Pentagon Fuel Use, Climate Change and the Costs of War Final Fuel Use...1 Pentagon Fuel Use, Climate...
Transcript of Pentagon Fuel Use, Climate Change and the Costs of War Final Fuel Use...1 Pentagon Fuel Use, Climate...
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PentagonFuelUse,ClimateChange,andtheCostsofWar
NetaC.Crawford1BostonUniversity
June12,2019
Summary
Initsquestforsecurity,theUnitedStatesspendsmoreonthemilitarythananyothercountryintheworld,certainlymuchmorethanthecombinedmilitaryspendingofitsmajorrivals,RussiaandChina.Authorizedatover$700billioninFiscalYear2019,andagainover$700billionrequestedforFY2020,theDepartmentofDefense(DOD)budgetcomprisesmorethanhalfofallfederaldiscretionaryspendingeachyear.Withanarmedforceofmorethantwomillionpeople,11nuclearaircraftcarriers,andthemostadvancedmilitaryaircraft,theUSismorethancapableofprojectingpoweranywhereintheglobe,andwith“SpaceCommand,”intoouter-space.Further,theUShasbeencontinuouslyatwarsincelate2001,withtheUSmilitaryandStateDepartmentcurrentlyengagedinmorethan80countriesincounterterroroperations.2
Allthiscapacityforanduseofmilitaryforcerequiresagreatdealofenergy,mostofit
intheformoffossilfuel.AsGeneralDavidPetraeussaidin2011,“Energyisthelifebloodofourwarfightingcapabilities.”3AlthoughthePentagonhas,inrecentyears,increasinglyemphasizedwhatitcallsenergysecurity—energyresilienceandconservation—itisstillasignificantconsumeroffossilfuelenergy.Indeed,theDODistheworld’slargest
1NetaC.CrawfordisProfessorofPoliticalScienceatBostonUniversityandCo-DirectoroftheCostsofWarproject.CrawfordthanksMatthewEvangelista,AnnaHenchman,CatherineLutz,NathanPhillips,StephanieSavell,AdamSweeting,andAlexanderThompsonfortheircriticalcommentsandhelpfulsuggestionsonanearlierdraftofthispaper.CrawfordalsobenefitedfromfeedbackatOhioStateUniversityinApril2019. 2Crawfordhaspreviouslyestimatedthatthebudgetarycostsofthepost-9/11wars,includingHomelandSecurityandourfutureobligationstocarefortheveteransofthesewars,arenearly$6trilliondollars.NetaC.Crawford,“UnitedStatesBudgetaryCostsofthePost-9/11WarsThroughFY2019:$5.9TrillionSpentandObligated,”CostsofWarProject,November2018.https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2018/Crawford_Costs%20of%20War%20Estimates%20Through%20FY2019.pdf.3GeneralDavidPetraeus,quotedinDepartmentofEnergy,“EnergyfortheWarfighter:TheDepartmentofDefenseOperationalEnergyStrategy,”14June2011,https://www.energy.gov/articles/energy-war-fighter-department-defense-operational-energy-strategy.
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institutionaluserofpetroleumandcorrespondingly,thesinglelargestproducerofgreenhousegases(GHG)intheworld.4
ThispaperspecificallyexaminesmilitaryfuelusagefortheUSpost-9/11warsandthe
impactofthatfuelusageongreenhousegasesemissions.ThebestestimateofUSmilitarygreenhousegasemissionsfrom2001,whenthewarsbeganwiththeUSinvasionofAfghanistan,through2017,isthattheUSmilitaryhasemitted1,212millionmetrictonsofgreenhousegases(measuredinCO2equivalent,orCO2e).In2017,forexample,thePentagon’sgreenhousegasemissionsweregreaterthanthegreenhousegasemissionsofentireindustrializedcountriesasSwedenorDenmark.
DODemissionsforallmilitaryoperationsfrom2001to2017areestimatedtobeabout
766millionmetrictonsofCO2e.Andofthesemilitaryoperations,itisestimatedthattotalwar-relatedemissionsincludingforthe“overseascontingencyoperations”inthemajorwarzonesofAfghanistan,Pakistan,IraqandSyria,5aremorethan400MillionMetricTonsofCO2e.
TheUSmilitaryispreparingforthreatsofattackfromhumanadversaries.Thethreats
ofterrorism,Russian,Iranian,ChineseorKoreanaggressionareallreal,butterroristsandthesecountriesarenotcertaintoattacktheUS.Armscontrolanddiplomacycandeescalatetensionsandreducethreats.Economicsanctionscanalsodiminishthecapacityofstatesandnon-stateactorstothreatenthesecurityinterestsoftheUSanditsallies.
GlobalwarmingisthemostcertainandimmediateofanyofthethreatsthattheUS
facesinthenextseveraldecades.Infact,globalwarminghasbegun:drought,fire,flooding,andtemperatureextremesthatwillleadtodisplacementanddeath.Theeffectsofclimatechange,includingextremelypowerfulstorms,famineanddiminishedaccesstofreshwater,willlikelymakeregionsoftheworldunstable—feedingpoliticaltensionsandfuelingmassmigrationsandrefugeecrises.Inresponse,themilitaryhasaddedthenationalsecurityimplicationsofclimatechangetoitslonglistofnationalsecurityconcerns.
UnlikesomeelementsofthepresentUSadministration,whichisinvariousmodesof
climatedenial,theUSmilitaryandintelligencecommunityactasifthenegativesecurityconsequencesofawarmingplanetareinevitable.TheDODhasstudiedtheproblemfordecadesandbeguntoadaptitsplans,operationsandinstallationstodealwithclimatechange.
TheUSmilitaryhasanopportunitytoreducetherisksassociatedwithclimatechange
—andthesecuritythreatsassociatedwithclimatechange—byreducingtheirrolein 4Theseemissionsarearesultnotonlyofwar,butalsoofon-goingnon-waroperationsandmaintenanceofmilitaryinstallations.Foradiscussionoftheconceptofgreenhousegasequivalencies,seeAppendix1.Alsoseehttps://www.epa.gov/energy/greenhouse-gas-equivalencies-calculator.5SeeAppendix1.Thisisaconservativeestimate.Notincludingbiogenicsourcesorreductionsfromrenewableenergyuse;thelatterwerelessthan1percentofemissions.Inthemostrecentyearforwhichstatisticsareavailable,totalgreenhousegasemissionsbytheDODforFY2017wereabout58.4millionmetrictonsofCO2equivalent.
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creatinggreenhousegasemissions.Whilesomesealevelriseandmassextinctionwillcertainlyoccur—thesechangeshavealreadybegun—themostdireconsequencesofclimatechangeandtheassociatedthreatsandconsequencestonationalsecurityarenotalreadybakedintothesystem.6Thereistimetoacttoreducegreenhousegasemissionsanditisurgenttodoso.IftheUSmilitaryweretosignificantlydecreaseitsgreenhousegasemissionsitwouldmakethedireclimatechangecausednationalsecuritythreatstheUSmilitaryfearsandpredictslesslikelytooccur.
PartIofthispaperoutlinesthescaleandpatternofUSmilitaryfueluse,includingthe
oilthattheUSusestoprotectaccesstoPersianGulfoil.PartIIestimatesgreenhousegasemissionsbytheUSmilitaryandtheportionofthoseemissionsthatareaconsequenceofthemajorpost-9/11USwars.TheUSmilitaryhasbegungreenhousegasemissionsreductions,butthereisroomformuchsteepercuts.Forreadersinterestedinfurtherdetail,Appendix1elaboratesontechnicalissuesandsummarizesthesourcesofdataandassumptionsforthebestestimatesofgreenhousegasemissionstheUShasmadeinwarfrom2001to2017.
PartIIIofthepapersummarizesthewaytheUSmilitaryunderstandsthenational
securityimplicationsofthemilitary’soildependencyandclimatechange.ThePentagonviewsclimatechangeasathreattomilitaryinstallationsandoperations,aswellastonationalsecurity,whenandifclimatechangeleadsmassmigration,conflictandwar.YetthePentagondoesnotacknowledgethatitsownfueluseisamajorcontributortoclimatechange.ThemilitaryusesagreatdealoffossilfuelprotectingaccesstoPersianGulfOil.BecausethecurrenttrendisthattheUSisbecominglessdependentonoil,itmaybethatthemissionofprotectingPersianGulfoilisnolongervitalandtheUSmilitarycanreduceitspresenceinthePersianGulf.ThePentagoncanalsoreduceUSmilitarygreenhousegasemissionsinotherways.ThesealternativesarediscussedmoreinAppendix2,whichsuggestsspecificmeasuresCongressmightconsidertoreduceDODfossilfuelconsumption.
AbsentanychangeinUSmilitaryfuelusepolicy,thefuelconsumptionoftheUSmilitary
willnecessarilycontinuetogeneratehighlevelsofgreenhousegases.Thesegreenhousegases,combinedwithotherUSemissions,willhelpguaranteethenightmarescenariosthatthemilitarypredictsandthatmanyclimatescientistssayarepossible.
Reductionsinmilitaryfossilfuelusewouldbebeneficialinfourways.First,theUS
wouldreducegreenhousegasemissions.Thiswouldtherebymitigateclimatechangeanditsassociatedthreatstonationalsecurity.Second,reducingfossilfuelconsumptionwouldhaveimportantpoliticalandsecuritybenefits,includingreducingthedependenceoftroopsinthefieldonoil,whichthemilitaryacknowledgesmakesthemvulnerabletoenemyattacks.IftheUSmilitaryweretosignificantlydecreaseitsdependenceonoil,theUScouldreducethepoliticalandfuelresourcesitusestodefendaccesstooil,particularlyinthePersianGulf,whereitconcentratestheseefforts.Third,bydecreasingUSdependenceon 6Keepingglobalwarmingtolessthan1.5°Cyieldsamuchmorelivableplanetthaniftheclimatewarmsmorethanthat.IntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC),“GlobalWarmingof1.5°C,”SummaryforPolicymakers,(Switzerland:IPCC,2018).
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oil-richstatestheUScouldthenreevaluatethesizeoftheUSmilitarypresenceinthePersianGulfandreevaluateitsrelationshipwithSaudiArabiaandotheralliesintheregion.Finally,byspendinglessmoneyonfuelandoperationstoprovidesecureaccesstopetroleum,theUScoulddecreaseitsmilitaryspendingandreorienttheeconomytomoreeconomicallyproductiveactivities.
I.USMilitaryEnergyConsumptionandFuel
Warandpreparationforitarefossilfuelintensiveactivities.TheUSmilitary’senergyconsumptiondrivestotalUSgovernmentenergyconsumption.TheDODisthesinglelargestconsumerofenergyintheUS,andinfact,theworld’ssinglelargestinstitutionalconsumerofpetroleum.
Figure1tracksUSFederalgovernmentenergyuse.From1975until1990,theenergyconsumedbytheDODwasessentiallysteady.Duringthe1991GulfWar,USalliancepartners,namelySaudiArabia,providedmuchofthefuelusedinthatwar.Afterthe1991GulfWar,andwiththeendoftheColdWar,USmilitaryenergyconsumptiondeclineduntilthe9/11attacks.In2001,asaconsequenceofbeginningamajorwarinAfghanistan,energyconsumptionbytheDODincreased,andin2005hititshighestlevelinadecade.Since2001,theDODhasconsistentlyconsumedbetween77and80percentofallUSgovernmentenergyconsumption.Figure1.DODandTotalUSFederalGovernmentEnergyConsumption,1975-2017,inBTUs7
7InTrillionsofBritishThermalUnits.Sourceofdata:USEnergyInformationAdministration.https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/dataunits.php.
0
500
1000
1500
2000
TrillionsofB
ritish
The
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Units(B
TUs)
U.S.DepartmentofDefenseConsumption U.S.GovernmentTotalConsumption
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Sincethe2007EnergyIndependenceandSecurityActtheUSgovernmenthasgraduallydecreaseditsoverallenergyuse.8OnlyinFY2013didDODenergyconsumptionreturntothelevelitwasin2000.TheheadlinefromtheEnergyInformationAdministrationannouncingthetransitionsaid“DefenseDepartmentEnergyUseFallstoLowestLevelSince1975.”9Yet,evenasithasrealizedsignificantreductionsinfossilfueluse,thePentagon’sconsumptionremainshigh.Indeed,themilitaryannuallyconsumesmorefuelthanmostcountries.
