühn.

General Discussion• Hypothesized, the fading of life-time reserves and a

growing awareness of life’s finitude should deeply affect personal perspectives of meaning and rationality:

• Individualistic-instrumental goals aiming at future gains should be deemphasized as sources of meaning; this in turn should enhance a reorientation toward self-transcendent strivings that do not essentially presuppose expected utilities which could be experienced by a future self.

• Disengagement from blocked goals and reorientation toward new goals are an important resource of coping with losses; we have argued that the above-mentioned shift in meaning perspectives is basically rooted in accommodative processes (Brandtsta¨dter & Rothermund, 2002b; Carver & Scheier, 2003).

Page 29: Personal Goals, Rationality Perspectives, and the Awareness of Life’s Finitude J. Barndtstadter, K. Rothermund, D. Kranz, W. Kühn.

• The present findings lend support to this assumption. • Cross-sectional comparisons in the age range from 35

to 84 years (Studies 1 and 2) suggest that personal importance of extrinsic strivings related to power, achievement, and competence decreases with advancing age, whereas an opposed trend emerges for valuerational or intrinsic orientations of authenticity, altruism, and spirituality.

• Similar changes in goals or existential attitudes occur when life’s finitude is made salient by experimental procedures.

• Using an implicit measure of value preferences, Study 4 highlights that the hypothesized change in evaluative orientations already occurs at an automatic, preconscious level.

Page 30: Personal Goals, Rationality Perspectives, and the Awareness of Life’s Finitude J. Barndtstadter, K. Rothermund, D. Kranz, W. Kühn.

• These shifts in preferences basically reflect an accommodative process by which goals or preferences are adjusted to changes in action resources, and in particular to perceived losses in residual lifetime.

• Consistent with this assumption, the shift from extrinsicinstrumental to intrinsic-valuerational goals (the ‘‘Memento effect’’) was found to be more pronounced among participants scoring high in a measure of accommodative flexibility (Studies 3 and 4).

Page 31: Personal Goals, Rationality Perspectives, and the Awareness of Life’s Finitude J. Barndtstadter, K. Rothermund, D. Kranz, W. Kühn.

Limitations and Open Questions • Dampening effects of mortality salience

manipulations on extrinsic, instrumental strivings were more pronounced than enhancing effects on intrinsic, valuerational orientations – which especially holds for the experimental Studies 2 and 3.

• Considering the highly normative character of the valuerational scale and the participants’ readiness to endorse the corresponding items, it might also be doubted whether this measure is sensitive enough to assess subtle changes in existential attitudes.

Page 32: Personal Goals, Rationality Perspectives, and the Awareness of Life’s Finitude J. Barndtstadter, K. Rothermund, D. Kranz, W. Kühn.

Conclusion • The recognition of limitations – and in particular the

experience of narrowing life-time reserves – seems to activate accommodative processes that lead to a downgrading of egocentric-individualistic concerns:

• When self-projections into a distant future become questionable, expected future utilities lose weight in the person’s regulation of action.

• Decentering from instrumental goals that aim at future personal benefits appears to be a developmental precondition for an increased orientation toward self-transcending and ‘‘timeless’’ values, although it may not automatically and instantaneously bring about such a more radical shift.

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• Similar to the overcoming of an egocentric epistemological perspective that has been described as a process of decentration by Piaget, one could perhaps consider the shift in existential orientations described above as a kind of final decentration:

• The experience of life’s limitations and finitude seems to enhance disengagement from individualistic concerns and an orientation toward ‘‘timeless’’ values that transcend the limits of personal lifetime.

• According to Kohlberg (1979) such a final decentration – or, as he put it, the attainment of a ‘‘cosmic perspective’’ – constitutes an ultimate horizon of morality from which universal ethical principles originate.

Page 34: Personal Goals, Rationality Perspectives, and the Awareness of Life’s Finitude J. Barndtstadter, K. Rothermund, D. Kranz, W. Kühn.

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