CASE FACTS ISSUE PETITIONERS RESPONDENTS RULING RATIOPeople

VSMateo

On October 30, 1996, 10 informations, one for each count of (ten) rape (of Imelda Mateo who is the daughter of Private Respondent’s live-in partner Rosemarie Capulong. which all happened at times Imelda's mother is not around, were filed against appellant Efren Mateo. Imelda did not report any of the incidents because Efren Mateo had threatened to kill her and her mother if she will disclose the matter to anyone. Despite all the serious charges against him, appellant denied each. The lower court found Mateo guilty beyond reasonable doubt, imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Hence, this petition is elevated to the Supreme Court for review.

W/N the case should directly be forwarded to the Supreme Court by virtue of the express provision in the constitution on automatic appeal where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death? (Automatic review)

The Solicitor General, however, assails the factual findings of the trial court and recommends an acquittal of the appellant due to the instances wherein all the factual basis presented by the complainant are incoherent and incongruent. The evidences presented as well as the witnesses cannot be considered a proof beyond resonable doubt.

Petition REMANDED. Court held that all the facts of the case be forwarded.

Allowing an intermediate review by the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic review is a procedural matter within the rule-making prerogative of the SC than the law-making power of the Congress. Nonetheless, it has been held that the Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate review over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (or lower but involving offenses committed on the same occasion or arising out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed).

PeopleVS

Gutierrez

In the morning of May 22, 1970, a group of armed persons set fire to various inhabited houses in barrio Ora Centro, Bantay, Ilocos Sur. On the afternoon of the same day, several residential houses were likewise burned in barrio Ora Este of the same municipality and province, which resulted to the destruction of various houses and resulted in the death of an old woman. Two informations were filed in the Court of First Instance (one for arson with homicide and the other for arson), charging the 17 private respondents, together with 82 other unidentified persons, “confederating, conspiring, constabulating and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously burn

W/N the respondent judge committed grave abuse discretion when he failed to act upon the contention that cases should be transferred to Criminal Circuit court of 2nd Justice District due to the impending miscarriage of justice?

Respondents in their answer denied any abuse of discretion in view of the fact that the Administrative Order merely authorized the court below, but did not require or command.

YES THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

Respondent Judge, in construing Administrative Order No. 226 as permissive and not mandatory, acted within the limits of his discretion and violated neither the law nor the EOs mentioned. HOWEVER, in refusing to consider Department AO No. 226 of the Secretary of Justice as mandatory, respondent Judge failed to act upon the contention of the prosecuting officers that the cases should be transferred to the Criminal Circuit Court of the Second Judicial District because a miscarriage of justice was impending, in view of the prosecution witnesses to testify in the court where they felt their lives would be endangered

Thus, the SC held:That RA No. 5179

or caused to be burned several residential houses, knowing the said houses to be occupied.” Two of the accused furnished bail and voluntarily appeared before respondent Judge, were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. The Secretary of Justice issued Administrative Order No. 221, authorizing the Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District to hold a special in Ilocos Sur. Three days after, the Secretary of Justice further issued Administrative Order No. 226, authorizing respondent Judge to transfer the criminal cases to the Circuit Criminal Court. The prosecution moved the respondent Judge for a transfer of said cases to the Circuit Criminal Court, invoking the above-mentioned administrative Orders and calling

creating the Circuit Criminal Courts did not, and does not, authorize the Secretary of Justice to transfer thereto specified and individual cases;That the SC, in the exercise of the Judicial Power vested by the Constitution upon it and other statutory Courts, possesses inherent power and jurisdiction to decree that the trial and disposition of a case pending in a CFI be transferred to another CFI within the same district whenever the interest of justice and truth so demand, and there are serious and weighty reasons to believe that a trial by the court that originally had jurisdiction over the case would not result in a fair and impartial trial and lead to a miscarriage of justice.That in the present