Asthenextfigureillustrates,jetfuel,dieselfuel,andelectricityproductionarethe
largestelementsofDOD,andthereforeUSgovernment,energyconsumption.Figure2.CategoriesofEnergyConsumedbytheUSGovernmentandDOD10
WhydoestheUSmilitaryconsumesomuchenergy?It’sfighting“tooth”employsequipmentthatguzzlesfuelatanincrediblerate.Thelogistical“tail”andtheinstallationsthatsupportoperationsarealsoextremelyfuelintensive.Eventhemilitary’snon-armoredvehiclesarenotoriouslyinefficient.Forinstance,theapproximately60,000HUMVEEsremainingintheUSArmyfleetgetbetweenfourtoeightmilespergallonofdieselfuel.11 8EnergyIndependenceandSecurityActof2007,https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BILLS-110hr6enr/pdf/BILLS-110hr6enr.pdf/.SeetheDepartmentofDefense,“OperationalEnergyStrategy:ImplementationPlan,”March2012https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/dod/operational-energy-strategy_implementation-plan201203.pdf.9USEnergyInformationSystem,“DefenseDepartmentEnergyUseFallstoLowestLevelSince1975.”https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=19871.10Source:U.S.EnergyInformationAdministration,“U.S.FederalGovernmentEnergyCostsatLowestPointSinceFiscalYear2004,”2October2017,https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=33152.Overall,gasolineledtotalUSpetroleumconsumption,followedbydieselfuelandhomeheatingoil,andnaturalgases(HGLs)ofvarioustypes.11DanielGouré,“TheU.SArmy’sAll-ButForgottenVehicleFleet,”RealClearDefense,22August2017,https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/08/22/the_us_armys_all-but_forgotten_vehicle_fleet_112116.html.ThegashungryFordF-150pickuptruckgets17milespergalloninthecity;thehungrierChevroletSuburbangets15milespergalloninthecity.
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InstallationandOperationalEnergyUse
TheDODtracksitsenergyconsumptionintwobaskets.Energyusageforinstallationsisabout30percentofPentagonconsumption.AlthoughthesemilitaryinstallationsintheUSandabroadnecessarilysupportoperations,theDODtracksinstallationenergyuseseparately.12But,asthePentagonnotes,“Inmanyways,installationenergysupportswarfighterrequirementsthroughsecureandresilientsourcesofcommercialelectricalenergy,andwhereapplicable,energygenerationandstorage,tosupportmissionloads,powerprojectionplatforms,remotelypilotedaircraftoperations,intelligencesupport,andcyberoperations.”13
TheinstallationtailthatsupportsUSoperationsandpowerprojectioncapability
includesmorethan560,000buildingsatabout500installations,locatedonover27millionacresoflandintheUSandacrosstheglobe.14InFY2017,theDODspent$3.5billiontoheat,cool,andprovideelectricitytoitsfacilities,downfromthepreviousyear,whenitspent$3.7billion.15Eachinstallation,ofcourse,canproducegreenhousegasemissions.ThePentagonbuildingitselfemitted24,620.55metrictonsofCO2ein2013.16
DespitethefactthatinMay2018theTrumpadministrationrescindedtheObama
administration’sfederalenergyefficiencygoals,theDODremainscommittedtoreducingitsenergyconsumptionforpragmaticreasons.17ThePentagonandeachservicebranchhavemultipleprojectsunderwaytoreduceinstallationenergyuseandtheoveralltrendininstallationconsumptionoverthelasttenyearshasbeendownward.Effortstodecreaseenergyconsumptionatinstallationsincludegraduallyreplacingsomenon-tacticalfleetvehicleswithhybrid,pluginhybridandalternativefuelvehicles,reducingengineidling,developingsolarinstallationsatsomefortsandbases,andconcludingpowerpurchaseagreementsforwindandsolarenergy.18Theseeffortshavebornefruit,buttheretheUSmilitaryhasroomformorereductions.
12OfficeoftheAssistantSecretaryofDefenseforSustainment,“InstallationEnergy,”https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/IE/FEP_index.html.DepartmentofDefense,“2016OperationalEnergyStrategy,”https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/Downloads/OE/2016%20OE%20Strategy_WEBd.pdf,p.4.14Eachinstallationconsistsofoneormoresites,whichmayormaynotbelocatedcontiguoustotheinstallation.15StatementofHonorableLucianNiemeyer,AssistantSecretaryofDefense,Energy,InstallationsandEnvironment,beforetheSenateCommitteeonAppropriations,SubcommitteeonMilitaryConstruction,VeteransAffairs,andRelatedAgencies,”26April2018,p.13.https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/Downloads/Testimony/FY19%20EI&E%20Posture%20Statement%20-%20SAC-M.pdf.SeeOfficeoftheAssistantSecretaryofDefenseforEnergy,Installations,andEnvironment,“DepartmentofDefenseAnnualEnergyManagementandResilience(AEMR)Report,FiscalYear2016,(July2017)p.15.https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/Downloads/IE/FY%202016%20AEMR.pdf.16SeetheEPA,https://www.epa.gov/ghgreporting/ghg-reporting-program-data-sets.17ExecutiveOrder13693of19March2015“PlanningforFederalSustainabilityintheNextDecade”wasrevokedbyPresidentTrumpwithExecutiveOrder13834on17May2018.Seehttps://www.fedcenter.gov/programs/eo13834/andhttps://www.fedcenter.gov/programs/eo13693/.18TheDepartmentofDefenseEnergyPerformanceMasterPlanwasdevelopedinFY2011.
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Asfigure3belowshows,whiletheArmyisthemostenergyintensiveatitsinstallations,energyconsumptionatinstallationsisrelativelyequallysharedbytheservices.Figure3.DODInstallationEnergyConsumption,inBTUs,byService19
Theprofileoffossilfuelenergyconsumptionlooksdifferentwhenweconsider
“operational”energy.Operationalenergyuse,definedastheenergy“requiredfortraining,moving,andsustainingmilitaryforcesandweaponsplatforms”accountsfor70percentofDODenergyconsumption.20Mostoperationalenergyconsumedisintheformof“bulkfuel”purchasesofjet(JP-8andJP-5)anddieselfuel.21Operationalusevaries,ofcourse,dependingonwhattheUSmilitaryisdoinginanyparticularyear—itsongoingandoccasionalmissions.WhentheUSisengagedinwar,asonewouldexpect,consumptionofjetanddieselfuelsincrease.Theirratiowilldependonthetypesofoperationsthemilitaryisperforming—whetherthewarorparticularphaseofthewarislandorairintensive.
19Source:“Figure4.1:FY2017InstallationEnergy(GoalSubject)ConsumptionbyMilitaryService,”fromtheOfficeoftheAssistantSecretaryofDefenseforEnergy,Installations,andEnvironment,“DepartmentofDefenseAnnualEnergyManagementandResilience(AEMR)Report,FiscalYear2017,(July2018)p.12.20DepartmentofDefense,“OperationalEnergy,”https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/OE/OE_index.html.21TheservicesmaypurchasefuellocallyandbereimbursedbytheDefenseLogisticsAgency.UnitedStatesGeneralAccountabilityOffice,“BulkFuel:ActionsNeededtoImproveDOD’sFuelConsumptionBudgetData”(GAO-16-664)(September2016),p.6.https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/679682.pdf.
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ThefigurebelowshowsoperationalenergyuseinFY2014,whenDODoperationalconsumptionwas87.4millionbarrelsofpetroleum.Jetfuelconsumptionbyallthearmedservicesaccountedformorethan70percentofoperationalenergyusethatyear.Althoughallserviceshaveaircraft,theAirForceisthelargestuserofpetroleumjetfuelamongthearmedservices.In2014,theUSwaslargelyabsentfromIraq,hadreduceditsforcesinAfghanistan,andbeganitswaragainstISISinSyria,whichstartedinAugust2014withairstrikes.
Figure4.OperationalEnergyUsebyDomainandMission,FY201422
Becauseoperationalfueluseisgreaterthanforinstallationfueluse,theUSspends
moreonit.InFY2017theDODconsumedover85millionbarrelsofoperationalfueltopowerships,aircraft,combatvehicles,andcontingencybasesatacostofnearly$8.2billion.23
22DepartmentofDefense,“2016OperationalEnergyStrategy,”https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/Downloads/OE/2016%20OE%20Strategy_WEBd.pdf,p.4.23OfficeoftheAssistantSecretaryofDefenseforSustainment.TheDODnotesthat“Traditionally,thescopeofoperationalenergyexcludesnuclearenergyusedforthepropulsionoftheU.S.Navy’saircraftcarriersandsubmarines,aswellastheenergyusedformilitaryspacelaunchandoperations.Operationalenergydoesincludetheenergyneededtooperatethecarrier’sembarkedaircraftandhelicopters.”DepartmentofDefense,“OperationalEnergy,”[emphasisintheoriginal]https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/OE/OE_index.html.TheUSNavyusesmorethan180nuclearreactorstopowerover140submarinesandsurfaceshipsincludingall11USaircraftcarriersand70submarines.SeeDepartmentoftheNavy,“UnitedStatesNavalNuclearPropulsionProgram,”September2017.https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/migrated/nnsa/2018/01/f46/united_states_naval_nuclear_propul
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Operationalfuelconsumptionvariesmorethaninstallationfueluse.Forexample,operationalfuelconsumptioninFY2017waslowerthaninFY2016.24
Unsurprisinglythen,totalUSmilitaryfuelconsumptiontracksUSengagementinwars
andoccupations.Alltold,from1998to2017theUSpurchased2.4billionbarrelsofpetroleumfuel.25Sincethe9/11attacks,annualfuelpurchaseshaveaveragedmorethan120millionbarrelsofalltypesoffuel.Between2010and2015,thearmedservicespurchasedanaverageof102millionbarrelsoffuelperyearfromtheDOD.26PurchaseshavedeclinedinrecentyearsastheUShasreduceditsoperationsinIraqandAfghanistan,averagingabout100millionbarrelsayearfrom2013-2017.Figure5.DefenseLogisticsPetroleumProductPurchasesinMillionsofBarrels,FY1998-FY201727
sion_program_operating_naval_nuclear_propulsion_plants_and_shipping_rail_naval_spent_fuel_safely_for_over_sixty_years.pdf.24InFY2016theDODconsumedabout86millionbarrelsoffuelforoperationalpurposes.OfficeofUndersecretaryofDefenseforAcquisition,TechnologyandLogistics,“FiscalYear2016OperationalEnergyAnnualReport,”https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/Downloads/OE/FY16%20OE%20Annual%20Report.pdf.25The1999spikeinjetfuelpurchasescorrespondswiththe78-dayNATOairwarinKosovotowhichtheUScontributedmorethan500aircraft.ForstatisticsontheUSrole,seehttps://www.afhistory.af.mil/FAQs/Fact-Sheets/Article/458957/operation-allied-force/.26TheDODthuslikelyitselfemittedanaverageof44millionmetrictonsofCO2fromburningpetroleumperyearforthisperiodfromoilusealone.GAO,“BulkFuel:ActionsNeededtoImproveDOD’sFuelConsumptionBudgetData,”p.9.Carbonemissionsperbarrelofoilare0.43metrictons.SeeUSEnvironmentalProtectionAgency,GreenhouseGasesEquivalenciesCalculator,https://www.epa.gov/energy/greenhouse-gases-equivalencies-calculator-calculations-and-references.(Theaverageheatcontentofcrudeoilis5.80mmbtuperbarrel(EPA2018).Theaveragecarboncoefficientofcrudeoilis20.31kgcarbonpermmbtu(EPA2018).Thefractionoxidizedis100percent.5.80mmbtu/barrel×20.31kgC/mmbtu×44kgCO2/12kgC×1metricton/1,000kg=0.43metrictonsCO2/barrel.)27SourceofData:ReportsbytheDepartmentofDefensevariousyears.ForFY2017,seeDefenseLogisticsAgency-Energy,https://www.dla.mil/Portals/104/Documents/Energy/Publications/E_Fiscal2017FactBookLowRes2.pdf?ver=2018-03-29-073051-897.DefenseEnergySupportCenter,DESC,renamedtheDefenseLogisticsAgency-EnergyinFY2010.Alsoseehttps://www.dla.mil/Energy/About/Library/Publications/.AlsoseeThomasP.Frazier,etal,“FuelPriceEffectsonReadiness,”InstituteforDefenseAnalysis,May2014,p.C-2. https://www.ida.org/~/media/Corporate/Files/Publications/IDA.../P-5087.ashx.
