RECONSTRUCTING DECISION-MAKING

FROM THE BOTTOM-UP

Junior military commanders’ thinking for human insecurity

challenges

by

Clare O’Neill

Abbreviations and Acronyms___________________________________________________________

ACMC Australian Civil-Military Centre

ACSC Australian Command and Staff College

ADDP Australian Defence Doctrine Publication

ASDA Act, Sense, Decide, Adapt

AusAID Australian Agency for International Development

CMAP Combat Military Appreciation Process

COA Course of Action

COIN Counterinsurgency

D&E Decision and Execuation

DSF District Stability Framework

DJFHQ Deployable Joint Force Headquarters

FOB Forward Operating Base

GoIRA Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

IED Improvised Explosive Device

IMAP Individual Military Appreciation Process

IPMB Intelligence Preparation and Monitoring of the Battlespace

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

JLC Junior Leaders Course

JMAP Joint Military Appreciation Process

JOPP Joint Operational Planning Process

LWC Land Warfare Centre

LWD Land Warfare Doctrine

MA Mission Analysis

MAP Military Appreciation Process

MDMP Military Decision Making Process

MOE Measures of Effectiveness

MRTF Mentoring and Reconstruction Task Force

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NGO Non-governmental Organisation

OGA Other Government Agency

ORBAT Order of Battle

PMS Project Management System

PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team

QIP Quick Impact Project

RMC-D Royal Military College - Duntroon

RTF Reconstruction Task Force

SMAP Staff Military Appreciation Process

SMEAC Situation, Mission, Execution, Administration and Logistics, Command and Signals

TCAF Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework

TCAPF Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework

TF-U Task Force Uruzgan

TTPs Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

UN United Nations

WFP World Food Programme

Table of Contents___________________________________________________________

Certificate of AuthorshipAbstractAcknowledgementsTable of ContentsAbbreviations and Acronyms

Chapter 1. Introduction 1Flicking the Switch 1

Context 5Conflict 6Role of the Junior Commander 13Thinking Tools 16Research Gap 21

Structural Framework 24Research Problem 24Aim 24Constraints 25Opportunities 26Advantages 27Scope 27Terminology 29Research Design 30Chapter Structure 32

Switch Flicked 34

Chapter 2. Personal Reflection: Reconstruction Task Force 35Pre-deployment 36

Uruzgan Province 36Decision-Making and Adaptive Action 37Reconstruction Framework 40

Deployment 42First Impressions – Reconstruction Task Force 1 42First project – Tarin Kowt Hospital 43Decision-Making and Adaptive Action 46Assessment 48Handover to Reconstruction Task Force 2 52Reconstruction Task Force 4: March – October 2008 53Failures and the final weeks 56

Concluding Thoughts 58

Part I: Model Requirements

Chapter 3. Theoretical AnalysisChapter 4. Model RequirementsChapter 5. Case Study

Part II: Model Development

Chapter 6. Model DevelopmentChapter 7. Model RefinementChapter 8 Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations

BibliographyAppendicesAppendix 1A: Spectrum of Conflict, Operational Posture and Tactical ActionAppendix 1B: Rank Structure of Australian ArmyAppendix 1C: Military Appreciation Process Appendix 1D: Individual Appreciation ProcessAppendix 1E: Combat Appreciation ProcessAppendix 1F: Adaptation Cycle

Appendix 2A: Map of Uruzgan ProvinceAppendix 2B: Order of Battle of Reconstruction Task Force 4Appendix 2C: Imagery from Uruzgan Province

CHAPTER 1___________________________________________________________

‘In preparing for battle, I have always found that plans are useless but planning is

indispensable.’ Dwight D. Eisenhower1

FLICKING THE SWITCH

In April of 2008 I was standing on piquet2 in a gun tower of the Forward Operating Base

(FOB) in Uruzgan Province, Afghanistan. Everyone was called upon for piquet duty

regardless of rank. It was my first week back in Afghanistan since my initial deployment in

2006. My week up until this point had been a whirlwind of handover meetings and

operational briefings within the confines of the FOB. The nature of piquet is to stand

vigilantly on guard; however, this time of compulsory stillness also provided an opportunity

to take stock and think.

The gun tower overlooked Tarin Kowt, the provincial capital of 6,000 people. As day turned

into dusk I saw the lights switch on in Tarin Kowt. It was not just pockets of light;

everywhere lit up. Light also streamed from jingle truck3 headlights as they travelled along

the main supply route from Kandahar. I looked at the person standing beside me wondering

who would say something first about this visual delight. The silence was broken by “what a

hell-hole”, as my piquet partner waved in the direction of Tarin Kowt. Not quite the words I

was thinking.

The matter of lights absorbed my thoughts. Night piquets at the FOB were in complete

darkness during my previous deployment in 2006. Inside the FOB the base had been blacked

out due to the rocket threat. Lights had to be turned off before someone left a tent so that

fragments of light would not escape. Soldiers dreaded the waning moon as the likelihood of

embarrassing trips in the dark increased even with the assistance of night vision equipment.

Outside the FOB, there had been no lights in Tarin Kowt. The local population had limited

generators; regardless they had no money for fuel. Trace rounds and illumination being fired

in support of troops-in-contact would occasionally break the darkness. The local people were 1 Attributed in Nixon, R.M., Six Crisis, Doubleday, New York, 1962.2 Piquet is traditionally posted at the forward position of a military defensive location in order to warn against an enemy advance. In Afghanistan, staggered piquets were posted in elevated gun towers on the perimeter of the FOB.3 Jingle trucks are decorated with bright colours and pendants that often dangle from the truck making a ‘jingle’ sound. They were commonly used in Uruzgan Province to transport logistic goods.

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in survival mode in 2006. They were not planning any tangible future for their families, as

they did not know if a future existed.

Fast forward to 2008 and as day turned into dusk on my first piquet, I saw the lights switch on

in Tarin Kowt and stream down the Kandahar Road. To me, Tarin Kowt was not the ‘hell-

hole’ that my piquet partner was seeing but a tiny glimmer of a future once imagined. Inside

the wire, the rocket attacks on the FOB were so irregular that force protection measures had

eased. Light radiated from open doors. Occupational health and safety measures to prevent

tripping in the dark now surpassed any requirement for camp black-out. I had felt uneasy

about the visible FOB lights since my return. It was difficult to turn off the feeling that the

FOB lights were denying me a force protection blanket I had grown accustomed to in 2006.

Nobody else seemed to see or sense the lights both inside and outside the FOB. I appeared to

be the only person giving lights a second thought after a switch was flicked or door left open.

I deployed to Uruzgan Province in 2006 with Australia’s 1st Reconstruction Task Force (RTF)

and was one of a handful of soldiers to return in 2008 with the fourth and final rotation of the

RTF. As a Project Engineer in both RTFs I worked with the community and provincial

government to incept and build local projects including health facilities, schools, bridges,

roads and security infrastructure. Although constrained by my own problem-framing biases

and military training, engaging with the local community on a daily basis gave me the ability

to sense the environment, situation and people. Looking back, my ignorance of the challenges

we faced and my inexperience in thinking for a counterinsurgency environment were acute.

For most members of RTF 4, 2008 was their first look and judgement of the province. The

lights I saw on piquet made me realise that my understanding of Tarin Kowt would be vastly

different to my peers who were seeing this microcosm for the first time. I was in a unique

position having seen firsthand the snapshot of Tarin Kowt before the reconstruction mission

commenced. The 2008 handover meetings proved vital as a download of information but it

was seeing the lights that made the changes real for me and adjusted factual updates to actual

comprehension.

I cannot say with absolute certainty why the light situation in Tarin Kowt had changed from

2006 to 2008. The lights were a physical entity; however, I wondered about the people behind

the light paradox. I knew the RTF had not set up power for the local population, neither had

the other coalition forces. There were no aid agencies or United Nations presence in the

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province. At the local level, the Provincial Director for Power was both corrupt and

incompetent. He had not implemented any projects. The people behind the lights were the

local people. They had bought small generators and then set up distribution systems for their

local neighbourhood. In a practical sense, I reasoned that the lights showed that the locals had

money to pay for the generators and ongoing fuel, and skills to set up and maintain the

system. From a conceptual view, the local population had a will to get things done, they were

progressing their town without external help and they believed that their investment was

worthwhile as they would be alive to use the lights into the future. This was a vast difference

from the nervous air of day-to-day survival I had witnessed in 2006. To me, the lights were a

stark indicator of change but I appeared to be the only member of our military team sensing

that the lights were on. The lights to my peers were normalcy not an indicator of change.

I was learning to think about ‘why’ given observed changes in dynamics. I thought about the

local population and wondered what had triggered their confidence in the future. I reasoned

that an insight into the drivers of stability could be gained if the first or second order triggers

could be deduced. Likewise, I was keen to sense any changes that had worsened the security

situation since my first deployment in order to gain a fuller understanding of the drivers of

conflict and instability. My time to observe the negative changes to stability would come in

due course.

My thinking raised questions. Could we ever understand the drivers of stability and instability

in a complex environment? Could this be achieved by observing changes over time? Was I

seeing the practical application of human security theory in real-life? Could our learning

about drivers offer opportunities to feed into our military planning to achieve our mission?