attention to the circumstance that they were issued at the instance of the witnesses for reason of security and personal safety. The accused opposed such transfer and the respondent Judge declined the transfer sought on the ground that said Administrative Order only provided for transfer of cases to the Circuit Criminal Court where the interest of justice required it for more expeditious disposal of the cases; and in the cases involved the accused had already pleaded; that if the objective of the proposed transfer was to subsequently obtain a change of venue from the Supreme Court under Sec. 4 of RA No. 5179 the same should have been done right at the very inception of these cases. RA 5179 created the Criminal Circuit Courts for the purpose of alleviating

case there are sufficient and adequate reasons for the transfer of the hearing of th.e said criminal cases of the CFI of Ilocos Sur to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, in the interest of truth and justice.

the burden of the CFI, and to accelerate the disposition of criminal cases pending or to be filed therein, but nowhere indicates an intent to permit the transfer of preselected individual cases to the circuit courts. In view of the lower court’s denial of the motion to transfer the cases to the Criminal Court, the prosecution resorted to the SC for writs of certiorari and mandamus, charging abuse of discretion and praying to set aside the order of denial of transfer and to compel the CFI to remand the cases to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Secondary Judicial District.

First Lepanto

VS CA (power

to promulgate

rules; enforcemen

t of consti

Briefly, this question of law arose when Board of Investment, in its decision dated December 10, 1992 in BOI Case No. 92-005 granted petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s

W/N The appellate jurisdiction conferred by statute (Article 82 of E.O. 226) upon the Supreme

Petitioner's contention is that Circular No. 1-91 cannot be deemed to have superseded art. 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 (E.O.No.

It can be Supersede by Circular No. 1-91.2.

Clearly, Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal from

rights, pleading,

practice and procedure

in all courts

application to amend its BOI certificate of registration by changing the scope of its registered product from "glazed floor tiles" to "ceramic tiles."

Eventually, oppositor Mariwasa filed a motion for reconsideration of the said BOI decision while oppositor Fil-Hispano Ceramics, Inc. did not move to reconsider the same nor appeal therefrom. Soon rebuffed in its bid for reconsideration, Mariwasa filed a petition for review with respondent Court of Appeals pursuant to Circular 1-91.

The Code, which President Aquino promulgated in the exercise of legislative authority, is in the nature of a substantive act of Congress defining the jurisdiction of courts pursuant to Art. VIII,

Court cannot be amended or superseded by Circular No. 1-91. 2.

226)

Petitioner questions the holding of the Second Division that although the right to appeal granted by art. 82 of the Code is a substantive right which cannot be modified by a rule of procedure, nonetheless, questions concerning where and in what manner the appeal can be brought are only matters of procedure which this Court has the power to regulate.

decisions of the BOI are concerned. Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by statute was previously allowed to be filed directly with the Supreme Court, should now be brought to the Court of Appeals.

The argument that Article 82 of E.O. 226 cannot be validly repealed by Circular 1-91 because the former grants a substantive right which, under the Constitution cannot be modified, diminished or increased by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making powers is not entirely defensible as it seems. Respondent correctly argued that Article 82 of E.O. 226 grants the right of appeal from decisions or final orders of the BOI and in granting such right, it also provided where and

Sec. 2 of the Constitution, while the circular is a rule of procedure which this Court promulgated pursuant to its rule-making power under Art. VIII Sec 5(5).

in what manner such appeal can be brought. These latter portions simply deal with procedural aspects which this Court has the power to regulate by virtue of its constitutional rule-making powers.

Lina VS

Purisma (power of

SC to disregard its own rules)

Lualhati Lina was a bookkeeper at Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB). Petitioner files for mandamus to compel Cabanos (President of Phil. Veterans Bank) to restore Lina to her position. Lina claims she was removed from office by Cabanos who acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess in Jurisdiction. It appeared from the annexes of the amended petition that Lina was dismissed by Cabanos pursuant to LOI# 13 / LOI # 19 for being notoriously undesirable. 

Whether or not the SC has power to disregard its own rules.

