Perils of Participatory DemocracyAuthor(s): Mukul KumarSource: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 40, No. 46 (Nov. 12-18, 2005), pp. 4857+4859Published by: Economic and Political WeeklyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4417397 .

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Discussion

Perils of Participatory Democracy MUKUL KUMAR

Arecent article on the status of panchayati raj (PR), 'Local Gover-

nance without Capacity Building: Ten Years of Panchayati Raj' (June 25, 2005), compares the situation in the three states ofMadhya Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Kerala. The findings of the essay are fairly consis- tent with the overall status of PR in India. The article, however, misses some struc- tural features of the PR phenomenon that have affected the growth of participatory democracy in the country in general and north India, in particular. These structural features are broadly the same all over India with some variations in degree and kind across states, which are exceptional. Kerala symbolises some of these changes of kind and stands out to some extent among the three states. I outline here some of the structural and procedural constraints gram panchayats (GPs) grapple with.

Structural Constraints

Just as participation became an important requirement to dwell upon for any discourse on development, participatory democracy has become one for politics. Political commitment in support of the mechanism of participatory democracy abound, but they lack the necessary vision and roadmap for making it successful. The steps under- taken to strengthen GPs are mostly worked out in excitement and haste. Decisions regarding delegation of the powers of planning, execution and monitoring to PR institutions are not clearly thought out. There are instances of delegation of either too little or too much to GPs, which remain incapable to handle them.

Many doubts are expressed regarding the seriousness of the intent of the changes that are usually envisaged by the political leadership. Most of these doubts relate to the creation of a parallel stream of political representation in addition to MPs and MLAs. This pluralisation of political

representation in the same region is seen as a threat to the power, influence and clout exercised by both bureaucracy and en- trenched power elites. The delegation of a lot of responsibilities to GPs in many states has led to rivalries cropping up within the political leadership. These have assumed different shapes and dimensions, depending upon the political sympathies of GP repre- sentatives. This could take either the shape of intra-party squabbles or inter-party conflicts leaving their imprint on smooth functioning of development activities at gram, block and district panchayat levels.

Even if we assume that the top political leadership of parties in power is serious and wants to make participatory demo- cracy a reality, it can be said that a lot more of strategic thinking and planning is needed to make PR institutions function on their own and not as an agent of bureaucracy or other politicians. The first step in this regard is strengthening of GPs. Participa- tory democracy in terms of participation of people in planning, execution and monitoring of activities meant for them leaves a lot to be desired. A roadmap outlining appropriate systems and proce- dures needs to be put in place, which would gradually help GPs negotiate the power for local level planning, execution and superintendence of whatever is public and meant for them - not only legally, but also administratively and socially.

The villagers in north India (based on my experience of Rajasthan and UP) are not yet enamoured by the potential and possibilities of gram panchayats. This should more or less hold true for all Hindi- speaking states. The turnout of villagers for gram sabha meetings is mostly low unless they are meant for some direct benefits. Gram sabhas rarely discuss is- sues related to superintendence of develop- ment works such as working of school or anganwadi centres or food for work programmes, the public distribution system and drought relief work, etc. On many occasions, gram sabha meetings are

notionally held and signatures of members are taken by visiting their houses to com- plete the formality. Peoples' apathy is, to a great extent, due to the lack of powers and resources available at the disposal of panchayats. The village development workers (VDWs), patwari and lekhpal continue to be the powerful functionaries in the local political set-up in rural India. The block development officer (BDO) still enjoys a significant clout at block level.

Procedural Constraints

The GP is constitutionally acknowledged as the third tier of the government struc- ture. It, however, does not exercise the autonomy and influence it ideally should. Political supremacy in the governance structure is the rule for the parliamentary system that we follow. The decisions at the GP should also be left to a group of local politicians, but it is, however, a different story at the field level. It is the bureaucracy which calls the shots.

Recently I had an opportunity to see the relationship between the GP and the bureaucracy very closely in UP. It is the pradhans who undertake the work, arrange for labour, assign tasks to them, supervise them, take measurements and keep a "kachcha" record. On many occa- sions the pradhans make payments out of their own pocket or otherwise and wait for the VDWs to come to the village to monitor. They also take measurements or enter the record of labour and material for admin- istrative purposes. The pradhan has to convince the VDW regarding the number of bricks used or number of trolleys of soil used. On many occasions the payment made by the pradhan to labour would not convince the VDW and he would make entries in records only that convinces him.