Was an observation about lights from a junior commander important for anyone else in my

chain-of-command or just a figment for my own curiosity? Had anyone else answered these

questions?

With so many questions and a mission to achieve, I grounded my thinking in doctrine and the

use of the Military Appreciation Process (MAP). Despite Australian history in Malaya and

peace support operations, doctrine was still lagging behind for the type of operating

environment we were confronted with. Only developing doctrine for counterinsurgency and

stability operations existed at the time. The MAP, taught during officer training at the Royal

Military College – Duntroon, provided a rational planning tool for enemy-focused kinetic

action; however, I found myself naturally adjusting the MAP for the lessons I was learning. I

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sensed that the MAP was a sound starting point for my thinking, planning and decision-

making but its warfighting focus was not enough for the environment and population-centric

mission I faced.

These unsettled thoughts from my time in Afghanistan initiated the rational for this thesis.

Reconstructing Decision-Making from the Bottom-Up is part theoretical analysis, historical

evaluation and model development. It is fundamentally about our people in the Army and

their requirement to think about people and act for people during conflict. The intended

audience is the military practitioner at the people-to-people interface, namely the junior

commander. The aim is to equip the junior commander with a thinking support model to

communicate, sense, act, decide and adapt to the human dimension of conflict. For practical

reasons, the model will remain within the baseline framework of the MAP and clarify the

myriad of resources and lessons learnt already available.

The central proposition of this thesis is that future junior commanders will face challenges

and opportunities for the human dimension during war, conflict, complex emergencies and

disaster relief operations. We need to better equip our junior leaders if they are to be able to

robustly ‘think’ within this context rather than arm them with retrospective solutions from

previous conflicts. Turning on lights, building roads, applying rule-of-law and principles of

clear-hold-build as advocated from other experiences in Afghanistan are not dogma. History,

lessons learnt, principles and doctrine will only help our junior commanders win their future

battles if they can be adopted or discarded after being considered, questioned and

contextualised. Effective thinking will help junior commanders mitigate problem-framing

bias, enable more of the problem to be seen, and offer opportunities for learning up and down

the chain-of-command.

The two parts of this thesis elaborate corollaries to this main proposition. Firstly, this chapter

provides the context and structural framework for the thesis. Part I then provides the

requirements for the thinking model through theoretical analysis of human security, junior

commanders’ role in complex environments and planning tools. Case studies from military

operations in Afghanistan are examined to determine thinking, planning and decision-making

lessons learnt. Part II then develops the model and builds consensus to bridge the divide

between theoretical niceties and practical realities for the future.

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This thesis is an attempt to arm future junior commanders with the necessary thinking tools

for human insecurity challenges. It does not pretend to provide the definitive model for junior

commander thinking. It is a conscious process of learning that when matched with a dynamic

environment has no end.

CONTEXT

Over the last decade there has been considerable debate over how to organise, equip and train

the Australian Army to meet current requirements and future operational challenges. This

debate was hastened by lessons learnt filtering back from Australia’s military commitments in

East Timor, Iraq and Afghanistan. Traditional approaches were challenged due to the

increased readiness requirements of personnel, complex nature of the contemporary

battlefield, and requirement to strengthen and speed the network of information. Major

changes included the publication of Army’s capstone document Adaptive Campaigning -

Future Land Operating Concept (AC-FLOC)4. At lower levels in the Army, lessons learnt

from operations drove Tactic, Technique and Procedure (TTP) changes, doctrine

modifications for land tactics and equipment improvements through short and long term

learning loops. Despite fiscal constraints, these changes demonstrate a healthy resolve to

continually evaluate current operations, implement organisational learning and prepare for the

challenges of future conflict.

Numerous and bold changes have been made within the Australian Army. However, the tool

designed to teach our junior commanders how to think, plan and decide, namely the Military

Appreciation Process (MAP)5, has remained largely unchanged through the modernisation

process. There is no point having a modernised networked Army if the thinking behind the

information being transmitted is sub-standard. It may be reasoned that the MAP has remained

fixed due to its robust application on current operations and flexibility for future conflict.

Research literature and complaints from commanders through lessons learnt data suggest that

the MAP provides a starting point for planning but has numerous deficiencies when used

during real-time conflict6. Unlike other TTP and doctrine revisions, the Army has not

concisely captured the problems or harnessed the mitigating strategies used on operations to

4 Major changes included the implementation of Adaptive Army, Brigade Rotation Model, expansion of Combat Training Centre Live, Plan Beersheba and publication of Australian Army, Adaptive Campaigning - Future Land Operating Concept, Canberra 2009.5 Australian Army, Land Warfare Doctrine 5-1-4 The Military Appreciation Process, Canberra, 2009. 6 Research literature and lessons learnt from the Centre for Army Lessons will be discussed in Chapter 4.

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resolve these deficiencies. Doctrinal changes have taken effect for operational level planning7

but not at the tactical level for junior commanders. This section will provide the broader

context for why junior commanders need an effective thinking tool for the human dimension

of conflict. It will do this through discussion of: conflict, the role of the junior commander in

conflict, thinking tools required to support this role, and conclude with the current research

gap.

CONFLICT

Future conflict

In the three decades after military operations ceased in Vietnam, the Australian Defence Force

has deployed land contingents around the globe to places including Afghanistan, Iraq, East

Timor, Solomon Islands, Namibia, Cambodia, Somalia, Rwanda, Bougainville and Sudan.

None of these deployments have been to fight a state peer or near-peer competitor. Disaster

relief contingents have deployed to Pakistan, Samoa, Indonesia and domestically in response

to devastation caused by fire, earthquakes, floods and tsunamis. This recent history shows

land forces being used in environments characterised by convergence8. Boundaries between

the battlespace and human environment, state and non-state actors, combatants and non-

combatants, military force and civilian agency responses, kinetic and non-kinetic actions, and

national and humanitarian objectives have all been blurred.

I will make three predictions about future conflict in order to theoretically underpin this

thesis. Firstly, it will be charactered by convergence. Secondly, each land force deployment

will have its own unique threat, strategic intent, tactical mission, and social, political,

economic and geographic context. Military commanders will not be forearmed with the

unique context and therefore will deploy without the primed solution. Lastly, people will be at

the forefront of the next war, conflict or complex emergency. People have featured in every

conflict throughout history - conflict is fundamentally a human activity. Conflict is created by

people and for people whether as individuals, collective groups or nations. People are both the

direct and indirect targets of any action; they are the perpetrators, victims, victors and losers.

In the end, only people resolve conflict.

7 This includes changes to Australian Defence Force, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 3.0 Campaigns and Operations, Canberra 2012 and Australian Defence Force, Australian Defence Force Publication 5.0.1 Joint Military Appreciation Process, Canberra, 2009. 8 See convergence discussion by Hoffman, F.G., ‘Hybrid Warfare and Challenges’, Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 52, 2009, http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/jfq-52/JFQ-52.pdf.

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Advocates that technological advances such as cyber warfare and drones will replace people-

centric conflict fail to understand why these technological weapons would be employed in the

first place. People ultimately choose to employ a type of warfare as a ‘means’ to target a

person or people. These technological means have human consequences such as fallout from

collapsed banking systems and the diminished organisational capacity of society after a cyber

attack. Devastation would not be confined to the fifth dimension during a cyber war.

Fascination with technology may change the ‘means’ but it does not change age-old truths

about strategy9. Believers in the theory known as the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ also

misinterpreted the dominance of technology advances. Emerging technologies enhance

military effectiveness; however, concepts that rely on technologies alone confuse military

capability and activity with strategy10. Land military forces providing the direct people-to-

people response during operations will therefore remain relevant in future conflict. Materiel

modernisation is vital; however, should not detract from improving the foundation of Army –

people.

Broad predictions about future conflict need to be balanced against the reality of trends in

Australia’s immediate region. These trends point to an environment of economic uncertainty,

power rebalancing, and risks associated with developing and fragile states. Many smaller

nations have already proven susceptible to the effects of natural disasters, demographic

changes, economic pressures and political tensions11. Broader global challenges with national

security implications include climate change, resource scarcity, urbanisation, demographic

changes, global order shifts, terrorism threats, organised crime, and violent political groups12.

The human security of people in Australia’s region is being challenged from both non-violent

and violent threats, and overall human fragility from failing states. Our regional outlook

demonstrates the likelihood for military and civilian responses to deal with human insecurity

challenges. This will see the convergence of national or state-centric security and human

security concepts13.

9 Colonel (Ret) Arthur F. Lykke Jr expressed strategy as an equation: "Strategy equals Ends (objectives towards which one strives) plus Ways (courses of action) plus Means (instruments by which some end can be achieved).” He advocated that the essence of successful strategy is attaining a balance between these ends, ways, and means. Lykke, A.F. Jr., ‘A Methodology for Developing a Military Strategy’, Military Strategy: Theory and Application, Carlisle Barracks U.S. Army War College, 1993, p. 3.10 McMaster, H.R., ‘The Pipe Dream of Easy War’, The New York Time Sunday Review, July 20, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/opinion/sunday/the-pipe-dream-of-easy-war.html?pagewanted=2&_r=011 Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Australia’s National Security Strategy, Canberra, 2013.12 Ibid. 13 Smith, M.G. & Whelan, J., ‘Advancing Human Security: New Strategic Thinking for Australia’, Security Challenges, Volume 4, Number 2, Winter 2008.