YES. In the light of our view that RTC committed a grave error in declaring itself jurisdictionally impotent in the premises.

SC reinstated Lina to work.

*The obvious reason for such an extension in the exercise of the Court's pervasive power is that any other procedure would amount to an unnecessary rigmarole

What remains for SC to do is only to direct that petitioner's case be tried and decided by RTC judge on the merits. But this is the Supreme Court whose power and duty to do substantial justice in every case before it are inherent, plenary and imperative, hence extensive to all instances where it appears that final resolution of the controversy before it is feasible without denying any of the parties involved full opportunity to be heard. Stated differently, if in any case elevated to this Court for the correction of any

The RTC dismissed the petition. The RTC dismissed the petition because the removal of Lina was pursuant to LOI issued by the President pursuant to Proclamation 1081, the validity or legality of said act is beyond the power of the courts to review, much less modify, or reverse. This is one of the express limitations upon the power of the Courts in GENERAL ORDER # 3 by President Marcos.The General Order provides that the courts cannot rule upon the validity or legality of any decree order or act issued by President Marcos, pursuant to Proclamation 1081.

which can only augment the expenses, efforts and anxieties of the parties and uselessly delay the administration of justice, no other result for all concerned being anyway perceptible.

supposed procedural error of any lower court, it should be found that indeed there has been a mistake, and it further appears that all the facts needed for a complete determination of the whole controversy are already before the Court undisputed or uncontroverted by the parties, the Supreme Court may at its option, whenever it feels the best interests of justice would be thereby subserved, dispense with the usual procedure of remanding the case to the court of origin for its own judgment, and instead, the Supreme Court may already resolve the pertinent determinative issues and render the final judgment on the merits.

Santero VS CFI Cavite

Pablo Santero was had 2 sets of children from 2 different wives. He died. The respondents were the Santero Children, the children by the 2nd wife, although she was not married to the father. A motion for allowance was filed by the Santero children, through their guardian/ mother Diaz. The filed the motion for support, education, clothing, and medical allowance. This was granted by the court. This was opposed by the other set of Santero Children (petitioners), the children by the 1st wife, who was also not married to the father.

W/N the controlling law is the civil code or the rules of court

PET claim that the wards are no longer schooling and have already attained the age of majority.

Such request for allowance by Diaz was opposed by the other Santero Children (petitioners), claiming that the children are employed and married, and that there is insufficient funds. They claim that under the Rules of Court, they are no longer entitled to allowance.

Diaz countered that the reason why the children were not enrolled was due to lack of funds. She cited Art 290/188 of the Civil Code (on support), as well as Rule 83 of the Rules of Court (allowance to the widow and family in estate proceedings.

The allowance requested by Diaz was granted by the court. Another motion for allowance was filed by Diaz for 3 additional children. These 3 additional children were already of age, but Diaz claims that all of her children have the right to receive allowance, as advance of the shares in their inheritance.

The controlling provision should be Art 290/188 of the Civil Code (support) and not Rule 83 of the Rules of Court (allowance to widow and family) Since the provision of the Civil Code, a substantive law, gives the surviving spouse and the children the right to receive support during the liquidation of the estate of the deceased, such right cannot be impaired by Rule 83 of the Rules of Court which is a procedural rule.

The fact that respondents are of age, and are gainfully employed, or married is of no moment and should not be regarded as the determining factor of their right to allowance under Art 290/188.

While the Rules of Court limits allowances to the widow and only the minor children, the New Civil Code gives the surviving spouse and his/her children without distinction. Hence, even the children who are no longer minors are entitled to allowances as advances from their shares in the inheritance from their father.

Damasco VS

Laqui (prescription of crimes vs

rules of court)

Filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Mandaluyong, Branch 59, presided over by respondent Judge Hilario L. Laqui, petitioner Atty. Eugenio S. Damasco was charged with the crime of grave threats. He threatened one Rafael K. Sumadohat with the infliction upon his person. Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. After trial, respondent judge found that the evidence presented did not establish the crime of grave threats but only of light threats. As a result, petitioner was convicted of the latter crime and was sentenced to pay a fine of P100.00 and the costs. The affidavit complaint was filed with the Fiscal's after the lapse of 61 days from 8 July 1987. Upon the other hand, the crime of light threats, which is a light offense, prescribes in two (2) Months.