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JetFuel,alltypes
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TheDODdoesnotreportfuelconsumptioninformationtoCongressinitsannual
budgetrequests.Indeed,althoughthePentagoncalculatesfuelconsumptionforinternalplanningpurposes,thisinformationisexplicitlywithheldbytheDODinitsreportingtoCongress.28TheDepartmentofEnergy,however,doesreportthefuelconsumptiondataformobilevehicleemissionsbytheUSmilitaryfrom1975to2017.Figure6illustratesthemixoffossilfuels,bytypefrom1975to2017.29
Figure6.DODVehicleFuelConsumption,1975-2017,inMillionsofGallons30
II.EstimatingUSMilitaryGreenhouseGasEmissionsandEffectsofRecentWarsHowmuchgreenhousegasdoestheUSmilitaryemit,andhowarethoseemissions
distributedbetweenbaseandoverseascontingencyoperations?Therearemanysourcesofgreenhousegasesrelatedtowarandpreparationforit.Specifically,therearesevenmajorsourcesofgreenhousegasemissionsonecouldconsider.31
28Actualandestimatedfuturepetroleum,oilandlubricantsconsumptionandcostsforaircraftareanalyzedontheDOD’sOP-26Aforms“POLConsumptionandCosts”whichexplicitlystatesthatfuelconsumptiondataisnottobesharedwithCongress:“TheOP-26AexhibitwillnotbeincludedinjustificationmaterialforwardedtoCongress.”Emphasisintheoriginal.DepartmentofDefense,Comptroller,DODFinancialManagementRegulation,Chapter3,p.3-108.https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/documents/fmr/archive/02aarch/02a_03old.pdf.29TheUSAirForceandArmyuseJP-8fuel;theNavyusesJP-5fuel.In2017jetfuelconsumptionaccountedforabout394TrillionBTU.Thiswasaslightdecreasefromthepreviousfiscalyear,whenitaccountedforabout398trillionBTUs.SeetheUSDepartmentofEnergy,ComprehensiveAnnualEnergyDataandSustainabilityPerformance,http://ctsedwweb.ee.doe.gov/Annual/Report/SiteDeliveredEnergyUseAndCostBySectorAndTypeAndFiscalYear.aspx.30DatafromtheDepartmentofEnergy,https://ctsedwweb.ee.doe.gov/Annual/Report/HistoricalFederalEnergyConsumptionDataByAgencyAndEnergyTypeFY1975ToPresent.aspx. .31Biogenicemissionsareexcludedinthesecalculations.TheDepartmentofEnergydoestracktheseforrecentyears.
6,296
37,918
14
592
181,436
6,329
GASOLINE
DIESEL
LPG/ PROPANE
AVIATION GAS
JET FUEL
NAVY SPECIAL FUEL
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1. Overallmilitaryemissionsforinstallationsandnon-waroperations.2. War-relatedemissionsbytheUSmilitaryinoverseascontingencyoperations.3. EmissionscausedbyUSmilitaryindustry—forinstance,forproductionofweapons
andammunition.4. Emissionscausedbythedirecttargetingofpetroleum,namelythedeliberate
burningofoilwellsandrefineriesbyallparties.5. Sourcesofemissionsbyotherbelligerents.6. Energyconsumedbyreconstructionofdamagedanddestroyedinfrastructure.7. Emissionsfromothersources,suchasfiresuppressionandextinguishingchemicals,
includingHalon,agreenhousegas,andfromexplosionsandfiresduetothedestructionofnon-petroleumtargetsinwarzones.
IfocushereonthefirsttwosourcesofmilitaryGHGemissions—overallmilitaryand
war-relatedemissions—andbrieflydiscussmilitaryindustrialemissions.Domesticandoverseasmilitaryinstallationsaccountforabout40percentofDOD
greenhousegasemissions.32AsweseefromFigures5and6above,jetfuelisamajorcomponentofUSmilitaryfueluseandthereforeofgreenhousegasemissions.Duringeachairmission,aircraftputshundredsoftonsofCO2intheair,nottomentionthesupportactivitiesofnavalandgroundbasedassetsfortheseairmissions.TheUSwarsinAfghanistanandIraqbeganwithdaysofmassiveairstrikes.Moreover,ineachcase,materialwasflowntothewarzonesandbasesweresetuptoprosecutethewarsandoccupations.Similarly,theUSwaragainstISISinSyriaandIraq,whichbeganinAugust2014hasentailedtensofthousandsofaircraftsortiesforvariousmissions—fromreconnaissance,toairlift,refueling,andweaponsstrikes.33AB-2BomberonamissionfromWhitemanAirForceBaseinMissourimightberefueledmanytimes.Forexample,on18January2017,twoB-2Bbombers,accompaniedby15KC-135andKC-10aerialrefuelingtankersmadea30hourroundtripmissionfromWhitemanAirForceBasetoLibyatodropbombsonISIStargetsinLibya.34
Forpurposesofillustration,Table1,below,showsthecapacitiesandrelativefuel
efficiencyofseveralAirForceaircraftandemissionswithoutaerialrefueling.Notethatthefueleconomyoftheseaircraftismeasurednotinmilespergallon,butgallonspermile.35
32SenateAppropriationsCommittee,Report(S.Rept.112-168,22May2012).QuotedinMosheSchwartz,KatherineBlakely,andDonaldO’Rourke,“DepartmentofDefenseEnergyInitiatives:BackgroundIssuesforCongress,”CongressionalResearchService,10December2012,p.48.33SeeDatafromUSCentralCommand.https://www.afcent.af.mil/Portals/82/Documents/Airpower%20summary/(U)%20APPROVED%20Dec%202018%20APS%20Data.pdf?ver=2019-02-08-022732-933.34SeeTomDemerly,“AllWeKnowAbouttheU.S.B-2Bombers30-hourRoundTripMissiontoPoundDaeshinLibya,”TheAviationist,29January2017.https://theaviationist.com/2017/01/20/all-we-know-about-the-u-s-b-2-bombers-30-hour-round-trip-mission-to-pound-daesh-in-libya/.35Fuelusedependsontheflightprofileoftheaircraftandotherfactors,suchasload.Bycontrastwithmilitaryaircraft,acommercialBoeing747getsabout5gallonspermile,andcancarryover500passengers.
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Table1.ExamplesofUSMilitaryAircraftJetFuelConsumptionandCO2Emissions36Aircraft Mission Internal
FuelCapacitypoundsandingallons37
Rangeinnauticalmilesoninternalfuel
Fuelconsumption,gallonspernauticalmile
MetricTonsofCO2eEmissions,withoutaerialrefueling.38
B-2 Bomber 167,000lbs/25,692gal
6,000 4.28gallons/mile
251.4MetricTons
F-35A(CTOL)
Fighterbomber
18,499lbs/2,846gal
1,199 2.37gallons/mile
27.8MetricTons
A-10 CloseAirSupport
11,000lbs/1,692gal
500 3.38gallons/mile
17.5MetricTons
KC-135R RefuelingTanker
50,000lbs/7,692gal
1,500(loadedwith150,000lbsoftransferfuel)
4.9gallons/mile
75.3MetricTons
KC-46A39
RefuelingTankerandCargo
Estimated16,000gal
6,385(loadedwith210,000lbsoftransferfuel)
Estimated2.9gallons/mile
156.5MetricTons
ThePentagondoesnotpubliclyandregularlyreportitsfuelconsumptionor
greenhousegasemissions,andthereisnoofficialpubliclyavailableDODsourceforallmilitarygreenhousegasemissions.40Itispossible,however,toestimatetheoverallgreenhousegasoftheUSmilitaryusingpubliclyavailableemissionsdatafromtheDepartmentofEnergyforrecentyears,FY2008andFY2010-2017andfuelconsumption
36Calculatedbytheauthorfromdataabouteachaircraft.Forinstance,theB-2carries167,000poundsofjetfuel(almost25,000gallons)totravel6,000nauticalmiles(c.6.900miles)andiscapableofmid-airrefueling,takingonanadditional99,000poundsoffuelateachrefueling.TheF-35A,withacombatradiusestimatedtobeabout584nauticalmileshasaninternalfuelcapacityof2,761gallons.TheA-10hasaninternalfuelcapacityof1,642gallonsofjetfuelhasacombatradiusofabout250nauticalmiles.37Assumingeachpoundofjetfuelweighsanaverageof6.5pounds.38SeetheAppendix.39TheKC-46Acanrefuelitself.Boeinghasnotreleaseddataonitsinternalfuelcapacity.TheestimatehereforfuelcapacityandconsumptionisbasedontheBoeing767-400ERrangeandfuelcapacity.40SomehavetriedtoestimatethegreenhousegasemissionsofthePentagoninwar.See,forinstance,NikkiReischandSteveKretzman,“AClimateofWar:TheWarinIraqandGlobalWarming,”OilChangeInternational(March2008),http://priceofoil.org/content/uploads/2008/03/A%20Climate%20of%20War%20FINAL%20(March%2017%202008).pdf.
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datafortheperiodof1975to2017.Thisdataallowsanestimateofhowmuchoftheseemissionsmaybeattributabletowar.
WhiletheDODcategorizesitsenergyuseintoinstallationsandoperations,the
DepartmentofEnergyusesdifferentcategories,dividinggovernmentdepartmentsCO2equivalentemissionsintothreecategories—standardoperations,non-standardoperationsandbiogenicemissions.41Becausethepaperfocusesongreenhousegasemissionsresultingfromfossilfueluse,biogenicemissionsarenotincludedintheestimates;biogenicemissionsaremuchsmallerthanstandardandnon-standardemissions.
ByDepartmentofEnergydefinition,non-standardoperationsare“vehicles,vessels,
aircraftandotherequipmentusedbyFederalGovernmentagenciesincombatsupport,combatservicesupport,tacticalorreliefoperations,trainingforsuchoperations,lawenforcement,emergencyresponse,orspaceflight(includingassociatedground-supportequipment).Non-Standardoperationsalsoincludethegenerationofelectricpowerproducedandsoldcommerciallytootherparties.”42Standardoperationsappeartobeeverythingelsethatadepartmentdoestoaccomplishitsfunctions,rolesandmissions.TheDepartmentofEnergyreportsthattheUSDODhasproducedatotal(standardandnon-standard)of527millionmetrictonsofCO2equivalentfrom2010to2017,anaverageofabout66millionmetrictonsperyearinthisperiod,roughlythesamegreenhousegasemissionsof14millionpassengercarsdrivenforoneyear.43
DepartmentofEnergydata,wereusedtoestimatethetotalgreenhousegasemissions
forstandardandnon-standardoperationsoftheDODfromFY2001-2017tobeatotalof1,212millionmetrictonsofCO2equivalent.Inanyoneyear,thePentagon’semissionsaregreaterthanmanysmallercountriestotalgreenhousegasemissions.Forexample,in2017,USDODgreenhousegasemissionswere59millionmetrictons(notincludingbiogenicemissions)ofCO2e.Inthatsameyear,PentagonemissionsweregreaterthanFinland,whichemitted46.8millionmetrictons,Swedenwhichemitted50.8millionmetrictons,andDenmarkwhichemitted33.5millionmetrictonsofCO2e.44
41DepartmentofEnergyFederalEnergyManagementProgram.EnergyInformationAgency,ComprehensiveAnnualEnergyDataandSustainabilityPerformance,http://ctsedwweb.ee.doe.gov/Annual/Report/ComprehensiveGreenhouseGasGHGInventoriesByAgencyAndFiscalYear.aspx.ThesecategoriesdonotcorrespondtotheEPAGreenhouseGasInventoryReports,nortotheDODcategories.42BesidestheDOD,onlytheDepartmentofHomelandSecurityperformsasignificantamountof“non-standardoperations.”DepartmentofEnergy,https://ctsedwweb.ee.doe.gov/Annual/Report/ComprehensiveGreenhouseGasGHGInventoriesByAgencyAndFiscalYear.aspx.43Therewereabout268millionpassengervehiclesintheUSin2016.SeetheEPA,passengervehiclesperyear,https://www.epa.gov/energy/greenhouse-gases-equivalencies-calculator-calculations-and-references#vehicles.44M.Muntean,D.Guizzardi,etal,FossilCO2EmissionsofAllWorldCountries:2018Report(JointResearchCentre,EuropeanCommission,2018)https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/publication/eur-scientific-and-technical-research-reports/fossil-co2-emissions-all-world-countries-2018-report
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Figure7.EstimateofDODGreenhouseGasEmissions,MillionsofMetricTonsCO2efromTotalandNon-StandardDODoperations,2001-201745
HowmuchofthetotalGHGemissionsshouldbeattributedtoUSpost-9/11wars?AsdiscussedinAppendix1,therearevariouswaystoestimatethis.TheestimateofgreenhousegasemissionsinthemajorwarsisbasedontheproportionoffuelusebyCentralCommand,whichisthecommandresponsibleforoperationsinAfghanistanandIraqandSyria.InFY2014(seefigure4)thiswasabout24percentofthetotalnon-standardoperationalfuelconsumptionbytheDOD.ButbecausetheUScounterterroroperationsareunderwayallovertheworld(inabout80-90countries)theCentralCommandisnottheonlywarzoneintheglobalwaronterror.TheportionofallgreenhousegasemissionsrelatedtoCentralCommandincludingoverseascontingencyoperations,andtheGlobalWaronTerror,isestimatedtobeabout35percentoftotalgreenhousegasemissionsfornon-standardandstandardoperations.
Table2.EstimatedDODandWarRelatedOverseasContingencyOperationGreenhouseGasEmissions,MillionsofMetricTonsCO2e,2001-201746
TotalDODCO2eEmissionsinMillionsofMetricTons
OCO-relatedCO2eEmissionsinMillionsofMetricTons
Standard 445 155.84Non-standard(directlysupportcombat) 766 268.21TotalEmissionsbyCategory 1,212 424.06
45BasedonDepartmentofEnergydata.MethodsaredetailedintheAppendix.46BasedonDepartmentofEnergydata.