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Although not a prominent term in our doctrine, human security approaches have been visible

in our history from the rehabilitation of Japan after World War II through to the deployment

of the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands in 2003. The Commission on

Human Security 2003 defined human security as follows:

“In essence, human security means safety for people from both violent and

non-violent threats. It is a condition of being characterised by freedom from

pervasive threats to people’s rights, their safety, or even their lives.”14

The Army plays a pivotal role in dealing with human insecurity challenges by securing

populations, maintaining security, fostering rule of law and capacity building host nation

security forces. Tasks also overlap with other government and humanitarian agencies for the

direct response to population-centric or humanitarian situations. It can therefore be seen from

the convergence of the battlefield and our regional outlook that human insecurity challenges

will be forefront during future deployments of Australia’s land forces.

National security principles and Army’s core role to win the land battle have naturally shaped

our current doctrine towards warfighting theory. For example, ask any junior commander

what theory underpins combined arms tactics and the response will be manoeuvre theory,

founded in concepts including centre of gravity dating back to the publication of Clausewitz’s

On War and Sun Tzu’s The Art of War. Ask the same question about what theory underpins

population-centric activities or what human security is, and the silence will be profound. The

MAP is theoretically founded in manoeuvre warfare principles yet is and will be applied for

conflict characterised by a dynamic human environment. Given predictions of future conflict,

it is time to analyse whether the warfighting theory underpinning the MAP is a value or

barrier to thinking for human insecurity challenges.

Applying the future conflict vision

A vision of future conflict is required to underpin the rationale for equipping, manning,

organising and training military forces. Away from academic discourse, predicting future

conflict, adversaries and the operating environment is a strategic level responsibility and

filters down the chain-of-command through documents including the National Security

Strategy, Defence White Paper and Future Land Warfare Report. This guidance confirms the

Army’s role in future conflict. Army must balance its core role “to conduct adaptive

14 Ogata, S. & Sen, A., Human Security Now, Commission on Human Security, New York, 2003.

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campaigning to win the joint land battle”15 with secondary roles. Secondary roles include

immediate responses for terror attacks, disaster relief, and evacuation of Australian citizens

from emergencies as well as longer-term posturing to strengthen Australia’s position as an

influential regional actor. Peacekeeping, stabilisation operations and humanitarian assistance

are all specified tasks. This is why military training for operations outside of kinetic

warfighting is important.

Doctrine provides the common framework and standardises how military forces will

contribute to future conflict or tasks given by government. Army defines operational activities

that link back to conflict predictions from the strategic level but are flexible for a specific

operating environment16. This is seen in Land Warfare Doctrine 3.0 Operations where

conflict is categorised in order to specify operational postures, phases and tactical actions.

Appendix 1A details the doctrinal categorisation of conflict. Conflict is defined along a

spectrum from stable peace through to general war with corresponding operational postures of

offensive, defensive and stability. The operational postures are different but not mutually

exclusive. The corresponding tactical actions of offensive, defensive, stability and enabling

action then provide the foundation that underpins initial recruitment through to collective

training in the Army. Doctrine for environments such as littoral and counterinsurgency

provide further guidance for land force tactics. Categorising conflict therefore enables

military practitioners to train with common doctrine and TTPs.

Categorising conflict is useful in order to develop an operating picture and train tactical

actions; however, categorising conflict can also comprise problem-framing and risk solutions

from the past being templated onto a different operating environment. When the type of

conflict corresponds to both the type of operation and tactical actions, this inhibits first

principle analysis, critical thinking and decision-making. This can be seen when a conflict is

labelled ‘counterinsurgency’ and doctrinal solutions using the ‘clear-hold-build’ framework

applied. Pre-established spectrums and operational themes are useful as a training foundation

but unworkable if used as a pre-determined solution for the future. As described by Military

Historian, Sir Michael Howard in 1974,“I am tempted indeed to declare dogmatically that

whatever doctrine the Armed Forces are working on now, they have got it wrong.”17

15 Australian Army, Adaptive Campaigning - Future Land Operating Concept, Canberra 2009.16 Australian Army, Land Warfare Doctrine 3.0 Operations, Canberra, 2008, p. 3-1. 17 Howard, M and Wilson, A.J., ‘Military Science in an Age of Peace’, The RUSI Journal, 119: 1, 1974, p.7.

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The desire to categorise conflict carries over when land forces deploy for a real-time conflict.

There are always initial questions for ‘what type’ of conflict they are about to fight in order to

determine the corresponding TTPs required during pre-deployment training. Many people

including politicians, strategists and academics are quick to categorise a conflict. In some

instances, categorising conflict can immediately stovepipe the responses and corresponding

tactical action. For example, Afghanistan has been labelled a counterinsurgency war, irregular

war, hybrid war, war on terror, long war, war of choice and complex emergency. It is a

challenge for any field or military practitioner wanting to navigate and understand this

discourse. This is before the practitioner is even faced with the reality and complexity of the

actual environment and mission they are tasked to achieve. Categorising conflict therefore

comes with a downside. As aptly described by Dr Al Palazzo from the Land Warfare Studies

Centre “separating war into numerous categories and allocating to them terms …

compromises clarity and promotes faddism.”18 Critical thinking by practitioners is needed in

order to see through this maze of words, negate stove-piped responses and prevent templated

solutions.

It would be unwise to draw a line through the spectrum of conflict and then apply the

corresponding doctrinal solution when faced with the next conflict. The future operating

environment will likely have convergent elements from across a number of conflict

categorisations with diffuse tactical actions. There is a balance between learning from the

past, relying on doctrine for commonality and original solutions. They can be complementary

means but all can be dangerous if applied blindly without critical thought. This is why

effective thinking by military practitioners is paramount.

Practical realities of future conflict

The Commandant of the United States Marine Corps in 1997, General Charles Krulak,

succinctly articulated the reality facing military practitioners through the concept of ‘three-

block war’:

“In one moment of time, our service members will be feeding and clothing

displaced refugees, providing humanitarian assistance. In the next moment, they

will be holding two warring tribes apart - conducting peacekeeping operations

18 For more information see Palazzo, A., Australian Landpower in the 21st Century: A Primer, History, and Guide to its Future Role, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra, 2013 (not yet published).

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and, finally, they will be fighting a highly lethal mid-intensity battle - all on the

same day ... all within three city blocks.” 19

General Kruluk’s observations came from lessons learnt in the 1990s from operations

including Somalia, Liberia, Haiti and Bosnia. Three-block war theory has since given rise to

doctrine for ‘complex war’20. Complex war acknowledges that the diverse range of activities

not only occurs on separate blocks but simultaneously due to the converging nature of the

operating environment21. With every new type of defined war comes the amended doctrinal

solution, for the Australian Army this came in the form of ‘adaptive campaigning’22 and

subsequent publication of AC-FLOC. AC-FLOC provides the foundation for complex war

with follow-on application of adaptive campaigning:

“to ensure land forces … deploy with both lethal and non-lethal capabilities to

perform a diverse and concurrent range of tasks from decisive combat to aid

delivery”23.

The overarching guidance through AC-FLOC has set the conditions in the Australian Army

for the adaptive and convergent character of warfare. It positions our forces to operate,

survive and act in potentially lethal environments, while being capable of performing diverse

simultaneous tasks during combat and stability activities. The diverse nature of these

underlying tasks and inability to disentangle an enemy from a population has also given rise

to greater need for understanding, coordination and cooperation between military forces, other

government agencies and non-governmental agencies. The complexity of the modern

battlefield exceeds the capacity of military forces to operate independently. Civil-military

activities add another layer of theory that military commanders are expected to understand

and effectively implement.

The importance of our military commander’s thinking, understanding and decision-making

ability through all levels from strategic guidance to tactical implementation is clear from

complex war principles. Military commanders are expected to be able to sense, think, plan,

decide, act, adapt and communicate within this complex operating environment. The actual

19 Krulak, C., ‘The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War’, Marines Magazine January 1999, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/strategic_corporal.htm> accessed 01 April 2013. 20 Australian Army, Complex Warfighting, Canberra, 2004.21 Australian Army, Adaptive Campaigning - Future Land Operating Concept, Canberra 2009. p. 16.22 Australian Army, Adaptive Campaigning, Canberra, 2006. 23 Australian Army, Adaptive Campaigning - Future Land Operating Concept, Canberra 2009.

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environment where the complexities are real, not just the environment outlined in doctrine or

a textbook. As military commanders will not be forearmed with the solution for their unique

conflict, their empowerment as the focal point for both adaptive action and people-to-people

interaction is vital. Within this context, it becomes evident that training our military

commanders on a linear decision-making tool that has solely been founded in combat

warfighting theory needs evaluation to test its ongoing feasibility. Lessons from current

operations and strategic guidance for future conflict has initiated evaluation of planning

processes taught at the Australian Command and Staff College24. It is now time to do this

same evaluation for decision-making processes for our lowest levels of command.