Whether or not it was proper for respondent Judge to still convict petitioner after finding him guilty of the lesser offense of light threats but which has already prescribed.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion to Rectify and Set Aside the dispositive part of respondent Judge's decision, contending that he cannot be convicted of light threats, necessarily included in grave threats charged in the information, as the lighter offense had already prescribed when the information was filed. Petitioner states that the crime was committed on 8 July 1987 and the information was filed only on 17 September 1987 or after the lapse of 71 days.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision is SET ASIDE.

Philippine jurisprudence considers prescription of a crime or offense as a loss or waiver by the State of its right to prosecute an act prohibited and punished by law. Hence, while it is the rule that an accused who fails to move to quash before pleading, is deemed to waive all objections which are grounds of a motion to quash, yet, this rule cannot apply to the defense of prescription, which under Art. 69 of the Revised Penal Code extinguishes criminal liability. Thus, as suggested by the cited memorandum, a departure from the ruling in Francisco vs. CA, can be done only "through an overhaul of some existing rules on criminal procedure to give prescription a limited meaning, i.e., a mere bar to the

commencement of a criminal action and therefore, waivable. But this will have to contend with the Constitutional provision that while the Supreme Court has the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and the legal assistance to the underprivileged, such rules shall not however diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.

Baguio Market

VendorsVS

Hon. Cortes (Congress

cannot repeal SC

rules)

Petitioner Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (petitioner) is a credit cooperative organized under Republic Act No. 6938 (RA 6938), or the Cooperative Code of the Philippines. Article 62(6) of RA 6938

The question is whether petitioner’s application for extrajudicial foreclosure is exempt from legal fees under Article

In 2004, petitioner, as mortgagee, filed with the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City (trial court) a petition to extrajudicially

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Orders dated 30 August 2004 and 6 October 2004 of the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City.

The 1987 Consti textually altered the power-sharing scheme under the previous charters by deleting in Section 5(5) of Article VIII. Congress’ subsidiary and corrective power.

exempts cooperatives:from the payment of all court and sheriff's fees payable to the Philippine Government for and in connection with all actions brought under this Code, or where such action is brought by the Cooperative Development Authority before the court, to enforce the payment of obligations contracted in favor of the cooperative.

In an Order dated 30 August 2004, Judge Iluminada Cabato-Cortes (respondent), Executive Judge of the trial court, denied the request for exemption.

62(6) of RA 6938.

foreclose a mortgage under Act 3135, as amended. Under Section 7(c) of Rule 141, as amended, petitions for extrajudicial foreclosure are subject to legal fees based on the value of the mortgagee’s claim. Invoking Article 62 (6) of RA 6938, petitioner sought exemption from payment of the fees.

Among others, i1987 Consti enhanced the rule making power of this Court [under] Section 5(5), Article VIII.

The payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Court’s institutional independence, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Court’s exclusive domain.

In re: Matter of

Clarification of

Exemption from

Payment of all court and

The petitioners, through counsel, requests for the issuance of a writ to clarify and implement the exemption of cooperatives from the payment of court and

W/N cooperatives are exempt from the payment of court and sheriff’s fees

Petition DENIED. The exemptions granted to cooperatives under R.A 6938; R.A9520 and OCA 44-2007 clearly do not cover the amount required to defray

sheriff’s fees sheriff’s fees pursuant to Republic Act No. 6938, as amended by R.A. 9520 known as the Philippine Cooperative Act of 2008. They contend that as a cooperative, they are exempted under Section 6, Art. 61 of R.A. 9520.