-
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
MillionsofM
TCO
2e
StandardEmissions Non-StandardEmissions TotalCO2eEmissions
15
TheestimateabovefocusesonDODemissions.Yet,acompleteaccountingofthetotal
emissionsrelatedtowarandpreparationforit,wouldincludetheGHGemissionsofmilitaryindustry.Militaryindustrydirectlyemploysabout14.7percentofallpeopleintheUSmanufacturingsector.47AssumingthattherelativesizeofdirectemploymentinthedomesticUSmilitaryindustryisanindicatorfortheportionofthemilitaryindustryintheUSindustrialeconomy,theshareofUSgreenhousegasemissionsfromUSbasedmilitaryindustryisestimatedtobeabout15percentoftotalUSindustrialgreenhousegasemissions.48Ifhalfofthosemilitaryrelatedemissionsareattributabletothepost-9/11wars,thenUSwarmanufacturinghasemittedabout2,600millionmegatonsofCO2equivalentgreenhousegasfrom2001to2017,averaging153millionmetrictonsofCO2eeachyear.
Figure8.GreenhouseGasesAttributabletoMilitaryIndustryfrom2001-201749
Finally,otheremissionssourcesthatarenotcalculatedorestimatedheremaybesignificantsourcesofgreenhousegasses.Specifically,itwasnotpossibletoestimatetheemissionsduetotheburningofoilbysabotageanddestructionofoilinfrastructureby
47In2016,839,171peopleworkedinUSDefenseIndustriesoutofatotalof12,348,100jobstotalintheUSmanufacturingsector.SeeDeloitte,“2017AerospaceandDefenseSectorExportandLaborMarketStudy,”p.13.https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/manufacturing/us-2017-us-A&D-exports-and-labor-market-study.pdfandtheUSBureauofLaborStatisticshttps://www.bls.gov/emp/tables/employment-by-major-industry-sector.htm.LouisUchitelle,“TheU.S.StillLeansontheMilitary-IndustrialComplex,”TheNewYorkTimes,22September2017,https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/22/business/economy/military-industrial-complex.html.In1992,about14.4percentofmanufacturingjobswereinmilitaryindustries.AnnMarkesonandS.S.Costigan,eds.,ArmingtheFuture:ADefenseIndustryforthe21stCentury(NewYork:CouncilonForeignRelations,1999)p.341.ManufacturingaccountsformostoftheindustrialsectorsgreenhousegasemissionsaccordingtotheannualEPAInventoryofU.S.GreenhouseGasesandSinks,1990-2017.Themostrecentisfoundathttps://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2019-02/documents/us-ghg-inventory-2019-main-text.pdf.48Thisdoesnotincludeindirectjobsandthereforeindirectmilitaryrelatedemissions.49CalculatedfromU.S.GreenhouseGasEmissionsbyEconomicSectorwithElectricity-RelatedEmissionsDistributed(MMTCO2Eq).EPA“InventoryofU.S.GreenhouseGasesandSinks,1990-2017.”
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
MillionsofM
etric
Ton
s
GHGAttributedtoMilitaryIndustry EstimateofMilitaryIndustryGHGattributabletowar
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belligerents,theenergyconsumedbyreconstruction,inparticularinmakingcement,andemissionsfromothersources.Ofthese,theemissionsfromburningoilinfrastructureinIraqandSyriamaybethelargest.Inthe2003invasionofIraq,oilwellsweresetalightbytheIraqimilitaryandburnedforseveralmonths.50Oilinfrastructurewastargetedagainin2015,whentheUSbombedoilinfrastructureinIraqandSyriaasameansofreducingISISrevenue.AndwhenISISretreated,itsetoilwellsandpipelinesonfireinIraqandSyria.51Inmanycases,thesefiresburnedforseveralmonths.Forinstance,startinginSeptember2014theUStargetedtankertrucks,andoilrefineryandstoragesitescontrolledbyISISasameansofcuttingofftheirrevenuestream.InOctober2015,theUSattackedmoreoilproducingISIScontrolledoilinfrastructure.52Further,NATOtankerswereoftenattackedbymilitantsandburnedduringtheirtransitthroughPakistanintoAfghanistan.
Inaddition,itwouldbepossible,usingthemethodsusedhereforUSmilitary
greenhousegasemissions,tocalculatetheemissionsofotherbelligerents.Morethan60countriesjoinedtheUSintheirwarinAfghanistan,37foughtwiththeUSintheIraqWar,andmorethan60werealliedwiththeUSinthewaragainstISIS.Theseemissionsmaybesubstantial.
Inadditiontoaccountingforgreenhousegasemissions,afullassessmentoftheclimate
changeconsequencesofwarwouldincludethelossofactualandfuturecarbonsequestrationduetodeforestation.Deforestationmayoccuraspeopledisplacedbywaruseforestsforshelterandfuel.Insomewars,suchastheUSCivilWarandtheVietnamWar,forestsweredeliberatelyburnedtodepriveadversariesofplacestohide.InAfghanistan,warcausedmigrationandillegalloggingappeartobethechiefcauseofdeforestation.ThecausesofdeforestationinIraqarecomplexbutincludewar.53
50Iraqdidthesameinthe1991GulfWar,settingoilproductionfacilitiesinKuwaitalightastheyretreated.InAprilandMay1991,anestimated3millionbarrelsofoilwereburningeachday,1or2milliontonsofcarbondioxide,orabout2percentofworldwideCO2emissionsfromfossilfuelandbiomass.CongressionalResearchService,“TheEnvironmentalImpactoftheGulfWar,”fortheUnitedStatesSenateCommitteeonEnvironmentandPublicWorksGulfPollutionTaskForce,March1992,pp.10and24.Outofthe82millionbarrelsreleasedonlandandatseaduringthe1991GulfWar,anestimated11millionbarrelsofoilspilledintothePersianGulf,coatingthecoastlinesofnotonlyKuwait,butothercountriesintheGulf,includingSaudiArabia,andIran.Morethanadecadelater,muchofthatoilremainedincoastalareas.SeeErichR.Gundlach,JohnC.McCain,andYusefH.Fadallah,“DistributionofOilAlongtheSaudiArabianCoastline(May/June1991)asaResultoftheGulfWarOilSpills,”MarinePollutionBulletin,vol.27,(1993)pp.93-96.DagmarSchmidt-Etkin,“SpillOccurrences:AWorldOverview,”inMervinFingas,ed.,OilSpillScienceandTechnology(Amsterdam:Elsevier,2011)p.8andJacquelineMichel,“1991GulfWarOilSpill,”inFingas,ed.OilSpillScienceandTechnology,pp.1127-1132.51SaifHameedandDominicEvans,“IslamicStateTorchesOilFieldNearTikritasMilitiaAdvances,”Reuters,5March2015,https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-idUSKBN0M10Z420150305.52ThiswasknownasOperationTidalWaveII.SeeMatthewReed,“BlowinguptheIslamicState’sOilCompany,”ForeignPolicy,26October2016,https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/10/26/blowing-up-the-islamic-states-oil-company-isis-abu-sayyaf/.53ZabihullahGhazi,“Afghanistan’sForestCoverIllegallyStrippedAway,”EnvironmentNewService,29August2013,https://ens-newswire.com/2013/08/29/afghanistans-forest-cover-illegally-stripped-away/.UNEnvironment,“SalvagingIraq’sRemainingWilderness,”10July2018.https://www.unenvironment.org/news-and-stories/story/salvaging-iraqs-remaining-wilderness.
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III.NationalSecurityThreatsPosedbyOilDependencyandClimateChange
Threenationalsecurityconcernsoverlap.First,theUSgovernmenthaslongbeenconcernedaboutdependencyonPersianGulfOil.Atthesametime,someportionofthemilitary’soperationalfuelconsumptionisrelatedtomissionsassociatedwithprotectingaccesstooilandprotectingtheregimesthatassureUSandglobalaccesstooil.Somebelievethismissionisvital,whileothersquestionwhetheritisstillnecessary.Whetherornotthismissionisessential,operationstoensureaccesstooilareexpensive,nottomention,fuelintensive.Byoneestimate,theannualincrementalcostofUSoperationstoprotectagainstthreatsagainstPersianGulfoilisabout$5billion.54Byanotherestimate,ataminimumtheUSspendsabout$81billionannuallydefendingtheglobaloilsupply.55
Second,theDODhasbecomeincreasinglyconcernedthatclimatechangeposesthreats
andchallengestothemilitaryasaninstitution,specificallytomilitaryinstallationsandoperations.ThisiscoupledwithaconcernthatfueldependencymakestheUSmilitaryvulnerable.TheUShasreducedfuelconsumptionsothatitislessdependentonfossilfuel.
Andthird,thePentagonisconcernedwiththethreatsclimatechangeposeto
internationalsecurity,namelymassivemigrationandpotentiallywar.However,themilitaryseemsunawareofhowmuchitseffortstoprotectaccesstoPersianGulfOil,itsothermilitaryoperationsincludingwar,andconsumptionatinstallationsareamajordriverofgreenhousegasemissions,andthereforeultimatelyofclimatechange.
Insum,theDODassumesthatclimatechangewillbeadisasterfortheinstitutionand
theplanetnomatterwhattheydo,evenastheybelievethattheymustcontinuetoprotectaccesstoPersianGulfoilsothattheUSandtherestoftheworldcanburnasmuchoilasitwantsataslowapriceperbarrelaspossible.ThePentagonfocusestheireffortsonadaptingtoclimatechangeandpreparingforclimatecausedinsecurity,evenastheycontinuetoensurethatAmericanscontinuetohaverelativelyinexpensiveaccesstoimportedoil.ProtectingPersianGulfOil:IsthisStillaVitalMission?
Theconcernaboutaccesstooilistwofold.TheUSeconomyremainsheavilyreliantonoil.Themilitaryhasdefendedagainstseveralscenariosregardingacut-offofPersianGulfoil.ThefirstscenarioisthethreatthatahostilepowerwouldgaincontrolofoilinthePersianGulf—forinstancebyoccupyingSaudiArabiaandKuwaitorbyblockingtheStraitofHormuz—andbeabletocontrolworldsupplyandincreasethepriceofoil.Inresponsetothefirstfear,theUScreatedtheStrategicPetroleumReservein1975andtheRapidDeploymentForce(RDF)in1979,whosespecificmissionwastodefendUSinterestsinthe 54EugeneGholz,“U.S.SpendingonItsMilitaryCommitmentstothePersianGulf,”inCharlesL.GlaserandRosemaryA.Kelanic,eds.,CrudeStrategy:RethinkingtheU.S.MilitaryCommitmenttoDefendPersianGulfOil(Washington,DC:GeorgetownUniversityPress,2016),pp.167-195.55SecuringAmerica’sFutureEnergy,“TheMilitaryCostofDefendingtheGlobalOilSupply,”21September,2018,http://secureenergy.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Military-Cost-of-Defending-the-Global-Oil-Supply.-Sep.-18.-2018.pdf.
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MiddleEast,includingoil.InJanuary1983,whenUScommandswerereorganized,theRDFbecameUSCentralCommand(CENTCOM).Figure9.ZonesofUSMilitaryCommands
WhenIraqinvadedKuwaitin1990,theBushAdministrationreiteratedtheimportance
ofoilintheregioninNationalSecurityDirective45.“U.S.interestsinthePersianGulfarevitaltothenationalsecurity.Theseinterestsincludeaccesstooilandthesecurityandstabilityofkeyfriendlystatesintheregion.TheUnitedStateswilldefenditsvitalinterestsinthearea,throughtheuseofU.S.militaryforceifnecessaryandappropriate,againstanypowerwithinterestsinimicaltoourown.”56In1991theUSevictedIraqfromKuwaitnotonlybecausetheIraqiinvasionofKuwaitwasillegal,butalsoinpartbecauseitfearedthatIraqposedathreattoSaudiArabia,andthustoAmericanaccesstooil.
Sincethen,theUShasstationedlargenumbersoftroopsinthePersianGulfatArmy,
Navy,andAirForcebases.TheAfghanandIraqwarsincreasedtheUSpresenceintheregion,aswellasUSmilitarypetroleumconsumption.Inlate2008,inadditiontotheconcernthatalocalstatemighttrytocontroltheflowofoilfromthePersianGulf,PresidentGeorgeW.BushaddedtheconcernthatextremistsmightcontroloilandtrytoblackmailtheUS:“Youcanimaginethemsaying,‘We’regoingtopullabunchofoiloffthemarkettorunyourpriceofoilupunlessyoudothefollowing.Andthefollowingwouldbealongthelinesof,well,‘Retreatandletuscontinuetoexpandourdarkvision.’"57
TheideathattheUShastoprotecttheglobalflowofoil,andmorespecificallyoilfrom
thePersianGulf,haslargelybeentakenforgrantedbytheUSmilitaryandnationalsecurity 56NationalSecurityDirective45,20August1990,https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsd/nsd_45.htm.57PeterBaker,“BushSaysU.S.PulloutWouldLetRadicalsUseOilasaWeapon,”WashingtonPost,5November2006.http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/04/AR2006110401025.html.