A reason why the MAP has not been revised may be explained due to the rationale for

prioritising training resources. Training our land forces for future operations is often framed

as a choice between conventional operations involving major combat and then everything else

lower on the spectrum of conflict. Some commanders believe that proficiency in combat skills

for fast-paced, decisive, kinetic activities gives their soldiers the ability to conduct non-kinetic

activities for low-intensity operations. As described in research from recent United States

operations, “this could not be further from the truth”.25 Furthermore, when forces are not

adequately trained, “military units fall back on what they know best – enemy-centric

operations”26. Relying solely on enemy-centric thinking can be counterproductive in an

environment with dynamic human terrain.

The adage that training hard for combat operations also trains effective action for slower-

paced spectrum of war operations is not accurate. This statement should not be confused with

support to turn Army’s back on our core combat role – we cannot ever assume that our region

in years to come will be as peaceful as the recent past. Training for kinetic operations is a

fundamental building block of our Army. However, I do advocate the need to evaluate how

we could train better for stability activities instead of resting on our foundation warfighting

laurels. We do not have the luxury to choose between being warfighters, peacekeepers or

humanitarians, just as we cannot choose whether we operate in desert, jungle or littoral

environments. Given the context of future conflict and expectations of land forces, we need

24 This includes changes to Australian Defence Force, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 3.0 Campaigns and Operations, Canberra 2012 and Australian Defence Force, Australian Defence Force Publication 5.0.1 Joint Military Appreciation Process, Canberra, 2009.25 Derleth, J.W. & Alexander, J.S., ‘Stability Operations: From Policy to Practice’, PRISM 2 Number 3, National Defense University Press, Washington DC, June 2011. 26 Ibid.

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tactical commanders equipped to quickly understand an environment and then make effective

decisions to best achieve strategic intent. This is where the role of the junior commander

becomes imperative.

ROLE OF THE JUNIOR COMMANDER

The Australian Army’s greatest asset remains its people. Soldiers who are physically robust,

mentally resilient, intellectually agile and professionally competent, who can make effective

and ethical decisions in confusing, chaotic and lethal environments are our foundation. For

the purpose of this research, the term junior commander describes junior officers (lieutenants

and captains) and non-commissioned officers (corporals). Appendix 1B describes the rank

structure in the Australian Army. Conventional force platoons and troops are led by

lieutenants who have undertaken their initial officer training at the Royal Military College and

officer basic course specific to their allocated corps. Junior officers at captain level also

perform reconnaissance and staff functions, particularly during the deployment of small

contingents. Sections are lead by corporals who have undertaken their initial solider training

at Kapooka, corps specific training and the Junior Leaders Course.

Our junior leaders are often confronted with unexpected challenges in unfriendly, isolated and

demanding environments, and are required to make quick decisions based on limited

information, often in the absence of direct supervision or guidance from their chain-of-

command. As outlined in Junior Leadership on the Battlefield, “These decisions will result in

success or failure, and life or death”27. Within the chain-of-command construct, junior

commanders are the point where tactical action is decisively initiated through their leadership

of soldiers on the battlefield. They are the interface between the higher-level plan and the

executed action.

The role of the junior commander on the contemporary battlefield is vast and dynamic. The

character of the battlefield has changed, expectations increased and tasks diversified. These

changes have had an impact on the requirement for junior commanders to transition, often and

repeatedly without notice, between high and low intensity operations. Our junior commanders

fight complex wars and do not get to choose when they are a warfighter or a humanitarian. As

described by James Szepesy:

27 Australian Army, Junior Leadership on the Battlefield, Edition 3, Canberra, 2010.

13

“This ability to transition effectively contributes to the strategic impact of small

unit leaders. The application of high intensity combat tactics in a low intensity

situation can transform a benign situation to a hostile situation with significant

strategic ramifications. The application of deadly force during a civil disturbance

is a good example … Similarly, failures will likely result if low intensity tactics

are applied in a high intensity situations. Use of non-lethal force in intense

combat will likely result in unnecessary casualties among friendly forces and limit

the ability to attain desired objectives. These failures can also have strategic

ramifications.28

Low-intensity operations including humanitarian assistance, exchanges and the Defence

Cooperation Program often consist of small contingents were junior commanders make up the

bulk of the planning and decision-making power. They often operate far from the direct

supervision of their senior leadership. This greatly narrows the gap between the strategic and

tactical level. In a recent Infinity Journal essay, Colin Gray wrote “Military officers perform

the strategic function at every level of command, from a platoon on upwards.”29

The character of contemporary conflict demonstrates that there are many converging

variables, making a perfect understanding of the situation and environment difficult to

achieve. Junior commanders and their teams are often the first responders, acting in an

information void, which makes their ability to critically think even more important. The

information they sense on the ground then filters up through the chain-of-command to clarify

higher-level planning assumptions and problem framing. Our junior commanders are our eyes

and ears on the battle space; a battle space sometimes not seen by the higher level and civil-

military personnel making decisions for operational and interagency plans. Every opportunity

for sensing and understanding must be seized and communicated. Our junior commander’s

perception must not be compromised by bias or rely solely on tactics, set steps or historical

panaceas they have read in doctrine. There are enormous responsibilities and pressures placed

on our junior commanders.

The junior commander has often been dismissed as too inexperienced to understand complex

problems. Their inexperience is why we currently arm our junior commanders with a rational

28 Szepesy, J., The Strategic Corporal and the Emerging Battlefield, The Fletcher School, Tufts University, March 2005, p. 63. 29 Gray, C.S., ‘Strategy: Some Notes for a User’s Guide’, Infinity Journal Volume 2 Issue No. 2, Spring 2012, p. 7.

14

decision-making model instead of relying on intrinsic thinking. Having a rational thinking

process for junior commanders must remain due to this inexperience. While there are many

challenges facing junior commanders, a key vulnerability is the lack of a rational thinking tool

to conduct population-centric missions. If junior commanders are only trained for high

intensity warfighting, the right questions may be overlooked in a stability operations

environment as we have a tendency to frame the problem to suit the solution we know best –

defeating the enemy which then skews our sensing on the ground.

Arming the junior commander with a rational process that focuses only on their role within

their higher commander’s intent30 misses opportunities for nesting and synchronising strategic

to tactical level planning. Even if the junior commander is only directly tasked with enemy-

centric activities, sensing the population and providing this information up the chain-of-

command is vital to help understand the overall complex situation. It also helps civilian

agencies who may not have the force protection capabilities to conduct reconnaissance for

their own specific needs. A junior commander will miss these opportunities if they are only

thinking about their task or if they are biased by an enemy focus. While the junior commander

may not be able to understand the entirety of the ‘complex problem’ and will only sense parts

of the situation on the ground, on mass, the network of junior commander’s ‘eyes and ears’

will form a web of understanding for their higher command. When this mass of information

from the ground-up is received, the higher command and civilian agencies will be able to

understand more of the problem. Achieving early problem-framing during a deployment

reduces risks for stove-piped responses, unnecessary action and drawn-out deployments.

These deductions for junior commanders are not new and have been best explained by

General Kurluck in his ‘Strategic Corporal’ paper, which explained the nexus of junior

command and Three Block War. He stressed that outcomes in battle often hinge on decisions

made and by actions taken at the lowest level. He outlined that junior leaders:

“deal with a bewildering array of challenges and threats. In order to succeed

under such demanding conditions they will require unwavering maturity,

judgment, and strength of character. Most importantly, these missions will

require them to confidently make well-reasoned and independent decisions

under extreme stress - decisions that will likely be subject to the harsh scrutiny

of both the media and the court of public opinion. In many cases, the individual

30 One up and two up higher commander’s intent as per Step One of the IMAP.

15

Marine will be the most conspicuous symbol of American foreign policy and will

potentially influence not only the immediate tactical situation, but the

operational and strategic levels as well. His actions, therefore, will directly

impact the outcome of the larger operation; and he will become, as the title of

this article suggests - the Strategic Corporal.”31

Since the publication of General Kurluck’s paper, the term strategic corporal has been used to

succinctly describe the challenges facing our junior leaders. It is then interesting to note that

we have not evolved decision-making doctrine so that junior leaders have the rational tools to

‘think’ about the strategic narratives, objectives, challenges and implications.

We must ensure our junior commanders are well prepared to lead on a complex battlefield.

How do we develop and train our junior leaders with these real world challenges? The basic

building blocks of training for leadership, character, ethos, values, physical capacity, mental

toughness and foundation warfighting must remain unchanged. However, much more is still

required to fully prepare the junior commander for the rigors of the contemporary operation

environment. There must be a commitment to professional development and critical thinking.

Our collective training and individual efforts for professional education must build on tactical

proficiency and aggressively cultivate our thinking ability.

THINKING TOOLS

The Australian Army already has the foundation for training effective thinking in complex

war. Doctrine for specific operations and environments provide inherent knowledge and

tactics for our forces. There is also considerable operational experience among our current

serving personnel. However, our thinking tools at the junior level have not kept pace. Key

tools currently used for thinking at the tactical level include the MAP, adaptive action and

assessment. The tools are currently disjointed, hindering the ability for time-poor leaders to

quickly transition doctrine to practical application.

Doctrine

There have been significant changes in doctrine for operations and tactics given the

challenges of the contemporary operating environment. The theoretical evolutions through the

publications of Complex Warfighting, Adaptive Campaigning and AC-FLOC were profound. 31 Krulak, C., ‘The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War’, Marines Magazine January 1999, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/strategic_corporal.htm> accessed 01 April 2013.