The pradhan's subordination to VDWs/ lekhpal is actuated by two reasons. One is an illicit relationship, of taking a share of public money, which the pradhans are cajoled, coerced or persuaded to agree to. In other cases pradhans are either not aware of their rights and responsibilities or not able to exercise them for lack of adequate support in their village, region or caste, A combination of both leads to this situ- ation in rural UP. The bureaucracy, from

Economic and Political Weekly November 12, 2005 4857

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its own end, also ensures that the pradhans do not ride over it.

The stratagems employed are as follows: (i) The secretariat/office of the gram panchayat is an elusive phenomenon. Hence, the pradhans do not have access to many information and circulars, which are meant to be shared with them.This lack of information on the part of the pradhan is used by the VDW to outsmart and further subordinate pradhans. (ii) Since financial resources are mostly available at the block or zilla panchayat levels, block officials have a say in sanc- tioning proposals made from villages. As resources are scarce in comparison to

proposals, allocations are done in favour of such pradhans who would dance to the block level officers' tunes. (iii) Monitoring and superintendance is another tool to question, negotiate and finalise the bureaucracy's share of the cake in the name of quality and the volume of work done in many instances. Resources are withheld or delayed to make pradhans agree to their terms and conditions. Many pradhans accept impositions such as an indefinite delay in their work and hence their commitment to their constituencies are not met without agreeing to these bureaucrats. To get work done pradhans need to be either politically/economically or socially powerful to counter all these stratagems or ready to collude with them. The majority of them are, however, subor- dinated to the operating system of bureau- cratic supremacy at least up to block level.

At this stage, I would like to make it clear that it's not that pradhans are always honest. I am discussing here the system that en- capsulates the relationship between the field arm of the bureaucracy and pradhans in north India, which is likely to corrupt even the best newcomers to local politics either through persuasion or coercion.

Conclusion

We have to be aware of field realities to plan intervention for effective function- ing of GPs. I must admit that, though sadly, we are not.

We need to be assured of the following: (i) Political supremacy should be the car- dinal principle for operations at the GP level. Systems and procedures should be worked out in such a manner that the pradhan of the GP is the supreme authority and all relevant/local government employ- ees should be available to carry out instruc- tions/decisions of the GP.

(ii) The resources need to be made avail- able at the panchayat level to make panchayat discussions meaningful and the agenda meaty enough for people to par- ticipate. A significant minimum level of resources for the gram panchayat should be disengaged from resources for block and zilla panchayats, and these should be allocated directly to GPs as in Kerala. (iii) The secretariat of GPs need to be made

fully functional and not just on paper. The VDW and lekhpals should compulsorily be based at the headquarters, i e, the village to which she/he is attached. This would make all documents, records and informa- tion accessible to sarpanchs/pradhans, ward members and other villagers, thereby building moral pressure on him to remain accountable to the pradhan, in particular, and the village, in general. Functionaries of other departments like extension workers of the agriculture or animal hus- bandry departments, etc, should also be based there. (iv) The capacity-building of pradhans is critically important. This should prefer- ably be done by some good voluntary organisations that could apprise him/her not only about rights and responsibilities, government schemes, panchayati raj struc- tures and functions, but also teach him/her some bit of activism, i e, involving people in meeting the requirements of effective functioning of panchayats and using them as a resource. Training organisations meant for panchayati raj in many of the states need to be reoriented as they tend to remain status quoist in orientation, teaching their clients mostly the "letter" of capacity- building, but not the "spirit".

The GPs in some states have been given too much responsibility without preparing them to handle it. This would discredit the GPs and other PR institutions. The load will take its toll. There would be mistakes in both approvals and execution of projects. The system would be happy to blame it on GPs and small-time politi- cians. Corruption related to panchayat works is on many occasions cited as the reason for not extending the cause of decentralisation any further. There is, however, little evidence to prove that the bureaucracy is a good substitute for the GP. Even if some corruption persists in the panchayati raj structure, we should risk it as we have given enough of a chance to political supremacy at the union and state levels in India. B2

Email: mksm_raj @rediffmail.com

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