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experts.AreportbytheCouncilonForeignRelationsnotedin2006,“Untilverylowlevelsofdependencearereached,theUnitedStatesandallotherconsumersofoilwilldependonthePersianGulf.”58
PerhapsinpartbecausedependenceonPersianGulfoilhasdeclinedsignificantlysince
2006,someanalystshaverecentlyquestionedwhetherthelargeUSpresenceinthePersianGulfregion,andtheinfrastructureinEuropethatsupportsit,isnecessary.59TheargumentisthattheUSislessdependentonPersianGulfoilthaninthepast,thatpriceshockswillnotnecessarilybeassevereifoilflowsweredisrupted,andthatevenifasinglecountrycontrolledsupplies,theywouldstillwanttoselltheoil.TheexceptiontothelatterisIraq,whichburnedKuwaitiOilfieldswhentheyretreatedfromKuwaitin1991andtheIslamicState,whichburnedoilfacilitiesastheyretreatedfrom2015-2018.Inanycase,theargumentgoes,eveniftheUSwerecompletelyabsentfromtheGulf,theUScouldreturntotheGulfandrestoreoilflowatsomelaterpoint.USforcesintheregionhavealreadydeclinedfromtheirpeakofabout230,000troopsin2008.60
Whatwouldhappenintheworst-casescenario—ifoilflowsfromthePersianGulf
werecurtailedorceasedforaweekorseveralmonths?TherewouldbesomedisruptiontotheUSeconomy,buttheeconomywouldnotcollapseifoilflowsfromtheMiddleEastweredisruptedforsometime.ItisarguablethatatotallossofGulfoilforuptothreemonths,wouldbe,atworst,quiteexpensive.Intheshortterm,itislikelythattheUSwouldadapt—asitdidwhentheoilimportsfromIraqandKuwaitwerehaltedafterIraq’sinvasionofthatKuwaitin1990.Theprinciplereactionofworldmarketswouldbeanincreaseinthepriceofoil.
Thiswouldnotbeadevastationforthreereasons.First,theUSislessdependenton
PersianGulfoilthaninthepast;theUShasamorediversesupplynetworkofpetroleum,includingincreasesindomesticproductionandincreasedimportsfromCanadaandothercountries.Second,theUShasastrategicoilreservecontaining727millionbarrelsofoil,whichcouldcarrytheUSthroughseveralmonthsofshortagesinsupply.Andthird,andperhapsmostimportant,overalldemandforoilhasdecreasedintheUS.Petroleumconsumptionpeakedin2005at40percentoftotalUSenergyconsumptionandhas
58CouncilonForeignRelations,NationalSecurityConsequencesofOilDependency:ReportofanIndependentTaskForce(Washington,DC:CouncilonForeignRelations,2006)p.29.https://cfrd8-files.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/0876093659.pdf.59SeeGlaserandKelanic,eds.,CrudeStrategy;JohnGlazer,“DoestheU.S.MilitaryActuallyProtectMiddleEastOil?”CatoInstitute,9January2017.https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/does-us-military-actually-protect-middle-east-oil;EmmaAshford,“Unbalanced:RethinkingAmerica’sCommitmenttotheMiddleEast,”SecurityStudiesQuarterly,vol.12,no.1(Spring2018)pp.127-148.AlsoseeMiltonR.Copulos,“America’sAchillesHeel:TheHiddenCostofImportedOil,”TheNationalDefenseCouncilFoundation,(Washington,DC:October2003).http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download;jsessionid=DD3F77E8166A096D9F1BB3B615199125?doi=10.1.1.186.7523&rep=rep1&type=pdf.60JoshuaRovner,“AfterAmerica:TheFlowofPersianGulfOilintheAbsenceofUSMilitaryForce,”inGlaserandKelanic,eds.,CrudeStrategy,pp.141-165:160.
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declined10percentsincethen.In2017,petroleumaccountedfor37percentofUSenergyconsumption.61ChinaismorevulnerablethantheUStoPersianGulfoilsupplydisruptions.
Nevertheless,economiststendtoassociateoilpriceshocksduetorestrictionsonthe
flowofoil(suchastheArabOilEmbargo)withrecessions.Thisistrue.Yet,becausemilitaryspendingislessproductivecomparedtootherformsofspending—sayoneducation,healthcare,infrastructure,orrenewableenergy—militaryspendingisarguablyanoveralldragontheUSeconomybecauseitproducesfewerjobsthanspendingonothersectors.Whichraisesthequestionofwhether,inprotectingagainstapotentialoilpriceincrease,theUSdoesmoreharmthanitrisksbynotdefendingaccesstoPersianGulfoil.Insum,thePersianGulfmissionmaynotbeasnecessaryasthePentagonassumes.NationalSecurityImplicationsofClimateChange
TheUSmilitary,theintelligencecommunity,andscholarsofinternationalsecurityhave
beenwarningofthedangersposedbyclimatechangeforseveraldecades.Themilitaryandintelligencecommunitytendtoclusterthenationalsecurityimplicationsofglobalwarminginducedclimatechangeintotwooverlappingareas:howclimatechangewillaffectUSinstallationsandmilitaryoperations,includinghowrespondingtoclimatedisasterswillstressmilitaryoperationsandpotentiallydetractfromothermilitarymissions;andhowclimatechangeposespoliticalandnationalsecuritythreats,uptoandincludingwar.62
Themilitaryhasemphasizedhowclimatechangechallengesmilitarysystems,
operations,andinfrastructure.Forinstance,inMay1990,TerryP.KellyproducedapaperfortheNavalWarCollege,“GlobalClimateChangeImplicationsfortheUnitedStatesNavy”emphasizingthreatstoNavy“navaloperations,facilities,andsystems”incomingdecades.Theanalysisfocusesitsrecommendationsonmonitoringandadaptingtoclimatechange.63Morerecently,theDODoffereda“ClimateChangeAdaptationRoadmap”in2014thatstressedthenecessityofpreparingforandadaptingtoclimatechange.64Inearly2018,theDODreportedthatabouthalfoftheirinstallationshadalreadyexperiencedclimatechangerelatedeffects.65Ayearlater,theDODreportedthattheUSmilitaryisalreadyexperiencingtheeffectsofglobalwarmingatdozensofinstallations.66Theseincluderecurrentflooding
61USEnergyInformationAgency,https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/?page=us_energy_home. 62Forinstance,seetheUSNationalIntelligenceCouncil,“ImplicationsforU.S.NationalSecurityofAnticipatedClimateChange,”21September2016.63TerryP.Kelly,“GlobalClimateChangeImplicationsfortheUnitedStatesNavy”NavalWarCollege,May1990.https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/weather/climatechange/globalclimatechange-navy.pdf.64DepartmentofDefense,“2014ClimateChangeAdaptationRoadmap,”https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/Downloads/CCARprint_wForward_e.pdf.65OfficeoftheUndersecretaryofDefenseforAcquisition,TechnologyandLogistics,“DepartmentofDefense,Climate-RelatedRisktoDODInfrastructureInitialVulnerabilitySurvey(SLVAS)AssessmentReport,”(January2018).https://climateandsecurity.files.wordpress.com/2018/01/tab-b-slvas-report-1-24-2018.pdf.66DepartmentofDefense,“ReportontheEffectsofaChangingClimatetotheDepartmentofDefense,”OfficeoftheUndersecretaryofDefenseforAcquisitionandSustainment,January2019.
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(53installations),drought(43installations),wildfires(36installations)anddesertification(6installations).Vulnerabilitywillonlyincreaseoverthenexttwentyyearsunlesstheworldbeginstodramaticallyreduceallgreenhousegasemissionsandsequestercarbondioxide.67
ThemosturgentthreattoinfrastructurehasperhapsbeentheNavy’son-goingconcern
thatrisingsealevelsandmajorstormswillinundatecoastalinfrastructureandlimittheuseofnavalbases.68Forinstance,meltingpermafrostintheArcticthreatensthephysicalstabilityoftheUSmilitaryfacilitiesthere,NorfolkNavalBaseisbeinginundated,andKeeslerAirForceBaseisregularlyflooding.TheNationalClimateAssessmentreleasedinlate2018showedimagesoftheUSNavalBaseatNorfolkVirginiaasparticularlyvulnerable.Figure10.USMilitaryAssetswithClimate-RelatedVulnerabilities.69
ThePentagon’sresponsetotheinfrastructuralandoperationalchallengesofclimatechangehasbeentourgemilitarypreparations.Theseincludepotentiallymovingorclosingmilitarybases,developingtrainingandequipmenttooperateinhotterandwetterordrierclimatestomeetclimatechangerelatedthreatstooperationsandresiliency.
https://climateandsecurity.files.wordpress.com/2019/01/sec_335_ndaa-report_effects_of_a_changing_climate_to_dod.pdf.67DepartmentofDefense,“ReportontheEffectsofaChangingClimatetotheDepartmentofDefense,”p.5.ThawingpermafrostisalreadyoccurringatFortGreeley,Alaska.68SeeU.S.Navy“ClimateChangeRoadmap,”April2010,DepartmentoftheNavy,https://www.navy.mil/navydata/documents/ccr.pdf.69Source:Figure1.9.UnitedStatesGlobalChangeResearchProgram,FourthNationalClimateAssessment:VolumeIIImpacts,RisksandAdaptationintheUnitedStates,(2018)https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/.
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InadditiontotheconcernthatadeclineinaccesstooilwouldhurttheUSandtheglobaleconomy,theDODhaslongbeenconcernedthattheUSmilitaryitself,byrequiringenormousquantitiesoffuelforitsoperations,istoodependentonoil.Specifically,highfuelconsumptionratesduringwar—forweapons,equipment,heatingandcoolingtents—increasetheneedtotransportfueltoconflictzones,whichisitselfavulnerabilityandalossofefficiency.Further,fuelhastobeprotectedintransitandisvulnerabletodisruptionsinsupply.
Forexample,duringtheUSoccupationofAfghanistan,USandNATOforceswere
dependentonthetransitoffuelthroughPakistan.ImportingfuelintoAfghanistanthroughPakistan—whereitcomprisedbetween30and80percentofeachconvoy—madethetankersvulnerabletoattack.Between2008and2014convoyswereattackedenroutethroughPakistantoNATObasesinAfghanistan485times,causing167deathsand450injuries.AsthethenSecretaryoftheNavy,RayMabussaid,“FossilfuelistheNo.1thingweimporttoAfghanistanandgettingthatfueliskeepingthetroopsdoingwhattheyweresenttheretodo,tofightorengagethelocalpeople.”70Further,tankerconvoysthroughPakistanweredisruptedfromlate2011toearly2012aftertheUSinadvertentlykilledPakistanitroopsandPakistanhaltedthoseconvoysforseveralmonths.
In2003,thenMarineCorpGeneralJohnMattissaidthattheUShadtobe“unleashed
fromthetetheroffuel.”In2011,whenaskedbyCongressmemberAdamSmithduringArmedServicesCommitteeHearingsMattiselaborated.
Onthefuel,itisasignificantAchillesheelforuswhenyouhavetohaultheamountsoffuelthatwehavetohaularoundthebattlefieldforthegeneratorsandforthevehicles.WeareworkingwithDARPA[DefenseAdvancedResearchProjectsAgency],weareworkingwithanumberofcivilianorganizationstotryandfindsolutions.Thereareeffortsunderwaytomakemoreexpeditionarybaseswhichwouldactuallygeneratesomeoftheirownenergyrequirementsusing,forexample,solarpower.Inmanyoftheseplaces,thereisalotofsunshine.Ifwecangetexpeditionarycapabilitytocapturethatandthenbasicallyrechargeourbatteries.Imean,itisanamazinglycomplexefforttomaintainthefuellines.Anditalsogivestheenemyanabilitytochoosethetimeandplaceofattackingus.WeareengagedwithScienceandTechnology,weareengagedwithDARPA,andwearelookingatverypragmaticwaysofdoingthis.Wearealsolookingatwhatwecandotoactuallychangehowwedistributefuel,toreducetheenemy'sopportunitiestocomeafterus.71
70ElisabethRosenthal,“U.S.MilitaryOrdersLessDependenceonFossilFuels,”TheNewYorkTimes,4October2010,https://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/05/science/earth/05fossil.html.71MattisattheCommitteeonArmedServices,HearingonNationalDefenseAuthorizationActforFiscalYear2012,3March2011.https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg65114/html/CHRG-112hhrg65114.htm.