16

Other changes have included the formal adoption of stability activities as a core land tactic

alongside offensive and defensive tactical actions through the publication of Land Warfare

Doctrine 3-0 Operations in 200832. New doctrine for specific operations and environments

have included Land Warfare Doctrine 3-10-1 Counterinsurgency (2009), 3.0.2 Peace Support

(2008) and 3-0-4 Population Centric Operations (to be released). The release of this doctrine

is useful for junior commanders to gain a theoretical understanding of stabilisation,

counterinsurgency and population support operations but beyond tactics, there is still a

missing link for practical application33.

In a book review of Conducting Counterinsurgency34 about Australia’s Reconstruction Task

Force 4’s application of counterinsurgency principles in Afghanistan, Lieutenant Colonel

Chris Smith aptly describes why just providing doctrine on specific operations and

environments can be dangerous if officers do not have critical thinking abilities:

“The primary criticism of the contemporary counterinsurgency doctrine of

Western English-speaking nations is that, rather than being a generalised and

broadly applicable doctrine for countering insurgencies, the doctrine applies to

very specific circumstances. For example, the Australian Army

counterinsurgency principle of Host Nation Primacy assumes the existence of a

very specific context for its relevance. The context for the principle’s relevance

is the conduct of a war against an insurgent group in which the Australian

policy objective is best achieved by using military force in support of the

incumbent government of some other country. This assumption is quite specific

and limits the utility of the doctrine to a very limited set of geopolitical

circumstances.”35

Lieutenant Colonel Smith goes on to stress that some leaders may apply template solutions to

an environment that only partially resembles the environment described in doctrine. This risks

“reinforcing highly flawed and contextually specific principles and lessons that if generally

32 Australian Army, Land Warfare Doctrine 3.0 Operations, Canberra, 2008. 33 A similar situation was found by James W. Derleth and Jason S. Alexander for United States policy as discussed in Derleth, J.W. & Alexander, J.S., ‘Stability Operations: From Policy to Practice’, PRISM 2 Number 3, National Defense University Press, Washington DC, June 2011.34 Connery, D, Cran, S and Evered, D, Conducting Counterinsurgency Reconstruction Task Force 4 in Afghanistan, Big Sky Publishers, 2012. , 35 Smith, C., ‘Book Review – Conducting Counterinsurgency: Reconstruction Task Force 4 in Afghanistan by David Connery, David Cran and David Evered’, Australian Army Journal Volume IX, Number 3, Canberra, Summer 2012.

17

applied might prove to be irrelevant, dangerous and decisively flawed.”36 Commanders may

resort to looking for similarities with past problems and then problem-frame their situation so

that the doctrinal solution fits.

Doctrine with TTPs, principles and lessons remain a vital foundation block for training;

however, the linking piece is training for critical thinking and decision-making. The Army

already has thinking tools but they have not been revised to synchronise concepts such as the

Adaptation Cycle in AC-FLOC, acknowledge that our junior commanders are ‘Strategic

Corporals’ or give thinking flexibility to junior commanders in dynamic and complex

environments including the types of operations outlined in the new doctrine. To give context

to the remainder of the thesis, the Army’s current thinking tools of the MAP, Adaptive Action

and assessment will be explained.

Military Appreciation Process

The MAP was introduced into the Australian Army in 1996 to ensure the entire chain of

command had a common process and terminology37. The MAP was designed as a decision-

making and planning tool to be applicable at tactical and higher levels. The process revised

the previous Army Appreciation Process and used constructs developed through the United

States Tactical Decision-Making Process (TDMP)38. The MAP purported to be a flexible

planning tool that could be implemented regardless of the level or type of conflict involved.

The MAP is a rational decision-making process that was designed for simple problems that

have clearly defined start and end states. Junior leaders are trained on the MAP to mitigate

their lack of experience for intuitive decision-making. The versions of the MAP taught to and

applied by junior military leaders are the Individual MAP (IMAP) and Combat MAP

(CMAP). The IMAP and CMAP are designed to work in tandem39. The IMAP allows a

detailed analysis of the problem prior to H-hour40 and the CMAP gives a process for quick

decision-making post H-hour when an incident or contact with the enemy occurs41.

36 Ibid. 37 See Appendices 1C-E for diagrams of the MAP, IMAP and CMAP steps. 38 Australian Army, Training Information Bulletin Number 74 The Military Appreciation Process, Canberra, 1996, p. 1-1.39 Holmes, S., ‘Decision-Making at the Tactical Level’, Australian Army Journal, Volume 9, Summer 2012, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra. 40 H-hour is the “specific time at which an operation or exercises commences, or is due to commence” Australian Defence Glossary.41 Australian Army, Land Warfare Doctrine 5-1-4 The Military Appreciation Process, Canberra, 2009.

18

The IMAP is a six step assumption-based linear planning tool. Assumptions are used when

certain information is unknown so that the planning process can continue. Assumptions made

during the planning process are “clarified as soon as possible”42 through the generation and

subsequent answer of information requirements. The mission, battlespace and enemy are

analysed to devise courses of action that are then wargamed and adjusted before being

implemented as tactical action. Courses of action are devised by targeting the enemy’s critical

vulnerabilities through decisive events to meet mission requirements. Tactics found in

doctrine for techniques, procedures and battle drills assist the development of courses of

action. If an assumption is not confirmed before execution of the course of action, the

commander assesses the inherent risk and modifies the plan to mitigate the risk or accepts the

risk and proceeds. The method for course of action development is founded in manoeuvre

theory with terms such as centre of gravity, essential tasks, critical vulnerabilities and decisive

events used regardless of whether the mission is enemy or population focussed. The IMAP is

primarily a decision-making rather than thinking tool as there are no feedback loops. The

IMAP stops when a course of action is executed therefore there is no formal framework for

assessing the course of action to allow self-learning and feedback up the chain of command.

Patrol reports, intelligence requirements and battle damage assessments after a mission is

executed do not doctrinally link back into the IMAP.

Adaptive Action

Adaptive Action was formally introduced into Army doctrine in 200643. Adaptive Action

merges Mission Command with the Adaptation Cycle44. The Adaptation Cycle stresses that

“detailed situational understanding will only flow from physical interaction with the problem

and success is achieved by learning from this interaction”45. Land forces fight for and not

necessarily with all the information they require therefore a constant cycle of acting, sensing,

deciding and adapting is used within an operational environment. A challenge is that a

complex environment is not static; interacting with the environment is time specific and may

in itself change the environment with both observed and hidden consequences.

42 Ibid, p. 5-10. 43 Future Land Warfare Directorate, Adaptive Campaigning – The Land Force Response to Complex Warfighting, Australian Army, December 2006. 44 See Appendix 1F for diagrammatical representation of Adaptive Action.45 Directorate of Army Research and Analysis, Adaptive Campaigning 09 – Army’s Future Land Operating Concept, Canberra, 2009, p. 43.

19

The Adaptation Cycle cycle does not fit seamlessly with the linear nature of the IMAP or

method of confirming assumptions through information requirements. Furthermore, the

Adaptation Cycle means that tactical action is undertaken to interact with the complex system

on the ground in order to inform higher-level problem framing, planning and learning.

However, before acting, the tactical level commanders conduct an IMAP to make a decision

about the action to take. They use assumptions about the environment and stakeholders which

doctrine states should be clarified before tactical execution. As the Adaptation Cycle has not

been linked to the IMAP and the IMAP has no feedback loops, the junior commander could

be forgiven for being confused46.

The Adaptation Cycle complements Mission Command which is:

“a philosophy for command and a system for conducting operations in which

subordinates are given clear direction by a superior of his intentions. The result

required, the task, the resources and any constraints are clearly enunciated,

however, subordinates are allowed the freedom to decide how to achieve the

required result.”47

Overall, mission command allows the lowest level to determine the action required, the MAP

provides the planning tool to decide this action and the Adaptation Cycle outlines the cycle of

learning to inject information into the planning process. These tools are currently not linked

through doctrine or taught as interrelated tools during the training of junior commanders.

Assessment

The last tool in the thinking framework is assessment, which is used to measure the effects of

executed tactical action. Patrol reports and after-action reviews currently provide junior

commanders with an opportunity to assess their action. However, these reports and reviews

are not synchronised with ‘learning how to learn’ in Adaptive Action or the original IMAP

conducted for the mission. The reports also only capture a moment in time and do not give

opportunity for long-term assessment to measure changes in dynamics. There are no other

assessment tools taught to junior commanders. The Australian Defence Force does have other

46 It is acknowledged that junior commanders operate in an environment where their Officer Commanding and higher level Staff MAPs will assist their planning; however, as acknowledged in Junior Leadership on the Battlefield, junior commanders can often operate in the absence of direct supervision or guidance from their chain-of-command. 47 Australian Defence Force Glossary

20

assessment frameworks that are taught on specialist, corps specific and higher-level command

courses. They include Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) and Battle Damage Assessments.

MOE processes for non-kinetic action are not taught in detail through the officer training

continuum. MOE training is left to courses such as the Information Operations Course, which

not every officer attends. Doctrine states MOEs for non-kinetic activities are based on

‘accurate assumptions’ and measureable in quantitative or qualitative terms. Problems with

assumptions have been previously discussed and using the term ‘accurate assumption’

undermines the doctrine’s credibility. The current method of making up pre-determined

MOEs goes against all theory for complex environments and adaptive action. Combined with

poor problem framing, making up MOEs may miss opportunities to sense effects that were

not predicted pre-mission. Adding to the problem is one of the suggested systems of using

‘traffic lights’ where a qualitative assessment assigning red, orange or green is given for each

MOE. This subjective view can be skewed if pressured to report ‘mission success’. As the

doctrinal MOE methods are flawed for non-kinetic activities, it will not be a simple case of

using existing doctrine to introduce MOEs into junior commander training. Despite the

difficulty, assessment of an operational environment is a key component of thinking and

learning at the junior commander level. It is currently a missing link and any introduction of

assessment needs to be synchronised with the MAP and Adaptation Cycle.

To give junior commanders ‘Strategic Corporal’ responsibility and then leave them with

deficient, ambiguous and disjointed thinking tools is negligent. The general need for this

research is to theoretically and practically analyse current tools, lessons learnt and practical

realities to bridge this gap.

RESEARCH GAP

There are four overarching research gaps in this field relating to the MAP’s model type, junior

command application, synchronisation with doctrine, and theory foundation for population

operations.

Model Type. Military members and academia have conducted significant research on a range

of military decision-making and planning models48. These models have included rational,

intrinsic, operational design, systems thinking and network analysis. The common problem

48 Research literature on the Military Appreciation Process and Military Decision-Making Process are discussed in Chapter 4.

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identified with the MAP is that the model type is for rational thinking and it is a linear

process. The MAP has also been criticised as stifling junior commander’s thinking for the

spectrum of tactical tasks due to its rigidity and start-stop nature. In comparison to other

models, the MAP has been criticised as mechanical, discontinuous, output driven, inflexible

and time dependent. Once these problems have been identified in the existing research there

has been limited further exploration of how to adjust the MAP to mitigate these problems,

rather, the research steers automatically to alternate model types such as operational design.

Army has implemented none of these alternate tools at the junior command level. How to

improve the MAP given the identified faults warrants further exploration, particularly for a

scalable MAP with pre- and post-mission thinking linked for continuity over a long duration

operation. This exploration will be conducted in this thesis in conjunction with the

synchronisation of the MAP with processes already in use in the Australian Army including

adaptive action, mission command and assessment. This will help maintain focus on practical

training realities rather than aspirational solutions lacking practical implementation.

Junior Command Application. Throughout the same literature, the focus of MAP research

has been for command and staff planning at formation level and above. This research has led

to the revision of using Joint and Staff MAPs at above formation level to using models

incorporating operational design processes. The current model for this level of planning is the

Joint Operational Planning Process. Both the Australian Command and Staff College and

Australian Civil-Military Centre are investigating and revising staff planning models for

interagency and joint task forces49. There has been limited review of the MAP’s use at the

tactical level for platoon level actions and below. There is also limited research for individual

decision-making as focus has been on staff, civil-military and interagency planning as a group

process. This means a gap in research exists for the use of the MAP by individuals,

particularly at the junior commander level.

Doctrine Synchronisation. The changing nature of planning models at the formation level

has been a top-down process. However, the adaptation of formation level models have not

inspired research into their synchronisation with lower level planning including the IMAP and

CMAP used by junior commanders. Staff plans using operational design rely on ongoing

information feeds about the situation, environment and stakeholders in order to frame the

problem and adapt in due course. This information comes from a variety of sources; however,

49 This includes the investigation of interagency planning tools through the Australian Civil-Military Centre’s Multiagency Peace and Stability Operations Process, see http://acmc.gov.au/tag/mapsop/.

22

ground truthing comes from the people deployed to the area, namely military and field

practitioners. In the case of the military, the ‘eyes and ears’ on the ground are junior

commanders and soldiers. Their information about the situation from firsthand sensing is vital

to ensure higher level plans are well-founded, particularly during ‘problem framing’. To

maximise advances in planning at the higher level, the inputs of the Joint Operational

Planning Process need to be synchronised with MAP outputs.

Theory Foundation. Lastly, the MAP is based on manoeuvre warfare. This theory provides

best practice to win the land battle in decisive combat operations. Australian military

discourse and doctrine has deemed the MAP the best-fit model for combat operations

compared to other options available and the practical reality of training resources. Outside of

combat operations, the MAP drives the user towards enemy focused solutions due to its

underlying theory. This inhibits population support planning, does not allow for best practice

as understood through human security theory or recognise field practitioners as the focal point

for people-to-people interaction to target bottom-up solutions50. This is most clearly seen

during the application of the MAP for stability activities and when a military force is tasked

with a population centric mission including humanitarian assistance. It is also evident in the

CMAP which is entirely enemy focused. A gap in research still exists for missions conducted

outside the scope of decisive combat operations for population centric missions.

The four overarching gaps in current research indicate the need for investigation into

individual level thinking at the junior commander level for missions outside the scope of

decisive combat operations. Improving the MAP will help bridge this research gap, benefit

the junior commander and positively resonate through their chain-of-command’s problem

framing. This thesis seeks to present information useful to those who will be called to

implement population-centric missions, so that junior commanders are better prepared than

those who have gone before.

50 A top-down approach refers to providing aid and development through the top of society. The theory provides that aid and development will then filter down to the local population. A bottom-up approach refers to the delivery of aid and development through working or investing money directly through the community authorities or directly to the local population with stabilising effects then filtering up to the top of society. This is approach is discussed in Chapter 2.

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STRUCTURAL FRAMEWORK

The remainder of this chapter outlines the structural framework for this thesis. The thesis is

divided into two parts: Part I – theoretical analysis and historical evaluation to establish the

model requirements and Part II – model development and consensus building. The chapters

are linked through the research design; however, can be read in isolation due to the target

audience of junior commanders and individual publication of chapters through the Land

Warfare Studies Centre51. As such, some definitions are repeated through the chapters. The

following section outlines the research problem, aim, constraints, opportunities, advantages,

scope, terminology, research design and chapter structure.

RESEARCH PROBLEM

My original contribution to knowledge is the development of a thinking tool for junior

commanders faced with the military response to human insecurity challenges. The primary

research question is: does the MAP provide the optimum tool to enable a junior commander

to communicate, act, sense, decide and adapt to the human dimension of conflict? My

hypothesis is that our current MAP is sound for kinetic actions during state-on-state war;

however, does not capitalise on best practice for adaptive action and operations centred on

effects for a local population. The MAP is therefore not an optimal thinking tool for the junior

commander for missions outside of combat operations. However, academic research, doctrine

and inherent knowledge through recent operational experience exist to enable the Army to

modify the MAP to meet the demands of the future operating environment.

AIM

The aim of this study is to develop a thinking support model for the junior military

commander’s adaptive action in an environment with human insecurity challenges. The model

will remain within the baseline framework of the MAP. This will equip the military field

practitioner with the thinking resources required to communicate, sense, act, decide and adapt

to the human dimension of conflict.

51 The Land Warfare Studies Centre (LWSC) is the Australian Army's principal think-tank and leads Army's conceptual thinking and debate on issues affecting future land warfighting, see http://www.army.gov.au/Our-future/LWSC.

24

CONSTRAINTS

A major constraint of this thesis is that the Australian Army will continue to use the MAP as

its primary decision-making and planning tool for junior commanders. This is due to the MAP

being suitable for the Australian Army’s core role to win the land battle in decisive combat

operations. The resources available and allocated time at Australian Army training institutes

do not currently allow for multiple planning tools to be taught and assimilated by junior

commanders.

Officers are trained on the MAP through initial training at the Royal Military College and

after graduation through the officer-training continuum at the Land Warfare Centre. It

currently takes 12 out of 18 months in the training curriculum at the Royal Military College to

adequately teach the MAP and then assess this knowledge practically through the spectrum of

operations at platoon level. The spectrum of operations is based on the land tactics of

offensive, defensive and stability activities. After graduation, the Land Warfare Centre then

steps up this officer training to include both individual and staff planning for Combat Team,

Battle Group and Formation level activities against the spectrum of operations at the tactical

level.

It is only when officers reach the Australian Command and Staff College that other planning

tools are taught. This 46-week course teaches command and staff planning for single service,

joint and interagency activities at the operational and strategic level. Planning tools move

away from the rational decision-making based MAP to operational design processes. By this

stage, the officers are above the level of ‘junior commander’ that is the focus of this thesis.

It is acknowledged that operational design processes may start to filter through the Australian

Army to junior commander training. This development would take many years for doctrine

and training to be modified and synchronised. It would also be a challenge to teach

operational design to cadets still learning the mechanics of a platoon attack. Any reader

should note that the direction in the Australian Army at the time of writing was for the MAP

to remain the sole decision-making tool for junior commanders therefore this research needs

to work within this constraint.

This research will look at modifications to the MAP in order to remain practically focussed

for Army instead of advocating the introduction of a new process. It would be ideal to start

from first principles to find the best model theoretically for the research problem; however,

25

the practical realities of training and the core requirement of the Army to win the land battle

must be acknowledged. Research has already been conducted for alternate processes to the

MAP but Army has not adopted these processes for junior commander training52. The benefits

of alternate models will not be neglected but discussed for their application within the MAP.