PHCCI claims that despite the exemptions granted by the aforementioned laws and issuances, they have been continuously assessed and were obliged to pay legal and other fees whenever it files cases in court.

the actual travel expenses of the sheriff, process server or other court-authorized person in the service of summons, subpoena and other court processes relative to the case.

2). 1 September 2009 Resolution exempted the cooperatives from court fees but not from sheriff’s fees/expenses.

3). Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Court’s institutional independence, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is

now the Court’s exclusive domain. That power is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, much less with the Executive.

4). The separation of powers keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by this Court. Viewed from this perspective, the claim of a legislative grant of exemption from the payment of legal fees under Section 39 of R.A. 8291 necessarily fails.

5). In many other cases, the Supreme

Court held its position that cooperatives are not exempt from paying court and sheriff’s fees. Hence, the exemption no longer exists. The Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to issue a circular clarifying that cooperatives are not exempt from the payment of the legal fees provided for under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.

Sto. TomasVS

Paneda (rules on crim pro

allows exception by law to rules on venue)

* wala ako mahanap na ok na digest

I will edit this

These consolidated cases pertain to the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995. On June 7, 1995 Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 that, for among other purposes, sets the Government’s policies on overseas employment and establishes a higher

standard of protection and promotion of the welfare of migrant workers, their families, and overseas Filipinos in distress.

In re Cunanan

- Controversies arose when Republic Act No. 972 “Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953” was enacted.

- Under the Rules of Court governing admission to the bar, “in order that a candidate (for admission to the Bar) may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject.” (Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court).

- Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by this court, and feeling conscious of having been discriminated against, unsuccessful

Whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional

UNCONSTITUTIONAL

In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the admission, suspension, disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial.

On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the

candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage lower than those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others, reduced the passing general average in bar examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946.

- The court expressed their unfavorable opinion about the bill passed by the Senate.

- On June 21, 1953, the President allowed R.A. 972 to become a law without his signature.

judicial and legislative departments of the government.

It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities may say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.

In Re UP Law Faculty

On April 28, 2010, the ponencia of Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo (Justice Del Castillo) in Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230) was promulgated. On May 31, 2010, the counselfor Vinuya, et al. (the "Malaya Lolas"), filed a Motion for

W/N there was plagiarism involved

Petition was DISMISSED. The petitoner law professors and practictioners were refrained from questioning the credibility of the verdict made by Judge Castello.

These cases clearly show that the absence of any formal charge against and/or formal investigation of an errant lawyer do not preclude the Court from immediately exercising its disciplining authority, as long as

Reconsideration of the Vinuya decision, raising solely the following grounds:I. Our own constitutional and jurisprudential histories reject this Honorable Courts’ (sic) assertion that the Executive’s foreign policy prerogatives are virtually unlimited; precisely, under the relevant jurisprudence and constitutional provisions, such prerogatives are proscribed by international human rights and humanitarian standards, including those provided for in the relevant international conventions of which the Philippines is a party. II. This Honorable Court has confused diplomatic protection with the broader, if fundamental, responsibility of states to protect the human rights of its citizens – especially where the rights asserted are

the errant lawyer or judge has been given the opportunity to be heard. As we stated earlier, Atty. Buffe has been afforded the opportunity to be heard on the present matter through her letter-query and Manifestation filed before this Court. (Emphases supplied.)Under the rules and jurisprudence, respondents clearly had no right to a hearing and their reservation of a right they do not have has no effect on these proceedings. Neither have they shown in their pleadings any justification for this Court to call for a hearing in this instance. They have not specifically stated what relevant evidence, documentary or testimonial, they intend to present in their defense that will necessitate a

subject of erga omnes obligations and pertain to jus cogens normsAccording to Attys. Roque and Bagares, the works allegedly plagiarized in the Vinuya decision were namely: (1) Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent’s article "A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens;" (2) Christian J. Tams’ book Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in International Law; and (3) Mark Ellis’ article "Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an International Crime."On July 22, 2010, Atty. Roque’s column, entitled "Plagiarized and Twisted," appeared in the Manila Standard Today. In the said column, Atty. Roque claimed that Prof. Evan Criddle, one of the authors purportedly not properly acknowledged in the Vinuya decision, confirmed that his work, co-authored with Prof. Evan Fox-Decent, had been plagiarized. Atty. Roque quoted

formal hearing.Instead, it would appear that they intend to present records, evidence, and witnesses bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case and in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC on the assumption that the findings of this Court which were the bases of the Show Cause Resolution were made in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, or were related to the conclusions of the Court in the Decision in that case.