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Figure11.AttacksonNATOSupplyConvoysThroughPakistan,2008to201472
ThePentagon’sresponsetoconcernsaboutfuelusehasbeentotrackfuelconsumption,andtofindwaystodecreaseconsumptionoffossilfuelsthroughconservationandincreasedinvestmentinrenewableenergy.Themilitaryeffortstoreducedependencyhaveincludedreducingenergyusedatmilitaryinstallationsandeducatingsoldiersabouttheneedtominimizeidlingvehicles—fromHumveestotanks,tojets.
Forexample,in2009thenewlycreatedMarineCorpsExpeditionaryEnergyOffice
begantocollectdataonMarineCorpenergyusagefrombulkdistributiontotheunitlevel.73TheMarineshavegonequicklyfromanalysistoaction.In2009,theMarinesmadetheirfirststudyoffueluseinAfghanistanandinthefollowingyeartheMarineCorpssentsolarpanelsandchargerstotheirforcesthere.74Afewmonthslater,thesolarpanelsdeployedintheGroundRenewableExpeditionaryEnergySystem(Greens)hadreportedlycutgeneratorfuelconsumptionbynearly90percent,from20to2.5gallonsperday.75In2010theDODestablishedaSeniorSustainabilityCouncil.Allofthisworkonefficiencyhas
72Sourceofdata:PakInstituteforPeaceStudies,annualPakistanSecurityReport,https://www.pakpips.com/publications#1512730923805-d52fde57-07fa.73See,MarineCorps,“UnitedStatesMarineCorpsEnergyExpeditionaryStrategyandImplementationPlan:BasestoBattlefields,”2010.https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/160/Docs/USMC%20Expeditionary%20Energy%20Strategy%20%20Implementation%20Planning%20Guidance.pdf.74SuzanneGoldenberg,“USMarinesinAfghanistanLaunchFirstEnergyEfficiencyAuditinWarZone,”TheGuardian,13August2009,https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/aug/13/us-marines-afghanistan-fuel-efficiency.75SpencerAckerman,“Afghanistan’sGreenMarinesCutFuelUseby90Percent,”Wired,13January2011,https://www.wired.com/2011/01/afghanistans-green-marines-cut-fuel-use-by-90-percent/.
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beenacceleratedandwouldnotonlysavemoney,themilitaryemphasizes,butalsoincreasetheresilienceofthearmedforces.76
Inaddition,thePentagonusesotherfuelsandhascontinuedtodiversifyitsenergy
supplies.TheUSmilitaryreliesonnuclearpowerforsomeimportantuses—mostnotablytopoweritsfleetof11aircraftcarriers.Itispossibletosubstitutesomealternativefuelsformilitaryapplicationsandresearchonusingbio-fuelinmilitaryvehicles,includingjets.
ThePentagonhasincreaseditsuseofrenewableenergysince2009.Themilitaryhas
madeamassiveinvestmentinsolargenerationandotherrenewableenergy,doublingrenewablepowergenerationbetween2011and2015.77Butsofar,switchingtorenewablesourceshasyieldedthesavingsinemissionsoffsetslessofthan1percentofUSDODGreenhouseGasemissions.78Takentogether,theseeffortshavebornefruit;themilitaryhassignificantlyreducedfueluse—evenwhilewagingwarinAfghanistan,Iraq,andSyria—andthereisenormousscopeforreducingemissionsevenfurther.In2017,themilitary’spushtoreduceenergyconsumptionranintopoliticswhentheTrumpadministrationdecidedtodenyclimatechange.ThePentagonwasputinanawkwardposition;aheadlineinFortunemagazineframedtheissuenicely“TheMilitaryisGettingGreener,butThatClasheswithTrump’sPromises.”79
Theotheroperationalconcernisthethreatclimatechangeposestothemilitary’s
capacitytoperformitscoremissions.Nationalsecurityofficialsanticipatingagrowingrolesupportingcivilauthoritiesindisasterreliefmissionsareconcernedthatnaturaldisasters,madeworseasaconsequenceofclimatechange,willstresstheoperationalcapacitiesoftheUSmilitary.Assealevelsrise,criticalcivilianinfrastructurewillbeatrisk.InSeptember2016,PresidentObamaissuedaNationalSecurityMemorandumthatsaid,“ClimatechangeandassociatedimpactsonU.S.militaryandothernationalsecurity-relatedmissionsandoperationscouldadverselyaffectreadiness,negativelyaffectmilitaryfacilitiesandtraining,increasedemandsforFederalsupporttonon-federalcivilauthorities,andincreaseresponse.”80 76OfficeoftheAssistantSecretaryofDefense,DepartmentofDefenseAnnualEnergyManagementandResilienceReport(AEMRR)https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/Downloads/IE/FY%202017%20AEMR.pdf.77TimothyGarder,“U.S.MilitaryMarchesonTowardGreenEnergy,DespiteTrump,”Reuters,1March2017,https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-military-green-energy-insight/u-s-military-marches-forward-on-green-energy-despite-trump-idUSKBN1683BL.AlsoseeReuters,“militaryGettingGreener,”http://fingfx.thomsonreuters.com/gfx/rngs/USA-TRUMP-ENERGY-MILITARY/0100400G00X/index.html.78AnnualDataonEnergyfromhttps://www.energy.gov/eere/femp/federal-facility-annual-energy-reports-and-performance.79AssociatedPress,“TheMilitaryisGettingGreener,butThatClasheswithTrump’sPromises.”Fortune,14January2017.http://fortune.com/2017/01/14/military-oil-trump-green-power/.80MemorandumfortheHeadsofExecutiveDepartmentsandAgencies,ClimateChangeandNationalSecurity,21September2016,https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/895016/download.
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ClimateChaosandWar
Themilitaryhasbecomeincreasinglyconcernedthatclimatechangeposesathreattointernationalsecurity.81Inthe2015NationalSecurityStrategy,theObamaAdministrationsaid,“Climatechangeisanurgentandgrowingthreattoournationalsecurity,contributingtoincreasednaturaldisasters,refugeeflows,andconflictsoverbasicresourceslikefoodandwater.ThepresentdayeffectsofclimatechangearebeingfeltfromtheArctictotheMidwest.Increasedsealevelsandstormsurgesthreatencoastalregions,infrastructure,andproperty.Inturn,theglobaleconomysuffers,compoundingthegrowingcostsofpreparingandrestoringinfrastructure.”82
InthemostrecentNationalSecurityStrategy,theTrumpadministrationignored
climatechange.Inresponse,morethan100membersofCongresswrotetothePresidentinJanuary2018tounderscoretherisksandtourgethePresidenttoincludeclimatechangeintheNationalSecurityStrategy.83Andatthesametime,RetiredAdmiralJamesStavridisarguedthatclimatechangewasarguablythemostpressingnationalsecuritychallengetheUSfaced.Stavridissaid,“Whatmakesclimatechangesoperniciousisthatwhiletheeffectswillonlybecomecatastrophicfardowntheroad,theonlyopportunitytofixtheproblemrestsinthepresent.Inotherwords,waiting‘tobesureclimatechangeisreal’condemnsustoahighlyinsecurefutureifwemakethewrongbet.Weareindangerofmissingnotonlythevastforestofloomingclimatechange,buttheabilitytoseesomeofthespecifictreesthatwillcauseusthemostproblems.”84
Themilitaryhasbeenconcernedthatclimatechangewillleadtoamorechaoticand
dangerousworld.TheyareconcernedforinstancethattheArcticSeaisnowopen,leadingtoquestionsabouttheneedtopatrolit.85NationalsecurityanalystsnowfrequentlysuggestthatdroughtinSyriafrom2007to2010,andthesubsequentmassmigrationtocities,createdtheconditionsthatcontributedtotheemergenceofthecivilwartherein2011.
Indeed,strategistspaintnightmarescenarioswhereclimatechangeleadstoarmed
conflict—suchaswhencropfailuresproducefamineanddroughtleadtoconflictsoverwaterandothernaturalresources.TheWhiteHousesaidin2016that“Thenational
81Forinstance,seeKurtM.Campbell,etal,“TheAgeofConsequences:TheForeignPolicyandNationalSecurityImplicationsofGlobalClimateChange,”CenterforStrategic&InternationalStudiesandCenterforNewAmericanSecurity,November2007.https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/071105_ageofconsequences.pdf.CenterforNavalAnalysis,NationalSecurityandtheThreatofClimateChange,CenterforNavalAnalysis2007.https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/national%20security%20and%20the%20threat%20of%20climate%20change.pdf.82WhiteHouse,“NationalSecurityStrategy,”February2015,p.12.https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy_2.pdf.83Theletterisfoundathttps://langevin.house.gov/sites/langevin.house.gov/files/documents/01-11-18_Langevin_Stefanik_Letter_to_POTUS_Climate_Change_National_Security_Strategy.pdf.84JamesStavridis,“America’sMostPressingThreat?ClimateChange”BloombergOpinion,11January2018,https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-01-11/america-s-no-1-enemy-climate-change.85USNavyTaskForceonClimateChange,“TheUnitedStatesNavyArcticRoadmap,2014-2030,”February2014,http://navysustainability.dodlive.mil/files/2014/02/USN-Arctic-Roadmap-2014.pdf.
26
securityimplicationsofclimatechangeimpactsarefar-reaching,astheymayexacerbateexistingstressors,contributingtopoverty,environmentaldegradation,andpoliticalinstability,providingenablingenvironmentsforterroristactivityabroad.Forexample,theimpactsofclimatechangeonkeyeconomicsectors,suchasagricultureandwater,canhaveprofoundeffectsonfoodsecurity,posingthreatstooverallstability.”86Similarly,inSeptember2016,theNationalIntelligenceCouncillistedarangeofconcernsfromincreasedmigration,tofoodshortages,togreaterconflictandwarcausedbyshortagesoffreshwaterandaccesstoarableland.87TheintelligencecommunityhaskeptitseyesonclimatechangeevenasPresidentTrumpdeniesthatglobalwarmingisaproblem.InJanuary2019,DanielR.Coats,DirectorofNationalIntelligencetoldtheSenateSelectCommitteeonIntelligencethat,“Globalenvironmentalandecologicaldegradation,aswellasclimatechange,arelikelytofuelcompetitionforresources,economicdistress,andsocialdiscontentthrough2019andbeyond.Climatehazardssuchasextremeweather,highertemperatures,droughts,floods,wildfires,storms,sealevelrise,soildegradation,andacidifyingoceansareintensifying,threateninginfrastructure,health,andwaterandfoodsecurity.Irreversibledamagetoecosystemsandhabitatswillunderminetheeconomicbenefitstheyprovide,worsenedbyair,soil,water,andmarinepollution.”88
PartofthePentagon’sresponsetoconcernsaboutclimatechangehasbeentocreateneworganizationswithintheDODandtostudytheissue.89Forinstance,theNavycreatedthe“TaskForceClimateChange”(TFCC)in2009.However,thePentagondoesnotacknowledgethatitsownfueluseisapartoftheproblemorthatreductionsinPentagonfueluseareapotentiallysignificantwaytoreducetherisksofclimatecausednationalsecurityrisks.ButthePentagoncouldmakethesameconnectionsthatHenryWaxmanmademorethantwodecadesago.InMay1998,CongressmanHenryWaxmansaid,“theKyotoProtocolwillimprovethenationalsecurityoftheUnitedStatesbyreducingtheriskofcatastrophicclimatechange,whichwouldcreateupheavalandunrestthroughouttheworld,includingthepotentialformillionsofenvironmentalrefugees.”Waxmanalsoarguedthat“measurestoimplementtheKyotoProtocolcanimproveoursecuritybyreducingourdependenceonimportedoilthroughimprovedenergyefficiencyandincreasedrelianceondomesticrenewableenergyresources.”90
86WhiteHouse,“FindingsfromSelectFederalReports:TheNationalSecurityImplicationsofClimateChange”May2015,p.3.87NationalIntelligenceCouncil,“ImplicationsforUSNationalSecurityofAnticipatedClimateChange,”NICWP2016-01,21September2016.https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and%20Pubs/Implications_for_US_National_Security_of_Anticipated_Climate_Change.pdf.88DanielR.Coats,“WorldwideThreatAssessmentoftheUSIntelligenceCommunity,StatementfortheRecord,”SenateSelectCommitteeonIntelligence”29January2019.https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf,p.23.89Ontheotherhand,a2017GAOreportsuggestedthattheUSmilitaryhadnotconsistentlytakenthelikelybudgetaryimpactsofclimatechangeintoaccount.GovernmentAccountabilityOffice,“ClimateChangeAdaptation:DODNeedstoBetterIncorporateAdaptationintoitsPlanningandCollaborationatOverseasInstallations.November2017.https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/688323.pdf.90Waxman,20May1998.CongressionalRecord,House,vol.144,part7,ProceedingsandDebatesofthe105thCongress,p.9983.
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Conclusion
EvenastheUSsaysitwillscalebackthesizeofitsmilitarypresenceinAfghanistan,Iraq,andSyria,theUShasbegunamassivebuild-upofitsmilitarycapacities.TheUSmilitarybudgetislargerthanithaseverbeensincetheendoftheColdWar.TheUSseemstobeontracktocontinuepolicingthePersianGulfevenasitturnstowhatitperceivesisanemergingthreatfromChinaandhasanincreasingmilitarypresenceinAfrica.Alloftheseactivitiesdemandfuelconsumptionandarehencegreenhousegasemissionintensive. TheUShasanimportantpublicpolicydecisiontomake.Dowecontinuetoorientourforeignpolicyandmilitaryforceposturetowardensuringaccesstofossilfuels?Ordowedramaticallyreducetheuseoffossilfuels,includingthemilitary’sowndependency,andthusreducetheperceivedneedtopreserveaccesstooilresources?
Reductionsinmilitaryfuelusewouldbebeneficialinfourways.First,iftheUSweretodecreaseitsdependenceonoil,theUScouldreducethepoliticalandfuelresourcesitusestodefendaccesstooil.IftheUSfurtherreduceditsimportsofoilfromthePersianGulf,includingfuelusedbythemilitarytoprotectthoseimports,itcouldthenreevaluatethesizeoftheUSmilitarypresenceintheregionandreevaluateitsrelationshipwithSaudiArabiaandotheralliesintheregion.TheUSwouldreappoliticalandsecuritybenefits,includingreducingthedependenceoftroopsinthefieldonoilanddecreasingdependenceonoilandthosewhoprovideit.
Second,bydramaticallydecreasingfossilfuelconsumption,theUSmilitarywould
reduceoverallUSgreenhousegasemissionsandperhapspromotecarbonsequestration(takingcarbonoutoftheatmosphereandfixingitinthesoilandtrees).Therearemanywaystodothis,frommoremodestmeasuressuchasincreasingfueleconomyandusingalternativefuels,whichthePentagonhasbeguntodo.Somebaseclosureswillbenecessitatedbyclimatechangeitself.MoresignificantreductionsingreenhousegasemissionswillbegainedbyrestructuringtheUSmilitaryposture,includingreducingUSmilitaryoperationsandinstallationsworldwide,andclosingbasesintheUS.Baseclosurescouldalsoleadtosignificantcarbonsequestrationifthosepubliclandsarereforested.SeeAppendix2formodestsuggestionsforCongressionalaction.
Third,byreducingtheuseofgreenhousegas-emittingfuels(coupledwithemission
reductionsinothersectors)thePentagonwoulddecreaseitscontributiontotheassociatedclimatechangethreatstonationalsecurity.Indeed,thePentagoncouldplayamajorroleinreducingtheworsteffectsofclimatechange,andanypotentialsecurityconsequencesofglobalwarming,ratherthanreactingorcleaningupafterthoseeffectshaveoccurred.
Fourth,asaconsequenceofspendinglessmoneyonfuelandoperationstoprovide
secureaccesstopetroleum,theUScould,inthelongrundecreaseUSmilitaryspendingandreorientitseconomytomoreeconomicallyproductiveactivities.Indeed,iftheUSmilitaryconvertedmoreofitsenergyconsumptiontorenewableenergy,thiswouldstimulatethe
28
renewableenergyindustryintheUS,withimportanteconomicbenefitsfortheentireUSeconomy.91
Insum,reducingPentagonfossilfuelusecouldhaveenormouspositiveimplicationsfor
theclimate.
Appendix1.CalculatingUSMilitaryGreenhouseGasEmissions
Duetogapsinreportingandaccounting,itisimpossibletoprovideaprecisecalculationofthetotalgreenhousegasemissionsoftheUSmilitary.MostUSgovernmentaccountingofUSgreenhousegasemissionsomitfiguresonhowmuchthemilitaryandmilitaryindustrycontributestoUSemissions.ThisisinpartbecausethePentagondoesnotreleasepetroleumfuelconsumptiondata.Further,asdiscussedbelow,emissionsfrominternationalbunkerfuels(formilitaryaircraftandships)andmultilateralwarswereexcludedfromnationalaccountsintheKyotoProtocolnegotiationsin1998.TheUSdoesnotappeartocountmostbunkerfuelsinitsGreenhouseGasInventorynationaltotals.92
AbsentafullPentagonaccountingoftheirfuelconsumptionandemissionsbyoperationtherearevariouswaystoestimateDODgreenhousegasemissionsinthepost-9/11wars.OnecouldbaseanestimateoftheproportionoftotalgreenhousegasemissionsthatshouldbeattributedtothewarontheproportionofthetotalmilitarybudgetspentonOverseasContingencyOperations.Inotherwords,onecanusetheaverageportionoftheDODbudgetspentonOverseasContingencyOperationsasanapproximatemeasureofenergyuserelatedtothewareffortandassumethatsomeportionofthebasebudget,andthereforebase/non-waroperationsandinstallationenergyuseiscorrelatedtowarrelatedspending.TheOverseasContingencyOperationsbudgetforthemajorwarzonesaccountedforanaverageof17percentoftheentireDOD(topline)budgetfrom2001to2017.Butthisruleofthumbwouldgiveanestimateofwarrelatedemissionsthatwouldbetoolowsincenon-standardemissionsaccountforsuchahighproportionofallDODfueluse.
Abetterwaytoestimategreenhousegasemissionsduetowarwouldbetofocuson
non-standardfuelconsumptionandtoestimatetotalgreenhousegasemissionsforOverseasContingencyOperations.Forexample,onaverage,between2010-2017the 91TheauthorthanksAlexanderThompsonforraisingthispoint.92SeeUSEnvironmentalProtectionAgency,InventoryofGreenhouseGasesandSinks:1990-2016,https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-01/documents/2018_complete_report.pdfandUSEnvironmentalProtectionAgency,InventoryofGreenhouseGasesandSinks:1990-2017,https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2019-02/documents/us-ghg-inventory-2019-main-text.pdf.AlsoseeAnnex3,PartA,Section3.8wherethemethodisto“omitallinternationalfueltransactions/deliveries”and“alllandbasedfuels.”https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2019-02/documents/us-ghg-inventory-2019-annex-3-additional-source-or-sink-categories-part-a.pdf.
29
DepartmentofEnergyattributed65.9percentofallDODgreenhousegasemissionstonon-standardoperations.Buttoassumethatallnon-standardfuelusewasforthemajorwarswouldyieldanestimatethatwouldbetoohighsincetheDODperformsother,non-post-9/11warmissions.
Anotherandarguablyevenbettermethodwouldbetobasetheestimateofgreenhouse
gasemissionsonthemajorwarsontheproportionoffuelusebyCentralCommand.InFY2014(seefigure4)thiswasabout24percentofthetotalnon-standardoperationalfuelconsumptionbytheDOD.ButbecausetheUScounterterroroperationsareunderwayallovertheworld(inabout80-90countries)theCentralCommandisnottheonlywarzoneintheglobalwaronterror.TheestimatehereisthattheportionofallgreenhousegasemissionsrelatedtotheGlobalWaronTerror,inpatrollingthePersianGulf,andCentralCommandOverseasContingencyOperationsisabout35percentoftotalgreenhousegasemissionsfornon-standardandstandardoperations.
TheestimatesofgreenhousegasemissionsbytheDODinthisanalysisarebasedcalculationsofUSgovernmentdataonfuelconsumptionfromtheUSDepartmentofEnergy,ComprehensiveAnnualEnergyDataandSustainabilityAnnualReports.93Dataforstandardandnon-standardgreenhousegasemissionsbyDepartmentisavailableontheDepartmentofEnergywebsiteforFY2008,andFY2010-2017.Inaddition,theDepartmentofEnergyprovidesnon-standardfuelconsumptiondataforvehicleandequipmentenergyuseforotheryears.94
ItispossibletocalculateannualDODvehicleandequipmentcausedgreenhousegas
emissionsforeachfueltypebasedonfuelconsumptionrates.Forexample,acalculationofCO2equivalentemissionsofjetfuelmakesthefollowingassumptions:eachgallonofjetfuelproduces0.135HHVMMBtu/gallon.Usingthestandardemissionfactorsforjetfuel—CO2of72.22kg/MMBtu;forCH4(methane)of.003kg/MMBtu;andforN2O(nitrousoxide)of.0006kg/MMBtu—onecancalculatethegreenhousegas,CO2equivalent,emissionsforagivenquantityofjetfuel.95TheGlobalWarmingPotential100yearvaluesaretheEPAandDepartmentofEnergyassumptionsof25formethaneand298forNitrousOxide.96
DepartmentofEnergyprovidedconsumptiondata,andtheEPAGlobalWarming
PotentialsforCO2,CH4andN2Owereusedtocalculategreenhousegasemissionsfor
93DepartmentofEnergy,“ComprehensiveAnnualEnergyDataandSustainabilityPerformance,”AnnualReports,http://ctsedwweb.ee.doe.gov/Annual/Report/ComprehensiveGreenhouseGasGHGInventoriesByAgencyAndFiscalYear.aspx.Dataasof1June2018.94EnergyconsumptionfromtheDepartmentofEnergy,http://ctsedwweb.ee.doe.gov/Annual/Report/HistoricalFederalEnergyConsumptionDataByAgencyAndEnergyTypeFY1975ToPresent.aspx.95CO2,MethaneandNitrousOxideemissionfactorsarefromOfficeofEnergy&RenewableEnergy,FederalComprehensiveAnnualEnergyandreportingRequirements,https://www.energy.gov/eere/femp/federal-facility-consolidated-annual-reporting-requirements.96GWPemissionscoefficients,https://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/co2_vol_mass.php.
30
gasoline,diesel,LPG/propane,aviationgas,jetfuel,andNavyspecialfuelfortheyearswherethereisnopublishedDepartmentofEnergyemissionsdata.97Forexample,calculationsofCO2eemissionsforUSDODjetfuelconsumptionin2017areillustratedinTable3.
Table3.CalculatingGreenhouseGasEmissionsforUSMilitaryJetFuelConsumption,FY2017
JetFuel UnitofMeasureAnnualConsumptionGHGNon-StandardOperations 2,915,738.50 thousandgallonsTotalEnergyConsumed 393,624,693.30 MMBTUCost $6,681,061.20 UnitCost $2.29 AnthropogenicCO2EmissionFactor 72.2 kgCO2/MMBtuCH4EmissionFactor 0.003 kgCH4/MMBtuN2OEmissionFactor 0.0006 kgN2O/MMBtuTotalQuantityEmittedAnthropogenicCO2 28,427,575,352.60 kgTotalQuantityEmittedCH4 1,180,874.10 kgTotalQuantityEmittedN2O 236,174.80 kgGWPFactorforCO2 1 CO2eGWPFactorforCH4 25 CO2eGWPFactorforN2O 298 CO2eTotalQuantityEmitted(CO2e) 28,527,477,299.80 kgCO2eTotalQuantityEmitted(MTCO2e) 28,527,477.30 MTCO2e
Assumingthatnon-standardemissionsfromvehiclefuelconsumptionwereveryclosetothetotalnon-standardfuelconsumptionfortheDOD,standardemissionswereestimatedforeachyear.DuringtheyearswherethereisDepartmentofEnergydataforDODemissions,non-standardemissionswereonaverage63percentoftotalemissions.Totalandstandardemissionswereestimatedassumingthattheratioswerethesamethroughtheentireperiod.TheresultsaregraphedinthefollowingfigureandshowninTable4.
97TheDepartmentofEnergyhaspublishedemissionsdatafornon-standardemissionsfor2008,and2010-2017.Theyhaveprovidedvehiclefuelconsumptiondatafortheyears1975-2017.AnnualGHGCO2eemissionsfromfuelconsumptiondataarecalculatedassumingthatvehicleconsumptionwasthemajorityofnon-standardconsumption.
31
Figure12.EstimatedDODGreenhouseGasEmissions,1975-201798
Table4.EstimatedAnnualGreenhouseGasEmissionsoftheDOD,1975-201799
StandardEmissionsMillionsofMetricTons
Non-StandardEmissionsMillionsofMetricTons
TotalCO2eEmissionsMillionsofMetricTons
1975 40 69 1091976 35 59 931977 35 60 951978 34 58 921979 35 60 951980 36 61 971981 39 66 1041982 39 67 1071983 39 67 106
98ForFY2008andFY2010-2017,thisestimateusestheDepartmentofEnergyfigures.TheotheryearsareestimatescalculatedfromDepartmentofEnergyfuelconsumptiondata.99CalculatedfromDepartmentofEnergyfuelconsumptiondata.ForFY2008andFY2010-2017,usingtheDepartmentofEnergyreportedfigures.
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2017
MillionsofM
etric
Ton
sCO2e
StandardEmissions Non-StandardEmissions TotalCO2eEmissions
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1984 40 68 1091985 39 67 1061986 39 66 1051987 40 69 1091988 35 60 951989 40 68 1091990 39 66 1051991 41 69 1101992 32 55 881993 32 55 871994 30 51 801995 28 48 761996 27 46 741997 27 45 721998 25 43 691999 25 42 662000 23 39 622001 23 40 632002 26 44 702003 29 49 782004 32 54 852005 31 52 832006 27 46 732007 28 48 762008 27 50 772009 28 48 772010 27 50 772011 26 49 752012 25 45 702013 24 39 642014 24 38 622015 24 39 632016 22 37 592017 22 37 59Total 1,340 2,290 3,629
33
Theseestimatesarelikelyconservativeforthreereasons.First,theimpactofmethaneandnitrousoxidegases,theirGlobalWarmingPotentials
(GWP)isnotthesameasC02butsignificantlyhigher.Whencalculatingthetotalgreenhousegasemissionstheseothergreenhousegasesarescaledintoanequivalentrelationtocarbondioxide,whichhas,bydefinition,aGWPof1.TheDepartmentofEnergyandtheEPAusetheUSEPA100yearGlobalWarmingPotentialswhichscalestheGWPofmethane,CH4,at25andnitrousoxide,N2O,at298over100years.100TheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChangeFifthAssessmentReportusesdifferentGWPof34forMethane’sCO2equivalent.101IftheIPCCglobalwarmingpotentialswereused,estimatesofUSDODgreenhousegasemissionswouldbehigher.
Second,recallthatjetfuelisthemajorsourceofvehiclenon-standardmilitary
greenhousegasemissions.CO2isthemajorproductofjetfuelconsumptionbutjetfuelcombustionemissionsathighaltitudealsocontainthemuchmorepotentgreenhousereleasewatervapor,aglobalwarminggas,whichitselfcausestheformationofcirrusclouds.TheDODputsadditivesinitsjetfuelstoensuretheyperformaccordingtomilitaryrequirements.Forinstance,becausemilitaryjetsflyatmuchhigheraltitudesthancommercialjetstheyuseadditivestoensurethatthefuellinesdonotfreeze.Anyemissionsfromthoseadditivesandwatervaporarenotcounted.ScientistsagreethateventhoughCO2isthemajorproductofjetfuelconsumption,theimpactoftheseothergreenhousegasesissignificant.WhiletheDepartmentofEnergyfiguresandthecalculationshereincludenitrousoxideandmethane,itispossiblethattheadditionaleffectsofhighaltitudewatervaporandadditivesforjetfuelcombustion,whicharenotincludedinthesecalculations,maybesignificant.“Non-CO2impactscannotbeignoredastheypotentiallyrepresentapproximately60%oftotalclimateimpactsthatareimportantintheshorterterm(excludingcloudinessimpacts).”102Insum,thismeansthattheimpactofaviation
100PFCs,HFCs,NF3,andSF6haveglobalwarmingpotentialsthatrangefrom7,390to22,800.Whiletheglobalwarmingeffectsofmethane,nitrousoxideandwatervaporarewellunderstood,whentheyareemittedduringjetfuelcombustionathighaltitudestheeffectsarenotaswellunderstoodastheeffectsofCO2.SeetheUSEnvironmentalProtectionAgency,“EmissionsofFlourinatedGases,”https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/overview-greenhouse-gases#f-gasesand“UnderstandingGlobalWarmingPotentials,”https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/understanding-global-warming-potentials.TheDepartmentofEnergyusestheEPAGWPfactors.SeetheirEnergyManagementDataReport.https://www.energy.gov/eere/femp/downloads/annual-energy-management-data-reportandCouncilonEnvironmentalQuality,“FederalGreenhouseGasAccountingandReportingGuidance,”17January2016,p.4.https://www.sustainability.gov/pdfs/federal_ghg%20accounting_reporting-guidance.pdf.101IPCCSecondAssessmentReport100GWPSeetheIPCCFifthAssessmentReport,ClimateChange2014:SynthesisReport.ContributionofWorkingGroupsI,IIandIIItotheFifthAssessmentReportoftheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange[CoreWritingTeam,R.K.PachauriandL.A.Meyer(eds.)].(IPCC,Geneva,Switzerland,2014).https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full.pdf.102EuropeanEnvironmentAgency,EuropeanUnionAviationSafetyAgency,Eurocontrol,“EuropeanAviationEnvironmentReport,2019”January2019,p.88.https://www.easa.europa.eu/eaer/system/files/usr_uploaded/219473_EASA_EAER_2019_WEB_LOW-RES.pdf.AlsoseeMartinCames,JakobGraichen,AnneSiemons,andVanessaCook,“EmissionReductionTargetsforInternationalAviationandShipping,”PolicyDepartmentA:EconomicandScientificPolicy,
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emissionswhenallgreenhousegasesareincludedmaybehigherthanthoseestimatedhere.
Third,thefocusisonthemajoremissionsoftheDOD.Specificallynotincludedare
estimatesforwhatarecalledScope3emissionsfrom,forinstance,employeeairandgroundbusinesstravel,wastewatertreatment,andsolidwastedisposal.Forexample,USDODScope3emissionsin2008were7.6millionMTCO2eandin2016,7millionMTCO2e.Norarebiogenicemissionsincluded.In2017,USDODbiogenicemissionswere.57millionMTCO2e.
Finally,internationalmilitarybunkerfuelsareexcludedfromgreenhousegasemission
accounting.AspartoftheKyotoProtocol,signedinDecember1997,theUSinsistedthatfuelsoldtoshipsandaircraftforinternationaltransportandformultilateralmilitaryoperations,“bunkerfuels”shouldnotbecountedagainstacountry’stotalemissions.103AstheUSUndersecretaryofStateStuartEizenstatsaidintestimonytoCongress,theKyotoProtocoldidnotlimittheUS:
Wetookspecialpains,workingwiththeDefenseDepartmentandwithouruniformedmilitary,bothbeforeandinKyoto,tofullyprotecttheuniquepositionoftheUnitedStates as the world's only super power with global military responsibilities. Weachievedeverythingtheyoutlinedasnecessarytoprotectmilitaryoperationsandournationalsecurity.
AtKyoto,theparties...tookadecisiontoexemptkeyoverseasmilitaryactivitiesfromany emissions targets, including exemptions for bunker fuels used in internationalaviation and maritime transport and from emissions resulting from multilateraloperations,suchasselfdefense,peacekeeping,andhumanitarianrelief.
This exempts from our national targets not onlymultilateral operations expresslyauthorized by the U.N. Security Council, such as Desert Storm or Bosnia, but,importantly,alsoexemptsmultilateraloperationsthat theU.S. initiatespursuant totheU.N.Charterwithoutexpressauthorization,suchasGrenada.104
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change continues to treat nationalmilitaryemissions,specificallyinternationalaircraftandnavalbunkerfuels,differentlythanotheremissiontypes.105
EuropeanUnion,November2015,pp.13-14.http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/569964/IPOL_STU(2015)569964_EN.pdf.103SeeRoyK.Salomon,“GlobalClimateChangeandU.S.MilitaryReadiness,”FederalFacilitiesEnvironmentalJournal,Summer1999,vol.10,no.2,pp.133-142.104UndersecretaryofStateStuartEizenstat,testimony,HearingBeforeTheCommitteeonForeignRelations,11February1998,https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-105shrg46812/html/CHRG-105shrg46812.htm.105SeeIPCC,“GoodPracticeGuidanceandUncertaintyManagementinNationalGreenhouseGasInventories,”https://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/gp/bgp/2_5_Aircraft.pdf.
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Appendix2.PossibleNextStepsforCongressionalActionontheDODandClimateChange
ThePentagonhasmadesignificantreductionsingreenhousegasemissionsinrecent
years.Bycontinuingtodecreasefossilfuelconsumption,theUSmilitarywouldreduceoverallUSgreenhousegasemissionsandcouldperhapspromotecarbonsequestration(takingcarbonoutoftheatmosphereandfixingitinthesoilandtrees).
ThereisroomfortheDODtocontinuereductions,usingmanymoremodestmeasuresincludingincreasingfueleconomyandusingalternativefuels.Moresignificantreductionsingreenhousegasemissionswillbegainedbyrestructuring,includingmakingtrainingmoreefficient,reducingUSmilitaryoperationsandinstallationsworldwide,andclosingbasesintheUS.Somebaseclosuresandrestructuringwillbenecessitatedbyclimatechangeitself.Baseclosurescouldalsoleadtosignificantcarbonsequestrationifthosepubliclandsarereforested.
Thisisawin-win-winstrategy.ReductionsinfuelusesavemoneyandmaketheUSmilitarylessvulnerabletofuelshortages;inthelongrun,reductionsinfueluseandconversionofbasesbyreforestationdecreaseclimatechangecausedimpactsincludinginsecurity;andconversiontorenewableenergysourcesandalternativefuelscouldsignificantlyboosttherenewableenergyindustryandelectriccarindustryintheUS.
CongressmightbecomemuchmoreactiveintrackingandreducinggreenhousegasemissionsbytheDOD.Specifically,CongressmightrequirethePentagontosupplymoreinformationonfuelconsumptionandenergyuseandrequirethePentagontoincreaseitsanalysisandplanningforatransitiontoreductionsinfossilfueluseandtoimmediatelyreducefuelconsumption.Somepotentialactionsareoutlinedbelow.
1.ComprehensivereportingofDODfuelconsumptionandenergyusage.
a.Inallfutureyears,theDODshouldreportfuelconsumptiontoCongressinits
budgetarysubmissionandinaseparateannualreportonDODfuelconsumption.Consumptionreportsshouldbebothaggregatedanddisaggregated(byfueltypee.g.jet,diesel,andotherfuels)eachyearbynamedoperationandwar,andforotheroperationsandinstallations,foreachoperationalcommandandeachservice.ConsumptioninformationshouldalsobeaddedtotheannualDefenseLogisticsAgencyEnergyFactbooks.
b.TheDODshouldreportthesesamefiguresfortheperiodfromFY2000throughFY2019inaseparatereport.
c.TheDODshouldreportfuelconsumptionfortrainingmissionsandpublicdisplayssuchasfly-overevents.
2.ComprehensiveAnalysisandPlanninga.DARPAshouldworkwiththeservicestoproduceastudyshowingcurrentDOD
non-tacticalvehiclefleetfuelconsumption,andtoidentifywaystoimmediatelyreducefuelconsumptionbeyondlevelsalreadytargeted.
b.Eachserviceshouldidentifywaystoreduceconsumptionoffuelbydecreasingthefueluseandincreasingthefuelefficiencyoftrainingexercises.
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c.Eachinstallationshouldinventoryitsenvironmenttoidentify“heatislands”bytheendofFY2020.
d.Eachinstallationshouldproduceplanstoreduceoverallenergyconsumptionby10percentand20percentbythestartofFY2022.
e.Identifyinstallationsthatshouldbeclosedorreducedinsizeduetoclimatechangeimpacts(suchasrisingsealevelsorextremeweather).Developaplanforconvertingtheseinstallationstositesforcarbonsequestration.
3.ComprehensiveApproachtoReductionsinFossilfuelusage.a.SwitchingtoalternativefuelsforelectricitygenerationatallUSmilitaryinstallations
sothatallDODinstallationsare90percentreliantonrenewabletechnologies,e.g.wind,solar,geothermalandhydropowerandlargestoragecapacitybatteriesthroughpowerpurchaseagreementsorlocalgenerationby2022.
b.Increasetherateofadoptionofallelectric,hybridandpluginhybridnon-tacticalfleetvehicles(NTV)basedontheresultsoftheDARPAstudyidentifiedabove.Moveto90percentelectric,orgas-electrichybridby2022.PrioritizefornewpurchasesthemostefficientvehiclesmadeintheUSthatmeettheDepartmentofEnergyNTVfueleconomystandards.
c.Toreducethe“heatisland”effectoflargeexpansesofconcreteandasphalt,andtherebyreducethenecessityforairconditioningonbasesandotherinstallations,eachbaseshallinventoryitspercentageoftreecoverandplantshadetreessothatthepercentageofshadetreecoverageisincreasedby10-20percentbytheendofFY2021.
4.MilitaryandInstallationBaseConversionsandClosuresa. Designatewhichmilitaryandnationalguardbasesandinstallationsshouldbe
closedduetoclimatechangeimpactsandwhichbasescanbeclosedforotherreasons,suchasdiminishedthreat.106
b. Asbasesandinstallationsareclearedoftoxiccontamination(suchaschemicalwasteandasbestos),changelandusesothatcarbonsequestrationispossiblesuchasbyplantingtreesorrestoringwetlands.
c. UseclosedDODbasesandinstallationsassitesofalternativeenergyproduction—wind,solar,orgeothermalasismostappropriateandefficientforthatbaseorinstallation.Similarly,convertedNationalGuardbasescouldbecomesitesofalternativeenergyproductionandcarbonsequestration.
106DepartmentofDefense,“ReportontheEffectsofaChangingClimatetotheDepartmentofDefense,”OfficeoftheUndersecretaryofDefenseforAcquisitionandSustainment,January2019.https://climateandsecurity.files.wordpress.com/2019/01/sec_335_ndaa-report_effects_of_a_changing_climate_to_dod.pdf.