The research design has therefore been founded in real-world considerations with practical

application for the Australian Army.

OPPORTUNITIES

The structure of the training at the Royal Military College and Land Warfare Centre provides

opportunities for the MAP to be nuanced against each distinct land tactic of offensive,

defensive and stability activities. For example, offensive activities are taught through a three-

month package incorporating warfighting theory, MAP application, Tactical Exercises

Without Troops and finally the practical application of executing offensive activities in a field

environment. The same structure and timeline applies to the defensive and stability activities

packages. A similar structure, less the application in a field environment, is applied at the

Land Warfare Centre.

Warfighting theory is adapted for each land tactic. This training is supported by the Land

Warfare Doctrine 3.0 Series – Operations where 806 pages for land tactics alone are

dedicated to ensuring the theory for offensive, defensive and stability activities are captured

doctrinally53. The same does not apply for the MAP as the structure and theory of the MAP

remains the same for each land tactic. This is also mirrored in doctrine with no changes in the

Land Warfare Doctrine 5.0 Series – Planning for the differences in land tactics. Individual

instructors at the training institutes are able to teach the nuance of applying the MAP through

syndicate discussions. However, this relies on the individual ability and operational

experience of the instructor rather than standard practice backed by formal doctrine. There

exists an opportunity through the Army’s training continuum to formalise the critical

instruction of the MAP already conducted by reflective and proactive instructors.

The opportunity through the distinct mission specific, pre-deployment training for ‘the war’

can also be harnessed. Guidance for training at the tactical level is two-fold, consisting of

ongoing training for ‘a war’ and specific training for ‘the war’. ‘A war’ describes broad

operation and environment scenarios such as those described in doctrine as major combat, 52 These models are discussed in Chapter 4.53 Australian Army, Land Warfare Doctrine 3.0.3 Land Tactics, Land Warfare Centre, Canberra, 2009.

26

counterinsurgency and peace support operations. Within this array of scenarios Army doctrine

trains against a fictional enemy force called the ‘Musorian Armed Forces’. ‘The war’

describes a real-time deployment of forces such as Operation Slipper in Afghanistan.

Throughout the pre-deployment training for ‘the war’, TTPs for the specific mission,

environment and actual enemy threat, as determined through lesson-learnt feedback from in-

theatre and analysis of these factors, are taught, trained and assessed. Doctrine changes from

broad to specific TTPs from ‘a war’ to ‘the war’, while notably the MAP remains constant.

Just as TTPs are adapted from broad to specific TTPs during mission-specific training, there

is an opportunity to do the same for the MAP, particularly when looking at what is ‘inside-

the-box’ for the six steps of the IMAP and having a scalable version of the IMAP.

ADVANTAGES

From this research, the junior commander will have a formal thinking framework to mitigate

their lack of experience for intrinsic thinking. It will improve their individual thinking for a

dynamic environment instead of applying stop-start processes. The model will integrate and

simplify the myriad of unlinked resources for assessment, planning, decision-making,

learning and adapting. Empowerment of field practitioners as a focal point for people-to-

people interaction also transitions human security from theory to practice. Advantages for the

junior commander includes mitigating problem framing bias at the individual level and

improving ‘learning how to learn’ when deployed on operations for adaptive action.

Superior and lateral commands including joint, interagency and civil-military staff planning

will benefit from the outputs of the junior commanders’ thinking. More of the problem will be

seen for higher-level problem framing with a network of junior leaders relaying information

from the ground up. It will improve information up the chain-of-command through greater

sensing, knowledge transfer and shared adaptive learning. Lastly, individual decision-making

will be nested with interagency planning tools for civil-military responses for synchronisation

of intent from strategic to the tactical level.

SCOPE

This research is for junior military commanders’ thinking at the individual level for human

insecurity challenges. The factors that limit the scope of this thesis are outlined below through

the discussion of military, junior commanders, individual processes, thinking and human

security and conflict terms.

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Military. This research is designed to be read and implemented by military personnel.

Military involvement in humanitarian activities is always nested in a nation’s strategic

security intent unlike non-governmental organisations. The resulting model will therefore not

have civilian application without major adaption to their context. The research has deferred to

military doctrine where discrepancies in literature exist to ensure focus remains on developing

a practically feasible model for Army.

Junior commander. The research targets the junior commander as defined in the context of

this chapter. The final model may have application to soldiers and field officers including

sub-unit commanders; however, these readers will need to put any application into the context

of their role. For example, field ranked officers have greater ability for intrinsic thinking so a

rational thinking tool needs to be put in the context of their experience. As this work focuses

on the junior commander, the research is also aimed at the tactical level of war therefore the

model is not designed for operational or strategic level planning.

Individual. The gap in research is at the individual planning level. Research for group and

staff planning has been conducted and continues to be refined by a number of organisations

including the Australian Command and Staff College and Australian Civil-Military Centre.

Civil-military, interagency and multi-agency planning has also been the focus of academic

research papers, many as a result of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams used in Afghanistan

and Iraq. The outcome of this research is for individual thinking that then feeds up into these

staff, civil-military and interagency planning tools.

Thinking. The literature in this area refers to thinking, decision-making, problem framing,

planning and designing. For example, the current MAP is called a decision-making tool as the

end result is for the commander to execute a decision; however, the MAP also incorporates

thinking and planning. The end model of this research aims to synchronise the MAP, adaptive

action and assessment which includes thinking, assessment, planning, decision-making,

implementing action, evaluating, learning and adapting. The scope is therefore not limited to

one action. Terming the tool a ‘thinking model’ will be used for simplicity in order to

encompass all elements.

Human insecurity. The use of the term human insecurity has been selected to succinctly

define the non-combatant population facing both violent and non-violent threats within an

environment of disaster, emergency, conflict or war. Pure offensive and defensive kinetic

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operations against an enemy is outside the scope of this research. As the focus is non-

combatants over a defined enemy, the scope is for non-kinetic action across a broad spectrum

of tasks including aid, development, capacity building, humanitarian, stability and security

actions. Human security will be detailed in Chapter 3. Instead of focusing solely on stability

or humanitarian actions, the broader term of ‘human security’ will be used for simplicity and

to ensure the resulting tool is applicable in an unknown environment for an unknown mission

instead of a set operation such as ‘counterinsurgency’ or ‘peace support’.

Conflict. The focus of this research is for conflict environments where the lead agency during

the response phase will be the Australian Defence Force. This distinguishes between the

difference in planning when the lead agency is another government arm such as the Australian

Mission in the host-nation or Australian Agency of International Development. These

agencies take the lead during disaster relief and humanitarian activities. This does not neglect

the interagency and civil-military constructs that make up all deployments regardless of the

benign or real threat. A conflict environment encompasses instability where violent and non-

violent threats against a population exist. Definitions for war, conflict, emergencies and

disasters are discussed in Chapter 3.

Lastly, this research is not designed to give a solution to a human insecurity challenge as

‘Clear-Hold-Build’ advocated in counterinsurgency manuals does. The research will provide a

tool to think about solutions for an environment that has not yet been accurately predicted.

For example, Afghanistan was not a widely predicted conflict before the events of 9/11 and

reconstruction was not a pre-determined mission during my initial military training. I was

trained for an environment and mission that more closely resembled the conditions in

Vietnam. This training provided a valuable foundation but also risked my generation

templating solutions from history for new environments. The specific environment the future

junior commander will face cannot rely solely on solutions of the past. The scope is broad to

reflect that conflict is a human activity; created by people, for people, effecting people and

solved only by people. The thinking prowess of our junior commanders is paramount in this

environment.

TERMINOLOGY

The terminology used in this thesis is consistent with common word and acronym usage by

Army’s junior commanders. Footnotes will explain military terminology where possible;

however, the audience of this thesis remains uniformed members of the Australian Army. It is

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aimed at junior commanders who have undertaken initial training at the Royal Military

College for officers or the Junior Leaders’ Course through the Land Warfare Centre for other

ranks.

RESEARCH DESIGN

The research design incorporates a broad and systematic approach through establishing the

model requirements (Part I), then evaluating and refining these requirements against the MAP

(Part II). This design encompasses five steps.

Part I - Model Requirements

Part I establishes the theoretical foundation for human insecurity challenges, and determines

the requirements, values and barriers of current thinking models. These requirements are then

developed through the evaluation of recent population-centric operations to ensure the

theoretical assumptions are nuanced against their practical execution and ground realities.

Theory Assumptions. The first step, corresponding to Chapter 3, determines the theory

assumptions for the model. It includes a literature review and engagement with experts and

field practitioners from the Australian Defence Force, Australian Civil-Military Centre, other

government agencies, non-governmental organisations, corporate organisations, United

Nations agencies and think-tanks54. The organisations were selected based on their expertise

and to ensure a broad spectrum across military, civilian and international agencies. This step

ends with a set of assumptions for the characteristics and principles for human insecurity

challenges during the response phase of operations.

Model Requirements. The second step, corresponding to Chapter 4, establishes the thinking

model requirements. Current decision-making models are examined specifically the MAP and

JOPP from Australian doctrine, and District Stability Framework (DSF) and Interagency

Conflict and Assessment Framework (ICAF) used by United States military and government

agencies. This step includes a literature review and engagement with the founders of these

tools including the Land Warfare Centre, Australian Command and Staff College, the United

States Agency for Development, State Department and Office of Conflict Management and

Mitigation. The requirements of the model ‘up the chain-of-command’ are established

54 The full list of people and organisations consulted is outlined as a section in the bibliography.

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through observations from Exercise Talisman Saber 201355. The Deployable Joint Force

Headquarters (DJHQ) was selected for this observation as it formed the designated Joint Task

Force. As such, DJFHQ problem framing and planning relied on the communication of

information from the ground up. DJFHQ also enabled observation for civil-military

engagement and interagency decision-making requirements due to the participation of

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Agency for International Development

and Australian Federal Police at this level. This step ends with the requirements, values and

barriers of thinking models.

Case Study. The third step, corresponding to Chapter 5, is an historical investigation of real-

life barriers, values and mitigating strategies for the use of the MAP in an operational context.

It nuances the theoretical assumptions and model requirements against their practical realities.

The RTF was selected as the main case study due its population centric mission using non-

kinetic tasks within a conflict environment. Other and follow-on rotations of Australian forces

in Afghanistan including the Special Operations Task Group, Mentoring and Reconstruction

Task Force (2008-2010), Mentoring Task Force (2010-2012) and Advisor Task Force (2012-

2013) had a focus on security and kinetic action. The RTF also worked under conditions

where the United Nations, aid agencies and other government agencies were unable to work

in Uruzgan Province due to the security situation. This meant that there was direct interaction

between the military force and the local population without third party involvement.

Information about the RTF has also been published in books making the information

releasable at an unclassified level56. The data was collected through a series of personal

interviews with junior commanders from the RTF and their immediate higher chain of

command57. The interview questions focused on their personal experience and strategies they

practically implemented at the individual level for the MAP. This historical analysis tested

and adjusted the assumptions from the theoretical analysis and model requirement steps.

55 Exercise TALISMAN SABER 2013 is a biennial combined Australian and United States training activity, conducted primarily in Australia to improve combat training, readiness and interoperability, across a wide spectrum of military activities. See http://www.defence.gov.au/opex/exercises/ts13/index.htm.56 Includes Connery, D, Cran, S and Evered, D, Conducting Counterinsurgency Reconstruction Task Force 4 in Afghanistan, Big Sky Publishers, 2012; Yeaman, S., Afghan Sun, 2013 (being launched on 5 September 2013). 57 15 interviews conducted in total.

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Part II - Model Development

Part II develops and refines the model through a further two steps.

Develop the Model. The fourth step, corresponding to Chapter 6, develops the initial

modifications for the MAP. Firstly, the MAP is examined against the baseline requirements

determined in Part I with modifications proposed where disparities exist through a qualitative

process. Secondly, a side-by-side analysis with existing models including the DSF and ICAF,

is conducted for cross-sectoral learning. This step ends with the proposed modifications to the

MAP with the value identified for each modification.

Refine the Model. The final step, corresponding to Chapter 7, reviews the modified MAP

through a series of expert interviews. This socialises, improves and collaborates the model for

practical implementation58. A Delphi technique is used to gather data from respondents with

the aim to achieve convergence of opinion on the modifications to the MAP59. The

respondents were selected based on their military experience in decision-making for

counterinsurgency, stability activities, humanitarian and disaster relief. A semi-structured

questionnaire was used and the respondents asked to comment on the MAP with examples

from military deployments and training experience. The information from the interviews was

processed qualitatively with focus on modifications that can be practically implemented. The

results of the review resulted in a model that can be practically implemented with an agenda

for further research.

CHAPTER STRUCTURE

The research design corresponds to the chapter structure. Part I establishes the requirements

of the model through Chapters 3 to 5. Part II develops and evaluates the model through

Chapters 6 to 7 with Chapter 8 concluding the thesis.

Chapter 2 is a personal reflection and introduces the case study of Australia’s RTF. Key tools

currently used for thinking at the tactical level are introduced including decision-making,

adaptive action and measures of effectiveness. The reader is familiarised with themes of

sensing bias, action flexibility, decision greyness and adaption indicators for non-kinetic 58 A similar method to that used by the United States Army Command and General Staff College for the modification of their MDMP will be used - Runyon, T., A MDMP For All Seasons: Modifying the MDMP for Success, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 26 May 2004. 59 Hsu, C. & Sandford, B.A., ‘The Delphi Technique: Making Sense of Consensus’, Practical Assessment, Research & Evaluation, Volume 12, Number 10, 2007, http://pareonline.net/getvn.asp?v=12&n=10.

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operations. Through the personal narrative, the chapter aims to give an overview of the

difficulties with current decision-making models from a practitioner’s viewpoint.

Chapter 3 establishes the theory assumptions. The chapter commences with a historical

evaluation of the spectrum and changing character of conflict. Definitions of war, irregular

war, conflict, emergencies and disasters, and the major theory concepts of national security,

manoeuvre warfare and human security are then addressed. The drivers of stability and

instability are included in the human security discussion. The stakeholders acting in these

environments are discussed including military, other government agencies, United Nations,

international agencies and aid agencies. Progression from broad objectives at the strategic

level to specific tasks at the tactical level then contextualise why military forces are deployed

to act for human insecurity challenges, addressing the debate surrounding military

humanitarianism. The chapter then examines the overlap, similarities and differences between

enemy and population centric activities. Next, Chapter 3 transitions from broad theory to

specific concepts for the junior commander. It describes the operating context of junior

military commanders including strategic corporals, three-block and complex war to describe

the key precepts of stakeholders, environment and tasks. The chapter concludes with the

criteria to define the operational environment and theory used to analyse the strengths and

weaknesses of the MAP.

Chapter 4 begins with a broad examination of decision-making, planning and thinking

methods including intrinsic, rational, analytical, rules-based, collaborative, network analysis

and design. The chapter then describes planning doctrine including the MAP and JOPP in

detail. It includes a discussion on nesting intent and synchronising effort laterally and up and

down the chain-of-command from the strategic to tactical level. Other Australian Army tools

include adaptive action and assessment, and United States tools, specifically the DSF and

ICAF are explained. Each tool is discussed against the requirements of a thinking model for

human insecurity challenges as concluded in the previous chapter.

Chapter 5 commences with a chronological overview of Australia’s deployment of military

forces to Afghanistan. Next, the operational detail of the RTF including mission, tasks,

structure and tactical environment is discussed. The methods of planning, thinking and

decision-making are analysed including discussion of the staff level planning and individual

thinking, and the nesting of intent from the Commanding Officer through to junior

commanders. The use of the MAP, adaptation cycle and assessment by junior commanders

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for tactical action is then outlined. Examples of events and missions from the RTF are used to

highlight discussion points. The chapter concludes with the baseline for values, barriers and

mitigating strategies for the MAP as well as the requirements for a thinking tool for a

population centric mission.

Chapter 6 outlines the development of the modifications for the MAP. Each step of the MAP

for both the IMAP and CMAP are examined against the model requirements with

modifications proposed where disparities exist. Next, a side-by-side analysis with the DSF

and ICAF is presented for cross-sectoral learning. The chapter ends with the proposed

modifications to the MAP with the value identified for each modification.

Chapter 7 gains consensus through expert interviews using the Delphi Technique. The chapter

commences with a broad discussion of the Delphi Technique and its use for this research. The

interview information is then outlined. Lastly, the consolidated modifications to the MAP that

combine the strengths of the research assumptions and ability for practical implementation are

presented.

The concluding chapter summarises the findings and discusses the implications for

policymakers who determine doctrine and training development. The thesis ends by noting

the potential utility for modifications to the MAP but also the limitations. The final chapter

draws conclusions and presents an agenda for further research.

SWITCH FLICKED

A thinking switch of questions was flicked for me when I returned to Afghanistan in 2008. I

saw the lights in Tarin Kowt but my peers did not. With different perceptions, starting points

and problem framing bias, how could we as junior commanders improve the way we thought

about people in order to act for people during conflict? My thinking did not correlate easily

with the linear process of decision-making in the MAP. It was clear that I did not have a

robust thinking process for the human dimension of conflict at the junior commander level

during my deployments.

As taken from Eisenhower ‘plans are useless but planning is indispensible’. To me, junior

commanders constantly thinking and learning in order to communicate, sense, act, decide and

adapt is indispensible and creates a network of learning which benefits their higher command.

Each individual enables more of the problem to be seen which helps frame problems and

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operational plans. Constant sensing of the effects on the ground from an implemented

operational plan then grounds the effectiveness of that plan in reality. This in turns enables

learning to improve the cycle of sensing, planning, deciding, acting and adapting.

This research will not add to the list of solutions for warfare or provide a roadmap for future

conflict. Nor does it aim to provide a retrospective solution for operations in Uruzgan

Province. Switching on lights will not help our next generation of junior commanders. Our

future junior military commanders will face their own unique version of my generation’s

Afghanistan. This research aims to provide a better foundation for junior military

commanders’ thinking so that their sensing and understanding of people is better placed than I

was to make decisions and share information for a population-centric mission.

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