Prof. Criddle’s response to the post by Julian Ku regarding the news report on the alleged plagiarism in the international law blog, Opinio Juris.

In Re IBP elections

At the helm of the IBP is the IBP National President (IBP-President),  who is automatically succeeded by the EVP. When the Philippine Bar was first integrated, both the IBP-President and the EVP were elected by the IBP-BOG from among themselves or from other members of the Integrated Bar, with the right of automatic succession by the EVP to the presidency for the next succeeding full term. The presidency rotated among all the nine regions in such order as the IBP-BOG had prescribed. Both the IBP-President and the EVP held a term of one (1) year, with the presidency rotating from year to year among the regions. On November 1, 1974,

To further avoid conflicting and confusing rulings in the various IBP cases like what happened to this one, the December 14,2010 Resolution and Velez, it is recommended that the Court create a committee for IBP affairs to primarily attend to the problems and needs of a very important professional body and to make recommendation for its improvement and strengthening.

the IBP By-Laws took effect, providing that the IBP-President and the EVP be chosen by the Board of Governors from among nine (9) regional governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. It was also provided that the IBP-President and the EVP hold office for a term of two (2) years from July 1 following their election until June 30 of their second year in office and until their successors shall have been duly chosen and qualified. Later, several amendments in the IBP By-Laws were introduced, among which were the provisions relating to the election of its national officers. In Bar Matter No. 287, dated July 9, 1985, the Court approved the recommendation allowing the IBP-President, the EVP and the officers of the House of Delegates to be directly elected by the House of Delegates.

Bustos VS

Lucero

Petitioner who was accused in a criminal case, filed a motion with CFI of Pampanga , praying that record of case be remanded to justice of peace court of Masantol, so petitioner may cross-examine complainant and witnesses with their testimony. It was denied.(started with Justice of Peace Court, now in CFI, then want to bring it back to Justice of Peace for re-examination)

1. Petitioner’s attorney memorandum submitted to CFI said that the accused appeared at the preliminary investigation. He pleaded not guilty before the Justice of Peace.

2. Counsel moved that complainant present her evidence so that she and witnesses could be examined and cross-examined. Fiscal and private prosecutor objected, invoking sec 11 of Rule 108. It was sustained.3. Accused’s council announced intention to renounce right to present evidence. Justice of Peace then forwarded it to CFI.

NO. SEC. 11, RULE 108 DOES NOT CURTAIL THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE'S SOUND DISCRETION ON THE MATTER

Dissenting: The right of the accused to examine and cross-examine evidence and witnesses against him is a Substantive Right! It is a substantive right because by exercising it, an accused person may show, even if he has no evidence in his favor, that the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution are not sufficient to indicate that there is a probability that a crime has been committed and he is guilty thereof, and therefore the accused is entitled to be released and not committed to prison, and thus avoid an open and public accusation of crime, the trouble, expense, and anxiety of a public trial, and the corresponding anxiety or moral suffering which a criminal prosecution always entails. Sec 11, Rule 108 diminishes this substantive right and therefore must be declared null and void..

Furthermore, the defendant cannot, as a matter of right, compel the witnesses to repeat in his presence what they had said at the preliminary examination before the issuance of the arrest. The constitutional right of the accused to confront/be confronted by witnesses against him does not apply to preliminary hearings. [Petition Dismissed. Costs against PET.]

Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be said to be synonymous. Substantive rights is a term which includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing